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APISTOTEAOTS TA META TA ®YTSIKA 


ARISTOTLE’S 
MER TARY SECS 


AVE ALS ED iNT: 
WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY 


BY 


VV IDE  κ59 


FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE 


DEPUTY PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
USIVERSITY OF OXFORD 


VoLuME I 


OXFORD 
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 


1924 


EPREBAGE 


THE main object of this preface is to express my sincere 
thanks to those who have helped me in preparing this edition 
of the Metaphysics. First I would thank the Trustees of the 
Jowett Copyright Fund and the Master and Fellows of Balliol 
College, whose generous financial help has made possible the 
publication of the book; their assistance is commemorated by 
the Balliol arms on the cover. Next I wish to express my 
gratitude to the following friends, who have read parts of the 
book in manuscript and much assisted me by their comments : 
Professors J. A. Smith and C. C. J. Webb of this University ; 
Professor E. 5. Forster of the University of Sheffield; 
Professor J. L. Stocks of the Victoria University, Manchester ; 
the late Mr. C. Cannan, Secretary to the Delegates of the 
Press; Mr. R. G. Collingwood, Fellow of Pembroke College ; 
Mr. H. A. Prichard, late Fellow of Trinity College; and 
particularly Professor H. H. Joachim of this University, who 
not only commented exhaustively on my treatment of Books 
ΖΗΘ but allowed me to make what use I pleased of his own 
valuable notes on Book Z. My apparatus criticus contains 
unpublished emendations (some of which I have adopted) 
by Professors Forster, Joachim, and Smith, and Mr. Cannan, 
as well as some by the late Professor I. Bywater, by the 
President of Corpus Christi College (Mr. T. Case), and by 
Professor A. R. Lord of Rhodes University College, Grahams- 
town. On some points in the later Platonic theory I have 
had the advantage of exchanging views with Professor A. E, 
Taylor of the University of Edinburgh. Mr. R. M°Kenzie, 
Fereday Fellow of St. John’s College, has helped me with 


134581 


vi PREFACE 


information on various lexicographical questions. I would 
also thank the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries to 
the Delegates of the Press, and the vigilant Readers to 
the Press, for their assistance; and Messrs. Methuen & Co., 
for allowing me to use in the Introduction a few pages of 
a book which they recently published for me. 

With regard to the structure of the Metaphysics 1 have 
learnt much from Professor Jaeger’s brilliant works. In the 
study of Aristotle’s account of earlier philosophers I have 
(it is hardly necessary to say) been greatly assisted by the 
classic works of Zeller, Diels, and Burnet; the fragments 
of the pre-Socratics are referred to in accordance with the 
numbering in Diels’s Vorsokrattker. My debt to M. Robin’s 
study of the later development of Plato’s thought, and to 
Sir Thomas Heath’s works on Greek mathematics and 
astronomy, is no less great. _ 

As the most concise way of indicating the course of the 
argument, I have prefixed to each section of the commen- 
tary (usually to the commentary on each chapter) a brief 
analysis which is distinguished typographically from the 
commentary itself. The general course of Aristotle’s thought 
can be best seen by reading the analysis continuously. 

No editor of the Metaphysics is likely to suppose that he has 
solved all the outstanding problems of this desperately 
difficult work, and I am certainly free from that illusion. 
All I can hope to have done is to have cleared up some points 
left obscure by my great predecessor Hermann Bonitz. I 
should have liked to attempt an introduction dealing more 
exhaustively with Aristotle as a metaphysician, but this book 
is already so long that I have refrained from imposing 
further on the patience of my readers. 


W. D. ROSS. 
OXFORD. 


CO NILE Nels 


VOLUME I 


Books REFERRED Το. 


INTRODUCTION 


I. The Structure of the Metaphysics 
II. Socrates, Plato, and the Platonists 
III. Aristotle’s Metaphysical Doctrine 
IV. Aristotle’s Theology . 

V. The Text of the Metaphysics 


METAPHYSICS, BOOKS A-E 
ext 
Commentary 


VOUM Et! 


METAPHYSICS, BOOKS Z-N 
Τεχί 
Commentary 


INDEXES 
Index verborum 


Index to the Introduction and Commentary 


PAGE 
ix 


ΧΗ 
XXX1ll 
Ixxvi 
CXXX 
εἶν 


114 


501 
9. 7, 


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be ὃ ¥ 7 ἂν 
“3 if 
* > - 
eee - - - - 
Eee eee Bite? 
ἀν pees ΤῈ 
wee wnt ων, 
τ J peer. 
Le at = 
σον α ei 2 a ee, 
εἰ Ξ Η 
x ἔν 


τ ERRATA 
PAGE 253, heading, for 28 read 32 
» 25. os τ, 20 SO le ae 
» 259 ” CVA Sc, es Oe 


= +o 


i =4 


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- ν΄ νιν 
ὡῶο ΔΝ pry 
- ἃ 
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Η wt atu > - re ie 
. 
- 
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' ἢ 
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+ 
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. . ν 


BOOKS@RERPERRED ΤΟ 


(This list is meant only to facilitate reference, and does not aim at 
completeness.) 


Alexander Aphrodisiensis: / Arist. Met. Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck. 
Berol., 1891. 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis: Dze durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente 
Alexanders zur Met. des Arist., ed. J. Freudenthal, in Adz. da. Preuss. 
Aad. Berl., 1885. 

Apelt, O.: Beitrage zur Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie. Leipz., 
1801. 

Aquinas, St. Thomas: Jnxterpfretatioin Met. Arist. Ῥαρίδε, 1480, &c 

Asclepius: 271 Arist. Met. Libros A-Z Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck. 
Berol., 1888. 

Bast, F. J.: Comm. Palacographica, in G. H. Schaefer’s ed. of Gregorius 
Corinthius. Leipz., 1811. 

Bekker, I.: Arist. Opera. 2 voll. Berol., 1831. 

Bessarion, J.: Avist. Opus Met. Latinitate donatum. Par., 1515, &c. 

Blass, F.: Avistotelisches, in Rh. Mus., xxx (1875), 481-505. 

Bonitz, H.: Observationes Criticae in Arist. Libros Met. Berol., 1842. 

Bonitz, H.: Arist. Met, 2 voll. Bonn, 1848-9. 

Bonitz, H.: Ueber die Categorien des Arist. Wien, 1853. 

Bonitz, H.: Arist. Studien, 11, ii. Wien, 1863. 

Bonitz, H.: Zudex Aristotelicus. Berol., 1870. 

Bonitz, H.: Avist. Met. tibersetzt. Berol., 1890. 

Brandis, C. A.: Artst. οἱ Theophrasti Met. 2 voll. Berol., 1823-37. 

Brentano, F.: Arist. Lehre vom Ursprung αἰ, menschlichen Geistes. 
_Leipz., 1911. 

Bullinger, A.: Avist. Met. Miinch., 1892. 

Burnet, J.: Zarly Greek Philosophy. Ed. 3. Lond., 1920. 

Burnet, J.: Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato. Wond., 1914. 

Bywater, I.: Aristotelia, iv, v, in Journ. of Philol., xxviii (1901-3), 
244-7 and xxxii (1913), 109-11. 


x BOOKS REFERRED TO 


Casaubon, 1. : Operum Arist. nova editio. 2 voll. Lugd., 1590, Kc. 

Chandler, H. W.: AZiscellaneous Emendations and Suggestions. Lond., 
1866. 

Christ, W.: Studia in Arist. libros met. collata. Berol., 1853. 

Christ, W.: Aritische Beitrige zur Met. des Arist., in Sitzb. d. Bayer. 
Akad. Miinch., 1885. 406-23. 

Christ, W.: Arist. Met. Ed.2. Lips., 1895. 

Colle, G.: Avist., La Mét., Livre I, trad. et comm, Louvain et Paris, 
LOUZMELZUFES LL Le DIC  ΤΟΖΣ. 

Diels, H.: Doxographi Graect. Berol., 1879. 

Diels, H.: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Ed. 3. Berl., 1912. 

Essen, E.: Bemerkungen tiber einige Stellen der Arist, Met. Stargard, 
1862. 

Essen, E.: Das Buch Z der Arist. Met. Coslin, Berl., 1863. 

Essen, E.: Ein Beitrag zur Losung der arist. Frage. Berl., 1884. 

Eucken, R.: De Arist. dicendi ratione. Pars prima. Gotting., 1866. 

Eucken, R.: Ueber den Sprachgebrauch des Arist. Berlin, 1868. 

Fonseca, P.: Comment. in libros Met. Arist. 2 voll. Rom., 1577-89, &c. 

Gillespie, C. M.: Motes on Arist., Met. A. 6, in Journal of Philology, 
xxxiv (1915-18), 151-4. 

Goebel, K.: Bemerkungen zu Arist. Met. Soest, 1889. 

Goebel, K.: Weitere hritische Bemerkungen viber Arist. Met. Soest, 
1801. 

Goebel, K.: Avitische Bemerkungen tiber Arist. Met. Soest, 1892. 

Goebel, K.: Uebersetzting von Buch A der Met. des Arist. Soest, 1896. 

Gomperz, T.: Bettrage sur Kritth u. Erklarung griech. Schriftsteller, in 
Sitzb. ad. K. Akad. in Wien, \xxxiii (1876), 564-9. 

Hayduck, M.: Lmendationes Arist., in Jahrbticher f. Cl. Phil., cxix 
(1879), 109-12. ; 

Heinze, R.: Xenokrates. Leipz., 1892. 

Innes, H. M.: Ox the Universal and Particular in Aristotle's Theory o7 
Knowledge. Camb., 1886. 

Jackson, H.: Avist. Met. 1, in Journal of Philology, vi (1876), 206 f. 

Jackson, H.: Plato’s Later Theory of Ideas. I. The Philebus and Arist. 
Met. 1. 6, in J. of P., x (1881), 253-98. 

Jackson, H.: Avist. Met. A. 1. 985b 25 ff.3 A. 9. 992b 29, in Proc. of 
Camb. Phil. Soc. Camb., 1895. 

Jackson, H.: On some Passages in Arist. Met. A, in J. of P., xxix (1903), 
139-44. 

Jaeger, W. W.: Emendationum Aristotelearum Specimen. Berol., 1911. 

Jaeger, W. W.: Studien 2. Entstehungsgeschichte d. Met. ad. Arist. 
Berl., 1912. 

Jaeger, W.: Emendationen su Arist, Met. A-A, in Hermes, 111 (1917), 
481-519. 

Jaeger, W.: Avéistoteles, Berl., 1923. 


BOOKS REFERRED TO xl 


Jaeger, W.: Emendationen zu Arist. Met., in Sitzb. d. Preuss. Akaa., 
Xxxlv (1923). 

Karsten, S.: Empedoclis Carm. Relig. Amst., 1838. 

Kiihner, R.: Ausfihrliche Grammattk d. griech. Sprache. 2 voll. in 4. 
Hannover, 1890-1904. 

Lasson, A.: Arist. Met. ins Deutsche tibertragen. Jena, 1907. 

Liitze, F.: Ueber das ἄπειρον Anaximanders. Leipz., 1878, 

Luthe, W.: Zur Kritik u. Erklarung von Arist. Met. u. Alexanders 
Commentar, in Hermes, xv (1880), 189-210. 

Luthe, W.: Begriff u. Angabe d. Met, (copia) d. Arist. Diisseld., 1884. 

Maier, H.: Die Syllogistik d. Arist, 2 voll. in 3. Tiibing., 1896-1900. 

Natorp, P.: Thema u. Disposition d. Arist. Met., in Philos. Monatsh., 
xxiv (1887), 37-65, 540-74. 

Natorp, P.: Ueber Met.K. 1-8. 1065425, in Philos. Monatsh., xxiv (1888), 
178-93. 

Philoponus, 1.: /a Arist. Phys. Commentaria, ed. H. Vitelli. 2 voll. 
Berol., 1887-5. 

Prantl, C.: Arist. Physica. Lips., 1879. 

Ravaisson, F.: Speusippi de primis rerum principits placita qualia fuisse 
videntur ex Arist. Paris, 1838. 

Ravaisson, F.: Essai sur la Mét. Ed.2. Paris, 1913. 

Richards, H.: Avistotelica, in J. of P., xxxiv (1915-18), 247-54. 

Robin, L.: La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres οἱ αῤγὲς 
Arist. Paris, 1908. 

Robin, L.: Sur la Conception arist. de la Causalité, in Archiv f. Gesch. 
ad. Phitlos., xxiii (1910), 1-28, 184-210. 

Rolfes, E.: Arist. Met. tibersetzt, 2 voll. Leipz., 1904. 

Roscher, W. H.: Szeben- u. Newnzahl im Kultus u. Mythus d. Griechen, 
in Abh, d. Stichs, Akad., xxi, xxiv (1903, 1906). 

Schwegler, A.: Die Met. d. Arist. 4 voll. Tiibing., 1847-8. 

[Shute, R. ;] Book Z, translated. |Oxf.], n.d. 

Simplicius: Zz Phys. libros Commentaria, ed. H. Diels. 2 voll. Berol., 
1882-95. 

Stein, H.: Empedoclis Fragmenta. Bonn., 1852. 

Sturz, F. W.: Emfpedoclis vita et philos., carm. relig. Lips., 1805. 

Susemihl, F.: Arist. guae feruntur Oeconomica, Appendix. Lips., 1887. 

Sylburg, F.: Avist. opera quae exstant, τι voll. Francof., 1584-7. 

Syrianus: Jn Met. Commentaria, ed. G. Kroll. Berol., 1902. 

Taylor, A. E.: Varia Socratica. Oxford, 1911. 

Themistius: Ju Arist. Met. Librum A Paraphrasis, ed. 5. Landauer. 
Berol., 1903. 

Themistius: 792: Arist. Phys. Paraphrasis, ed. H. Schenkl. Berol., 1900. 

Trendelenburg, F. A.: Geschichte d. Kategorienlehre. Ed.3. Berl., 
1876. 

Usener, H.: Zu Avist., in RA. Mus., N.F. xvi (1861), 312, 313, 488. 


ΧΙ BOOKS REFERRED TO 


[Walker, W. W.:] Zhe First Book of the Met. of Arist. translated... 
by a Cambridge Graduate. London, 1881. 

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von: Commentariolum grammaticum, iv. 
Gotting., 1889. 

Winckelmann, A. W.: Review of Bonitz’s Odbservationes, in N. Jahro. f. 
Philol., xxxix (1843), 283-94. 

Wirth, C.: Die ersten drei Capitel d. Met. d. Arist. Bayreuth, 1884, 

Zeller, E.: Platonische Studien. Tiibing., 1837. 

Zeller, E.: Philosophie ad. Griechen. Vol. i. Ed. 6. Leipz., 1919-20. 
Vol. ii, 1. Ed.4. Leipz., 1889; Vol. ii, 2. Ed. 4. Leipz., 1921. 

Zeller, E.: Bericht tib. ad. deutsche Litt. d. sokrat., platon, wu. arist. 
Philosophie, in Arch. f. Gesch. ad. Philos., ii (1889), 259-99. 


INTRODUCTION 


I 
THE SETRUCIURE OF THE METAPHYSICS 


Tue structure of the Metaphysics obviously presents many 
difficulties. It is evident on the face of it that this is not a 
single finished work, meant to be read in its present form. Not 
only are Books a, A, and K manifest intrusions, but even the 
other books lack the continuity of thought that one expects in 
a single work. If we look more to externals, the same fact is 
impressed on us in other ways. It is noteworthy that with the 
exception of H, Θ, M, and N all the books begin without a con- 
necting particle—a phenomenon which is rare in Aristotle’s 
works.' Accordingly scholars have regarded the Metaphysics as 
produced by the combining of separate treatises, some of them 
containing only single books, others small groups of books; 
and the latest and most thorough investigator of the problem” 
has treated each book (with the exception of the group ZH) as 
a distinct treatise. We shall see reasons for believing this to 
be in a sense true, but some care must be bestowed on the 
determination of that sense. 

In considering the relation of the various books, we should be 
guided by two considerations : (1) the connexion of the thought, 
and (2) the explicit references which one book makes to another. 
These references have for the most part every appearance of 
being genuine ; in many cases it would be difficult to remove 


1 The only other clear instances are Az. Post. ii, Phys. vii, Pol. iii, iv ; 
in Phys. ii, De Cae/o ii, E. N. vii, Pol. ii, vii, Rhet. iii the manuscripts 
differ. The Politics, of course, presents as great a problem as the 
Metaphysics. 

4 Jaeger, Studien sur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphystk des 
Aristoteles, and Avristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Ent- 
wickluing. 


XIV INTRODUCTION 


them from the text without removing a good deal with them ; 
and in most cases no plausible reason can be suggested for 
their insertion by a later hand. They have accordingly been 
treated as important by scholars; but not enough attention has 
always been paid to their precise form. 

It is important to distinguish two questions which may be 
asked about the order of the books. There is the question of 
the order in which they were written, and the question of the 
order in which they were delivered as lectures.'| The first is 
evidently a very difficult question to answer. Probably the 
safest evidence would be statistical evidence about matters of 
grammar and style, and very little such evidence has been col- 
lected. It is only the other question that the explicit references 
help us to solve. But there is a presumption that the order of 
delivery would in a general way correspond with the order 
of writing. The complexity of the matter is illustrated by the 
evidence with regard to the date of the Metaphysics relatively 
to Aristotle’s other works. The Metaphysics refers back to the 
Posterior Analytics, the Physics, the De Caelo, the De Genera- 
tione et Corruptione, and the Ethics, and it does not refer forward 
to any of Aristotle’s works. The De Generatione refers back 
to A (336 29). The Physics has a backward reference (191) 29) 
which is usually taken to be to Θ, but since @ itself refers back to 
the Physics (1049” 36) and the Physics refers forward at 1928 35 
to the Metaphysics, and apparently to that part of it to which Θ 
belongs (ΖΗΘ), it is probable that the reference in 191} 29, like 
that in the De Generatione, is to A, which as we shall see is 
probably earlier than the other books of the Metaphysics; the 
reference is doubtless to A. ro17»1. Finally, the De Motu 
Animalum refers back to A (7γοοῦ 8), but it is doubtful whether 
this work is by Aristotle. These are all the references to the 


1 Top. 184» 6 indicates that the Zopfzcs were read aloud, and the use of 
the terms ἀκροατής, ἀκρόασις where we should say ‘student’ and ‘ study’ 
suggests that this is probably true of Aristotle’s other works as well. £, /V. 
110418 ὡς καὶ πρῴην εἴπομεν may contain a reference to lecturing or 
reading aloud. But πρῴην may as easily mean ‘ some little distance back’ 
as ‘the day before yesterday’. Jaeger (S/d. 145-147) gives reasons for 
supposing that the publication of Aristotle’s works (the dialogues perhaps 
excepted) consisted in (1) their being read aloud, and (2) copies being 
taken by hearers, 


RHE STRUGCEUREYOM THE METAPHYSICS σὺ 


Metaphysics in the other works, and they suggest that it is 
among the latest of all Aristotle’s works, On the other hand 
the evidence from diction, so far as it has been collected,' 
establishes an affinity between the Metaphysics and not only 
what is probably one of the latest works, the Politics, but also 
what is probably one of the earliest, the Physics. 


The Connected Treatises. 


There is every reason to suppose that Book A formed the first 
part of Aristotle’s course of metaphysical lectures. It is quite 
in his manner to begin with an historical inquiry. A does not 
presuppose any of the other books; the only one that it refers 
to is B, and this it refers to (9938 25) as something still to come, 
while B refers to A as ‘ our prefatory remarks’ (9955) and ‘our 
first discussions’ (997° 4). 

B is also in its nature preliminary to the main treatise on 
metaphysics. It enumerates and discusses dialectically fourteen 
(or fifteen) problems. These are not thought of as a complete 
programme for the metaphysician, but as the problems which 
he must discuss first (995*25). B announces itself as following 
A (9955, 996°8, 997” 4), and it is noteworthy that the word 
πάλαι which is used in the second of these passages is one 
which may be used in referring to an earlier part of an identical 
work (Phys. 254216, Z. 1039%19, Pol. 1262529, 1282-15). 
Further indications of the close connexion between A and B 
are the use of the phrase ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἣ ζητουμένη in A, 983° 21 
(cf. 982° 4), B. 995%24, 9960 3, and the use of the first person 
plural in the sense of ‘we Platonists’ (A. gg0%9, 11, τό, 18, 


23, 991" 7, B. 9973, 1002) 14). 
The significance of B with reference to the structure of the 


1 By Eucken, in De Aristotelis dicendi ratione, and Ueber den Sprach- 
gebrauch des Aristoteles. 

* Blass’s theory that parts of the περὶ φιλοσοφίας are embedded in 
AAM, and distinguished from the remainder of these books by the care- 
fulness of the style and the avoidance of hiatus (777. Mus. xxx. 485-497) 
requires too forcible a treatment of the text to be convincing. But the 
three books περὶ φιλοσοφίας formed a basis for A, MN, and A respectively. 
Their probable contents are well discussed in Jaeger’s Arvistoteles, 125-170. 


xvi INTRODUCTION 


Metaphysics is evident. B might be a programme which Aristotle 
carried through fully in later lectures. It might be a mere sketch 
which he never followed up. Or it might lie somewhere between 
these extremes: it might be that he discussed some of the 
problems of B explicitly in the form in which they are raised 
in this book, while others he considered in a fresh shape and 
perhaps in new groupings, and others he laid aside or never 
felt himself able to solve. We shall find that something like 
this is, so far as we can judge from what is left us, what actually 
happened. 

The first four problems" are concerned with the possibility 
and the province of metaphysics: 

(1) Is it the task of one or of more than one science to 
investigate all the kinds of cause ? 

(2) Should the science that investigates the first principles of 
substance also investigate the first principles of demonstration ? 

(3) Is there one science that investigates all substances ? 

(4) Does the science that investigates substances investigate 
their properties as well ? 

Then come eleven problems which metaphysics actually has 
to solve : 

(5) Are there non-sensible as well as sensible substances >? If 
so, are they of more than one kind ? 

(6) Is it classes, or the constituent parts, that are the first 
principles of things ? 

(7) Are summa genera, or infimae species, more of the nature ~ 
of principles and substances ? 

(8) Is there anything other than individual things ? 

(9) Are the first principles limited in number, or in kind ? 

(το) Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things 
the same ? 

(11) Are unity and being substances, or attributes ὃ 

(12) Are the first principles universal or individual ? 

(13) Do the first principles exist potentially or actually ? 

(14) Are the objects of mathematics substances? If so, are 
they separate from sensible things ? 


‘I follow here the order of the discussion in chs. 2-6, which is more 
logical than that of the formulation in ch. 1; ch. 1 places the fifth problem 
before the fourth, 


ΠΕ ΘΙ ΠΟ ΠΕ OFS HMEeVATAPTYSICS. xvii 


(143) What are the grounds for belief in Forms as distinct 
from sensibles and from mathematical objects ? 

{ contains only one explicit reference to B, the reference in 
1004*33 to the fourth problem, but besides answering this 
question explicitly chs. 1 and 2 answer the first and the third 
question implicitly (cf. the summary of results at 1005*13). 
Similarly ch. 3 gives a plain affirmative answer to the second 
problem (1005* 19-8, especially the summary in »5-8). Not 
content, however, with deciding that metaphysics ought to study 
the first principles of demonstration, Aristotle proceeds actually 
to discuss them, and to this the rest of I is devoted. This 
procedure, by which a somewhat formal problem in B is made 
the starting-point for a further discussion, will meet us again in 
other connexions. Meantime, however, the unity of ABT is 
assured. It remains to be seen how many of the other books 
form parts of the same whole. 

E contains no formal reference to the problems of B. In 
effect, however, it takes up the answer given in I to the first 
problem (cf. the opening words with I’. 1003* 31), and proceeds 
to define the sense in which metaphysics deals with the prin- 
ciples of being as being. It clears this matter up in two 
directions. (1) It develops, alongside of the view that meta- 
physics studies being as such, a view not yet touched upon, 
viz. that it studies a particular kind of being—the kind that 
both has separate, substantial existence and is free from change, 
as distinct from the objects, on one side, of mathematics and 
those, on the other, of physics. These two views it tries to 
reconcile by saying that this kind of being, if it exists, is prior 
to the other kinds, and the science of it is primary and therefore 
universal, (2) It points out that ‘being’ is used in two senses 
which are not studied by metaphysics: (@) incidental being, 
where A is B only in virtue of something incidental to A or 
to B, and (ὦ) ‘being as truth’. The first cannot be studied at 
all; the second is presumably studied by logic. 

The doubt which has sometimes been expressed* on the 


' This question (1002 12-32) is plainly an appendix to the previous 
one; there is nothing answering to it in ch. 1. 

2 e.g. by Natorp, in Philosophische Monatshefte, xxiv. 37-65 and 
540-574. He is answered by Zeller in Archiv fiir die Geschichte der 
Philosophie, ii. 265 ff. Natorp’s attempt to show that E contains a view 

2573-1 b 


Xviil INTRODUCTION 


question whether there is any real connexion between E and 
ABI is set at rest by the fact that the first part of K, which is 
certainly very old and may well be a pupil’s notes of a course of 
lectures by Aristotle himself, is a continuous parallel treatment 
of the topics discussed in BIE. 

ΖΗΘ evidently form a fairly continuous work. Not only are 
there connecting particles at the beginning of H and Θ, but Z 
refers forward to H,! while H begins with a summary of Z 
(1042* 3-22) and Θ refers back to Z in language which implies 
a close connexion.’ It is true that other references to Z in 
H and Θ᾽ imply a relative independence, but this is evidently 
only the independence which sections of a larger whole may 
have. 

It is evident, again, that the reference of ® to Z as ‘our first 
discussions’* implies that ΖΗΘ is in a sense a distinct treatise 
from ΑΒΓ, These two groups have usually, as by Brandis 
and Bonitz, been treated as going together and forming the 
backbone of the Metaphysics; one of the main features of 
Jaeger’s view is his belief that ΖΗΘ do not belong to this 
‘backbone’.’ His arguments must be reviewed; they are as 
follows : 

(τ) M, which he believes to form part of the main treatise, 
refers for the treatment of sensible substance not to ΖΗΘ, which 
are in the main occupied with this subject, but to the Physics 

(Jaeger, p. 97). Jaeger follows Bonitz in interpreting ὕστερον in 


of the subject-matter of metaphysics incompatible with that contained in 
ΓΖ, and must therefore be spurious, is unsuccessful. 

* 1037" 20 can hardly refer to Ζ. 12, which follows almost immediately. 
It must refer to H. 6, to which 1039" 22 perhaps also refers. 

? 1045> 28 εἴρηται simply, 31 ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις. 

* 104316 ἐν ἄλλοις, 104927 ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγοις (οἴ, Ζ. 
1037” 10). 

* 1045Ὁ 32 (cf. ἐν ἀρχῇ Ζ. 1029" 1). 

ὁ The following criticism (up to p. xxi) was in print before the appearance 
of Jaeger’s Arisfoteles, and refers to his argument in the Stwdzen. I find 
myself in agreement with his later view, that the earliest parts of the Mefa- 
physics (apart from A, which was originally a separate treatise) are A, K 
init.—1065* 26, M. 1086* 21—N fin., and that BIE is a later version of Κα 
init.—1065 ἃ 26, and M init.—1086% 21 a later version of M. 10868 21— 
N fin, ABIE, ΖΗΘ, MN, and 1 seem to have been worked up into a whole 
before aAKA were added. 


THe 9 RUCTIURE OFStibevel TAPAYSICS. xix 


1076*9 as referring to a treatment later in the Physics. This 
is, however, rendered impossible by the piv ... δέ, Bonitz’s 
only reason for his highly unnatural interpretation lies in the 
absence of other references in MN to ZH®. But a passage in 
N (1088> 24) may refer to Θ, and both Z and H refer to the 
discussion in MN as to something that is coming later (10378 12, 
1042? 22). And even if 1076*g stood alone, it would be a plain 
reference to ΖΗΘ. 

Jaeger thinks that 1086 23 still more clearly shows that ΖΗΘ 
do not form a part of the main metaphysical treatise. He takes 
it to show that ΖΗΘ, since they deal with sensible substance, are 
physics rather than metaphysics. The meaning of the passage 
is something quite different. What it says is that the views of 
thinkers who recognize sensible substance only (i.e. the pre- 
Socratics) have, on the one hand, been treated in the Physics, 
and are, on the other, inappropriate to the present inquiry: 
i.e. their views are not pertinent to the present inquiry just 
because the present inquiry is confined to non-sensible sub- 
stance. In Book A, before he had narrowed down his subject 
to non-sensible substance, he actually discusses their views. 
The passage does not imply that a discussion of sensible sub- 
stance is inappropriate to metaphysics, but only that it is 
inappropriate to the present stage of the inquiry. 

(2) Not only HE. 1026* 16, 19, 27-32, but Z and ® themselves 
(1037" 10-17, 1048* 25-30) imply that metaphysics is concerned 
solely with insensible being, while in fact ZH® are occupied with 
sensible being (Jaeger, p. 97). 

In answer to this it must be pointed out that E itself combines 
the view that metaphysics studies unchangeable reality with the 
view that it studies the nature of being as such, the nature 
common to all being. Now when we ask what ΖΗΘ are in the 
main concerned with, the answer is perhaps most aptly given in 
M. 10769: ‘the actual or formal element in sensible being.’ 
These books study primarily not the matter of sensible being, but 
the formal element which is common to both sensible and non- 
sensible being and is thus a principle of being as such. And 
they study this first as it is in sensible substances just because 
these are ὁμολογούμεναι, and as a preliminary to the study of it in 
its purity (Z. 1037*13, 1041" 7, H. 1042%22-25), In describing 

1 Jaeger now (A77s¢, 212 ff.) takes it so. 
b2 


ΧΧ INTRODUCTION 


themselves as concerned with sensible being ZH admit them- 
selves to be preliminary to the main object of metaphysics but 
certainly not to be inappropriate as part of a metaphysical 
treatise. And in the same breath they point forward to 
MN as a future part of the same treatise (ὕστερον, 1037213, 
1042 23). 

(3) ZH® do not continue the discussion of the problems formu- 
lated in Β. E has indicated that the subject of metaphysics is 
insensible being ; the first problem, after the four preliminary 
problems discussed in TE, is the question whether there are 
insensible substances (B. 9978 34). Thus both B and E lead us 
to expect next a discussion of insensible substance, not of 
sensible. Further, ΖΗΘ never refer to the problems raised in 
B (Jaeger, pp. 101, 102). 

It must be admitted that in ZH® there is no explicit reference 
to B, and that these books do not in so many words discuss any 
of the problems there raised. ZH® form a relatively independent 
whole. But they present a phenomenon very like that pre- 
sented by I. 3-9. Just as there, having shown that it is the 
business of metaphysics to study the axioms (and thus answered 
his second problem), Aristotle proceeds forthwith to study them, 
so here, having shown that metaphysics studies substance (and 
thus answered his third problem), he discusses it forthwith, and 
postpones the discussion of the further questions raised in B, 
A similar phenomenon will be found in I. 

If ZH® do not refer to B, the facts remain, (a) that not only 
M but also I (1053” 17)—both of them books which Jaeger rightly 
maintains to belong to the main treatise, so far as there is a 
main treatise—use language which implies that ZH have come 
before,’ and (ὁ) that E refers forward to © with the word ‘later’ 
(1027 29), while Z and H use the same word with reference to 
M (1037° 13, 1042% 23). Thus the order ABTEZH@MN appears 
to be established. Yet ΖΗΘ form a section in which the problems 
of B have sunk somewhat into the background. 

(4) Z treats the ideal theory as not yet refuted (ch. 14). But 
it has been refuted in A. 8, 9 (Jaeger, p. 111). 

In answer to this two things must be said: 

(a) MN also treat this theory as not yet refuted. Jaeger himself 
believes that when MN were written A. 8, 9 were dropped out 


1 Further, N. 1088 24 may refer to ©. 10507 ff. 


DME SSLRUCTURESOb RA Err] APEHYSICS τσὶ 


of the course as being superseded by the fuller discussion in 
MN. May not ΖΗΘ belong to this later form of the course? 

(5) The refutation of the Ideas in Z is a refutation of them 
only from one particular point of view; it is an appendix to the 
discussion in ch, 13 of the claims of the universal to be regarded 
as substance (cf. H. 1042%15). The subject is for Aristotle so 
important that it is natural to him to discuss it more than once, 
from different points of view. 

The connexion of Z with E might appear to be established 
most easily by a comparison of the closing words of E with the 
first words of Z. But though the closing words of E would be 
pointless unless Z was to follow, if it was to follow they produce 
an intolerable repetition. They are plainly a later addition 
similar to what occurs at the end of a in all the manuscripts, 
and at the end of Τὶ, H, I in Ab. The substantial continuity of 
ΖΗΘ with E is, however, evident from the fact that ZH and © 
respectively discuss the two senses of being which E declares 
to be the subject of metaphysics, being as classified into the 
categories and potential-and-actual being. 

Jaeger has pointed out! that MN contain an earlier and a later 
discussion of Academic theories (M. 1086 21—N fin., M init.— 
1086* 18), The earlier form is in close connexion with AB; 
Jaeger points out that in M. 1086* 21—fin. there are more refer- 
ences to AB than in all the Bks. Z—A (1086 34, » 2, 15). 1086» 
20-32 reminds us of B. 999 27—1000* 4 (problem 9), and 1086» 
32-37, 371087? 4 of 1003* 13-17, 7-9 (problem 12) ; the solution 
comes in 10878 7-25. But the later version also refers to B 
(1076* 39, »39), M. 1-g is devoted expressly to the solution of 
problem 5 (cf. 1076* το with 9975 35). 

M presents one very curious phenomenon—the repetition in 
chs. 4, 5 (1078 34—1079» 3, 1079» 12—10808 8), practically word 
for word, of the arguments against the ideal theory put forward 
in A. 99οὉ 2—gg1? 8, and the appearance in chs. 6-9 of a polemic 
against the ideal numbers which entirely ignores the polemic 
against them in A. 991» g—g93* το. There can be no doubt that 
the repeated passage occurred in both contexts among Aristotle’s 
papers ; by far the most reasonable explanation of its double 
occurrence is that Aristotle, having to deal with the same sub- 
ject a second time, felt that his old treatment of it fully expressed 


1 Arist. 186-199. 


ΧΧΙ INTRODUCTION 


his views and therefore used it again (cf. the identity of A. 2 
with Phys. ii. 3). Certain slight differences’ enable us with 
some confidence to give the relative date of the two versions. 
In A, Aristotle several times says ‘we’ where it is clear that 
‘we’ means ‘we Platonists’, i.e. A belongs to the time when 
Aristotle was still a Platonist, though a critical one; Jaeger’s 
conjecture (Stud. 34, n. 2) that the book may have been read to 
the Platonic circle at Assos among whom Aristotle lived from 
348 to 345 is highly probable. In M he uses the third person 
of the Platonists, and in at least one instance?’ the criticism is 
sharper; the book belongs to the period when he has definitely 
broken with the Academy and set up as an independent teacher. 
Presumably when he had written M he omitted A.g from his 
course ; otherwise the repetition would have been too flagrant. 
I is evidently a more or less self-contained treatise, dealing 
with the nature of unity and of kindred conceptions. It is not 
referred to in any other book of the Metaphysics. But it 
contains a reference to B in 1053” 10, and not only a reference 
but a recapitulation (11-24) of a good part of the discussion 
of unity in B (1001 5-24). Here we evidently have Aristotle’s 
formal answer to the eleventh problem. From settling the 
question raised about unity in B, he is next led to discuss other 
questions about it. The book is, however, connected with B 
in another way as well. Aristotle has in 995” 20 raised the 
question, whose business it is to study the same, the other, the 
like, the unlike, and contrariety, and in I. 1004*17 he has 
answered that this is the business of the metaphysician, The 
actual discussion of them is found in 1. 4-10. We have seen 
also that I refers back to Z (105317). Clearly, then, it belongs 
to the main treatise, though somewhat loosely connected with 


' For which see notes on A. 9. : 

> Cf. ggo” 4, 1078” 36. The tone of A is less sharp also than that of the 
Topics and the Analytics; cf. An. Post. 83°32 τὰ yap εἴδη χαιρέτω" 
τερετίσμιτά τε γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐστίν. It is, of 
course, possible that, as Grant suggests, after a period of strong reaction 
against Platonism Aristotle settled into a more friendly attitude; but 
the opposite view seems more probable—that A is earlier than M, the 
Topics, and the Analytics. The fact that M is occupied less with the 
original ideal theory than with the number-theories of Plato, Speusippus, 
and Xenocrates is itself strong evidence of lateness. 


a 2 


THE SERUCTURE OB DHE METAPHYSICS xxiii 


the rest of it. It is evident also that it comes logically after, 
not before, MN. Otherwise it interrupts the discussion of the 
nature of substance which is carried on in ZH@MN.' The 
opening words of M indicate pretty plainly that Aristotle has 
just concluded his discussion of sensible substance. It may also 
be noticed that the absence of a reference in N. 1087 33 to the 
fuller treatment of unity in I. 1 suggests that I has not pre- 
ceded N. 

It seems, then, that ABIEZH@MNI form a more or less con- 
tinuous work. This is doubtless the ten-book Metaphysics which 
occurs in the list of Aristotle’s works in Anonymus Menagii. 
It is not, however, a complete work. If we ask how.far the 
problems raised in B are dealt with in later books, the answer 
may be stated as follows : 

Problem 1 is answered in I, 1, 2 (though not in the precise 
form in which it is raised), and further elucidated in E. The 
nature of being as such, thus shown to be the subject of meta- 
physics, and defined as excluding incidental being and being as 
truth, and including ‘being in the sense of the categories’ and 
‘being in the sense of potentiality and actuality’, is discussed 
in ZH and in Θ. 

Problem 2 is answered in I. 3. 1005* 19-- 8, and the topic 
thus claimed for metaphysics is considered in the remainder 
ὌΠ. ; ν , 

Problem 3 is answered in I. 1, 2 (especially 1004* 2-9), E. 1, 
and substance is further considered in ZH. 

Problem 4 is dealt with in T. 2, 1003 32—1005* 18 (1004* 32 
refers explicitly to this problem). Some of the main attributes 
of substance are further considered in I. 4-9. Thus all the 
preliminary problems about the possibility and the scope of 
metaphysics find an answer in I. 

Problem 5 is dealt with in MN. But the inquiry here, being 
an examination of the views of the Pythagoreans and the Plato- 
nists, is only preliminary to a statement of Aristotle’s views 
(πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητέον, M. 1076* 12). 
M. 1076? 1, 107781 refer explicitly to this problem. 

Problems 6, 7 are not dealt with expressly anywhere. But 


1 Tt will be remembered that HOMN are just the books which have a 
connecting particle in the first sentence. This is what we should expect 
if ZHOMN form a connected group of discussions. 


hKeu~ 
Qu (μίξει 


MIE pat ating 
IA rfamcer ? 


TT) a9 Kee ora, 


XxiVv INTRODUCTION 


Z. 13 incidentally gives Aristotle’s answer to them (cf. for problem 
6, Z. τοῦ 1035° 24, 30; for problem 7, Z. 12. 1038 19). 

Problem 8 is not answered expressly, but Aristotle’s attitude 
towards it may be gathered from Z. 8, 13, 14, M. το. 

Problem 9 is answered in M. το. 

Problem ro is not dealt with expressly, but Aristotle’s view 
may be gathered from Z. 7-10. 

Problem 11 is answered in Z. τό. 1040 16-24, I. 2. I. 2. 
1053” 10 refers explicitly to it. 

Problem 12 is answered in Ζ. 13-15, M. το. -M. το. 1086) 15 
refers explicitly to it. 

Problem 13 is not expressly answered, but Aristotle’s answer 
may be inferred from his doctrine that actuality is prior to 
potentiality (0. 8). 

Problem 14 is answered in M. 1-3, 6-9, N. 1-3, 5, 6, though 
not expressly referred to. 

Problem 14* is not expressly dealt with anywhere, but cf. 
M. Io. 

On the whole, then, the programme of B is fairly well carried 
out, though several of the problems are not dealt with in the form 
in which they are originally raised. It is only natural that 
Aristotle’s way of conceiving the problems of metaphysics should 
have been modified in the course of his study of them. He lets 
his thought follow ‘the wind of the argument’; but he never 
entirely forgets the problems raised in B, and he reminds us of 
them from time to time. 


The Outlying Books. 


Four books remain to be considered: a, A, K, A. Of these a 
evidently interrupts the connexion between A and B. It refers 
to no other book, and is referred to by none. The attempt to 
connect it with B by interpolating at 995*19 a free version ot 
a clause occurring in B, 9955 was exposed by Alexander once 
forall. The very title’of the book betrays that it is a late, probably 
the latest, addition to the corpus of the Metaphysics, inserted 
after the other books had already been numbered. One of the 
oldest manuscripts (E) has a scholion saying that most scholars 
ascribed the book to Pasicles of Rhodes, a pupil of Aristotle and 


THE SoRUCTURE OF THE WiTAPAYSICS «xxv 


a nephew of Eudemus.' Alexander (137. 2), Asclepius (113. 5), 
and Syrianus (1. 7, 14. 26, 37. 29, 98. 9) think it is by Aristotle ; 
Alexander has doubts about its being in its proper place, and 
thinks it a fragmentary preface to θεωρητικὴ φιλοσοφία in general 
(137. 3—138. 9). They are right in thinking both the thought and 
the language thoroughly Aristotelian. But the lack of connexion 
between the three chapters strongly confirms Jaeger’s view that 
we have in it Pasicles’ somewhat fragmentary notes of a discourse 
by Aristotle. The concluding words make it quite clear that the 
discourse was introductory to a course not on metaphysics but on 
physics (cf. Al. 137. 13), so that we have to deal here with an error 
of judgement on the part of those who put together the Meta- 
physics out of such materials as they found ready to their hand 
(Ase. 4. 4, cf. Al. 515. 9). 

A is evidently out of place where it is, and as evidently it is 
a genuine Aristotelian work. It is referred to in E, Z, ©, and I, 
as well as in the Physics and the De Generatione et Corruptione— 
either by the vague phrase ἐν ἄλλοις, or as τὰ περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς OF 
by some variant of this title; and under this title it occurs in 
Diogenes Laertius’ list, in which the Metaphysics itself does not 
occur. It is a useful preliminary to the Metaphysics, but it is not 
preliminary to it in particular. Some of the notions discussed in 
it (κολοβόν, ψεῦδος) are not appropriate to the Metaphysics, and it 
is apparently earlier than the physical works while the rest of 
the Metaphysics, in its present form, is later. 

K consists of two quite distinct parts and presents two distinct 
problems. 1059* 18—1065* 26 contains a shorter version of the 
contents of BPE; 1065226—1069* 14 contains a series of extracts 
a transition from the accidental, which is the subject of E. 2, 3, to 
chance, which is defined in terms of the accidental. K is not 
referred to in any other book,’ but the first part presupposes A 
(1059? 19) and contains an obscure reference (1064* 36) to a later 
book (ἢ A). An examination of the first part shows that it is no 


1 Asclepius (4. 20) says that some scholars thought that A was written 
by Pasicles; this is probably due to a confusion between A and a. 

2 The references in I. 1053” 10, M. 1076% 39 and ἢ 39, 1086? 15 refer to B. 
T001% 4-24, 998° 11-15 and 997” 12-34, 999 24—1000* 4 and 1co3* 6-17, 
rather than to the less detailed parallels in K, 1060% 36--" 6, 1059 38-) 14, 
1060” 28-30 and 19-23. 


XXVi INTRODUCTION 


mechanical paraphrase of BYE such as a disciple might have made 
but an independent handling of the same topics, omitting much 
(e. g. 1002b 321003" 5, 1007* 20-" 18, 10084 7--ῦ 12), rearranging 
much, and inserting not a little of its own (e. g. 1059” 14-21, 30, 
38, 10618 20-) 3, 1065" 14-21). Both the thought and with one 
exception the language are thoroughly Aristotelian. The ex- 
ception is the use of the combination of particles ye μήν in 
1060" 5, 17, 20,3, 12, 1061" 8, 1062 33.1 This does not prove 
that it was not written by Aristotle; a writer may use a phrase 
at one time of his life and then drop it, and Zeller points out 
that δέ ye is apparently used only in the Physics, Metaphysics, 
and Politics, and that re... τε is almost confined to the Politics 
and the Ethics. But, so long as the contents of K are recognized 
as Aristotelian, it does not much matter whether the actual form 
is due to Aristotle or to a pupil who took down Aristotle’s 
lectures. Its much smaller size, as compared with BIE, is 
rather in favour of the view that K represents a student’s notes— 
not, however, of the identical course of lectures which we have 
in BYE (it is too independent for that), but of a corresponding 
course given on another occasion. 

We may even conjecture that K represents an earlier course 
than BIE. B seems to imply that the doctrine of the Ideas has 
not yet been refuted ;* i.e. it belongs to a course in which A. 9 
was dropped out, and the Ideas were left to be discussed in M. 
K on the other hand implies that the Ideas have already been 
refuted (1059 3); i.e. it belongs to the period in which ch. 9 
was still retained in A and not replaced by the later form of 
it in M.$ 

The later part of K stands on quite a different basis. It consists 


1 οὐδὲ μήν, which occurs twice in this part of K, is not found elsewhere 
in Aristotle except in PAys. vii, the genuineness of which has been seriously 
doubted. But the argument against Καὶ is weakened by the fact that μήν 
is used throughout the JZe¢afhysics much oftener than in most of Aristotle’s 
works. 

? Otherwise the fifth problem, stated in 997% 35, becomes meaningless. 
997” 3 presupposes, as Jaeger points out, the account of the ideal theory 
in A. 6, but not the criticism of it in A. 9. 

® Jaeger shows in Avzst, 216-222 that there are several indications in| 
the first part of K of Aristotle’s standing closer to the Platonic tradition 
than he does in BLE. 


THE STRUCTURE OF THE METAPHYSICS xxvii 


of excerpts taken almost word for word from the Physics ; there 
is no independence of treatment. The selection is made with 
considerable skill, and gives a fairly clear account of the subjects 
dealt with. The selector has a special taste for definitions (cf. 
1065" 27, 30, 35, ὃ 1, 16, 22, 33, 1066 35, 1067” 21, 23, 1068) 20, 26, 
27, 30, 31, 1069" 1,5). It seems impossible to determine whether 
these extracts were made by Aristotle himself with a view to 
a brief course on physical topics, or by some pupil. Ifit was the 
latter, it is clear that he had the text of the Physics before him 
and was not simply taking notes of Aristotle’s lectures; the 
verbal resemblance, down to the very particles, is too great to 
admit of the latter supposition. The union of the two parts of 
K into a single book presents a curious problem ; it is natural 
enough that an editor, finding one set of papers ending with the 
discussion of accident, and another beginning with the discussion 
of chance, should have put them together so as to fill a fair-sized 
roll. In any case we must regard the second part as an intruder 
in the Metaphysics, for it is quite against Aristotle’s principles to 
suppose that a single discussion could be at home both in physics 
and in metaphysics. 

We come finally to Book A. Δ refers to no other book of the 
Metaphysics... Vhere are three passages in other books which 
may refer to A. E, 1027" 19 says that the question whether every- 
thing is ‘for the most part’ or some things are eternal must be 
discussed later, and this is not done except in A. 6-8. K. 1064 36 
says more definitely ‘if there is a substance of this nature— 
separate and unmovable-—as we shall try to prove that there 
is’, On the other hand, the reference in Z. 1037* 12 to a later 
discussion of the question ‘whether there is another substance 
remote from the matter of sensible substances, and whether we 
must look for a substance distinct from them such as numbers or 
something of the kind’, seems to refer much more probably to 
MN. And the other two references may be to a lost (or never 
written) positive part of the treatise of which MN is the preliminary 
critical part (cf. the formulation of the problem in M. 1076* 10, 
‘whether there is apart from sensible substances an unchangeable 


1 εἴρηται δὲ πῶς, 1072" 4, is rightly regarded by Bonitz as referring not to 
Θ. 8 but to A. 1071” 22-26; εἴρηται simpliciter can hardly refer to anything 
but a preceding passage of the same or a very closely connected book. 


1] 


XXvili INTRODUCTION 


and eternal substance’).!. Thus not much can be made of these 
references in favour of a real connexion between A and the rest 
of the Metaphysics. It presents all the appearances of a separate 
work, It announces itself in its first sentence as a discussion of 
substance, without reference to the fact that ZH have already 
dealt fairly comprehensively with this subject. 

Its first five chapters discuss the fundamental nature of sensible 
substance, thus covering the same ground as ZH, but treating the 
subject quite independently and in a way which has more affinity 
with the Physics than with the rest of the Metaphysics ; cf. the 
analysis of sensible substance into form, privation, and matter 
(1069> 32, 1070” 11-29, 1071°8, 34) with Phys. i. 6. It is to be 
noted, too, that while ZH are occupied mainly with the logical 
analysis of sensible substance into form and matter, A is concerned 
rather with a causal explanation of the existence of sensible things, 
and therefore brings in at an early stage and constantly insists 
on the necessity of a motive cause as well (1069 36, 1070* 21, 28, 
b 22-35, 1071* 14, 20-24, 28, 34). It thus prepares the way for 
the proof of the necessity of a single motive cause of the 
universe. 

All this first part of A is extremely terse. That it represents 
rather notes for a treatise than a substantive treatise is indicated 
plainly by the two sentences (1069? 35, 1070* 4) beginning with pera 
ταῦτα ὅτι, ‘after this remember to say that’. 

From the fact that A makes the existence of metaphysics 
conditional on the absence of any principle common to un- 
changeable substance and the objects of physics (1069 1), Jaeger 
infers (Stud, 122) that Aristotle has not yet assured himself that 
there is such a thing as metaphysics, and that therefore A must 
be earlier than TE, than ΖΗΘ, and than the Physics, in all of 
which the existence of metaphysics is clearly asserted, and must 
belong to the period of AB, in which metaphysics is still being 
looked for, an ἐπιστήμη ἐπιζητουμένη. He thinks, further (p. 123), 
that this is confirmed by the absence of any name for metaphysics, 
either θεολογική or πρώτη φιλοσοφία, in A. But the first argument 
is unconvincing; one might as well argue that E is an early 


* A cannot itself be the dogmatic sequel to MN ; the connexion between 
its two parts (cf. the reference in 6, 10713 to 1, 1069* 30) forbids this. 
Also 1075* 25 ff. contains a polemic which would be unnecessary if MN 
had come before. 


ΠῚ {ΠῚ ἘΞ GRUCTURE OSU Bavh TAP YSICS “xxix 


work because of the conditional expression εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τις οὐσία 
ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη (1026" 29). Nor could 
anything be inferred from the non-occurrence in these few pages 
of a name for philosophy; but in fact the name σοφία does occur 
(107520). The similarity of the mode of thought with that of 
the Physics suggests an early origin, but this is rendered doubtful 
by the reference to the astronomical theories of Callippus, which 
can hardly be dated before 330-325. 

It remains to consider-the view of Krische and Goedeckemeyer 
that A. 1-5 is continuous with K. 1-8 and supplies a parallel toZH® 
as those chapters supply a parallel to BrE.? It must be pointed 
out that there is nothing like the degree of affinity between A. 1-5 
and ΖΗΘ that there is between Kand BIE. A. 2, 3 beara general 
resemblance to Z. 7-9, but beyond this there are very few points 
of contact. Nor does A take up the problems raised in K. 1, 2. 
It is also to be noted that the relative size of A. 1-5 and that of 
K. 1-8 are very different; while K. 1-8 is about a third as long 
as BYE, Z is five times, ZH seven times, and ΖΗΘ ten times as 
long as A. 1-5, <A must be considered an entirely independent 
treatise, with one principal aim, that of establishing the existence 
of an eternal unmoved mover of the world. 


1 Cf. Heath, Avistarchus of Samos, 197, 198, 212. Jaeger states in 
Arist. 229 ff. other and stronger arguments for the early date of Δ. Cf. 
A init. note. He argues (366-379) that A. 8, with the exception of 1074% 
31-38, was added later, when the inquiries of Eudoxus and Callippus had 
convinced Aristotle of the necessity of a more elaborate theory of the 
cause of the celestial movements than the mere reference to the first 
mover. 

2 Krische, Forschungen auf ὦ. Gebiet der alten Philos, i, 263 f., 
Goedeckemeyer in Arch. fi Gesch. d. Phil. xx. 521-542, xxi. 18-29. 
Goedeckemeyer treats the following passages as parallel : 

1069 18-9 2 = Z. 1, 2. 

b 3-34 = H. 10428 24—1044! 20. 
35—1070% 9 = Z. 1032%12—1034? 7. 
1070% 9-13 = Z. 10298 2-7 or H. 1042 26-31. 
13-30 = Η. 1043 19-23, Z. 1033 19g—1034" 8. 
He admits that A, 4, 5 have no parallel in the preceding books, 


XXX INTRODUCTION 


Inserted Fragments. 


Certain features of the corpus to which Jaeger has called 
attention (not always for the first time) remain to be mentioned. 
One of these is the tendency to insert loose fragments at the end 
of the various books, where there was presumably room left at 
the end of the roll ora fresh length could easilybe added. Hehas 
made out a strong case for the occurrence of this in several 
instances. 

(1) He argues (Stud. 14-21) that A. τὸ is a later alternative 
version of A, 7, meant to come after the account of earlier views 
in chs. 1-6 and before the criticism of them in chs. 8, 9. 

(2) K. 1065°26-end is probably an insertion of this sort on 
a larger scale (ib. 38-41). 

(3) ®. τὸ (which had already been suspected by Christ and 
Natorp) is a similar insertion (ib. 49-53). ‘Being as truth’ has 
been in E. 4 as definitely excluded from the province of meta- 
physics as ‘accidental being’ was in E. 2, 3. Only the being of 
the categories and the being of potentiality and actuality should 
be discussed by metaphysics, and these accordingly are discussed 
in ZH and in ©. 1-9 respectively. The section of E in which 
a discussion of being as truth is promised, and in which truth as 
the apprehension of simple entities (as distinct from the truth of 
the judgement) is recognized (1027 25-29), is a later addition 
inserted after the doctrine of De An. 430226 had been worked 
out and ch. to had been inserted into ®. (Κ has nothing corre- 
sponding to the section in question, but the version there is so 
short that nothing can be inferred from this.) 

(4) Jaeger argues (ib. 53-62), again with much probability, that 
the discussion of the unity of definition in Z. t2 is a doublet of 
that in H. 6, and one that comes in very curiously when the 
subject has just been postponed for future discussion (σκεπτέον 
ὕστερον Ζ. ΤΙ. 1037%20). It is certainly odd in a closely united 
whole like ZH to find two chapters discussing the same subject 
without reference to each other. Z. 12, further, is a mere 
fragment, since it does not discuss definitions got by induction, 
as Aristotle meant to do after treating of those got by division 
(1037 27—1038" 34). Now ch. 11 closes (1037*21->7) with 
a summary of the contents of Z up to this point, and ch. 13 begins 


PHEeSTRUCTORE IORSIHEIMETAPAYSIGS xxxi 


with the announcement of a fresh start. Chs. 1-11, then, 
constitute a definite section of the argument, and Jaeger argues 
that probably chs. 1-11 and chs. 13-17 occupied separate rolls 
(Z, it should be noted, is the longest book of the Metaphysics), 
and that the isolated doublet was simply put in for convenience 
on the spare pages of the first roll. 

No one of these instances is perfectly conclusive in itself, but 
the cumulative effect of them is to suggest very strongly that we 
have here a vera causa of some of the peculiarities in the 
arrangement of the Metaphysics. 

The motives for the insertion of a, A, K, A in their present 
positions may have been as follows: 

(1) a was inserted between A and B because the final words of 
A seemed to promise the raising of certain preliminary ἀπορίαι 
before the main ἀπορίαι of B (Al. 137. 5-12). 

(2) A was inserted after I because I. 1004928 was taken to 
promise an examination of varieties in the meaning of terms 
(Al. 344. 22); perhaps also because E. 1026* 34 is the first back- 
ward reference to A. 

(3) A was put next to MN because like them it is concerned 
with eternal, non-sensible being. 

(4) K was put before A because A might superficially seem to 
be a parallel version of ΖΗΘ as K is of BIE (Al. 633. 25). 


The earliest editions of the Metaphysics. 


With regard to the time at which the various treatises were 
put together to form the J/efaphysics we have very little to go 
upon. Alexander (515. 20) expresses the opinion that two 
particular passages were ‘placed together by Aristotle but 
separated by Eudemus’. Asclepius (4. 9) has a different story, 
that Aristotle sent the whole work to Eudemus, who thought it 
unfitting ‘that so great a work should be published’; and that 
after his death, and the loss of parts of the book, later scholars 
filled up the gaps by drawing upon Aristotle’s other works and 
piecing the whole together as best they could. Zeller has 
pointed out! that Asclepius’ story implies the notion of an 
esoteric doctrine, which certainly does not go back to Eudemus, 


1 Abh. ἡ. Konigl. Akad. εἰ. Wissensch., Berlin, 1887, 156. 


ἜΣ ΣΙ INTRODUCTION 


and that the J/efaphysics is not in point of fact pieced to- 
gether with extracts from the other works of Aristotle. The 
authority of Asclepius does not in any case count for much. 
Alexander’s suggestion is more probable; Eudemus may have 
done some editorial work on the metaphysical as on the ethical 
treatises.’ 

The oldest list of Aristotle’s works, that of Diogenes Laertius, 
which is probably based on Hermippus (c. 200 B.c.), does not 
contain the Metaphysics, but mentions A under the title of περὶ 
τῶν ποσαχῶς λεγομένων ἢ κατὰ πρόσθεσιν. The list in Anonymus 
Menagit gives μεταφυσικὰ κ, and in an appendix τῆς μετὰ φυσικὰ 1. 
Both of these references probably point to a ten-book Meta- 
physics (stigma being excluded in the first reckoning and 
included in the second). The list of Ptolemaeus Chennus 
(c. A.D. 100) includes the Metaphysics in thirteen books (1. e. with- 
out a, or counting it as an appendix to A). The name Meta- 
physics, which occurs first in Nicolaus of Damascus, in the time 
of Augustus, has been commonly supposed to have been affixed 
by Andronicus (c. 60 B.c.) when he issued his great edition of 
Aristotle’s works ;? but Jaeger (ϑ μα, 180) points out that additions 
to the canon of classical writers do not seem to have been made 
after this date. If this be so, Andronicus’ Metaphysics must have 
contained fourteen (or thirteen) books, and the ten-book Meta- 
physics, and therefore, of course, the name Metaphysics, must be 
earlier than Andronicus, though presumably later than Her- 
mippus. But as we have no other trace of an edition earlier 
than that of Andronicus, this conclusion must remain very 
doubtful ; it is equally probable that Aristotle is an exception to 
the rule that the canon of classical authors was fixed by the 
beginning of the imperial period. 


1 A casual allusion like Alexander’s is more significant than an elaborate 
story like that told by Asclepius. The story connecting A or a with 
Eudemus’ nephew (Asc. 4. 21 and Schol. 589 41 Brandis) agrees well 
with the view that Eudemus did some editorial work on the Metaphysics. 

3 The earliest title is τὰ περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας (M.A. 7009), The 
title τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά is due to the place of the work in complete editions 
of Aristotle’s works (Asc. I. 19), which in turn was probably dictated by 
the view that it is proper to proceed from τὰ γνώριμα ἡμῖν (material things, 
treated of in the physical works) to τὰ γνώριμα ἁπλῶς (Al. 171. 6, Asc. 
1.7). 


Tie SURUCTURE OF SEHR VELTAPERYSICS: xxxii 


Jaeger has detected a curious point in the external history of 
the Metaphysics. Each of its books has a certain amount of 
independence, and it seems probable that each was originally 
written on a separate roll (the general absence of connecting 
particles, among other things, suggests this). These rolls must 
have been of very unequal size. Now at the end of the alter- 
nate books a, I, E, H, and I (and of these books only) there 
occur in one or all of the manuscripts words meant evidently to 
point to the beginning of the next book, as in old printed books 
the first word of each page is printed as a catchword at the end 
of the previous page. Jaeger argues (Stud. 181) from this that 
for commercial purposes the Metaphysics was probably arranged 
in seven rolls each containing two books; and unequal as the 
single books are, the pairs of books are not unlike in size. Thus 


Aa = 144 pages of Bekker ΘΙ = 134 pages 
Dae 7S Be ayy KATO ae 
EES se ate Dn ae MUN ἜΞΞΙ ΣΙΝ 
EAE | ani gE le Oo 


The catch-phrase at the end of A may be supposed to have 
been lost. 


II 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS 


Socrates. 


In considering Aristotle’s account of Socrates it will be well 
to have before us his actual words: 


A. 987% 29-" 9. M. 1078 9-32. 
μετὰ δὲ Tas εἰρημένας φιλοσοφίας περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδεῶν πρῶτον αὐτὴν 
ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐπεγένετοπραγματεία, | τὴν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν δόξαν ἐπισκε- 
τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τούτοις (the Pytha- | πτέον, μηθὲν συνάπτοντας πρὸς τὴν 
goreans) ἀκολουθοῦσα, τὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὑπέλα- 
ἴδια παρὰ τὴν τῶν Ἰταλικῶν ἔχουσα | Bov ἐξ ἀρχῆς οἱ πρῶτοι τὰς ἰδέας 
φιλοσοφίαν. | φήσαντες εἶναι. 


1 Not 9 as Jaeger says. 


2515} Cc 


XXXIV 


A. 987% 29-" 9. 
> / Ν 7 , 
ἐκ νέου Te yap συνήθης γενόμε- 
lal , Ν an c 
vos πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ηρα- 
κλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν 
lal Ν ͵ὔ 
αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης 
4 nw Ν Ν 
περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ 
Ψ Ψ Gap ‘ 
ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν 


Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ 
πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης 
φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ 
καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν 
ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, 


> tal > ὃ é/ ὃ \ Ν 
ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ 
“Ὁ ε / id Ν (4 / 
τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἑτέρων 

a / \ lol 
τοῦτο γιγνόμενον Kal οὐ τῶν αἰσθη- 
a ᾿ > \ A 
τῶν. .. οὗτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα 
“ m” / / 
τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, 
> \ -“ 
τὰ δ᾽ αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ 
ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα. 


INTRODUCTION 


M, 1078" 9-32. 
συνέβη δ᾽ ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα 


a n lal ‘A 
τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ TO πεισθῆναι περὶ 
“ lal 4 
τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις 

“ lal Ἂν 
λόγοις ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ 
9 Ν 
ῥεόντων, ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς 
ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν 
τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς 
ra / 
μενούσας" ov yap εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων 
ἐπιστήμην. 
ὧν ἊΝ Ν Ἂ > “τ 
Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς 
ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ 
4 ε / / A 
τούτων ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος 
πρώτου (τῶν μὲν γὰρ φυσικῶν ἐπὶ 
μικρὸν Δημόκριτος ἥψατο μόνον ... 
οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι πρότερον περί 
> , > tal δ᾽ > ,ὔ 
τινων ὀλίγων ... ἐκεῖνος δ᾽ εὐλόγως 
ἐζήτει τὸ τί ἐστιν συλλογίζεσθαι 
Ν > 4 3 ‘\ δὲ “ 
γὰρ ἐζήτει, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν συλλογι- 
σμῶν τὸ τί ἐστιν... δύο γάρ ἐστιν 
WA a 3 V6 / ,ὔ 
ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, 
τούς τ᾿ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ 
ε να / - cal , > 
ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου; ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν 
+ ae ete Ὑ ΄ ᾿, 59λλ᾽ 
ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης) --ἀλλ 
ε ὡς ΄ὔ Ν / 3 
6 μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ 
χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὁρισμούς" 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν. 


The only other reference to Socrates by name in the Meta- 
physics occurs in M, 1086°37-»5 τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 
ῥεῖν ἐνόμιζον καὶ μένειν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναί τε 
καὶ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι. τοῦτο δ᾽... ἐκίνησε μὲν Σωκράτης διὰ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, 
οὐ μὴν ἐχώρισέ γε τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον᾽ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας. 

The part that Aristotle assigns to Socrates in the history of 
philosophy is a comparatively modest one. In his review of 
previous philosophers he passes (987° 29) direct from the Pytha- 
goreans to Plato, and Socrates is introduced incidentally as one 
of the influences which affected Plato’s development. What is 
the value of Aristotle’s testimony? Prof. Taylor makes three 
statements, (1) ‘that Aristotle neither had, nor could have been 


SOCRATES, PLATO; ANDSTHE PLATONISTS. xxxy 


expected to have, any particular knowledge of the life and 
thought of Socrates, except what he learned from Plato, or read 
in the works of the ‘Socratic men”’’ ;! (2) ‘that every statement 
of importance made about Socrates in the Aristotelian corpus 
can be traced to an existing source in the Platonic dialogues’ ;? 
and (3) ‘that Aristotle exercised no kind of higher criticism on 
his documents, but simply accepted what he read in the Σωκρατικοὶ 
λόγοι of Plato and others as a dramatically faithful presentation 
of a real historical figure’. With the first statement I am 
generally in agreement, but I should prefer to say that Aristotle 
in all probability derived all his knowledge of Socrates from 
Plato and other members of the Academy. Aristotle was not 
born till fifteen years after Socrates’ death, and if a few stories 
about Socrates may have reached him at Stagira, it is pretty 
certain that he can have learnt nothing of importance about 
Socrates’ philosophical views till he became a student of the 
School of Plato. But there is a great gulf between the first of 
Prof. Taylor’s propositions and the other two, for these in 
effect ignore the fact that besides the dialogues Aristotle had 
Plato’s ἄγραφα δόγματα (to which in another context‘ he refers), 
and the whole verbal tradition current in the Academy, on which 
to draw for his knowledge of the teaching both of Socrates and 
of Plato. By his examination of Aristotle’s statements e/se- 
where about Socrates, Prof. Taylor makes good his case that 
all of these—all at any rate that have a philosophical importance— 
were or (as I should prefer to say) might have been derived 
from Plato’s dialogues.. But the first of the above-quoted pas- 
sages from M presents prima facie a powerful objection to both 
of the two latter of Prof, Taylor’s propositions. For according 
to the ordinary interpretation of his words Aristotle says that 
Socrates did not effect the ‘separation’ of the Ideas but that 
Plato did; and since the separation to which Aristotle objects 
is commonly supposed to be the sort of separation which is 
frequently put into the mouth of Socrates by Plato,’ the inference 
is commonly drawn that Aristotle distinguishes between the 
historical Socrates and the Socrates of the dialogues, and regards 


1 Varia Socratica, 40. ais 
8 ib. 41. * Phys. 209” 15. 
δ e.g. in Parm. 1308. Socrates says that he believes in χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη 
αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων av μετέχοντα. Cf. Phaedo 74 A, ὅτε, 
Ce 


XXXVI INTRODUCTION 


the latter as expressing the views not of Socrates but of Plato. 
himself. This would imply that Aristotle did not take the 
dialogues at their face value as historical accounts of Socrates’ 
views but exercised an independent judgement about them. 

To avoid this difficulty, Prof. Taylor supposes that ‘those 
who first said that there are Ideas’, who are the persons stated 
in the above passage from M to have differed from Socrates by 
separating the Ideas, are not Plato and his followers but the 
‘half-Pythagorean and half-Eleatic’! school of Megara (including 
Euclides and Terpsion)—the εἰδῶν φίλοι of Soph. 2484 who. 
assert ‘an absolute severance between γένεσις (process, fact) and 
ovoia’,* and with whom Plato in the Sophistes disagrees on this. 
ground, 

The answer to this suggestion lies in a comparison of the 
passage in M with that in A. In A Aristotle does not mention 
the separation and in M he does not mention Plato, but the 
reference in both passages to the influence of Heracliteanism, 
the identity of the way in which Socrates is introduced in both 
passages, and the identity, but for the change in number, of the 
final statement show that ‘those who first said there are Ideas’ 
in M means just Plato and his orthodox disciples. Prof. Taylor 
asks, ‘if Plato is distinguished as “ those who first said there are 
εἴδη ᾿᾿ from some one else who added that εἴδη are numbers, why 
does Aristotle constantly attribute the doctrine of the “ numbers” 
to Plato himself?’* But the distinction in 1078 9-12 is not 
between two persons but between two forms of the ideal theory, 
the theory of Ideas pure and simple as it was held originally (ἐξ 
ἀρχῆς, ib. 11) by the first believers in Ideas, and the theory of 
Idea-numbers. The earlier Plato and his first disciples are 
contrasted with his later self and his later disciples like Xeno- 
crates.‘ That Aristotle viewed Plato as the author of the ideal 
theory seems to be confirmed by £, JV. 1096" 12 καίπερ προσάντους 
τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. 
Is it likely that Aristotle would have spoken thus if the Ideas 
went back to the time of Socrates, who died long before he 
himself was born ? 

It is with Plato, then, and not with the Megarians, that 
Aristotle is contrasting Socrates, This can only mean one or 


τ δ ὥς Selb non Jey wey 
* Cf. Ps.-Al. 740. 18 (N.B, the singular ὑπέλαβεν), 741. 22. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND*THESPLATONISTS xxxvii 


other of two things. (1) He treats the Socrates of the dialogues 
as the historical Socrates, and contrasts the views put into his 
mouth with others which Plato expresses through other mouths 
in the dialogues, or expressed in his verbal teaching. Or (2) he 
treats the Socrates of the dialogues not as equivalent to the 
historical Socrates but as the mouthpiece of Plato’s own views, 
and contrasts these with those which he believes to have been 
held by Socrates himself. 

The first alternative is ruled out by what is implied both in 
the A passage and in the M passage, that it was not Socrates but 
those with whom he is contrasted that first used the word idea 
in its technical sense. It is notorious that the word is constantly 
used in such a sense by the Socrates of the dialogues. We are 
driven therefore to the second alternative, that Aristotle dis- 
tinguished clearly between the historical Socrates and the 
Socrates of the dialogues. Nor is this in the least incompatible 
with the supposition that all he knew of Socrates he learnt from 
the Academy, and perhaps even from Plato himself, It is 
natural to suppose that it was well understood in the Academy 
that Plato had in the dialogues sometimes used Socrates as the 
mouthpiece of Platonic and non-Socratic views, and Plato may 
very well have made this clear in his oral teaching. 

Prof, Taylor argues ' from the reference to Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι in 
Poet. 144711 that Aristotle meant by these a realistic type of 
composition in which truth to life was of the first importance and 
in which therefore Plato could not reasonably have ascribed to 
Socrates views quite different from those which he really held. 
But surely the important point is that the Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι are for 
Aristotle, just as muchas the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, 
forms of poetry or drama and not of history, that it is universal 
and not particular truth that is required of them, They are 
poetry, though written in prose, just as Empedocles’ works are 
not poetry, though written in verse. 

What Prof. Taylor’s view implies, if pushed to its logical 
conclusion, is that whenever Plato had original views to express, 
he was careful to put them into the mouth of some purely imaginary 
character. The views expressed by Parmenides and Timaeus, 
for instance, in the dialogues that bear their names, must be as 
historical as those expressed by Socrates, and all that we are 


So. Si S55 


XXXVIIL INTRODUCTION 


left with as the philosophy of Plato is what is said by the) 
‘strangers’ in the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Laws, and 
what we learn (mainly from Aristotle) about the theory of ideal 
numbers. Is it likely that Aristotle, his ablest pupil, the ‘mind 
of the school’, can have been so completely mistaken as this 
view implies that he was with regard to the fundamental nature 
of the dialogues? That he misunderstood some of Plato’s 
views is very probable, but that he should have thought Plato 
to be writing original philosophy when he was really only 
expounding other men’s views seems improbable. 


μὰς eluckauc If it be asked why Aristotle refers thus vaguely in M to ‘the 


Opes 


first believers in Ideas’ and not to Plato by name, the answer is 
to be found partly in the nature of Books M and N, partly in 
a delicacy for which Aristotle has not received the credit due to 
him. (1) MN is a study of various actual or even merely 
possible opinions conducted in as impersonal a manner as 
possible. It is throughout a criticism of the various forms of 
a general way of thinking which was common to the Pytha- 
goreans, Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates. ‘The Pytha- 
goreans’ is so vague an expression that Aristotle feels free to 
use it frequently, but Plato is mentioned only once,’ and 
Speusippus and Xenocrates never; all three are constantly 
referred to in the vaguest terms.2 (2) Aristotle seems to prefer, 
when he is criticizing Plato, not to mention him by name. Of 
the passages in the Metaphysics in which Plato is mentioned 
by name, A. 987* 29-988" 17 is mainly historical, with little 
criticism ; A. 988* 26, 990% 30, Z. 1028 19 are purely historical ; 
B. 996% 6, 1001" 9 are purely aporematic; in Τὶ τοιοῦ 12, A. 1o1g* 4 
Aristotle adopts a Platonic argument and a Platonic distinction ; 
KE, 1026 14, Κ. 1064" 29, A. τογοῦ 18 express a qualified approval 
(οὐ κακῶς is less faint praise in Greek than its literal equivalent 
in English); A. 1071 32—1072 4 expresses partial agreement, 
partial criticism ; M. 1083*32 states Plato’s view on a particular 
point to be better than those of his followers; only in 
1, 105313 ff. is Plato’s view simply attacked. To this last 
passage we must add A, 1025*6, where a particular argument in 
the Hippias Minor (not necessarily treated as having been 

1 1083” 32. 

* e.g. 1076% 19-21 of μὲν (Plato)... of δὲ (Xenocrates)... ἕτεροι δέ 
τινες (Speusippus). 


SOCRATES, PLATO,,AND THE PLATONISTS xxxix 


believed in by Plato) is described as illusory. On the other 
hand in the criticisms of the ideal theory which occur in A. 9, 
Z. 6, 8, II, 14, 15, M, N there are no explicit references to Plato 
except (1) A. 991} 3 = M. 1080* 2, a disparaging reference to the 
Phaedo, and (2) M. 1083 32, the comparatively laudatory reference 
mentioned above. It certainly seems as if Aristotle tried to 
avoid the direct mention of Plato when he was attacking the 
Platonic theory. 

There is a minor but interesting question, viz. whether Ari- ὭΣΤ 
stotle refers, as is maintained by ‘ Fitzgerald’s canon’,' to the 
historical Socrates as Σωκράτης and to the Platonic ἘΠ as 
ὁ Σωκράτης. Prof. Taylor maintains? that this canon is quite 
unfounded. The general practice in Greek is that the article is 
omitted with the names of persons except (a) in referring to 
a person already named in the context without the article (here 
ὃ = ‘the said’); (ὁ) to a person who is present and is pointed to ; 
(c) to a particularly famous person: so the practice is stated by 
Kihner.* Aristotle’s practice agrees with this in general. In 
Met. A there are fifty references to philosophers and poets with- 
out the article, and two with it—6é yap Παρμενίδης 986" 22, 6 μὲν 
yap Πλάτων 990% 29 (both explicable by (a) above). In the other 
books of the Metaphysics we find Πλάτων eleven times; in one 
passage* the best MSS. are divided as between Πλάτων and 
6 Πλάτων, and the latter form occurs nowhere else in these books. 
In the Rhetoric historical characters are mentioned at least 234 
times without the article, and there are (as far as I know) only 
twenty passages (other than those explicable by Fitzgerald’s 
canon) in which they occur with the article ;* some of these ° are 
explicable by (a) above, and the rest probably by (c). On the 
other hand Σωκράτης occurs in Aristotle’s genuine works 19 
times without the article and 22 times with it. This at once 
suggests that there is some special reason for the use of the 
article with this name, and the reason which naturally presents 


1 W. Fitzgerald, Selections from the Nic. Eth. of Aristotle, 163. 
ae 5.,, 41--1, 
° Gr. Gramm. § 462 (a). 4 A, 10707 18. 


δ 1357? 34, 1364" 19, 1365% 28, 136779, > 17, 19, 13684 20, Pnon 22, 
1384” 15, 1386 19, 1392 12, 13988 17," 31, 1399% 33, 1400} 17, 1401” 32, 
1402” 11, 140524, 141777. 

δ 1357” 34, 139817. Cf. Pol. 1270° 4-7, 1274° 31f., Poed. 14.535 24-29, 


xl INTRODUCTION 


itself is that Socrates is both a historical character and 
a character in Plato’s dialogues. The use of the article when 
he is referred to in the latter capacity may be explained as 
a sort of generalized form of such expressions as 6 ἐν Φαίδωνι 
Σωκράτης, ὃ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης. If this distinction is intended 
by Aristotle, we should expect to find Swxpdrys used generally 
with a past tense and ὁ Σωκράτης with the present. “Σωκράτης 
occurs with a past tense in Soph. El. 1837, P. A. 642° 28, 
Met. 9871, 107817, 1086%3, Ε. NM. 112725, 1144> 18, 28, 
1145°23, 25, 1147%15, Pol. 1260%22, Fhet. 1398824, 141998 

ὁ Swxpdrys with the present in Po/, 1261° 6, 12, 16, » 19, 21, 12626, 
9, 1264 29, > 7, 12918 12, 1316*2,> 27. There are other passages 
in which the verb throws no light on the question whether the 
real or the Platonic Socrates is meant, but the sense does so. 
In An. Post. 97°21, Met. 107828, Rhet. 1390 31, where there 
is no article, the sense clearly demands a reference to the 
historical Socrates. In the Politics the passages with the article 
(including 1263530, 1264* 12, ἢ 24, 29, 37 as well as those men- 
tioned above) occur, with one exception, in contexts in which 
the Republic is mentioned by name and its theories are under dis- 
cussion. (The exception is 1265 11 πάντες of τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, 
where the article is appropriately used, since Aristotle is referring 
to the Platonic dialogues; but the special reference is to the 
Laws. Aristotle either speaks carelessly as if Socrates had 
been a character in that dialogue, or deliberately identifies the 
‘Athenian Stranger’ with Socrates; Grote suggests that Plato 
intended this identification, and did not call the chief speaker 
Socrates, only because it was well known that Socrates had 
never been in Crete, where the scene is laid.) Thus Fitzgerald’s 
canon accounts for 35 out of the 41 passages. Further, it is not 
surprising if the article occasionally occurs with a past tense ; 
‘as Mr. Micawber said’ is hardly less natural than ‘as 
Mr. Micawber says’. £. NV. 11164 ὁ Σωκράτης φήθη refers to 
Laches 125, Prot. 360; FRhet. 1367” 8 6 Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν to Menex. 
235 D. There remain four exceptional passages. In Pol. 1342523 
we have ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο Swxpdare, where the reference is clearly 
to the Fepudblic ; but (a) Susemihl and Burnet regard the section 
in which this occurs as spurious, and (ὁ), if it is genuine, Prof, 


1 De Gen. et Corr. 335 10, Pol, 1342% 32, 
Je ᾿ 342° 3 


SOCKALTES<PBATO;AND#IT HE: PLAFONISTS oxi 


Cook Wilson’s emendation τῷ Σωκράτει may well be right after 
τοῦτο. In FRhet. 1415?30 we have λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, 
where the Menexenus is referred to; it is pardonable to suggest 
that in this one passage 6 has dropped out before the similar 
letter o. In Met. 107830, Rhet, 139831 ὁ Σωκράτης clearly 
refers to the historical person, but the former passage falls under 
Ktihner’s (a) and the latter probably under his (c). 

The canon is on the whole confirmed very strongly by Ari- 
stotle’s usage with other proper names, In £. ΜΝ, vii, for 
instance, Bywater observes’ that we have the article where the 
canon requires it in 1145°21, 1146821, 114833, 114915, 
1151» 18, and miss it only in 1145220. The rule is observed in 
twenty passages of the Politics,2 and ignored only in 134223 
(dealt with above) and in 1338* 28, where it is natural to restore 
(ὃ) “Odvace’s. In 1262? τι 6 ᾿Αριστοφάνης means Aristophanes 
in the Symposium. In the Rhetoric there are at least eighteen 
instances of the observance of the rule. Bywater admits only 
two exceptions—1415) 30 (dealt with above) and 1400* 27, where 
we may restore (6) ᾿Οδυσσεύς, Prof. Taylor, however, has 
pointed out several passages in which, of two literary characters 
referred to, only one has the article,’ as though Aristotle con- 
sidered that he had thus given a sufficient clue to his meaning. 
The article is exceptionally omitted in 1413? 26 (Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ 
Παλαμήδης). The Rhetoric also, as we have seen, uses the article 
occasionally of historical characters, and it would seem that in 
this, the most highly finished of Aristotle’s works, rhythmical 
grounds have led to a relaxation of the usual principle. In the 
Poetics there are at least 31 cases of the use of the article 
in accordance with the canon,‘ and only the following excep- 
tions :—6é θρῆνος ᾿Οδυσσέως ἐν τῇ Σκύλλῃ 1454°30 (not really an 
exception, because θρῆνος ᾿Οδυσσέως was presumably the regular 
way of referring to this part of the Scylla), ᾿οδυσσεύς 1454? 26, 
᾿Ορέστης ib. 31, Οἰδίπους 1460* 30, Σίσυφος 1456" 22, The dropping 
out of 6 before o and occasionally before o is clearly exceptio 
probans regulam. 


' Cont, to Text. Emend. of Aristotle's Nic. Eth, 52. 

2 Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of Poetry, 228. 

$ 139615, 13997 1, 528, 1400% 27, 1401} 35, 

* 1451 22, 14528 25, 27, Ὁ 5) 6, 7, 14536, 23, 24 167, 29, 145451, 2, 5, 
ΟΠ ST, TA, 145.5% 55,6, 75-27, © 10) 1460% 30, » 26, 1461912, 29,55, 7, 21 ὀζδι 


Respirpecs. 55: 

ied bh, ἃ. ὦ 

rots WA ust ἃ 
Socrates . 


xi INTRODUCTION 


The references to Socrates in the Metaphysics show that 
Aristotle held that Plato ‘separated’ the Ideas, and that Socrates 
did not. But we must agree with Prof. Taylor’ that the mean- 
ing of this phrase is by no means clear. Aristotle’s meaning 
seems to be that Socrates’ attempt to arrive at definitions of 
common terms (of which there are many examples both in 
Plato’s dialogues and in the Memorabilia) concentrated attention 
on universals, but that Socrates did not, any more than Aristotle 
himself, draw the conclusion that the universal exists as some- 
thing apart from the particulars; that either he had no theory 
on the subject, or he thought as Aristotle does that the universal 
exists only as the common element in particulars. Now to 
distinguish the universal from its particulars is in a sense to 
‘separate’ it. It is to think of it separately, and if the thought 
is not merely mistaken, this implies that the universal is 
a different entity from the particulars. What Aristotle means 
is that the Platonists treated the universal not merely as different 
from the particulars but as having a separate existence as well, 
1.6. (1) aS not existing as an element in particulars at all, or 
(2) as existing apart from them as well as in them. Now he 
refers frequently to the Platonic doctrine of the participation of 
the particulars in the Ideas, which implies the presence of the 
Idea as an element in particulars. His view of the Platonic 
doctrine must therefore be the second of those just mentioned. 

Whether he is right in this charge is a difficult matter on 
which to satisfy oneself. Much of Plato’s language lends itself 
to the charge, but it is hard to say how far he may not be simply 
putting in an emphatic and picturesque way the doctrine of the 
distinction of the universal from the particulars and of the im- 
portance of the universal, a doctrine in which Aristotle believed 
no less than Plato. Yet it is difficult to suppose that Aristotle 
could have so thoroughly misinterpreted a master with whom 
he was presumably for years in daily contact, as to take for 
a fundamental difference of view what was really a difference of 
emphasis and expression. It is more probable that he had real 
grounds for supposing that Plato and his orthodox followers 
(1) were, in the application of such words as παράδειγμα and εἰκών 
to the Idea and its particulars, expressing belief in the exist- 
ence of universals quite apart from particular instances, and (2) 


1 VS. 69 ff. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS ΣΙ 


in their zeal for the universal were losing sight of the particu- 
lars which after all are the facts with which any theory of the 
universe has to start.! 

There are certain other points in Prof. Taylor’s view of 
Socrates which call for some attention. Aristotle says that there 
are two things which may be ascribed to Socrates—inductive 
arguments and general definition. Prof. Taylor holds that 
inductive argument was in no special way characteristic of 
Socrates.” It would, of course, be as untrue to say that Socrates 
invented inductive argument as, in Locke’s phrase, to suppose 
that God has been ‘so sparing to men to make them barely 
two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them 
rational ’.* Prof. Taylor can without difficulty produce instances 
of the use of ἐπάγεσθαι for inductive argument from the early 
Hippocratean writings. But surely any one can recognize in 
Socrates, whether as depicted in the Memorabiha or as depicted 
in what are generally known as the ‘Socratic’ dialogues of 
Plato, a careful testing of general opinions by the examination 
of particular cases that is foreign to the previous schools ot 
Greek philosophy, with which Aristotle is here contrasting 
Socrates. In this sense the ascription of inductive argument to 
him as of something characteristic is thoroughly justified. 
Similarly in the careful and continual search for general defini- 
tions which we find both the Xenophontic and the Platonic 
Socrates pursuing there is something very different from either 
the bold uncritical definitions of the pre-Socratics’ or the 
acquiescence of common sense in mere descriptions or mere 
examples instead of definitions. 

Aristotle’s testimony is not, if our argument be sound, ‘in 
favour of the view that Plato’s dramatic portraiture of Socrates 
is, in all essentials, thoroughly historical’.’ It is against this 
view. Whether we think it decisive against this view will 
depend on our estimate of the force of the other arguments put 
forward in favour of the view, and on our estimate of Aristotle 
as a witness to facts in the history of philosophy two generations 


1 That Plato himself saw those dangers to be implied in the ideal 
theory is shown clearly enough by the first part of the Pavmenides ; that 
he ever succeeded in avoiding them is not so clear. 

WES Sinn Η, 8 Essay iv. 17. 4s 

4 Μ, 1078) 21, ETERS IS) οι 


xliv INTRODUCTION 


before his own time. As regards the latter point, his member- 
ship of the Academy for well-nigh twenty years surely implies 
that his testimony about Socrates is of great importance, He 
may be an unsympathetic and in some directions a hasty critic 
of the ideal theory, but on a question of fact, the question 
whether it was Plato’s own theory or that of Socrates that Plato 
expressed through the mouth of Socrates, he is unlikely to be 
mistaken. 

It is no part of my purpose to discuss the other arguments in 
favour of Prof. Taylor’s view. Every one must admire the skill 
with which he and Prof. Burnet have developed and supported 
by argument their hypothesis that the Socrates of the dialogues 
is the historic Socrates, a hypothesis which has brought new 
life into the study of Plato’s dialogues. It is both justifiable 
and important to work this hypothesis for all it is worth. 
Prof, Taylor has shown conclusively ' that the main facts in the 
biography of Socrates which is commonly accepted even by 
those who do not share his view are found in the dialogues of 
Plato, and have probably made their way into the accepted 
biography from no other source. 

The sketch of Socrates’ /ife and character which he has pieced 
together from the dialogues forms a coherent and lifelike whole. 
But on the question whether it was Socrates or Plato who first 
formulated the ideal theory Aristotle’s authority seems to me 
decisive. This is compatible with accepting Socrates’ account 
in the Phaedo’ of his early mental history as substantially true. 
Aristotle does not tell us that Socrates was a mere moralist who 
had never had any interest in physical or metaphysical questions. 
What he says is that when Socrates was interesting himself* in 
ethical questions and not in nature as a whole, Plato took him 
as his master, i.e. that Socrates’ influence on Plato belongs to 
the later part of his career, when, as Prof. Taylor himself 
maintains, the oracle given to Chaerephon had deflected the 
current of his life and transformed him from the head of the 
φροντιστήριον (which may well have been half-Anaxagorean, half- 
Pythagorean in its complexion ἢ into the critic of current ethical 
notions and the searcher for definitions of ethical terms. The 


1 In Plato’s Biography of Socrates. 
* 96 A-IOO A. 3 πραγματευομένου A, 987” 2 = Μ, 1078" 18, 
* Plato’s Biog. of Soc. 24. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND*THE PLATONISTS σῖν 


chronology in itself makes this probable. Prof. Taylor holds’ 
that the oracle was given before the beginning of the Pelopon- 
nesian war (i.e. before 431). Plato was born three years after 
this, and this consideration alone, if we follow Prof. Burnet and 
Prof. Taylor in holding the oracle to have been the turning- 
point in Socrates’ career,? would make it probable that Socrates 
was not the medium through which Plato became acquainted 
with the Pythagorean views out of which the ideal theory was, 
according to Aristotle, developed, but rather, as Aristotle 
implies, an influence on Plato independent of Pythagoreanism. 


Origin of Plato's views. 


We may now turn to Aristotle’s account of the origin of 
Plato’s views. According to him,’ Plato’s philosophy ‘in most 
respects followed * the Pythagoreans’, but was modified by two 
other influences:—(1) an early acquaintance with Heraclitean 
views, as represented by Cratylus, and a consequent conviction 
that as sensible things are always in flux, they cannot be the 
objects of knowledge; (2) the influence exerted by Socrates’ 
efforts to find general definitions of ethical terms. Three 
things here are somewhat surprising :—(1) the recognition of 
Plato’s doctrine as essentially akin to Pythagoreanism ; (2) the 
reference to an early association with Cratylus; (3) the absence 
of any reference to the influence of Eleaticism. 

(1) With regard to the first point it must be remembered that 


Aristotle has in mind the whole body of Plato’s teaching, in- | 


cluding the doctrine of ideal numbers, which is not found in the 
dialogues and therefore does not enter largely into our usual 
conception of his philosophy. This whole side of Platonism is 
plainly a development from Pythagoreanism. But even the 
ideal theory proper bears much resemblance to the Pythagorean. 
Aristotle states the relation between the two schools more defi- 
nitely ἢ by saying that while the Pythagoreans held that sensible 
things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato held that they exist 
by participation in Forms. Thé change from ‘imitation’ to ‘par- 
ticipation’ he regards as merely verbal but the change from 


1 ib. 26. Ὁ 1. ΤΌ. 5 οϑγῶ 30. 
* i.e. resembled. Cf. n. on A. 987% 30. * 987° 9. 


xlvi INTRODUCTION 


‘numbers’ to ‘Forms’ as more important. He later! amplifies 
his account by saying that Plato agreed with the Pythagoreans 
(a) in treating unity as a substance, not an attribute, and (ὁ) in 
treating numbers as the cause of the substantial nature of 
sensible things; and differed from them (a) in describing the 
material principle of the Forms not as a single thing, ‘the in- 
definite’, but as a ‘dyad’, the great and small, (ὁ) in saying that 
numbers are ‘apart from’ sensible things and not the things 
themselves, (c) in positing mathematical objects as entities 
‘intermediate’ between Forms and sensibles. Finally,’ the 
second of these divergences from the Pythagorean doctrine, 
and the introduction of the Forms, are said to be due to ἡ ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις σκέψις, While the first of the divergences is said to be 
due to a cause which need not concern us at present. 

The phrase ἡ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκέψις points back to the earlier 
statement that Socrates’ fixing of attention on definitions was 
an important factor in the development of Plato’s thought. The 
outcome of the whole passage, then, is that while the Platonic 
theory of Ideas was essentially akin to the Pythagorean theory 
of numbers, two modifications were due to Socrates’ insistence on 
the importance of careful definition, the recognition of unity and 
numbers as something apart from sénsibles, and the introduction 
of the Forms. What is the meaning of this? We know from 
other passages that the Pythagoreans identified things with 
numbers ; justice, they said, zs the number four, opportunity 
the number seven, and so on. Even sensible things were 
identified with numbers, and, as is implied in this, numbers 
were not grasped in their true nature as something abstract and 
independent of any particular material in which they may be 
exemplified, but were thought of as themselves material. In 
fact the notion of immaterial being had not yet been grasped. 
Attention to the problem of definition naturally led to a twofold 
divergence from the Pythagorean theory. (a) Plato was led to 
realize that a number must be different from the various 
particulars in which it may be embodied, and (ὁ) he was led to 
see that it is improper to put forward numbers as the very 
essence of other things; justice, for example, has a nature of its 
own and is not to be identified with four or any other number. 
These are the two ways, according to Aristotle, in which Socrates’ 

Deal 25. δέ τ δ ϑθι 


BOCKATES, PLATOFANDsTHESPLATONISTS © xlvii 


search for definitions produced features of Platonism which dis- 
tinguished it from Pythagoreanism. It is an example of the 
influence of logical inquiries on metaphysical views. 

(2) The recognition of the flux of all sensible things and the 
consequent impossibility of knowledge of them is present through- 
out the dialogues as the underlying assumption which does not 
need to be often emphasized because it is so unquestioningly 
taken for granted. What we should not have known from the 
dialogues is Plato’s early acquaintance with Cratylus. This 
cannot, I think, be merely Aristotle’s inference from the Theae- 
fetus and the Cratylus; there is nothing in those dialogues to 
suggest it. It seems to be a genuine piece of information 
derived in all probability direct from Plato; and it to some 
extent confirms the view that as regards Socrates also Aristotle 
was not entirely dependent on the dialogues for his information. 
His other piece of information about Cratylus ' may well come 
from the same source. 

(3) We might be tempted to suppose the Eleatics to be in- 
cluded among the ‘Italians’ whom, according to Aristotle, Plato’s 
philosophy in most respects followed. But a reference to what 
precedes and to other passages in which the word is used? 
shows that only the Pythagoreans are meant. The reason why 
Aristotle does not mention the Eleatics here probably is that 
he describes Plato as learning the lesson of Eleaticism from 
Cratylus and from Socrates. The Heraclitean insistence on 
the flux of all sensible things, Socrates’ insistence on the fact 
that there is something that can be known and defined, led 
Plato to draw the Eleatic inference that there is a non-sensible 
reality which is the object of knowledge.’ Eleaticism was 
mediated to him by Cratylus and Socrates. One misses, how- 
ever, a reference to the Eleatic Euclides of Megara, to whom 
Plato betook himself after the death of Socrates, and by whom 
he was considerably influenced.* 

These non-sensible objects of knowledge, Aristotle says,° 
Plato called Ideas, and it is implied that he was the first to use 
the term in this technical sense. Students of Greek philosophy 


Pea tOrors2. 

29879 10, 9888 26, De Caelo 293% 20, Meteor. 342” 30. 

δ᾽ 987" 5, 107815. 

* Cf. Burnet, Greek Philosophy i, pp. 230-237. 5-987" 7, 


Plote's μέσοι, 


rl Ook lus . 


Arilitte dots no 


Conmeel- Plats « 
fhe Keentiis, 


xl viii INTRODUCTION 


are much indebted to Prof. Taylor for the comprehensive study 
which he has made in Varia Socratica of the prose usage of the 
words εἶδος, ἰδέα down to the death of Alexander the Great. No 
one supposes that Plato used the words in a brand-new sense 
quite out of relation to their previous use. But there are certain 
contentions of Prof. Taylor’s as to their previous use which 
seem to be disproved by Prof. Gillespie’s study of his argument." 
One is that ‘the meaning ‘‘real essence” is the primary, the 
meaning ‘logical class”’ the secondary or derivative’ :? another 
is that the words, ‘wherever they occur in any but a most 
primitive sense, have a meaning due to their significance in 
Pythagorean geometry ’.* Prof. Gillespie has shown that in the 
Hippocratic writings εἶδος is frequently used in a sense which 
stands to the logical meaning of ‘class’ very much as the words 
‘form’, ‘kind’, ‘type’ do in the mouth of an unphilosophical 
Englishman. And he has shown that there is no evidence for 
the belief that the sense ‘geometrical figure’ which εἶδος seems 
to have borne at an early stage in the history of Pythagoreanism 
had any influence on the general use of the word. As regards 
Plato’s usage it is important to notice that both words as used 
by him imply a dependent genitive, and he speaks of ‘the 
Forms’ with an implied reference to the things of which they 
are the Forms. This in itself tells against the suggestion that 
εἶδος means a ‘simple real’; the Forms are for Plato simple 
entities, but that is not what the word means. In fact for the 
Platonic use Prof. Taylor's other translation ‘real essence’ 
seems to be just right. 

Aristotle’s attitude to the ideal theory and the nature of his 
criticism of it are matters of common knowledge, and it is not 
necessary to enter into these matters here. But it is worth 
while to consider what light Aristotle throws on the nature of 
any modifications that may have taken place in the ideal theory. 


‘The earlier and the later theory of Ideas.’ 

We must first consider Dr. Jackson’s view that an earlier and 
a later theory of Ideas can be traced in the dialogues.* He 

’ Classical Quarterly vi. 179-203. 

ano ued Os 5. ib. 180, 

4 Journal of Philology x. 253-298, xi. 287-331, xiii. I-40, 242-272, xiv. 
173-230, xv. 280-305. Cf. Prof. Taylor’s convincing criticism in Mind ν. ---- 
(N.S.) 304 n., 307-311. ἢ 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND *THE PLATONISTS © xlix 


holds that the later theory was distinguished in two main 
respects from the earlier. (1) It restricted the world of Ideas 
within very narrow limits; it recognized Ideas only of animal 
and vegetable types and of the four elements, rejecting Ideas of 
relations, of negations, of manufactured objects. (2) It stated 
the relation between the particulars and the Ideas no longer as 
one of participation, but as one of copying. 

(1) Aristotle seems to imply that Plato recognized Ideas only 
of ὁπόσα φύσει, only of those things which exist by nature ;1 
and he tells us that the current doctrine of Platonists in his 
time rejected not only Ideas of manufactured.objects, but also 
Ideas of relations and of negations.?- Whether Plato himself 
rejected the latter two classes we do not know; but we are 
definitely told that he rejected the first, and it seems possible 
that the reasons which led him to reject this might have led him 
to reject the others also. But Dr. Jackson seems to be wrong 
in holding that this rejection is to be found in the dialogues. 
In order to reach this result, he has to treat the Parmenides, 
which so far as it comes to any definite conclusion reaffirms the 
necessity of believing in an Idea answering to every common 
name, as if it rejected this necessity. He has to treat the 
μέγιστα γένη of the Sophist as not Ideas at all because they are 
abstractions like being and not-being and not animals, vegetables, 
or elements; and he has to treat the absence of any mention of 
Ideas of justice, beauty, and the like in the 77maeus as proving 
that when he wrote the 77maeus Plato did not believe in these 
Ideas ; when the fact is that Plato does not speak of such Ideas 
there because he is writing on physics and they would be quite 
out of place. 

The statements of Aristotle just referred to have been much 
discussed. It is notorious that Plato in several passages speaks 
of Ideas of manufactured objects.’ The theories that have been 
propounded in view of this fact are conveniently enumerated 
and well discussed in Robin’s Théorie Platonicienne des Idées et 
des Nombres,* a work of great learning and acuteness. (a) It 
may be said that when Plato speaks of Ideas of artefacta, he is 


1 A, 10708 18, 

2 A. 991°6, 9909 16, 13. 

8 Rep. 5968, 597, Crat. 389 8, 6. 4 174 ἢ, 
d 


2573-1 


l INTRODUCTION 


speaking loosely and perhaps half-humorously.! In reply it 
must be pointed out that Ideas of artefacta are required by the 
general doctrine that wherever there is a common name there 
is an Idea, and that the Ideas of bed and table form an integral 
part of Plato’s argument against art in the tenth book of the 
Republic. (δ) It may be said that Aristotle has misinterpreted 
Plato in saying that he recognized only Ideas of natural objects.’ 
But Aristotle’s statements agree with the definition put forward 
by Xenocrates as expressing Plato’s view: τοῦτον ὡς ἀρεσκόμενον 
τῷ καθηγεμόνι τὸν ὅρον τῆς ἰδέας ἀνέγραψε" αἰτία παραδειγματικὴ τῶν 
κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστώτων ... χωριστὴ καὶ θεία αἰτία. (c) It may be 
said, as by Dr. Jackson,‘ that Plato changed his opinion. But 
Aristotle does not speak of any change in the ideal theory in 
this respect, nor is any real evidence of a change to be found 
in the dialogues. (d) It may be suggested that it was only 
Plato’s disciples who changed the theory. Beckmann® supposes 
that the name of Plato is a later addition in the one passage 
where he is definitely named. But we should not have recourse 
to a violent assault on the text till more peaceable methods have 
first been tried ; and we must take some account of the testimony 
of Xenocrates. (e) Robin suggests that Plato rejected Ideas 
only of the products of the imitative arts, the copies which 
merely reproduce the outward form of their originals, and not 
the Ideas of the products of the useful arts, which have a form 
dictated by their end as truly as natural objects have; and that 
Aristotle misinterpreted him as having denied Ideas of the 
latter also. This suggestion agrees with the doctrine of the Fe- 
public, where the actual bed stands at one remove from the 
Idea (just as a natural object does), the painted bed at two 
removes. There is no Idea of the painted bed; its παράδειγμα is 
not an Idea but the actual bed. If this very plausible suggestion 
be right, Xenocrates and the Platonic school generally*® must 
have gone beyond Plato by banning Ideas of both types of 

1 So Proclus /z 77m, 29C, i. 344. 8, Diehl; Ravaisson, Zssaz i. 294 ff. ; 
Bonitz, 118 f. 

2 So Zeller, Plat. Stud. 262. 

δ᾽ Procl. Jz Parm. i. 888. 18, v. 136, Cousin. 

* So Susemihl, Genet. Entwick/. ii, 540; Ueberweg, Unters. 206f., 
Grunar. ἀν. 191; Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. ii. 1*. 703, 947 ; Heinze, Xenokr. 53f. 

5 Num Plato artefactorum ideas statuertt, 29-35. Cf. Alberti, Dze 
Frage tiber Geist u. Ordn. d. plat. Schrift. 75 1, ® A. 991° 6, 


SOCRATES, PLATOVANDSIHE PLATONISTS “hi 


artefacta, and Aristotle ascribes to the master what was true 
only of the disciples. 

On the question of Ideas of negations, of perishables, and of 
relations it may be enough to refer to the notes on A. ggo? 13-16, 
from which it will be seen that the belief in a clean-cut division 
between an earlier and a later ideal theory held by Plato 
himself is not supported by Aristotle’s statements. 

(2) In his other main thesis, that in the later Platonic theory 
the Ideas were no longer thought of as immanent in particulars 
but as transcendent, related to them solely as a pattern to its 
copies, Dr. Jackson is on still weaker ground. The Parmenides, 
on which he here chiefly relies, riddles the transcendence- 
theory with objections as completely as it does the immanence- 
theory, and the upshot of the dialogue is the recognition of the 
inadequacy of both metaphors alike to express the view which 
Plato still holds, that there must be Ideas to which particulars 
are somehow related and to which they owe their being. 
Further, the Aristotelian evidence on which Dr. Jackson takes 
his stand with regard to the range of the Ideal world entirely 
fails him with regard to the nature of the relation between Idea 
and particulars. Aristotle treats μέθεξις as the characteristic 
Platonic way of stating the relation, and he treats this as differ- 
ing only verbally from the Pythagorean way of stating the 
relation between numbers and sensible things, viz. as μίμησις." 
So little does Aristotle make’ of the distinction which seems to 
Dr, Jackson all-important. There is no suggestion whatever 
in Aristotle of an earlier and a later Platonic theory on this 
question. 

There is, however, in Aristotle much evidence of Platonic 
theories of which little or no trace can be found in the dialogues, 
and which partly belong to Plato’s later thought as it was 
expressed in the ἄγραφα δόγματα, and partly are due to develop- 
ments carried out by Speusippus and Xenocrates. 


The Ideal Numbers and Ideat Spatial Magnituaes. 


The first stage is the doctrine of the ἀσύμβλητοι ἀριθμοί which 


appears in Met. M. 6-8. This is no real advance or departure 
from the ideal theory as we know it from the dialogues ; it is 
1 A, 987? Io. ACF, 015,20. 
d2 


li INTRODUCTION 


merely the making explicit, with regard to Ideas of numbers, * 
of what was involved in their being Ideas. The ideal numbers 
are simply the natural numbers, i.e. the universals twoness, 
threeness, &c., of which all groups with two, three, &c., members 
are the particular instances. From their nature as Ideas it 
follows that they are specifically distinct and incomparable,’ 
i.e. incapable of being stated as fractions one of another. ‘Two- 
ness is not the half of fourness. Nor is a natural number an 
aggregate of units.’ If, therefore, the Platonists had been true 
to their principles, the question which Aristotle presses on 
them, whether the units in ideal numbers are comparable or 
not, would have fallen to the ground. Their answer would 
have been that there are no units in ideal numbers. It is 
possible that Plato held this view, but certainly some of the 
Platonists did not. Aristotle says (10808) that the views 
(a) that all units are comparable, and (ὁ) that the units in each 
number are comparable to each other but not to those in 
any other number, both found support among the Platonists, 
but he does not expressly assign either to Plato, In view of 
the general nature of their doctrines we may perhaps ascribe 
(a) to Speusippus and (ὁ), the compromise theory, to Xenocrates. 
The third view (c), that all units are incomparable, had no 
supporters (1080» 8, 10814 35). 

It should be added that a belief in ideal spatial magnitudes, 
no less than in ideal numbers, is implied in the Platonic theory 
as we know it from the dialogues. These also must be ‘incom- 
parable’, The idea of quadrilateral is not larger or smaller 
than or equal to the idea of triangle, nor can they be added 
together so as to make the idea of some other figure. The 
substance of what Aristotle has to say about the ideal μεγέθη is 
indicated in a later section of this essay. 


1 For which cf. Phaedo ΤΟΙ C5. 
2 
1080° 17, 1083 34. 
8 Syr. 113. 24 τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἐν ἐκείνοις (sc. τοῖς εἰδητικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς) τὸν 
A > , Ν ὃ \ Le} ὃ , ἊΝ ‘ > / fol > / 
μοναδικὸν εἰσάγειν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διπλασίαν ποιεῖν τὴν αὐτοδυάδα τῆς αὐτομονάδος, 
΄ > N > , " > \ ny ΄ ΄ “ - ee 
σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἐπιπόλαιον' οὐ yap διὰ ποσότητα μονάδων ἕκαστος τῶν ἐκεῖ 
> a -" ‘ ᾽ , 4 > ν᾿ ΄ a , 
ἀριθμῶν ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἣν εἴληφεν, ἀλλὰ κατά τινα χαρακτῆρα θειοτάτης 
ν , Mees Ἂν \ an > “ > - > 
καὶ ἁπλουστάτης οὐσίας... ὅμοιον οὖν μοναδικὸν πλῆθος ἐπιζητεῖν ἐν τοῖς εἰδη- 
ποὺς ΝΜ , 2 a a , a >» “ > el 
τικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ἧπαρ ἢ σπλῆνα σπλάγχνων τε τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ 


> , 
αὐτοανθρώπῳ. 


SOCRATES, PEATO, ANDsIHE PLATONISTS. liti 


τὰ μεταξύ. 

This is the doctrine that mathematical numbers and the other 
objects of mathematics form an order ot entities intermediate 
between Ideas and sensible objects. Aristotle expressly ascribes 
this doctrine to Plato,' and he tells us clearly what was the 
ground of the doctrine.? The objects of mathematics could not 
be sensible particulars because they were eternal and unchange- 
able ; they could not be Ideas because there were many alike, 
while each Idea is unique. Take, for instance, the propositions 
‘two triangles on the same base and between the same parallels 
are equal in area’. What are these two triangles? They are 
different from the Idea of triangle. This, from its nature as | 
a universal, is unique. Ifthere were two Ideas of triangle, there 
would have had to be another, genuine Idea whose form they 
would have possessed.’ On the other hand, Plato seems to have 
argued, the two triangles cannot be sensible triangles, since the 
proposition would still be true if all the sensible triangles that 
now exist ceased to exist; they are eternal while the sensibles 
are transient. Therefore there must be a third class of entities 
to which these belong. Similarly, when we say 2 and 2 makes 
4, we are not speaking of the Idea of two, since to suppose this 
duplicated and then added to itself is absurd. Nor are we 
speaking of sensible twos, since the proposition would be true 
even if all the sensible twos ceased to exist. 

The doctrine of ‘intermediates’ is not a purely fantastic and 
negligible one. It is an answer to a real question, the question 
involved in the notion of ‘any’. What do we mean when we 
say that ‘man is mortal’? We do not mean that ‘manness’ 
is mortal ; nor that the human race is mortal; nor that A, B, and 
C, certain definite men, are mortal. We mean that any man is 
mortal, and it is not unnatural to suppose that the subject of this 
proposition is a separate entity. The argument may be extended 
beyond the sphere of mathematics and applied to the objects of 
all the sciences. Political economy makes statements about 
what happens when two economic men enter into certain relations. 


1 4, 987>14. In the note ad loc. I have tried to show that the doc- 
trine is a natural conclusion from views expressed in the dialogues, 
though it is not actually expressed in any dialogue except the 7ziaeus. 

2 987>16. Cf. B. 1002» 14. 8 Rep. 597 C. 


thee ropecially , wo enue site A’ Ww wth auk pws al οὐ Prosd. 


liv INTRODUCTION 


Who are these economic men? They are not the Idea of the 
economic man, and they are not men of flesh and blood. Plato 
does not appear to have extended the doctrine of the inter- 
mediates beyond pure mathematics, but Aristotle notes the 
logical necessity for its extension beyond that sphere, if it is 
maintained within that sphere. Astronomy must have as its 
object a third heaven between the ideal heaven and the material 
heaven; there must be ‘intermediate’ objects of optics, harmonics, 
and medical science.’ 

Aristotle’s own conception of the objects of mathematics, or 
rather of geometry, itself assigns to them an intermediate 
position, though not as a class of separate entities between two 
other classes of separate entities. According to him the objects 
of geometry are sensible things considered in abstraction from 
their sensible qualities. Consider sensible things simply as 
having boundaries of a certain shape, and you are considering 
the objects of geometry. But a further act of abstraction is 
possible. Not only may you think away the ‘sensible matter’ 
of sensible things, but you may think away the ‘intelligible 
matter’ of geometrical objects, their extension,’ and you then 
come to the essence of the straight line, of the circle, &c., i.e. the 
formula of its construction which we express by its equation and 
which the Platonists expressed, more crudely, by assigning the 
number 1 as the form of the point or ‘indivisible line’, 2 as the 
form of the line, 3 as that of the plane, and 4 as that of the solid.’ 
Aristotle seems to accept the distinction between τὸ εὐθεῖ εἶναι 
(= δυάς) and τὸ εὐθύ. Thus the object of geometry is intermediate 
between the fully concrete sensible thing and the final result of 
abstraction, the pure form. 

But, Aristotle would say, it makes all the difference between 
his own and the Platonic view that he assigns no separate 
existence to either the intermediate or the final result of 
abstraction, while the Platonists assign a separate existence to 
both. The merits of the controversy between them thus turn on 
the same point which arises with regard to his discussion of the 
Ideas, viz. whether the Platonists meant by their χωρισμός the 
recognition of a factual separateness or only that of a cognizable 
difference between the things ‘separated ’. 


’ B. 997 15-32, M. 10777 1-9. 7 O30" 11 
> De An..404” 18-25. * ib. 429 18-20, Cf. H. 1043% 33. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS lv 


There is another respect in which the ‘separation’ of the 
objects of mathematics resembles that of the Ideas. Aristotle 
speaks as if τὰ μαθηματικά differed from τὰ αἰσθητά only as the 
abstract from the concrete. Abstract from the bronzeness of 
the bronze ball, he says, and you will find a mathematical sphere. 
But what you will find in fact is a very imperfect approximation 
to a sphere. In certain contexts Aristotle notes this fact; he 
points out that in geometry we may ‘suppose a line to be a foot 
long when it is not’, and that our proof is not vitiated by this. 
Similarly he knows that the ‘straight lines’ and ‘circles’ used 
in geometrical diagrams are not really straight lines and circles.' 
But he does not take account of the fact in his statement of the 
mode of existence of τὰ μαθηματικά. With Plato, on the other 
hand, the perception of this fact must have been one of the motives 
of his separation of mathematical objects from sensibles. τὰ 
μαθηματικά are not, as Aristotle maintains that they are, qualities 
present in sensible things; they are perfect figures such as the 
regular solids, to which the things of sense are but approximations. 
In this respect the separation of τὰ μαθηματικά is like the separa- 
tion of the Ideas. For those too are not, as Aristotle implies 
that they are, qualities present equally and completely in every 
particular ; they are such things as the ideal beauty and the ideal 
justice which transcend all objects admired as beautiful and all 
acts which pass for just. In this respect they are unlike Aristotle’s 
universals. 

Is Plato right in assigning separate existence to the objects of 
mathematics ? To Aristotle planes, lines, and points exist only 
potentially in the sensible bodies which exist actually. The 
plane is that at which the solid may be divided; the line that at 
which the plane may be divided ; the point that at which the 
line may be divided. Plato asserts their actual existence, and 
surely rightly. To cut a ball in two is not to bring into existence 
the common plane of its halves, it is to drive your knife along 
a plane that is already there. 

Thus, to sum up, the doctrine of the ‘intermediates’ turns 
(1) on the existence of propositions of the type ‘any X is Y’. 
So far as this goes the doctrine is unjustified. The many twos, 
for example, involved in the propositions of arithmetic are the 
pairs of ordinary life, thought of in abstraction from their special 


1M, 1078" 19, B. 997} 35—9989 4, dn. Pr. 49” 35. 


vi INTRODUCTION 


nature and only with regard to their common nature as pairs. 
Every pair of things is a two; it may be designated from another 
point of view by another number as well (just as what is one 
week is also seven days), but this does not prevent it from being 
fully and perfectly a pair. It is difficult, no doubt, to state how 
we can be judging about all pairs without thinking of any in 
particular ; but what is needed is not the recognition of a special 
entity but a closer reflection on the nature of judgement. 

(2) But as regards the objects of geometry another considera- 
tion comes into play. The ‘spheres’ and ‘circles’ of common 
life are not spheres and circles at all, and it is not of them that 
geometrical propositions are true. Such propositions are true 
of the perfect geometrical figures which thought recognizes as 
existing in space though their boundaries do not coincide with 
those of any sensible figure. It is these perfect figures which, 
with the ‘mathematical numbers’, are Plato’s intermediates. 

Aristotle sees that whatever numbers are implied in the truth 
of arithmetic must be retained, and no others, and he therefore 
rejects the ideal numbers and retains the ‘mathematical ’, though 
he regards them as having no separate existence. But in truth 
the mathematical numbers, as described by Plato in contrast to 
the ideal numbers and to sensible aggregates, are just those 
which arithmetic does not require. Aristotle would have done 
better to reject them and to accept the ideal numbers. 

Aristotle recognizes three views about τὰ μαθηματικά from 
which he distinguishes his own. There is (a) Plato’s view that 
they are κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν. There is-(6) the Pythagorean 
view that they are in sensible things and constitute them, the 
sensible thing being an aggregate of planes, and ultimately of 
numbers.” And there is (c) an intermediate view, that they are 
ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς as separate entities though occupying the same 
space as the αἰσθητά. Alexander‘ thinks that this also was 
a Pythagorean view, but it is clearly distinguished ἢ from the 
view which is described as that of the Pythagoreans.® And, further, 
it is opposed by arguments’ which are appropriate only against 


1 Β, 997 12—998* 6, M. 1076* 34. 

2 A, 987» 27, M, 10802, 16, N. 1090* 20-23, 

5 B. 998% 7-19, M. 1076% 33. 

4 724. 33-38. 5 M. 1080? 2, 
55. 16. 7 B, 998" 11, M. 1076" 1, 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS Wii 


believers in the Ideas. It is therefore to be regarded as the 
expression of an eclectic, half-Pythagorean, half-Platonic way of 
thinking. 


The derivation of Ideal Numbers from their first principles. 


A further phase in the development of Platonic theory was the 
derivation of the ideal numbers from a formal principle, the One, 
and a material principle which is variously named. The 
description of the material principle as ‘the great and the small’ 
is expressly ascribed to Plato in A. 987» 20, 25, 988°8-14, 26, 
Phys. 187" 17, 203% 15, 209 33. The last passage is specially 
interesting. ‘Plato ought to tell us why the Forms and the 
numbers are not in place, since τὸ μεθεκτικόν is place, whether τὸ 
μεθεκτικόν is the great and the small or, as he writes in the 
Timaeus, is matter.’ Simplicius observes that it was in the un- 
written lectures on the Good that Plato called the receptive 
material by the name of the great and the small; and Simplicius 
is probably right. The ‘more-and-less’ of Phil. 24 is an 
earlier form of the phrase. 

The description of the material principle as a dyad is referred 
to Plato in A. 987° 25, 33, 9888-14. This principle is, further, 
frequently referred to as ‘the unequal’ or ‘inequality’, and the 
association of this phrase with ‘the great and the small’! suggests 
that it also was used by Plato himself. 

The material principle is, once more, frequently referred to as 
‘the indefinite dyad’. There has been more controversy than the 
importance of the matter warrants over the question whether this 
phrase also was used by Plato. The phrase is often found un- 
connected with any ofthose mentioned above, but in M. 1083" 23-- 
36, N. 1088* 15, 10go 32—r1091" 5 it is connected with ‘the great 
and the small’, and therefore presumably assigned to Plato. 
This is confirmed by Theophrastus,? Alexander,’ Simplicius,* 
Syrianus, Asclepius, and Hermodorus (an immediate disciple of 
Plato). In spite of this evidence Trendelenburg, Susemihl, and 
Zeller (in Platonische Studien) considered that ‘the indefinite 


1 N, 1087 7, 9-11, 1091” 31. 2 Fr, xii. 33, Wimmer. 

8. 56. 16-21, 33-35, 85. 16-18. Alexander refers to Aristotle’s notes of 
Plato’s lectures on the good. 

* Phys. 454. 22—455. 11 (quoting Alexander). 

5 Quoted in Simpl. PAys. 247. 30 -- 248. 18 (cf. 256. 31—257. 4). 


viii INTRODUCTION 


dyad’ was not a Platonic expression, and Heinze maintained 
that it was peculiar to Xenocrates. But Zeller later abandoned 
this view, and M. Robin? shows the weakness of the arguments 
on which it rests. There is little doubt that this expression also 
was used by Plato in his lectures. One passage,’ however, 
deserves special notice. Aristotle says that ‘there are some who 
make the principle which co-operates with the One an indefinite 
dyad, but object, reasonably enough, to the phrase ‘the unequal”, 
owing to the impossible results that follow from it; but they 
have escaped only so many of the difficulties as follow necessarily 
from making the unequal, i.e. a relative term, anelement’ ; 1. 6. 
whereas Plato had used the expressions ‘the unequal’ and ‘the 
indefinite dyad’ indifferently for the material principle, some of 
his followers, for the reason stated, confined themselves to the 
latter, which probably became a more important technical term 
for them than it was for Plato. 

In several passages the material principle is described as 
plurality, and it is stated or implied that the thinkers who 
described it so were different from those who used _ the 
above-mentioned terms.* A comparison of N. rogt? 30-35 with 
1og1429-) 1, A. 1072" 30-34 suggests that Speusippus adopted 
this phraseology, and a passage in Plutarch,‘ if it is to be 
trusted, shows that Xenocrates also adopted it. 

In N. 1087" 16 Aristotle tells us that some Platonists described 
the material principle of the ideal numbers as ‘¢he many and few’, 
on the ground that ‘the great and small’ was more appropriate 
as the principle of ideal spatial magnitudes.’ We find here, 
again, evidence of an amendment, within the Platonic school, of 
Plato’s own description of the material principle. A similar 
change is indicated by N. 108717-21, where we are told that 
some thinkers substituted the more general expression τὸ 
ὑπερέχον καὶ TO ὑπερεχόμενον for ‘the great and the small’. 
Sextus Empiricus ἢ treats this as one of the essential Pythago- 
rean oppositions,’ and M. Robin suggests * with some probability 
that it was Platonizing Pythagoreans of the school of Hippasus 
who described the material principle in this way. 


1 pp. 649-654. 2 N. 1088? 28. 
° M. 1085 4-10, N. 1087” 5, 6, 8, 30, 1091” 31, 1092% 35-1. 
4 De An. Procr. ii. 1, 1012 ἢ, 5 Cf, N, 1088" 18, » 5-13, 1089» 11-14. 


® Adv. Math. x. 263 ff. MCE ANIL, Glen ΤΟΣ 8 p. 659. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS. lix 


Finally, others are said to have described the material 
principle as τὸ ἕτερον or τὸ ἄλλο. θάτερον occurs in Plato as an 
expression for the material principle,’ but in the context Aristotle 
distinguishes those who used these as their official titles for the 
material principle from Plato. Alexander says that they were 
Pythagoreans,’ and he may well be right; much of the terminology 
of the Zizmaeus is very likely Pythagorean rather than Platonic. 

It is difficult to discover the precise way in which the Platonists 
carried through the bold attempt to generate the number-series. 
For Aristotle the function of the indefinite dyad is essentially 
duplicative (dvorows).4 It is a sort of plastic material (ἐκμαγεῖον) ἢ 
which has the property of producing two copies of the pattern 
imposed on it. It ‘took the definite dyad and made two dyads’.* 
And so Aristotle is able to say that the Platonic elements can 
only produce τὸν ἀφ᾽ ἑνὸς διπλασιαζόμενον (ἀριθμόν) 2, 4, 8, ἅς. 
are produced from the One by a series of multiplications by the 
indefinite dyad. Aristotle describes* three modes of the pro- 
duction of number. ‘In one way, if the One falls on an even 
number, an odd number is produced’ (sc. by addition); ‘in 
another way, if the dyad falls’ (sc. on the One), ‘2 and its powers 
are produced’ (sc. by multiplication) ; ‘in another way, if the odd 
numbers fall’ (sc. on even numbers), ‘ the other even numbers 
are produced’ (sc. by multiplication). If this line of thought be 
followed out, the numbers up to τὸ would have been produced as 
follows : 


It 2 Ξ- 2 2X2 = 4 Aix =a 
2+-i=3 Γι 5 8+1=9 
a x20 5x2=I10 
ΘΙ ΞΞ 7 


But it is practically certain that it was not thus that Plato con- 
ceived the numbers as being generated. This presentation 
takes account of the fact that the material principle was a dyad ; 
it takes no account of its being indefinite, nor of what was 


' N. 1087? 26, 2 Tim. 35 A, B. 

8 798. 23. Cf. Damascius, De princ. 306; ii. 172. 20 54., Ruelle. ’Ape- 
στοτέλης δὲ ἐν τοῖς ᾿Αρχυτείοις ἱστορεῖ καὶ Πυθαγόραν ἄλλο τὴν ὕλην καλεῖν. 

4 M. 1082% 14, 1083? 35. 

DING Ghee Ti SoM Ooo Ὁ2. 7 N, 1091® Io. 

8. Μ, 10843. The interpretation of A. 987” 34 is too doubtful for any 
conclusions to be drawn from it. 


Ix INTRODUCTION 


apparently for Plato its fundamental character, that ot being 
‘great and small’; ‘dyad’ seems to have been simply a con- 
venient way of referring to this twofold character of the material 
principle.! Again, this way of generating numbers is as regards 
the odd numbers simply addition (which according to Aristotle’s 
own view is the only mode of generation of numbers),? and as 
regards the even numbers it is simply multiplication, which is 
just abbreviated addition; but Plato distinguished the ideal from 
the mathematical numbers just in this, that while the latter 
were addible the former were ποί. ὃ 

There are indications that the Platonists proceeded by quite 
a different road. Aristotle explains aptly in Phys. 206 27 why 
Plato called the material principle ‘great and small’. ‘ Plato 
made the indefinites two in number for this reason, that the 
indefinite is thought to exceed and to proceed to infinity both in 
the direction of increase and in that of diminution.’ This is just 
the picture of ἀπειρία that we get in the Philebus. It is vague 
quantitativeness, that which ranges from the infinitely great to the 
infinitely small, and which, to become any definite quantity, must 
be determined by πέρας or as Aristotle says, by the One. It is 
not, as Aristotle usually depicts it'as being, two things, the great 
and the small, but, as he occasionally calls it,‘ the great-and- 
small, one thing with opposite potentialities. As Simplicius 
expresses it,° quoting Alexander, who in turn was drawing upon 
Plato’s lectures on the good, ‘each of the numbers, in so far as 
it is a particular number and one and definite, shares in the 
One ; in so far as it is divided and is a plurality, in the indefinite 
dyad’. Further light is thrown on the matter, and especially on 
the description of the material principle as the unequal, by 
a quotation of Simplicius * from Hermodorus. According to him, 


' Al. 56. 8-13 gives a rather different explanation. He says that the 
dyad was selected as the material principle because it is the first thing 
after I in the number-series and contains the much and the little in their 
lowest terms, since its factors are in the ratio of 2:1. But this amounts 
to making the #zmber 2 the material principle of all numbers (including 
itself). The material principle is not the number 2 (the ‘ definite dyad’), 
but the indefinite dyad ; Aristotle is careful to preserve this distinction. 

2M. 1081” 14. 3 Μ, 1082» 28-36, 

* B. 998? 10, M. 1083 23, 31, N. 10878. 

> Phys. 454. 22—455. 11. δ ib. 247. 30—248. 18. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS xi 


Plato divided existing things into two classes, the καθ᾽ αὗτά (e. g. 
man, dog), and the zpos érepa, which are divided in turn into the 
πρὸς ἐναντία (e.g. good and evil) and the πρός τι (e.g. right and 
left, high and low). Among the πρὸς ἕτερα some are definite, 
others indefinite; ‘and those that are spoken of as great 
relatively to small all have the more and the less, as being borne 
to infinity by being in a higher degree greater or less. Similarly 
‘broader’ and ‘narrower’, and ‘heavier’ and ‘lighter’, and 
all such terms will be borne to infinity. But terms like ‘equal’ 
and ‘at rest’ and ‘in tune’ do not admit of the more and less, 
while their contraries do, for one unequal is more so than 
another, one moved more moved than another, one thing out of 
tune more so than another. All things,’ again, in both kinds of 
pairs (sc. the pairs of πρὸς ἐναντία terms and the pairs of πρός τι 
terms), except the one element (sc. the One), admit of the more 
and the less, so that what is of this sort is called unresting, 
infinite, formless, and not-being, by reason of negation of being’. 
One further extract from Simplicius is important; that in which 
he says that the movement of the dyad ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς ἀπειρίας ἀόριστον 
proceeds κατ᾽ ἐπίτασιν καὶ dveow.? 

In accordance with these indications and with Plato’s thought 
as expressed in the Philebus, it seems most probable that Plato 


thought of the ideal numbers not_as being reached by addition 
or by multiplication, but, vaguely enough, as successive resting- 

laces determined by the principle of limit in the indefinite ebb 
and flow of the ἀπειρία, the great-and-small. But it must be 
remembered that according to Aristotle Xenocrates identified the 
ideal with the mathematical numbers. In his account of the 
matter a more mathematical generation of the numbers may 
have come in, and it is probable that Aristotle’s account is based 
on Xenocrates rather than on Plato. If we are right in our 
view of Plato’s meaning, the material principle for him was the 
great-and-small, a single thing capable of indefinite expansion 
and of indefinite restriction. But Aristotle habitually speaks of 
the great and ¢he small. Itseems probable, then, that Xenocrates 
presupposed two material principles, the great and the small, and 
may have thought of them as being equalized by the One and as 
thus constituting, each of them, one of the units in the number 2. 
It is probably also to this way of thinking that the identification 


! The reading and translation here become doubtful, Seas Ga Us 


Ixil INTRODUCTION 


of the One with the odd! or with the middle unit in odd numbers 
belongs.’ 

There is one statement which prima facie contradicts the 
account we have suggested. In M. 10814 22 Aristotle says ‘the 
units in the first two are generated simultaneously, whether, as 
the first holder of the theory said, from unequals—for they were 
produced by the equalization of these—or otherwise’. Here 
Plato himself is credited with thinking of two unequal parts of 
the material principle, which are equalized by the formal principle 
and thus produce the two units in the number 2.° Aristotle, how- 
ever, expresses some doubt as to this method of production ; 
‘does each unit come from the great and small equalized’, he 
asks, ‘or one from the small, the other from the great?’‘ It is 
probable that he is here working on slight and obscure evidence 
as to Plato’s meaning. It is significant that, though he here 
implies that there are two ‘unequals’ in the material principle, 
it is not called ‘the unequals’ but ‘the unequal’ or ‘inequality ’.° 
The reason why the material principle is so called is given in 
the above-quoted fragment of Hermodorus. ‘Unequal’ is a 
synonym for ‘indefinite’, because if one thing is merely known 
to be unequal to another we know nothing definite about its 
actual size. We can hardly doubt that Plato’s meaning would 
be more truly expressed by saying that the number 2 is produced 
ἐκ τοῦ dvicov ἰσασθέντος, from the unequal or indefinite when 
equated or defined by the One, than it is in Aristotle’s phrase 
ἐξ ἀνίσων ἰσασθέντων. 

To return to the presumably Nenocratean account, it is note- 
worthy that Aristotle says* that ‘the Platonists produce many 
things out of the matter, but the form generates once only’. 
This, taken in connexion with Aristotle’s comments on it, seems 
to mean that the formal principle, the One, is operative only in 
the production of a single number, which must, of course, be the 
first number, two ;7 it would follow that the subsequent numbers 
are produced by the operation not of the One but of some other 


1M. 1084? 36. 2M. 1083? 29. 

® Cf. N. 1091° 23, where Plato is not mentioned by name. 

* M. 1083? 23. 

5 B, 1001) 23, I. 1056*10, A. 10759 32, Ν, 1087” 5, 7, 9-11, 1088» 20, 
1089” 6, 10, 1091 31, 1092” 1. 

8 A. 9884 2. : 7M, 1081922, 1084» 37, 


SOCRATES, REAL Oy ΝΕ PEATONISTS ««Ixii 


formal principle on the indefinite dyad. And in fact 4 is de- 
scribed as produced by the operation of the number 2 on the 
indefinite dyad,’ and 8 by the operation of the number 4 on the 
indefinite dyad.? Similarly, we may suppose, 3 generated 6 
and 5 generated το. But how were 3, 5, 7, and g generated ? 
In one passage ® Aristotle tells us that the Platonists say there is 
no generation of odd number, but elsewhere he says that the One 
is the odd,‘ or, more definitely, the middle unit in odd numbers,’ 
It may be that, asked whence came the odd unit in odd numbers, 
Xenocrates answered that it is the One itself. Ifthis be so, the 
One discharges a double function. In the production of 2 it is 
a principle of form or limit operating on the indefinite dyad ; in 
the production of 3 from 2 it is an actual element in the product, 
and so too in the production of 5 from 4, 7 from 6, and g from 8. 
Aristotle actualiy charges the Platonists with using the One in 
this double way; ‘they make the One a first principle in both 
ways—on the one hand it acts as form and essence, on the other, 
as a part and as matter’.® The cause of this mistake is that 
‘ they were pursuing the question both from the point of view of 
mathematics and from that of general definitions’ ;’ i.e. they 
made the mistake which Aristotle elsewhere charges Xenocrates ὃ 
with making, that of confusing the mathematical with the philo- 
sophical treatment of numbers. Alexander gives a different 
account of the odd unit in odd numbers—that it is one of the 
portions of the indefinite dyad, after the One has determined 
it ;° but this does not agree with Aristotle’s statements. 

M. Robin” has a different view of the production of the odd 
numbers. Suppose the ‘indefinite’ to be increasing. Then, 
says M. Robin, the Platonists think of the One as checking the 
process first when the indefinite has reached twice its original 
size. The number 2 is thus produced. But the indefinite dyad , 
goes on increasing: the One again checks it when it has again 
doubled itself, and so 4 is produced, and similarly 8. Again, the 
indefinite may be supposed to increase from 2 and at the same 


1M. 108121, [0825 12; 33. 2 M. 1082* 30. 

5 N. 1091223, where see note. 4M, 1084% 36. 

5 Μ, 1083 209. 6 M, 1084? 18. ΤΠ: 22. 
8 


Not by name, but we can be fairly sure that Xenocrates is meant. 
Cf. pp. Ixxiv—Ixxvi. 
* 57. 22-28. Ὁ pp. 446-450. 


Ixiv INTRODUCTION 


time, and at the same rate, to decrease from 4; the One checks 
both processes at the point where they meet, and 3 is produced. 
6 is produced from 3 as 4 was from 2. 5 is produced from 4 and 6 
as 3 was from 2 and 4, and 1o from 5 as 4 was from 2. ‘Finally, 
7 is produced from 6 and 8, and g from 8 and to, as 3 was from 2 
and 4. This account has the great merit of assigning to the 
indefinite dyad nothing but indefinite increase and decrease, 
and to the One no task except that of limiting this, and thus 
keeps closely in touch with the Philebus, as well as with 
Phys. 206527. Its defect, to my mind, is that the process 
it describes is neither such as we can well ascribe to Plato nor 
such as we can well ascribe to Xenocrates, but a cross between 
the two, When the numbers are treated, as they were by Plato, 
not as aggregates, but as specifically different forms or universals, 
the essence of each number is not that it contains so many units 
(for it does not contain units at all) but that it is the successor 
of the previous number; in this respect Plato may fairly be 
supposed to have anticipated Frege. And in view of this it 
is most unlikely that Plato generated the numbers in any other 
than their natural order from 2 to το. On the other hand, the 
suggested mode of generation is not likely to have been that 
of Xenocrates, for it takes no account of Aristotle’s statement 
that the odd unit in odd numbers was explained as being the One 
itself. Xenocrates is more likely to have generated the odd 
numbers in the way already suggested, by adding 1 to even 
numbers. 


The derwation of Ideal Spatial Magnitudes and their place 
in the theory, 


In several passages we read of ‘ the things after the numbers’, 
‘the things after the Ideas’, ‘the classes posterior to number’,' 
These are a further set of entities distinct from those we have so 
far dealt with—the ideal magnitudes, related to mathematical 
magnitudes as the ideal numbers are to the mathematical. The 
same differences of opinion present themselves here as with 
regard to numbers. Some (sc. Plato) distinguish ideal from 
mathematical magnitudes ; others (sc. Speusippus) believe only 
in mathematical magnitudes and speak mathematically ; others 
(sc. Xenocrates) believe in mathematical magnitudes but speak 


1 A, 992” 13, M. 1080? 25, 1085% 7. 


SOCRATES, PEATO, AND THE PLATONISTS Ixy 


unmathematically.1. As in the case of numbers, there were 
differences of detail between the Platonists as to the principles 
from which the ideal magnitudes were derived. (1) According to 
some the material principle was the various species of the great 
and small, viz. the long and short for lines, the broad and narrow 
for surfaces, the deep and shallow for solids ; while they differed 
about the formal principle answering to the One.? This view of 
the material principle answers to Plato’s treatment of the great 
and small as the material principle of number, and is probably 
Plato’s view. (2) Others made the formal principle the point, 
and the material principle something ‘akin to plurality’.* As it 
was probably Speusippus who specified plurality as the material 
principle of numbers, it is probably he who is referred to here. 
The point and ‘something akin to plurality’ would be for him 
the principles of mathematical magnitudes, since he did not 
believe in ideal magnitudes. The diversity of opinions about 
the formal principle ascribed to holders of view (1) is probably 
that which is indicated in B. roo1» 24, where it is suggested that 
the formal principle of magnitudes is either the One itself or 
‘some number’ (so Alexander interprets M. 1085213). The latter 
view is indicated more definitely in N. togo? 20-24,where Aristotle 
refers to the Platonists as deriving magnitudes ‘from matter and 
number—lengths from the number 2, planes from 3, solids from 4, 
or from other numbers’.‘ If we turn to Ζ. 1028 25-27 we find 
that after referring to the views of Plato and Speusippus (both 
mentioned by name) Aristotle continues ‘but some say that 
Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that all other 
things follow after them, lines and planes, right on to the 
substance of the heavens and to sensible things’. The first 
words of this passage point to the identification of ideal with 
mathematical number, which we have good reason for ascribing 
to Xenocrates, and the reference to lines and planes as following 
after numbers seems to refer to the view at present under discus- 
sion, in which ideal numbers are made the formal principle 
of ideal magnitudes. This view may therefore be probably 
ascribed to Xenocrates; the ascription is confirmed by a passage 
of Theophrastus,’ in which Xenocrates is praised for having 
carried through his explanation of the contents of the universe 
1M. 1080? 24-30. 2 A. 992" 10, M. 108589, N. 1090? 37. 
5. Μ, 1οΟϑΕ8 325 Ὁ 7: 1030} 13. 5 Fr, xii, 11 fin., 12 Wimmer. 
2673-1 [τὶ 


Ixvi INTRODUCTION 


from first principles—‘alike of sensibles, intelligibles, mathema- 
ticals, and even things divine’. 

As regards Plato himself, he is expressly stated! to have 
‘opposed’ the point, which he regarded as simply a ‘geometrical 
dogma’ or convention, and to have spoken of the indivisible line 
as the first principle of the line. It is impossible to say with 
certainty what led Plato to adopt the strange view that the line 
is constructed out of indivisible lines, but it was probably because” 
he could not believe either that it is constructed out of divisible 
lines, i. e. is infinitely divisible (he was apparently alarmed by the 
vicious infinite regress which this seemed to involve), or that it 
is constructed (as the Pythagoreans said it was) out of points. 
Aristotle has a truer conception of continuity and sees that the. 
line is constructed out of divisible lines, i. e. is infinitely divisible. 


M. Robin * treats the ideal magnitudes as occupying a place in 
the Platonic hierarchy between the ideal numbers and the Ideas. 
The hierarchy according to him is: 

nic numbers. 
Ideal figures. 
\Ideas, 
Mathematical numbers. 
[Geometrical figures. 
Sensibles, 
numbers being laws, types, or patterns of organization according 
to which are formed both Ideas and sensibles, and figures 
whether ideal or geometrical serving as intermediaries between 
the two classes they stand between. But a separation of the 
ideal numbers from the Ideas seems incompatible with Aristotle’s 
statements, and the Platonic hierarchy was (I think) more pro- 
bably as follows: 


Numbers 
= the Ideas. 
tage Ngee ioe 


Numbers 
Magnitudes 
Sensibles. 


Mathematical | = the Intermediates. 


5 Ἂ: 028 20. 
* For the other reasons which may have helped to lead Plato to this 
belief cf. A. 9925 20 n, 


* p. 470. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, ANDI THE PLATONISTS: Ixvit 


Aristotle describes the ideal magnitudes as ‘the things after the 
Ideas’, ‘the things after the numbers’, and as distinct from the 
Ideas as well as from mathematical magnitudes.’ But it is clear 
from his whole account that they are related to mathematical mag- 
nitudes exactly as the ideal numbers are to mathematical numbers. 
They are in fact the essences or universal natures of the straight 
line, the triangle, the tetrahedron, &c. It is because they are not 

_numbers that Aristotle infers that they are not Ideas,? Butit would 
be more accurate to say that they form a lower, more complex 
group of Ideas than the ideal numbers—more complex because 
(according to one form of the theory, at all events) they include 
ideal numbers as an element in them ; the number 2 is the formal 
principle of the line, 3 of the plane, 4 of the solid. Each class of 
entities in the universe is a union of form and matter, but as we 
pass from ideal numbers to ideal magnitudes, to mathematicals, 
and to sensibles, the formal element becomes more and more 
encumbered with matter. 


Identification of the Ideas with numbers. 


We come now to what was probably the last phase in Plato’s 
development of the ideal theory, a phase which is a much less 
legitimate development of the theory known to us from the 
dialogues. Aristotle implies quite definitely that Plato held 
all the Ideas to be numbers.® M. Robin has discussed the 
relation between the ideal numbers and the Ideas.‘ He states 
three possible alternatives: (1) that the two are co-ordinate, 
(2) that the numbers are subordinate to the Ideas, (3) that the Ideas 
are subordinate to the numbers. On the strength of a sentence 
in Theophrastus® he adopts the third view. Now the whole 
Aristotelian evidence, which is almost the same as to say the whole 
evidence, indicates that none of these views is the true one, but that 
the Ideas were absolutely identified with the ideal numbers.° 


PAL OO) PTS. 

* ib. This presupposes the Platonic identification of all Ideas with 
numbers, which we shall deal with presently. 

3 A, 987> 18-25, 4 pp. 454 ff. 

5 Fr, xii. 13 W. Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ἀνάγειν els τὰς ἀρχὰς δύξειεν ἂν 
ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων, εἰς τὰς ἰδέας ἀνάπτων, ταύτας δ᾽ εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμούς, ἐκ δὲ 
τούτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς. 

6 A, 991}, 902Ὁ 16, A. Ιο738 18, M. 1081" 7, 1ο0838 18, 1084% 7. 

Gra 


Ixvili INTRODUCTION 


The real question is whether Plato thought he was giving a more 
ultimate account of the nature of these entities when he described 
them as Ideas or when he described them as numbers. In 
M. Robin’s opinion! Aristotle’s view that each Idea must for 
Plato be identical with some particular number’? is a controversial 
and mistaken inference from the Platonic theory; but Aristotle’s 
statement that for Plato the Ideas ave numbers is too explicit to 
allow us to suppose that for Plato the numbers are simply, 
as M. Robin thinks,’ a sort of model after which the Ideas are 
fashioned. M. Robin discusses the theory of Bonitz,‘ and of 
Zeller in Platonische Studien,’ that the numbers mediate between 
the Ideas, which are pure quality, and the μαθηματικά, which are 
pure quantity. Zeller seems to have later given up this view, 
and M. Robin is right in maintaining against it that the numbers 
are pure quality, and that in them ‘the reciprocal play of the 
principles (the One and the indefinite dyad) is manifested in the 
most immediate and the most evident way’.® Aristotle’s way of 
putting the matter, that for Plato ‘the Ideas are numbers’, 
suggests that the numbers were not for Plato (as Zeller thought) 
mere symbols of the Ideas, but rather the last product of the 
abstractive process which had originally led him from sensibles 
to Ideas.’ In describing the Ideas as numbers, as successive 
products of the One and_ the great-and-small, he may have 
seemed to himself to be stating in the clearest way the fact which 
is so often expressed in the later dialogues, that in the ideal world 
itself there is multiplicity as well as unity. And the series of the 


numbers produced successively by the One may have seemed to 
him to express most clearly the hierarchy of the Ideas—linked 
through fewer or more intermediates with the supreme Idea— 
which was in his thoughts as early as the Republic. If this be so, 
as One was the number of the good,* the simpler and more com- 
prehensive Ideas would be represented by lower numbers, the 
more complex and less comprehensive by higher. But we 
cannot suppose with M. Robin that the numbers were thought of 
as entities different from and higher than the Ideas (Aristotle’s 


' p. 456. 2 A. 9919, 21, M. 10849 12-25, N. 10928, 14, 16-23. 

SSA Ds 4 Met. p. 541. 5 pp. 263, 298. & DAES) 

7 Cf.N. 109113 τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μέν φασιν 
αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι, οὐσίαν μέντοι τὸ ἕν αὐτοῦ ῴοντο εἶναι μάλιστα. 


8 N. 1091 13, EL. 48. τ2ιδ8 24, Aristox. Harm. Eleni. ii, p. 30 Meib. 


SOCRATES, PLATO; AND THE PLATONISTS lzix 


statements seem decisive against that view); thus his belief in 
a parallelism between the relation of the numbers to the Ideas and 
that of the mathematicals to sensibles! apparently falls to the 
ground. 

There is a passage in the Philebus which perhaps shows the 
dawning of the tendency that ultimately led Plato to identify 
the Ideas with numbers. In explaining πέρας he says* that he 
means by it ‘first the equal and equality, then the double and 
every ratio of number to number or of measure to measure’. 
And later * he defines ‘the family of the limit’ as ‘the family of 
the equal and the double, and all that puts an end to the dissen- 
sion of the contraries, and by introducing number makes them 
symmetrical and harmonious’. This is a remarkable identifica- 
tion of the principle of definiteness with number. Plato seems 
to be pursuing a fresh line of inquiry without considering its 
bearing on the ideal theory. But the trend of his later dialogues 
leads us to suppose that he recognized πέρας and ἀπειρία in the 
ideal as well as in the sensible world: The inference that the 
analysis was applied to both has a more definite basis in Aristotle’s 
statement that the principles of the Idea-numbers were the prin- 
ciples of all things. Later he says® that while the material 
principle of both Idea-numbers and sensible things is the great 
and small, the formal principle of Idea-numbers is the One, and 
the formal principle of the sensible things is the Ideas (i.e. the 
Idea-numbers). Yet the former statement is justified ; the prin- 
ciples of both are the One and the great and small, except that 
in sensible things the great_and small is used twice over, once ἢ 
with the One to produce the Ideas, once with the Ideas to 
produce the sensible things. 

Probably, then, ‘limit’ was used by Plato to mean the formal 
element both in Ideas and in sensible things. The Ideas are 
the limiting principle in sensible things; now in the Philebus 
Plato has got so far as to say that limit must be numerical, and 
that it is this that qualifies it to be a formal principle. From this 
it is no great step to saying that the Ideas are numbers. He 
already in the Philebus® calls them henads and monads. 

Aristotle ascribes to Plato something even more surprising 
than the identification of all Ideas with numbers. In the Meta 


1 p. 466. 2 ONSING S320 ἘΣ 
* A. 987? 10. 5 988810. Ct. "4. δ 15A6, BI 


Ixx INTRODUCTION 


physics‘ he says that some thinkers limited the series of ideal 
numbers to 10, while others thought it infinite; and in the 
Physics* he says that Plato limited it to το. This view, sur- 
prising as it is, has a parallel in Greek philosophy. The 
Pythagoreans thought that things were numbers; they were 
prepared to tell you (though not always unanimously) what 
number marriage or opportunity or justice was. And they too 
limited the series of numbers to 10; so much were they in- 
fluenced by the current notation.* Plato may similarly have 
thought that the numbers higher than τὸ could be treated as 
mere combinations of the numbers up to 10o—though this in- 
volves treating the higher natural numbers, contrary to his own 
principles, as συμβλητοί; and he may have thought that there 
were ten simple Ideas of which all others were compounds. 
But the ascription to him of this limitation of the Ideas to 
to rests on a single passage of Aristotle, and it is possible that 
Aristotle is taking seriously some mere obiter dictum of his 
master. 

If we ask what numbers Plato assigned to definite Ideas, it is 
not easy to give an answer. The materials are very scanty. 
In two different contexts Aristotle takes 3 as the Idea of man,‘ 
but in one passage 2 appears in this capacity,® and Aristotle 
may be merely making suppositions for argument’s sake. In 
another passage’ he enumerates certain entities which were 
generated ‘within the decad’, i.e. either from numbers lower 
than 11 or direct from the first principles. The passage is 
a difficult one, but the most probable supposition, in view of 
a statement by Theophrastus,’ is that the things mentioned were 
connected directly with the first principles, so that the passage 
gives us no instance of an entity which was identified with 
anumber. The most important passage for the identification of 
the numbers with things is De An. 404» 18 ff., where we learn 
that in Plato’s ‘lectures on philosophy’ atro τὸ ζῷον was derived 
from the Idea of One and the first length and breadth and 
depth (i.e. was identified with the number 10, which = 1+2+3 
+4).° Again, νοῦς was I, ἐπιστήμη 2, δόξα 3, αἴσθησις 4. The 
two identifications are not equally fantastic. Two is in fact 

1 A, 1073%19,M.1084%12, * 20632,  ® Cf, Philolaus, fr. 11, Diels. 


4M. 108111, 10844 14. 5 1084* 25, DINE coy 
CORT 1.2. ® Cf. Ζ, 1036" 13, M. 1084" 1, N. 1ogo> 22. 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS ΙΣΧῚ 


the smallest number of points that can determine a line, three 
the smallest number that can determine a plane, four the 
smallest that can determine a solid. And though lines, planes, 
and solids are not numbers, the numerical determination of 
them has in co-ordinate geometry proved a powerful engine for 
the discovery of truth. It is not so with the identification of 
mental faculties with numbers. There we are in the realm 
of pure fancy; we are back at the level of the Pythagorean 
identification of justice with 4 and of marriage with 5. If, as 
seems to be the case, Plato’s thought ultimately moved in this 
direction, it is not surprising that Aristotle should treat him as 
in the main a follower of the Pythagoreans,'! and complain that 
philosophy had been turned into mathematics.’ 


Speusippus and Xenocrates. 


We may now attempt to trace the allusions in the Metaphysics 
to Plato’s main successors. Speusippus is mentioned by name 
only twice, and Xenocrates not at all, but a good deal can be 
learnt about them by fairly certain inference. 

The passages in which Speusippus is mentioned are: (1) Z. 
1028 21, where we read that ‘Speusippus, beginning with the 
One, sets up even more substances (sc. than the Ideas, mathe- 
matical objects, and sensibles recognized by Plato), and origina- 
tive sources for each substance, one for numbers, another for 
magnitudes, yet another for soul; and in this way he spins out 
the series of substances ’.® (2) A. 1072" 30, ‘Those who suppose, 
as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus do, that the most beautiful 
and best is not at the beginning, because, though the originative 
sources even of plants and of animals are causes, beauty and 
perfection are in what proceeds from these sources, are mis- 
taken’, 

Two features of Speusippus’ philosophy appear from these 
references: (1) that he recognized more distinct classes of 
entities than the three recognized by Plato, and treated them in 
detachment from one another, recognizing separate principles 
for each; and that, like Plato, he started with the One as 
his first principle; (2) that he regarded ‘values’ as emerging 
late in the evolution of the universe, and thought of the first 


1 A, 987% 30. 2 9925 32, 5 Cf. n, ad loc. 


[xxii INTRODUCTION 


principles and their earliest products, numbers, as not possessing 
goodness. 

With these indications as to the nature of his views, there is 
little difficulty in recognizing other passages as referring to 
him. The second aspect of his philosophy is briefly referred 
to in A. 1075236. It is referred to again in N, 1092#11-17: 
‘nor does any one judge correctly who likens the originative 
sources of the universe to that of animals and plants, because 
the more perfect things always come from things indefinite and 
imperfect, for which reason he says this is so in the case of the 
first things also, so that the One itself is not even a reality’. 
The section 1092*21-8 seems to be mainly concerned with 
Speusippus, to judge from indications such as the reference to 
unity and plurality as first principles,’ the reference to numbers 
as the first of existing things,? and the suggestion that number 
is produced from its first principle ‘as from seed’.* Probably 
therefore also the intervening sentences 1092*17-21, in which. 
Aristotle charges an unnamed thinker or thinkers with generating 
place simultaneously with the mathematical solids, refers to 
Speusippus. 

There are two passages which link up with the first of those 
mentioned above,‘ and introduce us to a fresh aspect of his 
theory. These are: (1) A. 1075537, ‘Those who say that 
mathematical number ts the first entity and assert the existence of 
a series of substances and different principles for each substance, 
make the substance of the universe a chain of disconnected 
incidents (for on this view one substance makes no difference to 
another by its existence or non-existence), and set up many 
principles’. (2) N. rogo> 13, ‘Further, we might inquire, if we 
are not too easy-going, with regard to number as a whole and 
the objects of mathematics, into the fact that the earlier entities 
make no difference to the later; for if number does not exist, 
spatial magnitudes will exist none the less for those who say 
that the objects of mathematics alone exist, and if spatial magnitudes 
do not exist, soul and sensible bodies will exist none the less. 
But, to judge from the observed facts, nature is not a chain of 


Δ. 8.28. 
31,22. Cf. Ζ. 102821 above, A. 107537, M. τοϑοῦ 14, 1083421, N. 
5 ? 4, 3 > 
10go? 13-20, 23 below. 
® Cf. A, 1072» 35, N. 1092912 above. 4 Z. 1028? 21, 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS Ixxiii 


disconnected incidents like a bad tragedy.’ If further proof 
were wanted that the frequently mentioned view that the Ideas 
do not exist and that τὰ μαθηματικά are the primary entities was 
that of Speusippus, it is supplied by a comparison of A. 1072» 30 
above with N. 10g1#29-) 1, »22-25. Aristotle here says, ‘There 
is a difficulty ...in the relation of the elements and the first 
principles to the good and the beautiful; namely, whether any 
of the principles is the sort of thing that we mean by “the good 
itself” and ‘the best”, or this is not so but these are later in 
their origin. The cosmologists seem to agree with some of the 
thinkers of the present day, who say that this is not so, but that 
it is only when the nature of things has developed that the 
good and the beautiful appear in it. This they do by way of 
guarding against a real difficulty which arises for those who say, 
as some do, that the One is a principle... For a great difficulty 
arises, in avoiding which some have denied (that the good is 
among the first principles), viz. those who agree that the One is 
a first principle and an element, but only of mathematical number. 

It is certain, then, that Speusippus is referred to in the 
passages where Aristotle mentions the theory which denies 
the existence of Ideas owing to the difficulties it involves,' but 
asserts the separate existence of τὰ μαθηματικά and speaks 
mathematically about them.? 

The passage already referred to, N. τορι 29--ῦ 25, on the 
difficulties arising from ascribing goodness to the One, is 
succeeded in 32 by the statement ‘wherefore one thinker 
avoided ascribing goodness to the One, on the ground that, 
since genesis is from contraries, it would necessarily follow 
that evil was the nature of plurality’, From this it may with 
much probability be inferred that Speusippus was the thinker 
‘who is referred to as describing the One and plurality as the 
first principles of number,’ and probably also the thinker who 
treated the point (which was ‘akin to the One’) and ‘something 
akin to plurality’ as the first principles of spatial magnitudes.* 

Two passages not in the Metaphysics may be mentioned as 


1M. 1086 2. 

2 4. 1069 36, M. 1076921, ‘1080P 14, 1083%20-24, 108672, 29, N. 
10g0* 7-13, 25, 35: 

$ A. 1075% 32, M. 10855, N. 10876, 8, 27, 30, 1092 35. 

Sign tOoh = 12. 


Ixxiv INTRODUCTION 


throwing further light on the aspects of Speusippus’ philosophy 
mentioned above: 

(1) £.N. tog6>5, ‘The Pythagoreans seem to speak more 
plausibly about the good when they place the One in the 
column of goods; whom Speusippus also is thought to have 
followed’. Aristotle regarded Speusippus’ view as the most 
akin to Pythagoreanism of the Platonic views in two respects: 
(a) in that he does not place beauty and goodness in the 
beginnings of thing but regards them as having emerged in 
the course of development,! and (4) in holding no doctrine of 
Ideas but regarding τὰ μαθηματικά as the primary entities.2 The 
coupling of Speusippus with the Pythagoreans in the present 
passage is evidently connected with the first of these points. 
The significance of the allusion is not clear, but seems to be 
that, while Plato identified the One with the good, Speusippus 
regarded the One simply as one among the goods and, since it 
was a first principle, as not possessing the good in as high 
a degree as later products of evolution (such as the soul). 

(2) Theophr. fr. xii. 11 fin., 12, where Theophrastus repre- 
hends Speusippus, and indeed all the Platonists except Xeno- 
crates, for not having pushed far enough their deduction of 
things from first principles; ‘they generated numbers, planes, 
and solids, and showed that from the indefinite dyad spring 
certain things such as place, the void, the infinite, and that from 
the numbers and the One spring certain entities such as the 
soul, but they do not explain the generation of the heavens or 
of other things’. This is borne out by the almost complete 
absence of physical treatises in Diogenes Laertius’ list of 
Speusippus’ works.° 

Xenocrates was the most prominent member of the Platonic 
school after Plato and Speusippus, and it would be surprising 
if he were not alluded to in the Metaphysics. There is strong 
reason to suppose that he is the thinker who is frequently 
referred to as identifying the Ideas with the objects of mathe- 


TN TO72U2%. 

5. M. 1080 16. The description of the material principle as plurality is 
also a Pythagorean touch ; cf. A. 986224. In his preoccupation with the 
significance of the number τὸ ( 7Aeo/, Arzthm. p. 631.) Speusippus shows, 
once more, a recurrence to Pythagoreanism. He is said to have written a 
work on the Pythagorean numbers (ib. p. 62). δὴν, Ants 


SOCRATES, PLATO, AND THE PLATONISTS | Ixxv 


matics, in contrast with Plato, who distinguished them, and 
with Speusippus, who believed only in the latter.'. For it is 
impossible not to see the similarity between the reference in 
Z. 1028> 24 to some thinkers who ‘say that the Forms and the 
numbers have the same nature, and all other things follow after 
them, lines and planes, right on to the nature of the heavens 
and to sensibles’ and the passage of Theophrastus in which 
Xenocrates in contrast with the other Platonists is praised for 
deducing everything from the same first principles and ‘giving 
everything its place in the universe, alike sensibles, intelligibles, 
mathematicals, and, further, things divine’? We may fairly 
confidently suppose, then, that it is he who is so often mentioned 
as identifying the Ideas with mathematical objects,’ and as doing 
so by setting up ‘private hypotheses of his own’ and ‘destroy- 
ing, in effect, mathematical number’.' In two respects, in 
particular, he is said to ‘speak unmathematically of mathematical 
things ’—in his assertions that all magnitudes cannot be divided 
into magnitudes, and that not any two units taken at random 
make a two.> In connexion with the first point it must be 
remembered that Xenocrates was the main supporter of the 
doctrine of ‘indivisible lines’, against which the treatise De 
Lineis Insecabilibus is directed. The second point enables us to 
identify Xenocrates as being among those whom Aristotle 


96 


charges with believing in ‘incomparable units’. 


1 Aristotle regards Xenocrates’ view as the most mistaken of the three, 
and combining all the possible disadvantages, M. 1083? 2. 

* These passages should be compared with Sext.Emp. Adv. Math. vii.1 47, 
where Xenocrates is said to have recognized three kinds of substance, the 
sensible = that which is ‘ within the heaven ’, the intelligible = that which 
is without the heaven, the composite or object of opinion = the heaven 
itself (which is composite because it is perceptible by sight and also 
intelligible by means of astronomy). Zeller (ii, 14. 1012, ἢ. 7) identifies 
τὰ μαθηματικά of the Theophrastus passage with the οὐρανός of the passage 
in Sextus Empiricus. But taking these passages along with Ζ, το δῦ 25 
we seem to get the following classification: (1) intelligibles, including (a) 
idea-numbers, and (4) spatial magnitudes (these two are rather loosely 
described by Theophrastus as intelligibles and mathematicals respectively), 
(2) things semi-intelligible, semi-sensible = the heaven = things divine, 
(3) sensibles. 

3 A, 10697 35, M. 10768 20, 1080» 22, 

* M, 1083» 1-8, 1086 5-11. 5 M, 1080? 28, SM. 6. 


Ixxvi INTRODUCTION 


In a passage! which contains clear indications that the same 
thinker is being referred to (κινεῖν τὰ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ποιεῖν ἰδίας 
τινὰς δόξας 1]. 28, ὁποιασοῦν ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντας 30, προσγλιχόμενοι 
ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικά 31), we are informed that the thinkers in 
question ‘make magnitudes out of matter and number, lengths 
from the number 2, planes, presumably, from 3, and solids from 
4, or perhaps from other numbers’. Probably, then, Xenocrates 
was among those who held the particular view about the 
principles of ideal magnitudes which is referred to again in 
M. 1084? 4η- 2.” 

Finally, there is reason to suppose that it was Xenocrates 
who abandoned the description of the material principle as ‘the 
unequal’ while retaining the description of it as ‘the indefinite 
dyad ’.* 


1Π| 
ARISTOTEE’S METAPHYSICAL, DOELRINE 


The Method of Metaphysics. 


THREE main features of Aristotle’s method may be indicated. 
(1) He begins, as in several of his other works, with a history of 
previous thought, in which he shows how the four causes were 
successively recognized. It need not be supposed, however, that 
it was consciously by reflection on the work of his predecessors 
that he arrived at the doctrine of the four causes. The doctrine is 
presented as one already established in the Physics ;* the study 
of earlier thought is intended merely to confirm the completeness 
of the doctrine or else to suggest other causes besides the four, 
and in point of fact it does the former. We may say in general 
of Aristotle that he believes himself to be looking at the facts 
direct, but that his thought is coloured far more than he knew by 
that of his predecessors, and above all of Plato. (2) His method 
is aporematic. It is essential, he says,° to start with a clear view 
of the difficulties of the subject, and with an impartial considera- 
tion of the pros and cons on each main question. Accordingly 

1 N. 10go? 20-32. 

* De An. 404” 16-25 suggests that Plato himself also held this view. 


5 N. 1088) 28-35. For details as to Xenocrates’ views about the formal 
and the material principle cf. Zeller 11. 1‘, 1014, n. 3. 


* A. 9835 33. > Β. 995% 27-ῬΆ. 


- ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE Ixxvii 


a whole book (B) is devoted to such a presentation, without any 
attempt to reach a dogmatic result. Not only here, however, but 
in many other parts of the Metaphysics (notably in Z), the method 
is thoroughly aporematic; not infrequently, after discussing a 
question from one point of view without definite result, Aristotle 
proceeds to discuss it from another with the remark, ‘Let us 
try a fresh start’. The Metaphysics as a whole expresses not 
a dogmatic system but the adventures of a mind in its search for 
truth. (3) The method adopted is, for the most part, not that 
of formal syllogistic argument from known premises to a conclu- 
sion which they establish. The truths which it is most important 
for metaphysics to establish are fundamental truths which cannot 
be inferred from anything more fundamental. Any direct proof 
of them would inevitably be a petitio principii. The proper 
procedure, then, is to attempt no proof but to commend them 
by showing the paradoxical consequences of the denial of them. 
This procedure is consciously adopted by Aristotle with regard 
to the ‘laws of thought ’,’ and is actually followed in many of his 
other discussions. Generally we may say that his method in the 
Metaphysics is not that of advance from premises to conclusion, 
but a working back from common-sense views and distinctions to 
some more precise truth of which they are an inaccurate expres- 
sion, and the confirmation of such truth by pointing out the 
consequences of its denial. 


The Subject of Metaphysics. 

The subject of metaphysics is stated differently by Aristotle in 
different places. In Book A σοφία is said to be the study of ‘the 
first principles and causes’.? This formulation reappears in T,° 
and it is added that these causes must be causes of something in 
respect of its own nature, and that this can be nothing less than τὸ 
ὄν itself. Metaphysics, then, studies the causes which determine 
the nature not of this or that department of reality, but-of reality 
asawhole. These are the four causes the progressive recogni- 
tion of which, by earlier thinkers, forms the subject of Book A— 
matter, form, efficient cause, and final cause. But it is to be 
noted that one of these—matter—is not actually, in Aristotle’s 


1 Τὶ, 10067 5-28, For some further remarks on Aristotle’s conception 
of the method of metaphysics cf. notes on I, 1003 21, E, 1025» 7-18. 
2 982? 9. 8 10037 26. 


[xxviii INTRODUCTION 


view, present throughout reality; the prime mover and the 
subordinate movers of the celestial spheres are pure forms. 

To the causes of the real I adds another subject of meta- 
physical study—the essential attributes of the real,! by which he 
means such relations as those of sameness, contrariety, other- 
ness, genus and species, whole and part, and such attributes as 
perfection and unity. Some of these conceptions are discussed 
incidentally in various parts of the work, but Book I is more par- 
ticularly devoted to them. 

The subject-matter is similarly formulated in E.* Buta different 
formulation of it is also found there.* The branches of know- 
ledge are first divided into the practical, the productive, and the 
theoretical or disinterested. The last division is then subdivided 
into (1) physics, which deals with objects existing separately, but 
not free from movement; (2) mathematics, which deals with 
objects free from movement, but not existing separately, but 
imbedded in matter ; while (3), if there are objects which both are 
free from movement and have separate existence, they are the sub- 
ject of a third science prior to the two others—prior because its 
subject-matter, being eternal, is prior to the temporal and change- 
able, and, having separate existence, is more fundamental than 
that which has none but is considered apart only by an act 
of abstraction. This science is ‘theology’. So far, then, it is 
a problem whether there is such a thing as theology; this 
depends on the question whether there is an entity free from 
change and yet existing separately, i.e. a pure form. But the 
inquiry whether there is such a form is doubtless considered to 
be itself a branch of theology; if the answer were in the negative 
it would be the whole of it. The name theology is found only 
here and in the corresponding passage of Κι" The more usual 
names for metaphysics are σοφία and πρώτη φιλοσοφίᾳ. But 
θεολογική is a suitable name for it when its subject is de- 
scribed not as being gua being but as one particular kind of 
being. The two views of the subject-matter may, Aristotle pro- 
ceeds," both be held; it may be doubted whether first philosophy 
is universal in its scope or deals with one particular kind of reality, 
But, he adds, the two views are reconcilable; if there is an 
unchangeable substance, the study of it will be first philosophy 

1 1003" 21. 2 1004 1-8, 10058 11-18. 

§ 10253, 10268 31, 10289 3. eoclina. 5 1064? 3. © 10269 23. 


ARISTOTLE S METAPHYSICAL: DOCTRINE -«Ixxix 


and universal just because it is first. In studying the primary 
kind of being, metaphysics studies being as such. The true 
nature of being is exhibited not in that which cannot exist apart 
but only as an element in a concrete whole, nor again in that 
which is infected by potentiality and change—that which, as 
Plato says,! is between being and not-being, but only in that 
which is both substantial and unchangeable. 

The restriction of metaphysics to the study of one department 
of being (and of others only as owing their nature to this) recurs 
in Book A. Its subject-matter is there first restricted to sub- 
stance, as the ‘first part’ of the universe. Next substance is 
divided, not as in E into two kinds, the changeable and the 
unchangeable, but into three—the eternal sensible (the heavenly 
bodies), the perishable sensible, and the insensible. The two 
former are said to be the subject of physics,’ and accordingly 
chs. 2-5, which deal with sensible substance,* must be regarded as 
preliminary to chs. 6-10, which deal with unmovable or insensible 
substance. Not only A. 2-5, however, but the greater part of 
Z-® deals with the principles involved in sensible substance, and 
would have to be regarded as merely preliminary to the business 
of metaphysics, were it not that form, one of the principles 
involved in sensible things, and the principle mainly discussed 
in these books, is also that which exists separate and unchange- 
able in God and the ‘ Intelligences’ that move the spheres. It 
cannot be said that in practice the distinction between physics 
and metaphysics is well maintained by Aristotle, and it may be 
noted that the bulk of the Physics is what we should call meta- 
physics. It is not an inductive inquiry into natural law, but an 
a priort analysis of material things and the events that befall them. 


Further determination of the subject of Metaphysics. 


Book E, having shown that the study of separate unchangeable 
being is the study of being as such, proceeds to rule out certain 
senses of being as irrelevant, viz. (1) accidental or incidental 
being,‘ and (2) being as truth.® (1) Accidental being is not 
studied by metaphysics because it cannot be studied at all. 
A house, for example, has an indefinite number of accidental 
attributes ; it may be found agreeable by some tenants, injure 
the health of some, and benefit others. Science cannot 


1 Rep. 477 A. 2 [069% 36. ES TOG? 2, AINE), Oy 3, ὅπ ἢ a 


Ixxx INTRODUCTION 


investigate this indefinite series of attributes; the science of 
building, for instance, concentrates on the building of a house 
which shall be a house, a ‘shelter for living things and goods’,! 
and_ignores its incidental attributes. Similarly, geometry studies 
not any and every attribute of the triangle, but only those which 
belong to it gua triangle. In particular, any science excludes 
the discussion of logical puzzles which do not arise from the 
specific nature of its subject-matter but from the general nature ~ 
of things. Architecture is not interested in the fact that any 
house is ‘ different from practically everything else’; geometry 
does not consider whether a triangle is the same thing as a 
triangle with its angles equal to two right angles; the art of 
music does not ask whether ‘that which is musical’ is the same 
as ‘that which is literary’. 

Metaphysics, then, does not study those connexions of subject 
and attribute in which the attribute does not flow from the nature 
of the subject but is incidental or accidental to it. It does not 
study these, because they are not objects of knowledge at all. 
Two possibilities seem to be contemplated by Aristotle. (a) The 
accidental, the exception to law, may have a law of its own. If 
A is usually B, there may be a law that under certain conditions 
A is always or usually not B.?_ If this law is discovered, however, 
the apparent accident is found to be no accident, so that still 
there is no knowledge of the accidental. But (ὁ) in human action, 
and perhaps in other cases as well, Aristotle recognizes a real 
contingency which can never become an object of knoWledge. If 
a man behaves in a certain way he is bound to meet a violent 
death, but there is nothing from which it necessarily follows that 
he will behave in that way, and until he does so it is not deter- 
mined whether he will die by violence.’ 

The notion of the ‘accidental’ in Aristotle is somewhat com- 
plex. The primary meaning of συμβεβηκός is that which is 
suggested by such words as ‘incidental’, ‘coincidence’. The 
object of science, according to Aristotle, is to exhibit, as far 
as possible, the attributes of things as flowing necessarily from 
their essence as expressed in definition. But science is con- 
stantly frustrated in its effort. Callias, for instance, is pale; 
but paleness cannot be deduced from the essence of man, the 
infima species to which Callias belongs. Paleness is incidental 


1 Ἢ, 1043" 16. 2 1027925, 3 ib. 32-14, 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE Ἰχχχὶ 


to Callias. It is not implied, however, that his paleness is not 
the necessary result of some cause; it flows from something in 
the matter of which Callias is made.' 

In the present passage, and in A. 30, accident is described 
rather differently. The accidental is that which happens neither 
always nor for the most part—the exception to law. That it is 
exceptional follows from its being merely incidental. This 
description, again, does not imply any breach in the causal 
nexus, The exception may obey a narrower law of its own. 

There is, however, a third element in Aristotle’s notion of 
accident which seems to imply objective contingency, and not 
merely contingency relative to the present imperfection of our 
knowledge. In the history of the world there are actually fresh 
starts which are not the determinate result of anything that has 
preceded.? This is implied not only in the present passage, but in 
the other principal passages on the subject. In De Jni.9 Aristotle 
argues that the law of excluded middle is not true of judgements 
about the future. It is true, of course, that A will either be or 
not be B, but it is not true either that A will be B or that A will 
not be B. The reason is that there is an ἀρχή---ἃ genuine fresh 
starting-point for future events—in human deliberation and 
action.’ In De Gen. et Corr. ii. 11 the realm of causal necessity is 
confined to those processes which are cyclic—the revolution of 
the heavenly bodies, the rhythm of the seasons, the passage 
of rain into cloud and of cloud into rain, &c. Within this frame- 
work of necessity room seems to be left for a contingency not 
only in respect of human free will, but generally in respect of the 
details of terrestrial history. 

(2) The other sense of being in which it is not studied by 
metaphysics is ‘being as truth’, This is excluded because it 
belongs not to objects but to states of mind, and is therefore 
studied not by metaphysics but by logic. Aristotle admits, 
indeed, the notion of ‘false things’, and presumably therefore 
that of ‘true things’. But either (a) a ‘false thing’ means a 
non-existent thing, and a ‘true thing’ an existent thing, in which 
case false and true are not being used in their proper sense, 
and we have to do not with ‘being as truth’ but with being as 
existence. Or (δ) a false thing is one which produces the 
appearance of something that is not there, as does a scene- 


ΤΊ, 10588 29- 12. 2 1027? 11. 3 19" 7. 


2673-1 f 


IXxxil INTRODUCTION 


painting or a dream,'' These are presumably subjects not for 
metaphysics but for psychology.’ 

Two main senses of being remain—the being of which the 
categories are a classification, and potential and actual being— 
a distinction which cuts across the former since it is found within 
each category.’ Of these the former is studied in Z H, the latter 
in Θ. 

The Categories. 


The doctrine of the categories‘ is a peculiarly puzzling one, 
partly from the lack of any very definite information as to Ari- 
stotle’s precise object in formulating it, partly from our ignorance 
of the relative dates of the works in which various aspects of it 
are presented. There are, however, independent grounds® on 
which we may arrive at a provisional chronological arrangement 
of his works, an arrangement which in its main outlines is 
accepted by most scholars. Of the works concerned, the Cate- 
gories may be placed first, followed by the Topics, Sophistict 
Elenchi, Analytics, Metaphysics A, the physical works, the 
Ethics, and the rest of the Metaphysics. The authenticity of 
the Categories has been doubted, but on insufficient grounds, 
and if it is genuine we may reasonably suppose that this work, 
in which the doctrine is expounded at length, is earlier than 
those in which it is alluded to as familiar.® 

In the Categories the doctrine is introduced as a classification 
of the meanings of τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα, i. 6. of such 
expressions as ‘man’, ‘ox’, ‘runs’, ‘wins’, in opposition to ‘man 
runs’, ‘man wins’, which are κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα. In other 
words it is a classification of the meanings of words and phrases‘ 


1 A, 1024? 17-26. 


‘ Being as truth’ is discussed in ©. 10, as well as in E. 4. 

3 τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων A. 10172, τούτων Θ. 1051" 1, 

‘ For a discussion of various aspects of the doctrine which I have not 
dwelt on cf. Joseph, Jutroduction to Logic, ch. 3. 

5 The chief ground is the system of references in one work to another, 
which presents a consistent chronological scheme, if we allow for some 
works having been on the stocks concurrently. 

° An. Pr. 49° 7, De An, 402° 25, 410°15 may be definite references to 
the Categories. 

Τ Of words and phrases rather than of terms, for the latter are essen- 
tially the termini of propositions, while Aristotle is here thinking of objects 
of thought and the names for them, apart from the proposition. 


2 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE _Ixxxiii 


in opposition to sentences or judgements. Aristotle’s interest is 
logical, not grammatical, but he approaches the classification of 
objects of thought by a consideration of the words by which we 
symbolize them. Trendelenburg thought that the doctrine was 
based entirely on grammatical considerations; Bonitz had little 
difficulty, however, in showing that this is an exaggerated view, 
that Aristotle draws distinctions where grammar draws none, 
and ignores some which grammar does draw. 

The Categories refers to the categories by the very general 
word γένη. The term κατηγορίαι, or some variant upon it, is also 
used of them from the Categories onwards, and it is important to 
see what it means. The normal use of κατηγορεῖν in the sense of 
‘to predicate’ suggests that κατηγορία means either ‘predication’ 
or ‘predicate ’, and in other connexions it is found in both these 
senses. But the classification in the Categories is not a classi- 
fication of predicates. This is indicated by two facts. (1) 
Aristotle’s instances quoted above show that τὰ κατὰ μηδεμίαν 
συμπλοκὴν λεγόμενα include the subjects of propositions no less 
than the predicates ; and (2) the first category, that of substance, 
is divided into two parts, and substance in the most proper, 
primary, and complete sense is said to be that which is nezther 
asserted of a subject nor present in a subject, e.g. an individual 
man or horse. And this view, that individual substances form 
the primary subdivision of the first category, is steadily main- 
tained by Aristotle in other works. It will not do to treat this * 
as an excrescence on the doctrine. Bonitz was therefore led to 
suppose that κατηγορίαι does not in this connexion mean ‘ predi- 
cates’. He points out‘ that in certain passages in which the 
doctrine of the categories is not in question® κατηγορίαι means 
‘names’ or ‘designations’ rather than ‘predicates ’, and thinks 


CPTI 28: ΤΟ: 

4 = predication De 2727. 21 20, An. Pr. 4154, 12, © 31, “4524, 45> 24, 
57» 19, An. Post. 845 1; = predicate Am. Post. 96° 13 (positive predicate x 
στέρησις An. Pr. 52°15, De Gen. et Corr. 318” 16). In Cat. 3% 35, 37, Az. 
Post, 82% 20, Top. 109" 5, 141% 4, A. 1007% 35 either translation will serve. 
The regular term for predicate is τὸ κατηγορούμενον (κατηγόρημα occurs only 
five times). 

* As Apelt, for instance, does, Leitrdge, 142-145. 

* In his essay on the Ca¢egories (1853). 

S Soph. El, 18127, Phys. 19217, ἢ. A. 639% 30, Z, 1028° 28, The 
other passages he cites will not bear this interpretation, 


f2 


Ixxxiv ’ INTRODUCTION 


that it was from this sense that its technical meaning developed. 
The categories would then be a classification of the meanings of 
names, i.e. a classification of nameable objects of thought, and 
among these would naturally be included individual substances 
as well as those entities which can stand as predicates. But it 
is undesirable to divorce the technical sense of the word from its 
natural meaning of ‘ predicates’, and it is not necessary to do so. 
Though the primary members of the category of substance are 
not predicates but subjects, ‘substance’ itself is a predicate. 
‘What is this thing? A man. What is a man? An animal. 
What is an animal? A substance.’ ‘Substance’ is the last 
predicate we come to if we pursue such a line of inquiry, and 
the names of the other categories are reached by parallel lines 
of inquiry. Thus the names of the categories might properly be 
called ‘ predicates ’, and indeed the predicates par excellence, since 
they are the highest terms in the various ‘columns of predica- 
tion’.' A passage in the Categortes* shows how the transition 
from the ordinary to the technical sense of the word took place. 
‘If one of two contraries is a quality, the other also will be 
a quality. This is clear if we try the other predicates (κατη- 
yopia); e.g. if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is 
a quality, injustice also is a quality: for none of the other 
predicates (κατηγορίαι) will apply to injustice; for neither quantity 
nor relation nor place nor any of the terms of this sort will apply, 
but only quality.’ The categories are simply the predicates par 
excellence. And individual substances are in the category of 
substance not in the sense of being predicates but in the sense 
that ‘substance’ is the highest, widest term that can be predi- 
cated of them essentially ;* i.e. in the same sense in which 
secondary substances are in the category of substance, and 
particular qualities or quantities are in the category of quality 
cr quantity. The expressions τὰ σχήματα (or τὰ γένη) τῶν κατη- 
γοριῶν (or τῆς κατηγορίας) emphasize the fact that the categories 
are the highest types or classes under which all predicates fall. 
So too κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος, σχήματα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος mean 
‘predicates of being, types of predicate of being’, i.e, the 


11. 1054” 35, 10589 13, 

2 τοῦ 17-23. 

δ That the categories are a classification of τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὄν, i.e. of what 
things essentially are, is emphasized in A. 1017 22-30, where see note. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE Ixxxv 


highest predicates under one or other of which falls everything 
that is. 

There is another mode οἱ reference to the categories which 
becomes common in the later works, and especially in the 
Metaphysics, viz. by the expressions πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, ποσαχῶς 
τὸ ὃν σημαίνει, ols ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. The assumption in fact is made 
that to these various classes of entity there answer as many senses 
of ‘be’. To be means one thing for a substance, another for 
a quality, a quantity, &c. This appears to be a later phase of 
the theory; indeed the difference between the senses of ‘be’ 
is announced as a conclusion which follows from the difference 
between the main types of ‘what things are’. καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι 
λέγεται ὅσαπερ σημαίνει TA σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας" ὁσαχῶς yap λέγεται 
τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί 
ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός τι, τὰ δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ 
πάσχειν, τὰ δὲ πού, τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἑκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει, 
‘being has a different meaning corresponding to each of these 
kinds of predicate ’.' 

Bonitz emphasized the former aspect of the categories and 
regarded them as essentially a classification of realities ; recent 
inquirers have emphasized the latter aspect. Apelt* regards 
the categories as primarily a classification of the meanings of the 
copulative ‘is’; Maier regards them as a classification of all 
the meanings of ‘is’, the copulative being only one among 
these. Bonitz appears to give the truer account of the earlier 
and simpler form of the theory. And even in the later use of 
the theory there are features which seem incompatible with 
Apelt’s view. If the being that is being classified were simply 
the copulative ‘is’, the doctrine could hardly have been used as 
the basis of the division of motion into its kinds,’ or of the 
definition of soul.* 

Aristotle has no ‘deduction of the categories ’, no argument to 
show that the real must fall into just these divisions. He seems 
to have arrived at the ten categories by simple inspection of 
reality, aided by a study of verbal distinctions. Attempts have 


1. Δ, 1017422, Cf. Z.1030% 21 ὥσπερ yap καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν (to all 
the categories) ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως. 

ΡΟ 112. 115: 

8 Phys. 201% 8, 2618 31-36. 

4 De An. 402% 22-25. 


Ixxxvi INTRODUCTION 


been made at a systematic arrangement of the categories, 
e.g. that of the Greek commentator David (Scholia in Arist. 
48> 28-41; reproduced by Pacius) : 


1 
τὸ ὄν 
ἘΦ ΝΣ πάρα ον ome 
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (οὐσία) 
καθ᾽ ἑαυτό οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ 
μεριστόν (ποσόν) ἀμέριστον (ποιόν) σχέσις μόνη (πρός TL) κατὰ σχέσιν ἄλλων 


συμπλοκὴ pass καὶ ποσοῦ συμπλ. pes καὶ ποιοῦ συμπλ. οὐσίας Kal τῶν πρὸς τι 
| | | | | | 
πού ποτέ ποιεῖν πάσχειν ἔχειν κεῖσθαι 
The main difficulties of the doctrine are concerned with 
the category of substance. It contains two distinct types of 
thing: (1) individual substances, (2) the species and genera to 
which they belong. It may seem surprising that these should 
be grouped together. Why, it might be asked, should one of 
the universals under which Socrates may be classed, viz. ‘man’, 
be picked out as having more affinity with Socrates than other 
universals under which he may be considered, such as ‘ white 
object’?! Aristotle’s answer would be that Socrates’ nature is 
summed up much more completely in calling him a man than in 
calling him a white object ; he might be conceived of as changing 
his colour and yet retaining much that makes him what he is, 
but take away his manhood and nothing is left that could be 
called the same individual. ‘Man’ in fact is the name not of 


! The difficulty is recognized in the Categories. ‘Every substance 
seems to mean a “‘this”.... But the secondary substances, while they 
appear to indicate a “ this ”, do not really do so, but rather a quality. Yet 
they do not indicate simply a quality—they determine quality with refer- 
ence toa substance; they indicate a qualified substance’ (3? 10-21), Again, 
‘the species is more substance than the genus’ (20 7). The secondary 
substances are intermediate between primary substances and the other 
categories ; ‘for all the others are predicated of them’ as ¢hey are of the 
primary substances (35 1-4). This line of thought reaches its height in 
H. 1042" 21, where genus is said not to be substance at all. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE lxxxvii 


a single quality but of a whole group of interconnected qualities 
which together make up the most important part, at any rate, 
of the nature of that which has them.' There is therefore good 
reason for grouping primary and secondary substances together. 
But if the distinction of individual and species is recognized in 
the first category, why not in others? Something analogous to 
such a recognition is found in the TJopfics.? ‘In indicating the 
“what it is” we sometimes indicate a substance, sometimes 
a quality, sometimes one of the other categories. For when, 
a man being set forth for consideration, we say that what is set 
forth is a man or an animal, we say what it is and indicate 
a substance ; when, a white colour being set before us, we say 
it is white or a colour, we say what it is and indicate a quality.... 
And similarly in the other cases; for whether any such term is 
asserted of itself or its genus is asserted of it, we indicate what 
it is. But when it is asserted of something else, it indicates not 
what that is, but a quantity or a quality or one of the other cate- 
gories. [. 6. while from one point of view ‘what is it’ may be 
opposed to ‘what qualities has it, of what size is it’, &c., and 
used as a characteristic name for the category of substance,’ yet 
it finds a place in the other categories also, since if zt is a colour, 
the proper answer to the question will name not a substance but 
a quality, colour. Thus the distinction of universal from par- 
ticular, which was already recognized in the first category, is 
now found to break out in the other categories also.* 

Maier seems to go too far in describing this® as a thorough 
and conscious transformation of the doctrine of the categories, 
the recognition of the distinction between the categories as 
recurring within the first category. To say this is to lay too 
much stress on the verbal fact that τί ἐστι, which appears at the 
beginning of the passage as the name of the first category, is 


Cf. Caz. 229-37. 

2 10327-39. The same thought recurs in Z. 1030%17-27. Cf. B. 
996” 18-22, Ζ. 1028? 1. 

5. It is so used in I. 22. 

* This is implied in the Categorzes itself, where τὰ ὄντα are divided into 
(1) τὰ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου but not ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (classes of substances), (2) ra 
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ but not καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου (individual qualities, &c.), (3) τὰ καθ᾽ 
ὑποκειμένου and ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (types of quality, &c.), (4) τὰ μήτ᾽ ἐν ὑποκει- 
μένῳ μήτε καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου (individual substances) (1% 20-? 9). 

5 Syllogistik ii. 2. 321. 


Ixxxvili INTRODUCTION 


later said to indicate now substance, now quality, &c. The 
truth rather is that Aristotle here recognizes within the other cate- 
gories something akin to the division of primary and secondary 
within the first. 

From this time onwards both τί ἐστι and τόδε τι or τόδε appear 
frequently as names for the first category.1 The latter suggests 
individual substances ; the former, species and genera. Little is 
gained by showing statistically, as Apelt does,’ that the former is 
the more frequent designation. When either occurs alone, it 
must be understood as a shorthand reference to what was well 
understood to include both; when greater exactness is aimed 
at, both are used.’ In Book Z, which is probably one of the 
latest, as in the Categories, which may be the earliest of Aristotle’s 
extant works, the first category includes both individuals and 
species. 

Though Maier goes too far in describing the categories as 
primarily a classification of the senses of ‘being’ rather than of 
the things that are, he is right in regarding the former as a very 
important aspect of the theory. The theory enables Aristotle 
to drag to light various confusions into which his predecessors 
had fallen through lack of reflection on the meaning of the 
word ‘is’. Maier has distinguished these with great care as 
being three in number.* There is (1) the confusion between the 
‘is’ which implies identity and the ‘is’ of accidental predication. 
Instances of the mistake are given in Soph. Εἰ, 166% 28-36: 

Coriscus is a man. - 
Coriscus is different from man. 
Therefore Coriscus is different from himself. 
Or again, 
Coriscus is other than Socrates. 
Socrates is a man. 
Therefore Coriscus is other than a man. 
If you interpret a merely predicative ‘is’ as if it expressed 


1 τί (ἐστι) in Soph. El., An. Pr. and Post., G. C., Ε. N., Met., τόδε (τι) 
in Phys., G. C., De An., Met., Rhet. Apelt gives a very useful table on 
pp- 140-141. 

2 DSO: 8. Z, 1028911, 103018, 10329 14. 

* pp. 280-287. The fourth confusion Maier points out, that between 
changeable and eternal being, is solved not by the doctrine of the cate- 
gories, but by that of potentiality and actuality, 


ARISTOTCE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE — Ixxxix 


identity,’ you will land yourself in self-contradiction. To avoid 
this unpleasant result, Aristotle tells us, ‘some thinkers, like 
Lycophron, took away the ‘is’ (i.e. insisted on dropping the 
ἐστί, as Greek grammar allowed them .to do, in predicative 
judgements), ‘while others altered the form of speech from 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος λευκός ἐστιν to 6 ἄνθρωπος λελεύκωται, as though “ one” or 
“being” had but one meaning’. ΤῊ other words, the cure for 
the difficulty is neither of their childish expedients but the 
doctrine of the categories. Antisthenes is charged with having 
fallen into the same confusion. He ‘claimed that nothing should 
be described save by its own definition, one thing alone being 
said of one’;* in other words he did not recognize the predi- 
cative as distinct from the identifying judgement. 

(2) There is the confusion of existential and copulative being, 
of ‘being simply’ and ‘being something in particular’. Again 
the Sophtstic’ Elencht* gives instances : 

Not-being is thought about. 
Therefore not-being is. 

Or, 

This thing that is, is not man. 
Therefore this that is, is not. 

(3) There is the confusion of inherent being and subsistent 
being (to use Maier’s terminology), with which Parmenides is 
charged. ‘His reasoning is bad because, if we take merely the 
white things in the world, and suppose ‘white’ to have but one 
meaning, none the less the white things are many and not one; 
for what is white will not be one either by continuity or in 
definition. For to be white colour and to be coloured white 
will be different things—and that without our having to suppose 
anything separate from that which is white; the point is not 
the separateness but the difference between being white and 
being that to which white belongs.’* Because being is pre- 
dicable of everything that is, Parmenides concluded that the 
nature of all that is is just to be being.® 

‘ i.e. if because ‘ Coriscus is a man’ you think yourself justified in sub- 
stituting ‘ Coriscus’ for ‘man’ in ‘ Coriscus is different from man’, or 
because ‘ Socrates is a man’ you think yourself justified in substituting 
‘man’ for ‘Socrates’ in ‘ Coriscus is other than Socrates ’. 

2 Phys. 185% 25-32. 5. Ἃς ΤΟΖΆΡ) 22. 

* 166 37—167°6, Cf. PAys. 187% 3-6. 

δ Phys, 186% 25-31. § 186% 32-> 14. 


xe INTRODUCTION 


To some extent Plato cleared up these difficulties by his 
doctrine of the ‘intercommunion of Forms’. This was a 
recognition of the fact that to predicate is not to identify. But 
Aristotle is not satisfied with Plato’s solution. Whereas Aristotle 
points out the unsoundness of Parmenides’ arguments, ‘there 
were some’, he says, with evident reference to the Sophistes, 
‘who gave in to both his arguments—to the argument that if 
being has but one meaning, all things are one, by saying that 
not-being exists; to the argument from dichotomy, by setting 
up indivisible spatial magnitudes’.? But Plato was reasoning 
archaically. He thought that to explain the multiplicity in the 
world he must admit a not-being apart from being. He should 
instead have taken account of the distinctions expressed in the 
doctrine of the categories, and asked what sort of unity the 
world would be if there were no not-being—a unity of substance, 
of quality, or of what else. And secondly he should have asked 
what sort of not-being he was invoking. Like being, not-being 
has a variety of meanings answering to the categories.° 

Maier argues with much plausibility that in these old diffi- 
culties and in Plato’s consideration of them we have the original 
motive of the doctrine of the categories.* But something much 
less elaborate than the categories would have served this pur- 
pose; a distinction between substances and attributes, or 
between substances, qualities, and relations would, it seems, 
have been enough. The list of ten categories looks much more 
like an attempt to form an inventory of the elements in the real, 
and the solution of difficulties about the meaning of ‘being’ 
appears to be a by-product, although a very important one.° 


1 Soph. 251, 253 C—259 Ὁ. 2 Phys. 187° 1-3. 

5 N. 1088 3510897 10. 

4 The attempt of Rose and of Gercke (4. G.P. iv. 424-441) to show 
that the categories were actually an Academic doctrine is justly rejected 
by both Apelt and Maier. The isolated references to ‘ quality’, ‘ quantity’, 
&c., which we find in Plato, form in no sense a doctrine of categories, 
though they prepared the way for it. Nor have the categories any close 
connexion with the μέγιστα τῶν γενῶν of the Sophistes; the names of the 
latter—being and not-being, rest and motion, same and other—are enough 
to show this. 

5 It would be a mistake to infer from the use of forms like πολλαχῶς λέγεται 
τὸ ὄν that Aristotle’s interest is in the meanings of ‘being’ rather than in 
the varieties of the existent. Cf. De Am. 410% 13 ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE xci 


Substance the Main Subject of Metaphysics. 


Aristotle does not offer in the Metaphysics any treatment of 
the categories as a whole. The categories other than substance 
are, as it were, mere ‘offshoots and concomitants of being’.! 
Substance is prior to them in three ways:? (1) because it can 
exist apart while they cannot. It would seem natural to take 
this as an example of the situation described in the Categories® 
as that of τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, where 
A can exist without B but not B without A. But substance is 
not in fact so related to the other categories. Quality, no doubt, 
cannot exist without substance. A quality is either the quality 
of a substance or presupposes substance at a smaller or larger 
number of removes. But no more can substance exist without 
quality. A qualityless substance is as impossible as a quality 
which does not presuppose a substance. The differentia of any 
substance is a quality.’ It seems, therefore, that Aristotle must 
mean not that substance can exist without the other categories, 
but that it can exist apart while they cannot. The substance 
is the whole thing, including the qualities, relations, &c., which 
form its essence, and this can exist apart. It implies qualities 
but these are not something outside it which it needs in addition 
to itself. A quality on the other hand needs supplementation 
by a substance if it is to exist. Obviously, if this is his meaning, 
Aristotle must be thinking of substance as the individual thing, - 
δεύτεραι οὐσίαι, being universals, cannot according to his own 
doctrine exist apart, but must be supplemented by the qualities 
of their individual members. 

(2) Substance is prior in definition. In defining a member of 
any other category you must include the definition of the under- 
lying substance. It is implied that in defining a substance you 
need not include the definition of anything in any other category ; 
but this is not true, since every differentia of a substance is 
a quality. 

(3) Substance is prior for knowledge. We know a thing better 


τοῦ ὄντος (σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τόδε TL...) πότερον ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ 
οὔ; The question is whether soul is compounded out of all the kinds of 
being, not whether it is compounded out of all the senses of ‘ being’. 

1 This is said of relation in Z. /V. 1096% 21. 

2 Z, 10288 32-2. 8. 149 30, 4 A, 1020° 33, 35-" 2, "6. 


xcii INTRODUCTION 


when we know what it is than when we know what quality, 
quantity, or place it has. Indeed, if we want to know something 
which belongs to a non-substantial category, we must ask not 
what qualities, &c., it has, but what it is, what is its quasi- 
substance, that which makes it what it is. In this argument it 
is evident that substance is being thought of not as the concrete 
thing but as the essential nature. And this ambiguity is pre- 
sent throughout Aristotle’s treatment of substance. 

The existence of substance, and the distinction between it and 
the other categories, i.e. between substance and what we may 
sum up as qualities and relations, is for Aristotle ultimate and 
self-evident. The primary meaning of substance is ‘ that which 
is not asserted of a subject but of which everything else is 
asserted’, or, as he states the matter more fully in the Cate- 
gortes,' ‘that which is neither asserted of a subject nor present 
in a subject’. There are terms which can figure either as 
subjects or as predicates ; e.g. we can say ‘white is a colour’, 
and we can say ‘the wood is white’. There are others which 
can only, according to Aristotle, figure as subjects. To λευκόν 
ἐστι ξύλον is not a proper predication but an accidental predica- 
tion.” This doctrine seems to be a mistaken one.’ But even if 
the logical doctrine which accompanies it be untrue, Aristotle’s 
distinction between substance and the non-substantial is correct. 
Reflection on a statement like ‘Socrates is white’ shows that 
it is not white or whiteness, nor any of the qualities combined 
with it in Socrates, nor the sum of these qualities with whiteness, 
that is said to be white, but that which has all these qualities, 
the individual thing which is the substratum of them and in 
which they are united. But Aristotle is not content to leave it 
at that, to insist on the difference between individual things and 
their qualities and relations (though this is one of the main 
moments in his thought, especially in his opposition to Platonism); 


ΟΝ ΡῈ 2 An. Post. 838 1-17. 

8 Aristotle seems to be misled by the ambiguity of the neuter adjective 
with τό. τὸ λευκόν may mean ‘ the white colour’ or ‘the white thing’. If it 
means the latter—which it would mean for any one who said τὸ λευκόν ἐστι 
évhkov—the statement is as proper a predication as τὸ ξύλον ἐστὶ λευκόν. 
The one expresses the discovery that what was known to be white is wood, 
as the latter expresses the discovery that what was known to be wood is 
white. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE  xciii 


he strives to find the substantial element in individual sub- 
stances, and it is to this problem that he now proceeds. 

He gives first’ a prima facie account of the denotation of 
substance. (1) The most obvious substances are bodies, i.e. 
animals, plants, the four elements, and the parts and compounds 
of these. (2) The Pythagoreans treat the limits of body—planes, 
lines, points—as even more substantial than bodies. (3) Plato 
recognizes Forms and mathematical objects as kinds of sub- 
stance distinct from bodies. (4) Speusippus recognizes various 
kinds of substance each with separate originative sources—num- 
bers, magnitudes, soul, &c. (5) Some thinkers (Xenocrates) 
identify Forms and numbers, and recognize further classes of 
substance dependent on these—lines, planes, &c., and at the end 
of the series the physical universe and sensible things ; unlike 
Speusippus they treat the various grades of substance as 
dependent each on the simpler kind which goes before. 
Aristotle’s views with regard to bodily substances are to be 
gathered chiefly from ZH; his views about the incorporeal 
substances believed in by the Pythagoreans, Plato, and the 
Platonists are expressed chiefly in MN. In A he unfolds his 
doctrine with regard to the only incorporeal substances in which 
he himself believed. 


Substratum. 


Aristotle next? names four main claimants to the title of 
substance, i.e. not of individual substance but of the substantial 
element in individual things,—essence (τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι), the uni- 
versal, genus, substratum. The last has prima facie, as we have 
seen, the strongest claim. By the substratum may be meant 
(1) matter, (2) the sensible form, or (3) the complex formed by 
the union of the two. But the identification of substance with 
substratum tends to lead to the identification of it with matter. In 
thought we may strip off the attributes one by one, until nothing 
is left but bare matter, which includes neither positive nor even 
negative attributes ;* for the latter are merely incidental to it. 
But bare matter is evidently not substance ; it has neither the 
capacity for separate existence, nor the individuality, the ‘this- 
ness ’, which are held to be primary characteristics of substance. 


a 2 ak eS 5 1029% 24. 


XCiv INTRODUCTION 


Matter cannot exist separately ; Aristotle has no doubt about 
that. The bronze, which may be called matter or raw mate- 
rial for the sculptor, since it has not the shape he wishes 
to impose on it, is not completely raw material; it has a form 
of its own. (a) It has the inner structure peculiar to bronze, 
which it retains under his hands, and (ὁ) it has an outer shape 
which it loses under his hands, gaining another instead. Bare 
matter is only a product of the logical analysis in which we 
divide a given thing into form and that which is not form. And 
again bare matter is not individual; what is individual must 
have some character, and bare matter has none. 


Essence. 


Thus the thought of substance as substratum leads to a wrong 
result. Instead of abandoning it, however, Aristotle ostensibly 
retains it, but infers that the substratum must be one of the other 
two things he had said it might be—form, or the unity of form 
and matter. The latter is logically posterior to form, and is suffi- 
ciently familiar ; for these two reasons Aristotle concentrates on 
form, and proposes to examine it first as it exists in the most 
generally recognized substances, those perceptible by sense.’ 
But, feeling perhaps the difficulty of treating form as a variety 
of substratum, he here* makes a fresh start; he leaves the 
notion of substratum and passes to another of the four original 
claimants to substantiality—essence. This, though connected, 
is not identical with the form which was one variety of sub- 
stratum. That was τὸ σχῆμα τῆς ἰδέας, the sensible shape ; this 
is the inner nature, what makes a thing what it is, and is un- 
folded in definition. The essence of a thing, we read, is what 
that thing is said to be propter se. Therefore (1) accidental 
attributes are excluded from essence. Your essence is not to 
be musical. You were you before you were musical, and you 
may cease to be musical and still be you. This exclusion of 
certain attributes from the essence of an individual is somewhat 
arbitrary, It is obvious that you would not be the same you 


1 This forms the main subject of Z. 4-12. The study of form as it is in 
sensible things is preliminary to the study of it as it is in itself (1029? 
33, > 3-12, 10379 13, 10416). 

Ms, Ah 


ARISTO TEE Seite ΒΕ SIGAGLDOCTRINE σὸν 


that you are now if you ceased to be musical. Aristotle is 
working with a prima_facie notion of a core of being present 
throughout the whole existence of an individual and distinguished 
from the passing attributes. But he is perhaps aware of the 
possible objection. At all events, for him essence is the object 
of definition, and the individual is indefinable. After this one 
reference, therefore, to ‘your essence’ he refers henceforward 
to the essence of general types. (2) He excludes, secondly, 
attributes which ave in a sense propter se, viz. propria. To say 
that A belongs to B propter se is ambiguous. A belongs to B 
proplter se in one sense if it is included in the essence and 
definition of B (thus line is propéer se to triangle, point to line); 
in another sense, if it is present in B and if B is included in z¢s 
definition (thus straight and curved are propier se to line, odd 
and even to number).? What is καθ᾽ αὐτό to B in the second 
sense—e.g. white to surface—is not the essence of B. For 
though you cannot define white except by reference to surface, 
you can define surface without reference to white. (3) Nor 
is the essence of surface white surface. A definition, which 
is the statement of the essence of a thing, must not name 
the thing itself. 

(4) Aristotle next asks whether a term which is a complex οἱ 
a substance + something in another category, e.g. white man, has 
an essence. It might be objected that any proposed definition 
of it would have to be condemned, like those considered above 
under (1), as not propter se, since there is no essential connexion 
between man and white. But ‘proffer se’ above referred to 
the relation between the definition and the definiendum. A 
definition is ‘not propter se’ when it errs (a) by addition, as 
when white is defined by the definition appropriate to white 
man; or (4) by omission, as when white man is defined by the 
definition appropriate to white. It is not necessary to commit 
either of these mistakes, so that, as far as this goes, white man 
may have an essence and a definition. But, supposing these 
errors avoided, would the account of white man arrived at be 
an essence? No, for an essence is ‘just what an individual 


1 Probably indeed τὸ σοὶ εἶναι (1029 14) is not meant to be taken as 
the essence of an individual in distinction from the essence of a kind. τὸ 
σοὶ εἶναι is τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. 


2 An. Post. 73% 34- 5. 


xcvi INTRODUCTION 


thing is’ (ὅπερ τί or ὅπερ τόδε τι), and white man is not ‘just what 
an individual thing is’; it does not indicate the permanent 
fundamental nature of anything but the union of a term which 
does indicate such a nature with an accidental concomitant. 
Thus lack of necessary connexion within a definiendum (and 
therefore within its definition) is as fatal to any proposed defini- 
tion of it as would be the lack of necessary connexion between 
the definiendum and the definition. 

Of all terms only those which stand for species can be defined. 
Summa genera cannot be defined, since they cannot be analysed 
into anything simpler than themselves ; and complex terms other 
than species cannot be defined, since there is no necessary con- 
nexion between their elements. In species there is such a 
necessary connexion; the genus does not participate in the 
differentia as in something irrelevant to itself. The genus has 
no existence apart from the differentiae nor the differentiae 
apart from the genus.’ But of other terms an account (λόγος), 
though not a definition (spicpds), may be given. You can explain 
any single ὄνομα by stating a combination of words (λόγος) equiva- 
lent to it, or any Adyos by giving a more explicit Adyos equivalent 
to it. And such accounts may be called definitions in a secondary 
sense of definition. Other things than substantial species may 
in some sense have a τί ἐστι and a τί ἢν εἶναι, though only in 
a secondary sense, just as being itself belongs only in a secondary 
sense to them. Anything in any of the non-substantial cate- 
gories has, not an essence proper, but an ‘ essence-of-a-quality ’, 
ἃς. And in a tertiary sense even a mixed term like white man 
has an essence,’ which will be the union of an essence proper 
and an essence-of-a-quality. 

Aristotle proceeds * to consider (5) the possibility of defining 
yet another class of term, the ‘coupled term’ (cvvdedvacpevov) 
like ‘snub’ or ‘snub-nose’, which stands for τόδε ἐν τῷδε, a 
particular quality in a particular subject-matter, e.g. concavity 
inanose. This is distinguished from terms like ‘white man’ in 
that the connexion between the elements is essential. What is 
white need not be a man, but what is snub must be a nose, 
what is male must be an animal, what is equal a quantity, what 
is odd anumber. This being so, one might suppose that the 


1H. 6. 2 10305 31. 
πὸ ΤΘΞΟΣ 12: AR 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE xcvii 


connexion in these cases is that of genus with differentia, which 
is similarly described as non-accidental,! and that the snub, the 
male, the equal, the odd are species of nose, animal, quantity, 
and number respectively. This is, however, not Aristotle’s 
view. Sex, for example, is a contrariety not in the λόγος but 
in τὸ συνειλημμένον τῇ ὕλῃ, in the concrete thing which is a union 
of matter and form, and it belongs primarily not to form but to 
matter.” In I. g Aristotle distinguishes three ways in which 
attributes may be connected with generic subjects. (a) They 
may be connected as footed and winged are with animal. These 
are ‘proper attributes of the genus’ present in its very form 
and differentiating species within the genus. (ὦ) They may be 
connected as male and female are with animal. These are also 
proper attributes but present not in the form but in the matter, 
i.e. in the body, and not giving rise to a differentiation of 
species. (c) They may be connected as white and black are 
with animal. These are not even propter se to the genus and of 
course give rise to no differentiation of species.* It is men- 
tioned as arising from (and confirming) the fact that in case (ὁ) the 
difference is in the matter, that the same seed, i.e. the same 
male or formal element in generation, may by different treat- 
ment, i.e. by union with this or that female or material element, 
produce male or female offspring ; the difference between male 
and female comes from matter, not from form. Thus, when 
some members of a genus have an attribute and others not, 
(2) the attribute may be peculiar to the genus and one of its 
main differentiations. In this case, just as the genus, e.g. 
animal, is not a single attribute but a mass of interconnected 
attributes, so the attribute, e.g. footed or winged, carries with it 
a mass of other attributes, so that land animals and flying 
animals are real kinds clearly marked off from one another. 
Then the unity of genus and attribute is a species, a ‘secondary 
substance’, and is definable in the strict sense by naming the 
genus and the differentia. (ὁ) The attribute may be peculiar 
to the genus but carry with it only a small number of other 
attributes. In this case the attribute is said to belong to the 
matter, not to the form. The unity of genus and such an attri- 


1 1030713. ZN IUOGSY 1,21. 

5 In the language of the 7ofvcs, the attribute may be (a) a differentia, 
(ὁ) a proprium, or (c) an accidens of the genus. 

2573-1 g 


xcvill INTRODUCTION 


bute is called a ‘coupled term’ and is said to be not strictly 
definable. (c) The attribute may not be peculiar to the genus 
at all but may belong to certain members of the genus quite 
externally. In this case the unity of the two is a ovv@erov’ and 
is definable in the tertiary sense referred to above. 

The distinction of sex might be thought sufficiently important 
to be recognized as a genuine differentia. But it would cut 
across the differentiation of animals into the species ‘land- 
animal’, ‘water-animal’, ‘air-animal’, and Aristotle has there- 
fore to relegate it to a position of less importance. 

The reason given for such terms as snub or male not being 
definable is that any definition would involve ‘addition’, i.e. the 
definition of X as ‘Y which is X’. This is due to the intimate 
connexion of the elements in the coupled term. Snub cannot 
be defined apart from nose nor male apart from animal because 
what is snub must be a nose and what is male must be an 
animal. It is inferred that, since evevy term in a category other 
than substance presupposes a substance, the definition of any 
such term must involve an ‘addition’, and therefore be no 
proper definition. Only substance can be defined. Aristotle 
does not draw the conclusion that on the same showing no 
species can be defined, since within a species the elements 
genus and differentia must have a connexion even more inti- 
mate than that between the elements in a coupled term. And 
on his own principles he is justified in refusing to draw this 
conclusion. For in the nature of a species the elements genus 
and differentia are so closely united that one is not ἄλλο to the 
other at all, and the definition is not therefore ἐκ προσθέσεως." 

Pursuing the subject of essence, Aristotle asks in Z. 6 whether 
a thing is the same as its essence. It is difficult to see the point 
of this question. Aristotle first points out that terms which are 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός are not identical with their essence. The 
meaning seems to be best brought out in a passage later in the 
chapter, in which it is pointed out that a term like white is in one 
sense and is not in another identical with its essence. The 
essence of white is identical with the attribute white, but not 
with the subject to which the attribute belongs, nor yet with the 
whole which includes both subject and attribute. This ambiguity 
in the meaning of the neuter adjective with the definite article 


τ ΤΟΣ 252. "ον EO; 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE xcix 


has to be borne in mind throughout the discussions in Book Z; 
the extent to which Aristotle is embarrassed by it is rather 
remarkable. 

When Aristotle passes from terms κατὰ συμβεβηκός to terms καθ᾽ 
αὑτά, 1. 6. terms which stand neither for mere attributes, like 
white, nor for unities of subject and accidental attribute, like white 
man, he does not discuss on its merits the question whether such 
terms are identical with their essence, but takes as alleged 
examples of such terms the Platonic Forms, and asks whether, 
for instance, the Form of good is identical with the essence of 
goodness ; and he draws the conclusion that there is no ground 
for believing in Platonic Forms if by them is meant anything 
more than ‘ what it is to be’ so-and-so. It is unfortunate that he 
has thus improved the occasion by a fling at the Platonic theory, 
but his own view, that terms καθ᾽ αὑτά are identical with their 
essence, appears clearly enough. It is supported by three main 
arguments. It is implied (a) by the nature of knowledge, since 
to know a thing is obviously to know what it is to be that thing, 
and (ὁ) by the fact that if it were not so, essence would not exist. 
If the essence of good is not good, the essence of being will not 
be. But there is just as much ground for believing in the 
essence of being as in the essence of anything else, so that on 
this showing no essence would exist. (c) The identity of a thing 
with its essence is shown by the infinite regress involved in its 
denial. Ifthe essence of A is different from A, the essence of the 
essence of A is different from the essence of A, and so on. 

The reasoning of the chapter is weak, and to an unusual degree 
verbal and dialectical. Its meaning is rendered difficult to seize 
by the facts (1) that the proof of the non-identity of ‘accidental 
terms’ with their essence is not a direct one, but a reductio ad 
absurdum, and (2) that the argument for the identity of ‘self- 
dependent terms’ with their essence is conducted with reference 
to one particular kind of supposed self-dependent terms, the 
Platonic Forms. But the underlying doctrine has considerable 
importance. It may perhaps be stated thus. (1) There is 
a class of πρῶτα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγόμενα, primary and self-dependent 
entities, of which ‘soul’ would be a good example, which stand 
for certain natures and cannot be distinguished from ‘ what it is 
to be’ those natures; which are pure form, not complexes of 
formand matter. (2) There is a class of κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενα, 


g 2 


τ INTRODUCTION 


of which ‘white man’ is an example,—casual conjunctions of 
mutually independent elements, which, as we have seen from 
Z. 4, have ‘essence’ only ina tertiary sense, and are not identical 
with such essence as they have since they involve an element of 
matter which can never be stated in definition. Ultimately, as 
we shall see from 7, 10, 11, even combinations whose elements 
belong much more directly to one another than those of ‘white 
man’ do—entities like ‘man’, if ‘man’ means not soul but soul 
+ body—are, though not ‘accidental entities’, yet distinct from 
their essence, since definition (which is the unfolding of essence) 
cannot express the material element in them. (3) There are 
ambiguous expressions like τὸ λευκόν, which, if they mean the 
quality in question (e.g. whiteness), are καθ᾽ αὑτά and identical 
with their essence, but if they mean the thing that has the quality, 
considered as having it, are κατὰ συμβεβηκός and not identical with 
their essence. 
The discussion is resumed, after a digression, in chs. ΤΟ, 11, 
the main interest of which lies not in Aristotle’s answer to the 
questions he explicitly asks but in the complicated set of entities 
which emerges in the course of the discussion. There is (1) the 
‘pure form, e.g. the circle or the soul, which are identical with 
their essences ;' i.e, the pure form of circularity or of vitality. 
(2) The intelligible individual,’ the union of form with a particular 
intelligible matter, i,e. with a particular extension; 6. g. the indivi- 
dual geometrical circle. (3) The materiate universal, the union of 
‘this form’ with ‘this matter taken as universal’; e.g, ‘man’, the 
union of soul with a particular kind of sensible matter.’ (4) The 
sensible individual, the union of form with a particular parcel of 
sensible matter ; 6. g. Socrates or a particular bronze circle.‘ The 
recognition of the intelligible individual and that of the materiate 
universal are important innovations; hitherto the only σύνολον 
thought of has been, apparently, the sensible individual. But to 
complete the series a fifth type of entity between the first and 
the second should be recognized. Circularity is not a pure form 
but the embodiment in intelligible matter (space) of the equation 
to the circle, i.e. of a type of arithmetical relation which is 
capable of other embodiments as well. Aristotle suggests a cruder 
form of this distinction when he asks whether the line is the 


δ ΘΟ; loys 2. 
ὁ 1035” 27-30. * 1036* 3-5, 1035? 30. 


ARISTOTLE’S®METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE τὶ 


number two or the number two embodied in length Thus we 
should recognize besides the pure form the σύνολον which includes 
‘this form’ and ‘this intelligible matter taken as universal’. 
But Aristotle does not draw this conclusion. He maintains that 
geometry and arithmetic deal with entirely different γένη, and 
opposes strongly the Pythagorean and Platonic ‘reduction of 
things to numbers’.? 

Of the four types of entity here recognized by him, only the 
first and the last have any real claim to substantiality. The 
intelligible individual is merely one element in the nature of the 
sensible individual considered in abstraction from the rest, the 
secondary qualities.* The materiate universal, like ‘man’, which 
in the Categories’ is called a secondary substance, is here said not 
to be substance at all.’ It too exists only in sensible individuals. 
Pure form is for Aristotle substance, but few of the things that 
prima facie are pure forms turn out to be really pure from matter. 
‘The circle’ in general, which he here identifies with the essence 
of circularity, really involves intelligible matter. ‘The soul’, 
which he identifies with the essence of soul, is yet the ‘essence 
of a particular sort of body’,® and cannot exist apart from such 
a body. In the long run, God, the intelligences that move the 
spheres, and the human reason (or rather the ‘active’ element in 
it) are the only pure forms that Aristotle recognizes. Finally, 
there are difficulties in the view that sensible individuals are 
substances, There is the difficulty—which we shall discuss later— 
arising from the facts that the truly real must be knowable, while 
the individual is, on the face of it, not completely knowable.’ 
There is the difficulty—perhaps the same difficulty looked at from 
another point of view—arising from the presence of matter 
or potentiality in the individual, and its resulting subjection to 
change and destruction. The general tendency of ΖΗΘ is to 
carry Aristotle away from his earlier doctrine that the sensible 
individual is ‘primary substance’, to one which identifies primary 
substance with pure form and with that alone. 

The expression ‘intelligible matter’ occurs only here and in 
1037* 4, and in H, 104534, 36, where, however, it is used in 
a different sense, to express the fact that the genus is to the 


1H. 1043933. Cf. Z. 1036 12-17. 
2 7 OG OnAL as # To76% 11; M. 25 3. 2 Ft 7s 
δ ΟΞ ΟΡ 27, 6 ib. 14-16. ΔΕ 8. 


cil INTRODUCTION | 


differentia as matter is to form. On the other hand ἡ τῶν μαθη- 
ματικῶν ὕλη in K, 105915 means the same as ὕλη νοητή here. ‘The 
present phrase should probably not be understood in its most ob- 
vious sense as meaning matter which is itself intelligible. Matter is 
not intelligible ;* ‘intelligiblematter’ is a shorthand phrase for the 
material, pluralizing element in the intelligible, as ὕλῃ γεννητή is 
not generable but is the material element in generable things. 
Plato had? treated space (χώρα) as the material element or 
substratum of sensible things, the stuff out of which they are 
moulded by the entrance into it of shapes which are likenesses 
of the eternal existents, the Forms.* Space in his philosophy 
(unless we should rather say, in that of Timaeus) does the work 
which matter does in Aristotle’s. His analysis of sensible things 
is simply into space + τὰ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα. Aristotle recognizes 
layer upon layer of matter in sensible things, and only one of these 
is identified with space, viz. (1) intelligible matter, the minimum 
matter that anything can have ; this exists both in sensible things 
and in intelligible individuals.‘ It is this that pluralizes the pure 
form of circularity into the many geometrical circles. On this is 
superimposed, in sensible things, (2) sensible matter ; but this is 
not of one piece. The minimum form of it is (a) ὕλη τοπική, the 
matter that makes things capable of local motion ; the heavenly 
bodies have this without any of the other kinds of sensible 
matter.” On this, in sensible things other than the heavenly 
bodies, are superimposed (Φ) the matter or potentiality for 
qualitative change, which presupposes (a);° (c) the matter or 
potentiality for growth and diminution, which presupposes (ὁ) ἢ 
and therefore (a); and (d) ὕλη γεννητὴ καὶ φθαρτή, the matter or 
potentiality for generation and destruction, which presupposes 
(a), (ὁ), (c).8 This is ὕλη μάλιστα καὶ κυρίως." (ὁ), (c), and (d), 
though they have an order of logical priority, are not given 
separately, but are all present in all terrestrial sensible things. 
Extension, then, though involved in sensible things, is not for 
Aristotle as for Plato the stuff of which they are made. The 
stuff of which sensible things are made is something that answers 
more to our ordinary notion of matter, something that has solidity 


1 1036° 8, OT thin RIAs 5. προ, 
ΕΖ ΤΟΒΟΝ τι; 5 H. 10447, ©. 1050" 21, PAys. 260% 28. 
6 Phys. 260? 4. T 260% 29, SH lod2 δι 


® De Gen. et Corr. 3205 2. 


ARISTOTLE’S,. METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE ciii 


as well as extension. And the matter of the sublunary world is 
always qualified by one, or by a combination of both, of the 
members of each of the main ἐναντιότητες, hot and cold, wet and 
dry, and of the subsidiary ἐναντιότης heavy and light. 

But, though space is distinguished from matter, there is no 
space without matter; there is no actual void.’ It follows that 
intelligible individuals do not exist apart from sensible things. 
Wherever there is a geometrical sphere there is a material 
sphere—though not necessarily one which is qualitatively distinct 
from what surrounds it, so as to be sensibly a sphere. Mathe- 
matics is not the study of separate entities, but of sensible things 
considered as possessing size and shape but not as possessing 
sensible matter and the qualities that go with it.? There is, in 
fact, a series of sciences which abstract progressively more and 
more from the total nature of sensible things. One science 
(kinematics) considers them as moving, i. e. as having intelligible 
matter and local matter but not the other three kinds; another 
(solid geometry) considers them as having only intelligible matter, 
but that in three dimensions ; another (plane geometry) as having 
it in two; another (so Aristotle says, but the ob¢ter dictum should 
not be pressed) as having it in one dimension. Another will 
abstract from all three dimensions and treat them as indivisibles 
having position, and another (arithmetic) simply as indivisibles.* 

How do the various types of entity stand with regard to the 
question of definition? The definition of a pure form should take 
account only of pure form. The mdividual, whether sensible or 
intelligible, cannot be defined, but is apprehended by the aid of 
direct perception or intellection.* With regard to the materiate 
universal, Aristotle finds it hard to decide whether its definition 
should include areference to its matter. ‘Finger’, he says, ‘is de- 
fined by reference to man ’,’ which implies that man is not defined 
by reference to finger. Bones, sinew, and flesh are no part of the 
definition of man.’ Only the parts of the form are parts of the 
definition.” But a doubt arises in his mind. When a form can 
be manifested in more than one kind of matter, as a circle can in 
bronze, stone, or wood, the materials are evidently no part of the 
definition ; even if all circles were of bronze, bronze would be no 
part of the definition of circle. Are flesh and bones equally 


1 Phys. iv. 6-9. BEM 2. ἢ. 8 Μ, 1077” 17-30. 
4 Ζ, 1036 2-6, 5 1034» 28-31. 8 10357 17-22. UTR 


civ INTRODUCTION 


irrelevant to the form of man, lines and continuity to that of 
circle? Is the circle really a number or a numerical relation, 
which merely happens to be embodied in extension? No, such 
terms are essentially τόδε ἐν τῷδε, forms which require a particular 
kind of matter.!. Man cannotbe defined without reference to bodily 
parts, i.e. those parts which are κύρια, the dominant parts such 
as heart or brain in which the essence directly resides, and which 
are ‘simultaneous’ with man in the sense that he cannot come 
into being without them nor survive their destruction.” Yet after 
all Aristotle concludes that the definition of a σύνολον will not 
refer to matter, for that is indefinite; the definition of man is 
the definition of the soul.’ 

Aristotle’s vacillation on this point led Scotus to postulate for 
every σύνολον or materiate universal two forms—the forma partts, 
which is an element in the σύνολον (e.g. rationality, which is an 
element in man), and the forma tottus, which is the whole of the 
σύνολον (e.g. humanity, which is the whole of man, including his 
body as well as his soul). Zabarella, however, points out that 
neither rationality nor humanity contains matter as a part, and 
that both presuppose it as a vehicle and necessary condition, the 
former implicitly, the latter expressly. 

Aristotle admits elsewhere‘ the possibility of three ways of 
defining a σύνολον, by reference to the matter, to the form, or to 
both. The first is the way of the so-called physicist, the second 
that of the dialectician ; the truly physical or scientific definition 
is the third, which recognizes anger, for example, frankly as 
a λόγος ἔνυλος and defines it as desire for retaliation accompanied 
by ferment of the blood about the heart. 

In Ζ. 12 Aristotle discusses a question which was often in his 
mind,’ though he does not discuss it except here and in H. 6. 
Definition always mentions a genus and one or more differentiae; 
wherein, then, consists the unity of the substance defined? Does 
it not split into two or more externally related elements? His 
answer consists in pointing out (1) that the genus has no 
existence apart from its species; it stands to them in a relation 
analogous to that of matter to form; it is a potentiality which is 
realized only inthem, It therefore offers no obstacle to the unity 


1 1036 31-» 32. Cf. H. 1043? 2~4. ST HALOSG webs 
8. 10378 24-29. 4 De An. 4038 3- 9. 
5 Cf. De (nt, 17% 13, An. Post. 92% 29. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL, DOCTRINE ev 


of definition. Definition may thus be considered as if it consisted 
entirely of differentiae. Now (2) each differentia should be a 
differentiation of the previous one. If we take ‘footed’ as the first 
differentia of man, the next to be mentioned should be one which 
presupposes footedness and is a differentiation of it—not ‘ wing- 
less’ but ‘cloven-footed’. Thus the last differentia presupposes 
all the others and is indeed the essence and definition of man ; 
all danger of the definition, and the substance, splitting into 
irrelevant parts is seen to have disappeared. This account of defi- 
nition looks like a tour de force adopted in order to escape a meta- 
physical difficulty. In the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle 
has his eye on the actual conditions under which definition has 
to be effected, his doctrine is different. We must take differentiae 
each of which will extend beyond the definiendum but all together 
will ποι. Three is defined as a number which is odd, prime, and 
not the sum of two numbers—three independent differentiae.’ 
Man is defined as an animal which is tame and two-footed.* Yet 
even there it is stated as the zdea/ that each term in the definition 
should be such as to be presupposed by all the later terms.’ 
Not only in the definition of natural kinds, which has to be by 
approximation to a general type, but in that of abstract entities 
like the square, we often have to take account of differentiae 
logically independent of each other (equality of sides, rightness 
of one angle). But it is a good counsel of perfection that a single 
Jundamenitum divisionts should as far as possible be adopted 
through all the stages of the division implied in definition. 
Aristotle now passes from the discussion of essence. He has 
treated it from many points of view, but he has not answered his 
original question whether essence is substance. Perhaps the 
most valuable result is the growing sense of the complexity of 
the problem. He started with sensible form, matter, and the 
individual thing which is a complex of the two. He has now 
recognized in addition (1) essence, the inner nature which makes 
a thing what it is. He has recognized (2) intelligible matter, 
present in non-sensible things which might prima facie be thought 
to be pure form. He has recognized (3) the intelligible individual 
and (4) the materiate universal. And the last of these has 
revealed an unsuspected implication of matter in essence. 


1 969 32. 2. they 38: 3 96> 31, * 97° 26-31. 


ΟΝ] INTRODUCTION 


Essence was originally described as substance without matter,’ 
and is constantly identified * with form and therefore opposed to 
matter. But the essence of a materiate universal cannot be 
properly stated without reference to matter—not, of course, prime 
matter, which has no character and is therefore of no use for 
purposes of definition, nor yet the particular parcels of matter 
which are found in individuals, but something intermediate, the 
kind of matter in which alone the form in question can be 
embodied. The way is thus prepared for the recognition in H 
of a relation of the very closest between matter and form. 

The question of the unity of definition is resumed in H. 6. It 
we consider a γενητόν, e.g. a bronze ball, and ask what makes it 
one, we find it to consist of two elements, matter and form, each 
of which is adapted to the other.’ The bronze is potentially 
round; roundness is a character which can be imposed on 
bronze. No cause of their unity need be looked for, other than 
the craftsman who makes the potentially round actually round. 
But there is intelligible matter as well as sensible. The generic 
element in the essence of a thing may be regarded asa relatively 
vague matter or potentiality which is actualized in its different 
species. And here no efficient cause is needed. The genus 
does not first exist undifferentiated, as the bronze first exists 
unrounded. The genus exists only in its species; it is its 
nature to have one or other of the alternative differentiae. And 
it is the nature of the differentiae to belong to this particular 
genus and to no other.’ The supposed difficulty about the unity 
of definition arises from looking out for a difference between 
potentiality and actuality, and a λόγος which unites them. The 
truth is that the proximate matter and the form are the same 
thing ; the very thing that the one is potentially, the other is 
actually. Ifyou think of prime matter and of a highly specialized 
form you may wonder how they are ever to be brought together; 
but recognize the stages in the preparation or formation of 
matter,’ and you will see that matter is at each stage trembling 
on the verge of its proximate actualization, and needs but the 
hand of the craftsman, or of the master craftsman nature, to 


1 Z. 1032) 14. 

* 8, δ. 1032 1, 103516, 32, H. 1043” 1, 1044% 36. 
3 Cf. 1044% 27-20. * 1045" 23-35. 

δ 


Cf. 1044" 15-20, » 1-3, ©. 1048 37—1049% 24. 


ARISTOTLE S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE ‘evi 


make it pass over. And similarly between the genus and its 
first differentia, between the first differentia and the second, 
and so on, thereis no gulf. The genus exists only as characterized 
by one or other of the alternative first differentiae, each of these 
only as qualified by one or other of the alternative differentiae 
at the next stage, and so on right down to the last differentia, 
which constitutes the wfima species. To ask how matter and 
form are one is like asking for the cause of unity in general.' 


The Universal. 


Aristotle proceeds in Z. 13 to the next claimant to the title 
of substance — the universal,? and emphatically denies that 
this can be the substance of anything. (1) The substance of 
anything is the substance peculiar to it, but the universal is 
common. It cannot therefore be the substance either of all its 
particulars or of any of them, since it is not peculiar to any. 
(2) Substance is what is not asserted ofa subject, but the universal 
15 asserted of a subject. Nor canit be an element in the essence. 
To make it an element in the nature of its particulars is (1) to 
make it the essence of the class to which the particulars belong ; 
it is (2) to suppose individual substance to consist of elements 
that are not individual nor substances but qualities, and thus to 
make quality prior to substance; it is (3) to make the genus 
substance not only of the species but of each individual in it, and 
thus not peculiar to that whose substance it is alleged to be. In 
general, if imfimae spectes like man are substance, no mere 
element in their definition is substance. To say otherwise is to 
fall into the difficulty of the ‘third man’ or infinite regress and 
to make substance consist of actually existing substances, whereas 
what is actually one cannot be actually two. But a difficulty 
arises. Ifa substance cannot consist of universals nor of actual 
substances, every substance will be incomposite and therefore 
indefinable. But we have seen that only substance is definable. 
For the moment, then, we are left with the conclusion that 
nothing is definable. But we may perhaps find things that are 
definable in a particular sense. 


1 1045» 16-23. 

2 The fourth of the original claimants— genus—is not treated separately. 
The actual treatment of the universal identifies it with the generic element 
in the nature of a species. 


cviil INTRODUCTION 


The chapter is clearly dialectical. The result it leads to is 
one which Aristotle does not accept. He is no doubt in earnest in 
refusing to find the substance of any separately existing being ina 
universal character which according to all his principles cannot 
exist separately. And he is in earnest in refusing to recognize the 
universal as a substance present in the essence of its species or 
of its individuals. But it is his own doctrine that in some sense 
the universal is present in the essence of its particulars, and this 
will emerge later. 

Ch. 14 applies to the Platonic Ideas Aristotle’s arguments 
against reducing the substance of individuals to anything uni- 
versal. 

Ch. 15 carries on the thought of ch. 13. In that chapter 
Aristotle argued that no substance can consist of universals 
because every universal signifies not a ‘this’ but a ‘such’. He 
now draws the corollary that since definition is an enunciation of 
universal marks, it can never adequately express the nature of 
an individual. The chapter argues that (1) individuals are 
indefinable, and (2) in particular the Ideas are so since they are 
thought of by the Platonists as individuals, having separate 
existence. Individuals are indefinable (a) because they contain 
matter and are therefore perishable. A definition which was at 
one time true might therefore cease to be true, and therefore could 
only have been opinion, not knowledge. (d) In the discussion of 
the definability of Ideas the further point, which is applicable to αὐ 
individuals, comes out, that any definition is bound to name only 
common qualities and therefore not to state the unique nature of 
the individual. 

The conclusion that individuals cannot be subjects of definition 
nor of demonstration creates a serious difficulty for Aristotle, of 
which much has been made by Zeller. (1) On the one hand, for 
Aristotle only individuals are really substances. The only forms 
which have separate substantial existence apart from matter are 
individuals—God and the intelligences that move the spheres ; 
the mistake of the Platonists according to Aristotle is not that 
they believe in immaterial entities but that they identify them 
with universals.'. And, at a lower level, the individuals con- 
crete of form and matter are more real, more substantial than 
the universals in which their common qualities are abstracted 

1 rogo? 27—10414 3. 


ARISTOTLE SeMETAPHYSICAL. DOCTRINE. ‘cix 


from those peculiar to the individuals.! (2) On the other hand, 
definition and demonstration are the very types of knowledge. 
Science, or knowledge (Aristotle has one word for both), starts 
with definition and proceeds by demonstration ; it demonstrates 
universal properties as flowing from universal definitions. This 
is the consistent teaching of the Posterior Analytics. Now (3) that 
which is most real should be for Aristotle most fully knowable, 
and therefore most strictly the subject of definition and of 
demonstration. He has said explicitly and more than once that 
substance alone, or substance primarily, is definable.? 

In various passages Aristotle hints at a solution of this 
difficulty. (1) Individuals, though not definable, are known by 
the aid of intuitive thought (νόησις) or of perception—intelligible 
individuals like ‘this circle’ by the former, sensible individuals 
by the latter.* Apart from the abstractive and discursive pro- 
cedure of science there are other more concrete and direct modes 
of knowledge (of which one—vénous—is conceived as actually 
superior to science) by which the whole individual nature of the 
individual is grasped in a single act. Aristotle appears to be 
pointing here to an important fact, the fact that our knowledge 
of individuals, e.g. of persons or of places, is not held in the 
form of a set of universal propositions, and could not be com- 
pletely stated in such a form. But it is to be regretted that he 
did not work out more fully a theory of νόησις in which this 
function was correlated with the other functions he assigns to it— 
the knowledge of the first principles of science, and the knowledge 
of essences and of incomposite substances.‘ 

(2) Aristotle has elsewhere ® a different solution. It is only 
knowledge as existing potentially (i.e. as it is in the mind of 
a man of science when he is not thinking of the object of his 
science) that is of the universal; actual knowledge is of the 
individual. Or, as he also puts it, just as sight is directly of 
‘this’ colour, and only incidentally of colour in general because 
this colour is a colour, so grammatical science is directly ‘of this 
alpha’, and only incidentally ‘of alpha’. This contention also 
has truth. To take Aristotle’s own example of the science of 
grammar, the actuality of grammatical knowledge cannot be 


1 1035} 27, 1038» 6—10397 14, A. 10719 19-24. 
2 10309 21-7, 10318 13, 1039719. 5 10367 2-8. 
= (Sh Gy: 5 M, 10878 10-25: cf. De An. 417% 21-29. 


cK INTRODUCTION 


confined to the grasping of a set of universal laws. The scholar 
who is interpreting a particular passage is in the fullest sense 
thinking grammatically or knowing grammar. And what is true 
of this is true of all the sciences. ‘To solve a particular problem 
by mathematics is to think mathematically. One might go 
further and say that actual scientific thought is never con- 
cerned with universals cut off from their particulars, but with 
universals as the universals of their particulars. There is no 
insight into a general law which is not accompanied by some 
awareness, perceptual or imaginative, of particulars that fall 
under it. When the particulars have been completely lost sight 
of, the law is no longer an object of genuine knowledge but a 
convenient shorthand or memoria technica, which can be re- 
vitalized or, as Aristotle says, actualized only by a fresh contact 
with particulars. 

But this hardly meets the difficulty. For though scientific 
work is concerned thus with particulars, it is not concerned with 
them in their full particularity. The man of science treats them 
as instances of a universal, and is only vaguely aware of their 
differing individual natures; it is his business to abstract, and 
his knowledge can therefore never be adequate to the full reality 
of individuals. For adequate knowledge of them αἴσθησις and 
νόησις seem to be necessary as well as ἐπιστήμη. 

Ch. 16 proves two corollaries from the principles laid down in 
ch. 13. (1) From the principle that no substance consists of 
actual substances it follows that the material parts of substances 
—the organs and tissues that make up a living body, and its 
more remote constituents the four elements—are not actually 
existing substances but mere potentialities. The doctrine is 
briefly expressed and difficult, but seems to be as follows :— 
A living body may be said to exist actually and to be a substance. 
It has a life which is both independent and unified. But when 
it exists actually its parts considered as separate entities do not 
exist actually, any more than the half lines exist actually in the 
undivided line. As the elements are the matter out of which by 
the imposition of certain forms or principles of structure tissues 
(τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ) are made, and as tissues are the matter out of which 
organs (τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ) are made, so organs are the matter out of 
which by the imposition of a certain form, the soul, a living body 
is made, ‘made’ not in the sense that the elements necessarily 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE cxi 


exist before the tissues, the tissues before the organs, or the 
organs before the living body, but in the sense that logical 
analysis can draw the distinction between matter and form at 
these various levels. Now when the hand, e.g., exists in the 
body it has not the independence characteristic of substance ; its 
life is merged in the life of the body. And when it is severed 
from the body, then though it exists it has lost its life, its activity, 
which was its actuality. It is still but the matter of a living 
body, only now not of an existing living body but of one which 
has ceased to be and also perhaps of one that will in time be 
formed out of its decay and re-formation. 

(2) Aristotle has already, in ch. 13, established that no universal 
can be substance. He there considered particularly the narrowest 
universals, the genera next above infimae species. He now 
passes to the widest universals, the transcendentaha, being and 
unity, which are not genera but embrace all genera. These too, 
he shows, because they are ‘common’ cannot be substance, 


Essence 1s Substance. 


Having shown that the substance of things is neither their 
substratum nor their universal (nor their genus, which is a form 
of universal), Aristotle next, in ch. 17, essays to show that it is 
form or essence. The mode of approach is as follows. It is 
agreed that substance is an originative source and cause, i. e. 
that it is what makes things what they are. It is the answer to 
the question Why? Now the question Why ? is never of the 
form Why is A A ?—that is a stupid question. The sort of 
question that may really be asked is, Why does it thunder ? (i.e. 
Why is sound produced in the clouds ?) or, By reason of what are 
bricks and stones a house? In all these cases we are looking for 
a cause which is—to speak abstractly—the essence, but is in 
some cases, as in that of a house (or, generally, of artefacta), the 
end to be subserved, and in some (as in that of thunder) the 
moving cause. Our question always is, What makes the matter 
into a particular thing? The answer is, the presence of the 
essence of the particular thing, which is not another element in 
the thing alongside of its material elements, nor anything com- 
pounded out of elements. This it is that makes certain elements 
into flesh and certain others into a syllable, and this is the essence 
of the thing produced since it is the direct cause of its being. 


exil INTRODUCTION 


It is noteworthy that even in naming essence as the answer to 
the question, What is the explanatory cause of a thing’s being, and 
therefore its substance ? Aristotle indicates that this answer is but 
an abstract one. If we ask what makes this flesh and these 
bones into a man, these bricks and stones into a house, these 
clouds into thundering clouds, it is no doubt a correct answer to 
say, the presence of the essence of a man, of a house, or of 
thunder. But the answer takes us no further. Aristotle points 
the way to a more real explanation by saying that what we 
describe abstractly as the essence is, viewed concretely, some- 
times a final, sometimes an efficient, cause. Normally the real 
answer to the question is to name the final cause. No doubt the 
reason why this flesh and these bones make a man is that they 
are informed by the form of man, the human soul ; but an answer 
that cuts deeper is the answer, ‘ because they are organized in such 
a way as to subserve the ends for which man exists, intellectual 
and moral activity’. In his biological works Aristotle constantly 
aims at explaining structure by function. And similarly with 
artefacta. What makes these bricks and stones into a house? 
The fact that they are so arranged as to serve as a Shelter for 
living things and goods.’ Normally, then, the formal cause is 
also a final cause.’ But in the production of natural substances 
and of artefacta certain by-products emerge for which no final 
cause is to be posited,® and which are therefore to be explained 
mechanically, by reference to a moving cause. Thunder may no 
doubt be, as the Pythagoreans said, designed to terrorize the 
inhabitants of Tartarus,‘ but it is safer to explain it as due to the 
quenching of fire in clouds, or by some similar mechanical 
explanation. And, though his language in Ζ. 17 carelessly 
suggests that some things are to be explained teleologically and 
others mechanically,’ his real view is that the same thing which 
is due to a final cause is also due to an efficient cause. The 
light streams through the lantern to prevent us from stumbling, 
but also because that which has small parts must pass through 
that which has larger pores.° And this double action, of final 
cause and necessity, is normally at work in natural substances 
as well as in artefacta.". Thus Z, while identifying substance, 
what makes a thing what it is, with essence, points to a less 


ἘΠ 10437 16, 33. 2 1044? 1. 5 Ὑ, 12, 4 An. Post. 94” 33. 
5 To414 28-30, 6. An. Post. 94 27-31. 7 ib, 34-37. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE xiii 


abstract and a more satisfying explanation—the explanation by 
final or by mechanical causes or by both. H. 4 emphasizes the 
importance of ascertaining αὐ the causes of which a given thing 
admits—material, efficient, formal, and, where this is applicable, 
final cause,’ as well as that of assigning proximate rather than 
remote causes.’ It further brings out the distinction, somewhat 
obliterated in Z.17, between the status of natural substances like 
man, and natural phenomena like thunder. In the latter we 
have to do not with a simple union of matter and form, but with 
a union of substance (itself a union of matter and form) with 
a temporary qualification, The substratum of such things is not 
matter but substance.® 

The reduction of essence to formal or to final causes is, though 
mentioned, not stressed in Z. The point which Aristotle chiefly 
emphasizes in ch. 17 is that the essence is not to be thought of 
either as a component existing alongside of the material com- 
ponents, or as itself consisting of material components. If we 
view it in the former way we shall require a further principle of 
structure to explain how it is united with the material components. 
If we view it in the latter way we shall want to know how the 
material components are united to form the essence, i. e. we shall 
have to ask about the essence the same question that we asked 
originally about the concrete thing—what makes it what it is. 
We must pass clean away from any materialistic understanding 
of the essence and treat it as the structure of the concrete thing. 

It is chiefly against the materialistic views of the pre-Socratics 
that this required to be emphasized. One might have thought 
that Plato had in the doctrine of Forms already sufficiently 
emphasized the point. But itis proper that Aristotle in rejecting 
the Platonic doctrine, which he at least believed to be a doctrine 
of transcendent form, should have laid stress on the equally 
immaterial nature of the immanent form which he himself 
believed in. 

This, then, is Aristotle’s answer to the question what is sub- 
stance. The substance of a thing is the principle of structure, 
the presence of which in a collection of materials makes them not 
a mere collection but an organized whole. H. 2, 3 carry further 

1 1044% 33- 20. 
2 10442 15-20, 1-3. Cf. ©. 1048" 37—1046% 24. 
8 yo44>8-11. Cf. Z. 10385, ©, 10497 27-36. 


2573-1 h 


CXlV INTRODUCTION 


the notion of substance as the cause of being, that which makes 
a thing what it is! The doctrine is in two ways made more 
precise. (1) It is pointed out that the differentia or structural 
principle which makes a thing what it is may be of any one of 
many types. It may be a question of fusion (as in mead), or of 
colligation (as in a bundle of sticks), or of position (as in thresh- 
old and lintel), or of time (as in breakfast and dinner), or of 
place (as in the winds), or of sensible quality such as hardness 
and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness. There 
are again more complex wholes such as hand or foot which 
involve all, or more than one, of these differentiae. (2) In Z. 17 
Aristotle had spoken as if the essence or structural principle of 
anything—alike of man, of a house, and of thunder—were sub- 
stance. He nowrectifies this impression. None of the differentiae 
above-named is in the category of substance—they are in the 
categories of state (if κρᾶσις and δεσμός may be thus classified), 
position, time, place, or quality. But they present an analogy to 
substance. They are to the matter in the things named above 
as the substantial form is to matter in true natural substances. 
They, like the element of form in true substances, play the part 
of ‘actuality’ while matter plays the part of ‘ potentiality’ ;* for 
these expressions now begin to be used in connexion with form 
and matter, and tend to take their place. 

These differentiae not being substance, the things characterized 
by them—artefacta, temporary states of substances, and parts of 
living bodies—are not themselves substances. In fact, of perish- 
able things it is only those that are ‘held together by nature’, 
unified by an inherent power of initiating movement, that are 
substances.’ The elements, and therefore also the tissues and 
organs of living bodies, have the power of initiating simple move- 
ment upward or downward. But none of these, we have already 
seen,‘ are in the full sense substance. They are matter at 
different stages of preparation to play its part in the life of living 
things. Living things alone have ‘nature’ in the full sense, the 
power of purposive and centrally controlled reaction to a variety 


of stimuli, and these alone of all perishable things are in the full 
sense substances. 


t 104372; 2 ib. 4.57. 
8. 1043) 21-23. 4 Z. 1040? 5-14. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE cxv 


The Principle of Individuation. 


The question may be asked whether Aristotle thinks of this 
principle of structure as common to a species or peculiar to an 
individual. He has argued in Z, 13 that substance must not 
be κοινόν, but by what is common he seems to mean a genus 
like ‘animal’ as opposed to a species like ‘man’ or ‘horse’. 
Apparently he thinks that ‘man’ may be the essence, the whole 
essence, of individual men. The logic of the chapter should 
have led him to conclude that only the individual, or the im- 
material element in the individual, is substance, and it is only 
the doctrine of zzfimae species that prevents him from drawing 
this conclusion. That he does not do so seems to be shown by 
the fact that throughout these chapters it is the essence of 
universals—surface, white man, snub nose, odd number, man, 
house—that he is dealing with; the references to ‘ your essence’ ' 
and ‘the essence of Socrates’? are incidental and probably not 
deliberate. Individuals are indefinable ; if they have an essence 
it is at least inexpressible.® 

The problem of the principle of individuation was much 
debated by the schoolmen. The principal views held were the 
following. (1) St. Thomas assigned the origin of individuality 
to materia sensibilis signata, as opposed to materia sensibilis in 
communi, i.e. to the definite matter present in the individual as 
opposed to the type of matter present throughout a species, 
e.g. this flesh and bone as opposed to flesh and bone in general. 
This view was interpreted in two ways. (a) Some Thomists 
took materia signata to mean a certain amount of matter 
quantitatively determined. They distinguished indeterminate 
quantity, which they said was eternally present in matter, and 
determinate quantity, which ‘followed’ on form. The former 
was the original source of division, since it was by virtue of it 
that matter could be divided into parts and thus constitute 
separate individuals; the latter made the concrete thing in- 
divisible in itself and divided it from other things, and thus gave 
it numerical identity and individuality. (ὁ) Those who followed 
St. Thomas more closely (e.g. Caietanus) held materia signata 
to mean not matter+ quantity but matter+the proximate 


1 yo29P 14. 2 1032° 8, ΕΖ τε. 
lire 


CXV1 INTRODUCTION 


potentiality for a determinate quantity and for no other. The 
agent in acting on matter is all the time fitting it to receive 
the appropriate form and the determinate quantity. (2) Scotus, 
distinguishing, as we have seen, the forma totius from the forma 
partis, made a corresponding distinction between materia totius 
and materia partis. The latter was an element in the composite 
substance ; the former—also called differentia individualis, entitas 
tndividualts, or haeccettas—was what gave existence in individual 
shape to the form which in itself was universal. (3) Averroes 
and Zabarella distinguished between the plurality of individuals 
in the same species, and the numerical unity of each individual 
and its distinction from others. ‘The former was an imperfection 
and sprang from the division of matter; the latter was a per- 
fection and sprang from form. Form has two functions; it 
gives esse essentiae and esse existentiae; the generic form gives 
the first, the specific form the second, and therewith gives in- 
dividuality since to exist is to exist as an individual. Since 
matter does not give essence, still less can it give existence, 
which is to essence as actuality to potentiality. Some forms 
are by their very nature capable of being shared by more than 
one individual, and to these forms nature assigns divisible 
matter, which is the szve qua non but not the positive cause of 
individuality. (4) Others thought that it was the union of matter 
and form that constituted the individual, and assigned equal 
importance to the two elements. 

When we turn to Aristotle and ask which of these interpreta- 
tions best expresses his meaning, we find that, on the whole, he 
tends to describe matter as the source of plurality, if not of 
individuality. ‘Those things are one in number whose matter 
is one.’1 ‘The whole thing, such and such a form in this flesh 
and these bones, is Callias or Socrates; and they are different 
owing to their matter (for this is different), but the same in 
species, for the species is indivisible.’ ‘ Man, horse, and terms 
which are thus applicable to particulars but are universal, are 
not substance but are complexes of this definition and this 
matter taken universally; but it is the wtmate matter that is 
present in Socrates or any other individual.’* ‘Things are 
called the same in another sense if they are one both in definition 


ITA ΤΟΤΟΡ 52. 2 Ζ. 1ο345 5-8, 8 1035) 27-31. 


Ah HO ELE eM PIAPITYSIGAL DOCTRINE jcxvi 


and in number, e.g. you are the same with yourself both in 
form and in matter’;' here numerical unity is identified with 
unity in respect of matter. ‘That there is but one universe is 
evident. For if there were many universes as there are many 
men, their respective moving principles would be one in form 
but many in number. But all things that are many in number 
have matter.’? ‘If we supposed that there were but one circle, 
none the less to be a circle and to be this circle would be 
different; the one would be form, the other would be form in 
matter and would be a particular. This universe, then, and 
universe simply are different; the latter is of the nature of 
a form or shape, the former of the nature of something mixed 
with matter. ... In the case of all things whose substance is in 
matter, we see that the things of the same species are many and 
indeed indefinite in number.... But it does not follow that 
there is more than one universe; nor can there be, if this 
universe uses up all the matter, as it does. ... If hookedness is 
crookedness in a nose or in flesh, and flesh is the matter for 
hookedness, then if out of all flesh one flesh were made and 
hookedness belonged to this, nothing else either would be or 
could become hooked. Similarly if the matter for a man is flesh 
and bones, then if a man were made out of all the flesh and all 
the bones and these could not be disintegrated, there could not 
be another man. Similarly in all other cases; in general, of 
all the things whose substance involves an underlying matter, 
none can come into being if there is not matter available.’ ὃ 

The cumulative effect of these passages is very strong. Few 
passages can be cited in which individuation is ascribed to form. 
“Those things whose substance, i.e. whose essence, is one are 
themselves one.’* ‘The causes and elements of things in the 
same species are different, not in species, but in the sense that 
those of different individuals are different, your matter and form 
and moving cause and mine—though in their universal definition 
they are the same.’® ‘We say that one class of existing things 
is substance, and within this we distinguish matter, which in 
itself is not a ‘this’, shape or form, in virtue of which a thing is 
first called a ‘this’, and thirdly the complex of the two.’® With 


1 T, 1054 34. 2 A, 10747 31-34. 
3 De Caelo 278% 7-» 3, * Z, 1038) 14. 5 A, 1071% 27-209. 
6 De An. 412° 6-9, 


exvili INTRODUCTION 


this passage must be associated those in which form is described 
as τόδε τι, but it must be noted that there are others in which 
it is described as being not τόδε τι but τοιόνδε, and as being 
universal.’ In one, and perhaps in both, of two passages in 
which ἴδιον εἶδος occurs, the form peculiar to a species, not to an 
individual, is referred to.* 

The general effect of these passages is that, whereas things 
in different species differ in form (as well as in matter), things 
in the same species differ in matter only. The dominating idea 
is that of the zzfima species, the notion that there are fixed com- 
binations of characteristics which form the core of the individuals 
in which they are present; these alone nature seeks to secure 
and to perpetuate. All differences of less importance and 
permanence than these are deemed unworthy of the name of 
form and treated as the result of the union of identical form 
with different matter. The source of mere plurality is bare 
matter. But the source of the plurality of members of one 
species is not bare matter but qualified matter—is the fact that 
there is more of the requisite Aind of matter than is needed for 
a single individual realization of the specific form ; this seems to 
be the teaching of the passage quoted from the De Caelo. The 
matter with which the specific form unites is therefore not 
thought of as qualityless. It is with a certain kind of flesh and 
bone that the form of man unites. But further, if two parcels 
of flesh and bone with which the form unites are qualitatively 
alike, they are no more capable of producing two distinguishable 
men than if they had been prime matter. They must differ in 
character, i.e. in form. Socrates and Callias must therefore, 
while agreeing in their specific form, differ in the quality or 
form of their matter. Now this difference in the quality of their 
matter may be reckoned to the side of form or essence, and if 
this is done we get the notion of an essence of the individual 
which includes besides the specific form such further permanent 
characteristics as spring from differences in the matter with 
which the specific form is in different individuals united. 

How far does Aristotle think of the question thus? There 
are references in Z to ‘your essence’ and to ‘the essence of 


1 A. 1017? 25, H. 1042% 28, ©. 1049 35, A. 10709 11. 
3 Z, 1033 19-23, 1036% 28. 8. Δ, 10719 14, De An. 407” 23, 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE  cxix 


Socrates ’,' but these are incidental and must not be stressed. 


The only clear reference to the individual’s having a distinct 
form as well as a distinct matter is that quoted above from 
book A,? and there Aristotle does not seem to realize the 
importance of his own statement; at all events he passes from it 
without comment. The passages in which form is described as 
τόδε τι Should probably be interpreted in the light of the more 
precise passage in which it is described as that in virtue of 
which, in contrast with matter, a thing can be called τόδε τι. 
Matter itself is not individual; it is only when form is added 
that an individual results. An individual must have both being 
and character; without matter it could not have being, but 
without form it could not have character. And being and 
character are inseparable from one another ; nothing has either 
without the other; form and matter exist only in union and are 
separable only in thought. Of this we might say that Aristotle 
was well aware, were it not for his doctrine of the existence of 
certain pure forms, God and the beings that move the spheres ; 
we should perhaps add the human reason,’ but it would be rash 
to embark here on that disputed question of interpretation. 

With regard to these pure forms we may fairly press 
Theophrastus’ question, how, in view of Aristotle’s doctrine 
that plurality comes from matter, is their plurality to be ex: 
plained? Later thought treated each such matterless individual 
as the unique member of a separate species, and this would 
presumably have been Aristotle’s answer if he had put the 
question to himself. 


The Analysts of Becoming. 


Things may come into being according to Aristotle in either 
of three ways—by nature, by art, or spontaneously. The main 
object of Z. 7-9 is to show that in these three cases similar 
conditions are involved. 


1 yo29 14, 10328 8. 

2 1071% 27-29. Cf. the reference to the (individual) form of the bronze 
ball which comes into existence simultaneously with the bronze ball, A. 
1070* 21-24. 

8 A. 1070%24-27. Cf. De Ax. iii. 5. 


ΟΧΧ INTRODUCTION 


(1) Natural Generation. 


By nature in this connexion Aristotle means the power, in- 
herent in all living things and in the four elements, of initiating 
change. In natural as in all other generation ‘all things that 
come to be come to be by some agency and from something and 
come to be something’! The conditions of natural generation 
are: (a) an individual which already has actually the specific 
form which the offspring is to have. This is the male parent 
which has the same nature and specific name as the offspring ; 
production is ἐξ (more strictly ὑφ᾽) ὁμωνύμου ; it takes a human 
being to beget a human being.” (ὁ) A matter capable of being 
the vehicle of the specific form. Such a matter is found in the 
surplus blood which is the female parent’s contribution to the 
act of generation.’ (c) The specific form which is imposed on 
the material. 

It is true that the male parent and the offspring may be called 
by different names; a man may beget a woman, a stallion a 
mule. Such offspring are ‘mutilations’, fallings off from the 
perfection of the type. But even in them if we look deeper we 
find a unity of nature and even of name; it is always a human 
being that produces a human being, one bushy-tailed creature 
that produces another. The mule shares the generic though 
not the specific nature of his sire, while in a female child 
the specific nature of the male parent is reproduced but is 
embarrassed by the inferior matter with which it has to cope.* 


(2) Artistic Production. 


In artistic production—and this means all production due to 
mind—the pre-existence of the form is less obvious. The 
making of a house does not presuppose the existence of an 
actual house as generation presupposes an actual man. Never- 
theless in a sense there is a pre-existing house, viz. the form 
of house as conceived by the builder.® Such a product is pro- 
duced ἐξ ὁμωνύμου ἢ ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου," for the house in the 

7 1052 12. 5 10349 21—) 1, 10328 28. 8. H. το448 35. 
* 1033P 33-1034 2, 1034» 1-4, I. 9. 
SELOS22 te ὃ. [034% 22, 


ARISTOTLE’S "METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE cxxi 


builder’s mind is only part of—the formal element in—a house. 
In all artistic production there are implied two stages, one of 
νόησις, in which the artist works gradually back from the 
thought of the object he wishes to produce to that of the means 
necessary to its production, and one of ποίησις in which, re- 
versing the order, he successively brings these means into 
existence until at last he has fulfilled his purpose.’ 


(3) Spontaneous Production. 


The production of results ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου is of two kinds, one 
which simulates natural production and one which simulates 
artistic. To the first the name of ταὐτόματον in a specific sense 
is applied, to the second that of τύχη. 

(a) Some types of animal can be produced without seed, 
i.e. without the action of a male parent, no less than from 
seed,? The possibility of such production is due to the fact 
that matter, i.e. not prime matter but partially formed matter 
such as mud, has a certain power of initiating change, and the 
particular qualitative change that will transform it into a living 
body.’ We have no common name by which we designate the 
mud and the humble creature which springs from it. Such 
production is neither ἐξ ὁμωνύμου nor ἐκ μέρους ὁμωνύμου. But the 
production of a living creature at least presupposes the pre- 
existence of a part of it. 

(ὁ) Chance production is identical in kind with the second 
half of the process of artistic production. The first half, the 
νόησις, is here entirely absent. The process starts with the 
unintended production of the first stage in the making, which 
in artistic production is intended.t| This may be produced by 
external agency, as when an unskilled person happens to rub 
a patient just in the way in which a doctor would have rubbed 
him ex arte, and thus originates the curative process.’ Or again, 
it may depend on the initiative resident in living tissue ; the sick 
body may itself originate the healing process.’ In either case 
a part of the result pre-exists. If heat be the first step in the 
production of health, heat is a part of health or else involves 
such a part as its necessary result.’ 


1 1032) 6-21. 2 1032 30. 5 1034 > 4-6. 
4 1032? 23-28. Ὁ 1034" 20, Oily Pai 7 ib, 24-30. 


CXXxil INTRODUCTION 


All change presupposes not merely a matter which persists, 
but a privation which makes way for form. This may, or may 
not, be designated by a separate name in common speech (disease 
is so recognized, absence of statue-form is not).' 

In generation form is not generated any more than matter. If 
form were itself being produced, it would be being produced out 
of something else, i.e. by the imposition of form on matter, and 
if that form were being produced, it would be by the imposition 
of other form on other matter, and so ad infinitum. The most 
obvious interpretation of this passage would be that it teaches the 
eternity of form (though all that it actually proves is the existence 
of form before the process in which it is imposed on matter). 
But we are met by the fact that Aristotle sometimes speaks of form 
as coming into and passing out of being instantaneously.* In one 
passage he states both alternatives as possibilities.‘ He does 
not seem to have thought out the question fully, but the solution 
may perhaps be found in 1034» 18, There Aristotle points out that 
just as, when a new substance is produced, the form must already 
exist, so too, when a new quality, quantity, &c., is imposed on 
a substance, the new quality, &c., must pre-exist ; and adds that, 
while in the former case, the form must pre-exist actually (i. e. 
as embodied in the male parent), in the latter it need only pre- 
exist potentially. In the latter case the form is not eternal. But 
it is not brought into being by a process (which is what γίγνεσθαι 
always implies), but supervenes instantaneously ona process. It 
is never coming into being, but éem it was not (actually) and 
now it is. A white thing may become black, but white does not 
become black. The white thing becomes black bit by bit, but in 
each part black supervenes instantaneously on white.® 

Now artistic production is never the production of a new 
substance but only of a new shape, &c., in an existing substance. 
It might seem, therefore, that Aristotle thinks of the pre- 
existence of the form of the product as only a potential existence. 
This would, however, be an incorr-ct inference. For he does 
not say that where the production is not production of a new 
substance the form does not pre-exist, but that in such cases 
it need not pre-exist, actually. The form of house exists actually 


1 10338 5-22. 2 το338 24- 10. 
3 1039» 26, H. 1044? 21. 4H. 1043? 15. 
5 1044> 21-26, Phys. vi. 4. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE exzxiii 


before the building ofa particular house, for it is already embodied 
in other houses ; but Aristotle would probably say that when the 
first house was being built the form existed only potentially. 

But if the form of house exists before the building of a particular 
house, the individual form of the house does not pre-exist ; it 
comes into being without a process—instantaneously. Contacts, 
like forms, ‘are and are not, without becoming or perishing’;'’ and 
the form of the individual house comes into being timelessly with 
the last timeless contact of tile with tile, the form of the individual 
bronze sphere with the last contact of the hammer with the 
bronze. That which ‘becomes’ becomes bit by bit, but the form 
has no parts; it is the structure of the whole.’ Similarly, the 
form of the individual animal comes into being timelessly at the 
last moment of the vitalizing transformation of the female element 
by the male. 

Even where form pre-exists actually (e.g. where it is natural 
generation that is in question) it does not pre-exist apart from 
particular instances. Form is eternal only by virtue of the 
never-failing succession of its embodiments. If it had substantial 
existence of its own, a particular thing embodying it could never 
be produced since one substance cannot contain another. Form 
indicates a ‘such’, never a ‘this’, a characteristic, never the 
concrete thing that bears it. Thus the Platonic Forms are of no 
use for explaining the coming into being of substances.? 

To this account of becoming must be added the account in 
A. 4,5. The analysis here is more akin to that in the Physics 
in respect of the place assigned to privation. Z works for the 
most part with the antithesis of form and matter, and privation is, 
as we have seen, mentioned only incidentally. In A it is, along 
with form and matter, one of the three internal causes (ἐνυπάρ- 
xovra αἴτια) which are first mentioned.* To these are added the 
external causes, i. 6. (1) the proximate moving cause, 6. g. the art 
of medicine or of building (or to put it otherwise, the form ot 
health or of a house), or, in the case of natural generation, the male 
parent;® (2) in the case of natural generation the remote and com- 
mon moving cause, the sun as it moves along the ecliptic and pro- 
duces the sequence of the seasons;° (3) the ultimate or first moving 


1 De Caelo 280% 27, 2 Al. 486. 13-33. Cf. A. 1070* 21-24. 
5 7, 1033 19-29. * 1069 32-34, 1070? 18, 22. 
S 1071 14f., 28. SSD use 


CXX1V INTRODUCTION 


cause which moves not by mechanical agency, but by being 
desired and loved. A thus takes a wider sweep than Z. The 
interest of Z in becoming lies in the light it throws on the nature 
of form; the interest of A is in the question how far all things 
may be said to have the same causes, and how far different causes 
must be presupposed for different things ?? Aristotle points out 
that, except as regards the first cause, things in different genera 
have only analogically the same cause ; and he recognizes more 
clearly than anywhere else the existence of individual as well as 
specific form, when he says ‘ your matter and form and moving 
cause are different from mine, though they are the same in their 
general description’. And in the same spirit he says that 
‘universal causes do not exist; the individual is the cause of 
individuals ; man is the cause of man universally, but there is no 
universal man; Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father 
of you’. So, too, the prime cause is not a general principle, 
but an individual spirit. Book A might be described as preach- 
ing throughout the importance of the individual. 


Potentiality and Actuality. 


The expressions potentiality and actuality, almost entirely 
absent in Z, play a considerable part in H, as Aristotle passes 
from the static consideration of substance to the dynamic con- 
sideration of change. He now, in ®, undertakes to study these 
notions, and begins with a distinction of two main senses of 
δύναμις Which may perhaps be rendered by ‘ power’ and ‘ poten- 
tiality’. He will deal first with power, which is defined as 
‘a source of change in another thing or in the same thing qua 
other’. In proportion as a thing is knit together into one whole 
it cannot be acted on by itself, for action and passion involve 
a distinction between agent and patient ; hence, strictly speaking, 
there is (contrary to Plato’s opinion) no such thing as a self-mover. 
Power is a capacity in A of producing a change in B, or in one 
part of A of producing change in another part. This may be 
called transeunt δύναμις, inasmuch as two things are concerned. 
Potentiality, on the other hand, is a capacity in A of passing into 
a new State of itself. To the primary kind of power are related 


1 10718 36. 2 [070% 31, 3 1071727, 
4 ib, 19-23. 5 10757 11-15. 


’ 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE exxv 


(1) the complementary half of the same fact, a power in B of 
being changed by A, and (2) a power in B of not being changed 
for the worse or destroyed by A. These are akin to the first 
sense of δύναμις in that they imply an A and a B, but different 
in that the notion of power proper, i. 6. power of initiating change, 
is absent: (1) implies weakness ; (2) a sort of inertial resistance. 


Rational and Irrational Powers. 


Some powers are present in lifeless things, others in living 
things, or, to be more precise, in soul, and in that part of the 
soul which has λόγος, i.e. which can frame an account of an 
object and of the way to produce it. Some powers, in a word, 
are irrational, others rational ; to the latter class belong the arts 
or productive forms of knowledge, and, as the Ethics informs us, 
the moral virtues. Both classes are found in living things; 
to the former belong the innate powers such as the senses, to 
the latter those which are acquired by practice (which, it is 
implied, has an element of Adyos in it), or by instruction. Powers 
of the latter class have this in common, that they are not innate 
but are developed by exercise. Rational powers are also distin- 
guished from irrational by the fact that they are powers to do 
either of two contrary things. This follows from the fact that 
the Adyos of a thing is also the Adyos of its contrary. Because 
a rational power is a power to do either of two contraries, the 
conditions of the realization of a rational power are more complex 
than those of the realization of an irrational power. For the 
latter it is enough that the agent and the patient should come 
into that degree of proximity in which their powers become 
operative. But if proximity were the only necessary condition 
of the actualization of a rational power, then, since it is a power 
to do opposites, it would, when the proximity was given, actually 
do opposites and thus break the law of contradiction. Clearly, 
therefore, a further condition is needed. This condition is the 
occurrence of desire or choice of one of the opposites ; this given, 
the power becomes operative, but, of course, only in one of the 
two ways originally open to it.’ 


BG), By κΣ 


CXXVi INTRODUCTION 


Vindication of the Conception of Capacity. 


In Θ. 3 Aristotle turns to vindicate the conception of capacity 
against the attack of the Megarian school. The Megarians had 
said that a thing can act only when it is acting. “Two reasons 
for this view may be conjectured. (1) They may have reasoned 
that the only possible evidence that a thing has ἃ power 
is that it is actually exercising it, and that to ascribe power 
toathing when it is not exercising power must be a mistake. Or 
(2) they may have been taken in by an easily detected fallacy. 
Obviously A cannot act-when-it-is-not-acting ; they may have 
inferred that when A is not acting it is not capable of acting. 
Whatever may have been their grounds, Aristotle answers them 
as follows: (1) Their view implies that a man is not (e.g.) a 
builder except when he is building. How, then, account for the 
fact that after a cessation from building he can quite suddenly 
begin again, as a man who has never built before cannot do? Is 
not the condition which makes this possible a disposition left 
over from previous acts of building, and is not this just what 
we mean by saying that when he is not building he has the 
capacity of building? The simple alternatives, he is either 
building or not building, will not cover the whole facts. (2) Their 
view implies the denial of the reality of sensible qualities when 
they are not actually being perceived, and thus involves the 
doctrine of Protagoras—the most extreme form of sensationalism, 
(3) It implies that people become blind and deaf many times 
in a day, i.e. whenever they cease actually to see or hear. (4) If 
capacity is present only when actuality is present, that which is 
not happening is incapable of happening, and therefore never 
will happen; thus the existence of change is denied. 

This last argument appears to be fallacious. The real meaning 
of the Megarian doctrine seems to be that there is no such thing 
as capacity or possibility. A thing either is happening or it 
is not happening, and that is all that there is to be said about it. 
Therefore of that which is not happening they would say, not 
that it is incapable of happening, but that there is no sense 
in saying that it is capable of happening; and this does not 
imply a denial of change—it would be compatible with the 
assertion that change exists but is always necessary. 

It may be noted that though this discussion occurs in the 


ARIS LOLLE Se Mi tTArhySICAPS DOCTRINE exxvii 


section devoted to transeunt δύναμις, it really refers to immanent 
δύναμις, potentiality not power. To this Aristotle professedly 
proceeds in ch. 6. He expressly says here that it is indefinable, 
and explains it by citing typical instances. The relation of 
actuality to potentiality is that of the finished Hermes to the 
Hermes latent in a block of wood, of the man who is contem- 
plating truth to him who has knowledge ‘at the back of his 
mind’, of the man who is actually building to him who knows 
how to build. The relation is of two main kinds: (1) that of 
movement to power, (2) that of substance to matter. We recognize 
in the first of these a reference to the transeunt δύναμις, ἡ κατὰ 
κίνησιν λεγομένη δύναμις," with which the first half of the book was 
occupied. A power in A to produce change in B is at the same 
time an immanent δύναμις in A. In producing change in B, A is 
itself passing from potentiality to actuality. The second kind is 
that in which there is no question of A’s acting on B, but A 
merely passes from a relatively unformed to a relatively formed 
condition, as when the wood which is potentially a statue becomes 
an actual statue. 


Actuality and Movement. 


Aristotle has identified one kind of actuality with movement, 
but he proceeds® to specify a narrower sense of both terms 
in which they are opposed to one another. A movement in the 
specific sense always points to an end beyond itself, and is therefore 
not complete or final (τελεία) ; you learn in order to know, are 
healed in order to be well. An activity or actuality in the specific 
sense has its end in itself; seeing, thinking, knowing, living, 
being happy, aim at nothing beyond themselves. Movement 
cannot be classed either as δύναμις or as ἐνέργεια proper. It is 
‘the actuality of that which is potentially, as such ’—of bronze, for 
instance, not gwa bronze but qua capable of undergoing change. 
This is true of all four kinds of movement or change; qualitative 
change, for example, is the actualization of that which is suscep- 
tible to qualitative change, just in so far as it is thus susceptible. 
Change is thus the actualization of something which is essentially 
potential, and which in being actualized does not lose this 
character. That is why it is ἐνέργεια ἀτελής. If the potentiality 


1 1048* 25. 2 1048» 18-35. 


Cxxviii INTRODUCTION 


vanished in actuality there would be no movement, only a new 
position.! 

A movement takes time ; when you are learning you have not 
yet learned, when you are being healed you have not yet been 
healed. An activity is complete in each moment of itself; at the 
same moment you see and have seen, know and have known. 
Or, as Aristotle puts it elsewhere, a process must be quick or 
slow, an activity cannot be either; you may become pleased 
quickly or slowly, but you cannot enjoy pleasure either quickly 
or slowly.” This distinction has important applications both in 
theology (in the doctrine of the divine ‘activity of immobility ’) 
and in ethics (in the doctrine that neither happiness nor pleasure 
is a process, but an activity or its accompaniment). 


Priority of Actuality. 


Actuality is, according to Aristotle, prior to potentiality in more 
than one sense of prior.* (1) It is prior in definition. To be 
capable of being or doing so-and-so is a more complex thing than 
to be or do so-and-so, and can be defined only by reference to it. 
(2) It is, ina sense, prior intime. True, in the individual, poten- 
tiality comes before actuality, the matter out of which a man 
is made comes before the man, the musical faculty before its 
exercise. But the actual comes from the potential by the agency 
of something actual—and something of the same species as the 
product. The matter must be quickened by the male parent ; 
the musical faculty must be developed by the instruction of a 
teacher in whom it has already been developed. Potentiality 
presupposes actuality because only that is potentially which 
can “come to be actually and only the actual can make the 
potential to be actual. Aristotle adds an account of the de- 
velopment of faculty different from, though compatible with, that 
offered above. He has there found it to presuppose actuality 
in a teacher; he now argues that it presupposes actuality in 
the learner. It is only by playing a musical instrument that 
one acquires the faculty of playing it. At first sight this appears 
paradoxical, but the paradox is removed by reference to a doctrine 
stated inthe Physics. Of everything that is coming into being or 


1 Phys. 201% 9-Ὁ 15, b 27 202° 3 (K. 1065 14—10668 7, τοδέϑ 17-26), 
AS ING SOG 52. 8 Ὁ, teh εν ὃ. 


ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICAL DOCTRINE cxxix 


is moving some part has already come into being or been moved. 
Therefore a learner must already know something of what he is 
learning. All learning, as Aristotle maintains in the Posterior 
Analytics,’ comes from pre-existing knowledge. A child has not, 
indeed, scientific knowledge, but he has what is, Aristotle main- 
tains, continuous in character with scientific knowledge,’ viz. 
perception, which is never mere passivity, but is from the start 
something that judges,* and has universals for its object, though 
it be only universals immersed in particularity. Thus, if we 
take a wide enough view, potentiality does not precede actuality, 
but ‘actuality precedes actuality right back to the actuality of the 
prime mover ’.® 

(3) Actuality is prior in essence. It is the form or end to 
which the potentiality points, and which alone gives it its value. 
Or, if the ἐνέργεια point to an end beyond itself, i. e. if it be not an 
activity in the specific sense but a movement, it is, at least, nearer 
to the end than the potentiality. (4) One thing is prior to another 
in the strictest sense if it can exist without the other, and the 
other cannot exist without it.° Now the eternal can exist without 
the temporal but not vice versa; it is therefore prior to it. But 
nothing eternal exists potentially. For what has the capacity of 
being has also the capacity of not being, and therefore might 
conceivably not be, and is therefore not eternal. The prius of the 
whole universe, the prime mover, is pure actuality without any 
element of potentiality. And that which comes next to it, sun 
and stars and the outermost sphere of the heavens, has no 
potentiality in the fullest sense of potentiality, 1. 6. potentiality of 
not-being. It has not matter for generation and destruction but 
only matter for local movement, the potentiality of moving from 
here to there. Its eternity and the eternity of its movement 
is guaranteed by its nature; only the place of its movement 
changes. This eternity of movement is imitated even by perish- 
able things of the terrestrial world. Here the individuals are 


apt te ΕΟ Ay ly 472, Lost, ii. 1G, 

8 An. Post. 99> 35. 4 ib. 100 16- 1, 

5 to5cP4. To this section of the argument belongs in principle the 
proof in 10512 21-33 that geometrical discovery takes place through con- 
structions latent in the given figure being actualized by an actual exercise 
of thought. 

δ Cf, A. 10198 2-4, 11. 

2673-1 i 


CXXX INTRODUCTION 


not eternal, but by the cyclic transformation of the elements and 
the succession of the generations eternity of type and eternity of 
movement are secured. 

Further,’ actuality is better than good potentiality. Potentiality 
is indifferent as between its opposite actualizations, and therefore 
inferior to its good actualization. For the same reason it is 
superior to its bad actualization. Evil therefore has no existence 
apart from particular evil things. Evil being posterior in nature 
to potentiality, and potentiality to actuality, and the original and 
eternal constituents of the universe being, as we have seen, 
actual not potential, among them neither evil nor defect nor 
perversion can find a place. Evils (we may perhaps expand the 
argument by saying) are simply by-products of the effort of 
terrestrial things to imitate the perfect activity of the first mover— 
by-products due to the presence in terrestrial things of matter 
or potentiality. Matter, which zs one of the eternal constituents 
of the universe, is not evil but indifferent between evil and good ; 
and form, the other eternal constituent of the universe, is in 
itself good. 

With this suggestive, if rather too easy, argument for optimism, 
which brings us up to the threshold of the doctrine of Book A, 
our survey of the general metaphysical doctrine may close.* 


IV 
ARISTOTLE’S THEOLOGY 


Book A is rightly regarded as the coping-stone of the Meta- 
physics. Aristotle has given the name of ‘theology’ to the 
highest of the sciences, the science of that kind of being which 
combines substantial, independent existence with freedom from 
all change ;° and it is in this book that we find his only systematic 


1 Jo519 4-21, 
* The remainder of ©. 9 belongs rather to the proof of the temporal 


priority of actuality, and ©, 10 does not properly belong to the scheme of 
the book. Cf. Introduction, p. xxx. 
8 FE. 10268 10-19, K, 1064* 33-? 3. 


ARISTOTLE’S THEOLOGY CXxXxl 


essay in theology. There are passages in his other works which 
throw valuable light on his theological views, and others in 
which he is clearly accommodating himself to the views of his 
age.! He seems to have put forward in his earlier writings 
‘proofs of the existence of God’ quite different from that which 
we find in A. In the dialogue De Philosophia he is reported to 
have given what may be called an anticipation of the ontological 
argument ; ‘where there is a better’, he argued, ‘there is a best; 
now among existing things one is better than another ; therefore 
there is a best, which must be the divine’.”? Nor did he fail to 
use the teleological argument. Inthe same dialogue he pictured 
a race of men confronted for the first time with the beauty of 
earth and sea, the majesty of the sun and moon and the starry 
heavens, and drawing the inevitable conclusion that these 
mighty works proceed from gods. Dreams, premonitions,* 
and animal instinct® were further used by him as evidence for 
the belief in gods. But in his extant works, which express his 
maturer views, adaptation is usually ascribed to the unconscious 
teleology of nature rather than to the working out of a divine 
plan. 

In A, however, we find him, in the maturity of his powers, 
arguing for the existence of a God so remote from popular 
religious ideas that no element of accommodation to the in- 
telligence or the prejudices of his audience is to be suspected ;5 
and arguing, further, from principles that are deep-seated in his 


1 These can often be recognized by a reference to ‘ gods’ in the plural. 
Cf. Z. NV. 1099P ΤΙ, 1162% 5, 11797 25. 

2 Fr, 1476) 22-24. 3 Fr, 14769 34-P 11. Cf, ® 11-32. 

4 Fr. 1475» 36—1476%9. PNGicnae ΤΠ: Δ) 11: 10. tos, 

δ In Aristotle’s conception of God’s modus operandi, however, there are 
elements due to popular preconceptions. Manhas always tended to con- 
nect the divine with what is distant and what is high above him, and 
accordingly Aristotle thinks of the stars as ‘the most divine of pheno- 
mena’, and regards the prime mover as acting directly on the outermost 
sphere of the universe and only very indirectly on the earth. Again, the 
description of circular movement as the first movement is due to a preju- 
dice in favour of what is simple and is at the same time free from the 
‘contrarieties ’ of up and down which characterize rectilinear movement. 
In thinking of the world as infinite and of rectilinear motion as the 
primary kind of motion the Atomists were more truly scientific than 
Aristotle. 

1 5 


CXxxil INTRODUCTION 


metaphysics. The argument, which is a special form of the 
‘cosmological’ argument for the existence of God, the argument 
a contingentia mundt, pursues a somewhat tortuous course, but 
may be set out as follows.’ Substances are the first of existing 
things. Therefore if all substances are perishable, all things 
are perishable.’ But there are two things which are imperishable, 
as they are ingenerable, change and time. Time must be so, 
since apart from time there is no before and after. And change 
must be equally continuous with time; for time is either the 
same as, or a concomitant of, change.° Now the only continuous 
change is change of place,° and the only continuous change of 
place is circular motion." There must therefore be an eternal 
circular motion. 

Now to produce eternal motion there must be (1) eternal sub- 
stance. So far the Platonic Forms would suffice. But (2) this 
eternal substance must have in it a principle capable of causing 
motion, which the Forms have not.’ (3) It must not only have 
this power but exercise it. (4) Its essence must be not power 


1 The first chapter of Alexander’s ’Amopiat καὶ λύσεις is a proof on Aristo- 
telian lines of the existence of a prime mover. It does not, however, 
follow Aristotle’s proof very closely. 

° Aristotle’s arguments to prove this are found in Z. 1, A. 1069% 19-26. 
Substance is that which underlies all other entities, which are in the end 
but attributes of substance. 

* For suppose something to exist when all substances have perished ; 
this could only be an attribute which was the attribute of nothing—a 
contradiction in terms. 

4 While if we say time had a beginning or an end, we must say that 
before the beginning or afte the end time is not. A slightly different 
proof of the eternity of time is given in Phys. 251» 19-26. 

5 Time is, according to Aristotle, ‘the number of change in respect of 
before and after’ (Phys. 219" 1, 2208 24, 8, 223 33, De Cuelo 2705 14). 
The eternity of change, which is here inferred from that of time, is proved 
independently in Phys. 250 23—251» Io, 

° For all other changes are between opposites, and since a thing cannot 
have opposite movements at the same time, it must rest at the opposites 
which form the limits of its movement (Piys. 261% 31-Ὁ 26). 

™ For all other changes of place are from opposite to opposite, and 
therefore subject to the objection indicated in the previous note (Phys. 
261» 2726 3® 3, 264" 7—265° 12). 

8 to71P 4-11. 

® This is arguedin A, 991 8-11, » 3-9, 992% 29-32, Z. 1033” 26—1034" 5. 


ARISTOTLE’S THEOLOGY ΟΧΧΧΠΙΙ 


but activity, for otherwise it would be possible for it sometime 
not to exercise this power, and change would not be eternal. 
(5) These substances’ must be immaterial, since they must be 
eternal.? 

Aristotle now turns aside to meet the objection that since 
what acts must be able to act, while that which is able to act 
need not necessarily act, power is prior to actuality, and to refer 
to previous views on this question.’ He considers that he can 
meet this objection, and points to experience as showing that 
there is something that moves with an unceasing circular 
motion, viz. the starry heavens. He then passes‘ to a further 
consideration of the prime mover. Since the sphere of the 
fixed stars moves, there must be something that moves it. Now 
that which moves and is moved is an intermediate with which 
we cannot rest content; there must be something that moves 
without being moved.° 

This, the last term to which we come in the explanation of 
change, is the eternal, substantial, purely actual being whose 
existence he has already proved. The new feature which he 
has now discovered is its immobility, which might have been 
inferred directly from its already proved immateriality, since 
motion involves ὕλη τοπική. 

Now, how can anything cause motion without being moved ? 
The physical causation of movement implies the mutual contact 
of mover and moved, and therefore a reaction of the moved on 
the mover.’ The unmoved mover must therefore cause motion 


1 Aristotle here for the first time suggests a plurality of moving princi- 
ples, referring to the ‘intelligences’ that move the planetary spheres. 

2 1071» 12-22. The ground of the last assertion is that matter involves 
potentiality. 

8 yo71> 22—10724 18. SLO 72 e223 

5 Aristotle’s reason for refusing to be content, as Plato was, with the 
notion of a self-mover, is that in so far as it moves, it must already have 
a certain character, while in so far as it is moved, it must have that 
character only potentially, and actually not have it. E.g. that which 
warms itself must be warm in order to impart warmth, and cold in order 
to receive it. The law of contradiction, therefore, forces us to analyse the 
self-warming into a part which is warm and a part which is cold, i.e. 
self-imposed change turns out to be change imposed by one thing on 
another (Phys. 257% 31-} 13). 

8 Phys. 202% 3-7. 


CXXXiv INTRODUCTION 


in a non-physical way, by being an object of desire. An un- 

- moved mover, according to Aristotle, touches what it moves 
without being touched by it, but in such a case ‘touch’ is being 
used in a merely metaphorical sense, as is shown by the example 
which he gives: ‘we say sometimes that he who hurts us touches 
us without our touching him.’ Yet the causation of motion by 
the prime mover is sometimes described as having a quasi- 
physical character ; for the first mover is said not only to operate 
directly on the outer sphere of the universe, and only indirectly 
on the inner spheres, but actually to be at the outside of the 
universe ;” this, however, is an incautious expression which 
should not be pressed. Aristotle’s genuine view undoubtedly is 
that the prime mover is not in space.’ 

There has been much controversy over the question whether 
God is for Aristotle only the final cause, or the efficient cause 
as well, of change. There can be no doubt about the answer. 
‘Efficient cause’ is simply the translation of Aristotle’s 
ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, and God is certainly this. The truth is that 
the opposition of οὗ ἕνεκα to ἀρχὴ κινήσεως is not a well-chosen 
one. The οὗ ἕνεκα is one kind of ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. The cause 

of movement may be either (1) an end aimed at, or (2) a 
force operating a ergo, which may be (a) a physical force, or 
(ὁ) a mental force, an act of will. What Aristotle does imply is 
that God’s causation is not of either of the two latter types. It 
cannot be inferred, from the fact that Aristotle describes God as 
exercising infinite power,‘ that he thinks of Him as an efficient 
cause of type 2(d); the statement that He causes motion as an 
object of desire or of love is too explicit for that. Yet He is not 
an end existing merely in the future; He exists eternally and 
thus differs from a merely imagined and anticipated ideal.° 

The argument is complicated by the fact that the object of 
knowledge also is described* as moving without being moved. 
It is not, however, meant that the object of knowledge as such 
causes movement in space. The doctrine is that all existing 


1 De Gen, et Corr. 323% 25-33. 

2 Phys. 267 6-9. 8 De Caelo 2705 18. 

* 1073°7, Phys. 267” 22. 

5 Though Prof. Alexander’s view of Deity has affinities with Aristotle's , 
it is in this respect fundamentally different. , 

δ᾽ 10729 36: 


ARISTOTLE’S. THEOLOGY: CXXXV 


things may be arranged in two sets—a column of positives 
and a column of negatives. Of these the positives are the 
direct object of knowledge; the negatives are known only as 
the opposites of the positives. Among the positives, substances 
come first, and of substances the first is incomposite, fully actual 
substance, 1. 6, the kind of being that we have found to be implied 
as the first cause of movement. But this is not only the 
primary object of knowledge, the most intelligible of all things ; 
it is also the most desirable. The knowledge of it inevitably 
produces desire for it, love of it. And by the desire it inspires 
it sets the world in motion. What the object of knowledge as 
such ‘moves’ is simply the mind, and this it moves not to 
physical action but to thought.! 

The prime mover moves directly, as we have seen, the ‘ first 
heaven’; i.e. it causes the daily rotation of the stars round the 
earth. Since it moves by inspiring love and desire, it seems to 
be implied that the ‘ first heaven’ is capable of feeling love and 
desire, i.e. has soul. And this is confirmed by what Aristotle 
says elsewhere ; the first heaven, the planets, and the sun and 
moon are all thought of as living beings.? The further causal 
action of the prime mover is somewhat obscure. The motions of 
the sun, moon, and planets are explained by the hypothesis of 
a ‘nest’ of concentric spheres, each with its poles fixed in the 
Shell of the sphere next outside it. Thus each sphere imparts 
its own motion to the sphere next inside it, and the prime mover, 
- by moving the outermost sphere directly, moves all the other 
spheres indirectly.’ It causes the sun to move round the earth 
once in twenty-four hours, and thus produces the rhythm of day 
and night, and everything in terrestrial life for which that is 
responsible. But the rhythm of the seasons, with its consequences 
of seed-time and harvest and of the breeding-times of animals, is 
more important in the terrestrial economy, and this is due not, 


1 1072 27- 1. 2 De Caelo 285% 29, 292% 20,91. 

5. The cosmology is confused at this point. If motion is thus trans- 
mitted from sphere to sphere, the daily revolution of the sun, moon, and 
planets is sufficiently explained by the motion transmitted from the outer- 
most sphere (the ‘first heaven’) to all inside it ; the outermost of the 
spheres assigned to each of the seven moving bodies (which has this same 
motion), and the ‘intelligences’ which move these outermost spheres, 
become unnecessary. 


CXXXV1 INTRODUCTION 


or not in the same way, to the prime mover, but to the ‘in- 
telligences’ (as the schoolmen called them) of which Aristotle 
recognizes 55 (or 47)' as coexisting with the prime mover. In 
particular, generation and destruction are due to the sun’s motion 
in the ecliptic, which is due to one of the ‘intelligences’; genera- 
tion at any particular place tends to occur when the sun is near 
that part of the earth, and destruction when it has receded from 
it.2 The ‘intelligences’, like the first mover, move ‘as ends’, 
i.e. they too move by inspiring desire or love. Their relation 
to the prime mover is nowhere specified, but if Aristotle is in 
earnest, as he certainly is, in describing the first mover as moving 
all things, as that on which the universe and nature depend, and 
in insisting on a single ruler of the universe,‘ we must suppose 
that the first mover moves the intelligences. And since they 
are immaterial this movement will not be physical movement but 
the metaphorical ‘movement’ of desire and love. It will move 
them ὡς épdpevov.® 

If Aristotle’s language be taken strictly, then, we have a very 
complicated system : 

(1) The prime mover. 

(2) 55 intelligences actuated by love of the first mover. 

(3) The soul of the ‘first heaven’, actuated by love of the first 
mover. 

(4) The souls of the 55 spheres, actuated by love of the 55 
intelligences respectively. 

(5) The ‘first heaven’, moved by its soul. 

(6) The 55 spheres, moved by their souls. 

It is unlikely that Aristotle contemplated all this complication. 
He nowhere explicitly distinguishes the soul of the first heaven 
from God, nor the souls of the spheres from the intelligences. 
Averroes and Zabarella identify the form or soul of the first 
heaven with the prime mover, and the souls of the spheres with 
the intelligences.6 In so far as God and the intelligences 
are the final causes of the spheres which they respectively 
move, they are in the normal relation of soul to body, and it 


ΓΙ 


1 1074 II, 13. 2 De Gen. et Corr. 336% 32, Ὁ 6. 5 10749 23. 

4 1070) 34, 1072 13, 10763 5. 

δ So Alexander: μεθέξει καὶ τῷ βουλήματι τοῦ πρώτου καὶ paxaptwrdrov 
ἐξήρτηνται νοός (721. 32). 

δ Zabarella, De Reb. Nat., De Natura Coeli, ch. vi. 


ARISTOTLE oS: THEOLOGY CXXXVil 


might be that in his doctrine of God and the intelligences 
Aristotle is bringing into greater distinctness the doctrine of the 
De Caelo that the heavenly bodies have life and action. But if 
this be so, the description of God as acting by being the object 
of love and desire is simply metaphorical ; it is not the soul of 
the first heaven that desires God (for on this view God zs the 
soul of the first heaven), but the first heaven itself. And 
this will be an instance of the desire which matter in general 
is, by a bold metaphor, said to have for form.1 But in Ari- 
stotle’s system, taken strictly, matter does not desire form nor 
strive towards it; it has no bias towards form rather than 
towards the privation of form; it is purely passive. Further, 
to regard God as the soul of the first heaven is to regard Him 
as controlling it as a soul does its body, by acts of will, and 
this would conflict with Aristotle’s description of the divine 
life as one of pure thought. It seems preferable to sup- 
pose that in A ‘desire’ and ‘love’ are used in no merely meta- 
phorical sense, and therefore that life and soul are seriously 
ascribed to the spheres ;* these are living beings which aim at 
realizing in their own measure the perfect being enjoyed in full 
by God and the intelligences. The complication of the scheme 
of entities set out above should not, then, be diminished by 
identifying God with the soul of the ‘first heaven’ and the in- 
telligences with the souls of the planetary spheres. The scheme 
is simplified in a more satisfactory way if we do not regard the 
first heaven and its soul, the planetary spheres and their souls, 
as separate entities, but each of the spheres as forming with its 
soul a single composite living being.® 

How, we may ask, does love or desire for the prime mover 
produce the physical movements that have to be explained ? 
The theory is that each of these unities of soul and body desires 
a life as like as possible to that of its moving principle. The life 
of its moving principle is a continuous unchanging activity of 


1 Phys. 1928 16-23. 

2 So Aristotle says that motion is a sort of ζωὴ τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσι 
πᾶσιν, Phys, 250” 14, and that in a sense all things are full of soul, G. A. 
625 21. 

5 Cf, Plut. Plac. 881 E,F ᾿Αριστοτέλης. . . ἑκάστην οἴεται τῶν σφαιρῶν 
(Gov εἶναι σύνθετον ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστιν αἰθέριον κινούμε- 


Ξ : : , sey 
νον κυκλοφορικῶς, ἡ Ψυχὴ δὲ λόγος ἀκίνητος αἴτιος τῆς κινήσεως κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. 


CXXXVili INTRODUCTION 


pure thought (with the addition, we must suppose, in the case of 
the intelligences, of love of the prime mover). The spheres 
cannot reproduce this, but they do the next best by performing 
the only perfectly continuous physical movement, viz. movement 
in a circle.! Circular movement, which in fact involves constant 
change of direction, was thought of by Aristotle as involving no 
change of direction, and rectilinear movement, the only kind 
which really involves no change of direction,, was for him ruled 
out by the fact that if it is to be continuous it requires infinite 
space, in which he disbelieved.? 

If the spheres are actuated by love of their moving principles 
and these by love of the first mover, the questions may be asked, 
why should the first heaven move (1) in the direction in which, 
and (2) with the speed with which, it actually moves, and, suppos- 
ing there are reasons for this, (3) why do not all the other spheres 
move in the same direction and with the same speed? Aristotle’s 
answer to the first question is purely anthropomorphic. The 
right being the stronger and controlling half of the body, it is 
proper that the heavens should move towards the right, i.e. 
counter-clockwise.* And as they to all appearance move clock- 
wise, he has to suppose that not their north but their south pole 
is the ‘upper’ part of the heavens.‘ To the second and the 
third question he has no answer. Certain directions and certain 
speeds must be assumed if we are to ‘save the appearances ’, to 
explain the observed facts; but no teleological explanation of 
them is offered. On the other hand, he tries hard to show 
how all the changes observed on the earth, changes in position, 
quality, and size, flow, as on his theory they must, from the 
movements of the spheres,’ and ultimately from the prime mover. 
The heavenly bodies,* and particularly the sun,’ by their approach 
to any particular region of the earth produce heat, and by their 
withdrawal cold, and thus cause a constant transmutation of the 
elements into one another, since heat and cold are two, and the 


" κινεῖται καὶ ἠρεμεῖ πως ἡ σφαῖρα, Phys. 265” 1, 

5. 1, LSTA te. 

3 De Caelo 28δ3.2--12. 

* ib. 285” 19, 

5 Meteor. 339° 21-32. 

8 ib. 340 10, De Caelo 2805 19-33, G..A. 777 16—778" 3. 

1 Meteor. 341" 19, 346” 20, 354? 26, De Gen. e¢ Corr. 336% 15-9. 


ARISVOTEE!S LHEOLOGY Cxxxiy 


more important two,’ of the four qualities that characterize 
the elements. If it were not for this constant change of tempera- 
ture the elements would once for all move to their proper regions 
and remain there.’ 

Thus the heavenly bodies produce not only the generation and 
destruction, but also the local movements, that are observed 
upon the earth ; and the never-ending ebb and flow of movement, 
the perpetuation of species as birth repairs the ravages of death, 
are the nearest approach which sublunary things, containing as 
they do matter for generation and destruction, for qualitative and 
quantitative change, as well as for local movement, can make to 
the eternal local movement of the heavenly bodies,’ just as this 
in turn is the nearest approach which things that possess ὕλη 
τοπική can make to the eternal thought of the pure forms, God 
and the intelligences. 

Aristotle’s recognition of unmoved movers other than the 
prime mover involves three difficulties. (1) In 1074225-31 each 
of the celestial movements is said to be ‘ for the sake of the stars’. 
Why then should the intelligences be described as the ends of 
these movements ?* The answer is that the former are the end 
in the sense of the τινί, that for whose good the movements 
exist, while the latter are the end in the sense of the τινὸς ἕνεκα, 
the ideal at which the movements aim.’ The movements exist 
for the sake of realizing for the stars a mode of activity as like 
as possible to that of the intelligences. (2) In 10742 31-38 
Aristotle argues that the universe must be one since otherwise its 
moving principles would be many, and this they cannot be since 
they contain no matter to distinguish them from one another. 
But the intelligences are different from one another and from 
God, though they contain no matter, being unchangeable ® and 
without magnitude.” It might be suggested that they are pure 
forms specifically different, each of them being the sole member 
of a separate species, as some of the schoolmen maintained that 
the angels are.’ But (a) at that rate there might be specifically 


1 Meteor. 378” 10-20. 2 De Gen. et Corr. 337% 7-15. 
° De Gen. et Corr. 336” 9-19, 26—337% 7, 3388 17-" 19. 
* 1074 23. Pao; 222, SELO7 371333 Ueibe 3S. 


® St. Anselm even used language which, by denying that angels consti- 


tuted a genus like the genus humanum, might seem to make each suz 
generis. But he wrote before the full development of Aristotelian in- 
fluence made theologians careful in the use of such expressions, and he 


cxl INTRODUCTION 


different prime movers, and Aristotle’s argument for the unity of 
the universe would break down. And (ὁ) this way of escape is 
not open to Aristotle ; for he holds that specific difference implies 
a fortiort numerical difference,’ which implies matter.? The 
difficulty is an instance of a wider one; if difference implies 
matter, how does one species differ from another? The solution, 
in Aristotelian terms, lies in the doctrine that the genus is the 
ὕλη νοητή of its species (H. 1045% 34, A. 1024» 8, Ζ. 1038°6). It 
is implied that a different portion of this ὕλη vonry is realized in 
each species, and that this accounts for the difference of the 
species. The intelligences, then, will be forms but not pure 
forms, since they contain an element of matter though not of 
‘sensible matter’. In this they differ from the first mover. 

(3) If, as seems possible, Aristotle regarded the intelligences 
as actuated by love of the first mover, this itself implies an 
element of potentiality in them, since they are moved by desire 
of something which they themselves are not. This implies 
something quasi-material in them which is not in God. 

The intelligences are not mentioned elsewhere in Aristotle. 
They, and the parallel to them in Plato’s somewhat similar 
theory,’ reflect (in a form congenial to the philosophy of Plato 
and Aristotle) the traditional Polytheism in Greek religion, as 
Plato’s ‘best soul’ and Aristotle’s prime mover reflect the 
Monarchian element in it and the belief in the supremacy of 
Zeus. Butas in Christian times Monarchianism was the dominant 
tendency in Greek theology, the tendency which led to the 
severance between the Eastern and the Western church, so too 
it is a monistic system which at bottom Aristotle tries to main- 
tain; and into such a system the intelligences do not really fit. 

There can be only one pure form, the first mover or God. 
The celestial spheres should, to be consistent with Aristotle’s 
fundamental view, have been represented as living beings striv- 
ing each in its degree to reproduce the unchanging life of the 


was concerned not to expound a view of the nature of the angels for its 
own sake, but only to explain why the fallen angels could not be redeemed, 
like men, by God taking the nature of them all at once as He did that of 
all men at once in the incarnation. St. Thomas held the angels to be 
specifically but not generically different ; Duns Scotus held that not every 
angel was even specifically different from every other. 


1 A, 1016? 36. 2 10742 23. 3 Laws 899. 


ARISTOTLE ti HEOLOGY exli 


prime mover, without the intermediary of subordinate moving 
principles. 

It is now time to turn to the way in which the prime mover 
itself is depicted. We have already seen that it is pure form 
and pure actuality, the primary object of knowledge and of 
desire. We must say of it not that it has, but that it is, a life 
such as the best that we can for brief periods enjoy.! This 
activity is at the same time pleasure ; indeed waking, perceiving, 
knowing are the pleasantest things in the world just because 
they are activities. All physical activity being excluded by the 
immaterial nature of the first mover, Aristotle can only ascribe 
to it mental activity, and only that kind of mental activity which 
owes nothing to the body, viz. knowledge; and only that kind 
of knowledge which does not grasp conclusions by the aid of 
premises but is direct, intuitive (νόησις) ; i. 6. the prime mover is 
not only form and actuality, but mind, and hence the term God, 
which has not so far appeared, begins to be applied to it.’ 

Now knowledge in itself, i.e. when not dependent, as in man, 
on sense and imagination, is of that which is in itself best, and 
knowledge in the fullest sense of that which is in the fullest 
sense best. But that which is in the fullest sense best is, as we 
have seen, God. The object of God’s knowledge is therefore 
God Himself. ‘Now mind does know itself, by participation in 
the known; it becomes known by touching and knowing, so that 
the same thing is mind and object of mind’.* No light is thrown 
here on how this happens, but we may interpret the meaning 
thus: In νόησις mind is as it were in direct contact with its 
object (θιγγάνων) ; it is not then knowing one thing by means of 
another as middle term. Just as in sensation Aristotle supposes 
the sensible form to be as it were carried over into the mind, 
leaving the matter behind,‘ so in knowledge he supposes the 
intelligible form to be carried over. And the character of mind 
is to have no character of its own but to be characterized entirely 
by what at the moment it knows; if it had a character of its own, 
that would interfere with the perfect reproduction of the object 
in the knowing mind, as a mirror with a colour of its own 
reproduces less perfectly the colour of the mirrored object.® 


1 1072» 14. Silos Diss δ 020: 
4 De An. 4243 18. 5 ib. 429% 13-22. 
9 


exlii INTRODUCTION 


Thus in knowledge mind and its object have an_ identical 
character, and to know an object is to know one’s own mind as 
it is when it knows the object. 

This explanation of self-consciousness, difficult and unsatisfac- 
tory as it is, is intended primarily to explain the self-consciousness 
which accompanies awareness of an object. Consider the 
language: ἑαυτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ" νοητὸς yap 
γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. It isin and 
by knowing, sc. something else, that mind becomes object of 
mind, We must not suppose that what it knows primarily is 
itself, or what is offered as an explanation of its becoming its 
own object turns into a pelttio principi. But what Aristotle 
ascribes to God is knowledge which has only itself for its object. 
νόησις is expressly contrasted with ἐπιστήμη, αἴσθησις, δόξα, διάνοια, 
each of which is αἰεὶ ἄλλου, and ἑαυτῆς only ἐν παρέργῳ. 

An attempt has been made to render Aristotle’s conception of 
the divine knowledge more tolerable by exhibiting it as being, 
conversely to ordinary knowledge, of itself directly and of the 
world ἐν παρέργῳ. Nec tamen sequitur, says St. Thomas, quod 
omnia alia a se et sunt ignota; nam intellegendo se intellegit omnia 
alia.” Many others of the schoolmen express the same view, 
and Brentano tries to support it by reference to a passage ὃ in 
which Aristotle says that the knowledge of correlatives is the 
same, All things other than God owe their being entirely to 
God, so that God’s self-knowledge must be at the same time 
a knowledge of all other things. This isa possible and a fruitful 
line of thought, but it is not that which Aristotle actually adopts. 
For him, that God should know Himself, and that He should 
know other things, are alternatives,’ and in affirming the first 
alternative he implicitly denies the second. Indeed he denies 
explicitly much that the second would involve ; he denies to God 
all knowledge of evil, and all transition from one object of thought 
to another.” The result of this wish to exclude from the divine 
life any relation to evil and any ‘shadow of turning’ is the im- 
possible and barren ideal of a knowledge with no object but itself.° 


1 1074» 35. ® In Met. lib. xii, lect. xi, 

3 Top. 105 31-34. * 1074» 22, 

PRD inaigye 8.2) 20k 

δ Dr. Caird’s view, in his illuminating chapter on Aristotle’s theology 
(Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers, ii, 1-30), that Aristotle 


ARISTOTLE’S THEOLOGY exliii 


This, then, is Aristotle’s conception of the life of God; every 
activity but knowledge is excluded, and all knowledge except the 
knowledge of His own knowledge. The relation of God to the 
world is twofold; He is the primary object of knowledge and 
the primary object of desire. We have considered the latter 
relation ; we now turn to the former. Aristotle’s description of 
God as the πρῶτον νοητόν should be considered in connexion with 
the doctrine of ‘ active reason’. 

The famous doctrine of the active reason, perhaps the most 
obscure and certainly the most discussed of all Aristotle’s 
doctrines, is stated in a single chapter of the De Anina,' and 
with such brevity that much is left to the intelligence of the 
reader. ‘There must be’, says Aristotle, ‘within the soul a dis- 
tinction answering to the general distinction between the matter 
which underlies each class of things and is potentially each of 
them, and the efficient cause which makes them—the distinction 
of which that between an art and its material is an instance.’ 
Two points are here to be noticed. (1) The distinction between 
the active and the passive reason falls within the soul.?- This is 
fatal to any interpretation which identifies the active reason with 
a divine reason falling entirely outside the individual human 
being. It is not fatal to the view that the active reason is 
a divine reason immanent in.human souls. The chief difficulty 
to which such a view is exposed is that the only passage in which 
Aristotle deals explicitly with the divine nature—Book A of the 
Metaphysics—describes God in language which is quite un- 
suggestive of immanence. (2) The active reason is not a reason 
which creates out of nothing. It works on a material given to it, 
which it promotes from potentiality into actuality.° What is 


ascribes to God a self-consciousness ‘ which is at the same time a con- 
sciousness of the ideal order of the world’ (p. 22), seems to me to take 
insufficient account of definite statements in A. 

1 iii. 5. Good accounts of the various interpretations may be seen in 
Hicks’s ed. of the De Anima, \xiv-\xix; Adamson, Development of Gk. 
Phil. 249-254; Webb, Studzes in the Hist, of Nat. Theol. 264-273. 

2 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ might conceivably mean only ‘in the case of the soul’, 
But a temporary union of the two reasons within one personality is implied 
by χωρισθείς 1, 22. So, too, Theophrastus says (ap. Them. 108. 23) μεικτὸν 
γάρ πως ὁ νοῦς ἔκ TE τοῦ ποιητικοῦ Kal τοῦ δυνάμει. 

5 So Theophrastus describes active νοῦς as ὁ κινῶν, that which sets 
passive νοῦς to work (ap. Prisc, 29. 14, ap. Them, 108. 24), 


cxliv INTRODUCTION 


meant by this we must try to see from the sequel. ‘The one 
reason ’, Aristotle proceeds, ‘is analogous to matter because it 
becomes all things; the other is analogous to the efficient cause 
because it makes all things.’ The first of these statements points 
to the ordinary activity of apprehension. Just as, according to 
Aristotle, the sensitive faculty becomes its objects in the sense 
that their form is, so to say, conveyed over to the sensitive 
subject and becomes the whole content, the whole nature for the 
time being, of the sensitive subject, so in knowledge reason 
becomes identical with its objects. Their whole nature is in 
some sense in the mind, and there is nothing in the mind except 
them. The act of apprehension is ascribed, then, to passive 
reason. What is the role that is ascribed to active reason? In 
what sense does it make all things ? If we attend to the analogy 
of art and its material, we notice that art makes its objects by 
making the material into them. And if the analogy is meant to 
be exact, we must conclude that the réle of active reason is to make 
passive reason become its own objects by apprehending them. 
We shall see here an instance of Aristotle’s general principle 
that ‘what is potentially comes to be actually by the agency of 
something that already is actually’.' It is obvious that we come 
to know things which in the ordinary sense we did not know 
before. How, Aristotle asks himself, can this happen? Does 
not this transition from potential to actual knowledge imply that 
there is something in us that actually knows already, some 
element which is cut off from our ordinary consciousness so that 
we are not aware of this pre-existing knowledge, but which is 
nevertheless in some sort of communication with the ordinary 
consciousness or passive reason and leads this on to knowledge ? 
And when Aristotle refers ? tothe moments in which we can live 
a life like that of God, he will (on this interpretation) be thinking 
of moments in which the partition between active and passive 
reason is broken down and we become aware of our oneness with 
the principle whose knowledge is always actual and always 
complete. 

According to this line of thought, what the active reason acts 
on is the passive reason, which is a sort of plastic material on 
which active reason impresses the forms of knowable objects. 

1 Met, 1049” 24. 
2 Met. 1072» 14, 24, .Ε. N.1177> 26—1178* 8, 1178” 18-32, 


ABRISTOREE Ss) THEOLOGY cxlv 


But in the same sentence Aristotle introduces another line of 
thought, which seems to have been suggested by Plato’s use of 
the sun as a symbol for the Idea of Good (Rep. 507 B-509 δ). The 
one reason is analogous to matter by becoming all things, the 
other is analogous to the efficient cause by making all things, in 
the manner of a positive state like light ; for in a sense light 
makes the potentially existing colours actually existing colours. 
Some of the conditions of colour are present in the dark, but to 
make actual seen colours a further condition is necessary, viz. 
light ; and active reason is to the intelligible as light is to the 
visible. The analogy of light must not be pressed too closely. 
Light, according to Aristotle, is the functioning-as-transparent of 
the medium that stretches between the eye and its object ;? it is 
by directly producing change in the transparent medium that the 
object indirectly produces change in the eye and comes to be 
seen.” Active reason is not to be thus thought of as a medium 
between passive reason and its object; knowledge is a direct not 
a mediate relation, in Aristotle’s view. The analogy is a more 
general one. Though not a medium, active reason is a third 
thing, besides passive reason and the object, which has to be 
taken account of if we would understand the fact of knowledge, 
as light is a third thing, besides the eye and the object, which we 
must take account of if we would understand the fact of sight. 

Both active reason and light are said to operate as positive 
states (ὡς ἕξις tis), The expression is not strictly accurate. Both 
are strictly ‘activities’ and are described as such.’ A ‘positive 
state’ is properly something intermediate between a potentiality 
and an activity. But the contrast here thought of is that between 
positive state and potentiality. Light is the condition of a medium 
which has already been made actually transparent by the presence 
of an illuminant,‘ and it is its actuality that makes it possible for 
the eye which can see actually fo see, and for the visible object 
actually tobe seen. Similarly, the fact that active reason already 
knows all intelligible objects makes it possible for the passive 
reason, in itself a potentiality, actually to know, and for the 
knowable actually to be known. 

‘The active reason’, Aristotle continues, ‘is separable and 
impassive and unmixed, being’ (i. 6. because it is) ‘an actuality. 


1 De An. 418" 9, 419° 11. 2° A19* 10, 
3 430718, 4189, 4197 11. 4 418? 12, 


2673.1 k 


cxlvi INTRODUCTION 


For the active is always of higher worth than the passive, and 
the originative source than the matter.’ The meaning o1 
‘separable’ here is to be gathered from the occurrence later of 
the expression ‘when it has been separated’. It means that the 
active reason, united for a certain time with the passive, can be 
separated from it, and the reference is clearly to the destruction, 
at death, of the latter and the survival of the former. Else- 
where ' Aristotle speaks of ‘reason’, simply, as surviving death, 
but that is where the distinction between active and passive 
reason is not present to his mind ; when it is present he evidently 
thinks of the passive reason as being, like the lower faculties of 
sense and imagination, an integral part of the soul which is the 
actuality of a particular body and cannot survive it. The other 
phrases used, in this sentence, of active reason call for no special 
comment. They emphasize the facts that it is entirely in- 
dependent of the body and that it contains no unrealized 
potentialities but knows always what it ever knows. 

“Actual knowledge’, Aristotle proceeds, ‘is identical with its 
object ; potential knowledge is prior in time in the individual, 
but in general it is not prior in time, but reason does not at one 
time function and at another not.’ We have seen above that in 
some sense active reason is ‘in the soul’, but we certainly are 
not conscious of it, or are so only in moments of illumination ; 
thus, in some sense, in the individual potential knowledge comes 
before actual knowledge. But ‘on the whole’ it does not; active 
reason knows actually when passive reason as yet knows only 
potentially. It is clearly implied that active reason, though it is 
in the soul, goes beyond the individual ; we may fairly suppose 
Aristotle to mean that it is identical in all individuals. 

‘When it has been separated it is only that which it is 
essentially, and this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not 
remember, however, because this is impassive but the passive 
reason is perishable) ; and without this nothing thinks.’ Though 
active reason is always impassive and unmixed, it is implied that 
its true nature is somewhat obscured during its association with 
the body, but exists in its purity when this association is over. 
Does this imply that the disembodied reason is conscious, as the 
embodied reason is not, of the full extent of its knowledge ? 

The perplexing remark ‘we do not remember’ receives some 


1 Met. 1070% 26. 


ARISDOTLE Sit HEOLOGY exlvii 


light from a passage earlier in the book, in which Aristotle is 
speaking of the influence of old age on the mental life.t ‘In- 
tuitive thought and contemplation, then, die away through the 
destruction of something else within’ (i. e. within the body), ‘ but 
are themselves impassive. But reasoning, and loving or hating, 
are affections not of reason but of its possessor, in so far as he 
possesses it. Hence when he perishes there is neither memory 
nor love; for these belonged not to reason but to the compo: 
site being which has perished; reason is doubtless something 
more divine and is impassive.’ In the light of that passage it 
seems clear’? that Aristotle here means that memory does not 
survive death. The reason is that (1) active reason is impassive ; 
it takes no impress from the circumstances of life; its know- 
ledge has therefore no marks of date or circumstance: while 
(2) the passive reason which does take the impress of circum- 
stances has perished at the death of the individual. 

The last words of the chapter, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν voel, are 
capable of a great variety of interpretations, viz. : 

(1) ‘and without the passive reason the active reason thinks 
nothing.’ 

(2) ‘and without the active reason the passive reason thinks 
nothing.’ 

(3) ‘and without the passive reason nothing thinks.’ 

(4) ‘and without the active reason nothing thinks.’ 

It can easily be seen that on none of these interpretations do 
these words properly form part of the ground for our ‘not re- 
membering’. Probably οὐ μνημονεύομεν ... φθαρτός is parentheti- 
cal, and the final words go with what precedes the parenthesis. 
They then sum up the teaching of the chapter by saying ‘ and 
without the active reason nothing thinks’. 

Alexander identifies the active reason with God, and this view 
is adopted by Zabarella, whose argument * may be summarized 
as follows: ‘The active reason is clearly stated to exist entirely 
apart from matter.‘ Now in A, the only place where Aristotle 
discusses ex professo what pure immaterial forms there are, the 
only such forms that he recognizes are God and the intelligences. 
The active reason cannot be any ofthese inferior beings, for these 


1 408 24-30, 

2 Though the point has been much disputed. 

3 De Reb, Nat., De mente agente, capp. 12, 13. 4 430° 17. 
k 2 


exlviii INTRODUCTION 


have, apparently, the sole function of moving their respective 
spheres. The active reason, then, must be God, who as the 
πρῶτον νοητόν is the source of intelligibility in all other in- 
telligibles. It is God, then, as active reason, that makes the 
potential object of knowledge an actual object of knowledge, 
and at the same time enables the passive reason, which in itself 
has only the potentiality of knowledge, actually to know, just as 
(to use the image which Aristotle borrows from Plato ’) the light 
of the sun causes the potentially visible to be actually visible 
and the potentially seeing eye actually to see.’ 

Zabarella’s opinion is always worthy of the most serious atten- 
tion. But it would seem that in his zeal to get a perfect agreement 
between the De Anima and A he has put a somewhat unnatural 
interpretation on the former work. The active reason is dis- 
tinctly presented there as existing in the human soul. And 
χωριστός, Which he takes to mean ‘separate’, more probably 
means ‘separable’; the mode of being of active reason during 
the life of the individual seems to be contrasted with its state 
when it exists χωρισθείς, presumably after the death of the 
individual. Further, it is difficult to suppose with Zabarella 
that it is in its character as νοητόν rather than as νοῶν that it 
is represented as making the individual’s knowledge possible. 

A representation of God in the De Anima as immanent in the 
individual would not necessarily be inconsistent with the repre- 
sentation of Him as also transcendent. But a description of Him 
as having all our knowledge before we have it, and imparting it 
to us, would be inconsistent with the description of Him in A as 
knowing only Himself. It is possible that this inconsistency 
exists—that the two books represent divergent modes of Aristotle’s 
thought about the Deity. But it is not necessary to suppose 
this. Aristotle makes no actual mention of God in this passage 
of the De Anima, and though the pure never-ceasing activity of 
thought there described is in some respects like that ascribed to 
God in the Metaphysics, Aristotle probably did not identify the 
two. Itis more probable that he believed in a hierarchy reaching 
continuously from the lowest beings, those most immersed in 
matter, up to man, the heavenly bodies, the intelligences, and 
God ; the active reason in man being one of the highest members 
of this hierarchy but having others as well as God above it. 


1 10729 26-32. 2 De An. 430°15. 


ARISVOVLE Ss hOLOGY cxlix 


This is the interpretation of the De Anima to which the purely 
deistic doctrine of A points. 

The conception of God presented in A is certainly an unsatis- 
factory one. God, as conceived by Aristotle, has a knowledge 
which is not knowledge of the universe, and an influence on the 
universe which does not flow from His inner life of knowledge 
as action in man flows from knowledge; an influence which can 
hardly be called an activity since it is the sort of influence that 
one person may unconsciously have on another, or that even 
a statue or a picture may have on its admirer. Little wonder 
that generation after generation of commentators has found it 
hard to believe that this is really Aristotle’s view, and has tried 
to read something different into what he says. Even Alexander 
tried to find in his master some trace of a recognition of divine 
providence, and most ancient scholars agreed with him in this. 
Even Averroes, while denying to God any creative activity and 
any freedom of will, ascribed to Him—and thought he was 
following Aristotle in doing so—a knowledge of the general laws 
of the universe. St. Thomas and Duns Scotus expressed them- 
selves cautiously, but tended to interpret Aristotle’s God in 
a theistic sense. Our own time has witnessed a long controversy 
between Brentano and Zeller, the former maintaining, the latter 
denying, the theistic interpretation. Brentano’s attempt must be 
pronounced a failure ;! Aristotle has no theory either of divine 
creation or of divine providence. But there are traces in him of 
a way of thinking less arid than that which we have seen to be 
his deliberate theory. 

That God’s activity is one of knowledge, and of knowledge 
alone, is not merely the theory of A; it appears to be a part of 
Aristotle’s permanent thought, and is expressed with equal clear- 
ness in the De Caelo, the Ethics, and the Politics? On the other 
hand, in criticizing Empedocles for excluding part of reality from 
God’s knowledge, he, in effect, criticizes his own limitation of 
God’s knowledge to self-knowledge.’ When Aristotle considers 


1 It is examined in detail by K. Elser in Die Lehre des A. tiber das 
Wirken Gottes, Miinster, 1893. I have reviewed the main points of 
Brentano’s argument in (/zzd xxiii. (N.S.) 289-291. 

2 292% 22, > 4, 1158" 35, 115974, 1178) 10, 132528. πρᾶξις is ascribed 
to God in 25. WV. 115425, Pol. 1325 30, but in a wider sense in which 
θεωρία is a kind of πρᾶξις (1325? 20). 8. B, 1000? 3, De An. 410? 4. 


cl INTRODUCTION 


the nature of God, he feels that the ascription to Him of any 
practical interest in the world would detract from His perfec- 
tion; but when he considers the world he tends to think of God 
in a way which brings God into closer relation with the world. 
The comparison of Him to the leader of an army or to the ruler 
of a people’ suggests a very different way of thinking from παν 
which is implied in his formal view. 

If the question be asked, whether Aristotle thinks of God 
as creator of the world, the answer must certainly be that he does 
not. For him matter is ungenerated, eternal; he expressly 
argues against a creation of the νου. This would not neces- 
sarily exclude the view that matter is throughout eternity 
maintained in existence by God, but there is no trace of such 
a doctrine in Aristotle. Further, the intelligences appear to 
be independently existing, uncreated beings. And Brentano’s 
attempt to show that the reason of each individual human being 
is created by God at the birth of the individual breaks down over 
passages in which the eternal pre-existence of the reason is 
clearly maintained.’ 

There is one passage of A in which Aristotle at first sight 
seems to suggest that God exists immanently in the world as 
well as transcendently. ‘We should consider in which of two 
ways the nature of the whole possesses the good and the best— 
whether as something existing separately and by itself, or as the 
order of the whole. Perhaps we should say that it possesses 
the good in both ways, as an army does. For it is true both that 
its good is in its order, and that its leader is its good, and 
the latter in a higher degree ; for he does not exist by reason of 
the order, but the order by reason of him.’* But, though 
Aristotle says that the good exists both as a transcendent 
spirit, and as an immanent order, he does not say that God 
exists in both these ways. God is essentially for him, in A, the 
first cause; and in view of his often-repeated doctrine of the 
priority of substance, the cause must for him be a substance and 
not an abstraction such as order is. Yet he treats the order as 
due to God, so that his God may truly be said to be at work in 
the world, and in 4 15 sense immanent. 

One of the most conspicuous features of Aristotle’s view of the 

1 107514, 1076 4. 2 De Caelo 279» 12 tf., 301 31. 

* Notably De Az. 430% 23. 4 1075 11-15. 


ARISTOTLE'S THEOLOGY cli 


universe is his thorough-going teleology. Apart from occasional 
sports and coincidences all that exists and all that happens exists 
or happens for an end. But it is not so clear what interpretation 
is to be put on this view. Does he mean (1) that the whole 
structure and history of the universe is the fulfilment of a 
divine plan? Or (2) that it is due to the conscious working 
towards ends of individual beings? Or (3) that there is in 
nature an unconscious striving towards ends ? 

(1) The first alternative is out of keeping with the theory of A, 
according to which the sole activity of God is self-knowledge. But 
there are traces even in A of a different way of thought. When 
God is compared to the captain of an army, to whom the order in 
the army is due, or to the ruler of a people, or when the universe is 
compared to a household in which functions more or less definite 
are assigned to all the members from the highest to the lowest,! 
it is difficult not to suppose that Aristotle is thinking of God as 
controlling by His will the main lines of development of the 
world’s history. And similar language is not lacking elsewhere. 
We have seen that Alexander ascribed to Aristotle a belief in 
providential activity—so far as the maintenance of species is con- 
cerned. This interpretation is based on De Gen. et Corr. 336» 31, 
where Aristotle says that for those beings which, by reason of 
their distance from the first principle, are incapable of permanent 
existence (i. e. for men, animals, and plants, in contrast with the 
stars) God has provided what is next best by arranging for the 
continuance of generation. Similarly, the praise of Anaxagoras? 
for introducing reason as the cause of order in the world implies 
the ascription to God of a general ordering of the universe, as 
also do such phrases as ‘ God and nature make nothing in vain ’.* 
But it is remarkable how little trace there is of this way of 
thinking, if we discount passages where Aristotle is probably 
accommodating himself to common opinions; he never uses the 
word πρόνοια of God, as Socrates and Plato had done ;* he has 
no serious belief in divine rewards and punishments ; he has no 
interest as Plato has in justifying the ways of God to man.° 

1 1075915, 10767 4, 1075® 19. 2 A, 984» 15. 

8 De Caelo 271* 33. 4 Xen. Mem. i. 4. 6, &c.; Pl. 72m. 30 C, 44. 

5 His solution of the problem of evil lies in a reference to τὸ κακοποιόν 
inherent in matter (P/ys. 19215). Not that matter has any predisposi- 
tion towards evil ; but, being a potentiality of opposites, it is a potentiality 
of evil as well as of good. 


clii INTRODUCTION 


(2) The second alternative appears to be ruled out by the fact 
that the teleology in nature is definitely opposed to the working 
of thought. On the whole, it would seem that view (3) is that 
which prevails in Aristotle’s mind. For the one passage in 
which he says that God and nature do nothing in vain, there are 
many in which he says that nature does nothing in vain. The 
notion of unconscious teleology is, it is true, profoundly un- 
satisfactory. If we are to view action not merely as producing 
a result but as being aimed at producing it, we must view the 
doer of it either as imagining the result and aiming at reaching 
it, or as merely the agent of some other intelligence which 
through it is realizing its conscious purposes. Unconscious 
teleology implies a purpose which is not the purpose of any mind, 
and hence nota purpose at all. But Aristotle’s language suggests 
that he (like many modern thinkers) did not feel this difficulty, 
and that, for the most part, he was content to work with the notion 
of an unconscious purpose in nature itself. 

The defects of Aristotle’s theology flow, in the main, from its 
appearance in his system as a sort of appendix to physics, and to 
his particular physical theory. (1) The latter point may be taken 
first. Much of his argument for the existence of God rests on 
premises which have for us no more than antiquarian interest. 
The notion of the peculiar ‘divinity’ of the celestial bodies, 
of their exemption from all change except motion in space; 
the notion of the universe as a system of concentric spheres ; 
the notion of the priority of circular motion, and of a peculiar 
analogy between it and the unchanging activity of thought ; these 
and similar features of his thought diminish for us the value of 
the theology which presupposes them. In particular, they lead 
him to think of God not as operative with equal directness in all 
change and being, but as directly operative only at the outermost 
confines of the universe and as affecting human affairs only 
through a long series of intermediaries. But (2) the deeper 
defects of his theology arise not from its being based on a particu- 
lar physical theory, but from its being based on physics to the 
exclusion of other possible bases. The primary fact, according 
to Aristotle, which calls for a supersensual explanation is the 
fact of movement. He shares with many other thinkers the 
assumption that movement cannot simply be accepted as an 


1 Phys. 199” 26. 


ARI SOLES at HEOLOGY clili 


ultimate feature in the nature of the universe, but must be either 
explained, or asserted to be an illusory appearance. The Eleatics, 
and less decidedly Plato, had adopted the latter alternative. 
Aristotle’s characteristic philosophical virtue of faithfulness to 
the given facts made this impossible for him; he had to allow the 
reality of motion. But he could not regard it as not needing 
explanation. He therefore tried to explain it as due to something 
which was itself exempt from motion. It is exclusively as first 
mover that a God is necessary to his system. Aristotle does not, 
indeed, succeed in explaining movement; we are left with the 
question how a non-physical activity of desire can produce 
movement in space. But, apart from this difficulty, the God 
whom he sets up is inadequate to meet the demands of the reli- 
gious consciousness. These demands are, indeed, not easily 
satisfied in their entirety. They seem to point in two directions, 
_ and the main effort of theology is the effort to reconcile these 
apparently conflicting demands. On the one hand, there is the 
demand for a God who shall be all-inclusive and all-explaining, 
within whom body as well as soul, evil as well as good, shall fall. 
On the other hand, there is the demand for a God who is pure 
spirit without any tincture of matter, author of good and not 
of evil, personal spirit distinct from His worshippers, and enter- 
ing into personal relations with them. Aristotle’s God, to some 
extent, meets the latter demand. He is spirit, not matter, and 
one spirit among other spirits; and it is these two features in 
Aristotle’s view that led the Catholic Church to base its theology 
largely on his. But profound modifications of his view were 
necessary if his prime mover were to be identified with the God 
whom Christians worship.!. The prime mover is not the creator 
of the universe, for both matter and the subordinate forms are 
uncreated and eternal; nor is He a providential ruler, since His 
thought is of Himself alone; nor is He a God of love, since 
emotion of any sort would mar His life of pure contemplation. 
Still less does He meet the other set of demands, since His 
relation to the universe and to human spirits is (in A) described 
as one of transcendence alone. . 

Aristotle might have been led to a theology which would 


1 For an excellent account of St. Thomas’s modifications of Aristotle’s 
theology cf. Prof. Webb’s Studies in the History of Natural Theology, 


233-291. 


cliv INTRODUCTION 


have satisfied at any rate one, and perhaps to some extent 
both, of these demands, if he had approached the matter 
by studying the religious consciousness and asking what men 
really mean by God. He is, it is true, not entirely with- 
out regard for the religious consciousness which he finds 
around him. Many details of the popular religion he treats 
as worthless,! and ascribes to mere anthropomorphism’ or 
to utilitarian policy.* But in some of its main features—in 
the universal tendency to believe that there ave Gods, and in 
the tendency to think of the heavenly bodies as divine ‘—he is 
ready to welcome a divination of the truth. He does not, how- 
ever, carry his analysis of the religious consciousness very far. 
No doubt religion meant less for the average Greek of his time 
than it has meant for many other races. But in the mystery-cults, 
at all events, he would have found something that might have 
suggested to him that God is required not only by the intellect, 
to round off our knowledge of the world, but by the heart, to give 
us strength and courage to live; and such a God, he would have 
seen, must be something very different from the self-absorbed 
object of unreciprocated love whom he depicts. At the same 
time a study of these cults might have suggested to him that God 
cannot be merely the highest member of a hierarchy, but must 
somehow be present in His worshippers. 

Such a study, however, of the implications of the religious 
consciousness would have been foreign to his method, which was 
objective throughout. The facts of the external world, he would 
have said, require a God of a certain kind; if the religious con- 
sciousness demands a God who shall be other than this, so much 
the worse for the religious consciousness. But it would be 
justifiable to reply that morality and religion are facts no less 
than physical change, and may have as direct a bearing on 
the ultimate nature of the first principle of the universe. In 
a general sense, Kant was probably right in holding that the 
practical reason has more to tell us about God than the pure 
reason. 


1 Β, 10007 18. 2 1074» 5, Pol. 1252» 24. 3 1074) 4. 
4 1074» 8-14, De Caelo 270 5-24, 279" 30, 2845 2, Meteor. 339” 19. 
5 μαντεία, De Caelo 284° 3. 


clv 


Vv 
ΠΕ TEXT OF: THE METAPHYSICS 


Ir was with good reason that W. Christ in his edition of the 
Metaphysics almost entirely ignored the manuscripts used by 
Bekker other than Laurentianus 87. 12 (A) and Parisinus 1853 
(E); for the rest of these manuscripts have little independent 
value. There is, however, one manuscript of great value which 
was ignored both by Bekker and by Christ, viz, Vindobonensis 
phil. gr. C. Attention was called to this manuscript by 
A. Gercke in Wiener Studien xiv. 146-148. He referred to it by 
the symbol W, but as this had been appropriated by Bekker to 
another codex, I have used the symbol J instead. I made a 
partial collation of this manuscript in 1904; the collation was 
later completed for me by Mr. S. Eustratiades. The manuscript 
has been minutely described by Mr. F. H. Fobes in the Classical 
Review xxvii (1913), 249-250, and its relations to other manu- 
scripts, so far as the Meteorologica is concerned, have been 
discussed by him in Classical Philology x (1915), 188-214, and in 
his edition of the Meteorologica (1919). J contains the Metaphysics 
from 994*6 to the end, and in addition the Physics, the De Caelo, 
the De Generatione et Corruptione, the Meteorologica, and the Meta- 
physics of Theophrastus. It appears to belong to the beginning 
of the tenth century and to be the earliest extant manuscript 
of the Metaphysics. It contains not infrequent traces of uncial 
corruption and of transcription from an archetype in which the 
words were not divided, e.g. in 1000 14, 2*21,' 27 33, 30> 35, 
33°17, 41°27, 62°17, 72°6, 74°17, 77°14, 83712, 88> 16, go? 12. 
There are 44 places in which EA? appear to be in error (some- 
times only in matters of accent or breathing) and J to preserve 
the true reading : 994% 22, 995% 27, 1002 34, 5 19, 10831, 128 16, 
P19, 30, τοῦ τα 20921, ἢ 33, 21°3, 55 ὁ, 29°17, 319, 33°21, 
35* 22, 30, 41° 29, 45* 4, 46" 33, 4, 4723, 51°34, 5320, 20, 54” 34, 
58> 6, 26, 60°34, 63°9, 67°30, 68° 19, 6922, 71°13, 74> 36, 
75> 23, 78° 1, 82% 32, 84% 21, 89% 11, 91? 21, g2> 18, 93° 13.” E and 
J being evidently in very close agreement, I have examined all 

1 Tn this section of the Introduction 08-93? = 10008-1093. 

2 J has been corrected by a second hand, which often follows the text 
of E; cf. 1047 20-22, Io512 11. J occasionally has words omitted by 
accident in E, 6. g. in 9947 24, 9998 30, 1020 21. 


elvi INTRODUCTION 


the passages in E in which its reported readings differed from 
those of J (as well as all those in which Christ’s report differs 
from that of Bekker). Inthe following passages Bekker’s report 
is right and Christ’s wrong: 981° 21, 9824 4, 31, 32, 983" 33, ὃ 1, 
984” I, 15, 985° 19, 986" 16, 987° 1, 993" 13, 996" 22, 1006*21, 
Δ ΤΏ ΔΙ, τόρ 35, 120 20, τοῦ 19 Τοῦ ἴ8, eres) 228.06, 2715. 
35° 29, 38" 13, 39" 4, 33, 40 15, 19, 41° 25, 45" τ8, 50" 27, 52” 13, 
53°18, 55°2, 59°37, 61> 21, 26, 66°19, 6815, 605 τὸ, 70” 31, 
77* 20, 80" 9, 92) 17, 93* 11, "24. I found unreported readings 
in 982 15, > 26, 28, 983 τό, 22, 985" 17, 26, gg1* 6, ἢ 18, 999% 16, 
10004 29, 621, "2, οὔ 8, 22 dts, 1730, 19%20, 22, "25, 25226, 
27°29, " 24, 29" 26, 33° 19, 42015, 43°28, 46°33, 48” 7, 518 30, 
52* 25, 54? 22, 56” 4, 57% 15 bis, 58" 27,59” 37,63? 2,67” 5, 23,69” 25, 
70° 8, 715 14, 24, 72 14, 92 14, 21; readings of the second hand ' 
in 982) 31, 1045" 17, 522 13; traces of erasure in 1029 3, 31 20, 
47° 19, 57° 14, 80 15, 8238, 8647; I have distinguished more 
accurately between the first and the second hand in 9888, 
997° 26, 1020% 2, 29" 17, 18, 22, 34, 41) 25, 44 3, 35, 47° 3, 48° 37, 
085, 49% 21, "7, 51} 5, 27, 53° 3, 55° 7, 58" 24, 64> 23, 68) 12, 
70" 10,74" 32, 705 4, 80°20, 8120, 82° 32, 88% 21, " ὃ) ΘΟ, τὴ} 
go? 12. 

« In A» Christ had examined only selected passages; I thought 
it well, therefore, to collate this manuscript throughout. This 
enables me to confirm Bekker’s report against that of Christ in 
98121, ὕ5, 982°4, 31, 32 ὅϊ5, 986" 16, 989°4, 991° 13, "30, 
992” 10, 993" 8, 994* 10, 995” 12, 996" 14, 997” 12, L000* Io, 1" 12, 
2* 30, ΡῸ, 3.0, 658; 7% 15, © 31, 99.6, τὸ, ΤΡ 18) 24, 19) 6. ΤΡ Ύ ΤῸ 
> 18, 16 το, 18> 15, τοῦ 33, 20% 25, " 8, 28, 2195, 13, 22> 94, 25" 25, 
Πού), 918 139, >7, 392) 19,990.99) birt 15, 3759, Poe τ 
38” 10, 40°13, 410 6, 44°3, 45) 15, 48°31, 49°21, 52} το, 17, 
54° 31, 32, 34." 7, 17, 22, 60717, 31, 61> 21, 26, 62°35, 64" 12, 
65> 23, 67> 23, 68935, 704 31, 73° 26, θοῦ Ὁ, 853 τ, 9, P21, 89% 22, 
go’ 33. I found new readings in 981” 2, 3, 6, 982*5, 983" 9, 17, 


1 FE’ is a fifteenth-century hand which, besides making minor changes, 
quotes variant readings, sometimes those of Alexander, e.g. in 982 21, 
98317 (where Al. is expressly mentioned), 990%24, 99624, 99823, 
1008) 11,14» 18,17” 1, 40% 22,56 12; sometimes those of J, 6. g. in 1008” 23, 
25° 6, 53% 20, 58 26, 82% 32 ; sometimes those of A?, e.g. in 1004 32, 3171, 
43”9, 44 23,47” 10; sometimes from other sources, e.g. in 987 25,998» 27, 
1024" 13, 27% 34, 35% 22, 41 1, 835 13. 


THEA TEXT Or THE METAPHYSICS elvii 


» 16, 984% 20, 985" 12, 19, 988" 4, 989" 26, » 20, 992? 33, 993° I, 26, 
"27, 994° 14, 24, 995° 13, " 6, το, 996 10, 24, 997" 10, 999» 32, 
1000" 14,25, 20, 32, 15, 1° 28, 2° 11, 19, 24, © 8, 19/20, 3° 31, © 26, 
ΠΡ ΟΡ ΤΟ ΤΊ ease! 15.99, 8 2a 25 δ £5, 21, ΤΟΣ 17,” 2, 11 28, 
31, "25, 122 16 bts, 13" 10, 14219, "28, 15 8, 9, 15, "20, τό} το, 
ΠΟ ἘΠ] 50, τοῦο 1,4) 17, 10, 26, 1ὸῦ 7, 9, 25, 35, "15, 2081s 
ΞΕ 0 Ὁ 6, 21 01s,.22, 252. 18, 30, 535, ἡ 5) Ὁ, 9, 26, 28, 35, 36, 
2352 bis, 17, 23, 35, 2437, 8, 27, » 21, 25" 22, 23, 2630, 18, 2701, 
285 19 bis, "33, 2917, 25, 34, 30° 18, 23, 24, 34, 3114, 32715, 
33" 5, 7, 8, > 22, 28, 29, 345 II, 15, 17, ἢ 33, 35. 23,” 25, 34, 36° 17, 
6, 11, 31, 37°4, 8, 14,1, 6, 13, 38°3, 14,10, 12, 19, 22, 23, 
5, 0 50, 19, 21) 52 2052, 920, ΔΤ 12, 20, 21, 13.) ἴπ, 75. 
II, 17, 32, " 30, 445 29, "2, 3 (9 ὁ15), 8, 30, 465 33, 47) 25, 485 35, 
>], 49°14, 15, 16, 23, 50" 21, 515 28, 525 24, > 33, 5357, ᾿ 18, 
54) 2, 10, 55" 7, " 24, 35, 56:2, 6, οὐΐδ, " 23, 57) 29, 585 22, 36, 
5959, 35, 61" 24, 6251, " 13, 34, 63" 5, 64) 3, 20, 65" 22, 67°35, 
6852, 6059, 70) 26, 7158, " τό, 725 35, ἢ 26, 745 27, P22, 33, 
ΤΟ δεῖς, τ, 20, 79* 22,831, Pro, 810 23, 82. 8, 84} 22, 
878 24, ἢ 28, 30, 88° 13, » 12,919. [ἢ 982% 1, 1ο338 31 discovered 
readings of the second hand ; I found traces of erasure in 
1020? 18, 54218, 80°26, 27, "15, 900 35; I have distinguished 
between the first and another hand in 983° 7, 9958 5, 1002* 30, 
P17, 317 25, 55° 26. 

From a. 994*6 to the end of the Metaphysics ἘΞ and A? dis- 
agree in some 2,366 places; in 341 of these J agrees with Ap, 
in the rest with E. The position in detail is as follows: 


J=E J=AP 
α. 38 Ι 
Β 177 20 
Ts 257 38 
A 311 30 
EB. 43 12 
Z. 9.70 ie! 
H 79 8 
Θ 149 14. 
Ἱ: 145 24. 
Κ. 263 32 
A, 1069? 18-1073? I 82 12 


1,919 241 


elviii INTRODUCTION 


15 J=a 
A. 10738 I1-1076% 4 10 16 
M. 60 38 
N. 36 46 
106 100 


It thus appears that the second hand of A, apparently of the 
same period, which begins at 1073*1,' agrees better than the 
first hand not only with J but also with E, since the first hand 
has 2,160 discrepancies in 485 pages, the second only 206 in 
118. This is apparently due not to A»’s ceasing to represent an 
independent tradition (it seems still to represent this), but to the 
exercise of greater care by the copyist or by his original. For 
if we take H as typical of the earlier and N of the later books, 
and consider the disagreements between E and A? in places in 
which the true reading can be certainly determined by the sense 
or the grammar, we find A? right in H only 12 times out of 38, 
but in N 25 times out of 39. (J is right in 341 of these passages 
in H, and in 34 of those in N.) Since EJ obviously belong to 
one family and A? to an independent one, it is only to be 
expected that EJ should sometimes agree in error; there are 
seven clear cases of this in H and two in N. The error is 
clearly due to the common archetype. It might be expected, 
however, that EA> should be right when they agree against J, 
and JA» right when they agree against E. Neither of these 
expectations is entirely borne out. Cases in which J is right 
against EA» have been enumerated above. Of cases in which 
E is right against JA> there are none in H but three in N 
(1087® 33, rogo’ 3, 109227), In many of these exceptional 
cases the divergence is simply a matter of breathing or accent, 
and it is not surprising that E or J should be right and JA» or 
EA» wrong; in others the error was probably present in the 
common archetype of all the manuscripts, and the right reading 
is due to the intelligence of the copyist. For, as Diels has 
remarked,’ the writers of our manuscripts were ‘not simply 
writers for hire, but scholastically educated and perhaps even 
learned copyists, who devoted themselves with more or less skill 
to the διόρθωσις of their text. They are thus related to the 
archetype just as many newer recensions are to Bekker’s edition.’ 


1 Cf. Christ,p.vi. 2. Zur Textgeschichte der aristotelischen Phystk το. 


THES TEx OF Tite VMEPAPHYSICS clix 


The main characteristics of A’s text as against that of EJ are 
the following: 

(x) Differences of order of words—very frequent. 

(2) Differences of inflexion, e. g. of number or of degree. 

(3) Use of synonyms, e.g. 998 2 συνέστηκε AP Al., ἐστί EJ. 

(4) Differences of grammatical structure, e.g. 988*%9 μόνον 
κέχρηται AP, ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος E, 992} 12 εἰ... δώσει A, ἐὰν 
Cer a Oe 


(5) Use of ἢ instead of ἡ... .7, and of καί instead of re. . . καί 


Or kai... Καὶ: 

(6) Lacunae. These are in all probability partly due to the 
omission by a copyist, at some stage or stages of the transmis- 
sion of the text, of whole lines of the original he was copying; 
but I have been unable to discover any single standard length 
of line of which the lacunae are multiples. The omissions 
must have taken place at more than one stage, and in copying 
originals with lines of different length. Others may be more 
fortunate in pursuing this line of inquiry, which has been 
exemplified by Prof. Clark in The Descent of Manuscripts ; and 
for their information I append a list of the longer lacunae in A}, 
distinguishing by an asterisk those in which the omission has 
been facilitated by haplography, and which, therefore, it is not 
so necessary to trace back to the omission of whole lines of an 


original : 

14 letters ror6" 11, 29? 15", 32 letters 988* 13, ggo? 33. 
41 3, 665 25". 36 988? 15. 

15 1039” 33") 525 30 37 10308 As 51> ῃ: 

τὸ 987) 12", 1035) 20% 39 984" 32. 
Be oe gee? 41 1032%27*, ὁπ το. 
20,25", δ Rie 

18 1000 7, 1020% 21%. 4 τοις 

Ι ἸΟΖΙΔ ΤΙ, 534021" 47 gE Ns 

: 46°23. Ls 986" 9, 1017* 17%. 

20 986? 3. 49 To15? 22", τοῦ 7", 

21 1003 31, 21620, 49" 9". 
56} 34". 53 9945 29%. 

23 984) 1. 57 ΤΟΤΕ 18*. 

26 1047 25". 113 1067> 16*. 

28 986" 20, 1004>15*, [114 1045) 19. 
τοῦ τοῦ, 134 981? 2. 

29 985° το. 169 οϑοϑ 26. 


51 ΤΟΙ Ὁ 17. 


-- 


clx INTRODUCTION 


It is difficult to make much of this. There is, however, a 
large consensus of evidence that papyrus rolls were normally 
written in lines of about 36 letters (Gardthausen ii. 79. Christ 
(Sitzungsberichte der k. bayer. Akad. der Wiss. 1885, 411-417) has 
pointed out that A> has indications throughout of divisions 
answering presumably to ro-line sections in its original, These 
sections seem to have been of different lengths in different books, 
but in A the lines were of about 363 letters on the average. A 
line of this length, varying down to 32 and up to 39, will account 
for most of the longer lacunae in A, viz. those of 32, 36, 39, 134, 
and τόρ letters. In A the lines averaged about 283 letters ; and 
a line of 24-31 letters accounts for all the longer lacunae in that 
book. 

The main lacunae in E are the following : 


a4utetters, 1037" 1. 38 letters 994° 24. 
15 1078? 8", 40 999° 30°. 
16 1079" 20. 42 T020* 21", 
19 1022" 5*, 44 1007" 22", 
26 10448 3%, 52 gor 17. 
28 1076» 30*, 56 1075* 4". 
29 1037* I. 57 To508 17*, 
31 IO51® 11*. 60 1006" 26, 
35 1000 7. 61 1042* 24. 
27 1007*31", 47°11". 6 750 1048) 18, 


In many of the above passages the sense requires the words 
which are omitted by one of the manuscript families, but in 
others this is not so, and the question arises whether these are 
cases of omission or of later addition. In the bulk of these pas- 
sages there is no motive for the addition of the words, and the 
variation is much more likely to have arisen from the careless- 
ness of one copyist than from the excessive zeal of another. 
There are passages, however, in which a motive for the addition 
of words can be detected, and others where words have plainly 
been inserted at a wrong part of the text as well asin their right 
place ; in such cases I have excised the words in question: cf. 
984> 11, 1009%26, 1217, 23°21, 73°33 (words omitted by E), 
and 985° το, 10285, 29 27, 44° 18, 59° 30, 70” 29 (words omitted 
by Ab). . 

1 For the part played by emblemata in the text cf. Index s.v. Emble- 
mata, 


THES TEXD VOR THESMETAPHYSICS clxi 


It is noteworthy that in the bulk of the above lacunae it is 
whole clauses or groups of clauses that are omitted, and for the 
most part clauses not essential to the grammar. The copyists 
have evidently paid attention to the grammar, and been thereby 
saved from making more omissions than they have made. The 
lacunae in 994° 24, 1007% 22, 15> 16, 207 21, 25> 26, 29) 15, 34} 21, 
29, 45° 19, 47" 25, 51°11 are exceptions. It is also noteworthy 
that neither in AP nor in E are there many considerable lacunae 
after Θ, 

In very many passages A? on one side, EJ on the other have 
divergent readings between which there is little or nothing to 
choose from the point of view of sense, style, or grammar. And, 
while EJ are older than A», AP presents more traces of uncial 
corruption and other evidence which points to an original older 
than that of Ε].} Inthese circumstances it is hard to say which 
family is more likely to be preserving the original reading. It 
is natural, then, to turn to the Greek commentators and to the 
old translations to see which family they support. Alexander 
(fl. 200 A, D.) represents a tradition intermediate between the 
two. His commentary on Books A-A, so far as I have been 
able to trace his readings, agrees 161 times certainly and 18 
times doubtfully with E (or, from 994* 6 onwards, with EJ), 121 
times certainly and 37 times doubtfully with AX. The pseudo- 
Alexander’s commentary” on Books E-N agrees 148 times cer- 
tainly and 17 times doubtfully with EJ, 184 times certainly and 
45 times doubtfully with A>. Asclepius (c. 525) agrees 257 
times with EJ, 110 times with A? ; Syrianus (/7. 431) 5 times 
with EJ, twice with AP ; Themistius (born c, 315) throws no light 
on the problem. 

Our oldest manuscripts are separated from Aristotle by twelve 
centuries, Alexander only by five. [{ is therefore important to 
see what sort of relations exist in detail between the text of our 
manuscripts and that presupposed by Alexander’s commentary, 
Where EJA?AI. do not agree, the normal position is either 
ΑΡ ΑΙ. right, EJ wrong, or EJ Al. right, AP wrong. These 
alternatives are about equally common—a not infrequent situa- 
tion ; cf. what the editors of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri say of Ox. 

! Christ, Ὁ. vil. 

2 Perhaps by Michael of Ephesus (¢. 1070), to whom it is ascribed i 


one manuscript. 
2678-1 ] 


elxii INTRODUCTION 


843 (Plato, Symposium): ‘The text, as so often with papyri, is 
of an eclectic character, showing a decided affinity with no single 
manuscript. Compared with the three principal witnesses for 
the Symposium it agrees now with B against TW, now with the 
two latter as against the former, rarely with T against BW or 
with W against BT.’ Similarly of Ox. 1016 they say that ‘as 
between the two principal manuscripts, B and T, the papyrus 
shows, as usual, little preference, agreeing first with the one and 
then with the other’. 

In Book B, for instance, the first book for the whole of which 
J is available, Al. agrees 27 times with A? and 27 times with EJ. 
And this is much oftener than any other combination occurs. 
To show this I note below αὐ the cases in Book B of other com- 
binations, together with any other cases in that book which throw 
light on the relations between the manuscripts and Al. I add in 
brackets a number of significant cases from other books: 

. J Al. right, EA» wrong, 9958 27. 
2. EJ right, AP Al. wrong (1054) 17 brs). 

3. JA» versus ἘΞ Al.: either may be right, 996*15. 

4. EJA? right, Al. wrong, 995? 36, 1000% 28 (788 8). 

5. Al. right, EJA» wrong, 998% 23, > 17, 999” 21. 

6 ΕΔ» versus Al.: either may be right, 9978 5, » 23, t000? 32 
(82> 36). 

7. All wrong (in different ways), Toor® 12. 

8. Al.’s transpositions ignored by the MSS. (1005>2, 
708 20, ἢ 15). 

9. Al’s condemnation ignored (1041° 28), 

το. Al.’s emendations ignored, 996? 24, 1002 24 (78 34). 

11. Ὁ Al.’s emendations adopted. These cases require close 
consideration, since it is doubtful whether the manuscript reading 
is due to Alexander’s conjecture or is independent. toor 27 καὶ 
τὰ ἐπίπεδα EJA>: om. Al. Alexander notes the absence of these 
words. But their presence in the manuscripts is probably not 
due to Alexander’s note, for, if it were, the manuscripts would 
have added καὶ ai γραμμαί, which, Alexander notes, must also be 
understood. 

(982* 21) πάντα E: ἅπαντα A: om. Al., who desiderates πάντα. 

(995° I) λέγεσθαι EJA?: ἔτι τὸ λέγεσθαι Al., who finds ἔτι super- 
fluous. But if the manuscript reading were due to Alexander’s 
note the MSS. would have read τὸ λέγεσθαι. 


| 


THEST EXT OFS AEAMETAPAYSICS εἰσι 


(10084 25) yap Ab: δ᾽ EJ Al., who says δέ here = γάρ. 

(1016? 11) ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος μὴ εἷς EJ: om. AP Al. Alexander notes 
the absence of a reference to diversity of λόγος but does not sug- 
gest its insertion. The reading of EJ seems independent. 

(ib.) ἔτι J ci. Al. : ἐπεί EA, 

(1040* 22) ἔπειτα εἰ A>: ἔπειτα δὲ εἰ EJ : ἔτι Al., who desiderates 
ἔπειτα. But the presence of εἰ in the manuscripts seems to show 
that their reading is not due to Alexander’s suggestion. 

A consideration of the situations (2), (4), (8), (9), (10), (z1) 
seems to show that in all probability EJA> are independent of 
Alexander. The facts point to the existence in Alexander’s 
time of three texts of approximately equal correctness, repre 
sented now by EJ, A», and Alexander’s commentary. We shall 
do well, generally speaking, to treat the consensus of any two 
of them as taking us as near as we can hope to get to the text of 
Aristotle. Further, the number of places in which EJ and A» 
both disagree with Alexander is relatively so small that where 
Alexander’s reading is not clear the consensus of EJA? is almost 
as conclusive as the consensus of EJA” Al. is elsewhere. There 
are, however, a considerable number of cases in which the com- 
mon archetype of the three texts was in error and in which we 
must have recourse to manuscripts generally inferior, to Ascle- 
pius, or to conjecture. 

The lemmata and quotations in the Greek commentators, 
though much less important than the readings revealed by their 
actual commentaries, are, as Diels has shown in his work on the 
Physics, not without value. Those in Alexander agree 78 times 
with E (EJ), and an equal number of times with A”; those in 
pseudo-Alexander 61 times with EJ, 83 times with A>; those in 
Asclepius 357 times with E (EJ), 110 times with A? ; those in 
Syrianus 40 times with EJ, 19 times with A?. 

The cases in which Alexander gives the right reading against 
EA> are numerous and well known. Asclepius occasionally 
does so: cf. 989% 28, 29, 995 33, 10129, 252 13, 308 2, 3351. 
Even the lemmata and quotations in Asclepius and Syrianus 
sometimes seem to be right as against the best manuscripts, 
e.g. in 9988 29, 999" 21, 1000) 7, 4919, 69, 1151, 32, 245 27, 
25° 15, 77” 18, 79° 14. 

There were three mediaeval translations of the Metaphysics : 
(1) the Metaphysica vetus, extending from the beginning to I, 


clxiv INTRODUCTION 


1007* 31, which was apparently executed at Constantinople and 
was known in Paris shortly before 1210. (2) The Metaphysica 
nova, embracing a, A. 9872 6-end, B-I, A. beginning to 1075) 11. 
This translation was probably made either by Gerhard of Cre- 
mona or by Michael Scotus. The earliest trace of it is its 
occurrence in a manuscript dated 1243. The translation was 
made from the Arabic, diverges very considerably from the 
Greek text, and is of little use for its establishment. (3) A 
translation from the Greek, of which the first twelve books were 
produced between 1260 and 1270, and the last two books not 
before 1270. This translation may with comparative certainty 
be ascribed to William of Moerbeke, a Flemish Dominican, who 
translated much of Aristotle and was for his last nine years 
(1277-86) Archbishop of Corinth. In Books A~I'this translation 
follows the Metaphysica vetus very closely, amending it only in 
the direction of greater literalness, and it remains literal through- 
out; as a rule there is no difficulty in inferring the precise Greek 
which lay before the translator, so that the work has the value 
of a manuscript of the thirteenth or an earlier century.’ I col- 
lated its readings first in the earliest printed editions to which I 
had access, that of Andrea de Asula (Ven. 1483) for the first 
twelve books, and_ that printed in Johannes Versor’s Quaestiones 
(Colon. 1491) for the last two. But to guard against quoting 
readings which might be peculiar to these editions I subsequently 
studied the translation in the thirteenth-century MS. Balliol. 
277, and the fourteenth-century MSS. Bodl. Canon. 288 and 
Oriel. 25. The readings quoted represent the consensus of all 
or the majority of these texts of the translation. The readings 
agree for the most part with EJ, but not infrequently with Ap, 
e.g. in Book E 34 times with EJ, 5 times with A’. Readings 
ascribed by Bonitz to the Aldine edition or to Bessarion are 
very often to be found in this earlier source. In the following 
passages I is either alone or almost alone in preserving the true 
reading : 982° 27, 998% 23, 1002) 34, 69, 1216, 16! 11, 20°27, 
27° 33, 3108, 9, 3829, 410 29, 46°33, >4, 21, 470 21, 53" 20, 
61> 26, 63° 9, 68) 19, 71” 13, 72* 5, 75° 23, 77° 31, 785 28, 81> 23, 
89* 11, 93° 13. 

It is perfectly clear that neither EJ nor A» should be followed 

1 The three translations have been well discussed by M. Grabmann in 
Beitr, sur Cesch, der Phil, des Mittelalters xvii. 104-169. 


THEY LEX TOR THES MeTIAPAYSICS. clxv 


exclusively. But the weight of the Greek commentators and 
of the mediaeval translation is decidedly on the side of EJ, and 
I have accordingly foliowed this group of manuscripts, except 
where the evidence of the Greek commentators, or the sense, 
or grammar, or Aristotelian usage—what Mr. Bywater was so 
fond of referring to as the Sprachgebrauch—turns the scale in 
favour of A>, 

Of the other manuscripts quoted by Bekker for the Meta- 
physics Ὁ», Εν, G>, H», I> are manuscripts of Alexander, Syria- 
nus, or Asclepius, and I have already indicated the nature of 
their contribution to the determination of the text. The Lauren- 
tian MSS. 81. τ (S) of the thirteenth century, and 87. 18 (ΒΡ), 
87. 26 (C>) of the fourteenth century form a closely-connected 
family which has more affinities with EJ than with Ab. 5. 15 
either alone or almost alone in preserving the true reading in 
993? 16, 1005) 19, and stands along with more recent manuscripts 
in preserving it, against EJA®, in 984>26, 98611, 991" 25, 
1004* 26, 9? 27, 11 1, 14917, 24? 27, 25° 9, 13, 27” 27, 43°15, 45° 8, 
46° 31, >21,.22, 4710, 48> 31)°58» 30, 62913, 64°25, 26, 66° 4, 
67? 23, 7058, 71> τι, 77” 36, 79 19, 82) 21, 88" 35, 93) 4. 

Most of the affinities of Vaticanus 256(T), written in 1321, are 
with J and S. JT often agree against all the other manuscripts, 
6.5. In TOT4® 23, 15> 30, 16> 11, τοῦ το, 21° 22, 22% 27, 23° 36, 26°18, 
27°8, 46°33, 4703, 5134, 530 29, 67°30. T stands alone or 
almost alone in preserving the true reading in 1004° 19, 5? 19, 
11" 32, 28? 14, 375 26, 51° 34, 53? 29, 72° 5, 845 23, 89" 28 ; it agrees 
with other late manuscripts in preserving it in 984> 26, 985 33, 
986" II, 10007 29, 48 26, 24°27, 270 24, 45° 8, 46731, > 21, 58) 30, 
62% 13, 7078, 71> 11, 79> 19, 82) 21. 

The Marcian MSS. 211 (E>) of the thirteenth century and 
214 (H*), which Wilamowitz assigns to the fourteenth, are 
closely connected, and agree more with EJ than with A’. 
Marcianus 200 (Q) and Marcianus 206 (f), written in 1447 and 
1467 respectively, agree for the most part, the former with E, 
the latter with Eb, H@; Bekker does not cite these manuscripts 
after Book a, and they seem to be of no importance. 

The Latin version of Cardinal Bessarion, made about 1452, 
agrees for the most part with EJ, but not infrequently he stands 
alone or almost alone in giving the right reading, e.g. in 
1043” 23, 53" 29, 66" 2, 676, 707 11, 725 24, 75" 5, 76” 32, 78* 20, 


elxvi INTRODUCTION 


79” 30, 848 21, 23, 905 33, 9121; he owes something, apparently, 
to the mediaeval translation, e.g. in 982227, 1002 34, 6" 9, 124 16, 
16> τι, 46* 33, 538 20, ὅτ᾽ 26, 75” 23, 77231, 81> 23, and something 
to Alexander, e. g. in 1022" 35, 43> 23, 70* 11, 75° 5, 76” 32, 785 20, 
84" 23, go? 33, 9151. 

The editio princeps, the Aldine of 1498, agrees most closely 
with T and S; it has little or nothing of its own that is of value 
for the determination of the text. 

A good deal has been done for the restoration of the text by 
Sylburg, Brandis, Bekker, Schwegler, and Christ ; but all these 
together have done less for it than Bonitz, who, partly by careful 
study of the Greek commentators, partly by attention to what the 
argument requires, has convincingly amended almost every page 
of the work. 

I have paid special attention to the punctuation, a change in 
which often makes emendation unnecessary. 

With regard to the elision of vowels, the use οὖν paragogicum, 
the writing of οὕτως or οὕτω, οὐδείς Or οὐθείς, μηδείς OF μηθείς, ἐάν OF 
ἄν, ἑαυτοῦ OF αὑτοῦ, τοιοῦτον OF τοιοῦτο, ταὐτόν OF ταὐτό, I have thought 
it well to follow the oldest MS., J; but I have written γίγνεσθαι, 
γιγνώσκειν, not γίνεσθαι, γινώσκειν, irrespective of J. 

Christ has argued for the existence, in many passages, of dis- 
locations of the text and the insertion of words in the wrong 
context. This is a matter on which it is difficult to make up 
one’s mind. There seem to be clear instances in 995*19, 
1006# 28, 1029" 3-12, 1070* 20, » 29, and possible instances in 
1o1g* 20, 1071218, Three of these cases occur in A. I-5, a 
section which is, more than any other part of the Metaphysics, 
in the form of notes rather than of a finished book; it is pretty 
clear that the notes have not always been sorted into the best 
order. 


APIZTOTEAOY2 
TA META TA ®Y2ZIKA 


SIGLA 


E = Parisinus gr. 1853, saec. x 
J = Vindobonensis phil. gr. C, saec. x ineuntis 
A» = Laurentianus 87. 12, saec. xii 
Γ = Gulielmi de Moerbeka translatio, c. 1260-1275 
Al., Asc., Syr., Them. = Alexandri, Asclepii, Syriani, 
commentaria 
All, etc. = Alexandri, etc., lemmata 
Al.¢, etc. = Alexandri, etc., citationes 


Raro citantur 


recc. = codices recentiores 
S = Laurentianus 81. 1, saec. xiii 
T = Vaticanus 256, anni 1321 
i = Bessarionis translatio, c. 1452 
a = editio Aldina, anni 1498 
M = Metaphysicorum liber M 
Φ = Aristotelis Physica 


2573-1 


Themistii 


: ἈΡΙΣΤΟΤΈΛΟΥΣ 
TON META ΤᾺ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


, a / a 
1: Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημεῖον δ᾽ οϑοῦ 
“ ἢ} na 
7 τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησιο' καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας 
ἀγαπῶνται δι’ αὑτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἣ διὰ τῶν 
> / > Ν , e / > Ἂς \ ἊΝ 
ὀμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν 
μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἱρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν 25 
n " yy > “ / an / ε lal 
τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς 
αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς. φύσει 
ὯΝ μὴ » + 7 Ν lal 9 Ν / 
μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης 
τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐγγίγνεται. 
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν οϑον 
μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ 
le a Ἂς A lal , >) Ψ > / 
μανθάνει. ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέ- 
λιττα Kav εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἔστι), μανθάνει 
3 “ Ν lol Vd \ 7 Ν Ν x ἮΝ 
ὃ ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἐχει τὴν αἴσθησιν. τὰ 25 
N > " a , = \ a 2 3 
μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ Kal ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμ- 
πειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν: τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ 
, Ν a 7 32 2 lel / 2 7 
τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία 
a “ aA Φ' “ / 
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις" at yap πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγμα- 
Ὁ ΡΣ or δύ 2 “ \ a 00 a 
Tos μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. Kal δοκεῖ σχεδὸν g81? © 
7 hi ἣν / “ 9S \ > 7 5 7 > 
ἐπιστήμῃ Kal τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει ὃ 
ἴω lal € 
ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις" ἡ 
Ν Ν > 7 fe 2 7 c > \ las € 
μὲν yap ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ws φησὶ IIddos, ἢ 
δ᾽ ἀπειρία τύχην. γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν 5 
a id 
τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ 


980% 26 ἡμᾶς EY Asc.: τι ἡμᾶς AP 28 ταύτης] τῆς αἰσθήσεως 
ET Asc.l 29 δὲ γίγνεται E Asc bar ταῦτα... καὶ AP Al: 
τὰ μὲν φρόνιμα τὰ δὲ E Asc.: ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα τὰ δὲ καὶ Bywater 
23 δυνατὰ ET 24 καὶ recc. τι om. AP 25 ὅσα ED Asc.: 
ὃ A> 981° 2 καὶ alt, AP Asc): ἡ Er 3 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις EY 
Asc.: om. AP 4 Πῶλος A? et fort. Al. Asc.: Πῶλος ὀρθῶς λέγων 
Er 6 καθόλου pia E Asc.! 


B2 


10 


= 
σι 


20 


25 


30 


981» 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


a «ς Ψ ¢€ , Ἂς Ν Ν / € / “ 
τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει! ὑπόληψιν ὅτι 
Καλλίᾳ κάμνοντι τηνδὶὲ τὴν» νόσον τοδὲ συνήνεγκε καὶ 
Σωκράτει καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον οὕτω πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν" 
τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ᾽ εἶδος ἕν ἀφορισθεῖσι, 
κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώ- 
ὃ δ λ 58 [ἢ] / / , eee \ Ν 
εσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.--- πρὸς μὲν 
Φ Ν / > 7 / ION a / > Ν 
οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμ- 
΄ὔ / 9 ΄ » 2 ig ς Ἂς 3 ie a 
πειρίας λόγον ἐχόντων (αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν 
5. ie ie 9 lal ε Ν / - , « Ν 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἣ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ 
πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστόν εἶσιν" 
7 \ 4 ς ie c > / vr) > Ὁ 3S 
οὐ yap ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει 6 ἰατρεύων ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβε- 
δ “δ an 
βηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ 
τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι: ἐὰν 
γὺμ : μ iy βῶπΕε 
a BA ἊΝ ὩΣ of \ / \ \ Τὰ 
οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου 
Ν 7 BY ’ > 4 > ed b) lol / 
μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ᾽ ἐν τούτῳ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλά- 
κις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας" θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ 
. 3 > “ , δῷ 7 \ \ 2 ah lal 
ἕκαστον)" ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τό ye εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ 
τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σο- 
φωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς 
x N 59. 7 ἰοὺ > a Ν / ἮΝ 
κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι: 
fal 3. ὦ ie Ν XN Sd y ¢ ΕΣ A € Ἂς Ν 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ᾽ οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
i X Τὰ Ν ν» , 2 od y € SS Ν / 
ἔμπειροι TO OTL μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ᾽ οὐκ ἴσασιν" οἱ δὲ TO διότι 
καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ 
ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χει- 
ροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων 
+ Ν > “ \ “- > / By lal 7 > 
ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ᾽, ὥσπερ Kal TOV ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μέν, οὐκ 
εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ---τὰ μὲν οὖν 
ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας 
a 8 τοδὶ E Αβς}: τόδε AP II οἷον. . .« 12 καύσῳ om. AP et fort. 
Al.: οἷον τοῖς πυρέττουσι καύσῳ ἢ φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ ἢ μελαγχολικοῖς Asc.l 
12 χολώδεσι Jackson : χολώδεσιν ἢ ἢ codd, Τ' 13 ἐμπειρία τέχνης 
codd. Γ' Al! Asc.!: ἐμπειρίας τέχνη fort. Al. Asc., Heidel δοκεῖ 
διαφέρειν ET Asc: διήνεγκεν Ab All 14 Gauroyxevovels οἱ ἔμπειροι 
AP Αβο.: ἐπιτυγχάνοντας ὁρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπείρους EY 18 ἀλλ᾽ Ab 
Asc.: πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ E 19 Σωκράτη E Asc. 20 ἀνθρώπῳ ET et 
fort. Al. Asc.: καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ AP 21-22 μὲν καθόλου δος. 24 éka- 
στον] ἕκαστον μᾶλλον ET 26 ἐμπειρικῶν E 28 αἰτίαν in marg. 
ἘΣ 29 τὸ pr. AP Asc.: om. E 02: ros... 5 ἔθος EAP 


Asc.: om. A! et ut vid. Al. τοὺς] οἱ T ποιεῖν TeCC, 
3 ποιεῖν recc. ἃ ποιεῖ EY Asc. : om, Ab? 4 ποιεῖ E 


I. 981% 7 — 2. 98294 


dv ἔθος), ὧς οὐ κατὰ TO πρακτικοὺς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας 
5 \ Ν QA / x > Ἂν Ν ἊΝ 3- δ ἦ 
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. 
Ψ a ry, SIR \ N 37 \ 2 / 
ὅλως TE σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος Kal μὴ εἰδότος TO δύνασθαι διδά- 
σκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα 
lal 3 te > / J € Ν 3 / tp 
μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι" δύνανται yap, οἱ δὲ ov δύνανται διδά- 
ν᾽ Ν a 5) / 9) 7 € 7 > ie . 
σκειν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν 
oe / / 3 Le Ὁ lal 3. ὦ » b] > 
καίτοι κυριώταταί γ᾽ εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνώσεις" ἀλλ 
> / \ ἮΝ Ἅ \ > / Φ SS he ἊΝ \ fal 
οὐ λέγουσι TO διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, 
° ἊΣ / “ / \ Ν fa)! la Steen. \ 
ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν. TO μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν 
a Ν ᾿ς 
ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυ- 
ἢ ¢ Ν lal > / \ , Ne \ ,ὔ 
μάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον 
a / an € / > 9 «ς “ἢ Ἂν / lal 
εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων GAN ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν 
7 , 2 Ὁ / n \ lal ὡς 
ἄλλων: πλειόνων δ᾽ εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν 
πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέ- 
Ν / b) ,ὔ c / Ν \ Ἂς A 
ρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ TO μὴ πρὸς 
lal > 7] n / lal 
χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν 
τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς 
r nan lal y ny 
τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, Kal πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις 
τοῖς τόποις οὗπερ ἐσχόλασαν" διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθὴη- 
ματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχο- 
Adew τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς 
7 τς ,ὔ \ 3) / \ lal yo nan φ 
τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμο- 
γενῶν" οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν, ὅτι 
τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρ- 
/ 
χὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες" ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, 


ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ 2 


Je € Ν 4 a b) We te INS 3 
σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, XELPOTEXLOV δὲ ἀρ- 
χιτέκτων, ab δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν 
οὖν ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, 
δῆλον. 

3; ἣν Ν / ‘ 5 /, & lal ΄“ 3 xX Μ 

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ᾽ av εἴη 


6 τὸτὸν AP ἔχειν αὐτοὺς EY Asc.: αὐτοὺς ἔχειν A? 7 τε] 
δὲ ΑΡ καὶ μὴ εἰδότος E Asc.: om. APT ὃ ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο E 
Asc.: νομίζομεν" διὸ APT οἰόμεθα τεςο. 11 ταύταις Τ' 
13 θερμόν EY Α5ς.}: θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ ΑΡ τὸ] τὸν rece. 19 ὑπολαμ- 
βάνομεν AP 21 ai] ὅσαι AP 23 οὗπερ E Asc.: οὗ 
πρῶτον AP 29 ὥστε E Asc.: διὸ AT 30 ὁποιανοῦν AP 
Asc.°: ὁποιαντινοῦν E 31 δὲ alt. E Asc.¢: δ᾽ ὁ AY: τε yap ὁ Al.° 
982% 1 of δὲ θεωρητικοὶ Ab? 2 ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας AP Asc. et fort. 
ΑΙ. : αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ET 


ὃ 


20 


SS) 
ce) 


98 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


5 σκεπτέον, ἣ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας Kal περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπι- 
στήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχο- 
μεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο μᾶλ- 

€ lA Ν fal S she / i Ν 
λον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν 
σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην 

το αὐτῶν: εἶτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ 
(aie ϑ wh ν᾿ an ,ὔ \ Ν 5 / 
padia ἀνθρώπῳ γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ yap αἰσθάνε- 

/ / \ Ce a ‘ ION , yy X 
σθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥάδιον Kal οὐδὲν σοφόν) ἔτι τὸν 
μιᾷ fi \ \ lA nt . “ tA 
ἀκριβέστερον Kal TOV διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτε- 
pov εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην" καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν 

τ αὑτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν οὖσαν μᾶλλον 
> x lal 
εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρ- 
χικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον σοφίαν: οὐ γὰρ δεῖν 
2 / \ Ν 9 > 3 / \ 5 ny 
ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιτάττειν, Kal οὐ τοῦτον 
τα, ,, > BS / Χ Ὁ ΄ SRG τῷ S 
ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον σοφόν.----τὰς μὲν οὖν 

20 ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας 
καὶ τῶν σοφῶν' τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μά- 
λιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν 
(οὗτος γὰρ οἷδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα), σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ 
χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα 

25 καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν), ἀκριβέσταται 
δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν al μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ 
ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, 
οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας)" ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε 
ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν, οἱ τὰς 

ἍΤΕ / Ni a ep A Ἂς 3 γὼ. °/ \ Ue tea 7 
30 αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου), τὸ δ᾽ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι 
n / nr an na 
αὐτῶν ἕνεκα μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει TH τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπι- 
Se c \ 5... Ὁ, ? be ε ie SS t 
στήμῃ (ὁ yap τὸ ἐπίστασθαι bv αὑτὸ αἱρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα 

/ a 

982? ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἱρήσεται, τοιαύτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα 
ἃ σ᾽ καὶ om. AP 6 ἐστὶ σοφία AP 7 τοῦ σοφοῦ ET ΑΙ. 
Asc.°: τοὺς σοφούς ΑΡ τούτων T ὃ μὲν om. T πάντα AP et 
ut vid. Al.: μάλιστα πάντα ἘΠ᾽ Io τὰ om. AP 13 τὸν Om. 
Ab τῶν αἰτιῶν secl. Baumann I5 αὐτῆς E 16 ἢ τη 
σοφίαν bis scriptum in E 17 μᾶλλον AP Asc. : μᾶλλον εἶναι ἘΠῚ 
δεῖ T 18 τὸν sup. lin. ΕΓ οὐ τοῦτον ἘΠ Asc.°: οὐκ αὐτὸν AY 19 
τίθεσθαι AM 20 καὶ τοσαύτας et τῆς EY Asc.: om. A? 21 πάντα 
ΠΡ Ἄβοιος ἅπαντα A>: om. E? Al. 23 πως] mas ἔχει AP 
πάντα AP Asc.e: ἅπαντα E 24 ταῦτα om.T 26 τε AP All 
27 προσθέσεως Ti: προθέσεως codd. λαμβανομένων AY 30 ἑκά- 


orov E Asc.: ἕκαστον AP 31 αὑτῶν Christ 32 τὸ om. Christ 
αὑτὸ scripsi: ἑαυτὸ E Asc.: αὐτὸ AP Al. μάλιστα om. I 


2. 9828 5 —P 31 


3 na / » 3 Ν Ν an \ Ν y Ν 
ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια (διὰ 
Ν an \ " ͵ὕ ΩΝ / 3 9. > fa) 
yap ταῦτα Kat ἐκ τούτων τἄλλα γνωρίζεται ἀλλ᾽ ov ταῦτα 
διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ 
μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν 
ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον' τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου, ὅλως 
Ν ΝΎ, 3 a / lA ie SS / μὴ “ > 
δὲ TO ἄριστον ἐν TH φύσει πάσῃ. ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρη- 

/ Ἂν ~ Le Meat / \ A » 
μένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει TO ζητούμενον ὄνομα" 
δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητι- 

Li 5 ae δ n 
κήν" καὶ yap τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν. 

“ a a 

> οὐ ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτω οφη- 
Or. ὃ 1. δῆλ των φιλοσ 

, Ν x \ / € By \ ca) Ν 
σάντων" διὰ yap τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ 

Ἂν lal BA tal 3 5 “Ὁ Ν Ἂς / 

TO πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν TA πρόχειρα 
τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες 
καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν τῆς 
,ὕ Pe a 
σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον Kal ἄστρα 
καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. 6 δ᾽ ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμά- 
(wv οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς 
9. Ls Ν nan , 3 14 Ὁ“ 9 4 Ν 
ἐστιν" ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)" ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ διὰ 

\ i Ν BA 2 ie \ of Ν \ 
τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ TO 
DS X δ 5. 7 \ / ΄ μ᾿ 
εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. 

tal Ἂς Σὰν Ν , X Ν 
μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός: σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων 
ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγω- 

Ν 4 ψ' , 3) tal iol a « 2 
γὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι 

> , TN “ 7 (oe WA 5 Be τὰ BA 
οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἄνθρω- 
,ὔ 2 ΄ ς € a NY Nay + “. 
πος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὧν, οὕτω 
καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν’ μόνη 

Ν “ δε σὲ e / ed x \ 7 x > 9 θ 
γὰρ αὕτη αὑτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν. διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ avOpw- 
πίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἣ κτῆσις: πολλαχῇ γὰρ 7 φύσις δούλη τῶν 

0 VOR 15 ἢ KT XY OPT 


‘ \ x» Yo mee! 
ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην “θεὸς av μόνος τοῦτ᾽ 3 


a ἈΝ 
ἔχοι γέρας ᾽᾽, ἄνδρα & οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζγχτεῖν τὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὸν 


b2 καὶ τὰ E Asc.: καὶ AP: γ᾽ Jaeger 6 ἐστι πρακτέον EY Asc.!: 
πρακτέον ἐστιν ΑΡ ἑκάστου EY Asc.!: ἐν ἑκάστοις ΑΡ ο αὐτὴν AP Asc.¢ 


14 ἀτόπων A? et ut vid. Al.: ἀπόρων EY Asc.° 16 τὸν] τῶν E 
καὶ ἄστρα] καὶ περὶ ἄστρων AP: omittenda vel καὶ τὰ ἄστρα legenda 
ci. Bonitz 18 ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός AP ΑἹ. : φιλόμυθος ὁ φιλό- 
σοφός E Asc. 23 καὶ pr.] καὶ τῶν Asc. et fort. Al. 26 φαμέν] 
φαίνεται Wirth αὑτοῦ AP Asc.!: airod E 27 αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα 
οὖσα E: αὕτη ὡς μόνη οὖσα ἐλευθέρα fort. ΑἹ. 28 αὕτη ET Asc.?: 
αὐτὴ ΑΡ αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν αὑτῆς ΕΞ ἂν] μὴ E 31 γέρας AP Plato: 


τὸ γέρας E μὴ οὐ] τὸ μὴ οὐ AP: μὴ E κατ᾽ αὐτὸ E? 


σι 


20 


983" 


To 


15 


20 


Ld 
σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


ἐπιστήμην. εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι of ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν 
Ν lal 2 EN / a / BAN \ a“ 
τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι μάλιστα εἰκὸς Kal δυστυχεῖς 
εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς. GAN οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐν- 
δέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται 
5 ΄ὔ ΝΜ an 7 + Ἂς 14 
ἀοιδοί, οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιω- 
τέραν. ἣ yap θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτάτη: τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς 
a ¥ , er Ἂν / 3 a ς Ν Ν ia lod 
ἂν εἴη μόνη" jv τε yap μάλιστ᾽ dv ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν 
2 a 2 7 x + a iA » 4 > “ / 
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, κἂν εἴ τις TOV θείων εἴη. μόνη 6 αὕτη Tov- 
των ἀμφοτέρων τετύχηκεν" ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων 
la \ x 
πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, Kal THY τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μά- 
λιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι ταύτης, 
ἀμείνων δ᾽ οὐδεμία. -ττδεῖ μέντοι πως καταστῆναι τὴν κτῆσιν 
a n na a / 
αὐτῆς εἰς τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς GyTnoewy. ἄρχονται 
μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες εἰ οὕτως 
ἔχει, καθάπερ (περὶ) τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτόματα ἱτοῖς μήπω τε- 
\ a x a 
θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς 
διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι (rots 
μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται)" 
δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀπο- 
od / ar) / “ AX Ss 
τελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν" οὐθὲν yap 
ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικὸς ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος 
Ῥ: lal nr 
μετρητή. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, 
εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ 
Ν Ψ / 
τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον. 
"Emel δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων δεῖ λαβεῖν 
2: / » Ἂν 3 / XS ed “ ἂν , 
ἐπιστήμην (τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι φαμὲν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὴν πρώ- 
ae ὌΝ / Ν 3 Ψ' / 
τὴν αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γνωρίζειν), τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια λέγεται τετρα- 
χῶς, ὧν μίαν μὲν αἰτίαν φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί 
> μων 3 I Ἂς δ Ν 7 > \ 4 Ν 
ἦν εἶναι (ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον, 


b32 δὲ ET Asc.l τι] πη E οἱ sup. lin, E? καὶ] ὅτι καὶ T 
983° 1 συμβαίνειν AY 3 κατὰ EY Asc.: καὶ κατὰ AP 6 μόνον 
EY 6E Asc.: om, A® 7 εἴ τι AY: ἥτις. E ἐστί A? et fort. 
Asc. 9 μόνος EY Asc.c: μόνον AP 10 ὁ E Asc.¢: om. AP 
ταύτης Ab Asc.: αὐτῆς ET 11 πὼς ΕΓ Asc.le: om. ΑΡ τάξιν 
TAsc.l° 14 περὶ add. Jaeger τοῖς... . 15 αἰτίαν post πᾶσι (I. 16) 
transp. Jaeger, transponenda ci. Bonitz 15 τὴν alt. EY Asc.°: περὶ 
τὴν AP 17 τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ AP yp. E Al.: τῶν οὐκ ἐλαχίστων E Asc.° 
μετρῆται AY 20 οὕτως θαυμάσειεν APT Asc. : θαυμάσειεν otras E 
21 ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης APY Al.S: ζητουμένης ἐπιστήμης E Asc.° 
28 τί AP Al.°; τί πρῶτον ET Asc.° 


2. 982> 32 — 3. 983) 27 


v ‘ A ᾿ NS Ν ἊΣ / an « / Ἂν \ cf 
αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ TO διὰ τί πρῶτον), ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν ὕλην 
καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, τρίτην δὲ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, 30 
τετάρτην δὲ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν ταύτῃ, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ 
τἀγαθόν (τέλος γὰρ γενέσεως καὶ κινήσεως πάσης τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν), 
τεθεώρηται μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύ- 

“ Ἂν / \ Ν / δ na τὰ b 

σεως, ὅμως δὲ παραλάβωμεν καὶ τοὺς πρότερον ἡμῶν εἰς 983 
ἐπίσκεψιν τῶν ὄντων ἐλθόντας καὶ φιλοσοφήσαντας περὶ 

a 5) 7 a ἃς “ 5 - μ > A 
τῆς ἀληθείας. δῆλον yap ὅτι κἀκεῖνοι λέγουσιν ἀρχάς τινας 
καὶ αἰτίας: ἐπελθοῦσιν οὖν ἔσται τι προὔργου τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ viv 

ι t L 


σι 


XN BS ed » / cae ae δ lal a 
ἢ yap ἕτερόν τι γένος εὑρήσομεν αἰτίας ἢ ταῖς νῦν λεγο- 
/ a a / 

μέναις μᾶλλον πιστεύσομεν.---τῶν δὴ πρώτων φιλοσοφησάν- 
Ὁ lal Ἂς: > y ’ die 9 Ν 

τῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνας φήθησαν ἀρχὰς 

εἶναι πάντων" ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἐξ οὗ 

γίγνεται πρώτου καὶ εἰς ὃ φθείρεται τελευταῖον, τῆς μὲν 


- 


> / © - lal ἊΣ / ΡΝ Ley 
οὐσίας ὑπομενούσης Tots δὲ πάθεσι μεταβαλλούσης, τοῦτο στοι- 10 
χεῖον καὶ ταύτην ἀρχήν φασιν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων, καὶ διὰ 
n y+ 4 Δ Χ » + 5 , c “ 
τοῦτο οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὐθὲν οἴονται οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὡς τῆς 
4 / ΩΝ fo 7 Ω XOX \ vy / 
τοιαύτης φύσεως ἀεὶ σωζομένης, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν Σωκράτην 
na oN 
φαμὲν οὔτε γίγνεσθαι ἁπλῶς ὅταν γίγνηται καλὸς ἢ μουσι- 
κὸς οὔτε ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅταν ἀποβάλλῃ ταύτας τὰς ἕξεις, 
διὰ τὸ ὑπομένειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτόν, οὕτως 
ION fat BA Ip 7 3. ἐδ x a Va 7 δ 7 Ων 
οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν" ἀεὶ γὰρ εἶναί τινα φύσιν ἢ μίαν ἢ 
if fad 5 Ὁ Ὁ», Cy 7 4, / A 
πλείους μιᾶς ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται τἄλλα σωζομένης ἐκείνης. TO 
μέντοι πλῆθος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ 
/ 5 Ἂς a Ν € “ 7 5 Ν 
πάντες λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆγος 20 
φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος 
> » a / 
ἀπεφήνατο εἷναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάν- 
των ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου 
, \ » a \ Se) Ὁ 7 Aas ~} \ 
γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν 
ἀρχὴ πάντων).--διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην 
καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, 
\ 3.) ey > ἊΝ os (2 ΩΣ a ς la \ / 
τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. εἰσὶ δέ 


- 
σι 


τὸ 
ue 


329 ἑτέραν] μίαν ET 30 δὲ] δὲ τὴν AP 31 τὸ AP All; 
kat τὸ ET Asc.° 33 τεθεώρηται μὲν AP yp. E: τεθεωρημένων E 
ἡμῖν om. ET by δὲ om. E! 6 πρώτων AP All: πρῶτον ET 
13 σωζομένης. ὥσπερ (yap) Jaeger Σωκράτη E 15 ἀποβάλῃ AP 
16 ὑπομένειν E Asc.©: μένειν AP 17 det Bywater: δεῖ codd. Pr: 
δεῖν Wirth ἢ pr. EY Asc.¢: om. AP 21 φησὶν εἶναι ET Asc. : 
εἶναί φησιν AY 22 ἀπεφαίνετο APY ταύτην om. recc. 24 καὶ 


A» ΑΙ. : καὶ τὸ ζώιον ET Asc, 27 ἀρχὴ τῆς φύσεώς ἐστι E Al. 


30 


984" 


Io 


15 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


A \ Ν 7 \ Ἂν \ a a ͵ 
TWES οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέ- 
δ \ lod / 
σεως Kal πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύ- 
ig lal 3 / Ν Ἂν, Ὕ Ἂν > 7 Lod 
σεως ὑπολαβεῖν: ᾿Ωῶκεανόν te yap καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς 
/ an n Ἂς 
γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλου- 
7 a lal na 
μένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν Στύγα [τῶν ποιητῶν]: τιμιώτατον μὲν yap 
A 
τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὅρκος δὲ TO τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν 
ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύ- 
3 a ͵ 7 
σεως 7 δόξα, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς. μέντοι λέγεται 
Ὁ“ > / Ν lal ΄ ed Ὁ ἊΣ 
οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας (Inmmwva γὰρ 
> LA > / lal Ν / Ν ἊΝ Ἄν 
οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν 
πε a , y , , 
αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)" ᾿Αναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρό- 
“ \ “ 9 ὩΣ Ν / lal ς lat / 
τερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμά- 
σγ Ν lal ic lal \ ς / Φ 
των, Innacos δὲ πῦρ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος καὶ Πράκλειτος ὃ 
5 / an lal / 
Ἐφέσιος, ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὰ τέτταρα, πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις 
a a Ν / \ ᾽ 
γῆν προστιθεὶς τέταρτον (ταῦτα γὰρ ἀεὶ διαμένειν καὶ οὐ 
/ ἊΣ 3 xX / ἧς 5 /, / \ 
γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πλήθει Kal ὀλιγότητι, συγκρινόμενα καὶ 
διακρινόμενα εἰς ἕν τε καὶ ἐξ ἑνός)" ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλα- 
if a \ € la 4 ἘΣ ΟΝ / lave ? y 
ζμένιος τῇ μὲν ἡλικίᾳ πρότερος ὧν τούτου τοῖς δ᾽ ἔργοις 
° > \ Ἵ 
ὕστερος ἀπείρους elval φησι τὰς ἀρχάς" σχεδὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα 
a δ Ν Σὲ δ 
τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι καὶ 
ἀπόλλυσθαί φησι, συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, ἄλλως δ᾽ 
Ν I oh 
οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἀλλὰ διαμένειν aidva.—e€K 
a x Ν, 
μὲν οὖν τούτων μόνην τις αἰτίαν νομίσειεν ἃν τὴν ἐν ὕλης 
» , “0. 3 “ STERN Ν ἊΣ ε 
εἴδει λεγομένην. προϊόντων δ᾽ οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὧδο- 
a - id 
ποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν" εἰ yap ὅτι μάλιστα 
val / \ oy. Geeks δ Ν ΄ 2 i 
πᾶσα γένεσις Kal φθορὰ ἔκ τινος ἑνὸς ἢ καὶ πλειόνων ἐστίν, 
διὰ τί τοῦτο συμβαίνει καὶ τί τὸ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε 
na r > - 
ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ μεταβάλλειν ἑαυτόν λέγω δ᾽ οἷον 
\ lal / 
οὔτε τὸ ξύλον οὔτε ὁ χαλκὸς αἴτιος τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτε- 
) κα ION lal \ Ν / 7ὔ € Ν Ν 3 
ρον αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς ἀν- 
/ na a a 
δριάντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον. τὸ δὲ τοῦτο 
ρ 15 μ 1) 
a ᾿] Ν \ Ν το 5 Ἂς lal ε x ε a / 
ζητεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ τὴν ἑτέραν ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, ws av ἡμεῖς φαίη- 


Ὁ 28 παλαιοὺς AY; πάνυ παλαιοὺς Al.e 31 kal om.T 32 τῶν 
ποιητῶν om. fort. Al., secl. Christ 984° 3 οὕτως AP Al): τοῦτον 
τὸν τρόπον ET γὰρ] μὲν yap ET Asc, 7 ὁ alt.om. AP 
9 προσθεὶς E Al} Io ἢ om. AP Asc.° 15 ἁπλῶς Zeller 
16 μένειν AP Asc, 17 dvyom. ΑΡ 20 γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ A» Asc. : 
φθορὰ καὶ γένεσις ET καὶ EY Asc.: om. AP 21 γε] τ᾽ Abt 


24 ὁ δὲ] οὐδ᾽ 6T 


3. 983> 28 — 984? 22 


“ ¢€ > Ν lal / « Ἂς / 5 5 
μεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως. ob μὲν οὖν πάμπαν ἐξ ἀρ- 
a , n a a 
χῆς ἁψάμενοι τῆς μεθόδου τῆς τοιαύτης Kal ἕν φάσκοντες 
> \ ig 7 > Ν 5 7 «ς tal “ > x ’ὔ 
εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐθὲν ἐδυσχέραναν ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιοί 
na ad a 
ye TOV ἕν λεγόντων, ὥσπερ ἡττηθέντες ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ζ(η- 
Ve \ A >) / / S \ Ἂς γι “ bd 
TITEMS, TO ἕν ἀκίνητον φασιν εἶναι Kal THY φύσιν ὅλην οὐ 
Yo / nan fal 
μόνον κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν (τοῦτο μὲν yap ἀρχαῖόν τε 
\ / 
καὶ πάντες ὡμολόγησαν) ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην μετα- 
Ν Ὁ n a an é 
βολὴν πᾶσαν" καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῶν ἴδιόν ἐστιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἕν 
ων \ Gaal fal 
φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν οὐθενὶ συνέβη THY τοιαύτην συνιδεῖν 
Ὅν Ἂς | BA / \ / Ἂς Lay 
αἰτίαν πλὴν εἰ dpa Llappevidn, καὶ τούτῳ κατὰ τοσοῦτον 


7 


a 5 , A 2 Ν “ν UA Τὸ > 
ὅσον ov μόνον ἕν ἀλλὰ: καὶ δύο πως τίθησιν αἰτίας εἶναι" 
τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλείω ποιοῦσι μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται λέγειν, οἷον τοῖς 
\ x lot - a 
θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἢ πῦρ Kal γῆν' χρῶνται yap ὡς κινη- 
x yo na AN Ν / “ Ν Ν los \ tal 
τικὴν ἔχοντι τῷ πυρὶ τὴν φύσιν, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς 
/ 
τοιούτοις τοὐναντίον.----μετὰ δὲ τούτους Kal τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, 
n a los a ff 
ὡς οὐχ ἱκανῶν οὐσῶν γεννῆσαι τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν, πάλιν 
(iS) A A > ΄ ῳ » > , Ν 
ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὴν 
ἐχομένην ἐζήτησαν ἀρχήν. τοῦ γὰρ εὖ καὶ καλῶς τὰ μὲν 
nan » » a a > | 
ἔχειν τὰ δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν οὔτ 
ἡ [οὶ / babs fe 2) DEIN » πὴ V5 De) , 
ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐθὲν οὔτ᾽ εἰκὸς αἴτιον εἶναι οὔτ᾽ ἐκείψους 
| Led 999 > lal > / ‘ / an 3 / 
οἰηθῆναι: οὐδ᾽ ad τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέ- 
War πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἶχεν. νοῦν δή τις εἰπὼν ἐνεῖναι, κα- 
/ > lal mt x 3 nan 7 Agee X yy cal , 
θάπερ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, Kal ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου 
Ν mo if / Φ / bp) 1a > 81 δὲ / 
καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ᾽ εἰκῇ λέγον- 
τας τοὺς πρότερον. φανερῶς μὲν οὖν ᾿Αναξαγόραν ἴσμεν 
«ς γᾷ lal , a7 ? yA / Ὁ 
ἁψάμενον τούτων τῶν λόγων, αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἔχει πρότερον Ep- 


- π A ἢ 
μότιμος ὁ Κλαζομένιος εἰπεῖν. οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβά- : 


a lol Ἂς ων n » 

vovtes ἅμα Tod καλῶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων 
/ - Lo} 

ἔθεσαν, καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν" 


428 τῆς τοιαύτης] ταύτης yp. E Asc! 29 ἐν ἑαυτοῖς A> 
32 τοῦτο. .. 33 ὡμολόγησαν et Pi kal... ἐστιν EY Asc.: om. AP et 
fort. Al. 1 πᾶσαν Ε Al.: ἅπασαν AP ἕν AP Al. Ascl: ἕν μόνον 


ἘΠῚ 2 συνιδεῖν ἘΠ᾿ Α5ς.}: ἰδεῖν Ab: εἶναι ἰδεῖν Al. 3 τοῦτο I 
5 δὴ Ab All; om. ET Asc.¢ 11 ἀρχήν] ἀρχὴν τουτέστι τὴν ποιη- 
τικὴν τούτων εὖ ἔχειν καὶ καλῶς A? et fort. Asc. 12 δὲ] δὲ μὴ T 


13 ἄλλο] ἄλλο τι AP 13-4 ἐκείνους εἰκὸς οἰηθῆναι EL 14 καὶ τῇ 
τύχῃ A 15 ἔχειν EY δή] δ᾽ ci yp. E: τε Τ' 16 τοῖς A Asc.: 
om. E Simpl.¢ τὸν E Simpl.¢: τὸ AP τοῦ AP Asc.°: καὶ τοῦ 
ETL Simpl.° 17 εἰκῇ λέγοντας] μεθύοντας in marg. Ε 22 kal 
ἔθεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην yp. E 


30 


984” 


μ 


ο 


= 
σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


a - a Ν a 

ὑποπτεύσειε δ᾽ ἄν Tis Ἡσίοδον πρῶτον ζητῆσαι τὸ τοιοῦ- 4 

3 nN A nN " 
τον, κὰν εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔρωτα ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔθη- 
κεν ὡς ἀρχήν, οἷον καὶ ΤΙαρμενίδης" καὶ γὰρ οὗτος κατα- 
n / 

σκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν “᾿ πρώτιστον μέν" φησιν 
so yw lon 7 / pelea Xs ΄ ΟΝ ΤΥ / Ν 
ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων᾽, Ἡσίοδος δὲ “πάντων μὲν 


τὸ 
σι 


Ν » nN ψ 5.2 
πρώτιστα χάος γένετ᾽, αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα | γαῖ᾽ εὐρύστερνος - - | ἠδ 
ἔρος, ὃς πάντεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀθανάτοισιν ”, ὡς δέον ἐν τοῖς 

/ / / 
30 οὖσιν ὑπάρχειν TW αἰτίαν ἥτις κινήσει Kal συνάξει τὰ πρά- 
γματα. τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανεῖμαι περὶ τοῦ τίς πρῶ- 
τος, ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τἀναντία τοῖς aya- 
a a / 
θοῖς ἐνόντα ἐφαίνετο ἐν τῇ φύσει, Kal ov μόνον τάξις Kal 
ι 
> aw \ \ / \ Τὰ Ν 
985270 καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀταξία καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, καὶ πλείω τὰ 
lal lal lal an an yy 
κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν καλῶν, οὕτως ἄλλος 
cr / 
τις φιλίαν εἰσήνεγκε καὶ νεῖκος, ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρων αἴτιον 
, ? If 5 ΝΆ Ν ’ Ἀ Ν ’ 
τούτων. εἰ γάρ τις ἀκολουθοίη καὶ λαμβάνοι πρὸς τὴν διά- 
ὰ / a / 
νοιαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ἃ ψελλίζεται λέγων ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, εὑρή- 
Ν. ὡς - 41 τ μὴ na 9 ny \ Ἂς n 
σει THY μὲν φιλίαν αἰτίαν οὗσαν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ δὲ νεῖκος 
lal lal » / 
τῶν κακῶν' ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις φαίη τρόπον τινὰ Kal λέγειν καὶ 
fol / x \ \ \ 5 \ J Ν 3 ¥ 
πρῶτον λέγειν TO κακὸν Kal TO ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὰς ᾿Εμπεδοκλέα, 
, 5 ἃ, / lal » Ἂς lal , ΄“- « re Μ 
τάχ᾽ ἂν λέγοι καλῶς, εἴπερ τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων αἴτιον 


σι 


5, SN > 7 ΕῚ Γ Ν a a ΑΝ , a Ν a 
10 αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν ἐστι [kal τῶν κακῶν τὸ KaKdv],—obToL μὲν οὖν, 
" , a Ὄ Pats AX 
ὥσπερ λέγομεν, καὶ μέχρι τούτου δυοῖν αἰτίαιν ὧν ἡμεῖς διωρί- 
σαμεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ἡμμένοι φαίνονται, τῆς τε ὕλης καὶ 
Coleg ε a 5 “ / Ν AN an Ἂς 3 
τοῦ ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, ἀμυδρῶς μέντοι καὶ οὐθὲν σαφῶς ἀλλ᾽ οἷον 
ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιοῦσιν" καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι περι- 
3 
φερόμενοι τύπτουσι πολλάκις καλὰς πληγάς, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε 
5: 4 » @ δ 
ἐκεῖνοι ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης οὔτε οὗτοι ἐοίκασιν εἰδέναι ὅ τι 
ih \ Ἂς 3 
λέγουσιν' σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐθὲν χρώμενοι φαίνονται τούτοις ἀλλ 
AY > = a n 
ἢ κατὰ μικρόν. ᾿Αναξαγόρας τε yap μηχανῇ χρῆται τῷ 


525 καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ET Asc.®: οὗτος yap A 26 πρώτιστον recc. 
Plato Plut. Simpl.: πρῶτον EAP 28 yea γαῖα E 29 ἔρως AP 
30 rw’ E Al. Asc.: τὴν AT συνέξει AP 31 τούτοις APT 
32 ἔξεστι fort. Al. Asc. : ἔξεσται Richards καὶ ΟΠ]. Τ' 985% 1 καὶ 
pr. om, Τ' 4 λαμβάνει AP 7 καὶ λέγειν καὶ om. I’ 9 λέγοιτο 
Ab! ἁπάντων E Asc.°: πάντων AP Io atroom.I’ kal... 
κακόν ET Asc.°: om. AP Al. Asc. 11 ἐλέγομεν TP δυεῖν E 
ὧν] ἐφήψαντο ὧν EY 12 ἡμμένοι φαίνονται om. ET τῆς] περὶ 
τῆς A» 16 εἰδέναι] εἰδόσιν λέγειν EL: εἰδόσι λέγουσι Gomperz : 


εἰδότες λέγειν οἱ. Christ 


4. 984> 23 — 985> 14 


a \ Ν 7 \ 2 5 Ζ Ν ΧΆ, ΕΑ 
νῷ πρὸς τὴν κοσμοποιίαν, καὶ ὅταν ἀπορήσῃ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν 
3 beef 2 / 4 / Seid: b Ν tal A 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστί, τότε παρέλκει αὐτόν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις 

la “ lal \ a 
πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιᾶται τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ νοῦν; καὶ ?Ep- 
πεδοκλῆς ἐπὶ πλέον μὲν τούτου χρῆται τοῖς αἰτίοις, οὐ μὴν 

Δ) © an Let Ey) 4 Corr Oe | 4 
οὔθ᾽ ἱκανῶς, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τούτοις εὑρίσκει TO ὁμολογούμενον. πολ- 

a a Sues ¢€ Ἂς "4 Α \ Ν ia) 
λαχοῦ γοῦν αὐτῷ ἡ μὲν φιλία διακρίνει τὸ δὲ νεῖκος συγ- 
tal Ν ὕω 
κρίνει. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διίστηται τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ 
τοῦ νείκους, τότε τὸ πῦρ εἰς ἕν συγκρίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
77 ε Ψ Ν fe Ag \ n fe 
στοιχείων ἕκαστον: ὅταν δὲ πάλιν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας συνίωσιν 

3 \ e > lal 2 « / Ἂς / ie 
eis TO ἕν, ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ ἑκάστου τὰ μόρια διακρίνεσθαι 

ΤΆ > an Ν io ἧς \ , n 
πάλιν.----ἰ Εμπεδοκλῆς μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοὺς πρότερον πρῶ- 


Ν Ν » lal > le > 7 / 
Tos τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν διελεῖν εἰσήνεγκεν, ov μίαν ποιήσας : 


ἊΝ n » 3 Ν 5 > « 7 Ἂν 3 / BA 
τὴν τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας TE καὶ ἐναντίας, ἔτι 
ἊΝ ὌΝ « 2) “ δ » a / n 
δὲ τὰ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα τέτταρα πρῶτος 
a >’ ΝΥ Lal 7 / > 3 ε ~ a / 
εἶπεν (οὐ μὴν χρῆταί ye τέτταρσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὡς δυσὶν οὖσι μό- 
na / a 
vows, πυρὶ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τοῖς δ᾽ ἀντικειμένοις ὡς μιᾷ 
΄, 2 Prey 4 es if Ne) FN 
φύσει, γῇ τε Kal ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι' λάβοι δ᾽ ἄν τις αὐτὸ 
n a a a a , 
θεωρῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν)"---οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὕτω τε 
καὶ τοσαύτας εἴρηκε τὰς ἀρχάς: Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος 
aes a i 5 
αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναί 
/ \ Ν \ \ Ν Ν » re Ν \ ᾿ς 
φασι, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὃν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν 
[ρὴ \ \ BY + \ Ν Ν \ Ν » Ν 
πλῆρες καὶ στερεὸν τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ κενὸν τὸ μὴ ὄν (διὸ 
Ν IAN c Ν Ἃ a Ν » cs / “ 
καὶ οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὃν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰναί φασιν, ὅτι 
οὐδὲ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα), αἴτια δὲ τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα ὡς 
ὕλην. καὶ καθάπερ οἱ ἕν ποιοῦντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν 
5 a a n \ \ 
τἄλλα Tots πάθεσιν» αὐτῆς γεννῶσι, TO μὰνὸν Kal TO πυ- 
“ / Ν 
κνὸν ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι τῶν παθημάτων, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον 
A ἘΣ δὴ δ. 
καὶ οὗτοι τὰς διαφορὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἄλλων εἶναί φασιν. ταύ- 
τὰ a κι \ ! 
Tas μέντοι τρεῖς εἶναι λέγουσι, σχῆμά τε Kal τάξιν καὶ 


219 καὶ om, EY ἀπορήσῃ] ἀπορήσῃ yap EY δ. ONT OTC 
om. A yp. E 20 ἕλκει EB} 22 τούτου χρῆται EY Al): χρῆται 
τούτου AP 23 ἐξευρίσκει AP: εὑρίσκεται T 24 οὖν Τ' 25 mav| 
εἶναι Τ' 26 τότε τὸ EY ΑἹ. : τό re AP 27 πάλιν πάντα ὑπὸ recc. 
30 TO... διελεῖν] ταύτην... διελὼν ET Asc. 33 μόνον Τ' D4 τὰς 
om, recc. 6 τὸ pr.] οἷον τὸ EY 7 κενὸν] κενόν τε Kal μανὸν 
E: κενόν γε καὶ μανὸν recc. 9 τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα fort. Al. Asc., 
Schwegler: τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος codd.: τὸ κενὸν ἔλαττον τοῦ σώματος 
Zeller γε ὡς AP 12 τῶν παθημάτων ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι AP: 


a. τῶν π. τιθ, T ante τὸν yp. ΑἹ, καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν 


20 


985» 


Ὁ 


O° 


15 


20 


30 


g86* 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


θέσιν" διαφέρειν γάρ φασι τὸ dv ῥυσμῷ καὶ διαθιγῇ καὶ 
a , 4 , Si ἦν ὁ . ε ᾿ ΡΝ ἐς mee . 
τροπῇ pdvov' τούτων δὲ Ee pe a τ ἡ δὲ 
Ν ε Ὁ Ἂς 5. 
διαθιγὴ τάξις ἡ δὲ τροπὴ θέσις" διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ μὲν A 
τοῦ Ν σχήματι τὸ δὲ AN τοῦ NA τάξει τὸ δὲ XZ τοῦ Η 
7, \ Ν / “ δ a ε 7 - » \ 
θέσει. περὶ δὲ κινήσεως, ὅθεν ἢ πῶς ὑπάρξει τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ 
Ὁ fo n ot ξ 4 3 lal οἱ Ἂν 
οὗτοι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾳθύμως ἀφεῖσαν. περὶ μὲν 
οὖν τῶν δύο αἰτιῶν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ἐζη- 
τῆσθαι παρὰ τῶν πρότερον. 

Ἔν δὲ τούτοις καὶ πρὸ τούτων οἱ καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι 5 
τῶν μαθημάτων ἁψάμενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτά τε προήγαγον, καὶ 
ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς 
Ψ Φ / 2) is Ν / 4 > Ἂν / 
φήθησαν εἶναι πάντων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τούτων οἱ ἀριθμοὶ φύσει 

lal μ᾿ Ν 4 > , tas c Z Ν 
πρῶτοι, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἐδόκουν θεωρεῖν ὁμοιώματα πολλὰ 

a 3 \ / “ δ 5 Ν i a \ 
τοῖς οὖσι Kal γιγνομένοις, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν πυρὶ Kal γῇ Kal 
A ΤΥ: Ν Ν Ν a > “ ’ ΄ 
ὕδατι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν τοιονδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη 
τὸ δὲ τοιονδὶ ψυχή τε καὶ νοῦς ἕτερον δὲ καιρὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλ- 
λων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον ὁμοίως, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν ἐν ἀριθ- 

Ὁ ἊΝ x / \ Ἂν / 5 \ Ν Ν Ν BA 
μοῖς ὁρῶντες τὰ πάθη Kal τοὺς AOyovs,—eETEL δὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα 

“ , c 5 , Ν / bY n “ « 
τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαίνοντο τὴν φύσιν ἀφωμοιῶσθαι πᾶσαν, οἱ 
δ᾽ ἀριθμοὶ πάσης τῆς φύσεως πρῶτοι, τὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν στοι- 
χεῖα τῶν ὄντων στοιχεῖα πάντων ὑπέλαβον εἶναι, καὶ τὸν 
[ἡ > Ἂς ς , Ἂν \ 3 4 \ Ὁ“ Φ 
ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν. καὶ ὅσα εἶχον 
ὁμολογούμενα ἔν τε τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις πρὸς 
ἊΣ lal > cal / x / \ \ Ν “ 
τὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πάθη καὶ μέρη καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην διακό- 
opnow, ταῦτα συνάγοντες ἐφήρμοττον. Kav εἴ τί που 
διέλειπε, προσεγλίχοντο τοῦ συνειρομένην πᾶσαν αὐτοῖς εἶναι 
Ν 7 . MA 3 ἊΝ > Ν / ie « 
τὴν πραγματείαν λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, ἐπειδὴ τέλειον ἢ δεκὰς 
® a Ν lal / Ν “ »} la » 
εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶσαν περιειληφέναι τὴν τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσιν, 

P15 διαφέρειν γάρ φασι ΑΓ Asc.: διαφέρει γάρ φησι E ῥοισμῷ 
A> διαθιγῇ AP Asc.c: διαθηγῆι E 16 ῥοισμὸς AP 17 διαθιγὴ 
AP Al. Asc.: διαθηγὴ E 18 = τοῦ Η Wilamowitz: Z rod N codd. 
19 ὑπάρχει ET 21 ἐλέγομεν Τ' 22 παρὰ τῶν om. ET Asc.¢ 
24 mp@rovyrecc. 7eom.E προῆγον E Asc.° 25 τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς 


E ΑἸ. Asc.: οὔ ΑΡ 26 ἐπὶ ' 27 τούτοις AY ΑΙ. : τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς 
ET Asc.¢ 30 reom.E = 31 dppomxayrecc. 432 ἐπεὶ δὴ Christ: 


ἐπειδὴ vulgo τὰ] καὶ τὰ Τ' 33 ἐφαίνετο E ἀφωμοιῶσθαι recc. : 
ἀφομοιῶσθαι A”: ἀφομοιωθῆναι ἘΞ πᾶσιν E: πάντα fort. Al., ci. Bonitz 
986% 2 εἶναι ὑπέλαβον ET 3 εἶχεν AP: εἴχοντο T 4 ’év AP et 


ut vid. Al. : δεικνύναι ἔν ET Asc.°® 6 που ἘΠ et ut vid. Al. : πολὺ AP 
7 προσεπεγλίχοντο E τοῦ] ἕνεκεν αὐ. A? 8-Ὁ ἡ δεκὰς τελεία δοκεῖ 
in marg. E} 9 εἶναι... φύσιν ET Asc.: om. A? et fort. Al. 


4. 985% 15 — 5. 986P6 


\ x / ἊΝ Ν᾽ 5 \ Sf Ν ® 7 
καὶ τὰ φερόμενα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν δέκα μὲν εἶναί φασιν, 
» Ν > ᾿ 4 a lat Soy a / XN 
ὄντων δὲ ἐννέα μόνον τῶν φανερῶν διὰ τοῦτο δεκάτην τὴν 
ἀντίχθονα ποιοῦσιν. διώρισται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις 
Ce in 9; i¢ 9 2 lex Ἂν ig 2 / an lene. 
ἡμῖν ἀκριβέστερον. ἀλλ᾽ οὗ δὴ χάριν ἐπερχόμεθα, τοῦτό ἐστιν 
ὅπως λάβωμεν καὶ παρὰ τούτων τίνας εἶναι τιθέασι τὰς 
ἀρχὰς καὶ πῶς εἰς τὰς εἰρημένας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἰτίας. φαί- 
vovtat δὴ καὶ οὗτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ 
« “ al a Se δ ὁ Ὁ , NY ef “ Ν > “ 
ὡς ὕλην τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις, τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ 
στοιχεῖα τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πε- 
/ Ν ἌΣ x > A 9 3 , 5 uA 
περασμένον τὸ δὲ ἄπειρον, TO δ᾽ ἕν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι τού- 
if Ν ἈΝ YA a \ / x by 8) \ 5) 
των (καὶ γὰρ ἄρτιον εἶναι καὶ περιττόν), τὸν δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ 
re Kaw =) Ν Bo i ¥ So lv 7 ᾽ ΄ 
τοῦ ἑνός, ἀριθμοὺς δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανόν .----- 
ἕτεροι δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων τὰς ἀρχὰς δέκα λέγουσιν εἶναι 
τὰς κατὰ συστοιχίαν λεγομένας, πέρας [kal] ἄπειρον, περιτ- 
\ \ Lh & \ a > \ \ > 4 DA 
τὸν [καὶ] ἄρτιον, ev [καὶ] πλῆθος, δεξιὸν [καὶ] ἀριστερόν, ἄρρεν 
[καὶ] θῆλυ, ἠρεμοῦν καὶ] κινούμενον, εὐθὺ [καὶ] καμπύλον, φῶς 
[καὶ] σκότος, ἀγαθὸν [καὶ] κακόν, τετράγωνον ᾿ καὶ] ἑτερόμηκες" 
C4 4 + aa 7 ε σ / € 
ὅνπερ τρόπον ἔοικε καὶ ᾿Αλκμαίων ὁ Κροτωνιάτης ὑπολα- 
a ϑ By a 
βεῖν, καὶ ἤτοι οὗτος παρ᾽ ἐκείνων ἢ ἐκεῖνοι Tapa τούτου παρέ- 
λαβον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον" καὶ γὰρ [ἐγένετο τὴν ἡλικίαν) ᾿Αλκ- 


μαίων [ἐπὶ γέροντι ΠΠυθαγόρᾳ,) ἀπεφήνατο δὲ) παραπλησίως 2 


τούτοις᾽ φησὶ γὰρ εἶναι δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, λέ- 
γων τὰς ἐναντιότητας οὐχ ὥσπερ οὗτοι διωρισμένας ἀλλὰ 
Ν ,ὔ o \ / Ν δ 9 \ 
Tas τυχούσας, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρόν, ἀγαθὸν 
κακόν, μέγα μικρόν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀδιορίστως ἀπέρριψε περὶ 
lal lal © ys /, ® / Ν / « ed 

τῶν λοιπῶν, οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ πόσαι καὶ τίνες αἱ ἐναν- 
τιώσεις ἀπεφήναντο. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀμφοῖν τοσοῦτον 
oy, nm 5 ΄ > \ aA » ἐ Soe τὸ, «ᾧ, 

ἔστι λαβεῖν, ὅτι τἀναντία ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ὃ ὅσαι 
παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων, καὶ τίνες αὗταί εἰσιν. πῶς μέντοι πρὸς 
τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας ἐνδέχεται συνάγειν, σαφῶς μὲν οὐ 
διήρθρωται παρ᾽ ἐκείνων, ἐοίκασι δ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει τὰ 


4 Tr μόνον recc. Γ΄: μόνων EAP 16 δὴ EY Al.: δὲ AP Asc.) 
18 re om. E πεπερασμένον τὸ δ᾽ ἄπειρον EY Al. Asc. : ἄπειρον τὸ 
δὲ πεπερασμένον AY 20 καὶ... περιττόν Ἐ, Al.:om.AP 23 συστο- 
χίαν API 23, 24 καὶ quater om. E 24 καὶ alt. et tert. om. Τ' 
25,26 καὶ sexies om. ET et fort. Al. 28 kalom.I 209,30 verba 
uncinis inclusa EY Asc.: om. A? et fort. Al. 30 ἐπὶ] νεὸς ἐπὶ 
Diels 34 μικρὸν μέγα E Asc.© ἐπέρριψε recc. b2 ἀμφοῖν) 
ἀμφοῖν μὲν AP 3 τὸ... 4 ἑτέρων EY Asc, : om. AP 5 συνα- 


γαγεῖν AP 


Se) 
Οο 


986» 


on 


[9] 


15 


20 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


στοιχεῖα τάττειν" ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων συνεστά- 
\ y \ X\ > / lal Ν > n 
vat kal πεπλάσθαι φασὶ τὴν οὐσίαν.---τῶν μὲν οὖν παλαιῶν 
\ 7 ΄ Ἂς cal “- / 5 ΄ € 
καὶ πλείω λεγόντων TA στοιχεῖα τῆς φύσεως EK τούτων ἱκα- 
ΜᾺ , . ὰ fel 
vov ἐστι θεωρῆσαι τὴν διάνοιαν" εἰσὶ δέ τινες ol περὶ τοῦ 
\ ες ἊΣ + ΄ 5 Ie 4 Ν > Ν 
παντὸς ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης φύσεως ἀπεφήναντο, τρόπον δὲ οὐ τὸν 
αὐτὸν πάντες οὔτε τοῦ καλῶς οὔτε τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν. εἰς 
μὲν οὖν τὴν νῦν σκέψιν τῶν αἰτίων οὐδαμῶς συναρμόττει περὶ 
Ψ n ¢ / > ἬΝ “ Υ n Τὰ A ἐς 
αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος (οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἕν ὑπο- 
\ \ an a 5 
θέμενοι τὸ ὃν ὅμως γεννῶσιν ὡς ἐξ ὕλης τοῦ ἑνός, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτε- 
ρον τρόπον οὗτοι λέγουσιν" ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ προστιθέασι κίνησιν, 
a a a ὃς 
γεννῶντές γε τὸ πᾶν, οὗτοι δὲ ἀκίνητον εἶναί φασιν) οὐ μὴν 
:) x lat / > ast 3 lal lal / / 
ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτόν ye οἰκεῖόν ἐστι TH viv σκέψει. [Παρμενίδης 
Ν ἊΝ yy cal Ἂς Ν / « Ν e , 
μὲν yap ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνὸς ἅπτεσθαι, Μέλισσος 
δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην (διὸ καὶ 6 μὲν πεπερασμένον 6 δ᾽ 
" , ΟῚ ΟΕ hay Ἢ x. a , sul 
ἄπειρόν φησιν εἶναι αὐτό) Ἐενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἑνί- 


- cas (6 γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται γενέσθαι μαθητής) οὐθὲν 


διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, 
ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ev εἶναί φησι τὸν 
θεόν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ἀφετέοι πρὸς τὴν 
an , 
νῦν (ζήτησιν, οἱ μὲν δύο καὶ πάμπαν ὡς ὄντες μικρὸν 
ἀγροικότεροι, Ξενοφάνης καὶ Μέλισσος: ἸΠαρμενίδης δὲ 
if / a if / ἊΝ Ν \ δ Ν Ἂς 
μᾶλλον βλέπων ἔοικέ που λέγειν παρὰ γὰρ τὸ ὃν τὸ μὴ 
A IAN 9 lal > > ϑ / a Μ > Ν “ \ 
ὃν οὐθὲν ἀξιῶν εἶναι, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕν οἴεται εἶναι, τὸ ὄν, Kal 
” > / Ν a / 2 “ \ / 2 Ψ 
ἄλλο οὐθέν (περὶ οὗ σαφέστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως εἰρήκα- 
rf , ’ > lal lal Ne x \ 
μεν), ἀναγκαζόμενος δ᾽ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινομένοις, καὶ τὸ 
Δ S Ν \ , / Ν Ν Ν Ν ε 
ἕν μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὑπο- 
λαμβάνων εἶναι, δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν 
14 Ν ἊΝ , eo nN ἊΝ Lal / ΄ 
τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἷον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων" τού- 
Ἂς Ν Ν \ μὴ \ \ / / Ss Ν 
των δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὃν τὸ θερμὸν τάττει θάτερον δὲ κατὰ 


Ὁ λεγόντων τὰ στοιχεῖα AP All: τὰ στοιχεῖα λεγύντων E Asc.! 


11 ws AY ΑΙ.: ὡς ἂν E 12 τὴν om. ut vid. Al. Α5ς.9 16 μὲν 
om.I γὰρ om. Christ 17 ye om. AP 19 τὸν om. AP Asc.¢ 
21 δὲ] δ᾽ ὁ Richards 22 τούτου AP Asc.: ὃς τούτου ἘΠ 
γενέσθαι AP et ut vid. Al.: om. ἘΤ 23 οὔτε AP οὐδετέρας 
ἔοικε τούτων ΑΡ 24 τὸν θεόν EY Al. Asc.: om. AP 26 viv E 
Asc.: viv παροῦσαν AP 28 βλέπων om, E mov om. T° 
30 σαφεστέρως E Asc.& 31 τὸ ἕν] ἕν Bywater: τὸ ὃν ἕν ex Al. ci. 
Chri-t 32 ὑπολαβὼν AP 33 τὰς alt. om. AP 98791 δὲ] 


pev AP κατὰ μὲν] TO μὲν κατὰ EY 


SOOO Te On O73 


\ ‘ " Ν δι a a 
TO μὴ OV.—eK μὲν οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων Kal Tapa τῶν συνη- 
> , 4 n / rn an / Ν 
δρευκότων ἤδη τῷ λόγῳ σοφῶν “ταῦτα παρειλήφαμεν, παρὰ 
na Α 
μὲν τῶν πρώτων σωματικήν τε τὴν ἀρχήν (ὕδωρ γὰρ καὶ 
πῦρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σώματά ἐστιν), καὶ τῶν μὲν μίαν τῶν 
/ 
δὲ πλείους τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς σωματικάς, ἀμφοτέρων μέντοι 
ff. ε 3 Ὡ » 7 - , 4 
ταύτας ws ἐν ὕλης εἴδει τιθέντων, Tapa δέ τινων ταύτην τε 
Ν ἢ / \ \ 7 Ν “ ε ΄ ‘ 
τὴν αἰτίαν τιθέντων καὶ πρὸς ταύτῃ τὴν ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, καὶ 
ἊΨ n n 
ταύτην παρὰ τῶν μὲν μίαν παρὰ τῶν δὲ δύο. μέχρι μὲν 
> n ’ lal / 
οὖν τῶν ᾿Ιταλικῶν καὶ χωρὶς ἐκείνων μορυχώτερον εἰρήκασιν 
€ A \ 5 Ν “ ν tal παν ὰ 
οἱ ἄλλοι περὶ αὐτῶν, πλὴν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν δυοῖν τε αἰτίαιν 
/ 
τυγχάνουσι κεχρημένοι, Kal τούτων THY ἑτέραν οἱ μὲν μίαν 
NS ΄, a \ “ ε ΄, ἡ ε ν᾿ , ΄ 
οἱ δὲ δύο ποιοῦσι, τὴν ὅθεν 7) κίνησις" οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι δύο 
"μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν εἰρήκασι τρόπον, τοσοῦτον 
δὲ προσεπέθεσαν ὃ καὶ ἴδιόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν, ὅτι τὸ πεπερα- 
A \ Se, \ Ν aA > Can Ν od 
σμένον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον {kal τὸ ἕν) οὐχ ἑτέρας τινὰς ὠήθησαν 
i i a Ων a y a ¢ 
εἶναι φύσεις, οἷον πῦρ ἢ γῆν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ 
yA é 
τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν οὐσίαν εἶναι τούτων ὧν κατηγο- 
a \ > 
ροῦνται, διὸ Kal ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πάντων. περί τε 
τούτων οὖν τοῦτον ἀπεφήναντο τὸν τρόπον, καὶ περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν 
Μ / an 
ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι, λίαν δ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐπραγμα- 
τεύθ σα c (ζ 1 XX 3 λ 4 \ 4ν / C4 , 
σαν. ὡρίζοντό τε γὰρ ἐπιπολαίως, καὶ ᾧ πρώτῳ ὑπάρ- 
ξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὅρος, τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πράγματος ἐνό- 
μιζον, ὥσπερ εἴ τις οἴοιτο ταὐτὸν εἶναι διπλάσιον καὶ τὴν 
a lal / 
δυάδα διότι πρῶτον ὑπάρχει Tots δυσὶ τὸ διπλάσιον. GAN 
> > \ Ψ γ] \ Ν ν " \ / 9 ἊΝ 4 
οὐ ταὐτὸν ἴσως ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι διπλασίῳ καὶ δυάδι" εἰ δὲ μή, 
Ν Nes ox Δ »} ΄ / Ν Ν e 
πολλὰ TO EV ἔσται, Ὁ κἀκείνοις συνέβαινεν. παρὰ μὲν οὗν 
la 4 \ na VA cay va - 
τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοσαῦτα ἔστι λαβεῖν. 
᾿ / 
Mera δὲ τὰς εἰρημένας φιλοσοφίας ἡ Πλάτωνος ἐπε- 
7, , DS \ Ν ΄ 2) a Ἂς 
γένετο πραγματεία, τὰ μὲν πολλὰ τούτοις ἀκολουθοῦσα, τὰ 
δὲ καὶ ἴδια παρὰ τὴν τῶν ᾿Ιταλικῶν ἔχουσα φιλοσοφίαν. 


8.2 καὶ οἵη. Γ΄ συνεδρευκότων AP 3 ταῦτα ET Asc.°: τοσαῦτα 
AP 6 ras pr. om, E 7 ὡς] οὐδὲν ὡς Τ' 8 τιθέντων 560]. 
Christ 9 map’ ὧν bis AP 10 μορυχώτερον yp. Al., fort. Asc. : 
μαλακώτερον AP yp. E: μετριώτερον ET Al.!: μοναχώτερον Al.: μονι- 
μώτερον Asc.° 11 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν E 15 αὐτῶν ἐστιν ET 
16 καὶ τὸ ἕν A? et fort. Al.: om. ET Asc. 19 πάντων AP Asc.: 
ἁπάντων E 20 οὖν om. AP ἀπεφήναντο τοῦτον AP 22 πρώτῳ 
ET Al.: πρώτως AP Asc. 23 ἐνόμισαν ET 25 dco Ab 
26 ἴσως ἐστὶ ET Al.®: ἐστὶν ἴσως AP 28 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων secl, 
Jaeger 31 ἴδια AP Asc.: ἰδίᾳ E 


2673+1 Cc 


30 


987» 


σι 


ΤΟ 


15 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


b] / Ν / / na σ 4 \ al 
ἐκ νέου Te yap συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς 
c td / c c / n "ἢ lal ak c ’ 
Ηρακλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ῥεόν- 
των καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστε- 
[2 « f Nv / ἊΣ \ Ν Ν }0 Ν 
poy οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ 
/ \ ἊΝ fal Ψ ΄ὔ > / , ’ 
πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι 
lal n / 
τούτοις TO καθόλου ζητοῦντος Kal περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος 
πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον" 
c / c AP g / ny / \ > an 3 
ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἑτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθη- 
τῶν ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν 
τινός, ἀεί γε μεταβαλλόντων. οὗτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν 
» 40. 7 , Ἂς 5 >. XX Ν a \ 
ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε, TA δ᾽ αἰσθητὰ Tapa ταῦτα καὶ 
Ν a Ψ / Ν / \ > \ 
κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα' κατὰ μέθεξιν yap εἷναι τὰ 
> na 7 lal y ἣν Ν / + 
πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων [Tots εἴδεσιν). τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα 
/ / « ον Ἂς ’ὔ / ‘ wv 
μόνον μετέβαλεν" οἱ μὲν yap Πυθαγόρειοι μιμήσει τὰ ὄντα 
Ν S na ° a / Ν / + 
φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἀριθμῶν, Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει, τοὔνομα pera- 
/ Ν. / δ Ν. 7 eo x v 
βαλών. τὴν μέντοι ye μέθεξιν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν ἥτις ἂν εἴη 
na > nan - Ὁ - nan tas νΝ Ν Ἄς Ἂς τ Ν, 
τῶν εἰδῶν ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ 
Ν x » x x “ , Μ᾿ / 
καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ TOV πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι 
4 / n ὡς , an n 2 oh \ oe 
μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκί- 
νὴ a By Ὁ δ a \ Ν , 3. Φ a 
pyta εἶναι, τῶν δ᾽ εἰδῶν TH TA μὲν πόλλ᾽ ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι 
Ν ἈΝ tl Θεῶν a e id 3 \ > ΝΜ Ἂν ν 
τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἕν ἕκαστον μόνον. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ αἴτια τὰ εἴδη 
o Ν > la lal / cd an wy » 
τοῖς ἄλλοις, τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων On TOV ὄντων εἶναι 
lal μὰ / 
στοιχεῖα. ὡς μὲν οὖν ὕλην τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἶναι 
τ / ε 5 > 4 AS. 3 2 Ἂς \ / n 
ἀρχάς, ὡς δ᾽ οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν" ἐξ ἐκείνων yap κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ 
« Ν ας » in ον >) / Ν / ἃ 3 / Δ 
ἑνὸς [τὰ εἴδη] εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς. τὸ μέντοι γε ἕν οὐσίαν εἶναι, 
Ν ‘\ ed / iB δ y. 4“ / a 
Kal μὴ ἕτερόν ye TL ὃν λέγεσθαι Ev, παραπλησίως τοῖς Πυ- 
θαγορείοις ἔλεγε, καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις 
τῆς οὐσίας ὡσαύτως ἐκείνοις" τὸ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὡς ἑνὸς 
2 32 τε om. AP συνήθης γενόμενος AY Al.: συγγενόμενος E Asc, 
πρῶτον om. Τ' Ὁ τ' οὗτος E 2 μέντοι] δὲ AP 5 γιγνομένων 
Ab ov E Al.: οὐ περὶ AT αἰσθητῶν] αἰσθητῶν τινός EL Al. 
6 ὅρον AP ΑΙ. ; λόγον ET 7 οὕτως AP τὰ μὲν οὖν AP: μὲν 
οὖν τὰ τεςα. 8 ἰδέας καὶ εἴδη Τ' 10 συνωνύμων AY yp, ET ΑΙ. 
ASc.: συνωνύμων ὁμώνυμα E τοῖς εἴδεσιν 566]. Gillespie 11 μόνον 
E All: om. ΑΓ Asc.¢ μετέβαλεν E Asc.°: μετέλαβεν AP Al} 
12 τοὔνομα μεταβαλών om. AP 13 γε om. AP 14 τῶν εἰδῶν 
560], Gillespie, post μεθέξει 1. 12 transposuit Jackson ἀφῆσαν AP 
17 πολλὰ τὰ AP 19 πάντων E Al. Asc.®; ἁπάντων ΑΡ τῶν ὄντων 
φήθη AY 22 τὰ εἴδη 566]. Zeller τοὺς codd. Τ' Al.: καὶ τοὺς 


Asc. : τὰ ὡς Jackson 23 γέτι ΑΡ ΑΙ.}: τι τὸ Ε Α8..1 ἔν] εἶναι E 
25 τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας yp. E: τῆς ὕλης οὐσίας Τ' 


6. 987% 32 — 7. 988? 20 


> ἰ Ὁ Ν 3 ΓΑ 5» / \ n a) 
δυάδα ποιῆσαι, TO δ᾽ ἄπειρον EK μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τοῦτ 
Μν \ oo < S Ν > \ Ἂς Ν 5 / ε > 
ἴδιον" καὶ ἔτι ὃ μὲν τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς Tapa τὰ αἰσθητά, ot ὃ 
> \ ων 7 be τὸς Ν / \ ον 
ἀριθμοὺς εἶναί φασιν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ μαθημα- 
Ἦν, ἊΣ / ’ 7ὔ ‘ ἊΣ » Ν aA \ Ν 
τικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων οὐ τιθέασιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν TO ev καὶ τοὺς 
5» Ν Ας \ / “ Ἂν Ἂς WA « 
ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ. οἱ 39 
Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ ἣ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγὴ διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λό- 
η γ1) ] 
γοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν (οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖ- 

\ Ν lA a Ν cay, ,ὔ Ν Ν Ν 
xov), τὸ δὲ δυάδα ποιῆσαι τὴν ἑτέραν φύσιν διὰ τὸ τοὺς 
ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων εὐφυῶς ἐξ αὐτῆς γεννᾶσθαι ὥσ- 

+ 2 7 4 / fo) ra > 882 
περ ἔκ τινος ἐκμαγείου. καίτοι συμβαίνει γ᾽ ἐναντίως: οὐ 9 
Ν BA A ε Ἂς Ν 5 a “ Ἂς fal 
yap εὔλογον οὕτως. οἱ μὲν yap ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πολλὰ ποιοῦσιν, 

ΗΝ uA a Tal 

τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ἅπαξ γεννᾷ μόνον, φαίνεται δ᾽ ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης 
/ / € Ν Ν ων 9 7 eo XA Ν lal 
μία τράπεζα, ὁ δὲ TO εἶδος ἐπιφέρων εἷς ὧν πολλὰς ποιεῖ. 
ς > yo \ Ν A \ \ a iN Ν Ἂς 
ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ' τὸ μὲν γὰρ 8 
CTS ra a ee ν᾿ ΕἾ a Ν ., 
ὑπὸ μιᾶς πληροῦται ὀχείας, TO δ᾽ ἄρρεν πολλὰ πληροῖ 
καίτοι ταῦτα μιμήματα τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκείνων ἐστίν. Πλά- 
των μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ζητουμένων οὕτω διώρισεν" φανερὸν δ᾽ 
> “ > / “ “- ΒΔ ’ / a 
ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι δυοῖν αἰτίαιν μόνον κέχρηται, τῇ TE 
“ ΕΣ Ν a Ν Ν “ SS Ἂς y a fe: 
τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην (τὰ yap εἴδη τοῦ τί ἐστιν το 
αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ᾽ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν), καὶ τίς ἡ ὕλη ἡ 
ς / 3 Φ « » ἣν 3p N an Py lal Ν ’ 
ὑποκειμένη καθ᾽ ἧς τὰ εἴδη μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ὃ 
ὰ > va) γ' ( “ “ 5 \ I Ν 
ἕν ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι λέγεται, ὅτι αὕτη δυάς ἐστι, τὸ μέγα καὶ 
τὸ μικρόν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοι- 
χείοις ἀπέδωκεν ἑκατέροις ἑκατέραν, ὥσπερ φαμὲν καὶ τῶν 15 
na χω / 

προτέρων ἐπιζητῆσαί τινας φιλοσόφων, οἷον ᾿Εμπεδοκλέα 
καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόραν. 

 δΣυντόμως μὲν οὖν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπεληλύθαμεν τίνες 
τε καὶ πῶς τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες περί τε τῶν ἀρχῶν 
Ν a 2 / “ Ἂς ἊΝ ἐν > a 3 Ἄν ἦν 
καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας" ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γ᾽ ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, 20 


b 26 τὸ δ᾽ E All: καὶ τὸ APP 27 ἔτι ET ΑΙ. : ὅτι AP Asc. 
29 τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ET Al, Asc. : τὸν ἀριθμὸν AP 34 ἔξω τῶν πρώτων 
codd.T Al. Asc.: ἔξω τῶν περιττῶν Heinze: 566]. Zeller 988% 1-2 οὐκ 
ἄρ᾽ Susemihl 2 o A” Al. : vty ET Asc.° 4 ev dv Walker 
πολλὰ AP 5 μὲν γὰρ] μὲν yap θῆλυ AP; δὲ Τ' 8 διώρισεν E 
All Asc.¢: διώριζε APT 9. μόνον κέχρηται] ἐστὶ μόνον κεχρημένος 1" 
11 ἕν] ἕν καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ yp. Al. 12 μὲν AP yp. Al.: τὰ μὲν ET ΑΙ. 
τὸ δ᾽ ἕν ἐν codd. Τ' yp. ΑΙ. ; τὰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ Al. 13 ὅτι. . . 14 μικρόν ET 
ΑΙ. : om, A> 14 κακῶς ΕΑΡΓ Al, Asc.: καλῶς AP? 15 ὥσπερ 
A> ΑἹ, ; ὅπερ μᾶλλον EY ἔφαμεν Jackson 16 φιλοσόφων APT 
Al.e: φιλοσόφους E 

ς 2 


ie) 


15 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


a , Ce MS) a \ ἢ Ἐν 5) \ " a > 
ὅτι TOV λεγόντων περὶ ἀρχῆς Kal αἰτίας οὐθεὶς ἔξω τῶν ἐν 
tal \ » « lal id y 2 Ν / 
τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ἡμῖν διωρισμένων εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντες 
oh n Ν 9 7 / 7 / c ἊΝ 
ἀμυδρῶς μὲν ἐκείνων δέ πως φαίνονται θιγγάνοντες, οἱ μὲν 
Ν « “ \ 2 Ν. 7 BA / Ν iA 
yap ws ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, av τε play ἄν τε πλείους 
ὑποθῶσι, καὶ ἐάν τε σῶμα ἐάν τε ἀσώματον τοῦτο τιθῶσιν (οἷον 
Πλάτων μὲν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν λέγων, οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Ιταλικοὶ 
τὸ ἄπειρον, ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ 
SUL 2 f S Ν a ε lal μὰ "ν᾽ “ 7 
ἀέρα, ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἀπειρίαν' οὗτοί 
τε δὴ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἡμμένοι εἰσί, καὶ ἔτι ὅσοι 
ΦΥ͂ δ a \ ῳ Ὁ \ Ν / Ser ἊΣ , 
ἀέρα ἢ πῦρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτό- 
τερον" καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτόν τινες εἰρήκασιν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον 
στοιχεῖον»)"----οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἥψαντο μόνον, 

Ὧ / [π᾿ € 2) Ἂς “-“ / Ἂν τς 
ἕτεροι δέ τινες ὅθεν ἣ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (οἷον ὅσοι φιλίαν 
a \ a \ an > a 
καὶ νεῖκος ἢ νοῦν ἢ ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν)" τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι 
\ Ἂς τ Ay lo ἊΝ > \ τ td / b) € Ν 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σαφῶς μὲν οὐθεὶς ἀποδέδωκε, μάλιστα δ᾽ οἱ τὰ 
/ / + Ν ε “ lal > cal S 
εἴδη τιθέντες λέγουσιν (οὔτε yap ws ὕλην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ 
ΝΜ \ \ ὰ tal » ΜΔ9 «ς ΕΣ an ἊΝ > ἂν Lal 
εἴδη Kal TO ἕν τοῖς εἴδεσιν οὔθ᾽ ws ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς 
κινήσεως γιγνομένην ὑπολαμβάνουσινυ----ἀκινησίας yap αἴτια 
c \ fo) 2 7 Uy 5 SS \ ΤΌΣ “᾿ 
μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ εἶναι φασι»---- ἀλλὰ τὸ TL ἡν εἶναι 
« nf BA Ν ΝΜ I na 3 y Ν 
ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δ᾽ εἴδεσι τὸ 
e ‘ 2 “ ε «ς Ν « Ν \ € 
ἕν)" τὸ δ᾽ ov ἕνεκα αἱ πράξεις καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ καὶ at 
/ , Me / » [ἡ \ > / 
κινήσεις τρόπον μέν τινα λέγουσιν αἴτιον, οὕτω δὲ οὐ λέγου- 
319. ΔΨ A € Ν Ν a , δ / 
σιν οὐδ᾽ ὅνπερ πέφυκεν. οἱ μὲν yap νοῦν λέγοντες ἢ φιλίαν 
«ς od i, Ἂν he Ν ol / 5 Ἂς «ε 
ὡς ἀγαθὸν μὲν ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας τιθέασιν, οὐ μὴν ὡς 
« ἀ » “δ δ δ / , np » b) 346 
ἕνεκά YE τούτων ἢ OV ἢ γιγνόμενόν TL TOY ὄντων AAA ὡς 
ἀπὸ τούτων τὰς κινήσεις οὔσας λέγουσιν: ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως καὶ 
« ΩΝ ΌΣ δ τον δ / > Ν 4, 4 na 
οἱ TO ἕν ἢ TO ὃν φάσκοντες εἶναι THY τοιαύτην φύσιν τῆς 
Ν > ,ὔ y ,ὔ io 5 Ν ͵΄ ed x Ων Ων 
μὲν οὐσίας αἴτιόν φασιν εἷναι, οὐ μὴν τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἢ εἷναι ἢ 
rd “ te \ Ἂς / 14 > 
γίγνεσθαι, ὥστε λέγειν TE Kal μὴ λέγειν πως συμβαίνει av- 
tal 2 \ ν > Ἂς «ς lal >? Ν Ν Ν 
τοῖς τἀγαθὸν αἴτιον" οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
λέγουσι».----ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς διώρισται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ 
πόσα καὶ ποῖα, μαρτυρεῖν ἐοίκασιν ἡμῖν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες, 


225 ἀσώματον τοῦτο AY Asc.: ἀσωμάτους ET 34 7) pr.] καὶ EY 
35 ἀπέδωκε rece, DY εἴδη καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τιθέντες AP ὕλη AP 
2 τὸ ἕν Bonitz: τὰ ἐν codd. Al. οὔθ᾽ E ΑἹ. : οὐδ᾽ AP 3 αἴτια 
EY Asc.: αἰτίαν AP 8 πέφυκε τρόπον ΕΣ ἢ ET. Asc.®: καὶ AP 
g μὲν AP Αβς.ὃ: μέν τι ET οὐ τὴν AP 11 οὔσας] εἶναι τούτων 
Er 12 ἕν ἢ τὸ ὃν EY ΑΙ. : ὃν ἢ τὸ ev AP 13 οὐσίας μὲν E 
ἢ pre EY Asc.e: οἵη, A> 15 οὐ... 16 λέγουσιν ἘΤ' ΑἹ, Asc.°: om, AP 


7. 988% 21 — 8. 9894 12 


ov δυνάμενοι θιγεῖν ἄλλης αἰτίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ζητη- 
/ Ων BN a Niall 
τέαι al ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἅπασαι ἢ τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον, δῆλον" 
πῶς δὲ τούτων ἕκαστος εἴρηκε καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, 
τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀπορίας μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν. 
¢ Ν S ed Q a \ ᾽ὕὔ Ἂς ,ὕὔ ¢ 
Ooo. μὲν οὖν ἕν τε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν ὡς 
ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχοῦσαν; 
δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ 
στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον, τῶν δ᾽ ἀσωμάτων οὔ, ὄντων καὶ ἀσω- 
/ - na 
μάτων. Kal περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ἐπιχειροῦντες τὰς 
αἰτίας λέγειν, καὶ περὶ πάντων φυσιολογοῦντες, τὸ τῆς κινή- 
σεως αἴτιον ἀναιροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ τὴν οὐσίαν μηθενὸς αἰτίαν 
/ Ἂς X\ ie > \ \ 4 oO c ἊΝ lal 
τιθέναι μηδὲ TO TL ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις TH ῥᾳδίως τῶν 
ἁπλῶν σωμάτων λέγειν ἀρχὴν ὁτιοῦν πλὴν γῆς, οὐκ ἐπισκε- 
, Ν 3 » / / a lay / Ν 
ψάμενοι τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν πῶς ποιοῦνται, λέγω δὲ 
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα. τὰ μὲν γὰρ συγκρίσει 
BS Ν ΄ 2 2 [4 ΄ a Ἂς \ \ ΄ 
τὰ δὲ διακρίσει ἐξ ἀλλήλων γίγνεται, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς τὸ πρό- 
τερον εἶναι καὶ ὕστερον διαφέρει πλεῖστον. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἂν 
δόξειε στοιχειωδέστατον εἶναι πάντων ἐξ οὗ γίγνονται συγκρί- 
σει πρώτου, τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ μικρομερέστατον καὶ λεπτότατον ἂν 
εἴη τῶν σωμάτων (διόπερ ὅσοι πῦρ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι, μάλιστα 
ε / x fal / 7 / fal Ν \ 
ὁμολογουμένως ἂν TH λόγῳ τούτῳ λέγοιεν" τοιοῦτον δὲ Kal 
τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος ὁμολογεῖ τὸ στοιχεῖον εἶναι τὸ τῶν σω- 
μάτων: οὐθεὶς γοῦν ἠξίωσε τῶν ἕν λεγόντων γῆν εἶναι 
στοιχεῖον, δηλονότι διὰ τὴν μεγαλομέρειαν, τῶν δὲ τριῶν 
ἕκαστον στοιχείων εἴληφέ τινα κριτήν, οἵ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ οἱ δ᾽ 
“ «ς Ἂν OE an) Ge 7 7 x 7 2 . Ν 
ὕδωρ οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα τοῦτ᾽ εἶναί φασιν" καίτοι διὰ τί TOT οὐ καὶ 
\ fal , Ὡ ς \ lal > ᾽ς / 
τὴν γῆν λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ TOV ἀνθρώπων; πάντα 
Ν > la a \ Ν Ἀν, / ον SN 7 
yap εἶναί φασι γὴν, φησὶ δὲ καὶ Hotodos τὴν γὴν πρώ- 
τὴν γενέσθαι τῶν σωμάτων: οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτι- 
‘ , δι N aay? N ἣν a a 
κὴν συμβέβηκεν εἷναι τὴν ὑπόληψι»)".---κεατὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ- 


Ὁ 19 τοιοῦτον Bywater: τούτων ΕΑΝ : τοῦτον recc. 20 δὲ] τε " 
21 τὰς δὲ Γ 22 τὸ πᾶν καὶ] αὐτὸ ' μίαν AP Asc.l¢: μίαν εἶναι ἘΠ᾽ 
25 ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων EY Al.: om. AP 26 καὶ φθορᾶς om. Al. 
27 πάντων E Al.¢: ἁπάντων AP Asc.° 28, 29 τῷ!ϊ Bywater: 
τὸ codd. Al. 30 λέγειν] εἶναι = 432 γὴν καὶ ὕδωρ AP 34 πὴ E 
989° 4 ἕκαστος ὁμολογεῖ τὸ EL ΑἹ. : ἕκαστον ὡμολογεῖτο AP τὸ 
om. AP: mT 5 γὰρ T ἠξίωσε τῶν A? et fort. Al.: τῶν ὕστερον 
ἠξίωσε καὶ ἘΓ Asc. στοιχείων ἕκαστον Lecc, κριτήν τινα EY 
8 οὐ καὶ E Al.: οὐδὲ Α": οὐ T ΓΙ γεγενῆσθαι AP .12 συμ- 


βέβηκεν εἶναι] εἶχε AY μὲν om, T° 


30 


3 


989% 


or 


~ 


5 


ο 


15 


20 


30 


989" 


unr 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


Ν Nf ΝΜ 9 ΜΝ 4 / \ i 
Tov τὸν λόγον ovT εἴ τις τούτων TL λέγει πλὴν TUpOs; 
Sf AD) » 8: J, Ἂς / “ / “ Ἂς 
οὔτ᾽ εἴ τις ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον τοῦτο τίθησιν ὕδατος δὲ 
" > ΕῚ fal 3 / 4 2 7 Ν a f 
λεπτότερον, οὐκ ὀρθώς ἂν λέγοι" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι TO TH γενέσει 
ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον, τὸ δὲ πεπεμμένον καὶ συγκε- 
κριμένον ὕστερον τῇ γενέσει, τοὐναντίον ἂν εἴη τούτων, ὕδωρ 
μὲν ἀέρος πρότερον γῆ δὲ ὕδατος.----περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μίαν 
/ a t \ > 
τιθεμένων αἰτίαν olay εἴπομεν, ἔστω ταῦτ᾽ εἰρημένα" TO ὃ 
ba AN 3 » [4] ΄ ti Ἣν 3 on / 
αὐτὸ Kay εἴ Tis ταῦτα πλείω τίθησιν, οἷον ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς τέτ- 
ταρά φησιν εἷναι σώματα τὴν ὕλην. καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τὰ μὲν 
s ΦΈΡΩ Ν > / 5 / / / Ἂν 3 
Ταὐτὰ τὰ δ᾽ ἴδια συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη. γιγνόμενά τε yap ἐξ 
> / (Yes € > en / \ \ fod “ 
ἀλλήλων ὁρώμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ διαμένοντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ σώματος (εἴρηται δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως περὶ αὐτῶν), 
a a a ΕΥ̓ , 
καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν κινουμένων αἰτίας, πότερον ἕν ἢ δύο θετέον, 
Ψ): 9 b] fe BA 3 ’ 4, / LR Led Φ 
οὔτ᾽ ὀρθῶς οὔτε εὐλόγως οἰητέον εἰρῆσθαι παντελῶς. ὅλως τε 
5 tA > a > / a “ fe 3. Ὧν » 
ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἀνάγκη τοῖς οὕτω λέγουσιν" οὐ γὰρ ἐκ 
fal a j 
θερμοῦ ψυχρὸν οὐδὲ ἐκ ψυχροῦ θερμὸν ἔσται. τὶ yap αὐτὰ ἂν 
ἕ 3 , 
πάσχοι τἀναντία, καὶ τὶς εἴη dv μία φύσις ἡ γιγνομένη 
a ey a 5 - bY > Ie > x 
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, ὃ ἐκεῖνος οὔ φησιν. ᾿Αναξαγόραν δ᾽ εἴ τις 
ὑπολάβοι δύο λέγειν στοιχεῖα, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ὑπολάβοι κατὰ 
λόγον, ὃν ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ διήρθρωσεν, ἠκολούθησε μέντ᾽ 
adv ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῖς ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν. ἀτόπου γὰρ ὄντος καὶ 
DA - - Ἂς 5 Ἂς A \ x 
ἄλλως τοῦ φάσκειν μεμῖχθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν πάντα, Kal διὰ 
\ an “. 
τὸ συμβαίνειν ἄμικτα δεῖν προὐπάρχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ 
/ a 
πεφυκέναι τῷ τυχόντι μίγνυσθαι τὸ τυχόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 
“ Ἂς / \ Ν , , > xX fal 3, fal 
ὅτι τὰ πάθη Kal TA συμβεβηκότα χωρίζοιτ᾽ ἂν τῶν οὐσιῶν 
(τῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν μῖξίς ἐστι καὶ χωρισμός), ὅμως εἴ τις ἀκο- 
7 al ὰ 
λουθήσειε συνδιαρθρῶν ἃ βούλεται λέγειν, ἴσως ἂν φανείη 
καινοπρεπεστέρως λέγων. ὅτε γὰρ οὐθὲν ἣν ἀποκεκριμένον, 
δῆλον ὡς οὐθὲν ἣν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκείνης, 
s > 4 δ “δ 
λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ὅτι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν ἢ φαιὸν ἢ ἄλλο 
lat > ent? τᾷ 2 = ens > Ν ν , 
χρῶμα, ἀλλ᾽ axpwv ἦν ἐξ ἀνάγκης" εἶχε yap ἄν τι τού- 


ἃ. 13 λέγει τι AP 16 ὕστερον... πρότερον EY Al. Α5ς.: πρότερον 


... ὕστερον AY Al.¢ Asc,le 25 κινούντων EY Asc,! 26 εὐλόγως 
A> yp. E Al.: ἀλόγως ET Asc.°, ci. Al. ὅλως .. . 30 φησιν EL 
Asc.: om. AP et ut vid. Al. 28 τὶ Asc.: ricodd.T ἂν αὐτὰ 
TECc, 29 tis Asc.: τίς codd, T ἂν εἴη rece. 32 οὐ ΕΤ' 
Asc, : οὐ σαφῶς AP 33 ἐπάγουσιν A? et ut vid. Al.: λέγουσιν ἘΠ 
Ῥ 8 οἷον om, ΕΓ ἢ ἄλλο χρῶμα EY Asc. et ut vid. Al.: om, A 
9 ἀχρώματον AY: ἄχρουν Asc.& ἦν om. AP Asc.¢ TOUT@Y TOL 


χρωμάτων EY Asc.: τῶν χρωμάτων τούτων AP 


ὃ, 9389* 13 — 990° ὃ 


των TOV χρωμάτων: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄχυμον τῷ αὐτῷ 
λόγῳ τούτῳ, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τῶν ὁμοίων οὐθέν: οὔτε γὰρ ποιόν τι 
οἷόν τε αὐτὸ εἶναι οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε τί. τῶν γὰρ ἐν μέρει τι 
/ ,’ lal [4 lal a > lal “ Ν 9 7 
λεγομένων εἰδῶν ὑπῆρχεν ἂν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον με- 
μιγμένων γε πάντων: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν ἀπεκέκριτο, φησὶ δ᾽ 
εἶναι μεμιγμένα πάντα πλὴν τοῦ νοῦ, τοῦτον δὲ ἀμιγῆ μόνον 
Ν , 5 Ἂν ’ ΄ , ἘΞ ΤῸ Ν 
καὶ καθαρόν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτῷ τὰς 
5 Ν , ed a ἧς c a \ 9 / \ / 
ἀρχὰς τό Te ἕν (τοῦτο yap ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀμιγές) καὶ θάτερον, 
οἷον τίθεμεν τὸ ἀόριστον πρὶν ὁρισθῆναι καὶ μετασχεῖν εἴδους 
, “ Md Ἂν ἌΡ δ at + lat 7 / 
τινός, ὥστε λέγει μὲν OUT ὀρθῶς οὔτε σαφῶς, βούλεται μέντοι 


lA -" Ὁ“ / \ a a 7ὕ 
τι παραπλήσιον τοῖς τε ὕστερον λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν φαινομέ- : 


νοις μᾶλλον.---ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὗτοι μὲν τοῖς περὶ γένεσιν λόγοις 
καὶ φθορὰν καὶ κίνησιν οἰκεῖοι τυγχάνουσι μόνον (σχεδὸν 
γὰρ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας 
ζητοῦσι μόνης)" ὅσοι δὲ περὶ μὲν ἁπάντων τῶν ὄντων ποιοῦνται 
by) 7 a 3. ἊΜ Ν Ν > Ν bs 2 > 2 ἌΝ 
τὴν θεωρίαν, τῶν δ᾽ ὄντων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ αἰσθητὰ 
τιθέασι, δῆλον ὡς περὶ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν γενῶν ποιοῦνται τὴν 
τον τα A fe + ΕΣ 4 Ν bro) ΄ 
ἐπίσκεψιν" διὸ μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἐνδιατρίψειε περὶ αὐτῶν, τί 
al Ὁ lol a a a 
καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς λέγουσιν εἰς THY τῶν νῦν ἡμῖν προκει- 
, Ως δ᾿ ao ν᾿ 
μένων σκέψιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι ταῖς μὲν 
ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐκτοπωτέροις χρῶνται τῶν φυσιο- 
λόγων (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι παρέλαβον αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν" 
τὰ γὰρ μαθηματικὰ τῶν ὄντων ἄνευ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἔξω 
τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀστρολογίαν), διαλέγονται μέντοι καὶ πραγμα- 
τεύονται περὶ φύσεως πάντα" γεννῶσί τε γὰρ τὸν οὐρανόν, 
καὶ περὶ τὰ τούτου μέρη καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα διατη- 
ροῦσι τὸ συμβαῖνον, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ αἴτια εἰς ταῦτα 
4 c ς lal lal BA / 
καταναλίσκουσιν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦντες Tots ἄλλοις φυσιολόγοις 
“ , By layer 9 \ “ > i b] Ων 7) ς 
ὅτι τό γε ὃν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσον αἰσθητόν ἐστι καὶ περιείληφεν ὁ 
/ > , Ν > Saf, \ Ἂς rd / “ 
καλούμενος οὐρανός. τὰς δ᾽ αἰτίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ 
nr Ν, / 

εἴπομεν, ἱκανὰς λέγουσιν ἐπαναβῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνωτέρω 


“ - “δ lal 
τῶν ὄντων, Kal μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς περὶ φύσεως λόγοις ἁρμοτ- 


/ 
τούσας. ἐκ Tivos μέντοι τρόπου κίνησις ἔσται πέρατος Kal 


b το τῷ] καὶ τῷ AP 11 ἄλλο τι τῶν AP 17 θάτερον APF ΑΙ. : 
θάτερον καθάπερ ov E 19 λέγει AP Ale: λέγεται EL 20 τε 
E Α].9 Αβο.ὃ : om. AP νῦν om, ut vid. Al., Brandis 24 μόνον EY 
30 ἐκτοπωτέροις Al. Bonitz: ἐκτοπωτέρως codd. I Asc. 34 περὶ 
φύσεως πάντα E Asc.®: πάντα περὶ φύσεως APT οοοῦ 1 τὰ ult. 
om, AP 6 ἱκανὰς APT ΑἹ. ; ἱκανῶς E 


[ 
οι 


30 


990" 


15 


20 


25 


30 


ggo? 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


> 7 ἐν \ , 94’ 
ἀπείρου μόνων ὑποκειμένων Kal περιττοῦ Kal ἀρτίου, οὐθὲν 
, Δ lal > \ " / \ “ , 
λέγουσιν», ἢ πῶς δυνατὸν ἄνευ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς γέ- 
5 δ lat \ 
veow εἶναι kal φθορὰν ἢ τὰ τῶν φερομένων ἔργα κατὰ TOV 
> lal > / 
οὐρανόν. ἔτι δὲ εἴτε δοίη τις αὐτοῖς ἐκ τούτων εἶναι μέγεθος 
lal » yf ‘ a 
εἴτε δειχθείη τοῦτο, ὅμως τίνα τρόπον ἔσται τὰ μὲν κοῦφα 
Ν Ν , Bf - / 3, ΩΝ Ν, [3 / 
τὰ δὲ βάρος ἔχοντα τῶν σωμάτων; ἐξ ὧν yap ὑποτίθενται 
\ 4 δὰ “ A - a / 
καὶ λέγουσιν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον περὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν λέγουσι 
“Ὁ lal - Ων lal δ lad 
σωμάτων ἢ τῶν αἰσθητῶν" διὸ περὶ πυρὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ τῶν 
yx a 7 , In? € ay See . babs 
ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν εἰρήκασιν, ἅτε οὐθὲν 
περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οἶμαι λέγοντες ἴδιον. ἔτι δὲ πῶς δεῖ 
lal » Ἂς ΩΣ Ἂς ny Ὁ lal / Ν QA > Ἂν 
λαβεῖν αἴτια μὲν εἶναι τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πάθη καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν 
lal 5, / tal 
τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ὄντων καὶ γιγνομένων Kal ἐξ ἀρχῆς 
a 3, Ἂς \ 
καὶ νῦν, ἀριθμὸν δ᾽ ἄλλον μηθένα εἶναι παρὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν 
a eG e / € ΄ “ Ν 2 \ Ν “ 
τοῦτον ἐξ οὗ συνέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος; ὅταν γὰρ ἐν τῳδὶ μὲν τῷ 


ὩΣ 


, , \ \ 9 a \ Sey Ἃ f 
μέρει δόξα Kal καιρὸς αὐτοῖς ἢ, μικρὸν δὲ ἄνωθεν ἢ κά- 
ΩΝ ra , 

τωθεν ἀδικία καὶ κρίσις ἢ μῖξις, ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγωσιν ὅτι 
τούτων μὲν ἕκαστον ἀριθμός ἐστι, συμβαίνει δὲ κατὰ τὸν 
τόπον τοῦτον ἤδη πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν συνισταμένων μεγεθῶν διὰ 
τὸ τὰ πάθη ταῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς τόποις ἑκάστοις, πότερον 
μὰ - > , 3 5» /, τε > an 3 lal ἃ lal a 
οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστιν ἀριθμός, ὁ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὃν δεῖ λαβεῖν 
4 nN a . 
OTL τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ἢ Tapa τοῦτον ἄλλος; ὁ μὲν yap 
Πλάτων ἕτερον εἶναί φησιν" καίτοι κἀκεῖνος ἀριθμοὺς οἴεται 
καὶ ταῦτα εἷναι καὶ τὰς τούτων αἰτίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν von- 

Ν ΡΟΝ, {2 SS 5 ,’ 
τοὺς αἰτίους τούτους δὲ αἰσθητούς. 


«ς 


Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν (ἷκα- 
\ lal a 
νὸν yap αὐτῶν ἅψασθαι τοσοῦτον)" οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας 
/ an a lal lal Ἂς 
τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τωνδὶ τῶν ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς 


4. ὦ ef , » BN 5» Ἂς b) , “ y 
QLTLAS ETEPA TOVTOLS Loa TOV ἀριθμὸν εκομίσαν, ὠσπέρ εἰ TLS 


990" 2 — οο18 8 = Μ, 1ο78" 34 — 1079» 3 


59. μόνον APT 12 δῴη E Asc.! εἶναι ἘΞ Asc.): εἶναι τὸ AP 
16 ἢ pr.] ἢ περὶ E 23 καὶ] ἐκεῖ δὲ ex Al. ci, Luthe: καὶ τόλμα, 
ἐν τωιδὶ δὲ Diels 24 yp. ἀνικία E ΑἹ. ; ἀνεικία ci, Zeller κρίσις 
ΑΡ ΑΙ. : διάκρισις Ε ἀπόδειξις AD 25 μὲν ΑΙ. : μὲν ἕν E: ev AY 
Bonitz συμβαίνῃ ci. Bonitz τὸν τόπον τοῦτον EY Al.°: τοῦτον 
τὸν τόπον AY: τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον Asc.°: τὸν τόπον τοῦτο Luthe: τοῦτον 
τὸν τόπον τοῦτο Zeller 26 ἤδη] δὴ τὸ Luthe διὰ τὸ] διὸ Zeller 
28 οὗτος EY ΑἹ. : δὲ A: οὕτως Asc. αἴτιος εχ ΑΙ. οἷ, Luthe ἐστιν 
ἀριθμός EY Asc.le: ἀριθμός ἐστιν AP 33 τὰ AD AIL: τὸ E 


34 αἰτίας AY Al); om. EY Asc.! 


8. 990% 9 — 9. 990) 29 


. fol ,ὔ od , A » y Ν > / 
ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ δυνή- 
7 ἧς / pb) 7 Ν Ν Υ δ > 
σεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη (σχεδὸν yap ἴσα----ἢ οὐκ 
ἐλάττω-- - ἐστὶ τὰ εἴδη τούτοις περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ 
τούτων ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα προῆλθον" καθ᾽ ἕκαστον yap ὁμώνυμόν τι 
7 Ψ \ Ἂς > 74 nt BA Ba aA 3, \ 
ἐστι Kal παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, TOV τε ἄλλων ἐστιν EV ἐπὶ TOA- 
λῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις)" ἔτι δὲ καθ᾽ ods τρό- 
1 “ » x wy 3 > / ,ὔ / 
mous δείκνυμεν ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, κατ᾽ οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων" 
ἘΣ 3 , Ν \ > 2: / 14 9 Say, 
ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν yap οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων 
δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἴδη γίγνεται. κατά τε γὰρ 
τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴδη ἔσται πάντων ὅσων 
5 a ΕῚ ᾽ὔ \ Ν νΝ ὰ 3 \ n Ν las 9 / 
ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ TO ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ TOV ἀποφά- 
σεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος τῶν φθαρτῶν' pay- 
τασμα γάρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων 
ol μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἷναι καθ᾽ 
Ἕ \ / Ἑ XN Ν 7 ” / “ 
αὑτὸ γένος, ot δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν. ὅλως TE 
ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν λόγοι ἃ μᾶλλον εἶναι βουλόμεθα 
φ / y “ Ν 40. 7 > ΄ Ν νὰ 
[οἱ λέγοντες εἴδη] τοῦ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι’ συμβαίνει γὰρ μὴ 
> Ν / , 2 Ν \ τὰ , \ \ , 
εἶναι τὴν δυάδα πρώτην ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ TO πρός TL 
ny 3 ξ / \ / 3 A ἊΣ ES / “Ὁ \ 
τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτό, καὶ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τινὲς ἀκολουθήσαντες ταῖς περὶ 
τῶν ἰδεῶν δόξαις ἠναντιώθησαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.----ἔτι κατὰ 
μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθ᾽ ἣν εἷναί φαμεν τὰς ἰδέας οὐ. μόνον 
τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσται εἴδη ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἑτέρων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ 


». ἃ > / \ Ν > 7 > ἊΣ \ Ἂς lal BA 
νόημα ἕν οὐ μόνον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ Kal κατὰ τῶν ἀλ- : 


λων ἐστί, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ 
(Sg 09 \ > Ν 7 ,ὔ a x Ν 
ἑτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα) κατὰ δὲ 
τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἔστι με- 
θεκτὰ τὰ εἴδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. οὐ 


Ὁ ς ἐστὶ τὰ εἴδη APL ΑΙ. : τὰ εἴδη ἐστὶ E Asc. τούτοις APT ΑΙ. : 
τούτων E Asc. 6 ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα EY Asc.: ἐκεῖ APM καθ᾽] παρ᾽ Syr. 
7 tre E Al. M: om. A? Asc. ἄλλων ED Asc. M: ἄλλων ὧν AP Al.: 
ἄλλων ἃ yp. ΕΒ Ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν AP Al. Asc.: ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἕν ET 
8 δὲ ET Asc.le: om. APM 9. δείκνυμεν EY ΑἹ. Asc.: δείκνυται 
A’M 11 te E Al. M: ye AP 12 ἐκ Er Al. Asc. M: om. AP 
14 τι EY Alt Asc. M: om. AP 15 ἀκριβέστεροι AP et ut 
vid. Al. (85. 6): ἀκριβέστατοι EY Al! Asc. M 16 φασιν TM 
18 βουλόμεθα E Asc.: βούλονται APY Al. M “ΠΟ οἱ λέγοντες 
εἴδη secl. Blass 20 προτέραν Richards TO πρός TL] τούτου TO 
πρός τι kat M 21 τοῦ ET Al, Asc.: τῶν AP 22 ἰδεῶν AP Al. 
Asc; εἰδῶν ETM ἔτι ΑΡΑΙ1 Μ΄: ἔτι δὲ ET Asc! 24 ἔσονται 
ΑὟΜ 26 καὶ pr. E Al.: καὶ αἱ AP 29 τὰ AP ΑΙ. Asc. Μ: 
om, E μόνον codd. TM: μόνων ut vid. Al. Asc. 


- 


τὸ 


σι 


30 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


Ν Ν ‘ / 5 Ν Ὅν Ἂς / « / 
yap κατὰ συμβεβῆκος μετέχονται ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ εκάα- 
/ e Ν > € / ’ / 3 
στου μετέχειν ἣ μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου λέγεται (λέγω ὃ 
οἷον, εἴ τι αὐτοδιπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ ἀϊδίου μετέχει, 
»} “ς Ν ἌΣ / Ν a / 
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: συμβέβηκε yap τῷ διπλασίῳ 
δὲς 7 > - > va SA 2A Ν » 85 Ν 5 a 
ἀϊδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστ᾽ ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἴδη: ταὐτὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα 


> 7 ψ 9 κ΄“, x ες “ἢ \ 4 / Ν, 
9918 οὐσίαν σημαίνει κἀκεῖ" ἢ τί ἐσται τὸ εἰναι φάναι TL παρὰ 


5 


10 


15 


a Xa aa lal Ν Ν δε ς iy “ ᾿] lol 
ταῦτα, TO ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν; καὶ εἰ μὲν ταὐτὸ εἶδος τῶν ἰδεῶν 
καὶ τῶν μετεχόντων, ἔσται τι κοινόν (τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ 
τῶν φθαρτῶν δυάδων, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων δέ, τὸ 

Ν ὰ \ See One 5. 2 9:5 ἣν \ a Δ > Ν 
δυὰς ἐν καὶ ταὐτόν, ἢ ἐπί τ᾽’ αὐτῆς καὶ τῆς τινός;)" εἰ δὲ 

Ν, \ ION ~ € [4 Ὁ » \ v4 Ὁ 
μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὁμώνυμα ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅμοιον ὥσπερ 
ἂν εἴ τις καλοῖ ἄνθρωπον τόν τε Καλλίαν καὶ τὸ ξύλον, 


μηδεμίαν κοινωνίαν ἐπιβλέψας αὐτῶν.--- πάντων δὲ μάλιστα 
διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἴδη τοῖς 
“. lal a ΩΣ lal 
ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις Kal φθειρομένοις" 
οὔτε γὰρ κινήσεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἴτια αὐτοῖς. 
5 Ν Ν + Ν \ 3 pe AX fal Ἂς a BA 
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλ- 
λων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα τούτων" ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ἣν), οὔτε 
εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν: οὕτω μὲν 
Ν sy + ν» , bs c Ν Ἀν 4 
yap av tows αἴτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς TO λευκὸν μεμιγμένον 
τῷ λευκῷ, GAN οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος, dv ᾿Ανα- 
ξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὔδοξος δ᾽ ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς 
7 cc? Ν a Ν Ν μ , Ν 
ἔλεγον (ῥάδιον γὰρ συναγαγεῖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς 
τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν) ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τἄλλα 
2 > / 4 n 2 , / \ Ν 
κατ᾽ οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν 
παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἷναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτών τἄλλα κενο- 
λογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς. τί γάρ ἐστι 
Ἂν Sf , μὴ Ν Ip 7 3. / 9) , / 
τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον; ἐνδέχεταί τε 
9918 ὃ — > g = 1079? 12 — 1080% 8 


b 30 ἕκαστον Asc.& 31 μὴ om. yp. Al. 33 συμβέβηκε... 34 
εἶναι EY Asc. M: om. AP 34 οὐσία codd. I Al.° M: οὐσίᾳ fort. 
Al.: οὐσιῶν vel οὐσίας ex Al. coni. Bonitz ταὐτὰ Al.: ταῦτα codd. 
Τ ΑΙ. δὲ ἐνταῦθα] γὰρ ἐνταῦθά τε Al. Bonitz 9918 4 καὶ] καὶ 
δυάδων AY: καὶ τῶν δυάδων Al.c M 5 ἕν EY Al. Μ: εἶναι ἐν Ab 
Ale: σημαίνει ἕν Bywater τ᾽ αὐτῆς Bonitz: ταύτης codd.T: αὐτῆς M 
6 ὁμονυμία ἘΞ : ὁμωνυμία Τ' Α5ς.Ὁ 7 καλοίη AP Α5ς.Ὁ 9 ἄν om. 
Ab Io καὶ AP Al.: καὶ τοῖς EM 12 οὔτε Sylburg: οὐδὲ codd. 
Asc. M 13 οὐδὲ Sylburg: οὔτε codd. M 14 ye APM: om, E 
Asc.& μὲν om. T 15 ὡς AP ΑἹ. : om. ET Asc.c M 21 αὐτὰ E 
et ut.vid. Al.: ταῦτα Asc: re AP: om. Γ΄ Al M 23 re APM: 
δὲ All: yap ΕΓ Asc.¢ 


9. 990 30 — 991° 20 


και εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον 
fal 3 / "» 
πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος γένοιτ᾽ 
x e v , c , Ν a oe x ° > ε 
ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης: ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι κἂν εἰ ἦν ὁ 
N / 3. Μ᾽ / 7 a > a 
Σωκράτης ἀΐδιος. ἔσται Te πλείω παραδείγματα Tov αὐτοῦ, 
“ Ν » ey a 9 / BY lal \ \ iN 
ὥστε καὶ εἴδη, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, 
[ἡ Ν Ν oy > / Υ̓͂ > , ” 5 lo 
ἅμα δὲ Kal TO αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τών αἰσθητῶν 
, Ν y > Ν \ 7 OA oe \ / 
παραδείγματα τὰ εἴδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος, 
/ lal 
ὡς γένος εἰδῶν: ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ 
> , y ,ὔ x 9: 7 s \ δ 3 lA A Ὁ 
εἰκών. ἔτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὗ 
ἡ οὐσία' ὥστε πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσαι 
\ LJ 3 Ἂς an tts [2 / ε Ν lal 
χωρὶς elev; ev δὲ TH Φαίδωνι οὕτω λέγεται, ws Kal τοῦ 
εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν: καίτοι τῶν εἰδῶν 
» x ἊΝ > Ἂν loa 
ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μὴ ἢ TO κινῆσον, 
\ ἊΝ e Φ 3 7 \ 4 Ὁ Μ 
καὶ πολλὰ γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὔ 
yy a Ὁ“ a v4 >] / ἮΝ Ly \ 
φαμεν εἴδη εἶναι’ ὥστε δῆλον OTL ἐνδέχεται καὶ τἄλλα καὶ 
εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἵας καὶ τὰ ῥη- 
θέντα νῦν. 


By oy aN 5 Ν ἊΣ y lat ν oy 
ἔτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη, πῶς αἴτιοι ἔσον- 
’ a ed 9. / 3) Ν + oe €g\ ἃς < 
Tal; πότερον ὅτι ἕτεροι ἀριθμοί εἰσι Ta ὄντα, οἷον ὁδὲ μὲν (ὁ) 
ἀριθμὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁδὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ὁδὲ δὲ Καλλίας; τί 
οὖν ἐκεῖνοι τούτοις αἴτιοί εἰσιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οἱ μὲν ἀΐδιοι οἱ 
δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσει. εἰ δ᾽ ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν τἀνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ 
7 “ 4 5 Ν ed / - ’ \ / 5 ἈΝ 
συμφωνία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν γέ τι ὧν εἰσὶ λόγοι. εἰ δὴ 
fal c vA Ν “ἢ \ ’ \ ε Ψ Ν / Ν 
τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς 
» ἘΞΑ Ν ef , > e 555, ε / 
ἔσονται ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ Καλλίας 
a fal ,ὔ 
λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, 
ἊΝ ΗΝ lal € ,΄ Ba Ν Ὁ ΕῚ / “9: , \ 
καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔσται Kal ἡ ἰδέα ἀριθμός" καὶ 
> » 5 Ψ , Xx ν / “ Da / 
αὐτοάνθρωπος, εἴτ᾽ ἀριθμός Tis ὧν εἴτε μή, ὅμως ἔσται λόγος 
3 2 cad nm \ ’ >, / » 9) Ba ἊΣ cal 
ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τινῶν Kal οὐκ ἀριθμός, οὐδ᾽ ἔσται τις διὰ ταῦτα 


ἃ 24 ὁτῳοῦν Richards 25 γένοιτ᾽ APM: γίγνοιτ᾽ E 26 οἷος 
A> Al.: οἷος περ E: οἷον M 27 ἔσται... ἘΠ εἰκών om. yp. Al. 
29 τὸ om. M: τοῦ AP αὐτοάνθρωπος EY Asc. Μ΄: αὐτοανθρώ- 
movAP ἔτι δ᾽ oT 30 αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν recc. οἷον τὸ 
γένος om. Γ 31 ὡς γένος codd. T Asc.: τῶν ὡς γένους Μ et fort. 
ΑΙ. by ἂν οἵη. ΑΡ ἀδύνατον bis AP 3 λέγεται codd. ΓΜ: 
λέγομεν Al. Asc. ὃ διὰ] καὶ διὰ Τ' g εἶεν Τ' ΑΙ. 10 ὁ addidi 
11 ἄνθρωπος ἀριθμὸς AP 13 οὐδὲν om. Γ΄ κἀνταῦθα ΤΓ' 14 ὧν] οὗ 
Walker δὴ APT ΑἹ.: δήτι ΕΞ 17 καὶ ἀέρος. .. 18 ἀριθμός AP ΑΙ.: 
om. E Αβο.; καὶ ἄλλων... ἀριθμός οἴη. 18 καὶ prom. recc.: ἢ 
fort. Al. καὶ tert,] 6 Al. et sup. lin. add. E 20 οὐδ᾽ AP et ut 
vid. Al.: καὶ οὐκ EY ἰδέα ante διὰ add. Jaeger, post ταῦτα Schwegler 


30 


gg 


ο 


- 
σι 


25 


9925" 


io 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


ἀριθμός. ἔτι ἐκ πολλῶν ἀριθμῶν εἷς ἀριθμὸς γίγνεται, ἐξ 
εἰδῶν δὲ ἕν εἶδος πῶς; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἐν 
my SY lot φ ΕῚ n / ἘΝ ΟΝ, ς é » 
τῷ ἀριθμῷ, olov ἐν τῇ μυριάδι, πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ μονάδες; εἴτε 
“ ἃς » Ν 
γὰρ ὁμοειδεῖς, πολλὰ συμβήσεται ἄτοπα, εἴτε μὴ ὁμοει- 
Natal an / 
δεῖς, μήτε αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις μήτε αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι πά- 
gas τίνι γὰρ διοίσουσιν ἀπαθεῖς οὖσαι; οὔτε γὰρ εὔλογα 
an LA ς / a / ” 2 9 o ed 
ταῦτα οὔτε ὁμολογούμενα τῇ νοήσει. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ἕγερον 
/ a / \ Ὁ ς Ν 
γένος ἀριθμοῦ κατασκευάζειν περὶ ὃ ἡ ἀριθμητική, καὶ 


/ x Ν ’ ΄ δ a δ 5 7 
πάντα τὰ μεταξὺ λεγόμενα ὑπό τινων, ἃ πῶς ἢ ἐκ τίνων 


ΕῚ \ Ρ} n δ XX ὃ Ἃς lal cal , 2 ν ἊΣ 
ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν; ἢ διὰ τί μεταξὺ τῶν δεῦρό τ᾽ ἔσται καὶ 
Ὁ τὸς ν» ε ε 4 - Lf « / ΝΜ 
αὐτῶν; ἐτι αἱ μονάδες αἱ ἐν τῇ δυάδι ἑκατέρα ἔκ τινος 
/ / Ψ' Ὅ᾽ / » ἊΝ Pid, c -} \ 
προτέρας δυάδος" καίτοι ἀδύνατον. ἔτι διὰ τί ἕν ὁ ἀριθμὸς 
/ yx ὡς Ἂν -“" 3 / Ν MEAN 
συλλαμβανόμενος; ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις, εἴπερ εἰσὶν 
ε Ρ a ¢ / -“ Sr ae \ 
ai μονάδες διάφοροι, ἐχρῆν οὕτω λέγειν ὥσπερ καὶ ὅσοι τὰ 
vad Ων 
στοιχεῖα τέτταρα ἣ δύο λέγουσιν" καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστος οὐ 
τὸ κοινὸν λέγει στοιχεῖον, οἷον τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ πῦρ καὶ γῆν, 
νυν , Ν a ν , a Ny , ε ν 
εἴτ ἔστι τι κοινόν, τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε μή. νῦν δὲ λέγεται ὡς ὄντος 
a Xx a 
τοῦ ἑνὸς ὥσπερ πυρὸς ἢ ὕδατος ὁμοιομεροῦς" εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως, οὐκ 
a > , « 5 / > Ἂς lal [τὸ Μ > 7 ὰ 
ἔσονται οὐσίαι οἱ ἀριθμοί, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἐστί τι ἕν 
ON \ rove de ob) ? / a f \ ο Ν 
αὑτὸ καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀρχή, πλεοναχῶς λέγεται TO ἕν' ἄλ- 
Ν 9᾿ , Ν Ν ον 9 / 3 Ν 
Aws γὰρ ἀδύνατον .----βουλόμενοι δὲ τὰς οὐσίας ἀνάγειν εἰς τὰς 
/ lal 
ἀρχὰς μήκη μὲν τίθεμεν ἐκ βραχέος καὶ μακροῦ, ἔκ τινος 
μικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου, καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἐκ πλατέος καὶ στενοῦ, 
lal ? >] / \ an 7 na e δ \ b] 7 
σῶμα δ᾽ ἐκ βαθέος καὶ ταπεινοῦ. καίτοι πῶς ἕξει ἢ τὸ ἐπί- 
ἊΝ δ Ν \ Ν Ng Te BA 
πεδον γραμμὴν ἢ TO στερεὸν γραμμὴν Kal ἐπίπεδον; ἄλλο 
/ 
yap γένος τὸ πλατὺ καὶ στενὸν καὶ βαθὺ Kal ταπεινόν" 
Ὁ“ μιν 29) 9 Ἂν € / >) > - “ Ἂς Ν \ 
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ᾽ ἀριθμὸς ὑπάρχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὅτι TO πολὺ καὶ 
ὀλίγον ἕτερον τούτων, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐθὲν τῶν ἄνω 
b 21 ἔτι APY Al. Asc.l: ἔτι δ᾽ E 22 μηδ T ex EY Asc.!¢; 
om. AP ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ] ἐναρίθμων E Al.': ἀριθμῶν T yp. E Asc.le 
24 συμβήσεται ἄτοπα AY ΑἹ. : ἄτοπα συμβήσεται ET Asc.¢ 25 μήτε 
. ++ μήτε] an μηδὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις, μηδὲ μηδὲ AP All αὐταὶ 5: 
αἱ αὐταὶ EAY Al.l¢; ἑαυταῖς Asc.° μήτε δὲ Α5ς.9 ἄλλαι] ἄλλαι 
αἱ Ἐ 27 δ᾽ Ej Asc: τὲ AP ΑἹ. 28 γένος A» All: τι γένος 
ΕΓ Asc. ὃ EY ΑΙ. : ὃν Ab 29 τίνων Asc. - ἃ πῶς] ἁπλῶς 


Er Al. 30 ἔσται ἔοτί. Α]. τί ADA] Asc.: rita ED τῶν δεῦρό] 
τῶνδέ AP 31 ἑκατέρα ET Al, Asc.: ἑκατέρων AP 992" 1 mpo- 


τέρας ET et fort. Al.: ἔτι προτέρας τῆς A® et ut vid. Asc. 3 ἀδιά- 
Φφοροι yp. Al. 6 τι E Al. Asc.: om. APT 11 βραχέος καὶ 
μακροῦ AP ΑΙ." : μακροῦ καὶ βραχέος ET Asc.¢ 13 ἢ EY ΑΙ, : om. 


A> Asc.¢ 15 καὶ pr.] καὶ τὸ E 16 ev EY ΑΙ. : om. AP 


9. 991 21 — 9926 13 


ὑπάρξει τοῖς κάτω. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ γένος τὸ πλατὺ τοῦ Ba- 

Ogos’ ἦν γὰρ ay ἐπίπεδόν τι τὸ σῶμα. ἔτι αἱ στιγμαὶ ἐκ 
> / Ν μὴ fal / οἷ 

τίνος ἐνυπάρξουσιν; τούτῳ μὲν οὖν τῷ γένει καὶ διεμάχετο 

ε " n , > ear > Ν 

Πλάτων ὡς ὄντι γεωμετρικῷ δόγματι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκάλει ἀρχὴν 
a a Ν }/ ὅν ἢ s peas z 

γραμμῆς--τ-οτοῦτο δὲ πολλάκις ἐτίθει---τὰς ἀτόμους γραμμάς. 

καίτοι ἀνάγκη τούτων εἶναί τι πέρας" ὥστ᾽ ἐξ οὗ λόγου γραμμὴ 

\ Ν μὲ “ Ν A a 7 \ 

ἔστι, καὶ στιγμὴ ἔστιν.---ὅλως δὲ ζητούσης τῆς σοφίας περὶ 

τῶν φανερῶν τὸ αἴτιον, τοῦτο μὲν εἰάκαμεν (οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγομεν 

\ a Ἀν Wa i b) Ν a cal Ν ᾽ 9.» ἢ, 

περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς), τὴν δ᾽ οὐσίαν 

οἰόμενοι λέγειν αὐτῶν ἑτέρας μὲν οὐσίας εἶναί φαμεν, ὅπως 

δ᾽ ἐκεῖναι τούτων οὐσίαι, διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν" τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν, 


“ Ν / ᾽ > / εἰ ION Ν “ tal 
ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν», οὐθέν ἐστιν. οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς 
Δ 
( 


/ a A la al lal 
ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν Ov αἴτιον, δι’ ὃ Kal πᾶς νοῦς καὶ πᾶσα : 


4 


7 a ION / n ry “ δι ΄ 
φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἥν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν 
n > lal AN « Ἂς »Ἢ" > Ν / Ν ie 
τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐθὲν ἅπτεται τὰ εἴδη, ἀλλὰ γέγονε τὰ μαθή- 
ματα τοῖς νῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία, φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν 
αὐτὰ δεῖν πραγματεύεσθαι. ἔτι δὲ τὴν» ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν 

φ A J A « / \ lal 
ὡς vAnv-padnparikwrépay ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, καὶ μᾶλλον 
κατηγορεῖσθαι καὶ διαφορὰν εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς ὕλης 
ho . / ‘ \ , “ ‘ © 
ἢ ὕλην, οἷον τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ φυσιο- 
λόγοι φασὶ τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνόν, πρώτας τοῦ ὑποκειμένου 
φάσκοντες εἶναι διαφορὰς ταύτας" ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὑπεροχή 
τις καὶ ἔλλειψις. περί τε κινήσεως, εἰ μὲν ἔσται ταῦτα κίνησις, 
δῆλον ὅτι κινήσεται τὰ εἴδη: εἰ δὲ μή, πόθεν ἦλθεν; ὅλη 
Ν ε Ν ΄ ΨΦ ὩΣ / “ al <7 
yap ἡ περὶ φύσεως ἀνήρηται σκέψις. ὅ τε δοκεῖ ῥᾷδιον 
εἶναι, τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι ἕν ἅπαντα, οὐ ylyverau τῇ γὰρ ἐκθέσει 
τ Γ' ἢ 
οὐ γίγνεται πάντα ev ἀλλ᾽ αὐτό τι ἕν, ἂν διδῷ τις πάντα' 
\ Or an εἰ Ν / / \ / μὲ n , 
καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, εἰ μὴ γένος δώσει TO καθόλου εἶναι" τοῦτο ὃ 
ἐν ἐνίοις ἀδύνατον. οὐθένα δ᾽ ἔχει λόγον οὐδὲ τὰ μετὰ τοὺς 


ἃ 20 ἐνυπάρξουσιν A? ΑἹ. : ἐνυπάρχουσι EY Α5ς.} 21 ἐτίθει... 
22 ἐκάλει Walker 22 ante τοῦτο et ras interpunxi 24 σοφίας 
EY Al. Asc.: φιλοσοφίας AP 26 ὅθεν E Al.: πόθεν AP 29 ὃ 
περὶ ras ἐπιστήμας AP; ὃ περί τινας ἐπιστήμας Rolfes 30 διὸ E 
31 οὐδὲ] τόδε AP 33 ἄλλων E Al.: τῶν ἄλλων AP D4 ἢ ὕλην 
AT ΑἹ. : om. E καὶ alt. om. T 6 ταύτας om, AP 7 καὶ 
ἔλλειψις EY ΑἹ. : om. AP re EY’ Asc: δὲ AP ἔσται ταῦτα 
codd. © Al.: ἐστι ταῦτα Α56.} : ἔστ᾽ ἐνταῦθα fort. Asc., Jaeger: ἔσται 
Heidel 9 σκέψις ἀνήρηται AP ὅ τε AP Al: καὶ ὃ E Asc} 
Io ob... ἐκθέσει EY Al. Asc.: ἐκ τῆς ἐκθέσεως A? 12 εἰ... δώσει 


A> Al; ἐὰν... δῷ ἘΓ 13 ἐν ἘΠῚ Al.: om, A? 


992" 


-ι 


ο 


20 


τὸ 
ur 


30 


993" 


TON META TA ®YSIKA A, A EAATTON 


Q \ , Naor \ / + “ My x 
ἀριθμοὺς μήκη τε καὶ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεά, οὔτε ὅπως ἔστιν 3} 
" x 7: oy INIA fa) Ἂς + ¥ oy, > 
ἔσται οὔτε τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν" ταῦτα yap οὔτε εἴδη οἷόν τε εἶναι 
>’ / 5 »} + Ν / Ἂς \ 
(οὐ γάρ εἰσιν ἀριθμοί) οὔτε τὰ μεταξύ (μαθηματικὰ yap 
ἐκεῖνα) οὔτε τὰ φθαρτά, ἀλλὰ πάλιν τέταρτον ἄλλο φαί- 
νεται τοῦτό τι γένος. ὅλως τε τὸ τῶν ὄντων ζητεῖν στοιχεῖα 
μὴ διελόντας, πολλαχῶς λεγομένων, ἀδύνατον εὑρεῖν, ἄλλως 
τε καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ζητοῦντας ἐξ οἵων ἐστὶ στοιχείων. 
2 , Ss \ a x δ \ 5.4.7 > / 
ἐκ τίνων yap τὸ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ἢ TO εὐθύ, οὐκ ἔστι δήπου 
a > θυ a ᾽ a , 2 7, “ \ a 
λαβεῖν, GAA εἴπερ, TOV οὐσιῶν μόνον ἐνδέχεται: ὥστε TO TOV 
y € x a XN as Xx x a > 2 
ὄντων ἁπάντων TA στοιχεῖα ἢ (ητεῖν ἢ οἴεσθαι ἔχειν οὐκ ἀλη- 
θές. πῶς δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ μάθοι τὰ τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα; 
δῆλον γὰρ ὡς οὐθὲν οἷόν τε προὐπάρχειν γνωρίζοντα πρότε- 
ρον. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῷ γεωμετρεῖν μανθάνοντι ἄλλα μὲν ἐν- 
δέχεται προειδέναι, ὧν δὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ περὶ ὧν μέλλει 
An / ef Ἂν Ν Ἄν ἴον ” 
μανθάνειν οὐθὲν προγιγνώσκει, οὕτω δὴ Kal ἐπὶ TOV ἄλλων, 
“ 3) ὧν “ i? y ΕῚ [4 Ψ Υ / 
ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις TOV πάντων ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, οἵαν δή τινές φασιν, 
οὐθὲν ἃν προὐπάρχοι γνωρίζων οὗτος. καίτοι πᾶσα μάθησις διὰ 
A BN “ 
προγιγνωσκομένων ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν ἐστί, καὶ ἡ δι’ ἀποδείξεως 
Ν ς by i an a Ν > μὰ Sey Ν / Ἂς 
(καὶ) 7 δι’ ὁρισμῶν (δεῖ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ὁ ὁρισμὸς προειδέναι καὶ 
C2 iA ςε / SN Ν ς 3 ΕῚ a 5 Ss BS 
εἶναι γνώριμα)" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν 
2) \ / / μὴ Ν n 
εἰ καὶ τυγχάνοι σύμφυτος οὖσα, θαυμαστὸν πῶς λανθάνο- 
μεν ἔχοντες τὴν κρατίστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἔτι πῶς τις γνω- 
ριεῖ ἐκ τίνων ἐστί, καὶ πῶς ἔσται δῆλον; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει 
»} ie 4 5 td Ν DA -“ Ν Ν Lar.) 
ἀπορίαν: ἀμφισβητήσειε yap ἄν τις ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ ἐνίας 
συλλαβάς" οἱ μὲν yap τὸ (ὰ ἐκ τοῦ σ καὶ ὃ καὶ a φασὶν 
> / Y 
εἶναι, ol δέ τινες ἕτερον φθόγγον φασὶν εἶναι καὶ οὐθένα 
τῶν γνωρίμων. ἔτι δὲ ὧν ἐστὶν αἴσθησις, ταῦτα πῶς ἄν τις 
ἊΝ be Ἂς » / 7 Ν ΜΝ» ὅν τὰς 
μὴ ἔχων τὴν αἴσθησιν γνοίη; καίτοι ἔδει, εἴγε πάντων ταὐτὰ 
b14 τε οἵη. E Ascle οὐδὲ AP 15 τίνα AP ΑἹ. : εἴ τινα EL 
Asc. 17 τέταρτον om. Τ' φαίνεται τοῦτό τι E et ut vid. ΑἹ. : 
τοῦτο φαίνεται AP 19 διελόντα APY ΑΙ. πολλαχῶς λεγομένων 
E All: τὰ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα APT 20 οἵων] ὧν APT et fort. Al. 
21 εὐθύ EY Al.: εὖ AP 23 ἢ pr. EY Al.: om, AP 26 τῷ EY 
Al. Asc.®: τῷ γεωμέτρη AP 28 δὲ E Asc.°¢ 29 πάντων EF. 
Asc.°: ἁπάντων AP οἵαν δή] és ET Asc.° 1 ἢ ΜΞ. Ναὶ 
7 Al. Bonitz: ἢ-. -ἢ codd. T Asc. 33 7 AP 993° I εἰ καὶ 
τυγχάνοι AP All: καὶ ef τυγχάνει ET Asc.) 2 γνωρίσειεν E Asc.!: 
γνωρίζει T: γνωρίσει Al. 5 ¢a Al. Bonitz: oa codd. T Asc. 
6 Al. Bonitz: » codd. T Asc. 6 δὲ τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον ἴδιον εἶναι 


ΑΡ 8 ἔδει EY Asc.¢: δεῖ AP ταὐτὰ Asc.°iet fort. ΑἹ. : ταῦτα 
codd. © 


9. 9922 14 — 1. 995 6 


al 3 b] @ e € 7 7. 3 3 “ 
στοιχεῖά ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν, ὥσπερ αἱ σύνθετοι φωναί εἰσι» ἐκ τῶν 
οἰκείων στοιχείων. 10 
σ Ν μὴ \ ἂ / 2 a a eg 
Ort μὲν οὖν tas εἰρημένας ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἰτίας 
a D 3 
Gnreiv ἐοίκασι πάντες, καὶ τούτων ἐκτὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχοιμεν ἂν 
> - “ ὡς ἈΕῚ a 4, > / ° 3 5 n 
εἰπεῖν, δῆλον Kal ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων: GAN ἀμυδρῶς 
ταύτας, καὶ τρόπον μέν τινα πᾶσαι πρότερον εἴρηνται τρό- 
/ 3 an / X Da ΞΕ / 
mov δέ τινα οὐδαμῶς. ψελλιζομένῃ yap ἔοικεν ἣ πρώτη 15 
‘4 \ , ef £ \ pL) Ἂν ἊΝ Ν 
φιλοσοφία περὶ πάντων, ἅτε νέα τε καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς οὖσα [καὶ 
τὸ πρῶτον], ἐπεὶ καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς ὀστοῦν τῷ λόγῳ φησὶν 
Pp ’ μ ᾿ : TAD GP 
εἶναι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος. 
5 Ν Ν ε / > tal \ , Ν lal vA 
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁμοίως ἀναγκαῖον καὶ oapkas καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ef Gs . ΄ x SS Gl DS a Ν Ν x 
ἕκαστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἢ μηδὲ ἕν" διὰ τοῦτο yap Kal σὰρξ 20 
Wey an a AN cal " e \ > Ν Ν “ 
καὶ ὀστοῦν ἔσται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον καὶ οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην, 
ἃ ΡῚ ~ v4 “ \ “ Ν “ Ν Sp 5 Ν 
ἣν ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα. ἀλλὰ 
a + Ν Ns / x 2 ° f 
ταῦτα ἄλλου μὲν λέγοντος συνέφησεν av ἐξ ἀνάγκης, σα- 
a Ἂς > ” \ \ δι ΄ 7 Ν 
φῶς δὲ οὐκ εἴρηκεν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δεδήλωται καὶ 
πρότερον" ὅσα δὲ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, 25 
3 / / / Ν xX 5 δ σε ας > te / 
ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν: τάχα yap dv ἐξ αὐτῶν εὐπορήσαιμέν 
τι πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον ἀπορίας. 


A EAATTON 


« \ a 5 / 7 a Ν Ν a Ν 
H περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπὴ τῇ δὲ 30 
an Ψ.3 lal 
ῥᾳδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτ᾽ ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι θιγεῖν 
αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, GAN ἕκαστον λέγειν τι 993" 
\ lal / \ > ὦ Ν δ Ν δ \ > / 
περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ᾽ Eva μὲν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλ- 
pa > ! Ν / / 
Lew αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγε- 
> / / 
Bos: ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἔοικεν ἔχειν καθάπερ τυγχάνομεν παροιμια- 
/ / oN 4 ε / 4 XN Xs » ε 7 
ζόμενοι, τίς ἂν θύρας ἁμάρτοι; ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν εἴη ῥᾳδία, - 
\ Der Ν ‘ / Ἂς Q 7. a \ 
TO δ᾽ ὅλον» TL ἔχειν καὶ μέρος μὴ δύνασθαι δηλοῖ TO χαλε- 


ἃ 12 ἔχομεν AT Al.¢ 15 Ψψελλιζομένη ἘΠ᾽ 16 ἁπάντων ΑΡ 
τε καὶ Sa: τε E Αβς.ὃ: καὶ Al.c: om. AP καὶ τὸ πρῶτον 560] 118], 
om. i ΑἹ. 19 σαρκὸς ET Al.°: σάρκα T 20 ἑκάστου Τὶ μηδὲ 
ἕν] μηδέν Τ' : μηδενός AP ΑΙ. γὰρ ET Al. Α58ς. : ἄρα AP ἡ σὰρξ 
Α 21 ἐστὶ I et fort. Al. 23 ἂν om.T 24 τούτων AP 
Al. Asc.: τῶν τοιούτων ET Al.) 26 ἀπορήσαιμεν AP 27 TH 
om. AP 29 ἃ ἐλαττον] β ex a fecit E 30 ἡ EAT ΑΙ. 
yp. Al. Asc.l: ὅτι ἡ Al. 31 θιγεῖν] τυχεῖν ET Asc.) D1 πάντας 
codd, Τ' Al.°: πάντως ex Al. Asc, ci. Brandis 6 ὅλον μὴ δύνασθαι 
καὶ μέρος ἔχειν aliquos coniecisse refert Al. τι AP Al.: τ᾿ E Αβο.:}: 
om, Τ' 


Io 


18 


20 


994" 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥ͂ΣΙΚΑ A EAATTON 


\ altos »ἷ ἊΝ Ν a / Μ Ν ΄ 
πὸν αὐτῆς. ἴσως δὲ καὶ τῆς χαλεπότητος οὔσης κατὰ δύο 
, 3 9 a / 5 2 ΕῚ στῶν ‘ » 
τρόπους, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ αἴτιον 
αὐτῆς: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα πρὸς τὸ 
φέγγος ἔχει τὸ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς 
ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὰ τῇ φύσει φανερώτατα πάντων. οὐ μόνον δὲ 
p ῇ ρ ὁ ob 
Ὁ a , 
χάριν ἔχειν δίκαιον τούτοις ὧν ἄν τις κοινώσαιτο ταῖς δό- 
> Ἂς \ lal .} ’ 5 / \ 
ξαις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπολαιότερον ἀποφηναμένοις" καὶ 
Ν fc / , ὧν Ἂς “ / ε na 
yap οὗτοι συνεβάλοντό tu τὴν yap ἕξιν προήσκησαν ἡμῶν' 
> J Ἂν Ν ἈΝ > / Ν ων 77 > 
el μὲν yap Τιμόθεος μὴ ἐγένετο, πολλὴν ἂν μελοποιίαν οὐκ 
᾽ ᾿) Ν XN a , ᾽ ἊΝ See Ν 
εἴχομεν" εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρῦνις, Τιμόθεος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο. τὸν 
3 Ν 4 νος nan \ Lal 5 ᾿ς =) / 
αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον Kal ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποφηναμένων" 
Ν Ν Ν peg / / ’ ε Ἂς na 
παρὰ μὲν yap ἐνίων παρειλήφαμέν τινας δόξας, οἱ δὲ τοῦ 
γενέσθαι τούτους αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν. ὀρθῶς δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὸ κα- 
λεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας. θεωρητικῆς 
ἧς Ν / > YA lot 3 μ᾿ Ν Ν xX 
μὲν yap τέλος ἀλήθεια πρακτικῆς δ᾽ ἔργον: Kal yap ἂν 
Ν na ΕΣ na > Ν bra 5 Ν / + n 
TO TOS EXEL σκοπῶσιν, οὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον ἀλλὰ πρός TL καὶ νῦν 
θεωροῦσιν οἱ πρακτικοί. οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνευ τῆς 
> od Ν , 3. Ἂν lal » ’ A \ 
αἰτίας" ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα αὐτὸ τῶν ἄλλων καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ 


lal μ᾿ € / \ / oe \ fal , 
5 τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει TO συνώνυμον (οἷον τὸ πῦρ θερμότατον" 


Ν x lal BA \ » a lal , ¢ 
καὶ yap τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ αἴτιον τοῦτο τῆς θερμότητος)" ὥστε 
RY 49. J Ν lal € / ΝΜ “ » , i) 
καὶ ἀληθέστατον τὸ τοῖς ὑστέροις αἴτιον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι. 
διὸ τὰς τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀληθε- 

> / 5 la) CNN dea) / ν , ΜΌΝ, lal 
στάτας (ov γάρ ποτε ἀληθεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκείναις αἴτιόν τί ἐστι τοῦ 
> Ψ 5 Ἂ “ a A “ > ed « Ν᾿ an 
εἶναι, ἀλλ ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοι-), ὥσθ᾽ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ 
Ἄ “ ‘ Led 5 
εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ THs ἀληθείας. 
> Ν Ἂς “ὔ 3 μὲ 9 / Ν > BA Ν 
Αλλὰ μὴν ὅτι y ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τις καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα τὰ 


Ὁ 8 αἴτιόν ἐστιν αὐτῆς AP 9 γὰρ καὶ τὰ recc. 12 κοινώσαιτο 
A? Al: κοινωνήσαιτο E sed ro eadem ut vid. manu postea additum : 
κοινωνήσαι fort. Al. τὰς δόξας Richards 13 τοῖς AP Al. Asc.°: 
τοῖς ἔτι ET ἐπιπολαιότερον AP Al.: ἐπιπολαιοτέρως E Asc.° 
14 συνεβάλοντό AP Al. Asc.: συμβάλλονταί ET προήσκησαν ET Al. 
Asc.¢: ἤσκησαν ΑΡ 17 enifort. Al., Jaeger: περὶ APT Asc.: om. E 
περὶ τῆς E Asc.: om. ΑΓ ἀλήθειαν T 18 μὲν yap] δὲ Γ᾽ γὰρ 
incl. Christ 19 δ᾽ Abr Al.) Asc.l: δὴ Ε ἔχει EY Asc.l: om, AP 
Al.) καλεῖσθαι APT Ald: καλέσαι E Asc.l¢ 20 τὴν... ἀληθείας 
EL Al.! Α5ς.}: τὴν Kata... ἀληθείας θεωρητικήν AP 22 ἐχῆϊ E 
οὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον Brandis: οὐκ ἀΐδιον ΑΡ Al.: οὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ recc. 
Asc. : οὐ τὸ αἴτιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ E yp. Al.: οὐ τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ Τ' πρός 
τὸ πρός fort. Al., ci. Christ 27 ὑστέροις EY Al.¢ Asc. ; 
ὕστερον AP 29 ἐκείναις EY Asc.!: ἐκείνων AP Al.¢ ἐστι 
ET Asc.!; om, A Al.¢ 


2 


9935 7 — 2. 994% 29 


Ψ na » Aes 9 2) ΄ A 2 LOIN Wal 
αἴτια τῶν ὄντων οὔτ᾽ εἰς εὐθυωρίαν οὔτε κατ᾽ εἶδος, δῆλον. 
\ an 
οὔτε γὰρ ws ἐξ ὕλης τόδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦδε δυνατὸν ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον 
Φ / XN cd “ Led 9 3 Dat ΠῚ δὴ > » ’ 
(οἷον σάρκα μὲν ἐκ γῆς, γῆν δ᾽ ἐξ ἀέρος, ἀέρα δ᾽ ἐκ πυρός, 
\ a Ney BA “ « > Ἂν fod / 
καὶ τοῦτο μὴ ἵστασθαι), οὔτε ὅθεν ἣ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (οἷον 
Ἢ fal an fal n 
τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κινηθῆναι, τοῦτον δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ 
« Ψ Ν Ν e ¢ Ν “ / \ 4 Ἂς 5 
ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, Kal τούτου μηδὲν εἶναι 
/ ς if Ν ION \ Oey > " ΗΝ ἢ We 
πέρας)" ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα εἰς ἄπειρον οἷόν τε ἰέναι, 
/ 
βάδισιν μὲν ὑγιείας ἕνεκα, ταύτην δ᾽ εὐδαιμονίας, τὴν δ᾽ εὐδαιμο- 
Jf ε > 
νίαν ἄλλου, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου ἕνεκεν εἶναι" Kal ἐπὶ 
τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι δ᾽ ὡσαύτως. τῶν γὰρ μέσων, ὧν ἐστί 
τι ἔσχατον καὶ πρότερον, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ πρότερον αἴτιον 
τῶν per αὐτό. εἰ γὰρ εἰπεῖν ἡμᾶς δέοι τί τῶν τριῶν αἴτιον, 
τὸ πρῶτον ἐροῦμεν" οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γ᾽ ἔσχατον, οὐδενὸς γὰρ τὸ 
τελευταῖον" ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον, ἑνὸς γάρ (οὐθὲν δὲ 
ὃ 7 a δ Χ , > ὑδ᾽ yy XN / n 
ιαφέρει ἕν ἢ πλείω εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἄπειρα ἢ πεπερασμένα). τῶν 
> a 0 a / 
δ᾽ ἀπείρων τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ἀπείρου πάντα τὰ 
a na / 
μόρια μέσα ὁμοίως μέχρι τοῦ νῦν' ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ μηδέν ἐστι 
n “ » ς. 7 2 b} s XN SIN τὰ, \ / 
πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον οὐδέν EaTW.—AAAG μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ TO κάτω 
. “ , ’ 
οἷόν τε εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι, τοῦ ἄνω ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ὥστ᾽ ἐκ πυ- 
Ν Ἂς “ »] Ν ΄ a \ Ὁ ple Neat A Ἧ, 
ρὸς μὲν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τούτου γῆν, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ ἄλλο τι γίγνε- 
/ na Ν 7 ’ > “ ἌΣ ΜΕ / 
σθαι γένος. διχῶς yap γίγνεται τόδε ἐκ τοῦδε----μὴ ὡς τόδε 
A Ἢ ΤῊΝ 
λέγεται μετὰ τόδε, οἷον ἐξ ᾿Ισθμίων Ὀλύμπια, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ 
Ν > re 
ὡς ἐκ παιδὸς ἀνὴρ μεταβάλλοντος ἢ ws ἐξ ὕδατος ἀήρ. 
c > ny 
os μὲν οὖν ἐκ παιδὸς ἄνδρα γίγνεσθαί φαμεν, ὡς ἐκ τοῦ 
δ na / 
γιγνομένου τὸ γεγονὸς ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτελουμένου τὸ τετελεσμένον 
Pes ᾿ς 9 / 
(del γάρ ἐστι μεταξύ, ὥσπερ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι γένεσις, 
a yo c 
οὕτω καὶ TO γιγνόμενον τοῦ ὄντος Kal μὴ ὄντος" ἔστι yap ὁ 
a A / 
μανθάνων γιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμων, Kal τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ λέγεται, 


9943 2 εἰς ET Al.) Asc.°: em AP 3 εἶναι E Asc.° εἰς] ἐπ᾽ 
E Al. Asc.¢ 6 ὑπὸ pr. ET Asc.°: ἐκ AP 8 ode... οἷόν] 
kal... οὐχ οἷόν AP Asc. εἶναι AP 10 ἄλλου pr. EJT Asc.°: 
ἄλλου ἕνεκεν AP 11 τοῦ] τῶν recc. δ᾽ om. J 12 rt Al. om, 
Ab All; ἔξω τι EJT Asc.! 13 τῶν AYT ΑΙ. : τῶι EJ jar’ αὐτὸ 
EJ ΑἹ. : μεθ᾽ αὑτό ΑΓ ἡμᾶς εἰπεῖν AP τί τ Al, Asc.: τι codd. 
14 τό γ γε τ᾽ AP 15 τὸ] τόγε EJ δὲ] γὰρ T 18 ἐστι τὸ J 
20 te AP Al.: τ᾽ ἐστὶν EJT ΑΞ5ς.} εἰς AP ΑΙ.1; ἐπ᾽ EJ Al. Asc.l 
ἰέναι EJ? Al. Asc.!: ἀπιέναι ΑΡ 22) μὴ π΄. 24 ek] ἢ ὡς ἐκ Jaeger 


μὴ JT yp. E Al. Asc.: ἢ A? et fecit E 23 ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὡς scripsi : ἀλλ᾽ 
ὡς ἢ γρ. E yp.J: ἄλλως ἢ ἢ Jet ut vid. E!: 7 fecit E: i) οὐχ οὕτως ἀλλ᾽ 


ὡς ἢ AP: ἢ ὡς ex Al. ci. Bonitz 24 ὡς οῃῃη. Ε]Τ ἀήρ. ..25 φαμεν 
om, E 25 ἀνήρ, γίγνεσθαί φαμεν [ὡς ἐκ Jaeger ἀνὴρ] 28 yap 
APet ut vid. Al.: δὲ EJT Asc.¢ 29 Kal... 30 ἐπιστήμων EJT Al. 


Asc.: om, AP 
2678-1 D 


σι 


- 
on 


20 


25 


3° 


994» 


10 


15 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A EAATTON 


΄ > / 2 ‘4 \ \ ’ ε 5 ».}ὕἷ 
ὅτι γίγνεται ἐκ μανθάνοντος ἐπιστήμων)" τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ἀέρος 
ὕδωρ, φθειρομένου θατέρου. διὸ ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὐκ ἀνακάμπτει 
εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐδὲ γίγνεται ἐξ ἀνδρὸς παῖς (οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται 
> “ / \ / b) »/a + Ν Ν / 
ἐκ τῆς γενέσεως TO γιγνόμενον ἀλλ᾽ (ὃ) ἔστι μετὰ THY γένεσιν" 
[ Ν Aye / > a ah “ Ν a Ν ION Ν 
οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡμέρα ἐκ τοῦ πρωΐ, ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο' διὸ οὐδὲ τὸ 
\ 5 ε / 14 Ν μὴ , b) / ~ 
πρωὶ ἐξ ἡμέρας)" θάτερα δὲ ἀνακάμπτει. ἀμφοτέρως δὲ 
ἀδύνατον εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι" τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων μεταξὺ 
ἀνάγκη τέλος εἶναι, τὰ 8 εἰς ἄλληλα ἀνακάμπτει: ἣ γὰρ 
θατέρου φθορὰ θατέρου ἐστὶ γένεσις.----μα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸ 
lal 2. aA el bp) \ \ > + ς / 
πρῶτον ἀΐδιον dv φθαρῆναι: ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἄπειρος ἣ γένεσις 
AN eae 4 ἐλ / 5» 4 / / " / Ν 
ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, ἀνάγκη ἐξ οὗ φθαρέντος πρώτου τι ἐγένετο μὴ 
ἀΐδιον εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τέλος, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃ μὴ ἄλλου 
ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τἄλλα ἐκείνου, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἔσται τοιοῦτόν τι 
ἔσχατον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρον, εἰ δὲ μηθὲν τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ 
@. δ΄ > ᾽ « ΑΙ ΩΨ na / “» n 
οὗ ἕνεκα, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ TO ἄπειρον ποιοῦντες λανθάνουσιν ἐξαιροῦντες 
Ν an b) “ / Ἁ > \ x 5 / ION 
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσω (καίτοι οὐθεὶς dv ἐγχειρήσειεν οὐδὲν 
πράττειν μὴ μέλλων ἐπὶ πέρας ἥξειν)" οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἴη νοῦς ἐν 
τοῖς οὖσιν' ἕνεκα γάρ τινος ἀεὶ πράττει 6 γε νοῦν ἔχων, 
“ ἘΣ / \ Ν / , > / 5 Ν Ν 
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι TEpas' τὸ γὰρ τέλος πέρας ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν 
ION \ ΚΝ 3. 5» / 5» / ᾿] Ν Q \ 
οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἄλλον ὁρισμὸν 
λ 160 ῶ λό ω" ee: Ν + € ” 6 ar 
πλεονάζοντα τῷ λόγῳ' ἀεί τε yap ἔστιν ὁ ἔμπροσθεν μᾶλ- 
c rio > Ν Ὁ Ν \ lal Ἂν Ν ION 
λον, 0 6 ὕστερος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὗ δὲ TO πρῶτον μὴ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ 
τὸ ἐχόμενον" ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες, 
> Ν , 59. 7 Ν > DS ἡ > a \ Ν 
οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν: καὶ τὸ 
γιγνώσκειν οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται 
νοεῖν; οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς, ἣ κατὰ τὰς διαιρέ- 
σεις μὲν οὐχ ἵσταται, νοῆσαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ στήσαντα (διόπερ 
οὐκ ἀριθμήσει τὰς τομὰς ὁ τὴν ἄπειρον διεξιών), ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἣν ὅλην οὐ κινουμένῳ νοεῖν ἀνά ὶ ἀπεί ὑδενὶ ἔ 
τὴν ὅλη μένῳ νοεῖν ἀνάγκη. καὶ ἀπείρῳ οὐδενὶ ἔστιν 


8.42 yap EJT Al. Α5..15: δὲ AP by ὃ add. Christ: ἃ ci. Christ 
éor_om. Al.: ἔστι τι Rolfes 2 ἐκ τὸ AP τὸ οὔ. AP Al. 3 θάτερα 
ἘΠΓ ΑἹ. : θάτερον ΑΡ ς ἀνακάμπτειν AP γὴ EJ Al.) Asc.¢: om. A> 
9 ἔτι Ἐ7Τ Α5ς.1}: ἐπεὶ AP Α].9 10 τι ex Al. ci. Bonitz: τὸ codd. Τ' 


15 τοῖς οὖσιν AP Al.: τοιούτοις EJT 16 δέ Christ: yap codd. T 
τέλος πέρας EJ Al.: πέρας rékos AP 20 ἐχόμενον] ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν 
ἘΠῚ 21 πρὶν AP All: πρὶν ἢ EJT ἐλθεῖν EJT At! Asc.¢ : 
ἔλθη AP 25 ἀριθμήσει EJT et ut vid. Al.: ἀριθμεῖ A 26 ὅλην 
scripsi: ὕλην codd. Γ ΑΙ, Asc. οὐ κινουμένῳ SCTIPSi: ἐν κινουμένῳ 
codd. Τ' Asc.: κινουμένῳ ΑἸ. : κινουμένην Al? yp. Al. οὐδενὶ Ἐ312 


AP ΑΙ. : οὐδὲν Ε}]} yp. ET 


2. 994" 30 — 3. 995% 20 


᾿ 


δ᾿ ΩΝ , > y ‘3 3.3 \ vo ,ὕ a 3 Ν 
εἷναι" εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἄπειρόν γ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι.----ἀλλὰ 
Ν \ Sey) / Se / Ν » fal Yat > 
μὴν καὶ εἰ ἄπειρά γ᾽ ἦσαν πλήθει τὰ εἴδη τῶν αἰτίων, οὐκ 
xX 9 999 A » Τὰ , Ν yD 7 4 
ἃν ἣν οὐδ᾽ οὕτω TO γιγνώσκειν" τότε yap εἰδέναι οἰόμεθα 
ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν" τὸ δ᾽ ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν πρόσθε- 30 
σιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πεπερασμένῳ διεξελθεῖν. 

8 Αἱ δ᾽ ἀκροάσεις κατὰ τὰ ἔθη συμβαίνουσιν: ὡς γὰρ 

a a a 
εἰώθαμεν οὕτως ἀξιοῦμεν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ Tapa ταῦτα οὐχ 995 
ia / 3 Ν \ ἊΝ > / 5 Δ Ν 
ὅμοια φαίνεται ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν ἀγνωστότερα καὶ 
/ \ ὩΝ / ἐφ ¢ Ν > \ 
ξενικώτερα' τὸ yap σύνηθες γνώριμον. ἡλίκην δὲ ἰσχὺν 
Ν Ν Ἂ « , a 3) υ ὡς / δ) 
ἔχει τὸ σύνηθες οἱ νόμοι δηλοῦσιν, ἐν οἷς τὰ μυθώδη καὶ 
παιδαριώδη μεῖζον ἰσχύει τοῦ γινώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τὸ 5 
ἔθος. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐὰν μὴ μαθηματικῶς λέγῃ τις οὐκ ἀποδέ- 
᾿ς ob pb μὴ μαθημ γῃ 
a ree - 
χονταὶ τῶν λεγόντων, οἱ δ᾽ ἂν μὴ παραδειγματικῶς, οἱ 
δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιοῦσιν ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητήν. καὶ οἱ μὲν πάντα 
lal n δ 

ἀκριβῶς, τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι 


H 


/ x Ν \ ΄ f= , ΜΠ αἱ Ν 
συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν: ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς το 
τοιοῦτον, ὥστε, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 
λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ, διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι 
πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἄτοπον ἅμα (ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην 

\ , > Lee Ν Ne) ION / εἰ a AN 
καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης" ἔστι δ᾽ οὐδὲ θάτερον ῥάδιον λαβεῖν. τὴν 
δ᾽ ἀκριβολογίαν τὴν μαθηματικὴν οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἀπαιτη- 15 
τέον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἔχουσιν ὕλην. διόπερ οὐ φυσικὸς ὁ 
τρόπος' ἅπασα γὰρ ἴσως ἡ φύσις ἔχει ὕλην. διὸ σκεπτέον 

“ 7 5 ς 4 Ὁ“ Ν Ν Ν / ε Ν 
πρῶτον τί ἐστιν ἣ φύσις" οὕτω γὰρ καὶ περὶ τίνων ἡ φυσικὴ 

lod “ BN 
δῆλον ἔσται [καὶ εἰ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἢ πλειόνων τὰ αἴτια Kal 
ἂς μὰ ἊΝ “A ri 
τὰς ἀρχὰς θεωρῆσαί ἐστιν]. 20 


be7 com. 11: ἢ Τ᾿ γ] δ᾽ AP τῶ 7 28 πλήθη] 30 πρόθεσιν 
Ab 32 συμβαίνουσιν οὖσιν J 995" 1 λέγεσθαι codd. I Asc.°: 
ἔτι τὸ λέγεσθαι Al. 3 γνώριμον AP Asc.: γνωριμώτερον EJT 4 τὰ 
ἘΠ Asc.¢: περὶ τὰ AP 5 τοῦ EJAM YE Al. Αβς.5: τὸ AD διὰ 
ET Al.¢ Asc.¢: om. APJ 6 λέγει J 11 ὥστε] ὥσπερ J 
12 τισι δοκεῖ Ε]Τ' Al: δοκεῖ τισί ΑΡ. πεπαιδεῦθαι EJ" 13 ἀπο- 
δεκτέον EJT Ale: ἀποδεικτέον AP 14 οὐδὲ θάτερον AP ΑἹ, : οὐδέ- 
τερον EJY Asc. 17 τρόπος codd. T yp. Al. Asc.°: λόγος Al. 
18 ἡ AP Al.: om. EJ Asc. τίνων APT ΑἹ. : τίνος EJ Asc. 19 καὶ 
... 20 ἐστιν codd. I Asc.: om, Al.: a nonnullis ex 99§” 5 falso 
hoc loco adiecta esse refert Al. 


35 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA B 


B 


/ lal « cr 

᾿Ανάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς 1 

a a a n n a > ‘ 
πρῶτον περὶ ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον' ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα 
Ν > fal + ε fe / Xx Μ \ 
τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειληφασί τινες, κἂν εἰ TL χωρίς 
τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βου- 
λομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς: ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον 
εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ 


30 ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, GAN ἣ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία 


38 


a an x “ / co) Ν Ψ lal / 
δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος" ἢ yap ἀπορεῖ, ταύτῃ πα- 
, ἢ a I 9... x. > , 
ραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις" ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέ- 
i 5 κ᾿ , \ Poe Garey ΄, 
pos προελθεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τε- 
θεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς 
(ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ 
δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητού- 
Δ) 


b “ x N τ ᾿ \ Ν ὮΝ , N ’ 
995 μενον EVPNKEV ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν TO yap TEAOS TOUT® μεν ον 


§ 


Io 


n n Ἂς , an Ν Ν la rd / 
δῆλον τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη 
\ nan \ \ lat 
ἔχειν πρὸς TO κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων Kal τῶν ἀμφι- 
,ὔ / “ » / + ees) / 
σβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.----ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπορία πρώτη 
μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιμιασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πότε- 
- δ n n los 
pov μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι Tas αἰτίας" καὶ πό- 
τερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης 
o \ na a Ὁ 
ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες, 
4 4 5 A SN Ne ¢ i \ τὰ 
οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀπο- 
Υ BS + \ \ a A fal / + 3505) 
φάναι ἢ ov, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων: εἴ τ᾽ ἐστι 
x 
περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον pla περὶ πάσας ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, 
δι ad δ 
Kav εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σο- 
φίας τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν. καὶ τοῦτο δ᾽ αὐτὸ τῶν 
5 7] 3 \ mn 4, ὡς > Ἂς > rd 4 
ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι 


995" 4-6, cf. 996% 18 --- 26 6-10, cf. 996" 26 --- 997° 15 
10-13, cf. 997° 15-25 13-18, cf. 997* 34 — 998° 19 

224 ἐπιζητουμένην EJ Al.: ζητουμένην AP Asc.} 25 πρῶτον 
pr. EJT Al.: om. AP 27 τυγχάνει J et ut vid. Al.: τυγχάνη EAP; 
τυγχάνοι Fecc. 30 ἀγνοοῦντας AP Al. Asc.!: ἀγνοοῦντα EJL Asc. 
31 ἡ yap ἀπορία ΤΑ» 32 ἀμφοτέροις Richards 36 οὐδέποτε 
JAD Asc. DT εὕρηκεν] εἰ εὕρηκεν AP Asc. 2 δὲ alt.om. Abr 
5 πεπροοιμιασμένοις ΕΞ πρότερον J 6 πολλῶν EJT Al.e: πολλῶν 
ἐστὶν AP ΑΞ5ς.9 8 πάντες AP Asc. ϑυ7γ.} : ἅπαντες EJ 9 καὶ 


ἀποφάναι om. E 10 er APT: εἴτ᾽ vulgo 12 καὶ E 


I. 995% 24 — 996" 6 


μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μο- 
ναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τά τε 
εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθη- 
τῶν. περί τε τούτων οὖν, καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ 
πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ 


τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις : 


\ 3 na Ne / Ν ς / \ P) 74 \ 5 ye 
περὶ ταὐτοῦ Kal ἑτέρου Kal ὁμοίου Kal ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιό- 
,ὔ n 
TynTOs, Kal περὶ προτέρου Kal ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὅσων οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ πειρῶνται 
σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος 
> N a ἮΝ lA of Ν Υ͂ 2 lal “ ’ 
ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων" ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα Kad 
αὑτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον 
3 Ν \ ® ὰ ΔΤ N fe x 4 € 3. \ \ 
ἀλλὰ Kat dpa ἕν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον: καὶ πότερον at ἀρχαὶ καὶ 
lal / δ ὰ χω / 
τὰ στοιχεῖα TA γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα 
¢ / - 
ἕκαστον" καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέ- 
ΟΝ a @ 4 fal Ns 
γεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον πότερον ζῷον ἢ ἄνθρωπος 
3 / ‘ “ yi Ν \ Somes, i 
ἀρχή τε Kal μᾶλλον ἔστι Tapa TO καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. μάλιστα 
/ 
δὲ ζηγτητέον Kal πραγματευτέον πότερον ἔστι TL παρὰ τὴν 
of ΕΣ > 5 € NN Μ \ an \ δ + \ , 
ὕλην αἴτιον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ οὔ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν 7) οὔ, Kal πό- 
a x 
τερον ἕν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, Kal πότερον ἔστι TL Tapa TO 
΄ , Ν τ ΄ Ψ = A Of 
σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης) 
aA BN an - lal a a 
ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ᾽ οὔ, Kal ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων. 
yo « ΡῚ \ , > a δ »" c 7 Ν ε oY 
ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ὡρισμέναι, Kat αἱ ἐν 
τοῖς 'λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ; καὶ πότερον τῶν 
tear) \ ᾿ , ς ΕἾ ΝΌΟΝ ef \ , 
φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων at αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, Kal πότερον 
- δ lal lal ΝΣ ἂν, A 
ἄφθαρτοι πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάν- 
7 Y 4 \ 
των χαλεπώτατον καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ 
We Yj 
ν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ of [Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, 


905" 18-27, cf. 007" 25-34 27-29, cf. ο985 20 --- 14 29-31, 
cf. 998> 14 — 999% 23 ὀ 481-36, cf. 999% 24 — "24 996 I, 2, 
cf. 999” 24 — τοοοῦ 4 2-4, cf. 1o00* § — 10017 3 4-9, cf. 
Iool® 4 — 25 


Ὁ 16 πλείονα EJT Asc.° Syr.°: πλεοναχῶς τὰ AP 21 καὶ ult.] 
καὶ ταυτότητος καὶ recc. 24 μόνων AP Α5ς.ὃ ; μόνον ἘΠῚ 27 ἄρα 
7145": εἰ ἄρα recc. 29 εἰ om. EJ 31 μάλιστα EJP Alt SyrJ: 
μᾶλλον AP Asc.) 33 καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ οὔ EJT Al. Asc.: om, AP καὶ 
...ov AbT Al, Asc.: om. EJ τοῦτο] εἰ τοῦτο Jaeger 36 ποῖα 
ταῦτα recc.: ὁπόσα ταῦτα ut vid. Al. 696" 1 ai alt. om. AP Syr.¢; 
εἰ Asc! 2 aiom. A? Asc.! Syr.° 6 ἔλεγον E*JT Ase. 


15 


Ιο 


15 


20 


25 


30 


35 
996? 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA B 
« 


rn » x 
οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι 
rn ” 
τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ φιλίαν ἄλλος 
, a ς x “ δ ἌΝ \ , € > \ 
δέ τις πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα' καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ 
/, 5" A xX ε xX ’ 6 an / \ 
καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ 
ὃ 7 Ἃ ΕῚ ΤῊΣ ν᾽ , ἄλλ es x Ν la σιν" 
υνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ: ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησι 
\ ᾿ς lal 9 / Ων / / A 5. & 
kal yap ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν. πρὸς δὲ 
ve 7 
τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα 
, λ 3 
καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ, Kav εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον 
lal lal ΕΥ 
κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις; περὶ 
/ 3 \ r rn 
yap τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν TO εὐπορῆσαι τῆς 
> n nan / na 
ἀληθείας GAN οὐδὲ TO διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥάδιον καλῶς. 
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ ὧν πρῶτον εἴπομεν, πότερον μιᾶς 2 
ΩΝ n a a 
ἢ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν 
lal 7 lal xX 
αἰτίων. μιᾶς μὲν yap ἐπιστήμης πῶς av εἴη μὴ ἐναντίας 
Μ x >) Ν / ” Ἂς n lal » 9 
οὔσας τὰς ἀρχὰς γνωρίζειν; ἔτι δὲ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων οὐχ 
ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι: τίνα γὰρ τρόπον οἷόν τε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν 
a na xX an A 
εἶναι τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἢ τὴν τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὃ ἂν 
> 3 A > (ee \ Ν Ἂς « fal vA / ie 2 A 
ἢ ἀγαθὸν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν τέλος ἐστὶν 
καὶ οὕτως αἴτιον ὅτι ἐκείνου ἕνεκα καὶ γίγνεται καὶ ἔστι 
μὴ \ Ν / Ν \ e@ ead / , , . / 
τἄλλα, TO δὲ τέλος Kal TO οὗ ἕνεκα πράξεώς τινός ἐστι τέλος, 
! lal n 7 
αἱ δὲ πράξεις πᾶσαι μετὰ κινήσεως; ὥστ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις 
ἊΝ if. i > 
οὐκ av ἐνδέχοιτο ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ᾽ εἶναί τι αὐτο- 
’ Ν Ν 9 a / > Ν 4 Ν 
αγαθόν. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν οὐθὲν δείκνυται διὰ 
ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐδεμία διότι βέλτιον 
“Ὁ lal 4 3 IO’ \ / / > Ν 5 A n 
ἢ χεῖρον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ TO παράπαν μέμνηται οὐθεὶς οὐθενὸς τῶν 
τοιούτων, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἷον ᾿Αρίστιππος 
5 / 5 Ἂς Ἂς ΄ / / 
προεπηλάκιζεν αὐτάς: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, 
lal / o na lol 
καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οἷον ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι 
/ xX a / / Ν ως Ν, 
βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς 
> ‘4 “Ὁ , A τὰ n A lal ν Ν A 
οὐθένα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.---ἀλλὰ μὴν 
9962 9, 10, cf. Ιοο38 5-17 10, 1%, cf. 1002» 32 — 1003 5 


12-15, cf. 1001» 26 — 1002? 11 18 — b 26, cf. 995» 4-6, K. 1059 
20-23 (996 21 — P 1, cf. 1059* 34-38) 


49 ἢ ΕῚΡ Syr. 1; ὁ δὲ Ab 11 δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἘΠῚ Al. : om. 
Ab 14 εἰ οὐσία AP 15 “ἐνυπάρχουσαι om. EY Syr.! et fort. Al. 
22 πᾶσι πᾶσαι ET 23 εἶναι ἐν τοῖς fort. Al. et Asc., Jaeger 
τὴν ἀγαθοῦ A» 24 αὐτοῦ AP Asc.° 25 ἔστι] ἔστι καὶ AP 
30 διὸ J 59: αὐτά fort. Asc., Goebel 34 βαναύσοις ΕΠῚ 
Asc. ; βαναύσοις αὐταῖς AP by κακῶν EJT Al.: καλῶν AP 


ΟΝ 7, τὸ 240960032 


v ὕ ΕἸ lal ny 4.5. 2 ὌΝ \ « / « , 
el ye πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι τῶν αἰτίων εἰσὶ Kal ἑτέρα ἑτέρας 
a ~ ΝΥ 
ἀρχῆς, τίνα τούτων φατέον εἶναι τὴν ζητουμένην, ἢ τίνα μά- 
Nora τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ ζητουμένου ἐπιστήμονα τῶν ἐχόντων 
αὐτάς; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν 
/ « Φ A Ἂς ς Pe « / 
αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη 
καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον, ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, 
\ > Li δ / 2 Ν μὴ fa) / / 
τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος 6 λόγος. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν πάλαι διωρισμένων 
τίνα χρὴ καλεῖν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν ἔχει λόγον ἑκάστην 
,ὔ @ Ν Ἂς ? ty ¢ / 
προσαγορεύειν" 1) μὲν yap ἀρχικωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη 
Ν Ὁ “ / 9) b) - \ ἡ 5) / 
καὶ 1) ὥσπερ δούλας οὐδ᾽ ἀντειπεῖν Tas ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας 
δίκαιον, ) τοῦ τέλους καὶ τἀγαθοῦ τοιαύτη (τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα 
τἄλλα), ἣ δὲ τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων καὶ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ 
διωρίσθη εἶναι, ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη: πολλαχῶς γὰρ 
5" / \ , A lal Ν 7 Ν \ an 
ἐπισταμένων τὸ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον μὲν εἰδέναι φαμὲν τὸν τῷ 
lal δ fal lol 
εἶναι γνωρίζντα τί τὸ πρᾶγμα 7) TO μὴ εἶναι, αὐτῶν δὲ 
΄ ¢ Cae a \ / \ to We) > ? 
τούτων ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον, Kal μάλιστα τὸν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ 
᾿" \ , a “ δ lal Ων / tA \ 
οὐ τὸν πόσον ἢ ποῖον ἢ τί ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ 
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ εἰδέναι ἕκαστον καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις 
/ J 5 / € / ως lal ° LJ / 
εἰσί, τότ᾽ οἰόμεθα ὑπάρχειν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν (οἷον τί 
b] \ / “ , “ ς / \ \ let Es. 
ἐστι τὸ τετραγωνίζειν, ὅτι μέσης εὕρεσις" ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἐπὶ 
n \ Ν Ν / \ ἃς Ν Ν 
τῶν ἄλλων), περὶ δὲ τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ περὶ 
lal a aN fal / 
πᾶσαν μεταβολὴν ὅταν εἰδῶμεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως" 
“ ’ e \ ° / nN / wa 3 Ν 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἕτερον καὶ ἀντικείμενον τῷ τέλει, ὥστ᾽ ἄλλης ἂν 
δόξειεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τὸ θεωρῆσαι τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ἕκα- 
στον.--------ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀποδεικτικὼν ἀρχῶν, πότερον 
c b) ‘ bl) “δ δ / .) / , . / 
μιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης ἢ πλειόνων, ἀμφισ βητήσιμόν ἐστιν (λέγω 
δὲ ἀποδεικτικὰς τὰς κοινὰς δόξας ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες δεικνύου- 
“ a > n ON / a 5 Ν 
ow) οἷον ὅτι πᾶν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, καὶ 
5 / A ων Ν \ 4. \ “ Ν fel 
ἀδύνατον ἅμα. εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, Kal ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦ- 
/ a aA 
ται προτάσεις, πότερον μία τούτων ἐπιστήμη Kal τῆς οὐσίας ἢ 
ἑτέρα, Kav εἰ μὴ μία, ποτέραν χρὴ προσαγορεύειν τὴν ()- 
996” 26 — 9975 15) cf. 995" 6-10, 1059% 23-26 


b2 ἑτέρα EJ Al. Asc.: ἕτεραι AP 3 τοῦτον J 4 τοῦ 
ζητουμένου EJT Al.° et ut vid. Al.: om. AP 5 τοὺς alt. om. rece. 
6 μὲν om. J 9 ἐπιστημῶν] ἐπὶ AP ἔχει ἘΠῚ Al. Asc.°: οὐδαμῶς 
ἔχει AP Al.! 10 ἡγεμονικωτάτη EJU Asc.°: ἢ γενικωτάτη AP 
12 καὶ ἀγαθοῦ AP 20 οἷον τί ἐστι om. J 23 πᾶσαν AP Asc.° 
Syr.!: ἅπασαν EJ 24 ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἄλλης yp. E, ci. Al. 32 Kal 


div εἴη pia AP προτέραν J 


5 


Ιο 


τος 
ο 


30 


35 
997" 


Io 


15 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ B 


/ lal Cc Ν “' > BA “4 ᾽ὔ x Ὁ 
τουμένην νῦν. μιᾶς μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὔλογον εἶναι" τί γὰρ μᾶλ- 
a * < \ τ 
λον γεωμετρίας ἢ ὁποιασοῦν περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἐπαΐειν; 
Υγ im € f Ν ε “ 2 i ς fal Ν ed I 
εἴπερ οὖν ὁμοίως μὲν ὁποιασοῦν ἐστίν, ἁπασῶν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχε- 
ny > an / 

Tal, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως οὐδὲ τῆς γνωριζούσης Tas 
> / rl \ td \ > lal [ - \ ,ὔ 
οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ γιγνώσκειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ τίνα 

n ¢ / 
τρόπον ἔσται αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη; τί μὲν yap ἕκαστον τούτων 
BN lal lal na 

τυγχάνει dv καὶ νῦν γνωρίζομεν (χρῶνται γοῦν ὡς γιγνω- 

/ ’ lal ἊΨ 5 / ᾿] Ἂς Ἂ,, Ν A 
σκομένοις αὐτοῖς Kal ἄλλαι τέχναι)" εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὴ περὶ 
αὐτῶν ἐστί, δεήσει τι γένος εἶναι ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὰ μὲν 

/ Ν, > »} y > ass Ν / Ν 3 te 
πάθη τὰ δ᾽ ἀξιώματ᾽ αὐτῶν (περὶ πάντων yap ἀδύνατον 
wd / 4 5 Ν yo “9 ow / \ 
ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι), ἀνάγκη yap ἔκ τινων εἶναι καὶ περί τι καὶ 
n Ν > / Ψ i ou , “ 

τινῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν: ὥστε συμβαίνει πάντων εἶναι γένος ἕν 

lal > / lal Ν n 
τι τῶν δεικνυμένων, πᾶσαι yap αἱ ἀποδεικτικαὶ χρῶνται 

“ > , > Ν \ δ ἐδ δ ε las > , Ape Ν 
τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν.----ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἑτέρα ἡ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἡ περὶ 
τούτων, ποτέρα κυριωτέρα καὶ προτέρα πέφυκεν αὐτῶν; κα- 
θόλου γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ πάντων ἀρχαὶ τὰ ἀξιώματά ἐστιν, 
Μ rh ὃν Ν Ν la) / / va \ Ca DA αὖ 
εἴ T ἐστὶ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίνος ἔσται περὶ αὑτῶν ἄλλου TO 
θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος;------ὅλως τε τῶν οὐσιῶν πό- 
a x fal Ν 3. 
τερον μία πασῶν ἐστὶν ἢ πλείους ἐπιστῆμαι; εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ 
7 9. Ἐν , ‘\ J) / 7 \ τ 7 

μία, ποίας οὐσίας θετέον τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην; τὸ δὲ μίαν 

n ἣΝ 
πασῶν οὐκ εὔλογον" καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀποδεικτικὴ μία περὶ πάν- 
τῶν εἴη τῶν συμβεβηκότων, εἴπερ πᾶσα ἀποδεικτικὴ περί 
τι ὑποκείμενον θεωρεῖ τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα ἐκ τῶν 
κοινῶν δοξῶν. περὶ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ 
αὑτὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δοξῶν. περί 

᾿ A nr \ 5 a n ” a ae " 
τε γὰρ ὃ μιᾶς καὶ ἐξ ὧν μιᾶς, εἴτε τῆς αὐτῆς εἴτε ἄλ- 
λης, ὥστε καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα, εἴθ᾽ αὗται θεωροῦσιν εἴτ᾽ 
ἐκ τούτων μία.------ἔτι δὲ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας μόνον 
€ Ων 
ἡ θεωρία ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ταύταις; λέγω 


997% 15-25, cf. 995” 10-13, 1059%26-29 425-34, cf. 995} 18-27, 
ae 29-34 


b 3 γὰρ] yap ov Schwegler 34 περὶ] τῶν περὶ AP 997% 4 οὖν 


ὡς I 5 καὶ] καὶ αἱ Richards, legit fort. Al. ο ἕν ΕἸΡ Al. : 8 
om, AP 11 εἰ] ἡ J 17 er DT: er’ vulgo 15 καὶ] καὶ τὸ ἊΡ 
18 εὔλογον ἘΠῚ Asc. Syr.: : ἄλογον Ab 19 εἴη] ἃ αν εἴη ΑΡ 22 ἐστὶ 
θεωρῆσαι ἘΠΤ ΑἸ. : θεωρῆσαί ἐστι Ab 23 ὃ AP Al. Asc.: τὸ ore 
E JT Syr) 24 εἴθ᾽ αὗται APT ΑἹ, Syr.®: εἴτ᾽ αὐταὶ EJ: εἴθ᾽ ai 
αὐταὶ Asc. yp. Al. θεωροῦσιν AP ΑΙ.: dewphoovaw ΕΠΤ' Syr. Asc.¢ 


ir J 25-26 ἡ θεωρία μόνον EJ All Asc Syr.! 


2B 1900.38 —19970122 


asi 2 


δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ τὸ στερεὸν οὐσία Tis ἐστι καὶ γραμμαὶ Kal ἐπί- 
a lol an 7 
πεδα, πότερον τῆς αὐτῆς ταῦτα γνωρίζειν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης καὶ 
τὰ συμβεβηκότα. περὶ ἕκαστον γένος περὶ ὧν αἱ μαθημα- 
\ He XA A 3 Ν Ἂς fal 3 2 > 
Tikal δεικνύουσιν, 1 ἄλλης. εἰ μὲν yap τῆς αὐτῆς, ἀπο- 
ie » ν Nae fal 9), 57 > as Ν a 
δεικτική τις ἂν εἴη καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας, ov δοκεῖ δὲ Tod τί 
2 2 jd cs > ee κα 7 yo ες a \ 
ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις εἶναι" εἰ δ᾽ ἑτέρας, τίς ἔσται 7) θεωροῦσα περὶ 
Ν > n a / 
τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα; τοῦτο yap ἀποδοῦναι Tayxa- 
Yj > 
λεπον.---ἔτι δὲ πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας μόνας εἶναι 
/ \ lal DN 
φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, Kal πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ 
πλείω γένη τετύχηκεν ὄντα τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ λέγοντες τά 
» Ν Ν ΄ Ἀν Ἢ Ν Ἂς ων ie 
τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, περὶ ἃ τὰς μαθηματικὰς εἶναί φα- 
3 V6 c me io / Ν Μ' Ν \ 
σιν ἐπιστήμας; ὡς μὲν οὖν λέγομεν τὰ εἴδη αἴτιά τε Kal 
οὐσίας εἶναι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰς εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις περὶ 
a lal a XN 5 ΄ ’ὔ > \ Ὁ A 
αὐτῶν: πολλαχῇ δὲ ἐχόντων δυσκολίαν, οὐθενὸς ἧττον ἄτο- 
x BS na 
Tov τὸ φάναι μὲν εἶναί τινας φύσεις παρὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ 
> “ ΄ Ν Ν aE ae , al > cal Ν oe 
οὐρανῷ, ταύτας δὲ Tas αὐτὰς φάναι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πλὴν ὅτι 
ok 
τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὰ δὲ φθαρτά. αὐτὸ yap ἄνθρωπόν φασιν 
a s oe ἊΝ ς 14 A 3 > / / 
εἶναι Kal ἵππον καὶ ὑγίειαν, ἄλλο 6 οὐδέν, παραπλήσιον 
“ lad ΩΣ an ᾿ 
ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεοὺς μὲν εἶναι φάσκουσιν ἀνθρωποειδεῖς δέ" 
ad BN + 
οὔτε yap ἐκεῖνοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐποίουν ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἀϊδίους, οὔθ᾽ 
Φ δ oh y 
οὗτοι Ta εἴδη GAN ἢ αἰσθητὰ ἀΐδια. ἔτι δὲ εἴ τις Tapa τὰ 
εἴδη καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τὰ μεταξὺ θήσεται, πολλὰς ἀπορίας 
ed al Ν «ς «ς ΄ὔ iy / >? i: ἊΝ 
ἕξει: δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὁμοίως γραμμαί τε παρά τ᾽ αὐτὰς καὶ 
» ¢ lal an > 
τὰς αἰσθητὰς ἔσονται καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων γενῶν" ὥστ 
ἐπείπερ ἣ ἀστρολογία μία τούτων ἐστίν, ἔσται τις καὶ οὐρανὸς 
τς Ν 3 \ > \ Ν “ ’ὔ Ν tA \ 
παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη Kal 
4 ¢ Ψ,: x ὮΝ Ἂν > ie 72 lal na fal 
τᾶλλα ὁμοίως τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανόν. καίτοι πῶς δεῖ πιστεῦ- 
’ INN DS as Ν ~ / Ν 
σαι τούτοις; οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀκίνητον εὔλογον εἶναι, κινούμενον δὲ 
Ν “ >) / ¢ 7 Ν Ν ἊΝ @ ε 3 Ἂν 
καὶ παντελῶς ἀδύνατον" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ὧν ἡ ὀπτικὴ 
~ / / ‘ 
πραγματεύεται καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἁρμονικὴ" Kat 
Ἂς fal 5 / > ᾿" Ν > Ν Ν Ν > Ν 
γὰρ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς 


997° 34 — 998° 19, cf. 995» 13-18, 1059% 38 — ἢ 21 


428 ἐστὶν APT Asc.¢: om. EJ b2 dom. AP 5 πολλαχῇ 
.. . δυσκολίαν EJT Asc.° Syr.!: πολλὰς... δυσκολίας AP 7 ὅτι] 
τι AP 10 θεοὺς EJ Al.: τοὺς θεοὺς AP δέ EJ Syr.!: δὲ εἶναι APT 
12 ἄλλ᾽ Christ: ἀλλ᾽ codd. Τ : ἄλλο Al., ci. Bonitz 14 τ᾽ αὐτὰς 
ut vid. ΑΙ. ; ταύτας AP: αὐτὰς EJT 17 τε om. J 


30 


3 
998" 


or 


σι 


Io 


15 


TQN META TA ®YSIKA B 


Ma rd Ν va 5 Ν Ν δ > / “ 
αἰτίας" εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ μεταξὺ καὶ αἰσθήσεις, δῆλον 
“ Ν lat a \ 7 een \ a lol 
ὅτι καὶ ζῷα ἔσονται μεταξὺ αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν. 
/ lal n lal tal 
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ ποῖα τῶν ὄντων δεῖ ζητεῖν 
rs fal 
ταύτας Tas ἐπιστήμας. εἰ yap τούτῳ διοίσει τῆς γεωδαισίας 
is , 
ἡ γεωμετρία μόνον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τούτων ἐστὶν ὧν αἰσθανόμεθα 
€ > 3 3 lat an Ψ \ ϑν Ν a 3 
ἢ 6 οὐκ αἰσθητῶν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ Tap ἰατρικὴν ἔσται τις ἐπι- 
/ / an fal 
στήμη Kal παρ᾽ ἑκάστην τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ αὐτῆς τε ἰατρι- 
lol fal n lal na “a ‘ 
κῆς Kal τῆσδε τῆς ἰατρικῆς" καίτοι πῶς τοῦτο δυνατόν; Kat 
Ν ς Χ 3 7 wy Ἂς \ iN \ TaN \ 
yap ἂν tyely ἄττα εἴη παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἊΣ / ef Ν XOX lal ’ / « « ,ὔ’ ἴον 
ὑγιεινόν. ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὡς 7 γεωδαισία τῶν 
an n a δ 
αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ μεγεθῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν: ἐφθείρετο γὰρ ἂν 
/ “ n lal 
φθειρομένων.----ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν dv εἴη μεγεθῶν 
ION Ν Ν 9 Ν c , / / Μ Ν c | 
οὐδὲ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ ἀστρολογία τόνδε. οὔτε yap αἱ αἰσθη- 
‘ a / 
ταὶ γραμμαὶ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν οἵας λέγει ὁ γεωμέτρης (οὐθὲν 
x AN na ᾿] a “ ION / «“ Ν, 
γὰρ εὐθὺ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὕτως οὐδὲ στρογγύλον; ἅπτεται yap 
ral , > DS Ν ςε ,ὔ 2 3 er 
τοῦ κανόνος οὐ κατὰ στιγμὴν ὁ κύκλος ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Llpwra- 
, Ν 2 i \ / ¥ c Τὰ Ν 
γόρας ἔλεγεν ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας), οὔθ᾽ αἱ κινήσεις καὶ 
εἰ an > a a a N 
ἕλικες TOD οὐρανοῦ ὅμοιαι περὶ ὧν ἡ ἀστρολογία ποιεῖται τοὺς 
/ lal lal 
λόγους, οὔτε TA σημεῖα τοῖς ἄστροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν. 
TaN / Ψ ἌΝ ἃς. ~ Ν an , 
εἰσὶ δέ τινες of φασιν εἶναι μὲν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λεγόμενα 
τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, οὐ μὴν χωρίς ye τῶν αἰσθη- 
n 5 > 5 / ® Ν / 3 / / 
τῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τούτοις" οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἀδύνατα πάντα 
μὲν πλείονος λόγου διελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θεω- 
ie) ΝΜ Ν ἌΝ 4 A ν 4 if: ? \ 
ρῆσαι. οὔτε yap ἐπὶ τούτων εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτω μόνον, ἀλλὰ 
n , a 
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐν Tots αἰσθητοῖς εἶναι 
let BS ’ “ 4 , ἊΝ ia 5 x SS of 
(rod yap αὐτοῦ λόγου ἀμφότερα ταῦτά ἐστιν), ἔτι δὲ δύο στε- 
ρεὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τόπῳ, καὶ μὴ εἷναι ἀκί- 
/ ral a 
vynta ἐν κινουμένοις ye ὄντα Tots αἰσθητοῖς. ὅλως δὲ Tivos 
e ov: 7 aS Ν Me ne! f Ὁ 9. 3: o a 
ἕνεκ᾽ ἂν τις θείη εἶναι μὲν αὐτά, εἷναι δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς; 
> / a 
ταὐτὰ yap συμβήσεται ἄτοπα τοῖς προειρημένοις" ἔσται yap 
οὐρανός τις παρὰ τὸν οὐρανόν, πλήν γ᾽ οὐ ls ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ 
ρανός Tis Tap pavev, πλήν γ᾽ οὐ χωρὶς & ἐν τῷ 
> n 
αὐτῷ τόπῳ" ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδυνατώτερον. 


"23 μεταξύ, καὶ αἰσθήσεις, εἰ δ᾽ αἰσθήσεις, δῆλον αἱ vid. Al. 25 περὶ 
ΑΓ ΑἹ.} ϑυγ.} : παρὰ EJ Asc.! 26 γεωδεσίας ΕἸἾΤΑΡ 27 ὧν] 
ἃ EJ Syr.! 31 ὑγιεινά τα AP 32 γεωδεσία ΕΠΤΑΡ 34 τῶν 
EJ Asc.¢: om. AP 35 περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ EJ Al. Asc.: ἡ περὶ 
τὸν οὐρανὸν AP Syrl ai EJ Asc.°: om. AP 998* 2 οὔτε J 
4 καὶ] καὶ αἱ E Syr! 5 ὅμοιαι om. A>: ὁποῖαι fort. Al.: ofa Jaeger 
ἡ om, AP 9 of E1J? 13 δὲ] re E 19 6 AP 


3 


2. 0070 23 — 3. 998 13 


Περί τε τούτων οὖν ἀπορία πολλὴ πῶς δεῖ θέμενον τυ- 
χεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν πότερον δεῖ τὰ γένη 
val \ > Ν € / Ἃ ΘᾺ > Φ 2 
στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧν ἐνυ- 
παρχόντων ἐστὶν ἕκαστον πρώτων, οἷον φωνῆς στοιχεῖα καὶ 
ἀρχαὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ὧν σύγκεινται αἱ φωναὶ 


Τὰ 2 > > \ \ € / \ lal ἀ , 
πρώτων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ TO κοινὸν ἣ φωνή: Kal TOV διαγραμμάτων 


an n / Log « > 7 “ / 
ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγομεν ὧν at ἀποδείξεις ἐνυπάρχουσιν 
3 al lal BA 5 7 Xx γ x a / 
ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξεσιν ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, 
Υ X rn \ ς 7 / a tal 
ἔτι δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ οἱ πλείω λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα 
Ν «ὦ 2 we ΄ \ ed Φ / 5 ὃς / 
καὶ οἱ ἕν, ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται Kal ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκεν ἀρχὰς λέ- 
γουσιν εἶναι, οἷον ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ 
τούτων στοιχεῖά φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόν- 
> > > ε 7 a aA a » ΗΝ N 
των, ἀλλ οὐχ ws γένη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων. πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τις ἐθέλει τὴν φύσιν ἀθρεῖν, οἷον 
® / ral 
κλίνην ἐξ ὧν μορίων συνέστηκε Kal πῶς συγκειμένων, τότε 
γνωρίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς.----ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐκ 
x cal ΕἾ 
ἂν εἴησαν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη τῶν ὄντων" εἰ δ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν 
γνωρίζομεν διὰ τῶν ὁρισμῶν, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τὰ γένη τῶν ὁρισμῶν 
, na n νΝ ΩΣ δ 
εἰσίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῶν ὁριστῶν ἀρχὰς εἶναι τὰ γένη. κὰἂν 
» ¥ N an ν lad 9 / \ Wi 99 ἦν lal 
εἰ ἔστι τὴν TOV ὄντων λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην TO τῶν εἰδών λαβεῖν 
> ὰἃ J ἘΣ » “ 9. αὶ > \ Ν / bape 
καθ᾽ ἃ λέγονται τὰ ὄντα, τῶν ye εἰδῶν ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσίν. 
φαίνονται δέ τινες καὶ τῶν λεγόντων στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων τὸ 
x x J > a “ 
ἕν 7) τὸ ὃν ἢ τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ὡς γένεσιν αὐτοῖς χρῆ- 
Ὁ Ζ 
σθαι.--«ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀμφοτέρως γε οἷόν τε λέγειν τὰς 
» / ς Ν x , fal ohn Wd e .“ ee ε 
ἀρχάς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας εἷς" ἕτερος δ᾽ ἔσται ὁ 
διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόν- 


9985 20 — > 14, P14 — 9995 23, cf. 995" 27-29, 29-31, 1050} 21 — 
10607 1 


ἃ 20 οὖν om. AP 21 πότερον APY Al, Asc.: πότερα EJ Al.} 
22 ἐνυπαρχόντων EJT Asc.°: ὑπαρχόντων AP 23 πρώτων E*T Al, : 
πρῶτον E*JAP ΑἸ.1 Asc.¢ Syr.! καὶ] ἃ καὶ J 24 φωναὶ AP et ut 
vid. Al.: φωναὶ πᾶσαι EJT Asc.° 25 πρῶτον AP 26 ἐνυπάρ- 
xovra AP 27 τῶν ἄλλων EJT Asc.°: τούτων AP 29 σύγκειται 
Asc.°: σύγκεινται EJ AP 30 pera E (sed erasum) JI Asc.° Syr.!: 
μεταξὺ AP by θέλει AP 2 κλίνης εἰδὼς ἐξ Susemihl 
συνέστηκε AP ΑἹ. : ἐστὶ Ε]Τ' Syr.! τότε] καὶ τότε AP: ἀθρῶν, τότε 
ci. Schwegler, ἀθρεῖ καὶ τότε Christ 4 εἰ AP Asc. Syr.!: ἡ EJT 
All 6 κἂν EJ Ascl: καὶ AP Syr.!} 8 καθὸ λέγονται AP ἀρχαὶ 
τὰ γένη EJ Al, Asc. : τὰ γένη ἀρχαί AP Io ἢ alt. EJT Al.! Asc.¢ 
Syr.: καὶ AP καὶ] καὶ τὸ recc. 


20 


30 


998? 


~ 
σι 


ΓΞ 
or 


999" 


σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ B 


a) iN ,’ . At / Ny \ \ / + pease 
TOU. ——mpos δὲ τούτοις εἰ καὶ OTL μάλιστα ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη εἰσί, 
Ν᾿ Ὁ a “ a Ων 
πότερον" δεῖ νομίζει» τὰ πρῶτα τῶν γενῶν ἀρχὰς ἢ τὰ 
ἔσχατα κατηγορούμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων; καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔχει 
5 ’ ᾿ ἃς \ 3 =n. \ , Ὁ 3 7 
ἀμφισβήτησιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἀρχαΐί, 
φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀνωτάτω τῶν γενῶν" ταῦτα γὰρ λέγεται 
κατὰ πάντω!. τοσαῦται οὖν ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων ὅσα- 
περ τὰ πρῶτα γένη, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται τό τε ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν ἀρχαὶ καὶ 
οὐσίαι" ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ πάντων μάλιστα λέγεται τῶν ὄντων. 
> , Ν cal »ν A o / ” Ay a » \ ¥ 
οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ey εἶναι γένος οὔτε TO ἕν οὔτε TO ὄν" 
¥ / \ Ν Ν 8, « 4 \ μὴ Ν 
ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς ἑκάστου γένους καὶ εἶναι καὶ 
“ > ς { γι Ν “ δ Ν Μ a 
μίαν εἶναι ἑκάστην, ἀδύνατον δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ 
a n a‘ n 3 “Ὁ 
γένους ἐπὶ τῶν οἰκείων διαφορῶν 7) τὸ γένος ἄνευ τῶν αὐτοῦ 
bi ἡ [ὦ > XV ὦ ὃ / δ Ν v > ᾽ὔ Ἂς ΝΜ 
εἰδῶν, ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ τὸ ἕν γένος ἢ τὸ ὄν, οὐδεμία διαφορὰ οὔτε 
δὴ ¥ a ν > Ν Ν > \ , EBS κα Se 
ὃν οὔτε ἕν ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ γένη, οὐδ᾽ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται, 
ν i) \ \ / Ν \ Ν Ν ν , 
εἴπερ ἀρχαὶ τὰ yer). ἔτι καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ συλλαμβανό- 
μενα μετὰ τῶν διαφορῶν ἔσται γένη μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων 
fal Ἂν Ν ΄ς “ Ν 5 > ta) Ν Ἃς 4, Ν Ὁ 
(νῦν δὲ τὰ μὲν δοκεῖ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ): πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι μᾶλ- 
ΕἾ a 
λον αἱ διαφοραὶ ἀρχαὶ ἢ τὰ γένη" εἰ δὲ καὶ αὗται apxal, 
ἄπειροι ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχαὶ γίγνονται, ἄλλως τε κἄν τις τὸ 
n / 5 Ν fal 5» Ν ἊΝ \ 5 ΖΝ , 
πρῶτον γένος ἀρχὴν τιθῇ. ἀλλὰ μὴν Kal εἰ μᾶλλόν ye 
3 Ν Ν ed » ὰ ἊΝ Ν 5 / 9 f Ν 
ἀρχοειδὲς τὸ ἕν ἐστι», ἕν δὲ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ἀδιαίρετον δὲ 
Δ Ων 
ἅπαν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ κατ᾽ εἶδος, πρότερον δὲ τὸ κατ᾽ 
εἶδος, τὰ δὲ γένη διαιρετὰ εἰς εἴδη, μᾶλλον ἂν ἐν τὸ 
ἔσχατον εἴη κατηγορούμενον" οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένος ἅνθρωπος 
τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἔτι ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερόν 
ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων εἷναί τι παρὰ ταῦτα (οἷον 
> ΄ a 5 a € ! > ν ἐν δὰ \ Ν 
εἰ πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἣ δυάς, οὐκ ἔσται τις ἀριθμὸς παρὰ 
Ἂς μῷ a Ἅ fal € Ἂς > Ν “Ὁ Ἂς ἊΝ 
τὰ εἴδη τῶν ἀριθμῶν" ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ σχῆμα παρὰ τὰ εἴδη 
lat ! . > Ν , fol “ 7 
τῶν σχημάτων: εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων, σχολῇ τῶν ye ἄλλων 
a \ / Ἂς Ν Μ , Ν tal , > 
ἔσται τὰ γένη Tapa τὰ εἴδη" τούτων yap δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι 
> 15 πύτερον AP ΑἹ. ; πότερα ἘΠ1 ΑἸ. 17 εἰ] ἣ fecitE ἀεὶ 
Al.: δεῖ AP: ὅτι EJ Asc. Syrt: οἵη. ΠῚ ἀρχαί JT Al. Asc.) εἰ fecit 
I: ἀρχάς Ab 18 ταῦτα... 10 πάντων codd. Asc.: om. fort. 
Al., secl. Jaeger (cf. 1. 21) 22 τῶν ὄντων EJT Al. Asc. Syr.): om. 
A> éypr.... ὄν EJT Asc. Syr.!: οὔτε τὸ ἕν οὔτε τὸ ὃν εἶναι γένος AP 
24 τοῦ ΤἸΑΡΓ ΑἹ. : ἄνευ rod E Syr} 25 ἐπὶ APY ΑἹ]. : καὶ E SyrJ: 
om. J τῶν alt. EJT Al. : τοῦ τῶν Syrt: τούτων τῶν AY 27 ὃν 
οὔτε ἕν AP Asc.®: ἕν οὔτε ὃν ΕἾ: τὸ ἕν οὔτε τὸ ὃν ἘΠ] 28 ἔτι δὲ τὰ 
μεταξὺ καὶ "31 αὐταὶ ΕΒ] 999" 3 κατ᾽ pr. AP ΑἹ. Asc.¢: κατὰ τὸ EJ 
5 γένος AP Asc.®: τὸ γένος EJ ἅνθρωπος scripsi: ὁ ἄνθρωπος AY: 
ἄνθρωπος EJ Asc.° 7 ἐστιν] καὶ ἔστιν J 9 τῶν EJT Asc.°: 
τὰ τῶν AP οὐδὲ om. A 


3. 998> 14 — 4. 9997 


/ , τς re ay! ᾽ " \ N , “« oe 
γένη)" ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὲ; πρότερον τὸ δ᾽ ὕστε- 
Ν / lal 
pov. ἔτι ὅπου TO μὲν βέλτιον τὸ δὲ χεῖρον, ἀεὶ τὸ βέλτιον 
πρότερον" ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τούτων ἂν εἴη γένος .----ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων 
Ὁ / Ἂς > + a .} , ts > Ἂν 
μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορούμενα ἀρχαὶ 
εἶναι τῶν γενῶν: πάλιν δὲ πῶς αὖ δεῖ ταύτας ἀρχὰς ὑὕὑπο- 
val / a ἊΣ lal 
λαβεῖν οὐ ῥᾷδιον εἰπεῖν. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴν δεῖ καὶ τὴν 
αἰτίαν εἶναι παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ὧν ἀρχή, καὶ δύνασθαι 
εἶναι χωριζομένην αὐτῶν" τοιοῦτον δέ τι παρὰ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
μὴ 
εἶναι διὰ τί ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι, πλὴν ὅτι καθόλου κατηγο- 
ta) \ ἃς / > Ν ‘ > Ν nan Ν Ὁ 
ρεῖται καὶ κατὰ πάντων; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ διὰ τοῦτο, τὰ μᾶλ- 
λον καθόλου μᾶλλον θετέον ἀρχάς" ὥστε ἀρχαὶ τὰ πρῶτ᾽ 
ἃν εἴησαν γένη. 
"R 3 2 / / 5" la \ los 
ὗστι δ᾽ ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλε- 
SK > / lad ‘ Ὁ «ς 4 > / 
πωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέ- 
aTnke νῦν. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τὰ 
δὲ 2 of ἡ a δ᾽ > ΄ 5 4, Ὁ ἢ 
ἕ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα ἄπειρα, τῶν ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λα- 
a 5 , @ Ν ¢ \ 4:8 Ne 4 
Bey ἐπιστήμην; ἢ γὰρ ἕν τι καὶ ταῦτον, Kal ἡ καθόλου τι 
ς 4 7 , ; iGo " ἀλλὰ Ν > a 
ὑπάρχει, ταύτῃ πάντα γνωρίζμεν.---ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο 


2 at οἷ \ “ ω Ἂς νὰ 39 ὦ 2 Ὁ 
AVaYKALOY ἐστι Καὶ δεῖ τι εἰναι Tapa τὰ καθ εκᾶαστα, ἀναγκΚαιον 3 


ν Ν / > Ν x > ef ΝΜ ae 4 Ἃ 
ἃν εἴη τὰ γένη εἶναι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἤτοι τὰ ἔσχατα ἢ 
“ a "» / 

τὰ πρῶτα' τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄρτι διηπορήσαμεν.---ἔτι εἰ 

πφ ” Ν Ν ΄ “ an an 

ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς 
WA 4 2 Ν ly a ® δ ἊΣ Ἂς »” 

ὕλης, πότερον, εἰ ἔστι, Tapa πάντα δεῖ εἶναί τι, 7) παρὰ μὲν ἔνια 
ων So? v Ν Α᾿ N > TNL eS " / 5 

εἶναι παρὰ δ᾽ ἔνια μὴ εἶναι, ἢ παρ᾽ οὐδέν; εἰ μὲν οὖν μηδέν ἐστι 

XX ἊΣ > ef AN xX ν Ν 2 Ν / > Ὡς 

παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη νοητὸν ἀλλὰ πάντα αἰσθητὰ 

ΣῈ 7 > /, ᾿ ta > / \ Μ > 2 

καὶ ἐπιστήμη οὐδενός, εἰ μή τις εἶναι λέγει τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστή - 

Ν 3 9)? > of AX IQ bey Ν ᾿ς 2 Ν 

μην». ἔτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἀΐδιον οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἀκίνητον (τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ 
/ 7 ΜΝ ὦ , > 7. 3 S ἐν ν 5. 

πάντα φθείρεται καὶ ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν)" ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ γε ἀΐδιον 
5 ION / δ , 5 / x a / 

μηθέν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γένεσιν εἶναι δυνατόν. ἀνάγκη yap εἶναί τι 
7 

τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται καὶ τούτων τὸ ἔσχατον ἀγένη- 


999* 24 --- ἢ 24, cf. 995» 31-36, 1060" 3-27, 23-28 


ἃ 14. οὐδὲν recc, 16 ὑπολαβεῖν ἀρχὰς EV Α5ς.} 5γτ.} 17 εἰπεῖν 
om.A>Asc! 18 elvacantedei17 AP 426 εἰ γὰρ APT 27 δ᾽ EAP 
Asc. Syr.: γ᾽] 30 ἀναγκαῖον... 31 ἕκαστα JAPT Asc. : om. E 
32 εἰ EJP Al, Asc.: SAD 43 repr. EJT Asc.le; om. AP σύνο- 
λον] σύνολον, λέγω δὲ σύνολον Jaeger 34 ἔστι] ἔστι τι EJT: ἔστιν 
εἶδός τι TECC. > 1 ἢ παρ᾽ οὐδέν 560]. Essen 4 δ᾽ om. ΕἸ 
Asc.! Syr.! 6 μηθέν EJ Asc, SyrJ: οὐδέν AP Alc 7 ἀγένη- 


τον EJ Ale Asc.®; ἀγέννητον AY 


5 


999" 


on 


to 


ΤΡ 


28 


TO0o0* 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ B 


yy ¢t/ / Noe Ny. , 5 / Da S 
Tov, εἴπερ ἵσταταί TE καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον" ἔτι δὲ 
fe > 
γενέσεως οὔσης Kal κινήσεως ἀνάγκη Kal πέρας εἷναι (οὔτε 
ἃς » / ΡΣ > , / 2 Ν / Ν / 
yap ἄπειρός ἐστιν οὐδεμία κίνησις ἀλλὰ πάσης ἔστι τέλος, 
Ψ" ‘A ’ - 7. A > / / Ν Ν 
γίγνεσθαί τε οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι" τὸ δὲ γε- 
\ > / > “ fn / yo 2 Σὲ τ ς Ὁ 
γονὸς ἀνάγκη εἶναι ὅτε πρῶτον γέγονεν)" ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ἡ ὕλη 
» Ν \ 5 , ae Ν x “Ὁ » aN 
ἔστι διὰ TO ἀγένητος εἶναι, πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον εὔλογον εἶναι 
i a 
τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅ ποτε ἐκείνη γίγνεται" εἰ yap μήτε τοῦτο ἔσται 
us 2 ΤᾺ IOAN + ἂν / > Ν fal > , 
μήτε ἐκείνη, οὐθὲν ἔσται τὸ παράπαν, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, 
a) / & Ν \ / Ἂν Ν Ν Ν τ 
ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον, τὴν μορφὴν καὶ τὸ εἶδος .--- 
Ly fal / nan 
εἰ δ᾽ αὖ τις τοῦτο θήσει, ἀπορία ἐπὶ τίνων τε θήσει τοῦτο 
Ν aN /. + 4 Ν s EAS / > Lye 
καὶ ἐπὶ τίνων ov. ὅτι μὲν yap ἐπὶ πάντων οὐχ οἷόν Te, 
φανερόν" οὐ γὰρ ἃν θείημεν εἶναί τινα οἰκίαν παρὰ τὰς τι- 
νὰς οἰκίας. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον ἡ οὐσία μία πάντων ἔσται, 
Ὁ a > , 3 5. ay eX X l e ε; 
οἷον τῶν ἀνθρώπων; ἀλλ᾽ ἄτοπον' ἕν γὰρ πάντα ὧν ἢ 
οὐσία μίας. ἀλλὰ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα; ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο 
ΝΥ «“ Ἂς \ a 7 ε “ ΄ ef 
ἄλογον. ἅμα δὲ καὶ πῶς γίγνεται ἡ ὕλη τούτων ἕκαστον 
ΚΝ Ν , yx “ yi Ν Ν a 3 na 
Kal ἔστι TO σύνολον ἄμφω Tadra;——éru δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν 
\ 4 2 / x 5 Ὡς \ ν 8: ὍΔ, ed AX 
Kal τόδε ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ μὲν yap εἴδει εἰσὶν Ev, οὐθὲν 
Ν 5 a dd +9) 3. \ Ν ὰ ἊΝ \ » \ Ἂν Ὶ 14 
ἔσται ἀριθμῷ ἕν, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸ TO ἕν καὶ TO ὄν: Kal TO ἐπίστα- 
a y 3 / + ad aE. / 5 Ν Ἂς 
σθαι πῶς ἔσται, εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἕν ἐπὶ πάντων; ---Οαλλὰ μὴν 
εἰ ἀριθμῷ ev καὶ μία ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ 
ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἄλλαι ἄλλων (οἷον τῆσδε τῆς συλλαβῆς 
ΑΨ ΜΡ, a don " \ rae) \ ς ᾽ ΄ \ 
τῷ εἴδει τῆς αὐτῆς οὔσης Kat αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἴδει αἱ αὐταί: καὶ 
ν a € ’ 2 an a > Ν Ν ef 9 > 
yap αὗται ὑπάρχουσιν ἀριθμῷ erepat),—el δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ 
αἱ τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ 
a >A «“ \ Ν > na aA x \ > 
στοιχεῖα οὐθὲν ἕτερον" τὸ yap ἀριθμῷ Ev ἢ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
λέγειν διαφέρει οὐθέν: οὕτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, 
Ν 5 an A OS τὰ 2 \ 4 - μ᾿ > ~ 
TO ἀριθμῷ Ev, καθόλου δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτων. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὰ 
fal lal n £2 lal a 
τῆς φωνῆς ἀριθμῷ ἣν στοιχεῖα ὡρισμένα, ἀναγκαῖον ἣν ἂν To- 


999} 24 --- τοοοῦ 4, cf. οοὔϑ 1, 2, 1060» 28--30 


08 γίγνεσθαι Al. 9 καὶ alt. om. T 13 ἐστὶν ἀΐδιος διὰ Ci, 
Christ ἀγέννητος recc. ~14 6 ποτε E Al. Asc.: ὁπότε JAYT Al.° 
γίγνεται εἶναι" εἰ Τ' 21 ἕν... ὧν Syr.° et ut vid. Al. Asc.: οὐ 
yap ἕν ἅπαντα ὧν JAY Al.! Asc.° et fecit E: οὐ yap πάντων yp. Syr. 
7 EJ Asc.° Syr.°: om. AP 22 τοῦτο EJT Asc.°: τούτοις AP 
23 ἡ EJ Asc! et ut vid. Al.: ποτε ἡ AP 24 περὶ... 25 τόδε 
EJT Asc. : om. AP 26 αὐτὸ ἕν καὶ ὃν EJ: αὖ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ ὃν Syrl 
30 αἱ pr. om. EJ 31 εἰ δὴ Susemihl 32 ἀρχαὶ om. EJT 
ev om. EJ 1000" I τὸ pr.] τῷ J οὖν] ἂν ci. Fonseca 


2 φωνῆς ἕν ἀριθμῷ EJT ὡρισμένω Ad ἂν om. rece. 


4. 999» 8 — 10008 31 


σαῦτα εἶναι τὰ πάντα γράμματα ὅσαπερ τὰ στοιχεῖα, μὴ 
ὄντων γε δύο τῶν αὐτῶν μηδὲ πλειόνων. 
3, a 
Οὐθενὸς δ᾽ ἐλάττων ἀπορία παραλέλειπται καὶ τοῖς 
νῦν καὶ τοῖς πρότερον, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ 
n 7 / 9: ΄ὔ > A ef - 3 Ν XX € > ts 
τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀρχαί εἰσιν ἢ ἕτεραι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ αἱ αὐταΐ, 
πῶς τὰ μὲν φθαρτὰ τὰ δὲ ἄφθαρτα, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν; 
c Ν > \ « ‘4 \ / Ψ 4 
ot μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεολόγοι 
/ 9 / fel lal fal \ 6 / € n 3 3 
μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτούς, ἡμῶν δ᾽ ὠλι- 
γώρησαν (θεοὺς γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐκ θεῶν γε- 
γονέναι, τὰ μὴ γευσάμενα τοῦ νέκταρος καὶ τῆς ἀμβρο- 
/ x J 2 a < a Ν ΘΕ ἘΝ 
σίας θνητὰ γενέσθαι φασίν, δῆλον ὡς ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα 
γνώριμα λέγοντες αὑτοῖς: καίτοι περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς προσφο- 
pas τῶν αἰτίων τούτων ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἰρήκασιν" εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
χάριν ἡδονῆς αὐτῶν θιγγάνουσιν, οὐθὲν αἴτια τοῦ εἶναι τὸ 
νέκταρ καὶ ἡ ἀμβροσία, εἰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι, πῶς ἂν εἶεν ἀΐ- 
διοι δεόμενοι τροφῇ“) ---ἀὀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφι- 
μένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖδ' παρὰ δὲ τῶν OV 
ἀποδείξεως λεγόντων δεῖ πυνθάνεσθαι διερωτῶντας τί δή 
2 3 lat beet al y Ἂν Ν 3. Ν , ᾿ \ 
ToT ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἀΐδια τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ 
τὰ δὲ φθείρεται τῶν ὄντων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε αἰτίαν λέγουσιν 
BA + “ ν᾿ a c 3) € > \ 2) \ 
οὔτε εὔλογον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὡς οὐχ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαὶ 
OX bey > fal x G.) \ Ἂν -. > 7 7 
οὐδὲ αἰτίαι αὐτῶν ἂν εἶεν. καὶ γὰρ ὅνπερ οἰηθείη λέγειν 
Ν / (s / ors. ’ na \ 
ἄν τις μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένως αὑτῷ, ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ 
οὗτος ταὐτὸν πέπονθεν' τίθησι μὲν γὰρ. ἀρχήν τινα αἰτίαν 
fal (ad Ν tal , > Ἂ AN ον \ a 
τῆς φθορᾶς. τὸ νεῖκος, δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο 
nm ” CLEC? “ Ν " , δι i 2 
γεννᾶν ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός: ἅπαντα yap ἐκ τούτου TaAAA ἐστι 
πλὴν ὁ θεός. λέγει γοῦν “ἐξ ὧν πάνθ᾽ ὅσα 7 ἦν ὅσα τ’ 
ἔσθ᾽ ὅσα τ᾽ ἔσται ὀπίσσω, | δένδρεά τ᾽ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέ- 
ION a tov Ue ΕῚ ΕῚ 7 \ « 7 
pes ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, | θῆρές τ᾽ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες 


1000% 5 — 1001% 3, cf. 996% 2-4, 1060 27--36 


2 3 τὰ alt.om. AP 7 αὐταί AP Al.: αὐταί εἰσι EJT 8 φθαρτὰ 
τὰ δὲ ἄφθαρτα AP Al.: ἀφθαρτὰ τὰ δὲ φθαρτά EJT Asc. 10 αὑτούς 


Christ : αὐτούς codd. 14 αὐτοῖς ΑΡ καίτοι καὶ περὶ ΕΪ προσφο- 
pas] φύσεως yp. E 16 αὐτοὶ T 18 μὲν om. Τ' μυθικῶν AP 
24 ἂν αὐτῶν E; αὐτῶν J 25 αὐτῷ AP 27 φορᾶς J δόξειε 


δ᾽ ET Al; ae) : ὡς δόξειεν AP οὐθὲν... 28 γεννᾶν EJT Α].1; 
οὐδὲν δ᾽... γεννᾷ A 28 eo... γὰρ] ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἅπαντα καὶ Al. 
29-30 ὅσα τ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ recc.: ὅσα τ᾽ ἐστὶν ΑΡ Ale: om. Ε]Τ 30 ὀπίσσω 
om, APT Simpl.° ἄνδρες J: ἀνέρες τ᾽ AP 31 7 om, AP 


10 


»ἱ 
on 


20 


30 


τοοοῦ 


σι 


Io 


ἘΝ 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YZIKA B 


καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες ᾿. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τούτων δῆ- 


ἰχθῦς, 
> Ν Ν “oh b) c J ἃ x 4 
λον" εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἦν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἕν adv ἣν 


“ ἔσχατον 


ἅπαντα, ὡς φησίν: ὅταν γὰρ συνέλθῃ, τότε δ᾽ 
[ἡ lal 39 Ν Af / >. Φ lal Ν > lA 
ἵστατο νεῖκος. διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸν εὐδαιμονέ- 
στατον θεὸν ἧττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων: οὐ γὰρ γνω- 
pier ἅπαντα: τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει, ἡ δὲ γνῶσις 
a € / “ ς te ce ΄,΄ \ fe 3») v ee Sr 
τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ. γαίῃ μὲν γάρ," φησί, “γαῖαν 
ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ 
Ἂς “ 3. SS Ἂν fod lal , Ὥς τ τος 
πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, | στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ 
λυγρῷ." ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν δὴ ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅτι 
na lal - la) Xx na 
συμβαίνει αὐτῷ τὸ νεῖκος μηθὲν μᾶλλον φθορᾶς ἢ τοῦ 
a» ΝΜ ¢ / ’ 3599 «ς ΄, fal μὰ if 
εἶναι αἴτιον" ὁμοίως δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἡ φιλότης τοῦ εἶναι, συνάγουσα 
γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἕν φθείρει τὰ ἄλλα. καὶ ἅμα δὲ αὐτῆς τῆς με- 
lod Xx 
ταβολῆς αἴτιον οὐθὲν λέγει GAN ἢ ὅτι οὕτως πέφυκεν" 


“ ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δὴ μέγα νεῖκος ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη, εἰς τιμάς 
ple Sd ΄ “ / “ ‘ 3 a“ 
τ᾽ ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο | ὅς 'σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλα- 
fe 9.59 ΄ “ ” c ot lal Ν By ia 
τέος Tap ἐλήλαται ὅρκου" ws ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ὃν peTaBad- 
λειν" αἰτίαν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης οὐδεμίαν δηλοῖ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως 
fal \ x 
τοσοῦτόν ye μόνος λέγει ὁμολογουμένως: οὐ yap Ta μὲν 
Ἂς na a \ , 
φθαρτὰ τὰ δὲ ἄφθαρτα ποιεῖ τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ πάντα 
Ν lal a 
φθαρτὰ πλὴν τῶν στοιχείων. ἡ δὲ νῦν λεγομένη ἀπορία 
2 Ν Ν 7, ἊΝ Ν Ν 3. + bY ΡῚ 2 TE a 2 4 “ 
ἐστὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐστίν.---ὅτι 
ἊΝ ων > ss y id > \ 3 7 “ Cer 
μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν αἱ αὐταὶ ἀρχαί, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω" 
> XN e 5 we oe Ν > / ἐᾷ Ν ‘ 
εἰ δὲ ἕτεραι ἀρχαί, pla μὲν ἀπορία πότερον ἄφθαρτοι καὶ 
> o δ 7 > Sy Ν 7ὔ “ «ς 
αὗται ἔσονται ἢ pOapral: εἰ μὲν yap φθαρταί, δῆλον ὡς 
nan ἊΝ 
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ταύτας ἔκ τινων εἶναι (πάντα γὰρ φθεί- 
ρεται εἰς ταῦτ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν), ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν ἀρχῶν 
ἑτέρας apxds εἶναι προτέρας, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον, καὶ εἰ 
7 \ > 7 τῷ » Uy SS n x \ 
ἵσταται καὶ εἰ βαδίζει εἰς ἄπειρον: ἔτι δὲ πῶς ἔσται τὰ 


by ἦν APY Asc.: ἐνῆν EJ ἐν] τὸ νεῖκος ἐν AP? 2 συνέλθῃ 
EJ et ut vid. Al. Asc.: συνέλθωσιν AP δ᾽ om. EJ? 3 ἱστᾷ 
τὸ E? διὸ] ὃ AP 4 γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα EJT 7 αἰθέρι 
...8 ἀΐδηλον οπχ. EJT 7 δῖον Α5ς.9 De “4᾽:.: θεῖον ΑΡ ἀτὰρ... 
8 ἀΐδηλον recc.: om. AP 8 στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν De An.: στοργῇ te 
στοργήν EJT δέ τι 7 9 Avypo J 11 αἴτιον om. AP 
13 τὸ αἴτιον AP 14 ἄλλο te J 15 6 AP πλατέος om. Τ' 
16 παρ᾽ ἐλήλαται Sturz: παρελήλαται AP Simpl.°: παρελήλατο EJ 
Αβεδ; dissoluit® ὥστ᾽ T 17 τῆς] ἐξ E: om. J 18 μόνος 
A» et ut vid. Al.: μόνον EJT 24 αὐταὶ J Asc.e: αἱ αὐταὶ AP 
25 πάντα AP Asc.;: ἅπαντα EJ 28 ra om, AP 


. IO000* 22 — IOOI® 2 
3 


φθαρτά, εἰ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναιρεθήσονται; εἰ δὲ ἄφθαρτοι, διὰ 
foe) Ν 4 >) / > lal Ne co: > Ἂς [οὶ 
τί ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἀφθάρτων οὐσῶν φθαρτὰ ἔσται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν 

᾿ a \ a 
ἑτέρων ἄφθαρτα; τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ εὔλογον, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδύνα- 

a a a 
Tov ἢ πολλοῦ λόγου δεῖται. ἔτι δὲ οὐδ᾽ ἐγκεχείρηκεν οὐδεὶς 

/ 
ἑτέρας, ἀλλὰ Tas αὐτὰς ἁπάντων λέγουσιν ἀρχάς. ἀλλὰ 
st an a 
TO πρῶτον ἀπορηθὲν ἀποτρώγουσιν ὥσπερ τοῦτο μικρόν τι 
λαμβάνοντες. 

ἐ - 

Πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατον καὶ πρὸς τὸ 
γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγκαιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ 
ἕν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι 
δ Ν ἊΝ ὰ \ Sy: 5) x - - ΄ὔ ἌΝ, ἢ \ BN 
dv τὸ μὲν ἕν τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ 
A \ ὍΝ ε ε νΝ ,ὕ € Ὡς ὡς 
ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
ἐκείνως οἱ δ᾽ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. Πλάτων 
Ν Ν \ δ , > el ΄ \ BY ION \ 
μὲν yap καὶ of Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὃν οὐδὲ τὸ 
ἃ 9 Ἂς cal > lol Ἂς Ψν, > «ε Μ fas 3 ͵ὕ 
ev ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὑτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας 
αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι: of δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον Ἔμ- 

lel c 3 , elisa J “ Ν ο΄. 
πεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν 
. ’, Ν Ὁ / [2] Ἂς γι: LD aed 
~éotw δόξειε yap ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία 
γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἕν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ᾽ 
Ἄν \ Ὁ Ν a a Ν Ν » 3 co Ἂς Ἅ, 
ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἕν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα 
> , edd , \ > x \ € 7 Ss 
εἶναί τε Kal γεγονέναι. ὡς δ᾽ αὔτως καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ 
στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι" ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν 
Se ἃς Ν Ἄν “ > ἊΝ Ὁ , , 
τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὃν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν. συμβαΐίνει 
δέ, εἰ μέν τις μὴ θήσεται εἶναί τινα οὐσίαν τὸ ἕν καὶ τὸ 
ὄν, μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων εἶναι τῶν καθόλου μηθέν (ταῦτα γάρ 
ἐστι καθόλου μάλιστα πάντων, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τι ἕν αὐτὸ 

by SEEN » a a BA xX + ας Ν 
μηδ᾽ αὐτὸ ὄν, σχολῇ τῶν γε ἄλλων τι ἂν εἴη παρὰ τὰ 


Ioo1® 4 -- Ῥ 25, "Ὁ 26 --- Ico2? 11, cf. 996% 4-9, 12-15, 1060% 
So 219 


b 32 εἴρηκεν ex Al. ci. Bonitz ΙΟΟΙδ 1 post ἑτέρας add. λέγειν 
ADP, λέγει 1532 λέγουσιν ἁπάντων AP 10 τὸ pr. om, E 12 αὐτοῦ 
... ὄντι Christ: αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ὄντι ci. Bonitz: αὐτοῦ τὸ ἐν 
εἶναι καὶ ὄν τι AP: ταὐτὸ ἕν εἶναι καὶ ὄντι ἘΠ: αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν εἶναι καὶ ὄν τι 
T Al.¢: τῆς αὐτῆς, καὶ ταὐτοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι fort. Al. 13 ὅτι 
Brandis: ὅτι vulgo: ὅ τί ποτε AP ἕν AP et ut vid. ΑἹ. : ἕν ὄν EJP 
14 λέγειν τί τοῦτο AP 15 γοῦν] yap Γ 19 ἕν καὶ τὸ ὃν AP AL: 
ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν EJT 20 θήσεται ... οὐσίαν] τινὸς οὐσίαν λέγει yp. Al. 
τινα οὐσίαν EJT Α1].5 Asc.!: τινας οὐσίας AP 5υτ.} τὸ ἐν in marg. E 
22 δὲ EJT Al.®: yap AY: δὴ Susemihl 


2678-1 E 


30 


Ioor® 


μι 
σι 


20 


25 


30 


Toor» 


Ιο 


05 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®&YSIKA B 


, bd ¢ oo Ν '΄Ν » a ee ἊΝ B] 7, 
λεγόμενα καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), ἔτι δὲ μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐσίας, 
lal “ 2599 “ἃ b) \ ΚΝ ς / , 
δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἃν ἀριθμὸς εἴη ὡς κεχωρισμένη τις φύσις 
an » « τς ἃς 5 BS / ς ~ Ν “ 
τῶν ὄντων (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμὸς μονάδες, ἡ δὲ μονὰς ὅπερ 
“2 ae: } > > » > TX ΟΝ 3 Ν » > a > / 
ἕν τί ἐστιν)" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τι αὐτὸ ἕν καὶ ὄν, ἀναγκαῖον οὐσίαν 
ἌΡ ἢν ΟΣ τ τὰ \ Sy. > x « , , 
αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸ ἕν καὶ TO ὄν ov yap ἕτερόν τι καθόλου 

a b) Ν lay > / b) Ν Ν bd x 
κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ ταῦτα avTd.—addAa μὴν εἴ γ᾽ ἔσται 
ΒᾺΝ BY Ν ϑι ΤᾺ ed Ν 5 7 an ᾿ Ν 
τι αὐτὸ ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ ἕν, πολλὴ ἀπορία πῶς ἔσται τι παρὰ 
ra) of / Ν nn 7 ca > » Ν 
ταῦτα ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ πῶς ἔσται πλείω ἑνὸς τὰ ὄντα. τὸ 
N oy] an Ψ > y “ 5% \ / 
yap ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥστε κατὰ τὸν Tlappevidov 
7 2 tf a ε a XS » \ 
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη λόγον ev ἅπαντα εἶναι τὰ ὄντα καὶ 
[4 a Ν Μ 9 / Ἂς / BA Ἂς Ἂς 
τοῦτο εἶναι TO ὄν. ἀμφοτέρως δὲ δύσκολον" ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ 
3 Nat ven) By 4 \ 9) in Sie 525.» \ > \ 
ἢ TO ἕν οὐσία ἄν τε ἢ TO αὐτὸ ἕν, ἀδύνατον τὸν ἀριθμὸν 
οὐσίαν εἶναι. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν μὴ ἢ, εἴρηται πρότερον δι᾿ ὅ' ἐὰν 
: μ μὴ ἢ» εἰρη β 
Ν Ἂς a fal ,ὔ ΄- 
δὲ ἢ, ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐκ τίνος γὰρ 
‘\ Ν a »” aN Ν ω τ ἀ Ἂς Ν ἃ hs 
Tapa TO ἕν ἔσται αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἕν; ἀνάγκη yap μὴ ἕν εἷ- 
ef Ν Ν Μ᾿ \ ἦς δ Ἂς Ὄ a e 
ναι" ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ ἕν ἢ πολλὰ ὧν ἕν ἕκαστον. 
yy i) / 5 Ν Ν ¢ Ν ἃς Ν / Waid 
ἔτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα 
IAN x ν aA Ν [2 / / τὰ ΄ 
οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη (0 γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον 
ποιεῖ μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὔ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, 
« » / “ » Ν / 
ws δηλονότι ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος" καὶ εἰ μέγεθος, 
, a Ν » Ν \ Ν ᾿ς Ν 
σωματικόν" τοῦτο γὰρ πάντῃ ὄν' τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πὼς μὲν 
/ / a \ > 5 / Φ Ψ a 
προστιθέμενα ποιήσει μεῖζον, πὼς δ᾽ οὐθέν, οἷον ἐπίπεδον 
Ν ἐξ \ \ \ ἊΣ > “ 3 3 > Ν 
καὶ γραμμή, στιγμὴ δὲ καὶ μονὰς οὐδαμῶς) ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ 
@ a a x > / 5, b) / ΄ 
οὗτος θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς, καὶ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἀδιαίρετόν τι 
vA \ A \ J “ re 4 / Ds al 
ὥστε [καὶ οὕτως] καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τιν᾽ ἀπολογίαν ἔχειν (μεῖ- 
ὧν μὲν γὰρ οὐ ποιήσει πλεῖον δὲ προστιθέμενον τὸ τοιοῦτον») "---- 
5 Ν cal Ν ΩΣ ἘΝ ΄ δ , / a 
ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου ἢ πλειόνων τοιούτων ἔσται 
μέγεθος; ὅμοιον γὰρ καὶ τὴν γραμμὴν ἐκ στιγμῶν εἶναι 
t 2 \ Ἂς \ ν 4 € / a 
φάσκειν. ἀλλὰ μὴν Kal εἴ τις οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνει ὥστε 
δ 25 φύσις τις EJT ϑγτ.} 28 ἕν καὶ τὸ ὃν AP ΑἹ. : ὃν καὶ τὸ 
ἐν ἘΠῚ Asc.¢ καθόλου codd. Τ' Al. Asc. Syr.: καθ᾽ οὗ Bonitz 
33 ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν λόγον AP: λόγον συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη Γ΄ 1 δύσ- 
καλον E 2 τὸ «αἷς, EJT All: τι AP 4 €k τινος J yap AP 
Ale: γὰρ καὶ EJT Syr.) 5 μὴ ἕν AP et fort. ΑἹ. : μηδὲν EJP Ase, 
Syr.! 9 μηδὲ ἔλαττον ΑΓ Al.: om. EJ οὗ] 11 σωματικοῦ 
ci. Christ 12 προστιθεμένω" AP 13 ἐπειδὴ ἘΠΤ Asc.®: εἰ δὴ 
A? Al. 14 οὗτος Ε]Γ ΑἹ. : οὕτως AP Asc.¢ καὶ AP ΑΙ. Asc.e: 
καὶ οὐκ ΕΤ τι AP ΑἹ. : om. EJT 15. ὥστε καὶ οὕτως] καὶ οὕτως 
ὥστε ci. Christ, καὶ οὕτως Lasson: καὶ οὕτως seclusi ὄντως ci. Fonseca 


καὶ alt.om. ΤῚ εἴ fort. Al, ἔχει ἀπολογίαν E (sed ν post ἔχει erasum) 
ic 17 τοιούτων AP ΑἹ. : om. EJT Syr,} 


4. ἸΟΟΙ 24 — 5. 10027 18 


/ 6 θά 7 / ᾿ a ἘΝ ’ a \ 
γενέσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ 20 
Ν \ - 
ἄλλου μὴ ἑνός τινος τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ζητητέον διὰ 
ἦα \ n CaN x 5 \ € EN Ἂς / x Ν 
τί καὶ πῶς ὁτὲ μὲν ἀριθμὸς ὁτὲ δὲ μέγεθος ἔσται τὸ γε- 
ἣν Μ Ν ἣν A € > , \ ε ἣν τ ϑ Ἂς, tA 
νόμενον, εἴπερ TO μὴ ἕν ἡ ἀνισότης Kal ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις 
a + BS “ 3 ΘΑ Ν / ἮΝ “ > 3, 
ἦν. οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ ταύτης οὔτε ὅπως ἐξ ἀρι- 
a Tpin © / δι a 
θμοῦ τινὸς Kal ταύτης γένοιτ᾽ ἃν τὰ μεγέθη, δῆλον. 25 
fe 2 5 / > 7 ie « 5) Ἂν \ 
5 Τούτων δ᾽ ἐχομένη ἀπορία πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ καὶ 
τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές 
> δ Ey > Ν Ν / >) 7 i ΝΑ Ν 7 
εἰσιν ἢ οὔ. εἰ μὲν yap μή εἰσιν, διαφεύγει τί TO ὃν Kal τίνες 
αἱ οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων" τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη καὶ al κινήσεις 
καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις καὶ οἱ λόγοι οὐθενὸς δο- 3° 
na / 
κοῦσιν οὐσίαν σημαίνειν (λέγονται yap πάντα καθ᾽ ὕποκει- 
μένου τινός, καὶ οὐθὲν τόδε τι} ἃ δὲ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν δόξειε 
ee > 4 “ Ν Lal \ “ \ bus 3 ( 
σημαίνειν οὐσίαν, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ, ἐξ ὧν 
Ἂς / 7 / 7 / NX δ a 
τὰ σύνθετα σώματα συνέστηκε, τούτων θερμότητες μὲν Kal 1002 
> ca) / n 
ψυχρότητες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη, οὐκ οὐσίαι, TO δὲ σῶμα 
na \ 
TO ταῦτα πεπονθὸς μόνον ὑπομένει ὡς ὄν TL καὶ οὐσία τις 
be) > Ν Ν , na ἣν ΘΕ Se lol 3 ig 
οὖσα. ἀλλὰ μὴν TO γε σῶμα ἧττον οὐσία τῆς ἐπιφανείας, 
καὶ αὕτη τῆς γραμμῆς, καὶ αὕτη τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς 5 
στιγμῆς: τούτοις γὰρ ὥρισται τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνευ 
σώματος ἐνδέχεσθαι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ σῷμα ἄνευ τούτων 
4. ἡ , ε Ν Ν Ν € / Ν 
ἀδύνατον. διόπερ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ πρότερον τὴν 
2 7 \ Ν a Μ᾿ Ν a ων Ἂς Ν 
οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ ὃν ᾧοντο τὸ σῶμα εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἄλλα 
n νὰ 
τούτου πάθη, ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τῶν σωμάτων το 
τῶν ὄντων εἶναι ἀρχάς" οἱ δ᾽ ὕστεροι καὶ σοφώτεροι τού- 
® / 5 / / ων » ’ Ν 
τῶν εἶναι δόξαντες ἀριθμούς. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, εἰ μὴ 
” By “ “ IO 3 Ν Suey oN ἡ 547 3 
ἔστιν οὐσία ταῦτα, ὅλως οὐδὲν ἐστὶν οὐσία οὐδὲ ὃν οὐθέν" οὐ 
x XN A / ΄ BA Μ - 
γὰρ δὴ τά γε συμβεβηκότα τούτοις ἄξιον ὄντα καλεῖν. 
>) Ν ον, 9 n Ν «ς lal 4 lal > 7 Ἂς ΜΞ 
---ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο μὲν ὁμολογεῖται, ὅτι μᾶλλον οὐσία τὰ 18 
“- / \ na \ n 
μήκη τῶν σωμάτων καὶ at στιγμαί, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ὁρῶμεν 
4 / a a 
ποίων av elev σωμάτων (ἐν yap τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἀδύνατον 
> 2 ih 4 > / > 7 BA Ν ΄ “ 
εἶναι), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία οὐδεμία. ἔτι δὲ φαίνεται ταῦτα 


b 27 καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα desideravit Al. 28 μὲν οη. ΕΒ 32 ἂν οῃλ.Ϊ 


23 καὶ ἀήρ AP Asc.: om. EJT 1002” 4 ἥττων E 5 avrn-alt. | 
ἡ γραμμὴ AP 7-8 τούτων εἶναι ἀδύνατον TeCc. 9 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα AP 
Asc.: τἄλλα δὲ EJ 11 ὕστεροι AP Asc.c: ὕστερον Ε]Τ κιὶ EJ 
Asc.°: καὶ of AP 13 οὐδὲν AP et ut vid. Al.: οὐδεμία EJT Asc.¢ 
ἔσται ci. Bonitz 14 δὴ] ἂν AP 15 ὡμολόγηται J 18 δὲ 


om. EJ? Asc. 
E 2 


20 


25 


30 


1002» 


5 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ B 


/ > / » nan / Ἂν Ν 2 / 
πάντα διαιρέσεις ὄντα Tod σώματος, TO μὲν εἰς πλάτος 
τὸ δ᾽ εἰς βάθος τὸ δ᾽ εἰς μῆκος. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁμοίως 
ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ στερεῷ ὁποιονοῦν σχῆμα: ὥστ᾽ εἰ μηδ᾽ 
5 a , € a IOX N “ a , 3 a ΄ 
ἐν τῷ λίθῳ “Ἑρμῆς, οὐδὲ τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ κύβου ἐν τῷ κύβῳ 
[ἢ ¢ > , > By 999 2 I > x 
οὕτως ὡς ἀφωρισμένον: οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ᾽ ἐπιφάνεια (εἰ yap 
ς ra} x ¢/ ΡΝ > € 2 7 : \ “ ς ᾽ 
ὁποιαοῦν, Kav αὕτη ἃν ἣν ἡ ἀφορίζουσα τὸ ἥμισυ), ὃ ὃ 
αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ γραμμῆς καὶ στιγμῆς καὶ μονάδος, 
σ΄ b) > ἧς Ἂς > if Ν n δα SS lad 
ὥστ᾽ εἰ μάλιστα μὲν οὐσία τὸ σῶμα, τούτου δὲ μᾶλλον 
a Ἂς ΕΣ Ἂν [9] Ν >’ ΄ὔ / - Ζ 
ταῦτα, μὴ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα μηδὲ οὐσίαι τινές, διαφεύγει τί 
τὸ ὃν καὶ τίς ἣ οὐσία τῶν ὄντων. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις 
\ Ν \ Ν / \ S Ν / Υ̓ 
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν γένεσι» καὶ τὴν φθορὰν συμβαίνει ἄλογα. 
a a ee a 
δοκεῖ μὲν yap ἡ οὐσία, ἐὰν μὴ οὖσα πρότερον νῦν ἢ ἢ πρό- 
τερον οὖσα ὕστερον μὴ ἢ, μετὰ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι 
ταῦτα πάσχειν' τὰς δὲ στιγμὰς καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰς 
τὸ ΄ὔ > > / Μ / EA / 
ἐπιφανείας οὐκ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε γίγνεσθαι οὔτε φθείρεσθαι, 
CEN Ν ΝΜ CNS Ν 3 LY “ Ν e x 
ὁτὲ μὲν οὔσας ὁτὲ δὲ οὐκ οὔσας. ὅταν yap ἅπτηται ἢ δι- 
αιρῆται τὰ σώματα, ἅμα ὁτὲ μὲν μία ἁπτομένων ὁτὲ δὲ 
δύο διαιρουμένων γίγνονται: ὥστ᾽ οὔτε συγκειμένων ἔστιν GAN 
μὲ , Deen ε om ΒΝ aN > x 
ἔφθαρται, διῃρημένων τε εἰσὶν at πρότερον οὐκ οὖσαι (od yap 
ἘΝ ν᾽ ’ Ds / / 
δὴ ἥ γ᾽ ἀδιαίρετος στιγμὴ διῃρέθη εἰς δύο), εἴ τε γίγνονται καὶ 
φθείρονται, ἐκ τίνος γίγνονται; παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ 
περὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ' οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται 
γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἕτερον ἀεὶ δοκεῖ εἷ- 
> e J / > c ‘3 Ὡς na “ Ν \ b.’ 
vat, οὐκ οὐσία τις οὖσα. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι ἔχει καὶ περὶ 
τὰς στιγμὰς καὶ τὰς γραμμὰς καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα' ὁ γὰρ 
SUN ΄ ed = € 7 δ , x “ἢ 
αὐτὸς λόγος: ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμοίως ἢ πέρατα ἢ διαιρέσεις 
εἰσίν. 
/ a tad 
Ὅλως δ᾽ ἀπορήσειεν ἄν tis διὰ τί Kal δεῖ Cyreiv 
Ν > Ν / Ν 7 x \ Ν Ἂ Ὁ ἃ 
ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα παρά τε τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ μεταξύ, οἷον ἃ 
419 διαίρεσις AP 21 ἕν ἐστιν rece. σχῆμα ἘΠΠ ΑΙ. Asc. : 
σχῆμα ἢ οὐδέν AP 21-22 μηδὲν τῷ J 24 αὐτὴ AP 25 καὶ 
alt.] καὶ ἐπὶ EJT ΑΙ. 30 μὲν EJ Asc.e: om. Α ἡ οὐσία, ἐὰν 
i Brandis: ἐὰν ἡ οὐσία A? et ut vid. Asc.: ἡ οὐσία EJT πρότερον 
EJ yp. A> Al. Asc.: τὸ πρότερον AP νῦν om. AP ἢ i et ut vid. 
Asc., Brandis: εἶναι EJT: om. AP 31 μὴ] de py T 7 APet 
ut vid. Asc.: om. EJT > 2 γίγνονται E (sed o ex ε facto) AP 
Asc.°: yiyvorat J συγκειμένου Ab Aap: epOapro fecit E 5 τίνος 
scripsi: τινος vulgo 7 εἶναι] ἀεὶ εἶναι J: ὡς AP 9 τὰς alt. 
om. EJ 10 διαίρεσις E Asc.° 13 ἄλλ᾽ ἅττα EJT ΑΙ. 


Asc.: ἄλλα τοιαῦτα AP 5γ7χ.} te AP ϑγγῖ: om. EJ All Asc! τὰ 
alt. om, E 


5. 1002819 — 6. 1003 7 


’, wy > ἊΣ ἊΣ a “ Ν Sen” Ἂς 
τίθεμεν εἴδη. εἰ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι τὰ μὲν᾽ μαθηματικὰ 
τῶν δεῦρο ἄλλῳ μέν τινι διαφέρει, τῷ δὲ πόλλ᾽ ἄττα 
ς m ΩΝ 3 Ἂς / Ὁ“ 3 > x > lal ε 
ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι οὐθὲν διαφέρει, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἔσονται αὐτῶν αἱ 
»} \ 2 a Ρ J of IO a > a 
ἀρχαὶ ἀριθμῷ apwpicpevar (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα 
γραμμάτων ἀριθμῷ μὲν πάντων οὐκ εἰσὶν at ἀρχαὶ ὡρι- 
σμέναι, εἴδει δέ, ἐὰν μὴ λαμβάνῃ τις τησδὶ τῆς συλλα- 
fal BN \ a “- ΄ὔ 3, ν Ν 2) nn 
Bis ἢ τησδὶ τῆς φωνῆς" τούτων δ᾽ ἔσονται καὶ ἀριθμῷ 
¢ n 
ὡρισμέναι----ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μεταξύ: ἄπειρα γὰρ 
2 a Ν Ὁ a 4 ? 2 Ν yi Ν Ὡς ’ Ν Ν 
κἀκεῖ τὰ ὁμοειδῆ), ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἔστι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ 
x N ῳ > " Ὁ D x ¥y , 
τὰ μαθηματικὰ ἕτερ᾽ ἄττα οἷα λέγουσι τὰ εἴδη τινές, 
> Ν He “ na b) 2 ν > / 299 ¢€ 5 \ n 
οὐκ ἔσται μία ἀριθμῷ ἀλλ᾽ εἴδει οὐσία, οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν 
» 5 n ΟΝ ψ: >) SS y > δὴ n 
ὄντων ἀριθμῷ ἔσονται ποσαί τινες ἀλλὰ εἴδει:"----εἰ οὖν τοῦτο 
ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὰ εἴδη ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι τιθέναι. 
καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὴ καλῶς διαρθροῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι 
“Δ᾽ A f. \ 3 , lal / 9 lal 
ye τοῦθ᾽ ὃ βούλονται, Kal ἀνάγκη ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτοῖς, 
v4 n » nan > ? ἘΝ , τὰ Ν AN XX 
ὅτι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐσία τις ἕκαστόν ἐστι Kal οὐθὲν κατὰ συμ- 
, > ἊΣ ἊΣ Μ 7 if Ν » > 
βεβηκός.---.ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴ ye θήσομεν τά τε εἴδη εἶναι καὶ 
aA μ nn ἌΝ 9 ἊΣ oh ἊΣ \ ΝΜ > 7 ἃ 
ἕν ἀριθμῷ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ μὴ εἴδει, εἰρήκαμεν ἃ συμ- 
βαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀδύνατα.--------σύνεγγυς δὲ τούτων ἐστὶ τὸ 
διαπορῆσαι πότερον δυνάμει ἔστι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἤ τιν᾽ ἕτερον 
τρόπον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλως πως, πρότερόν τι ἔσται τῶν ἀρ- 
a BA , Xx € / 5 iA “ 88. 2 
xv ἄλλο (πρότερον γὰρ ἡ δύναμις ἐκείνης τῆς αἰτίας, 
Ἂν Ν Ἂς > 3 cal ol ,ὔ o yx rf 3, μὴ 
τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνως πᾶν ἔχειν)" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι 
δυνάμει τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐνδέχεται μηθὲν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων" 
δυνατὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μήπω ov γίγνεται μὲν γὰρ τὸ 
μὴ ὄν, οὐθὲν δὲ γίγνεται τῶν εἶναι ἀδυνάτων. ------ταύτας τε 
οὖν τὰς ἀπορίας ἀναγκαῖον ἀπορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ 
, , \ x «ε / ΑΝ > ed 2 
πότερον καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς λέγομεν τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. εἰ 


1002? 32 — 1003° 5, cf. 996* Io, If 1003* 5--17, cf. 996% 9, 
10, 1060 19-23 


"15 πολλὰ τὰ APT 17 ἀριθμῶν AP ἐνταῦθα EJ yp. AP! Al.¢ 
Asc.e: ἐνταυθὶ Ab? 19 λανθάνῃ J τῆσδε... 20 τῆσδε AP 
23 οἷα] οἱ J 24 ἀλλ᾽ ci. Al. : καὶ codd. T Asc.° 25 ἀριθμῷ 
ἕν ἔσονται AP 26 τιθέναι om. EJT Asc. 28 ye AP Al. 
IASG. ὁπι, ἘΠῚ αὐτοὺς AP Asc.° 30 θήσωμεν J τε om, 
EJ 31 ἕν οἵη. EJr 32 ἀδύνατα] ἀδύνατα πρότερον J? AP 
33 τίν᾽ recc. 34 mos 7ΓῚ Al.: πῶς. EAP 


- 
σι 


30 


1003* 


§ 


10 


15 


20 


25 


30 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ B, Γ 


Ν Ν γ ΝΜ > 7 ’ Ἂν Ἂς lol an 

μὲν yap καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι (οὐθὲν yap τῶν κοινῶν 
τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, 7) δ᾽ οὐσία τόδε TU εἰ δ᾽ 
yy , \ A / \ lod , Ἂς 
ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ ἕν θέσθαι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον, πολλὰ 
ἡ fal c vy , > , \ ς ν Ν \ 
ἔσται (Ga ὁ Σωκράτης, αὐτός τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ 
Gov, εἴπερ σημαίνει ἕκαστον τόδε τι καὶ ἕν)" ---εἰ μὲν οὖν 
καθόλου αἱ ἀρχαί, ταῦτα συμβαίνει: εἰ δὲ μὴ καθόλου 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, οὐκ ἔσονται ἐπιστηταί (καθόλου 
γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη πάντων), ὥστ᾽ ἔσονται ἀρχαὶ ἕτεραι πρό- 
lal 5 lol ε , es ΝΥ / 
Tepat τῶν ἀρχῶν at καθόλου κατηγορούμεναι, ἄνπερ μέλλῃ 
ἔσεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμη. 


ΠΤ 


7 5 γ. a a \ A @ oA \ Ἂς / 
Eotw ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ TO ὃν ἡ ὃν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ 
ς } > € , “ Ἄ \ 5 5 a 5 / 
ὑπάρχοντα καθ᾽ αὑτό. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει 
λεγομένων ἣ αὐτή; οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ 
, \ yn 1 » =k Ν , > a 5 
καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ OV, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτε- 
/ Ν “4 “ Ν , e € 
μόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι TO συμβεβηκός, οἷον at μαθη- 
ματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκρο- 
y / Lal pa € / / ee 
τάτας αἰτίας (ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς 
lal 3 lal an 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ᾽’ αὑτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ of τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν 
ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τ 


“τῷ Q7 


- a » Φ \ Ν \ b} > 
στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ 
n nn Ὁ δὴ 
ὄν. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἣ ὃν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας 
t 
/ 
ληπτέον. 
aA an x 
To δὲ ὃν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ev καὶ 
7 Ν / ‘ .} «ς ,ὔ rf > “ \ Ν 
μίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως ἀλλ ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ 
« x ef \ - ἃς lol td ' A Ν 
ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίειαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν τὸ δὲ 
τῷ ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ τῷ σημεῖον εἶναι τῆς ὑγιείας τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι 
δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικήν (τὸ μὲν 


(BE Ay ΟΝ 2) 


1003* Io ἕν θέσθαι Rickards: ἐκθέσθαι codd. et ut vid. Al.: ἐκτί- 
Geral: δεῖ ἐκθέσθαι Jaeger 11 ζῷα susp. Christ 14 ἐπιστηταί 
EJ’ Al.: ἐπιστῆμαι AP 15 ἡ ἐπιστήμη AP Al, Asc.: αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι 
Ejr 16 aiom. EJ 17 ἐπιστῆμαι J 22 καθ᾽ αὑτά Al. 
25 τοῦτο J 28 αὑτάς A» Asc.° et fort. Al. 31 ὄντα EJY 
60... ὃν om, AD 34 ἀλλ᾽ om, AP 


6. 1003% 8 — 2. τοῦ" 30 


‘ [οὶ 2 , Ν / > \ x Ν an 9 Ν 
γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἰατρικὴν λέγεται ἰατρικὸν τὸ δὲ τῷ εὐφυὲς 
> A a lal fol 
εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἷναι τῆς ἰατρικῆς), 
ὁμοιοτρόπως δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ληψόμεθα λεγόμενα τούτοις, 
\ a = 
οὕτω δὲ Kal τὸ ὃν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν GAN ἅπαν 
\ ig 3 Pe x Ὁ \ 4 tags id » / 
πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν' τὰ μὲν yap ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, 
SS 3 “, if Shh: DS 5) “, eg > of Ve x 
Ta δ᾽ ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας, Ta δ᾽ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν ἢ 
δ Ψ ΩΝ XN δ 
φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ ποιότητες ἢ ποιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ 
> x a Ων 
οὐσίας ἢ τῶν πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν λεγομένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς 
3 / δ 3 ,ὔ \ \ \ Ν A S δ » 
ἀποφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας" διὸ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι μὴ ὄν φαμεν. 
/ na a 
καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ἁπάντων μία ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, 
€ 4 lal \ $f Ἂς an + ’ Ν / lal 3 
ὁμοίως τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῶν καθ 
ἃ J > / 5 \ lal C > Ἂς Ν n 
ἕν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
-πρὸς μίαν λεγομένων φύσιν καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ 
/ fal - an 
λέγονται καθ᾽ ἕν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα μιᾶς θεωρῆσαι 
7 ὄντα. πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ 
a Sogo ΝΜ \ aA / > > νυ 8. «9 \ ¢ 
ov τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, Kal bu’ ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν 7 
9, 3 fal 3 a x / Ν ΡΣ Ν Ν BS 3. Υ̓ 
οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἃν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν 
\ 
τὸν φιλόσοφον.--- (ἅπαντος δὲ γένους καὶ αἴσθησις μία ἑνὸς 
καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οἷον γραμματικὴ μία οὖσα πάσας θεωρεῖ 
Ν \ \ a οἴ ἂν e nN 4 ν fal ἣν 
τὰς φωνάς" διὸ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἣ ὃν ὅσα εἴδη θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς 
L 
ἐστὶν ἐ ῷ γένει, τά ἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν. εἰ δὴ τὸ 
πιστήμης τῷ γένει, τε εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν. Ὶ 
Ἃ \ NA: DN \ 7, / a > cad 3 / 
ov καὶ TO ἕν ταὐτὸν καὶ pla φύσις τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλή- 
λοις ὥσπερ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἴτιον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ λόγῳ. δηλού- 
μενα (διαφέρει δὲ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁμοίως ὑπολάβωμεν, ἀλλὰ 
Ν ἘΝ Ὁ > \ Ν χυ BA \ » 
καὶ πρὸ ἔργου μᾶλλον») ταὐτὸ yap εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, 
NN + Ny) % > 6 , lal x 
καὶ ὧν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, Kal οὐχ ἕτερόν TL δηλοῖ κατὰ 
\ Τὰ “" Ζ \ e A Ν bad Δ 
τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλούμενον τὸ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὧν 
7 a , 9 > 7 ¥ 9s SN ΣΈ yen) 
ἄνθρωπος (δῆλον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐ χωρίζεται οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ γενέσεως οὔτ 


ἐπὶ φθορᾶς), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι 

b2 ἔχειν EJ Α5ς.ὃ: ἔχειν τὴν AP 3 τῷ ἔργον εἶναι] τοῖς ἔργοις Τ' 
τὴν ἰατρικήν A 4 ὁμοίως J 5 δὴ ci. Christ ἀλλὰ πᾶν E 
6 οὐσίαι EJP Α5-ς,} : οὐσία AP 8 φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις EJT et ut 
vid. Al.: φθορὰ ἢ στέρησις AP 10 ἀπόφασις AP 15 λέγεται EJ 
20 οἷον EJ Asc.!: οἷον ἡ AP 21 7 ὃν J?AY et fort. Al.: om. EJ? 
Al.! Asc.¢ 22 τε codd. Asc.¢: δὲ Γ' Al.te 23 ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν EJT 
Al Asc. Syrt: ἕν καὶ τὸ ὃν AP 26 καὶ ἄνθρωπος APT ΑἸ. : om. EJ 
Asc. Syr. edd. 27 καὶ ἄνθρωπος om. Asc. 28 τὸ] τί E εἷς a. 


A eae eee Ἔ Ξ : 
καὶ εἷς ὧν scrips: εἷς ὧν Syr.: ἔστιν εἷς a. καὶ ἄ. καὶ ὧν Asc. ; εἷς ἐστὶν 
” . » \ ἡ 1, 2 ay \ ee ~ ¥ » 
a. καὶ ἔστιν AP: a. καὶ ἄ, «καὶ εἷς EJ: ἄ, καὶ ὧν ἄ. καὶ εἷς D2 ἔστιν a. ἄ, 
καὶ ἔστιν ut vid. Al. - 


- 


5 


20 


30 


ΤΩΝ META TA OYSIKA I 


(4 2 ΟῚ / Ψ \ - \ OX a Ἄν 
ἣ πρόσθεσις ἐν τούτοις ταὐτὸ δηλοῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον τὸ ἕν 
Ν Ay By. ΝΜ oe LN / > / ed 3 <i Ἂς 
παρὰ τὸ ὄν, ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία ἕν ἐστιν οὐ κατὰ συμβε- 
, τὸ , \ NGA » ω 2 a ταῖν 
βηκός, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅπερ ὄν TU—WOO ὅσα περ τοῦ ἑνὸς 
᾿ a a Ὁ A a 
εἴδη, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοῦ ὄντος" περὶ ὧν TO τί ἐστι THs 
35 αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης τῷ γένει θεωρῆσαι, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον περὶ 
>’ an ΔΉ ς / \ an 7 an / \ Ν 
ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. σχεδὸν δὲ 


10042 πάντα ἀνάγεται τἀναντία εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην" τεθεω- 


/ 3 Ad tas nN 2 n 3 - n 3 / Ν 
ρήσθω δ᾽ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐν τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἐναντίων. καὶ 
fal / 7 Ν᾽ “ἷ ε 9. 14 of 
τοσαῦτα μέρη φιλοσοφίας ἔστιν ὅσαι περ αἱ οὐσίαι: ὥστε 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα πρώτην καὶ ἐχομένην αὐτῶν. ὑπάρ- 

aS bay , μὲ \ Ἃ \ \ ed Ν \ € 
5 χει yap εὐθὺς γένη ἔχον τὸ ὃν [καὶ τὸ ἕν] διὸ καὶ αἱ 
BI a 9 4 / Ba Ν ε / 
ἐπιστῆμαι ἀκολουθήσουσι τούτοις. ἔστι yap ὃ φιλόσοφος 
ὥσπερ ὁ μαθηματικὸς λεγόμενος: καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἔχει 
/ \ / ss / 7 3 / Ἂν Ν 
μέρη; καὶ πρώτη τις καὶ δευτέρα ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἄλλαι 
PS “ 3 “ Ze 3 \ Ἂς laa Ἂ 
ἐφεξῆς ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν .----ἐπεὶ δὲ μιᾶς τἀντικείμενα 
fel lol Ν CoN τ Ψ fal 9. / Ἂς \ 
10 θεωρῆσαι, τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος---ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ 
, - > \ a Ν \ 3 / Ὁ 
στέρησιν μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι 
Nhe tN iow oS 5 , δ ε / xX \ « lol / 
TO ἕν οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἢ (γὰρ) ἁπλῶς λέγομεν 
> 7 - M4 / wt xp a 
ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο, ἤ τινι γένει: ἔνθα μὲν οὖν 76 ἑνὶ 
ε τῇ , “ τὶ mo 5 , “5 , Ν 
ἡ διαφορὰ πρόσεστι παρὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσειἷ, ἀπουσία yap 


ς 2 , 5 7 > 14 2 Sy a / \ is 

15%) ἀπόφασις ἐκείνου ἐστίν, ἐν δὲ τῇ στερήσει Kal ὑποκει- 
ένη τις φύσις γίγνεται καθ᾽ ἧς λέγεται ἣ στέρησις) [τῷ 
μένη Vy ] y Ἶ pn t 
? \ a . a 
δ᾽ ἑνὶ πλῆθος ἀντίκειται]----Ὃστε καὶ τἀντικείμενα τοῖς εἰρη- 
/ 
μένοις, τό τε ἕτερον καὶ ἀνόμοιον Kal ἄνισον Kal ὅσα 
Yj / x fal δ an 
ἄλλα λέγεται ἢ κατὰ ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ ἕν, 


Ὁ.31 οὐδὲν EJP Α].9 Asc.: οὐδὲν ἔτι AD 34 ὄντος AP Al.¢ Asc. : 
ὄντος ἐστίν EJT 36 τοιούτων EJAT Asce.: τοιούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις 
ἀντικειμένων Sa et fort. Al. σχεδὸν... Ιοο45 2 ἐναντίων susp. Suse- 
mihl, fort. recte (cf. 1004” 33 — 1005% 1) 1004* 1 τεθεωρήσθω AP 
Al.° (252. 3): τεθεώρηται EJ 2 kai... 9 μαθήμασιν ante εἰ 1003 22 
ponenda ci. Al., ante ἅπαντος 1003? 19 ponenda vidit Schwegler 
4 τινα πρώτην EJT Al. Asc.: πρώτην τινὰ AP 5 ἔχον AP yp. Al: 
ἔχοντα EJ Al. Asc. ὃν καὶ τὸ ἕν Ε7Τ' Α].9 Asc.: ἕν καὶ τὸ ὄν AP: καὶ 
τὸ ἔν Ἰπο] 511 Natorp αἱ AP Asc.c: οἴη. EJ 7. ὥσπερ EJT Asc.e: 
οὕτως ὥσπερ ΑΡ eet] ἔτι 11πΠῸ6 το τῷ.... πλῆθος codd. Τ' ΑΙ. 
Αϑς.} : 566]. Luthe 12 i)... λέγομεν ex Al. οἷ. Schwegler: ἡ 
ἁπλῶς λεγομένη ΕἾΑΡ Asc.: ἢ ἡ ἁπλῶς λεγομένη ἘΠ]: ἢ ἁπλῶς λεγο- 
μένη Τ' 13 ἐκεῖνο Ἐ7Α]. : ἐκείνῳ JAPT et fecit E τῷ ἑνὶ ἡ an 
secludenda? 16 τῷ... 17 ἀντίκειται seclusi (cf. 1. 10): habent 
πῶς T Al.¢ Asc.¢ 19 ταῦτα Asc.¢ T et ut vid. ΑἹ. : ταὐτὰ EJ 

1 


2, 10035 31 — 1004» 16 


τῆς εἰρημένης yvwplCew ἐπιστήμης" ὧν ἐστὶ Kal ἡ ἐναντιό- 20 
ας / € 3 fi: ¢ Ὁ ἊΝ € / 
της διαφορὰ yap τις ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἑτερό- 
Ὁ“ 3 3 ἊΝ na \ ὮΝ is \ lal 
τῆς. ὥστ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς TO ἕν λέγεται, Kal ταῦτα πολ- 
λαχῶς μὲν λεχθήσεται, ὅμως δὲ μιᾶς ἅπαντά ἐστι γνωρί- 
me a , 
ζιν" ov yap εἰ πολλαχῶς, ἑτέρας, GAN εἰ μήτε καθ᾽ ἕν μήτε 
ΟΣ, αὐ τὰ ς , > ,ὕ NE NS / ν N a 
πρὸς ἕν οἱ λόγοι ἀναφέρονται. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα πρὸς TO TPG- 25 
τον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὅσα ἕν λέγεται πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, 
ὡσαύτως φατέον καὶ περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων 
ἔχειν: ὥστε διελόμενον ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, οὕτως ἀπο- 
δοτέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν ἑκάστῃ κατηγορίᾳ πῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο 
t t 
fe a x Ν Ν a ” > “- Ν x lat - ἊΝ 
λέγεται: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο τὰ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν τὰ 39 
% 
δὲ κατ᾽ ἄλλους λεχθήσεται τοιούτους τρόπους.----φανερὸν 
μὴ “ 9 val 5 7 5. Ψ», [τ ° \ , 
οὖν [ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη] ὅτι μιᾶς περὶ τού- 
των καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ λόγον ἔχειν (τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ν 
fat > - 3 Mi we Τὰ a , \ / 
TOV ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμασιν), Kal ἔστι τοῦ φιλοσόφου περὶ πάν- 
τῶν δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τίς ἔσται τοο4" 
ε ΡῚ , 3 SN ᾽ν , \ "Ὁ / ie 
ὁ ἐπισκεψόμενος εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης καθή- 
K ἃ x EN 
μενος, ἢ εἰ ἕν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον, ἢ τί ἐστι TO ἐναντίον ἢ ποσα- 
n / iq γᾷ Ν \ \ lal x n ΄ 
χῶς λέγεται; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. 
> \ bs Cal ae Φ' ἃ \ a eS. ae N la) 2 ef: 
ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἣ ἕν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος 7) ὃν ταῦτα καθ᾽ αὑτά 5 
» A 5) > > Φ > \ aN ‘ Ὁ a lal 
ἐστι πάθη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ 7) ἀριθμοὶ ἢ γραμμαὶ ἢ πῦρ, δῆλον 
ὡς ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τί ἐστι γνωρίσαι καὶ τὰ συμ- 
βεβηκότ᾽ αὐτοῖς. καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ αὐτῶν 
4 c 9 lal 5 ἐν; / ε 3 / 
σκοπούμενοι WS οὐ φιλοσοφοῦντες, GAA OTL πρότερον ἡ οὐσία, 
περὶ ἧς οὐθὲν ἐπαΐουσιν, ἐπεὶ ὥσπερ ἔστι καὶ ἀριθμοῦ 7) ἀρι- 10 
θμὸς ἴδια πάθη, οἷον περιττότης ἀρτιότης, συμμετρία ἰσό- 
€ X\ x \ a x 3 6 Ἂν ἊΝ 
TNS, ὑπεροχὴ ἔλλειψις, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ 
\ 7 na a 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς (ὁμοίως δὲ Kat 
στερεῷ καὶ ἀκινήτῳ καὶ κινουμένῳ ἀβαρεῖ τε καὶ βάρος 
Υ [ x ¢ \ ny hi? eK Ψ» Ν 
ἔχοντι ἔστιν ἕτερα ἴδια), οὕτω καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἧ ὃν ἔστι τινὰ 15 
ἴδια, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐπισκέψασθαι 
2 20 τοῖς εἰρημένοις E ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης AP Al! Asc.®: ἕν τι 
καὶ ἡ ἐναντιότης ἐστί EJT 21 διαφορὰ] ἐναντιότης AP 23 ὅμως 
ΕΠΤ Asc. et ut vid. Al.: ὁμοίως AP . γνωρίζειν ἐστί EJT 25 ava- 
φέρονται τότε ἑτέρας. ἐπεὶ EJT 26 ἀναφέρεται recc. : ἀναφέρετε E: 
ἀναφέρονται J AP πρῶτον EJT Asc.: πρώτως AP 30 ἐκεῖνα recc. 
32 ὅπερ... ἐλέχθη EXJT Asc.: om. E?AP et fort. Al. 6 ἀριθμοὶ EJT 
Asc.°: ἀριθμὸς AP Al.e γραμμαὶ EJT Ale Asc.e: γραμμὴ A> 
7 ws om, AP 14 ἀβαρεῖ re EJ Asc.®: καὶ dBapet AP: καὶ ἀβαρεῖ 
τε Eucken 15 οὕτω... 16 ἴδια EJT Asc.: om. AP 


20 


30 


ΙΟοΟδὃ 


10 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Γ 


τὸ ἀληθές. σημεῖον δέ' of γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ 
\ > \ Ν i 4 δύ , lal fal Xr / ᾿ ε Ἂς σο 
τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ' ἣ γὰρ σο- 
Ν ia ΄ 7 ᾿ "ἢ Ν € \ 
φιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ 
διαλέγονται περὶ ἁπάντων, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὄν ἐστιν, 
διαλέγονται δὲ περὶ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσο- 
plas ταῦτα εἶναι οἰκεῖα. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέ- 
φεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ 
, Oo ψ in , an , a N a ΄, 
διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου 
a / ” Ν Ε Ν Ν \ Φ ς 
τῇ προαιρέσει' ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ 
/ / ς Ν / ’ yy 
φιλοσοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη, οὖσα δ᾽ οὔ. 


ς / 


Ἔτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις, καὶ πάντα 

2 / >) Dae Ν \ Ἂν μ Ν > A \ a ia 
ἀνάγεται εἰς TO Ov Kal TO μὴ ὄν, Kal εἰς ev Kal πλῆθος, οἷον 
! fais Ce SN / Ν a / Ξ Ν, 3 oy. Ν \ 
στάσις τοῦ ἑνὸς κίνησις δὲ τοῦ πλήθους" τὰ δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ THY 
οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἅπαντες συγκεῖσθαι" 
πάντες γοῦν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας λέγουσιν; οἱ μὲν γὰρ πε- 

\ Ὧν yy ¢ Ν BS \ 4 « XN / 
ριττὸν Kal ἄρτιον, ot δὲ θερμὸν Kal ψυχρόν, ot δὲ πέρας 
καὶ ἄπειρον, οἱ δὲ φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος. πάντα δὲ καὶ τἄλλα 
ἀναγόμενα φαίνεται εἰς τὸ ἕν καὶ πλῆθος (εἰλήφθω. γὰρ 
ἡ ἀναγωγὴ ἡμῖν), αἱ δ᾽ ἀρχαὶ καὶ παντελῶς αἱ παρὰ τῶν 
A c ᾿ς / ~ 4 a ba \ 5» 
ἄλλων ὡς εἰς γένη ταῦτα πίπτουσιν. φανερὸν οἣν καὶ ἐκ 
lal / ἃ a an ‘ 
τούτων ὅτι μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης TO ὃν 7) ὃν θεωρῆσαι. πάντα yap 
δ > , oN > 5 ,ὔ > \ Ν a > / \ A 
ἢ ἐναντία ἢ ἐξ ἐναντίων, ἀρχαὶ δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ev 

a n lal {2 
καὶ πλῆθος. ταῦτα δὲ μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης, εἴτε καθ᾽ ev λέγε- 
ν , Ὁ ν oo \ b) / τὰ > “ 

ται εἴτε μή, ὥσπερ ἴσως ἔχει καὶ τἀληθές. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως εἰ 
καὶ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ἕν, πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον τἄλλα 
λεχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ὁμοίως, [καὶ διὰ τοῦτο] καὶ εἰ 
Ν ” Ν A δ \ A , Ἂς ΟΝ ΓᾺ Ἐν ͵ ΩΝ 
μὴ ἔστι τὸ ὃν ἢ τὸ ἕν καθόλου καὶ ταὐτὸ ἐπὶ πάντων ἢ 
, [2 ᾿ y ? oo 5} Ν ν Ν iN A Ν 
χωριστόν, ὥσπερ ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Tpos ἕν τὰ 
ἣν Ais a \ = ὡς > a , = , 
δὲ τῷ ἐφεξῆς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ τοῦ γεωμέτρου θεωρῆσαι τί 
Ν > ν᾿ x / A. th δ BY δ νας oN eo 5 > 
TO ἐναντίον ἢ τέλειον ἢ ἕν ἢ OV ἢ ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, GAA 


b 22 ταῦτα εἶναι AY Asc.: εἶναι αὐτὰ EJT 23 ἡ alt. AP Alc 
Asc.°: om, EJ 25 τῇ EJ Al.c: om. AP πείρατι πιστικὴ 
26 ἡ γνωριστική J: γνωστική yp. J 28 τὸ alt. EJ Asc.: om. A 
eis EJP Asc.: om. AP 30 σχεδῶν E 33 πάντα EJ Asc.°; 
ἅπαντα AP 34 avaydpeva φαίνεται EJT Asc.®: φαίνεται dvayspeva 
Ab καὶ] καὶ τὸ J 10058 2 ταῦτα] εἰς ταῦτα AP; τὰ αἴτια Asc, 
5 καὶ] kal τὸ iJ de EJT Asc.l: δὲ καὶ AP ἕνα Ab 6 καὶ om. 
ἘΠῚ Asc. 7 τὸ ἕν λέγεται AP 8 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἘΠ| Α5ς.}: 
om. AP 9 ἢ καὶ τὸ AP 16 τὸν οὐ τὸ Εἰ 12 ἕν ἢ ὃν EJ’ 


Asc.®: ὃν ἢ ἐν AP 


2. 10045 17 — 2. 10059 


x ἐξ € θέσ Φ“ Ν a lal » / iN δ ae 

ἢ ὑποθέσεως. OTL μὲν οὖν μιᾶς ἐπιστήμης TO OV ἡ ὃν 
lal \ Ν / eat e lal 

θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῷ 7 ὄν, δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι 


σι 


2 ’ lal > lal τὰ Ν Ν lal « , c + pee’ 
οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀλλὰ Kal τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡ αὐτὴ 
/ n 
θεωρητική, τῶν τε εἰρημένων Kal περὶ προτέρου Kal ὑστέρου, 
\ / \ yy AG” ἣν \ / \ n 
Kal γένους καὶ εἴδους, καὶ ὅλου καὶ μέρους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῶν τοιούτων. 
is Ἂς , “ δ (aw ¢ > / 7 
8 Δεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης περί τε 
τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ περὶ 20 
lel ey 2 Ν \S Ψ δ“ Ν an a , 
τῆς οὐσίας. φανερὸν δὴ OTL μιᾶς TE Kal τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου 
καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ σκέψις' ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς 
μὴ > 3 > \ \ bINw A n y \ n 
οὖσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶν- 
Ἂς “ na ΨΜ > \ 2 ¥ [4 Ν \ / 
ται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν 7) ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ TO γένος 
ὄν" ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ᾽ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἱκανόν, τοῦτο 25 
δ᾽ ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδεί- 
ἕξεις" ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἣ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ 
i PX 
ΟἹ a \ / a \ Ν ee M4 \ \ 
αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ περὶ τὸ dv ἡἣ ὃν γνωρίζντος Kal περὶ 
ἥς Ἅ Ν € / , ’ \ fal Ν 5» 
τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ θεωρία. διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκο- 
a an fal ΩΝ / 
πούντων ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἢ μή, 30 
Μ ae SS y /, 5 ἂς fal nm ΝΜ 
οὔτε γεωμέτρης οὔτ᾽ ἀριθμητικός, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, 
res na a , Ν ἡ 7 a / 
εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες" μόνοι yap ᾧοντο περί τε τῆς ὕλης 
lal nN > fal 
φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ 
φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω (ἕν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσι"), 
τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ 35 
περὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη σκέψις" ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυ- 1005)? 
» b) > > / “ δ} Ὁ at - / Ν 
σικήῆ, GAN’ οὐ πρώτη. ὅσα ὃ᾽ ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς 
ἊΝ Lod 5 A 4 lal ’ / > 5 
περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι᾿ ἀπαι- 
δευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν" δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων 
“ , 5 Ν SRS Pus A “ Ν 
ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας (ητεῖν.----ὔτι μὲν 5 
οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος 
“ / \ \ cal n 5 a 5 ay > 
ἣ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπι- 
σκέψασθαι, δῆλον: προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα 
, / 
περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν Tas’ βεβαιοτάτας ἀρχὰς 


1005 19-2, cf. K. 4 8--34, cf. 1061 34-1062%2 (23-26, οἵ. 
1062* 31-35) 


CMa δὲῖ 22 τούτων ἐπίσκεψις AP 24 ὄντως E 25 ὅν] 
ἕν Abi 30 εἰ] ἢ εἰ Et: εἰ ἢ EX 32 re EJT Asc.°: om, AP 
Dy σοφία τις EJT Ale: τις σοφία AP 2 doa... καὶ ζητεῖν post 


δῆλον 1. ὃ ponenda censet Al, 8 rov om, J 


10 


15 


wb 
σι 


30 


35 


10068 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA I 


τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἡ ὄντα τὰς 
πάντων βεβαιοτάτας. ἔστι δ᾽ οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. βεβαιο- 
, ΕῚ Ν an Ν A las 3 / 
τάτη ὃ ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον" 
γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἷναι τὴν τοιαύτην (περὶ 
γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζυσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον. 
ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο 
οὐχ ὑπόθεσις' ὃ δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὁτιοῦν γνωρί- 
a a / 
ὦντι, Kal ἥκει» ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη 
ς id na b) / a / 2 » WA Ν 
ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον" τίς δ᾽ ἔστιν αὕτη, μετὰ 
ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ 
ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (καὶ ὅσα 
yy la by Ν » / \ Ν 
ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ᾽ ἄν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα πρὸς τὰς 
lal / “ 
λογικὰς δυσχερείας)" αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν 
ἀρχῶν: ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ 
ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ 
Ν » / € / ’ ” Ν ° lal 
Twes οἴονται λέγειν Ἡράκλειτον. οὐκ ἔστι yap ἀναγκαῖον, 
ε , a \ ς , ὃ ᾿ Ν Ν 3 , 
ἃ τις λέγει, ταῦτα καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχε- 
d «ς / lal > an > ͵ 7 >’ 
Tat ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τῷ αὐτῷ τἀναντία (προσδιωρίσθω ὃ 
Εὖ γα Ν / a / ἃς > / 3 7 2 ΕΣ \ 
ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ προτάσει τὰ εἰωθότα), ἐναντία δ᾽ ἐστὶ 
δόξα δόξῃ ἡ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἅμα 
ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό; ἅμα 
Ν Ο yy ἊΝ »] 7, / ς / ~ Vg 
yap ἂν ἔχοι τὰς ἐναντίας δόξας ὁ due evopevos περὶ τού- 
του. διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν 
/ lol 
ἐσχάτην δόξαν: φύσει yap ἀρχὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιω- 
μάτων αὕτη πάντων. 
, 
Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἵ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχε- 
σθαί φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὑπολαμβά- 
Ὁ“ n Ν lal A / \ Ν lal 
νειν οὕτως. χρῶνται δὲ TG λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν 
κα a a 
περὶ φύσεως. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος 
bu τ ἊΝ Ν a \ Ν μα bp] 7 “ 
ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βε- 


bio τὰς Ejr Al.: ras περὶ Ab 15 ξυνιόντα AP 16 ὑποθέσει 
ΑΡ a] τὸ AP 17 ἔχοντι ΒΞ Ἀ βεβαιοτάτη ante ἀρχή |. 18 ἘΣ 
ΑΙ. 19 λέγωμεν JSTL: λέγομεν EA? τε AP Ale: om. EJ Asc] 
21 ἔστω τὰ προδιωρισμένα AP 22 δ᾽ ἁπασῶν EJT 27 ὑπάρχειν 
τῷ αὐτῷ EJT Ale: τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχειν AP 427-28 προδιωρίσθω 
ἡμῖν AP 29 ἀδύνατον ἅ ἅμα ἘΠΤ Asc.: ἅμα ἀδύνατον AP 31 διε- 
ψευσμένος APAL: δεν εὐσάμενος ἘΠ 32 of AP ΑΙ. Asc.°: om, EJ 
35 A τε codd. All: om. Γ' 1006* 2 χρῶνται JAPT, ex χρῶντο 
ecit 


3. 10055 ro — 4. 10068 32 


βαιοτάτη αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν. ἀξιοῦσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο 
> , Ν eee) feos ig " Ν > , 
ἀποδεικνύναι τινὲς δι᾿ ἀπαιδευσίαν' ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία 
Ν Ν. / 14 lal a b) / \ γᾷ > 
TO μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ 
δεῖ" ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς 
ἄπειρον γὰρ adv βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδ᾽ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν), 
3. / Ν - - 9 , ΄ - a 4, 
εἰ δέ τίνων μὴ δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν, τίνα ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι 
Ἐν ‘a ? ἊΝ 3) * yo > - yo of SC) 
μᾶλλον τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιεν εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπο- 
δεῖξαι ἐλεγκτικῶς καὶ περὶ τούτου ὅτι ἀδύνατον, ἂν μόνον 
, ς 9. De x ἊΣ / c ἊΝ - 
τι λέγῃ ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν' av δὲ μηθέν, γελοῖον τὸ ζ(ητεῖν 
/, \ \ \ A / Θ Ν + e a 
λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λόγον, ἣ μὴ EXEL ὅμοιος 
γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἣ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. τὸ δ᾽ ἐλεγκτικῶς ἀπο- 
δεῖξαι λέγω διαφέρειν καὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὅτι ἀποδει- 
,ὕ Ν x , 9 nan Ν ΩΣ > a ” Ν fal 
κυύων μὲν ἃν δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ 
(4 oS: v a x ν \ > 5 / οἷ Ν 
τοιούτου αἰτίου ὄντος ἔλεγχος ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις. ἀρχὴ 
a Arde Nasa 
δὲ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἢ εἶναί τι λέγειν 
ΩΥ Ν a an Ν Ἂς γι 5 ” « / Q 2) 
ἢ μὴ εἶναι (τοῦτο μὲν yap τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι τὸ ἐξ 
μὴ a > “κ᾿ + x 7 / δ con Ν BA . 
ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖν), ἀλλὰ σημαίνει» γέ τι καὶ αὑτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ 
τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ λέγοι τι. εἰ γὰρ μή, οὐκ av 
ΝΜ cal yd , PD: > nan Ν eek: + ἊΝ 
εἴη τῷ τοιούτῳ λόγος, οὔτ᾽ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὔτε πρὸς 
" EN A aA ς , 
ἄλλον. ἂν δέ τις τοῦτο διδῷ, ἔσται ἀπόδειξις" ἤδη γάρ τι 
δ c / = 3 yy > ΣΝ τ Ν > ae 58 
ἔσται ὡρισμένον. ἀλλ᾽ αἴτιος οὐχ ὁ ἀποδεικνὺς ἀλλ᾽ ὁ ὑπο- 
/ . >) an Ν , € / , »” Ἂς < fal 
μένων᾽ ἀναιρῶν yap λόγον ὑπομένει λόγον. ἔτι δὲ 6 τοῦτο 
/ 9S 
συγχωρήσας συγκεχώρηκέ τι ἀληθὲς εἶναι χωρὶς ἀποδεί- 
ξεως [ὥστε οὐκ dv πᾶν οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι].---πρῶτον 
Ν S n «ς fal / > > Ν >) / “ 7. x 
μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὡς τοῦτό γ᾽ αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ὅτι σημαίνει TO 
Y \ = BN - > 72 “ 3 > x ἘΣ “ Ν 
ὄνομα τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν οὕτως καὶ 
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχοι: ἔτι εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει ἕν, ἔστω τοῦτο 
\ -~ ΄ , ὡς Nek 7, Ase " res 
τὸ ζῷον δίπουν. λέγω δὲ TO EV σημαίνειν TovTo’ εἰ τοῦτ 


1006% 5-18, cf. Κ. 1062% 2-5 18 — 1007% 20, cf. 1062% 5-19 
(1006? 28-34, cf. 1062° 19-23) 


25 πασῶν EJ Asc.c: ἁπασῶν ΑΡ δὲ ' 8 ἁπάντων EJ Asc.°: 
πάντων AP 14 μὴ ἔχει AP ΑΙ. : μηθένα ἔχει λόγον EJT 15 ἤδη 
AP ΑΙ. : ἤδη ἔστιν JT: om. E Asc. 16 ὅτι] ὅτι ὁ EJ 17 ἂν 


δόξειεν αἰτεῖσθαι ante διαφέρειν (]. 16) Τ' αἰτῆσθαι AP ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ 
τοῦ Τ' 18 αἰτίου om. AP 19 οὐ EJ yp. ΑΙ. : οὐχὶ AP: om. Al. 
20 yap om. yp. Al. 21 ἀλλὰ] ἀλλὰ τὸ recc. trom. ΑΡ αὐτῷ 
EJ 423 οὔθ' αὑτῷ EJ 26 ἔτι... 27 ἀποδείξεως AP ΑἹ. : om. EJT 
Asc. 28 ὥστε... ἔχοι AP All: om. EJT Asc.: cf. 1. 30 29 γ}} 
tT J 30 πᾶν EJ Asc.®: ἅπαν AP 32 τὸ pr.om.J εἶ] τὸ εἰ AP 


5 


To 


3° 


IToo6» 


on 


10 


20 


TON META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Γ 


“Ὁ πὰ (owe } \ 4 
ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἃν 7} τι ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται TO ἀνθρώπῳ 
> ΄, 
εἶναι (διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐθὲν οὐδ᾽ εἰ πλείω τις φαίη σημαίνειν 

’ / , 
μόνον δὲ ὡρισμένα, τεθείῆ γὰρ ἃν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ λόγῳ 
ων " ὰ 
ἕτερον ὄνομα' λέγω δ᾽ οἷον, εἰ μὴ φαίη τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἕν 

Ν - Ὄ \ ~ 
σημαίνειν, πολλὰ δέ, ὧν ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς λόγος τὸ ζῷον δί- 

ων XN \ ed γι « / Ν * 4 ΨΚ δ 
πουν, εἶεν δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι πλείους, ὡρισμένοι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμόν 7 
τεθείη yap ἂν ἴδιον ὄνομα καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τὸν λόγον" εἰ δὲ 
> 
μή [τεθείη], GAN ἄπειρα σημαίνει» φαίη, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν 
4 / . \ xX XN ὰ ,ὔ > Ν > if: 
εἴη λόγος" TO yap μὴ ἕν σημαίνειν οὐθὲν σημαίνειν ἐστίν, 
Ν , Ss “- > / 4, ey, \ / 
μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι 
\ 7, N , \ \ ΓΕ Το. 
πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν 
babs Ν ΟῚ / lal Ἂς fal . ᾿ b) > / 
οὐθὲν yap ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, εἰ δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, 
[οὴ ε ᾿" / a 
τεθείη dv ὄνομα τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι ἕν).----ἔστω δή, ὥσπερ 
/ a lal 
ἐλέχθη κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, σημαῖνόν τι TO ὄνομα καὶ σημαῖνον 
ths > ΟΝ Δ.) / oe / ων id “ > ‘Fe 
ἕν" od δὴ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι σημαίνειν ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ 
> 3 Ν 
μὴ εἶναι, εἰ τὸ ἄνθρωπος σημαίνει μὴ μόνον καθ᾽ ἑνὸς 


5 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕν (οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀξιοῦμεν τὸ ἕν σημαίνειν, 


Ν PY ςε , 9 \ Ὁ“ Ὁ Ν \ ‘ Ν Ν 
τὸ καθ᾽ ἑνός, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂἃν τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν 
Ν \ A ὰ 2 / Ὁ a . bd 
καὶ TO ἄνθρωπος ἕν ἐσήμαινεν, ὥστε ἕν ἅπαντα ἔσται" 
> \ 
συνώνυμα yap) καὶ οὐκ ἔσται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ 
b) 5 δ ’ ε “ Ἂν, ΓΝ. ε -“ ἡ 
ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καθ᾽ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὥσπερ av εἰ ὃν ἡμεῖς ἄνθρωπον 
a » Ἂς ΝΜ lal \ 9 > / 
καλοῦμεν, ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν' TO δ᾽ ἀπορούμενον 
> Le Vee! ΕΣ ’ 9 / \ Bem bs “ op \ Ν > 
ov τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται TO αὐτὸ ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι 
BA Ν v 3 Ν Ν o Ν Ν 7 
ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ TO πρᾶγμα. εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαί- 
εἰ \ » Ν Ν eae ἡ “ “ Ν 
νει ἕτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ 
Ν Ν a > / “ “ > ΄ “ 3 Ν \ b) 
TO μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥστ᾽ ἔσται TO ἀν- 
7 ‘) Ν ᾿} ͵ 4 A Ν Ν fal Ν 
θρώπῳ εἶναι μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ civa ἕν γὰρ ἔσται. τοῦτο γὰρ 
la ‘ «ἢ ed \ ε / Sen / 3 ς 4 
σημαίνει TO εἶναι Ev, TO ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἰ ὁ λόγος 


8.33 ἄνθρωπος ἘΠῚ Asc.°: om. APetutvid. Al. 377 εἰ ΑΡ ἔσται 


AP ΑἹ. : ἐστι EJT Αβς.9 τὸ JA, ex τῶι fecit E 34 εἰ ἘΠῚ 
Asc.: εἰ ἐπὶ AP: εἰ ἔτι ci. Christ DI λύγῳ EJ Asc.®: τῷ λόγῳ 
Ab 2 τὸν ἄνθρωπον EJ Asc. 3 ἑνὸς μὲν εἷς ἘΠῚ Asc.: els 
μὲν εἴη AP τὸ ζῷον τὸ δίπουν J 4 εἰσὶ EJT Asc. 5 τῶν 
λόγων E 6 τεθείη codd. Τ' Al. Asc.: 566]. Gomperz 7 ev] 
ἕν τι rece. ἐστίν om, ἘΠ 9 αὑτόν Τ Asc.° i et fort. ΑἹ, : αὐτόν 
codd. Al.¢ 10 οὐδὲ Ale μὴ AP ΑΙ. : μηθὲν EJT 12 κατἢἾ 
καὶ κατ᾽ E σημαΐνειν τι AP 13 ὅπερ EJT Ale: om. AP 
13-14 μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ EJT 16 τὸ tert. et 17 τὸ AP Al. Asc.: 
om, EJ 21 τὸ αὐτὸ dua AY Ale: ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ EJ Asc.®: ἅμα T 


26 τὸ εἶναι ΕἾΤ᾽ Asc.e: om, AP τὸ om, EJ 


4. 1006® 22 — 10078 23 


tle SN ΟΝ ¢ ὰ “ wes ΄ > \ Ν 
εἷς" εἰ δὲ ἔσται ἕν, ἕν σημανεῖ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ μὴ 
> / " > 9 / Ψ ¢ F. > / 7 
ἀνθρώπῳ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐδέδεικτο ὅτι ἕτερον σημαίνει. ἀνάγκη τοί- 
νυν, εἴ τί ἐστιν ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος, ζῷον εἶναι δί- 

“ Ν Ἵν a ᾿ / \ > ? > / 
ποὺυν (τοῦτο yap ἢν ὃ ἐσήμαινε τὸ ἄνθρωπος)" εἰ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη 
“ > ) / Ν ” / \ freee aA 7 fal 
τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι (réTe) τὸ αὐτὸ ζῷον δίπουν (τοῦτο 
“ ,ὕ My ἢ δ. Me σα ἢ δι \ 3 
γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ ἀνάγκη εἷναι, τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι μὴ εἶναι 

> ” ϑ 4 4“ > Ν a > - \ 
[ἄνθρωπον)" οὐκ dpa ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ἀληθὲς εἶναι εἰπεῖν τὸ 
> \ Ν > ἊΝ Ν ων ” c > > \ 
αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς 
, τ ἃ, κ a Ν > Ὡς Ἀν 2 \ N > , 
λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον' τὸ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ 
5 \ \ ἊΣ > / ων} ed / μ \ 
εἶναι Kal TO μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἕτεροι!’ σημαίνει, εἴπερ Kal 
\ 4 AN Ν vA » e \ Ν 
τὸ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἕτερον" πολὺ γὰρ 
5» γ , a - δ“ ed , Ν Ν 
ἀντίκειται ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον, ὥστε σημαίνεω ἕτερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ 
\ Ν ,ὔ Ν τὴν \ ὰ ἊΣ / Ν > \ 
TO λευκὸ; φήσει TO αὐτὸ Kal ἕν σημαίνειν, πάλι» τὸ αὐτὸ 
b) a “ \ , 5) / Ψ A / y \ > 
ἐροῦμεν ὅπερ καὶ πρότερον" ἐλέχθη, ὅτι ἕν πάντα ἔσται Kal οὐ 
, cas 7, ᾽ Ν Noes 5 , a γι 
μόνον τὰ ἀντικείμενα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο, συμβαί- 

Ν / ἣν τ 7 ¥ " re ὟΝ Ν 

νει τὸ λεχθέν, Av ἀποκρίνηται τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. ἐὰν δὲ 
a n lal ’ 
προστιθῇ ἐρωτῶντος ἁπλῶς καὶ Tas ἀποφάσεις, οὐκ ἀποκρί- 
Ν -) / AN Ν 4 > δὰ ba \ \ 
νεται TO ἐρωτώμενον. οὐθὲν yap κωλύει εἶναι TO αὐτὸ Kal 
‘ ᾿ ἴω 
ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία τὸ πλῆθος" GAN 
“ἢ 2 / δ᾽... Ν ᾽ tal Ν na » “Ὁ yw 
ὅμως ἐρομένου εἰ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἄνθρωπον τοῦτο εἶναι ἢ οὔ, 
ἀποκριτέον τὸ ἕν σημαῖνον καὶ οὐ προσθετέον ὅτι καὶ λευ- 
\ \ \ ΩΝ if / ΝΥ b) »“ Ν 
κὸν καὶ péya. καὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἄπειρά γ᾽ ὄντα τὰ 
a A δ 
συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν" ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν. 
ὁμοίως τοίνυν εἰ καὶ μυριάκις ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ 
a / 
οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ προσαποκριτέον TO ἐρομένῳ εἰ ἔστι» ἄνθρω- 

Ψ“ > 1 \ 9 ΝΥ ᾽ \ \ ων 
πος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ μὴ καὶ τἄλλα 
4 , / “ \ δ Ν ν Ν 
ὅσα συμβέβηκε προσαποκριτέον, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἢ μὴ ἔστιν" ἐὰν 

a n / fal an / 
δὲ τοῦτο ποιῇ, οὐ διαλέγεται.---- ὅλως δ᾽ ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ τοῦτο λέ- 

Ls / 
yovres οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. πάντα γὰρ ἀνάγκη συμ- 
βεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι 3) 

] I ρ ρ t ) 
ζῴῳ εἶναι μὴ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τι ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι 
te μὴ τ γ ρ ρ ἐμ! + ’ 

» 27 onpavetex Al, scripsi: σημαίνει οοἀ 4. 1 31 τοῦτο E?APT Asc.°: 
τότε ἘΠῚ τότε τὸ fort. Al., ci. Bonitz: τὸ AP: τότε EJ Asc. 

3 ἄνθρωπον om. fort. Al., secl. Christ 434 δ᾽ αὐτὸς EJ Asc.l°; αὐτὸς 
δὲ APA! = 100781 εἶναι ἄνθρωπον] ἄνθρωπον εἶναι Christ 4 σημαίνει 
A> 5 φησι" ὁ €orwAl, Bonitz: ἐστὶ ςο. 1 9 ἀποκρινεῖται fort. 
ΑΙ, 10 τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι AP 12 ἐρωμένου E 15 ἅπαντα EJT Α5ς-.: 
τὰ ἄπειρα πάντα AP διελθετέον ΑΡ 17 ἐρωμένωι ἘῈ 18 ἅμα] ἀλλὰ 


Ab 21 εἶναι μὴ εἶναι Ab ΘΟ ἢ τιν 38 εἶναι tert. om, E! 23 μὴ 
εἶναι ἘΠ. Asc. τί ἦν εἶναι μὴ εἶναι ΑἹ, ; μὴ εἶναι τί ἢν εἶναί τινος A® 


30 


1007" 


- 
ar 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA Τ' 


na 3 a Ν ϑ Ja > x ἊΝ τον 5 7 
τοῦτο οὐκ ἔσται μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ 


εν ia) 3 ! ΄ nN S 9 [Vee ες 
25 (KQLTOL QUTAL ἀποφάσεις τούτου)" ey γὰρ Ἢν O ἐσήμαινε, 


Io 


I 


or 


\ a a / 3 7 Ν 5 > la / 3 ἊΝ 
καὶ ἦν τοῦτό τινος οὐσία. τὸ δ᾽ οὐσίαν σημαίνειν ἐστὶν 
Ψ > Ν \ 4 Θὲ. σι > + 3: τϑ Ν 
ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ. εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται αὐτῷ τὸ 
“ 3, Ψ 5 x Ψ Ν 5 ΄ “5 δ Ψ 
ὅπερ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι ἢ ὅπερ 
ἊΝ “4 2 Va » BA Ὁ Pp a =) - 
μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἄλλο ἔσται, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αὑτοῖς 
λέγειν ὅτι οὐθενὸς ἔσται τοιοῦτος λόγος, ἀλλὰ πάντα 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός" τούτῳ γὰρ διώρισται οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμ- 

μβεβὴη Dye? " μ 
βεβηκός: τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν ὅτι 

7 γὰρ Ὁ ᾿ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβη 

" x SN > 5 2 “ , > x / Ν 
ἐστι μὲν λευκὸς ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅπερ λευκόν. εἰ δὲ πάντα κατὰ 

Ν / AX Ba ἴον \ ’ τ 2 SON 
συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται, οὐθὲν ἔσται πρῶτον TO καθ᾽ ov, εἰ ἀεὶ 
τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς σημαίνει τὴν κατη- 

/ > / + , " Si > 3. Ὁ 7 OX 
γορίαν. ἀνάγκη apa εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον" οὐδὲ 
Ἂς i“ / lal \ Ἂς Ν > 
yap πλείω συμπλέκεται δυοῖν' τὸ yap συμβεβηκὸς ov 
συμβεβηκότι συμβεβηκός, εἰ μὴ ὅτι ἄμφω συμβέβηκε 

an - an \ 
ταὐτῷ, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τὸ λευκὸν μουσικὸν Kal τοῦτο λευκὸν 
“ ἡ na 5 lA / 2 ) > € / 
ὅτι ἄμφω τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁ Σωκρά- 
Ν ey 4 Mh La; (ey? 7 3 \ 

της μουσικὸς οὕτως, OTL ἄμφω συμβέβηκεν ἑτέρῳ τινί. ἐπεὶ 

΄, Ἂν Ν cy Ν 2 3: 7 / , 
τοίνυν τὰ μὲν οὕτως τὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνως λέγεται συμβεβηκότα, 
“ 4 4 « ss Ν o yy / > ΩΣ δέ 
ὅσα οὕτως λέγεται ὡς τὸ λευκὸν τῷ Σωκράτει, οὐκ ἐνδέχε- 
ται ἄπειρα εἷναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, οἷον τῷ Σωκράτει τῷ λευκῷ 
e Yd ἐδ > \ [4 7 ὰ 3 «ς / 
ἕτερόν τι συμβεβηκός: ov yap γίγνεταί τι ἕν ἐξ ἁπάντων. 
οὐδὲ δὴ τῷ λευκῷ ἕτερόν τι ἔσται συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ μου- 

ἢ τά Ὁ ἕτερ μβεβηκός, μ 
- na Ων lal 
σικόν" οὐθέν τε yap μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνο τούτῳ 
Ie ‘ ed / ig s Ν 4 , 
συμβέβηκεν, καὶ ἅμα διώρισται ὅτι τὰ μὲν οὕτω συμβέ- 
Ν 8, τ \ \ / “ > Ὁ“ > 
βηκε τὰ δ᾽ ὡς TO μουσικὸν Σωκράτει: ὅσα δ᾽ οὕτως, ov 


συμβεβηκότι συμβέβηκε συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐκείνως, 
ey > > Τὰ Ἂς ἊΝ / Ba 
ὥστ οὐ πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεχθήσεται. ἐσται 


BY \ A > 7 - ᾿Ὶ] ἊΝ fal / “ 
ἄρα τι καὶ ὡς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δέδεικται ὅτι 
ἀδύνατον ἅμα κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰς ἀντιφάσεις.----ἔτι εἰ ἀλη- 


1007” 18 --- 1008* 2, cf. τοδ2ὃ 23--30 


225 καίτοι αὗται EJT Asc.: καὶ τοιαῦται AP ΑἹ. ἐσήμαινε APT 
Α1].9 : ἐσήμηνε EJ 26 ἐστὶν] αὐτῆς ἐστὶν AP 27 αὐτῷ τὸ EJT 
Al.: τι AP 28 ἢ AP ΑΙ. Asc.c: om. EJT , μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ ΕΓ Al. 
Asc.e: ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ AP 29 ein J ἄλλο EJT ΑἹ, Asc. : ἄλλο τι 
A> ΑΙ.9 31 τούτῳ... συμβεβηκός om. E} 34 καθ᾽ οὗ εἰ. Al.: 
καθόλου codd.T Al. Asc. εἰ AP Al.: εἰ δ᾽ Ἐ]ΠΓ Asc.¢ "2 πλείω 
ΕἘΠΤ Asc.: δύο AP 6 οὗτος [ 13 τούτω AP 15 συμβέβηκε 
EJ Asc.°: συμβέβηκε τὸ recc.: accidit!: om. AP 17 ὡς scripsi: 
ὡς codd,. Γ 


4. 10078 24 — 10088 II 


θεῖς αἱ ἀντιφάσεις ἅμα κατὰ tod αὐτοῦ πᾶσαι, δῆλον ws 
τὰ a 
ἅπαντα ἔσται ἕν. ἔσται yap τὸ αὐτὸ Kal τριήρης καὶ τοῖ- 
y x aA a 
xos καὶ ἄνθρωπος, εἰ κατὰ παντός τι ἢ καταφῆσαι ἢ 
3 “ Ψ / / 5 / ° \ 
ἀποφῆσαι ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ ἀνάγκη τοῖς τὸν Lpwra- 
a > / 
yopov λέγουσι λόγον. εἰ yap τῳ δοκεῖ μὴ εἶναι τριήρης ὁ 
BA a ς > + 7 c \ 7 4 
ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τριήρης" ὥστε καὶ ἔστιν, εἴπερ 


ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής. καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξαγόρου, : 


ς “ / / - \ »} a ς 7 \ 
ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα' ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. TO 
phe Lo ea. / \ 77 \ BAY / \ 
ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, Kal οἰόμενοι TO ὃν λέγειν περὶ 
lal Ἂς ν» / Ν Ν / Ἃ \ Ν 2 
τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν: τὸ yap δυνάμει OV καὶ μὴ ἐντελε- 
7 XN See. , 5 2 SS XN 7 3 2 lal Ν 
χείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γ᾽ αὐτοῖς κατὰ 
Ν \ Ν δ. abn > , / ἈΝ 
παντὸς (παντὸς) τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν: ἄτοπον γὰρ 
> c / ec x > cal > ,ὔ Ὁ / ἕξ € δ᾽ «ς / a δ 
εἰ ἑκάστῳ 1) μὲν αὐτοῦ ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει, ἡ δ᾽ ἑτέρου ὃ μὴ 
ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρξει: λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἰ ὀληθὲς εἰπεῖν τὸν 
BA 4 > BY rol “ NON / XN 9 
ἄνθρωπον ὅτι οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ 
/ > Ἂς > c Τὰ > ‘i ἊΝ > / 
τριήρης. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάφασις, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν" 
> XN Ν « c / Ὁ ’ , € / 
εἰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἣ κατάφασις, ἥ ye ἀπόφασις ὑπάρξει 
ἊΣ δ € 9᾽ a >) io τ ,ὔ « / id , Ν «ς 
μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν κἀκείνη ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρξει καὶ ἡ 


Las » 2 ᾽ [ἡ \ ε I ned és 
τῆς τριήρους" εἰ δ᾽ αὕτη, καὶ ἡ κατάφασις.--ταῦτά τε οὖν 
7. “-“ / \ , fal ἊΝ Ὁ“ 3 > / 

συμβαίνει Tots λέγουσι τὸν λόγον τοῦτον, Kal ὅτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη 
XA / x Ε , 3 Ν > Ν 4 vA ‘ 
ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι. εἰ yap ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἄνθρωπος καὶ 
> BA “ [τς \ ἀρ 3 BA PES! ΕΣ ν 

οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὔτ᾽ ἄνθρωπος οὔτ οὐκ ἂν- 
θρωπος ἔσται: τοῖν γὰρ δυοῖν δύο ἀποφάσεις, εἰ δὲ μία 
2 > - 2 7 Ν “ , > Υ > , ps 

ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐκείνη, καὶ αὕτη pla ἂν εἴη ἀντικειμένη.----ἔτι 
ἤτοι περὶ ἅπαντα οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι καὶ λευκὸν καὶ οὐ 

EY , 
λευκὸν καὶ ὃν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας φάσεις καὶ 


> 2 © , δ x > Ν Ν , 7 
ἀποφάσεις ὁμοιοτρόπως, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τινας, περί 


? » \ > Ν Ἂς ‘ / @ Xd a 
τινας ὃ ov. καὶ εἰ μὲν μὴ περὶ πάσας, αὗται ἂν Elev 


τοοϑ 4--7, cf. 1062% 36 — Ὁ 7 


bar τι ἘΠΤ Asc: om. AP 23 λέγουσι λόγον EJT Α8ς.ὃ : λόγον 
λέγουσι AP ΑΙ.9 δοκεῖν AP 24 ws AP Ale: ὅτι EJ ἔσται 
KECC. ἔσται Al, 25 ἡ] ἢν ἡ AP 26 ὑπάρχειν JA» Asc.: 
ἐνυπάρχειν E: ἕν ὑπάρχειν Τ' 27 Kal... λέγειν om. J τὸ ὃν 
λέγειν ET ΑἸ1.1 Asc.e: λέγειν τὸ ὃν AP 30 παντὸς ex Al.ci. Bonitz: 
om. codd. I Al.! Asc. 31 αὑτοῦ Christ ὕὑπάρχει T 32 τὸν 


ἄνθρωπον EJ Asc.¢: τὸ ἄνθρωπος AP 43 ἢ τριήρης ἢ om. EJT Al. Asc. 
edd. 1008%1 ἢ ἡ EJP ΑἹ. : οὐ. ΑΡ 44ὅτι] ἐστιν ὅτι AP γ ἀμφοῖν 
A> Al.: ἀμφοτέρων EJ Asc. ἐκείνῃ T ἔτι] τι AP 10 μὲν 
περὶ AP 

2678:1 Ε 


30 


35 
10088 


ΙΟ 


15 


20 


30 


τοοϑὺ 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑΤΓ 


Ν 
ὁμολογούμεναι: εἰ δὲ περὶ πάσας, πάλιν ἤτοι καθ᾽ ὅσων τὸ 
lo \ > a \ 3 “ ϑ “ \ a 
φῆσαι Kat ἀποφῆσαι καὶ καθ΄ ὅσων ἀποφῆσαι καὶ φῆσαι, 

Ν Ν, ὡς Ὁ n \ , nan > “ XX > 
ἢ κατὰ μὲν ὧν φῆσαι Kal ἀποφῆσαι, καθ᾽ ὅσων δὲ ἀπο- 
φῆσαι οὐ πάντων φῆσαι. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὕτως, εἴη ἄν τι πα- 
Ἃ > » Ν Ὁ“ 7 / Ν 3 \ Ν. ων 
γίως οὐκ ὄν, καὶ αὕτη βεβαία δόξα, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ εἷναι 
βέβαιόν τι καὶ γνώριμον, γνωριμωτέρα ἃν εἴη ἡ φά- 
« 3 / 3 Ἂν € ὮΝ \ “ἷ > fal / 
σις ἡ ἀντικειμένη" εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως Kal ὅσα ἀποφῆσαι φά- 
δ A > Ν a Ψ @ “ 
ναι, ἀνάγκη ἦτοι ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οἷον ὅτι 
Ἂς Ν / “ > / XN Ν \ PI Ν 
λευκὸν καὶ πάλιν ὅτι οὐ λευκόν, ἢ οὔ. καὶ εἰ μὲν 
Ν > Ν fal S > / na Ἂν 
μὴ ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οὐ λέγει τε ταῦτα καὶ 
> ? 522 Ἂς Ν Ν » a ss , XN 
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐθέν (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα πῶς ἂν φθέγξαιτο ἢ 
/ \ Me > ν ε “ \ 4 
βαδίσειεν;), καὶ πάντα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἕν, ὥσπερ Kal πρότερον 
Ν \ 9 εἰς + \ + \ \ \ te 
εἴρηται, καὶ ταὐτὸν ἔσται καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ θεὸς καὶ τριή- 
\ δι τ lf 3.τ ὖν > x € 7 ee aL 
pys καὶ at ἀντιφάσεις αὐτῶν (εἰ yap ὁμοίως καθ᾽ ἑκάστου, 
Or ψ' μ᾿ « / > ἊΣ "4 τ Ἄν 3 Ν 
οὐδὲν διοίσει ἕτερον ἑτέρου" εἰ γὰρ διοίσει, τοῦτ᾽ ἔσται ἀληθὲς 
Ney c 7 Ν \ ᾿] fat 3 14 3 / 
καὶ ἴδιον)" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ διαιροῦντα ἐνδέχεται ἀληθεύειν, 
΄, \ / \ Sy ΄, “ , AN > 
συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ OTL πάντες ἂν ἀλη- 
\ / x F 
θεύοιεν καὶ πάντες dv ψεύδοιντο, καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὁμὸ- 
λογεῖ ψεύδεσθαι. ἅμα δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ οὐθενός ἐστι 
\ a € / AN ~ / Μ Ἂς Ὡ v9 
πρὸς τοῦτον 7) σκέψις" οὐθὲν yap λέγει. οὔτε yap οὕτως οὔτ 
2 Ψ Ud ? 2 of \ > “ \ t 
οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, GAN οὕτως TE καὶ OVX οὕτως" καὶ πάλιν 
a Ψ / + v4 ΜΔ) “ + > “ > 
ye ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω, ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως" εἰ 
Ν tA BA ¥ ν ς / ν ἈΠ ν᾽ ε ἢ 
γὰρ μή, ἤδη ἄν τι εἴη ὡρισμένον.----ἔτι εἰ ὅταν ἡ φάσις 
> ν 3 ε 9. ὅτ re » ΕΝ oY > Ν 3 ε 
ἀληθὴς ἢ, ἢ ἀπόφασις ψευδής, κἂν αὕτη ἀληθὴς ἢ, ἣ 
I 7, 3 
κατάφασις ψευδής, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα φάναι καὶ 
ἐξ na na > a a 
ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως φαῖεν ἂν τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ἐξ 
los νΝ Ων x 
ἀρχῆς κείμενον.----ἔτι apa ὁ μὲν ἢ ἔχειν πως ὑπολαμβά- 
BN 
νων ἢ μὴ ἔχειν διέψευσται, ὁ δὲ ἄμφω ἀληθεύει; εἰ yap 
/ \ an 
ἀληθεύει, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ λεγόμενον ὅτι τοιαύτη τῶν ὄντων H 


215 πάντως E 17 ἂν EJT Al.: γὰρ ἂν AP 18 ἡ ἀντικειμένη 
EJ Al.: ἢ ἡ ἀντικειμένη ἀντίφασις APT Asc. δὲ] δὲ τῷ ἀποφάναι Τ' 
ὅσα EJT Al. Α5ς.} : ὧν ἔστιν AP φάναι EJ Al. Asc.l: κατὰ τού- 
τῶν ἔστι φάναι AP; φάναι κατὰ τούτων Τ' 21 λέγει AD οὐ λέγει 
om. J 23 βαδίσειεν EJT Al. Asc.: νοήσειε ΑΡ πάντα EJ Asc.: 
ἅπαντα AP 25 εἰ 8 Ej’ Al. Asc. 26 οὐδὲν EJ Asc.®: οὐδενὶ 
Ab 28 ἀληθεύοιεν EJ Asc.!: ἀληθεύσειεν AY: ἀληθεύσαιεν Al 
31 τούτῳ Τ' 33 οὔτε] οὔτε οὔτε AP 34 εἴη] πω AP 35 ἢ alt. 
om, APT 36 τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα AP Asc.: ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ EJT b 3 γὰρ] 
yap μὴ AP Al. Asc. 4 λεγόμενον ; ἢ ὅτι fort. Al. 


4. τοοϑὰ 12 — 1008P 34 


φύσις; εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀληθεύει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἢ ὁ ἐκεί- 5 


(δ. γ A » x » Ν Zsa) 
vos ὑπολαμβάνων, ἤδη πως ἔχοι ἂν τὰ ὄντα, καὶ TOUT 
5 Ν Ὁ » \ 3 .“ \ > 3 ,ὕ "ἢ Sic (2 
ἀληθὲς av εἴη, Kat οὐχ ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως 
ἅπαντες καὶ ψεύδονται καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν, οὔτε φθέγξα- 
σθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰπεῖν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἔσται: ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτά τε καὶ 
οὐ ταῦτα λέγει. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως 
yy ἊΝ > yf 7 Xx , yo nt 
οἴεται καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, TL ἂν διαφερόντως ἔχοι τῶν γε φυ- 
n WA \ / , 9 “ 2) \ 4 i 
τῶν; ὅθεν Kal μάλιστα φανερόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὕτω διά- 
yy an BA + lol , \ , an 
κειται οὔτε TOV ἄλλων οὔτε τῶν λεγόντων τὸν λόγον τοῦτον. 
διὰ τί γὰρ βαδίζει Μέγαράδε ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡσυχάζει, οἰόμε- 
a DY 
vos βαδίζειν δεῖν; οὐδ᾽ εὐθέως ἕωθεν πορεύεται εἰς φρέαρ ἢ εἰς 
/ aN - 3 Ἂς 7 > Ἃ ε > 
φάραγγα, ἐὰν τύχῃ, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται εὐλαβούμενος, ws οὐχ 
ὁμοίως οἰόμενος μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸ ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν; 
δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ὑπολαμβάνει τὸ δ᾽ οὐ βέλ- 
> Ν an \ \ Ν + \ 3 > 
τιον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, Kal TO μὲν ἄνθρωπον τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἄνθρωπον 
\ Ν Ἂς \ \ 2 Ἄ ἊΝ 5 / € if 
καὶ TO μὲν γλυκὺ TO δ᾽ οὐ γλυκὺ ἀνάγκη ὑπολαμβάνειν. 
> Ν Pp) y ed tal \ « “ , 
ov yap ἐξ ἴσου ἅπαντα ζητεῖ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει, ὅταν oin- 
θεὶς βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ πιεῖν ὕδωρ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἄνθρωπον εἶτα 
a > 7 yo 2 > \ ce € / Ν yi 
ζητῇ αὐτά! καίτοι ἔδει ye, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἣν ὁμοίως καὶ ἄν- 
θρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ ἐλέχθη, οὐθεὶς ὃς οὐ 
/ Ν Ν > / ΩΝ > BA “ c yo 
φαίνεται τὰ μὲν εὐλαβούμενος τὰ δ᾽ οὔ ὥστε, ὡς ἔοικε, 
/ € L yo ς a > X Ν ef 
πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐχειν ἁπλῶς, εἰ μὴ περὶ ἅπαντα, 
>) Ν Ν \ BA \ val > Ν SS > f 
ἀλλὰ περὶ TO ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι 
ἀλλὰ δοξάζοντες, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιμελητέον ἂν εἴη τῆς 
3 id 7 \ ᾿ς 3 Ὰ “Ν « n a € 7 
ἀληθείας, ὥσπερ Kal νοσώδει ὄντι ἢ ὑγιεινῷ τῆς ὑγιείας" 
\ Ν ¢ It \ iN > / 2 ς n / 
καὶ yap ὁ δοξάζων πρὸς τὸν ἐπιστάμενον οὐχ ὑγιεινῶς διά- 
\ X\ 2 Ἃ + 4. ὙΦ᾽ / f 
κειται πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.----ἔτι εἰ OTL μάλιστα πάντα οὕτως 
Υ͂ \ >’ “ > Ἂς , fal \ ἊΝ yo 
EXEL καὶ OVX οὕτως, ἀλλὰ TO ye μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἔνεστιν 
ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως φήσαιμεν εἶναι 
1 γὰρ μ ἥσαιμ 
Ἂς δας + \ Ν 3.9.2 Θ Ζ if c Ὡς 
τὰ δύο ἄρτια καὶ τὰ τρία, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοίως διέψευσται ὁ τὰ 


1008? 12-27, cf. 10639 28-35 


Ῥ ἢ AP ΑΙ, ; om. EJT Asc, 8 καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ E 9 ἔστιν 
EJ! Ase. ταὐτά. « «1ὸ ταὐυτὰ ἘΠ Il γε φυτῶν ci. Bonitz: πεφυ- 
κότων EXJAP; φυτῶν ἘΠῚ ΑἹ. Asc. 15 δεῖν AP Al.: om. EJT 


Asc. edd. εὐθὺς AP ἢ eis AP Al. Asc.: ἢ EJT 17 room. E 
20 post ἀνάγκη add. ὡρισμένως ΕΖ 23 ζητῆ J et fecit E: ᾧτεῖ AP 
ἔδει ye EJ Asc.: γ᾽ ἔδει AP 32 ἕν ἐστιν J 34 δύο] δύο 
εἶναι AP 

FQ 


- 


5 


30 


oh 
Por) 


10098 


10 


20 


25 


TON META TA ®YTSIKA T 


/ / +7 \ « / 5 ® X\ « / 
τέτταρα πέντε οἰόμενος καὶ ὁ χίλια. εἰ οὖν μὴ ὁμοίως, 
δῆλον ὅτι ἅτερος ἧττον, ὥστε μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει. εἰ οὖν τὸ 
las 5 7 Κ BA > Ν Φ 2 7 Ν 
μᾶλλον ἐγγύτερον, εἴη γε ἄν τι ἀληθὲς οὗ ἐγγύτερον τὸ 
μᾶλλον ἀληθές. Kav εἰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤδη γέ τι ἔστι βε- 

’ \ b) / \ “ » μὰ / 
βαιότερον Kat ἀληθινώτερον, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμέ- 
νοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ 
ὁρίσαι. 

Ἔστι δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς δόξης καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρου λόγος, 
Nese: ς ΄ὔ > \ " \ a Ἃ Ν ay bY 
Kal ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς ἄμφω ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἷναι: εἴτε 

x Ν a ΙΝ 5 \ 3 a \ DS / 
yap τὰ δοκοῦντα πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα, 
ἀνάγκη εἶναι πάντα ἅμα ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ (πολλοὶ γὰρ 
5 7 « / > Si \ \ N- a ἃς 
τἀναντία ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἀλλήλοις, Kal τοὺς μὴ ταὐτὰ 
a an 3 / \ 
δοξάζοντας ἑαυτοῖς διεψεῦσθαι νομίζουσιν: ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τὸ 
αὐτὸ εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), καὶ εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ 
δοκοῦντα εἶναι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ (τὰ ἀντικείμενα γὰρ δοξάζουσιν 
ἀλλήλοις οἱ διεψευσμένοι καὶ ἀληθεύοντες" εἰ οὖν ἔχει τὰ 
wy “ 9. / / Ψ Ἂς » > A lal > an 
ὄντα οὕτως, ἀληθεύσουσι πάντες). ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς 
ἐφ , ϑ / c / Led 7 3 > ς 
εἰσὶ διανοίας ἀμφότεροι οἱ λόγοι, δῆλον" ἔστι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁ 
αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς ἅπαντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως! οἱ μὲν γὰρ πει- 
θοῦς δέονται οἱ δὲ βίας. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπορῆσαι 
« ΄ [4 ie 3.. € Ν > Ἂς \ x 
ὑπέλαβον οὕτως, τούτων εὐΐατος ἡ ἄγνοια (ov yap πρὸς τὸν 

Ν , / a 

λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἡ ἀπάντησις αὐτῶν)" ὅσοι 
I ! , > ȴ a ~ 
δὲ λόγου χάριν λέγουσι, τούτων δ᾽ ἔλεγχος ἴασις τοῦ ἐν τῇ 

a a lal / a 
φωνῇ λόγου Kat τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. ἐλήλυθε δὲ τοῖς δια- 

a o ε , > n > a ε κ᾿ ma Τ᾿ 

ποροῦσιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, 7) μὲν τοῦ ἅμα 
τὰς ἀντιφάσεις καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ὁρῶσιν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ 
γιγνόμενα τἀναντία" εἰ οὖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι τὸ μὴ 
ὄν, προὐπῆρχεν ὁμοίως τὸ πῤᾶγμα ἄμφω ὄν, ὥσπερ καὶ 

> / tal Cc 2 / Ν , 
Avagaydpas μεμῖχθαι πᾶν ἐν παντί φησι καὶ Δημόκρι- 
τος" καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τὸ κενὸν καὶ τὸ πλῆρες ὁμοίως καθ᾽ 


1009* 6-16, 22-30, cf. 1062 12-24 16-22, 1o11® 3-16, cf. 
1063» 7-16 

b 35 πάντα E 10098 1 τι om. AP 6 ἔτι Christ ἄμφω 
αὐτοὺς EJ 9 εἶναι πάντα... ψευδῆ AP Al.: πάντα... ψευδῇ εἶναι 
ἘΠΡ Asc. 15 ἀληθεύουσι 1511 Asc. 15-16 ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς 
εἴη Α5ς.} : εἰσὶν ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς AP 16 ἀμφότεροι of] οἱ τοιοῦτοι AP 
17 ἅπαντας ἘΠ Asc.°: πάντας AP 21 τοῦ Αὔ et ut vid. Al.: τοῦ 
rt EJ 24 ὑπάρξειν EJ 25 γίγνεσθαι AP Al.: γενέσθαι EJ 


Asc.¢ 26 ἄμφω ὄν, τούτεστιν dy καὶ μὴ ὄν AP 


4. 1008» 35 — 5. 1009? 20 


a \ uo) 
ὁτιοῦν ὑπάρχειν μέρος, καίτοι TO μὲν ὃν τούτων εἶναι TO δὲ 
μὴ ὄν, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐκ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντας ἐροῦμεν 
ὅτι τρόπον μέν τινα ὀρθῶς λέγουσι τρόπον δέ τινα ἀγνοοῦσιν" 
Ἂ Ἂς δ / “ vA ’ » aA 4 9 fi 
TO yap ὃν λέγεται διχῶς, ὥστ᾽ ἔστιν ὃν τρόπον ἐνδέχεται 
7 tT) 5 a ἊΝ ΕἾ x 5 ἃ EA \ dd A 
γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, ἔστι δ᾽ ὃν ov, Kal ἅμα TO 
υ ἐς Σὸν ee be Be} \ Ν » »} τ Ὁ Ν ἜΗΝ » 
αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὃν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ [dv]: δυ- 
if Ν 
νάμει μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία, 
᾿ 
ἐντελεχείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν 
ey, Ν “Ὁ G “ » Φ » “ ¢ t 
καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἣ οὔτε κίνησις ὑπάρ- 
+ Ν + , \ / “ ἊΝ \ 
χει οὔτε φθορὰ οὔτε yeveois TO παράπαν.---ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ 
«ς \ x / 5 Le 5) / -ἢ lal > ny 3 tg 
ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλή- 
λυθεν. τὸ μὲν yap ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται 
/ δον > fa N 3 Ψ' \ c Ἂς \ 
προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι, TO δ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῖς μὲν γλυκὺ γεῦυο- 
Le a > - Ἂν " 
μένοις δοκεῖν εἶναι τοῖς δὲ πικρόν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πάντες ἔκαμνον 
x , ΄ ΄ὔ 3. ἃ an (oe δ a 
ἢ πάντες παρεφρόνουν, δύο δ᾽ ἢ τρεῖς ὑγίαινον ἢ νοῦν εἶχον, 
δοκεῖν ἂν τούτους κάμνειν καὶ παραφρονεῖν τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλους οὔ' 
lal an y, a n 
ἔτι δὲ Kal πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τἀναντία [περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν] 
φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ ἑκάστῳ πρὸς αὑτὸν οὐ 
ae Ἂς Ν » ie tal an > 7 vd Lgl 
ταὐτὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀεὶ δοκεῖν. ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ 
Ων lal lal > “Ὁ > a 
ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον: οὐθὲν yap μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι 
EN a © 
ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ ἄδηλον. ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν 
/ Ν NS Ψ "3 > > 3 Τὰ N 
φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, TO 
, Ν Ἄν: wy 3 > / 9 Ν > γι 
φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί 
3 / ἊΝ Ν > lal \ , 
φασιν: ἐκ τούτων yap καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος 
\ lal Ν Ad x ᾿ tal e - , 
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἕκαστος τοιαύταις δόξαις 
γεγένηνται ἔνοχοι. καὶ γὰρ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς μεταβάλλοντας 
A \ 
τὴν ἕξιν μεταβάλλειν φησὶ τὴν φρόνησιν' “πρὸς παρεὸν 
Ἂς lel > ,ὕὔ 2 , 2) \ P) em Ν , 
yap partis ἐναύξεται ἀνθρώποισιν." καὶ ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ λέγει 


δ al \ 
ὅτι “ ὅσσον (δ᾽) ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεὶ | καὶ τὸ 


1009% 3ο--36, cf. 106224-33 38 — "433, cf. 1063735 -- >7 

4 33 ὃν] ὅπως AP 34 καὶ pr. AP Asc.e¢: om. Ε]Γ κατὰ EJ 
Al. Asc.¢: om, AP ὄν om, ut vid. Asc., secl. Christ 37 τινὰ 
om. EJT Asc. b 4 δοκεῖ EJT 7 xatom. EJY Al.! Asc.° 
ἄλλων ζῴων EJT Asc.: ζῴων ὑγιαίνουσι AP Al. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν AP 
Al: om. Ε]Τ' Asc. ὃ πρὸς αὐτὸν JAP 12 ὅλως EJT Al}: 
ὁμοίως AP; ὅμως ut vid. ΑἹ, 17 μεταβαλόντας J 19 ἐναύξεται 
ΕἼΤΑΡ ; ἀέξεται Ἐ7 20 ὅσον ΕἾΑΡ δ᾽ Boissonnade: γ᾽ Sturz: 
τ᾽ Stein: οπΊ, ςοά4. " τόσσον E αἰεὶ] et AP 


30 


35 


Toog? 


4 
σι 


25 


30 


ww 
σι 


ΤΟΙ͂ΟΝ 


10 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Γ 


“-“ a Ν , 
φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστατο". καὶ Παρμενίδης δὲ ἀποφαίνε- 
lat 
ται τὸν αὐτὸν tpdmov: “‘@s yap ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχει κρᾶσιν με- 
a 
λέων πολυκάμπτων, | Tos νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρίσταται: τὸ 
Ν > \ By a / te / 9 , 
γὰρ αὐτὸ | ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει, μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν] 
\ C \ / Ν Ν 7 3 \ /, 3) Ε] 
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί: τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα: Ανα- 
, Ν \ 2) 4 / \ a ε t 
ξαγόρου δὲ Kat ἀπόφθεγμα μνημονεύεται πρὸς τῶν ἑταί- 
a a penn , 
pov τινάς, ὅτι τοιαῦτ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἔσται τὰ ὄντα οἷα ἂν ὑπολά- 
ιν XS Ν Ν σ Zz Ba ie 
Boow. φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν “Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνε- 
Ν / “ ΡΣ 7 Ἂς 7 ε ΠΥ CaN 
σθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ws ἐξέστη ὑπὸ 
a fol tal b) LAE «ες “ Ν 
τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι adAAodpoveovTa, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν 
Ν \ ny 9 ed > Σ nn S v4 } 
καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, εἰ 
bp} 4 ΄ \ bs » ef “ \ > 
ἀμφότεραι φρονήσεις, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἅμα οὕτω τε Kal οὐχ 
οὕτως ἔχει. 7) καὶ χαλεπώτατον τὸ συμβαῖνόν ἐστιν" εἰ 
ι 
ἊΣ € i BY EN ie 2 Ν ς 4 los 
yap οἱ μάλιστα τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς ἑωρακότες---οὗτοι 
δ᾽ εἰσὶν of μάλιστα ζητοῦντες αὐτὸ καὶ φιλοῦντε-----οὗτοι τοι- 
4 " ἮΝ , \ fal 3 ra \ 
avras ἔχουσι τὰς δόξας καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφαίνονται περὶ 
τῆς ἀληθείας, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ἀθυμῆσαι τοὺς φιλοσοφεῖν 
a x lal x 
ἐγχειροῦντας; τὸ yap τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν 
ν \ ? / y Ν “Ὁ / / σ΄͵ \ n 
εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν .---αἴτιον δὲ τῆς δόξης τούτοις ὅτι περὶ τῶν 
+ Ἂς ἊΝ 3 fi > , Ν > » ς / 
ὄντων μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐσκόπουν, Ta δ᾽ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον 
> Ν ᾿] Ν Ψ 3 Ἂς / Ἂς € fal rd ‘4 
εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον" ἐν δὲ τούτοις πολλὴ ἡ τοῦ ἀορίστου 
φύσις ἐνυπάρχει καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴπομεν" 
Ἂν a 
διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν (οὕτω yap 
ες , o 5) ΄σ x “ > Ἃ 2 Land J 
ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ πίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφα- 
Yj ° n ,ὔ 
νην). ἔτι δὲ πᾶσαν ὁρῶντες ταύτην κινουμένην τὴν φύσιν, 
κατὰ δὲ τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος οὐθὲν ἀληθευόμενον, περί γε 
\ I 
TO πάντῃ πάντως μεταβάλλον οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἀληθεύειν. 
ἐκ γὰρ ταύτης τῆς ὑπολήψεως ἐξήνθησεν ἣ ἀκροτάτη δόξα 
cal / lal 
τῶν εἰρημένων, ἡ τῶν φασκόντων ἡρακλειτίζειν καὶ οἵαν 
, > a - + ~ / 
Κρατύλος εἶχεν, ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν wero δεῖν λέγειν 
\ , 
ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ “Hpakdelrw ἐπετίμα 


2. 4 cv \ lal 5 n na ’ Ν 3 lal Ἄς 
εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι" αὐτὸς 


b 22 ἑκάστοτ᾽ Ἐ1] Theophr.: ἑκάστῳ AP ΑἹ. : ἕκαστος E? Al.®: ἕκα- 


oro TD ἔχη E: εἶχον Τ' 23 πολυπλάγκτων Theophr. τὼς] 
τ᾽ ὡς AP: ws ex τῶς fecit E 24 φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν om. AP: φύσις 
Al. 27 τινάς recc. Τ' Al.: τινός EJA» Asc. 31 εἰ om. AP 
33 ἔχη E ἡ] ἢ AP 37 ἀθυμῆσαι JAP Asc.c: ἀθυμεῖν E et 
fort. Al. 38 πετώμενα E 1010” ὃ ἀληθεύομεν T δὲ T 


14 ὅτι AP Asc.: om. EJT 


5. 1009 21 — τοιοῦ 5 


Ν ” Rae) « « “-- Ν \ \ a μ᾽ ,’ 
γὰρ ᾧετο οὐδ᾽ ἅπαξ. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον 
a \ / ᾿ 
ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν μεταβάλλον ὅτε μεταβάλλει ἔχει τινὰ 
, val ms Ων 
αὐτοῖς λόγον μὴ οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καίτοι ἔστι ye ἀμφισ- 
4 an 
βητήσιμον' τό τε yap ἀποβάλλον ἔχει TL τοῦ ἀποβαλ- 
/ \ ny / a 
λομένου, καὶ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἤδη ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι, ὅλως 
“ Ὄ 
τε εἰ φθείρεται, ὑπάρξει τι ὄν, καὶ εἰ γίγνεται, ἐξ οὗ 
> Ὁ ° tal ly a 
γίγνεται καὶ ὑφ᾽ οὗ γεννᾶται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο 
Ss sl ᾿] Ν 5 Ν a / 2 lal / 
μὴ ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παρέντες ἐκεῖνα λέγω- 
ov > b) / b] Ν Ν Ν \ 
μεν, ὅτι ov ταὐτό ἐστι TO μεταβάλλειν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν 
\ a 
καὶ κατὰ TO ποιόν: κατὰ μὲν οὖν TO ποσὸν ἔστω μὴ μένον, 
2 Ν Ν \ a) 4“ / yo 2 BA 
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἅπαντα γιγνώσκομεν. ἔτι δ᾽ ἄξιον 
ἐπιτιμῆσαι τοῖς οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 
Lo 3. ΟΝ ey 4 te Ν =) \ ἢ ἡ A 
αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἰδόντες οὕτως 
a Ν “ fay 2} la’ c 7 5 ΄ὔ ς x 
ἔχοντα περὶ ὅλου τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπεφήναντο' ὁ yap 
περὶ ἡμᾶς τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ τόπος ἐν φθορᾷ καὶ γενέσει διατε- 
a 3 i a a 
λεῖ μόνος ὦν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός 
3 “ Le » Pd 9. a / b) a 
ἐστιν, ὥστε δικαιότερον av bu ἐκεῖνα τούτων ἀπεψηφίσαντο 
\ an lal 
ἢ διὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνων κατεψηφίσαντο. ἔτι δὲ δῆλον ὅτι 
ἊΝ lal ral a o 
καὶ πρὸς τούτους ταὐτὰ τοῖς πάλαι λεχθεῖσιν ἐροῦμεν" ὅτι 
° / 
yap ἔστιν ἀκίνητός tis φύσις δεικτέον αὐτοῖς καὶ πειστέον 
αὐτούς. καίτοι γε συμβαίνει τοῖς ἅμα φάσκουσιν εἶναι 
\ Ἂς ΩΣ ΕῚ - - t fi δ tal 
καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἠρεμεῖν μᾶλλον φάναι πάντα ἢ κινεῖσθαι" 
Ε xX Ba > “ lal [τ \ ¢ If 
ov yap ἔστιν εἰς 6 τι μεταβαλεῖ: ἅπαντα yap ὑπάρχει 
Ὁ Ν ἧς lal "ἢ / ε > - Ν , 
πᾶσιν.-τ--περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας, ws οὐ πᾶν TO φαινόμενον 
n Ν Ν lal 
ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδ᾽ (el) ἡ αἴσθησις (μὴ) ψευδὴς τοῦ 
IN 7 ΕἸ 74 Ψ See 7 > SREY lel 2 be i, Se 
ye ἰδίου ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαντασία ov ταὐτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει. εἴτ 
» n> an a / 
ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποροῦσι, πότερον τηλικαῦτά ἐστι 
a ® an / , 
τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ χρώματα τοιαῦτα οἷα τοῖς ἄπωθεν φαί- 


ΤΟΙΟϑ 22-25, cf. 1ο638 22-28 25-32, οἵ, Το638 το- 170 35—?1, 
cf. 1063 17-21 b 1-26, 1011 31-34, cf. 1062» 33 — 1063 10 


415 τοῦτον JAPY, ex τούτων fecit E 16 ὅτι] ἔτι [7 17 λόγον AP 
Asc.: ἀληθῆ λόγον EJT 18 τι] τι ἔτι ex Al. ci. Bonitz 22 ἰέναι 
Bekker: εἶναι ςοά 4, ΤΑ], εἰς om.T 27 εἰδότες Τ' 29 φορᾷ E 
30 povovl οὐθὲν ws εἰπεῖν EJT Asc.®: ὡς εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν AP 31 ἂν] 
ei AP τούτων J Asc, et ut vid. Al. : τοῦτον EAPT 32... Π' 
ΑΙ. : εἰ AP 34 πιστέον E 35 ye συμβαίνει EJ Asc.¢: συμ- 
βαίνει ye AP 36 ἢ κινεῖσθαι πάντα AP 37 μεταβαλεῖ Richards: 
μεταβάλλει EJ Al. Asc.°: μεταβάλλειν AP bg μέν ye ὅτι Brandis 
εἰ et μὴ addidi, fort. leg. Al. Asc.: om. codd, © Alt 3 ye om. 
EJ© Al! Asc. 5 ἄπωθεν scripsi: ἄποθεν codd. 


30 


τοιοῦ 


10 


ΤᾺ 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA ΤΕ 


νεται ἢ οἷα τοῖς ἐγγύθεν, Kal πότερον ola τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν 
x a a na 2 
ἢ οἷα τοῖς κάμνουσιν, καὶ βαρύτερα πότερον ἃ τοῖς ἄσθε- 
a NA Ὁ 5) / \ > a ‘2 NN - 
νοῦσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἰσχύουσιι, καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς κα- 
i δ A a ΟἹ / (4 ἊΝ ἊΝ 3 » ᾿ 
θεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί 
ca) > Si 
ye, φανερόν' οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ ᾿Αθήνῃσιν 
μὲ oN 3 ἔξ , 9 \ > lal ν \ \ 
εἶναι ὧν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ὠδεῖον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ 
a ,ὔ 
τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως 
κυρία ἣ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ 
/ o € ca) BN Ν / ot ip Clee) τ 
μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος. ἔτι δὲ ET αὖ- 
lol lat 9 Ne bp] € ia 4 € a 2 14 \ 
τῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐχ ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ 
δ... δ fa if \ “ ἘΠ σι 3 Ἂς Ν Ν lA 
ἰδίου ἢ Tov πλησίον Kal τοῦ αὑτῆς, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν χρώ- 
ματος ὄψις, οὐ γεῦσις, περὶ δὲ χυμοῦ γεῦσις, οὐκ ὄψις" 
- a lal \ \ / 
ὧν ἑκάστη ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ περὶ TO αὐτὸ οὐδέποτε φη- 
4“ 4 Ν > “ oy 5} τὴ IOS pee Ve 
σιν ἅμα οὕτω καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ 
/ ‘- Ν I? > / 5 Xx \ Ἂν; & 
χρόνῳ περί ye TO πάθος ἠμφισβήτησεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ᾧ 
t \ / I Vem "3 Pes ἔν δὶ a a 
συμβέβηκε TO πάθος. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον 6 μὲν αὐτὸς oivos δό- 
x x Ν BN a ΄, , ἜΠΗ, 
ξειεν ἂν ἢ μεταβαλὼν ἢ τοῦ σώματος μεταβαλόντος ὁτὲ 
Ν 4“ Ν Εν Ν 5: ΄ > ? > ΄ ΄ 
μὲν εἶναι γλυκὺς ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ γλυκύς" ἀλλ᾽ οὐ TO γε γλυκύ, 
οἷόν ἐστιν ὅταν ἦ, οὐδεπώποτε μετέβαλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ adn- 
θεύει περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἐσόμενον γλυκὺ 
τοιοῦτον. καίτοι τοῦτο ἀναιροῦσιν οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἅπαντες, 
“ Ν >’ / ἊΝ “᾿ / Ὁ“ 3 . > / 
ὥσπερ Kal οὐσίαν μὴ εἶναι μηθενός, οὕτω μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
/ - 
μηθέν: τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως 
wy cr > yy 7 3 ἊΝ lf > ω “ \ 
ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ εἴ τι ἔστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐχ ἕξει οὕτω τε καὶ 


ΟΣ A Ψ 3 » + \ > \ / δὰ x 
30 οὐχ OUVTWS.— AWS τ᾽ εἴπερ ἔστι TO αἰσθητὸν μόνον, οὐθὲν ἂν 


εἴη μὴ ὄντων τῶν ἐμψύχων" αἴσθησις γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη. τὸ 
μὲν οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως 
ἀληθές (τοῦ γὰρ αἰσθανομένου πάθος τοῦτό ἐστι), τὸ δὲ τὰ 
ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ ai- 


Ὁ 6 ὑγιαίνουσιν... 7 κάμνουσιν codd.T Al. Asc.: κάμνουσιν ... ὑγιαί- 
νουσιν Christ 7, 8,9. dAPet fort. Al.: οἷα EJT Asc. 8 ἰσχύουσιν 


ἘΠ Al. Asc.: ἰσχυροῖς Ab 9 ἐγρηγόρωσιν E 9-10 οὐχ οἷόν τέ 
ye AP 10 οὖν I ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ] ὑπολαβὼν AP 16 αὑτῆς scripsi: 
αὐτῆς codd. Τ' Al.: ἄποθεν ex Asc. ci. Bonitz 17 οὐκ] ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ EJ 
ASG 18 dv... οὐδέποτε EJT Al.e Asc.l: ὧν kal... οὐδὲ πώποτε 


Ab 20 ye] δὲ AP 22 μεταβάλλων AP Al. Asc.© μεταβάλλοντος 
JA?» Asc.¢ 23 γε] τε AP 24 70m.J οὐδέπω μετέβαλεν EJP 
Asc.©: μεταβάλλει AP 26 ἅπαντες EJ Asc.l: πάντες AP 30 ἄλλως 
τ᾿ Al. 31 εἴη μόνον μὴ JT 32 μήτε pr.... αἰσθήματα ἘΠΤ et 
ut vid. Asc.: μηδὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι AP: μηδὲ τὰ αἰσθήματα εἶναι fort. 
Al., Christ 


5. 1010 6 — 6, 10118 26 


’ δ... > Ν Ν “ > y SN € ἴα 
σθήσεως, ἀδύνατον. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἥ γ᾽ αἴσθησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς 35 
> 7 3 3 Ψ \ e Ν Ν » A 3 / 
ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τι Kal ἕτερον Tapa τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὃ ἀνάγκη 
πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως" τὸ γὰρ κινοῦν τοῦ κινουμένου 
΄ a 
φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι, κἂν εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῦτα, IOII® 
οὐθὲν ἧττον. 
ΡΞ / Oy ρὰ a Ἂν fal “ / 
6 Εἰσὶ δέ τινες of ἀποροῦσι καὶ τῶν ταῦτα πεπεισμένων 
καὶ τῶν τοὺς λόγους τούτους μόνον λεγόντων" ζητοῦσι yap 
7 an ‘ 
τίς ὁ κρινῶν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ ὅλως τὸν περὶ ἕκαστα KpL- 


σι 


a > n \ S “- 3 7) “ fy 5b] a 
νοῦντα ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὅμοιά ἐστι TO 
> lal a Ων 
ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν, δύνανται 
> an lal 
δ᾽ αἱ ἀπορίαι at τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό' πάντων yap 
λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι οὗτοι: ἀρχὴν γὰρ ζητοῦσι, καὶ ταύτην 
3 > 7 / ΡῚ Ny τῶν / 3 τ ἐ 
dv ἀποδείξεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε πεπεισμένοι οὐκ εἰσί, το 
7 > 2 al Lf 2 ἘΣ leg ν fal 
φανεροί εἶσιν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπερ εἴπομεν, τοῦτο 
Shee ἰῷ Ν / ὋΣ UA ΄ Ν fal Ὁ > a , 
αὐτῶν τὸ πάθος ἐστίν: λόγον yap (ζητοῦσιν ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λό- 
> 7 Ν > Ἂν > > / 7 ἣν με Ν 
γος" ἀποδείξεως γὰρ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν. οὗτοι μὲν 
a πδὲ ΕΥ a Oa (ἔ \ > Newou Ἃ fas )» 
ν ῥᾳδίως ἂν τοῦτο πεισθεῖεν (ἔστι γὰρ οὐ χαλεπὸν λαβεῖν 
οἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν Bb ἦνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον © 
ῷ λόγῳ τὴν βίαν μόνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον ζ(- 


- 
Oo 


an 2 ? NS > lal 5 fal nN “ 7 / 
τοῦσιν" ἐναντία yap εἰπεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, εὐθὺς ἐναντία λέγοντες. 
> Ν Ν ” / , 3) ’ x / τὶ \ Ἀπ ἘᾺΝ 
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι πάντα πρός τι, ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά ἐστι καὶ αὐτὰ 
’ € id > x » “ % / >) / \ ἊΝ 
καθ᾽ αὑτά, οὐκ ἂν εἴη πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές" τὸ γὰρ 
,ὔ 
φαινόμενον τινί ἐστι φαινόμενον: ὥστε ὁ λέγων ἅπαντα τὰ 
φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ ἅπαντα ποιεῖ τὰ ὄντα πρός τι. 20 
διὸ καὶ φυλακτέον τοῖς τὴν βίαν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ (ητοῦοιν, 
ed Ἂν \ € fi ’, 5 lal [ὦ ’ LN , 
ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀξιοῦσιν, ὅτι od TO φαινόμενον 
” >) Ν \ , e ’ὔ \ Ὡ 7 
ἐστι» ἀλλὰ TO φαινόμενον ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ OTE φαίνεται 
ἣν [Ὁ \ “ Ὁ. 2 Cy / Ν , Ἂς δ“ 5 
καὶ 7 καὶ ὥς. ἂν δ᾽ ὑπέχωσι μὲν λόγον, μὴ οὕτω ὃ 
,ὕ n 7, 
ὑπέχωσι, συμβήσεται αὑτοῖς τἀναντία ταχὺ λέγειν. ἐν- 2 


σι 


δέχεται γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὄψιν μέλι φαίνεσθαι 


TOI1® 3-16, cf. 1063" 7-16 


b 35 δύνατον AP αὐτῆ ἑαυτῆς E: αὐτὴ ἑαυτῶν Asc.©: αὐτῆς AP 
ΙΟΙ131 ἄλληλα EJT Al. Α5ς.Ὁ : ἄλλα AP ταῦτα recc. Asc.°: ταυτὰ 
ΑΒ: ταῦτα αὐτὰ EJT ς κρινῶν Richards: κρίνων codd. ΓΤ κρίνοντα 
ΑΓ 8 αἱ τοιαῦται ἘΠΤ Al. Asc.e: αὗται AP 9. οὗτοι εἶναι APY 
10 ὅτι γε AP Asc.e: γε ὅτι EJ] οὐ πεπεισμένοι ἘΠΤ' Asc.® 15 μόνον 
Ε]Γ Al! Αϑ5ς.ὃ;: μόνην AP 16 εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἀξιοῦσιν Richards 
18 ἅπαν EJ Α58ς..5 ἀληθές... 19 φαινόμενον pr. om, J 25 αὑτοῖς 
A> Asc.: αὐτοῖς EJT 26 τῷ αὐτῷ EJT Asc.°: τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ 
fort. Al. 


30 


35 
ror1P 


10 


20 


ΤΩΝ META TA OYSIKA IT 


τῇ δὲ γεύσει μή, Kal τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δυοῖν ὄντοιν μὴ 
ἡ δ » 
εις ἢ - » x > Se τα > \ , 
ταὐτὰ ἑκατέρᾳ TH ὄψει, ἂν Gow avopoua ἐπεὶ πρός γε 
x DS Ν fi > / oe \ / / 
τοὺς διὰ τὰς πάλαι εἰρημένας αἰτίας τὸ φαινόμενον φά- 
, 2 N a \ N A , 1 "Ἔ ,ἷ > 
σκοντας ἀληθὲς εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάνθ᾽ ὁμοίως εἶναι 
ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ: οὔτε γὰρ ἅπασι ταὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι οὔτε 
ΘΙ ΘΟ ces SEN ee ὁ 5 Ν 5 / x \ > 
ταύτῳ Gel TavTa, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις τἀναντία κατὰ τὸν av- 
/ a / 
τὸν χρόνον (7) μὲν yap ἁφὴ δύο λέγει ev τῇ ἐπαλλάξει 
“ he «ς 3 » e 2 > y+ lod | ἰὰς \ 
τῶν δακτύλων ἣ δ᾽ ὄψις ἕν)"----ὠἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι τῇ αὐτῇ ye καὶ 
Ν Ν “ rs Py 
κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθήσει καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ev τῷ αὐτῷ 
χρόνῳ, ὥστε τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως διὰ τοῦτ᾽ 
wy th a / 
ἀνάγκη λέγειν τοῖς μὴ δι’ ἀπορίαν ἀλλὰ λόγου χάριν 
/ a / 
λέγουσιν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τούτῳ ἀληθές. 
καὶ ὥσπερ δὴ πρότερον εἴρηται, ἀνάγκη πρός τι ποιεῖν 
ed x \ / ΝΕ ΕΣ “ ᾿] Δ / Cee 
ἅπαντα καὶ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ αἴσθησιν, ὥστ᾽ οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ 
» ba bs Ν J > XS 7 ὯΝ 
ἔσται οὐθὲν μηθενὸς προδοξάσαντος. εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ ἔσται, 
oN Ψ > δὰ wy « \ / Νν 2 ref εν 
δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅπαντα πρὸς δόξαν. ἔτι εἰ ἕν, πρὸς 
ὰ aN 
ἕν ἢ πρὸς ὡρισμένον" καὶ εἰ TO αὐτὸ Kal ἥμισυ Kal ἴσον, 
Ἔ ! 
GAN οὐ πρὸς TO διπλάσιόν ye τὸ ἴσον. πρὸς δὴ τὸ δοξά- 
> oN ἡ Ν A / > ” Υ̓ 
ὧν εἰ ταὐτὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον, οὐκ ἔσται ἄν- 
θρωπος τὸ δοξάζον ἀλλὰ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. εἰ δ᾽ ἕκαστον 
Ν n 
ἔσται πρὸς TO δοξάζον, πρὸς ἄπειρα ἔσται τῷ εἴδει TO δοξάζον. 
" μὴ / na \ > na 
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη δόξα πασῶν τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς 
if / a 
ἅμα τὰς ἀντικειμένας φάσεις, καὶ τί συμβαίνει Tots οὕτω 
/ \ δὰ 7 Ὁ / a ΞΕ 5 Ν 
λέγουσι, καὶ διὰ τί οὕτω λέγουσι, τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω" ἐπεὶ 
᾽ , a 
ὃ ἀδύνατον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἅμα ἀληθεύεσθαι κατὰ τοῦ 
> Lay Ν “ ION 5 ΄, ε « / > / 
αὐτοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲ τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται 
n 3 n an > 
τῷ αὐτῷ' τῶν μὲν yap ἐναντίων θάτερον στέρησίς ἐστιν οὐχ 
Ὁ Chg Ν , ς \ / 3 , 7 2 > , 
ἧττον, οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις" ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀπόφασίς ἐστιν ἀπό 
ε ; ΕἾ 
τινος ὡρισμένου γένους" εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον ἅμα καταφάναι καὶ 


1Ο118.31-34, cf. 1062” 33 — 1063 10 b 17-22, cf. 1063? 17-19 


428 ταῦθ᾽ EJ ἀνόμοια A? et fecit E 30 καὶ] ἐροῦμεν ὅτι συμ- 


βαίνει αὐτοῖς τὸ πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ Jaeger 31 ταὐτὰ 
ἘΠ1 Αβςο.ὃ: ταῦτα AP 32 ταὐτῷ ΑἹ, Asc.° Tia: ἑαυτῶ AP: αὐτῷ 
Ἐ7Ὸ 34 οὔ τι] οὔτε recc.: οὔ τοι ci. Bonitz "4 πρός 
A'r Asc.: καὶ πρός EJ 5 ὥστ᾽ ov AUT 8 ἢ AP IO ἔσται 
A? Al.: ἔστιν EJT 11 δ᾽ δὲ καθ᾽ AP 12 πρὸς alt. APT Al. 
Asc. Syr.: om. EJ 15 διὰ τί] ἂν AP 16 ἅμα ἀληθεύεσθαι 


APT All: ἀληθεύεσθαι ἅμα EJ Asc.! 19 δὲ EJP ΑΙ. : om. AP ἡ δὲ 
στέρησις AY ΑΙ. Asc.: om. EJP 20 καὶ] AP 


O; 10} τ 7. 1012" 13 


/ lal 
ἀποφάναι ἀληθῶς, ἀδύνατον καὶ τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν ἅμα, ἀλλ᾽ 
δ ἧς » δ Ἶ Ν a , ςφ ε a 
ἢ πῇ ἄμφω ἢ θάτερον μὲν πῇ θάτερον δὲ ἁπλῶς. 
> 
ἡ ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι 
3 / 5 x x ny 
οὐθέν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ev καθ᾽ ἑνὸς ὁτιοῦν. 
δῆλον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὁρισαμένοις τί τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος. 2 
A X\ δ / \ A Ν ΩΝ XA \ Ἂς A > ny 
TO μὲν yap λέγειν TO ὃν μὴ εἶναι ἢ TO μὴ OV εἶναι ψεῦ- 
ἈΝ X \ BN p> \ A ‘ BY \ > 3 / “ 
ὃος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὃν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥστε 
/ > Ὁ \ > 
Kal ὁ λέγων εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀληθεύσει ἢ ψεύσεται: ἀλλ 
yy Ν A / ἣν > x i‘ + \ ᾿ς yy oy 
οὔτε TO ὃν λέγεται μὴ εἶναι ἢ εἶναι οὔτε TO μὴ ὄν. ἔτι 
+ Ν + “- 5 vi “ Ν \ 
ἦτο. μεταξὺ ἔσται τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ὥσπερ τὸ φαιὸν 30 
/ S a xR ¢ \ ΄ > / Ἀν. ὁ 
μέλανος καὶ λευκοῦ, ἢ ὡς τὸ μηδέτερον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἵππου. 
> Ν Α᾿ cf > x / 4. Ν. 5 “ Ν 
εἰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως, οὐκ dv μεταβάλλοι (ἐκ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ 
> 5 \ ΄ νὴ 5 ΄ > Ν > , lal 
els ἀγαθὸν μεταβάλλει ἢ ἐκ τούτου εἰς μὴ ἀγαθόν), νῦν 
> xX X 
δ᾽ ἀεὶ φαίνεται (od yap ἔστι μεταβολὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ εἰς τὰ ἀντι- 
7 \ , 5, “o> ὧν ay \ “ ᾿ y 5 
κείμενα καὶ μεταξύ): εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι μεταξύ, καὶ οὕτως εἴη ἄν 35 


>] Ν ’ pI Ν. ny / ny > > ξ 
τι εἰς λευκὸν οὐκ ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ γένεσις, νῦν O οὐχ ὁρᾶται. IO12% 


ur 


» cs \ . \ \ ε J x ’ x 
ἔτι πᾶν TO διανοητὸν καὶ νοητὸν ἡ διάνοια ἢ κατάφησιν ἢ 
a “ los 0 XK > 
ἀπόφησιν----τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον----ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ ἢ ψεύδη- 
ig Ν ς \ lon -“ “δ > rc 5 ͵7 
ται' ὅταν μὲν ὠδὶ συνθῇ φᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, ἀληθεύει, 
o i Cys ΄, "» Ν , a 3. ᾿ 
ὅταν δὲ ὠδί, ψεύδεται. ἔτι παρὰ πάσας δεῖ εἶναι τὰς 
ἀντιφάσεις, εἰ μὴ λόγου ἕνεκα λέγεται: ὥστε καὶ οὔτε ἀλη- 
‘ Ν a) 
θεύσει τις οὔτ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθεύσει, καὶ παρὰ TO ὃν Kal τὸ μὴ OV 
Ba “ \ Ν / \ Ν / 
ἔσται, ὥστε καὶ Tapa γένεσιν Kal φθορὰν μεταβολὴ τις 
» x 5 “ἤ fe Ce es , \ > 7 5. Ud 
ἔσται. ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις γένεσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις TO ἐναντίον ἐπιφέ- 
᾿ lal Μ 
ρει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἔσται, οἷον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς οὔτε περιττὸς οὔτε 
5, Ν 5 ’ 2 3 5 4 5) fal € fal Ν n 
ov περιττὸς ἀριθμός" ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον: ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ δὲ δῆ- 
Bs > Υ̓ fal \ > 4 € ΄ Ν 
λον. ett εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡμιόλια τὰ 
» Ν . Ἂς / f Ν yx 2 ” na 
ὄντα ἐσται ἀλλὰ πλείω. πάλιν yap ἔσται ἀποφῆσαι τοῦτο 


σι 


»ὶ 


ο 


IOL1” 23-101 2 24, cf. 1063” 19-24 


b 22 μὲν EJ Asc.°: om. AT 23 ἀποφάσεως J 24 ev EJT 
Al. Asc.: om, AP 25 τί οτη. AP 26 τὸ μὴ ὃν AP Asc.c: 
τοῦτο ἘΠΤ 27 τὸ ὃν AP Al. Α5ς.ὃ ; ὃν EJ καὶ τὸ] τὸ δὲ EJ 


28 καὶ ὁ λέγων EJT Asc.°: ἐκεῖνο λέγων AP: καὶ ὁ λέγων τοῦτο Al.° 
29 λέγει EJT Al. Asc. 30 ἤτοι EJ Asc.: ἤτοι τὸ AP AL ἔσται 
EJY Asc. et ut vid. Al.: ἐστι AP ΑἸ. 31 τοῦ μέλανος J 34 ἀεὶ 


Ε7Γ Al.: om. AP μεταβολὴ JAPT, ex μεταβάλλειν ut vid. fecit E 
35 εἴη ἄν τις EJT et fort. Asc.: 4 ἡ ἀντίφασις AP: ἡ ἀντίφασις Al. 
101271 ἡ γένεσις fort. Al. 6 λέγηται AP 12 τὰ ὄντα EJT 


Al. Asc.?: ταῦτα AP 13 γάρ ἐστιν JI τοῦτο EJT Ale: τοῦ AP 


20 


τ 
σι 


30 


35 


Ior2b 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Γ 


A / ἊΝ ἊΝ μὴ ἥν \ na) ya ε 
πρὸς τὴν φάσιν καὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν, καὶ τοῦτ ἐσται τι' ἢ 
fal » ,ὔ 4 
yap οὐσία ἐστί τις αὐτοῦ ἄλλη. ἔτι ὅταν ἐρομένου εἰ λευκόν 
x ‘ Ss Ῥὴ , 
ἐστιν εἴπῃ ὅτι ov, οὐθὲν ἄλλο ἀποπέφηκεν ἢ TO εἶναι' ἀπό- 
> ε ΄ 
φασις δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. ἐλήλυθε δ᾽ ἐνίοις αὕτη 1 δόξα 
an - NX 
ὥσπερ kal ἄλλαι τῶν παραδόξων: ὅταν yap λύειν μὴ 
NA / 3 jp ) / lal u ig > 
δύνωνται λόγους ἐριστικούς, ἐνδόντες TH λόγῳ σύμφασιν ἀλη- 
θὲς εἶναι τὸ συλλογισθέν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν 
Ψ lal NS \ 
λέγουσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ TO πάντων ζητεῖν λόγον. ἀρχὴ δὲ πρὸς 
ἅπαντας τούτους ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ. ὁρισμὸς δὲ γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ ση- 
a cS a \ 
μαίνειν τι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτούς" 6 yap λόγος ov τὸ 
x. val © \ a 2 fe Ν ς , 
ὄνομα σημεῖον ὁρισμὸς ἔσται. ἔοικε δ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτου 
λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀληθῆ 
tal ς Ta | ἣν ΑΝ / \ an ΡΣ / 
ποιεῖν, 6 δ᾽ ᾿Αναξαγόρου, εἶναί τι μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως, 
πάντα ψευδῆ; ὅταν γὰρ μιχθῇ, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε οὐκ ἀγαθὸν 
7 Yap μιχυῇ» iy. γ 
\ a “ ’ ON > “- 5) / 
TO μῖγμα, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀληθές. 
Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ μοναχῶς 
/ / 
λεγόμενα καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν ὥσπερ 
΄ 5 Ἂ 
τινὲς λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐθὲν φάσκοντες ἀληθὲς εἶναι (οὐθὲν 
. m =f x 
yap κωλύειν φασὶν οὕτως ἅπαντα εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν 
διά 7 ti t δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ δὸ 
μετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι), οἱ δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ. σχεδὸν 
Ἂν 4 ς / ξ; > \ nt ς iy ¢ Ν / 
yap οὗτοι ot λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου: ὁ yap λέγων 
ig / 3 3 “ Ἂν; / Lad \ Ἂν / nN 
ὅτι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν 
λόγων ἑκάτερον τούτων, ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκεῖνα, καὶ 
“ 3 ἣν, > a ὮΝ lal τὰ ! 4. =X 
ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι. ἔτι δὲ φανερῶς ἀντιφάσεις εἰσὶν 
a > @ u a i lal / 
as οὐχ οἷόν τε Gua ἀληθεῖς eivar—ovde δὴ ψευδεῖς πάσας" 
/ lal na , 
καίτοι δόξειέ γ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. 
2 ἃς Ἂς / ἌΝ ,ὔ 4 3 a lal 
ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αἰτεῖσθαι δεῖ, κα- 
,ὔ > na ΩΣ xX Ν 
θάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, οὐχὶ εἶναί τι ἢ μὴ 
> > a 
εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι, ὥστε ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ διαλεκτέον λα- 


1012* 24- 18, cf. 1063 24-35 ( 13-18, cf. 1062" 7-9) 


415 ἐρωμένου E εἶ οὐχ. AP . 16 ἄλλο EJT Asc.!: om. AP 
ἀποπέφηκεν ἸΤῚ et fort. Al.: ἀποπέφυκεν EA: ἀποπέφακεν Christ 
18 καὶ ai ἄλλαι E Asc.t yap om. AP 21 λόγον ζητεῖν EJT 
24 ὁρισμὸς γίνεται EJT 27 ὥστε πάντα EJT Asc. 30 Kal τὰ 
κατὰ YeCC. 32 κωλύειν ἘΠῚ Al.c: κωλύει AP Asc.& 34 οὗτοι 
A Asc.¢: αὐτοῖς Ε]Τ τῷ τοῦ Ἡρακλείδου AP 35 τὸν λόγον J 
b 3 δὴ] δεῖ E 4 δόξειεν ἂν AP Ale 5 πάντας AP All: ἅπαντας 
EJ Asc.¢ 6 οὐχὶ EJ Al. Asc.e: οὐ AP 7 λαβόντας EJT 
Asc.: λαβόντα AP 


8 


7, 101214 — ὃ. 1or2> 31 


nan xX 
βόντας τί σημαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ TO ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν 
Aue fe ~ 5 
ἄλλο τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ (ὃ) ἀποφάναι ψεῦδός ἐστι», ἀδύ- 
νατον πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως 
a - aN μον 
θάτερον εἶναι μόριον ἀληθές. ἔτι εἰ πᾶν ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀπο- 
2 > lal 3 / 3 , ς᾽. s. / 
φάναι ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ εἶναι": θά- 
Ν , a > , ag / 2 7 
τερον yap μόριον THs ἀντιφάσεως ψεῦδός ἐστιν. συμβαίνει 
δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς 
ι \ 5 tad Ξε Ν Ἂς / ’ na VA \ \ 
ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν yap πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν 
2 7 € a 4 3 lol > vA \ «ε a > > a 
ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ 
(ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ 
\ aX Cus, 2s et ΘᾺ lal c Ν \ 2 7 < 
καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐξαιρῶνται ὃ μὲν τὸν ἐναντίον ὡς 
2 > Ν , 5 if Ὁ Ν \ « a c > ΄ 
οὐκ ἀληθὴς μόνος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ ὡς οὐ ψευδής, 
ION Φ > / 72 3 lal > fe , 2 
οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπείρους συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτεῖσθαι λόγους ἀλη- 
θεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς: ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ 
ἀληθής, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται.----φανερὸν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ 
ε fe ΕΣ lat / 5» lal , 5... « / 
ot πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα 
tal > Ν Ἂς " tal / 2 ON eS ᾿) lal Νὰ 
κινεῖσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ 
ψευδῆ ἔσται, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον (ὁ γὰρ λέγων 
SS ΣΝ 2 Ὧν \ / > » > Ν / ~ 
ποτὲ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται)" εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖ- 
ται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές’ πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ: ἀλλὰ δέ- 
δεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον. ἔτι ἀνάγκη τὸ ὃν μεταβάλλειν: ἔκ 
x » ε ,ὔ 2 Ν Ν ION ΙΔ 2 
τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἦρε- 
“2΄οῖλ an / 3.5 > > / Ba / A BL OSS tal Ἂς 
μεῖ 1) κινεῖται ποτέ, ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθέν: ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ 
κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό. 


Ὁ 8 σημαίνειν EJ 9 τὸ... . ἀποφάναι scripsi, legit ut vid. Α5ς-.: 
τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ΑΡΡ All; ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι 
EJ: ἢ φάναι ἢ ἢ ἀποφάναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ἢ ex Al. ci. Bonitz: τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ 
φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι καὶ τὸ γρ. Al.: 7 τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀποφάναι Christ ἢ τὸ 
ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ ἢ ἀποφάναι τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ ci. Maier 13 μόριον AP 
ἸΑβοιθ: μέρος ΕἸ 14 θρυλούμενον ΕἸ. ΑΙ.1: θρυλλούμενον AP Asc.} 
15 καὶ τὸ AP 16 αὐτοῦ JAP αὐτοῦ AP 17 τὰ yap ἐναντία iB 
ov φησιν αὐτὸν ET Asc. ©: οὔ φησιν εἶναι αὐτὸν J: : ὅν φησιν αὐτὸς εἶναι 
ἀληθῆ BtUgs φησι μὴ εἶναι AP 18 αὐτὸς αὐτόν AP 19 ἐστίν 
om. AP ΑἹ.} τὸν] τὸν αὐτὸς EJT αὑτοῦ J: αὐτοῦ EAP 
20 ἀπείρου AP 21 ἀληθῆ alt. EJ Ale Asc.c: om. APT 22 φανε- 
ΠΟ» SE αὐτό om. yp. Al. 24 πάντα καὶ ἀεὶ ΔΒ ταῦτα JT 
28 ἀνάγκη τὸ ὃν ΕἸ Asc.°: τὸ ὃν ἀνάγκη APY 29 εἴς τι EJT Α5ς.9 
et ut vid, Al. : ἐστιν Ab 30 ποτέ JT Al. Asc.°: ποτὲ δέ EAY 
τι ὃ ἘΠΤ ΑΙ. Α5ς.: τιν᾽ ἃ AP 30-31 κινεῖται κινούμενα AP 31 
πρώτως yp. E αὐτό EJT Asc.®: αὐτὸ ἀρχὴ λέγεται AP 


15 


20 


bo 
on 


30 


35 
1013% 


fo 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


A 


? ἣν )ὔ ε Ν “ἢ BA cal / 

Αρχὴ λέγεται ἡ μὲν ὅθεν ἄν τις τοῦ πράγματος 
κινηθείη πρῶτον, οἷον τοῦ μήκους καὶ ὁδοῦ ἐντεῦθεν μὲν αὕτη 
5 9, > 7 ΝΟΣ ΚΣ € iS Ge x , ef 
ἀρχή, ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ ἑτέρα" ἡ δὲ ὅθεν ἃν κάλλιστα ἕκαστον 
γένοιτο, οἷον καὶ μαθήσεως οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ 

/ > “ > halt’ ἃ Θ᾽ / 3 3. Ψ en 9. x , 
πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον ἀλλ᾽ ὅθεν ῥᾷστ᾽ ἂν μά- 
Bou ἡ δὲ ὅθεν πρῶτον γίγνεται ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὡς πλοίου 

/ \ 2: / Ν - i Ν 7 
τρόπις καὶ οἰκίας θεμέλιος, καὶ τῶν ζῴων οἱ μὲν καρδίαν 
€ ς pI tA ε 3 ἐν Ἃ id a € / 
οἱ δὲ ἐγκέφαλον οἱ 0 ὅ TL ἂν τύχωσι τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβά- 
vovow: ἡ δὲ ὅθεν γίγνεται πρῶτον μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος καὶ 
[2 n ε 7 / Ν Ν « » 
ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἡ μεταβολή, 
οἷον τὸ τέκνον ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ ἡ μάχη 
ἐκ τῆς λοιδορία' ἡ δὲ οὗ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινεῖται τὰ 
κινούμενα καὶ μεταβάλλει τὰ μεταβάλλοντα, ὥσπερ al 

Ν , 3 Ν \ « lal Ν « lal 
Te κατὰ πόλεις ἀρχαὶ καὶ at δυναστεῖαι καὶ at βασιλεῖαι 
καὶ τυραννίδες ἀρχαὶ λέγονται καὶ αἱ τέχναι, καὶ τούτων 
ai ἀρχιτεκτονικαὶ μάλιστα. ἔτι ὅθεν γνωστὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα 
πρῶτον, καὶ αὕτη ἀρχὴ λέγεται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον 
cal > 4 c € / 3 mn ὡς \ Ν Ε 
τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ ὑποθέσεις. ἰσαχῶς δὲ καὶ τὰ αἴτια 
λέγεται: πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί. πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοι- 

lol n an i EN δ “ὃ 
νὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ 
γιγνώσκεται" τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν ἐνυπάρχουσαί εἶσιν αἱ δὲ 
} »ἅ NE ae / ΟῚ ἐν \ \ tal Ae { 
ἐκτός. διὸ ἥ τε φύσις ἀρχὴ Kal τὸ στοιχεῖον Kal ἡ διάνοια 
καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ οὐσία καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα: πολλῶν γὰρ 
καὶ τοῦ γνῶναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀρχὴ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ 
καλόν. 

Αἴτιον λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυ- 
πάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ 6 ἄργυρος 
τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη: ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ 
Ν / Lay ent J \ c / an / > > Ν 
τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ 


cap. 2 = Phys. 194» 23 — 195) 21 


b 34 τι Τ' 1013% 1-2 γένοιτο ἕκαστον APT 8 ἡ alt. EJ Alc: 


om. AP 14 ἔτι] ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἔτι AP 15 καὶ EJT Asc.°¢ et 
fort. Al.: καὶ yap AP 17 κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν EJT Asc): τῶν ἀρχῶν 
κοινὸν ΑΡ 20 70m. J 23 καλόν ΑἹ. : κακόν EJAT yp, Al. 
Asc. 24 αἴτιον AP All Asc,!: αἴτιον δὲ EJT 25 6 pr. EJ 


Asc.° ®; om, AP 27 ὁ EJ®: om. AP 


I 


2 


% 


\ / A / \ ς ί Ν € / yy 
σωτηρίας" ἄμφω δέ, Kal ἢ παρουσία Kal 7 στέρησις, αἴτια 


I, 1012) 34 — 2. ΤΟΙ 521 


Ν 4 / @ an ἊΣ a \ 4 ἋΣ & \ 
τὰ τούτου γένη (οἷον Tod διὰ πασῶν τὸ δύο πρὸς ev καὶ 
ε / lal 
ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ 
los na δ a 7 Ὁ 
ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον 6 
an / an 
βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου Kal ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν 
τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος. ἔτι 
ὡς τὸ τέλος" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν 
12 c Ἰώ Ἂς i's Ν nN / φ. «ς “6 \ 
ἡ ὑγίεια. διὰ τί yap περιπατεῖ; φαμέν. ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ. καὶ 
» , oe Jee 2 , Ν Υ \ Ὁ“ 
εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. καὶ ὅσα 
a , o τ 
δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, οἷον τῆς 
«ς 7 ς > γᾷ Ν ε ! δ Ν , δ x 
ὑγιείας ἡ loxvacta ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ 
fal an / 
ὄργανα' πάντα yap ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει 
δὲ ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ὄργανα τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα. τὰ μὲν 
3. ” \ a / te Ν 
οὖν αἴτια σχεδὸν τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, συμβαίνει δὲ πολ- 
lo / lal δι τὸν \ ἊΣ a > an y 
λαχῶς λεγομένων τῶν αἰτίων Kal πολλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἴτια 
“4. > XX i Φ fal bP) / \ Ὁ 2 
εἶναι ov κατὰ συμβεβηκός (οἷον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ 7) ἀν- 
δριαντοποιητικὴ καὶ 6 χαλκὸς οὐ καθ’ ἕτερόν τι GAN ἣ ἀν- 
δριάς" ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη τὸ 
7 @ fal 
δ᾽ ὡς ὅθεν ἣ κίνησις), καὶ ἀλλήλων αἴτια (οἷον τὸ πονεῖν 
a > Τὰ \ Φ nan n 5 > > \ ἌΓ ΑΝ , 
τῆς εὐεξίας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πονεῖν" ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον 
ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς τέλος τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἀρχὴ κινήσεως). ἔτι δὲ 
ταὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν" ὃ γὰρ παρὸν αἴτιον τουδί, 


30 


35 


To13? 


Io 


ὌΣΣΟΙΣ IN > .τὖὦ ἢ κ Ὁ 7 e \ 3 7 ¢ 
TOUT ἀπὸον αἰτιώμεθα ἐνίοτε TOV EVAVTLOV, OLOV Τῇ ἀπουσίαν 


τοῦ κυβερνήτου τῆς ἀνατροπῆς, οὗ ἣν ἡ παρουσία αἰτία τῆς 


4 a d ὡς Ν an ’ / Ν 9; / 

ὡς kiwobvra.—édnavra δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἴτια els τέττα- 
pas τρόπους πίπτει τοὺς φανερωτάτους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα 
τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευαστῶν καὶ τὸ πῦρ 
καὶ ἡ γῆ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ 

a Ῥ “ 

μέρη τοῦ ὅλου καὶ at ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος ὡς τὸ 
3 Ὁ »ν δ / Ν \ XN € \ € / Ὁ 
ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά ἐστιν" τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον 


228 rovrayrecc. τὸ] τὰ EJ Al. Α5ς.9 Φ 32 μεταβαλλομένου 
Al. Φ 34 ὑγιαίνει E b 3 ὄργανα τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα AP Asc.: ὡς ὄργανα 
τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἔργα EJT: ἔργα τὰ δ᾽ ὄργανα © et fort. Al. 6 ἀνδριαντο- 
ποιητικὴ AP Ale Asc.°: ἀνδριαντοποιικὴ EJ 10 τῆς EJ Asc.° 
Them. : αἴτιον τῆς APT 12 τῶν AP Asc. Φ et ut vid. Al.: ἐνίοτε 
τῶν EJT 13 ἀπὸν EJT Al. Asc. Φ: αὐτὸ AP αἰτιόμεθα AP 
14 τῆς τοῦ πλοίου ἀνατροπῆς ᾧ 15 δέ] δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ AP 16 δὲ EJT 
All Asc. Φ: δὲ καὶ AP 19 καὶ ἡ γῆ EJT Asc.¢: om. AP® 
πάντα om. AP®: πάντων Asc.° 20 ὑποθέσεις EJA*T®: προτάσεις 
Asc.° et ut vid. Al. 


- 
σι 


20 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


x Ib ΄- ἊΝ ε Ν ον ἄν; LA) / “ ἌΝ να ie 
τὰ μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς TO τί ἣν εἶναι, TO τε ὅλον Kal ἡ σύν- 
Ν ἷς 
t ὁ βου- 
lay ἊΝ a 
λεύσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μετα- 
a δ Τὸ Ν 9 ε \ If x 5 ἊΝ 
25 βολῆς ἢ στάσεως. τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν 
na \ a , an 
τῶν ἄλλων: τὸ yap οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον Kal τέλος τῶν 
/ a 
ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι: διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἀγα- 
\ oy an \ 
θὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.--τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια ταῦτα καὶ 
Lele 2 a » ’, ὮΝ nan 3 Ξ > n / 
τοσαῦτα ἐστι TH εἴδει, τρόποι δὲ τῶν αἰτίων ἀριθμῷ μέν 
iro / 
30 εἰσι πολλοί, κεφαλαιούμενοι δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐλάττους. λέγονται 
lol n a na - 
γὰρ αἴτια πολλαχῶς, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμοειδῶν προτέρως 


δι x 
θεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς Ka 


καὶ ὑστέρως ἄλλο ἄλχου, οἷον ὑγιείας 6 ἰατρὸς καὶ 6 τεχυΐί- 

Ν nn Ν n ἊΝ / \ 2. / Ν IwEN 

TNS, καὶ τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ ἀριθμός, καὶ ἀεὶ 

τὰ περιέχοντα ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. ἔτι δ᾽ ὡς τὸ συμ- 

35 βεβηκὸς καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη, οἷον ἀνδριάντος ἄλλως ΠΠολύ- 

Ν yA 2 / leg / fal 3 

κλειτος Kal ἄλλως ἀνδριαντοποιός, ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ ἀν- 

n 7 Gi Ν Ν / ἊΝ Ν 

10142 δριαντοποιῷ ἸΠολυκλείτῳ εἶναι: καὶ τὰ περιέχοντα δὲ τὸ 

i, φ yf x 2) i \ \ “ 

συμβεβηκός, οἷον. ἄνθρωπος αἴτιος ἀνδριάντος, ἢ καὶ ὅλως 

ζῷον, ὅτι ὁ [Πολύκλειτος ἄνθρωπος ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον. 

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων ἄλλα ἄλλων πορρώτερον καὶ 

ἐγγύτερον, οἷον εἰ ὁ λευκὸς καὶ 6 μουσικὸς αἴτιος λέγοιτο 

an x‘ 

τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον Πολύκλειτος ἢ ἀνθρωπος. 

Ν \ > 3 i fd \ ἐν; ἊΣ 

παρὰ πάντα ὃε καὶ τὰ οἰκείως λεγόμενα καὶ τὰ κατὰ 

, Ἂς Ἂν ε / / Ν 2 c 5 

συμβεβηκός, τὰ μὲν ὡς δυνάμενα λέγεται τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐνερ- 
lal a nan n δ lad 

γοῦντα, οἷον τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι οἰκοδόμος ἢ οἰκοδομῶν οἰκο- 


σι 


Γ , ri e y 
10 δόμος. ὑμοίως δὲ λεχθήσεται καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὧν αἴτια τὰ αἴτια 
a ’ , @ an Ὧν 5 Ἶ Lee) / AX 
τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἢ ἀνδριάντος ἢ ὅλως 
Sak \ a a δ mA SN a WA \ ΔῊΝ 
εἰκόνος, καὶ χαλκοῦ τοῦδε ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ ὅλως ὕλης: καὶ ἐπὶ 


lal Ψ c fA BA ἊΝ ἃ Ἂν 
τῶν συμβεβηκότων ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ συμπλεκόμενα καὶ 
a la / Δ 
ταῦτα κἀκεῖνα λεχθήσεται, οἷον οὐ Τ]ολύκλειτος οὐδὲ ἀν- 
18 δριαντοποιὸς ἀλλὰ [Πολύκλειτος ἀγ')ριαντοποιός. ἀλλ᾽ 


tf I a " a 
ὅμως ἅπαντά ye ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἕξ, λεγόμενα 


Ὁ 25 τὰ δ᾽ APAL: τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα Ε7Τ' Asc.: τὸ δ᾽ Phil. 27 ἐθέλειν AY 
ἀγαθὸν AP Al.e Φ: ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἘΠΤ' 28 οὖν om. AP 30. λέγεται 
EJ 32 ἄλλο ἄλλου EJT ΑἸ. : ἄλλου ἄλλο AP ὁ alt. om. EJT 
34 ἕκαστα EJ Simpl.: ἕκαστον AP Phil.¢ 36 ὅτι] καὶ ὅτι AP 
1Ο148 2 οἷον... ἢ EJT Asc.: οἷον εἰ... εἴη ἢ ΑΡΦ 4 πορρώτερον 
ese : πορρώτερα AP: πρότερον recc. 5 ἐγγύτερον ΕΠΤΦ : ἐγγύτερα 
Α λέγοιτο] οἴοιτο AP 7 παρὰ codd. Φ (1) Simpl.) Phil.!: 
om. ® (EF) 9 τοῦ ἘΠΓΦ: τὸ τοῦ AP II ἢ pr. EJT@®: ἣ AP 
12 καὶ AP Ale ®: ἢ ΕΓ 7 pr. EY Ale ®; ἡ JAP 


3 


2. 1013 22 — 3. 10149 


eX > n xX τ « Ν ΕῚ e A € \ ,ὕ “Ὁ 
δὲ διχῶς: ἢ γὰρ ὡς τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς τὸ γένος, ἢ 
© \ Ν δ ε N / a , XN 
ὡς TO συμβεβηκὸς ἢ ὡς TO γένος τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ἢ 
ε , fay Kh ς “- , / OY fat ls 
ὡς συμπλεκόμενα ταῦτα ἢ ὡς ἁπλῶς λεγόμενα, πάντα δὲ ἢ ὡς 
2 a x Ν / / Ν a “ ὃν 
ἐνεργοῦντα ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν. διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι τὰ 
μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἅμα ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι 
Ν - » Φ “ ς > 2 na a ¢ ,ὔ 
καὶ ὧν αἴτια, οἷον ὅδε ὁ ἰατρεύων τῷδε τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ 
Ne, ¢ > Le a a > / \ Ν Ν 
καὶ ὅδε ὁ οἰκοδόμος τῷδε τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ 
, > 
δύναμιν οὐκ ἀεί: φθείρεται γὰρ οὐχ ἅμα ἡ οἰκία καὶ ὃ 
οἰκοδόμος. 
τ a / 3 Ὁ be , b] ’ 
Στοιχεῖον λέγεται ἐξ οὗ σύγκειται πρώτου ἐνυπάρ- 
χοντος ἀδιαιρέτου τῷ εἴδει εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος, οἷον φωνῆς 
στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται ἡ φωνὴ καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται 
μὲ 2 ~ \ Vion) 4. BA Ν Cone a 
ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ᾽ εἰς ἄλλας φωνὰς ἑτέρας τῷ 
» βι 5 x x a x , € a » 
εἴδει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ Kav διαιρῆται, τὰ μόρια ὁμοειδῆ, οἷον 
ὕδατος τὸ μόριον ὕδωρ, GAN οὐ τῆς συλλαβῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ 
καὶ τὰ τῶν σωμάτων στοιχεῖα λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἰς ἃ 
διαιρεῖται τὰ σώματα ἔσχατα, ἐκεῖνα δὲ μηκέτ᾽ εἰς ἄλλα 
᾿ , \ " ὰ ¥ ΄, “ a 
εἴδει διαφέροντα' καὶ εἴτε ἕν εἴτε πλείω τὰ τοιαῦτα, 
a a , Ν a 
ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγουσιν. παραπλησίως δὲ Kal τὰ τῶν 
/ lal na 
διαγραμμάτων στοιχεῖα λέγεται, Kal ὅλως τὰ τῶν ἀπο- 
δείξεων' αἱ γὰρ πρῶται ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν ἀπο- 
δείξεσιν ἐνυπάρχουσαι, αὗται στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀποδείξεων λέ- 
γονται' εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι συλλογισμοὶ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκ τῶν 
lal | Sag Stay / \ / Ν lal an 
τριῶν δι’ ἑνὸς μέσου. Kal μεταφέροντες δὲ στοιχεῖον καλοῦ- 
“ ὸ By 4 ΄ 
ow ἐντεῦθεν ὃ ἂν ἕν ὃν καὶ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἢ χρήσι- 


/ ὃ ‘ ἣν \ s\ Ν c “ \ AO 7 
| POV, lO και TO μικρὸν Και ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἃ ἰαιρετον στοι- 


χεῖον λέγεται. ὅθεν ἐλήλυθε τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου στοιχεῖα 
a 4 ef eis ὰ δ Nee a 2 tas Cs, 

εἶναι, ὅτι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ev dv καὶ ἁπλοῦν ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρ- 
x “- x “ 7 \ Ave A \ Ν Ν 

χει 7) πᾶσιν ἢ ὅτι πλείστοις, καὶ τὸ ἕν καὶ τὴν στιγμὴν 

ἀρχάς τισι δοκεῖν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ καλούμενα γένη 

217 ἢ ὡς τὸ γένος APTS: om. EJ γένος EJ® Phil.®: τοῦ καθ᾽ 


αὑτά add, A, καὶ τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτό T, αὐτοῦ rece. et fort. Al. το ὡς alt. 
om. recc. πάντα δὲ ἢ ΑΡΦ εἰ αἴ vid. ΑἹ. : ἔτι EJT 22 καὶ APALS@: 


αὐτά τε καὶ EJT ὁ om, AP 23 ὁ οἰκοδομῶν ® τὰ] To J 
26 ἐνυπάρχοντας E 27 τῷ . . . ἕτερον] εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ yp. Al. 
28 διαιρεῖ Ἐ 30 κἂν EJ Ale Asc.: ἂν καὶ AP 31 συλλαβῆς 
συλλαβή Richards 34 διαφέροντα σώματα ἘΠΤ' b2 ἐκ τῶν 
τριῶν] ἐκ τῶν τριῶν μέσων AP: τῶν τριῶν Al. et ut vid. Asc.: τῶν τριῶν 
μέσων yp. Al, 8 καὶ pr. EJT Al.®: διὸ καὶ AP 9 ἀρχὰς καὶ 


στοιχεῖά τισι Al, δοκεῖ APT Al.¢ 
2573-1 G 


20 


5 


{0 


15 


20 


σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Δ 


Μ᾽ ἂν nan 
καθόλου καὶ ἀδιαίρετα (οὐ yap ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν), στοιχεῖα 
o EN Ye 
τὰ γένη λέγουσί τινες, Kal μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν διαφορὰν ὅτι 
4 “ \ , ὍΝ ἧς Ν ς Ν ε / 
καθόλου μᾶλλον τὸ γένος" ᾧ μὲν yap ἡ διαφορὰ vTap- 
\ Ν / 5 o Δι SS \ / > Ν € 
χει, Kal TO γένος ἀκολουθεῖ, ᾧ δὲ TO γένος, οὐ παντὶ ἣ 
διαφορά. ἁπάντων δὲ κοινὸν τὸ εἶναι στοιχεῖον ἑκάστου τὸ 
πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκάστῳ. 
n / i 
Φύσις λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον TOV φυομένων γέ- 
᾿ » : γῇ ,ὔ Ν e Ν > o Δ 
νεσις, οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγοι τὸ υ, ἕνα δὲ ἐξ οὗ φύε- 
/ 
ται πρώτου τὸ φυόμενον ἐνυπάρχοντος" ἔτι ὅθεν 7 κίνησις 
/ lal : ἜΣ Ἂν Ψ ‘ 
ἡ πρώτη ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐν αὐτῷ 2) αὐτὸ 
> / 
ὑπάρχει: φύεσθαι δὲ λέγεται ὅσα αὔξησιν ἔχει δι’ ἑτέρου 
n a Ἂν / oN / Ὁ“ 
τῷ ἅπτεσθαι καὶ συμπεφυκέναι ἢ προσπεφυκέναι ὥσπερ 
/ “ ν᾿ 
τὰ ἔμβρυα' διαφέρει δὲ σύμφυσις ἁφῆς, ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ 
ION Ν Ν ς Ν e 2 / o 2 Ν “ 
οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἕτερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμ- 
/ » ὰ \ EN ᾿Ὶ 9 a A a 9) \ a 
πεφυκόσιν ἔστι TL ἕν TO αὐτὸ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὃ ποιεῖ ἀντὶ τοῦ 
ἅπτεσθαι συμπεφυκέναι καὶ εἶναι ἕν κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ 
/ 5 SS Ἂν τ Ν / By Ν , / 
ποσόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ TO ποιόν. ἔτι δὲ φύσις λέγεται 
> ae , \ ἊΝ x 7, 7 “ ,΄ » 5 
ἐξ οὗ πρώτου 1) ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεταί τι τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἀρρυ- 
θμίστου ὄντος καὶ ἀμεταβλήτου ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὑτοῦ, 
οἷον ἀνδριάντος καὶ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν χαλκῶν ὃ χαλκὸς ἡ 
φύσις λέγεται, τῶν δὲ ξυλίνων ξύλον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων: ἐκ τούτων γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον διασωζομένης τῆς 
πρώτης ὕλης" τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων 
τὰ στοιχεῖά φασιν εἶναι φύσιν, οἱ μὲν πῦρ οἱ δὲ γῆν οἱ 
δ᾽ ἀέρα οἱ δ᾽ ὕδωρ οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον λέγοντες, οἱ δ᾽ 
» ΄ € Ἂς / an By 2 DA , / 
ἔνια τούτων of δὲ πάντα ταῦτα. ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον λέ- 
«ε / € a i y de eg = ς / 
γεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία, οἷον ot λέγοντες 
Ἂς / Φ Ἂς 7, A δ “ + fal 
τὴν φύσιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην σύνθεσιν, ἢ ὥσπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς 
ἐᾷ 4 6e / > \ w 2/ 
λέγει ὅτι “ φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἐόντων, 


ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξίς τε 
διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων | ἔστι, φύσις δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται 
5 7 ” Ν δ v2 ν BY , + 
ἀνθρώποισιν . διὸ καὶ ὅσα φύσει ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται, ἤδη 
ἘΠΕ 3 Ὁ t , δ > + Ν 
ὑπάρχοντος ἐξ οὗ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ εἶναι, οὔπω φαμὲν 
Ἂς / ” 2s \ 7 Ν ἕν \ ἊΣ / 
τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃ TO εἶδος Kal THY μορφὴν. 
bio οὐ APAL!; εἰς E: εἷς JT 11 τινες εἶναι καὶ AP 16 φύσις 
AP Al.¢: φύσις δὲ EJT Asc} 18 πρώτου E* Al.: πρῶτον EXJAYT 
19 αὐτὸ] αὐτῶι E 21 συμπεφυκέναι ἢ EJT Al. Asc.: om, AP 
26 δὲ οἵη. APT 27 τῶν ΕΤΤ Al. Asc. Φ; τῶν μὴ A ἀρρυθμίστου 
Asc.© ®: ἀρυθμίστου codd. 28 αὐτοῦ AP 29 ἡ: Ε] Ase.e: 
om, AP 37 70m. T ΙΟ153 2 τε οἵ, AP ἐστὶ καὶ φύσις AP 


3. 1014 10 — 5. rors> 3 


φύσει μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν, οἷον τὰ ζῷα 
Ὡς ἃς. , Ch te » Ν Ὁ ΄ Ὁ Ν 4 
kal τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν' φύσις δὲ ἥ τε πρώτη ὕλη (καὶ αὕτη 
a δ ε A SN Ve δ ε “ , a a 
διχῶς, ἢ ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸ πρώτη ἢ ἡ ὅλως πρώτη, οἷον τῶι 
Ἂς y \ 38 δ = ε , Ψ ’ 
χαλκῶν ἔργων πρὸς αὑτὰ μὲν πρῶτος ὁ χαλκός, ὅλως ὃ 
ἐγ “ > / Ν Ν “ \ \ δ᾿ \ € 
ἴσως ὕδωρ, εἰ πάντα τὰ τηκτὰ ὕδωρ) καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ 
, a ,’ 3 \ \ Si: a / a 2 
ovata: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως. μεταφορᾷ ὃ 
ἤδη καὶ ὅλως πᾶσα οὐσία φύσις λέγεται διὰ ταύτην, ὅτι 
νος: uA 2 7 ΟΣ 2 XN a 9 / ε lA 
καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐσία τίς ἐστιν. ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων ἣ πρώτη 
φύσις καὶ κυρίως λεγομένη ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ τῶν ἐχόντων 
> \ 7 pI ig ta Ἂν > ε Ν cf an va 
ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὑτοῖς ἣ αὐτά: ἡ yap ὕλη τῷ ταύτης 
δεκτικὴ εἶναι λέγεται φύσις, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις καὶ τὸ φύε- 
n 4 \ ’ > 7 \ « 9 ἊΝ na 7 
σθαι τῷ ἀπὸ ταύτης εἶναι κινήσεις. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινή- 
σεως τῶν φύσει ὄντων αὕτη ἐστίν, ἐνυπάρχουσά πως ἢ δυ- 
δ 
νάμει ἢ ἐντελεχείᾳ. 
SH) a / Ὄ / 9 ᾽ , aA ε 
Αναγκαῖον λέγεται οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται Gy ὡς 
, Ω \ > a Sune N aA , 3 
συναιτίου (οἷον τὸ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἣ τροφὴ τῷ (ζῴῳ dvay- 
na Ν ’, cy Ὁ 
καῖον, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἄνευ τούτων εἶναι), καὶ ὧν ἄνευ τὸ 
“ Ν Ἂς 3 / Ων > “Ὁ id xX Ν \ > 
ἀγαθὸν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, ἢ TO κακὸν ἀπο- 
nan Oy an e n a 
βαλεῖν ἢ στερηθῆναι (οἷον τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαῖον 
¢/ \ I? \ Ν nan ΕῚ » A 2 / 
iva μὴ κάμνῃ, Kal τὸ πλεῦσαι εἰς Αἴγιναν ἵνα ἀπολάβῃ 
ἮΝ td yy \ 7 x ie 7 a > 2 Ν Ν 
τὰ χρήματα). ἔτι τὸ βίαιον καὶ ἡ βία' τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ 
Ἂν Ν « ~ Ν Ἂς 74 5 ,ὔὕ Ν ᾽ 
παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν, 
nN XS , > na , \ \ , “ 
τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν (ὥσπερ 
καὶ Εὔηνός φησι “wav γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀνιαρὸν 
ἔφυ), καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις (ὥσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει 
“ἀλλ᾽ ἡ βία με ταῦτ᾽ ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν "), καὶ δοκεῖ ἡ 
ἀνάγκη ἀμετάπειστόν τι εἷναι, ὀρθῶς: ἐναντίον γὰρ τῇ 
/ 
κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν κινήσει Kal κατὰ τὸν λογισμόν. ἔτι 
\ Ἂς 3 , Ν Ν᾽ 2 awa 4 
TO μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως 


Μ Ν ΓΝ fal \ 9, lal \ iy / / 
ἔχειν" καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο TO ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τἄλλα λέγεταί 


dt 5 a , = 7 2 - / 
πως ἅπαντα ἀναγκαῖα" τό τε yap βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέ- 
XK “- BN 
γεται ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν τότε, ὅταν μὴ ἐνδέχηται Kara 
‘\ ι1 Ἂς Ἂς \ ΄ ς 4 5" / μὴ 
τὴν ὁρμὴν διὰ τὸ βιαζόμενον, ὡς ταύτην ἀνάγκην οὖσαν 
dv ἣν μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συναιτίων τοῦ 


28 ἢ ἡ] ἡ τὰ AP: ἢ Christ ἡ οἵη. AP 9 πρῶτον AP 
II μεταφορὰ AP 15. αὐτοῖς AP 16 αἱ γενέσεις JT ΑΙ. et fecit 
E: γένεσις AP τῶ AP 17 κινήσεις EJT Al.: κίνησις A» 
18 αὕτη EJT Ale: ἡ αὐτή AP 19 ἐνεργείᾳ Al.¢ et ut vid. Al. 
23 τὸ AP ΑΙ. Asc: τι EJT 27 τὴν alt. EJ Asc.: om. AP 


G2 


Io 


15 


35 


To15> 


5 


10 


20 


25 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


ἢ 1 τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως" ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἔνθ 
Giv καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως" ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχηται ἔνθα 
μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν. ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄνευ τινῶν, 
ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστιν αὕτη. ἔτι 
« “ ’ a 5 / τῷ ’ 4 / »” 

ἣ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως 

oy ’ 2 / ς cal 4 3 ἴ ἘΝ cal 

ἔχειν, εἰ ἀποδέδεικται ἁπλῶς: τούτου δ᾽ αἴτια Ta πρῶτα, 

εἰ ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός. τῶν μὲν 

δὴ ἕτερον αἴτιον τοῦ ἀναγκαῖα εἶναι, τῶν δὲ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ 

διὰ ταῦτα ἕτερά ἐστιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ὥστε τὸ πρῶτον καὶ 

κυρίως ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἁπλοῦν ἐστίν' τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται 

πλεοναχῶς ἔχειν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως" ἤδη γὰρ 
an x By τ ἡ yy Ν 5.. \ 9 7 

πλεοναχῶς ay ἔχοι. εἰ ἄρα ἔστιν ἄττα ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκί-: 
IOr 3 7 3) \ , ION ~ 4 

νητα, οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις ἐστὶ βίαιον οὐδὲ παρὰ φύσιν. 

Ἕν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ 

e+ “ \ x ΠῚ ΄ ΄, κ \ 

αὑτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μὲν οἷον Κορίσκος καὶ τὸ μουσι- 

’, Ν Υ' 2: > ἫΝ τὰς 5 “ >a ne Ἂς 
κόν, καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός (ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἰπεῖν Κορίσκος καὶ 

8 / 

TO μουσικόν, καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός), καὶ TO μουσικὸν Kal τὸ 
δίκαιον, καὶ μουσικὸς (Κορίσκος) καὶ δίκαιος Κορίσκος" πάντα 
“ a x , τῷ , \ δῇ ΄, \ Ν 
γὰρ ταῦτα ἕν λέγεται κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ μὲν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ 
Ν vg A ’ 14 / \ Ν BY \ 
μουσικὸν ὅτι μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ συμβέβηκεν, TO δὲ μουσικὸν Kal Ko- 
/ “ 4 , / € / x ὧν 
ρίσκος ὅτι θάτερον θατέρῳ. συμβέβηκεν' ὁμοίως δὲ τρόπον 
Ν, ‘ € \ 7 / lal a / ὰ “ / 
τινὰ καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος τῷ Κορίσκῳ ἕν ὅτι θάτερον 
a 7 θ / / “ ἢ 3 , a x 4 Φ Ν 
τῶν μορίων θατέρῳ συμβέβηκε τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, οἷον τὸ 

SY fal oe \ τὸ A 7 / » > 
μουσικὸν τῷ Κορίσκῳ' καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος δικαίῳ Ko- 

7 “ € / / a 3. ΟΝ CoN / ¢ 
ρίσκῳ ὃτι ἑκατέρου μέρος TH αὐτῷ ἑνὶ συμβέβηκεν ἕν. 
ς / Ν δ 5. ὍΝ , x ον τῇ ΄ ΄ Ν > 
ὡσαύτως δὲ Kay ἐπὶ γένους κὰν ἐπὶ τῶν καθόλου τινὸς ὀνο- 

/ Ν /, e “ » Ἂν, Ψ, Ἂς 
μάτων λέγηται τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὅτι ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτὸ 
\ Ν "» ᾿ “Ὁ Ν “ a “» ΄ὔ a BA 
καὶ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος' ἢ yap ὅτι TO ἀνθρώπῳ μιᾷ οὔσῃ 

3 ί / Ν ee Ων “ Ε n θ᾽ ed 
οὐσίᾳ συμβέβηκε TO μουσικόν, ἢ ὅτι ἄμφω τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκα- 


ba ἐνδέχεται AP 5 καὶ τὸ omittendum ci. Bonitz 6 αὐτῆς AP 
10 δὴ] δ AP ἀναγκαῖον AP 14 ἄρα EJT Al. Asc.: yap AP 
ἄττα] ἄττα καὶ ΑΡ ἀΐδια] ἁπλᾶ Al. 15. οὐδὲν] οὐδ᾽ ἐν E: οὐδὲν 
ev fort. Al, et Asc., Jaeger 16 τὸ δὲ... 17 μὲν EJT Al. Asc.: 
om. AP 18 καὶ Κορίσκος μουσικός] καὶ Κορίσκος καὶ μουσικός AY: 
om. J? ταὐτὸ... 19 καὶ alt, EJT Al. Asc,: om. A? 19 καὶ 
pr.] ἕν καὶ ex Al. ci. Bonitz 20 καὶ μουσικὸς om, 77 Κορίσκος 
καὶ δίκαιος Al,: καὶ ὁ AP: δίκαιος ΕΤ Γ΄; om. J} 21 roalt. EJ Al.: 
om, AP Asc. 22 TO... 23 συμβέβηκεν EJT Al, Asc.: om. AP 
27 μέρους ΑΡ & EJ Al.: om. AT post ἕν add. οὐδὲν yap δια- 
φέρει ἢ Κορίσκῳ τὸ μουσικὸν συμβεβηκέναι EJ; om. AP Al. Asc. 29 


ς 


ὅτι] ὅτι 6 AP 30 τῶν ἀνθρώπων J 


5. 101554 — 6. 10168 28 


, / ’ Ὁ > Ν aN 
στόν τινι συμβέβηκεν, οἷον Κορίσκῳ. πλὴν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν 
, ΝΜ € / = x x X\ ν «ς Us Ν 
τρόπον ἄμφω ὕπαρχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἴσως ὡς γένος καὶ 
“ a > / xX Ν « er x ji a ΕῚ 7 “ Ων 
ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ δὲ ὡς ἕξις ἢ πάθος τῆς οὐσίας.---ὅσα μὲν 
μὴ Ν Ν re od cal Ἂν , fe 
οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ἕν, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγε- 
n Ν 2 € Ἂς ἃ / Ν Ν fe lal 
Tau’ τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὰ ἕν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν λέγεται TO 
συνεχῆ εἶναι, οἷον φάκελος δεσμῷ καὶ ξύλα κόλλῃ" 
Ν / x / 53 Ν / 7 / 
Kal γραμμή, κἂν κεκαμμένη ἢ, συνεχὴς δέ, pla λέγεται, 
a a im τ 
ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον, οἷον σκέλος καὶ βραχίων. 
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων μᾶλλον ἕν τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ ἢ τέ 
μ eX ἢ τέχνῃ. 
μιν Ν / oe , rs 3 δεν \ Ἂς Lg 
συνεχὲς δὲ λέγεται οὗ κίνησις μία καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ οἵόν 
Ν ta 2 a s Φ 3 a Ν Ν / 
τε GAAws: μία δ᾽ οὗ ἀδιαίρετος, ἀδιαίρετος δὲ κατὰ χρόνον. 
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ συνεχῆ ὅσα μὴ ἁφῇ evr εἰ γὰρ θείης ἁπτό- 
XxX! μη i γὰρ 1 
7, , , a 5 A , 
μενα ἀλλήλων ξύλα, οὐ φήσεις ταῦτα εἶναι ev οὔτε ξύλον 
» a vy > ¥ x 997 ! Lo A 
οὔτε σῶμα οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο συνεχὲς οὐδέν. Ta TE δὴ ὅλως συνεχῆ 
a , x Υ͂ , Ν oY la xX X Υ̓ 
ev λέγεται κἂν ἔχῃ κάμψιν, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τὰ μὴ ἔχοντα 
° A 
κάμψιν, οἷον κνήμη ἢ μηρὸς σκέλους, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται μὴ μίαν 
εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σκέλους. καὶ ἡ εὐθεῖα τῆς κεκαμμένης 
μᾶλλον ἕν" τὴν δὲ κεκαμμένην καὶ ἔχουσαν γωνίαν καὶ 
/ Ν > / / [4 9, / Ἂν ἊΣ ed Ἂς 
μίαν καὶ οὐ μίαν λέγομεν, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ μὴ ἅμα τὴν 
κίνησιν αὐτῆς εἶναι καὶ ἅμα: τῆς δ᾽ εὐθείας ἀεὶ ἅμα, καὶ 
οὐδὲν μόριον ἔχον μέγεθος τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, 
ὥσπερ τῆς κεκαμμένης. ἔτι ἄλλον τρόπον ἕν λέγεται τῷ 
τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ εἴδει εἶναι ἀδιάφορον: ἀδιάφορον δ᾽ ὧν 
5 ὮΝ A LON Ν Ν » \ 3) ς / 
ἀδιαίρετον τὸ εἶδος κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν" τὸ δ᾽ ὑποκείμενον 
«δ a xX n 
ἢ TO πρῶτον ἢ TO τελευταῖον πρὸς TO τέλος" καὶ yap οἶνος 
Ὁ / \ > e Ὁ 5 2 ἊΣ A ων \ 
εἷς λέγεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἕν, 7} ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ TO εἶδος, καὶ 
φ a “ 
οἱ χυμοὶ πάντες λέγονται ἕν (οἷον ἔλαιον οἷνος) καὶ τὰ τηκτά, 
δ “Ὁ 
ὅτι πάντων τὸ ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον τὸ αὐτό᾽ ὕδωρ γὰρ ἢ 
ἀὴρ πάντα ταῦτα. λέγεται δ᾽ ἕν καὶ ὧν τὸ γένος ἕν 
a cal lal / 
διαφέρον ταῖς ἀντικειμέναις διαφοραῖς----καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται 
πάντα ev ὅτι τὸ γένος ἕν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς διαφοραῖς 
(οἷον ἵππος ἄνθρωπος κύων ἕν τι ὅτι πάντα ζῷα), καὶ τρό- 
Ν , “ ε Ὁ“ ᾽ὔ lal Ἂς ( vieaih 
πον δὴ παραπλήσιον ὥσπερ ἣ ὕλη pla. ταῦτα 6€ OTE 
b 33-34 καὶ οὐσία Τ' ΙοΟΙ68 1 φάκελος EJ Al.: φάκελλος AP 
56. 3 οἷον om. EJ Asc.° 5 συνεχὲς... 6 χρόνον om. J? 
οὗ codd. Al.¢; οὗ ἡ a et fort. Al. 15 ἀεὶ] δεῖ AP 17 ὥσπερ 
om. Εὖ évom. EJ 18 ἀδιάφορον alt. EJT Asc.¢: om, AP: 
΄ -“ - > , ~ a 
ἀδιάφορα recc. 21 ἔν] ἂν AP 24 ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν EJT 26 ἕν 
πάντα AP 27 τι οἵη. AP ζῷον AP 


38 


10162 


15 


τὸ 
σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


Ν Ν 
μὲν οὕτως ἕν λέγεται, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ ἄνω γένος ταὐτὸν λεγε- 
30 ταυ---ῶἂν ἢ τελευταῖα τοῦ γένους εἴδη---τὸ ἀνωτέρω τούτων, οἷον 
δὰ ΕῚ Ν Ν Ν 4 , τς ἀπὰ Ν a “Ὁ Ψ“ 
τὸ ἰσοσκελὲς καὶ τὸ ἰσόπλευρον ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν σχῆμα ὅτι 
ἄμφω τρίγωνα' τρίγωνα δ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. ἔτι δὲ ἕν λέγεται 
“ ς , ς \ ΟΝ 4 / ϑ᾽ , \ BA 
ὅσων ὃ λόγος ὁ TO τί ἣν εἶναι λέγων ἀδιαίρετος πρὸς ἄλλον 
Ν a ‘gee 4 Ν -“ Di ON, Ν 2 δ᾿ τς 
τὸν δηλοῦντα τί ἣν εἷναι] τὸ πρᾶγμα (αὐτὸς γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν 
ἊΝ , /, “ Ἂν \ Ν 3 he \ ~ 
35 πᾶς λόγος διαιρετός). οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τὸ ηὐξημένον καὶ φθῖ- 
νον ἕν ἐστιν, ὅτι ὁ λόγος εἷς, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπέδων ὁ τοῦ 
τοιδὺ εἴδους. ὅλως δὲ ὧν ἡ νόησις ἀδιαίρετος ἡ νοοῦσα τὸ τί ἣν 
εἶναι, καὶ μὴ δύναται χωρίσαι μήτε χρόνῳ μήτε τόπῳ 
μήτε λόγῳ, μάλιστα ταῦτα ἕν, καὶ τούτων ὅσα οὐσίαι" κα- 
θόλου γὰρ ὅσα μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν, 7 μὴ ἔχει, ταύτῃ ἕν λέ- 
5 γεται, οἷον εἰ ἣ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ἔχει διαίρεσιν, εἷς ἄνθρωπος, 
> » ἊΝ ~ dé ~ 5 Ν Ὁ , ὰ / SN Ν 
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ ζῷον, ἕν ζῷον, εἰ δὲ ἣ μέγεθος, ἕν μέγεθος. τὰ μὲν 
a a “Ὁ nan x x‘ 
οὖν πλεῖστα ἕν λέγεται τῷ ἕτερόν τι ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ ἔχειν ἢ 
, δ , > ¢ BS ἊΣ ΄ , a Φ ς 
πάσχειν ἢ πρός τι εἶναι ἕν, τὰ δὲ πρώτως λεγόμενα ἕν ὧν 7 
οὐσία μία, μία δὲ ἢ συνεχείᾳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ λόγῳ: Kal ya 
μία, μ ὲ ἢ exela ἢ εἴδει ἢ λόγῳ: καὶ γὰρ 
ΕῚ an € / x Ν Ἂς a xX “- X\ a SN > 
το ἀριθμοῦμεν ws πλείω ἢ TA μὴ συνεχῆ ἢ ὧν μὴ ev TO εἶδος 
\ @ € , Ἂν e oy 9. ἡ Ν ε ς a e 
ἢ ὧν ὃ λόγος μὴ Els. ETL δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ws ὁτιοῦν ἕν φαμεν 
Le xd 53 Ν ‘ / Da 3 «ε + 3 ’ vA 
εἶναι ἂν ἢ ποσὸν καὶ συνεχές, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, ἂν μή TL ὅλον 
ἢ, τοῦτο δὲ ἂν μὴ τὸ εἶδος ἔχῃ Ev οἵ UK ἂν φαῖμεν 
ἢ, μὴ ς ἔχῃ ἕν' οἷον οὐκ ἃ mn 
« , A / c lal Ἂν / n / 
ὁμοίως ἕν ἰδόντες ὁπωσοῦν τὰ μέρη συγκείμενα TOD ὑποδή- 
o's τς Ν "Νὰ / > 3 aN [ὦ “ 6 , 
15 ματος, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν οὕτως ὥστε ὑπό- 
δημα εἶναι καὶ εἶδός τι ἔχειν ἤδη ἕν" διὸ καὶ ἡ τοῦ κύκλου 
/ lA nf n a Ὁ“ Ν / , 3 ‘ 
μάλιστα μία τῶν γραμμῶν, oTL ὅλη καὶ τέλειός ἐστιν.----τὸ 
Ν cen an =) a aoe) 2 na i) \ Ν lal 
δὲ ἑνὶ εἶναι ἀρχῇ τινί ἐστιν ἀριθμοῦ εἶναι: τὸ yap πρῶτον 
/ p) / & Ν , / fa) na , 
μέτρον ἀρχή, ᾧ yap πρώτῳ γνωρίζομεν, τοῦτο πρῶτον μέ- 
2 . a a 
ao Tpov ἑκάστου γένους ἀρχὴ οὖν τοῦ γνωστοῦ περὶ ἕκαστον TO 


429 δὲ κατὰ τὸ fort. Al. Asc. γένος AP Al. Asc.: γένος ὃ EJT 
30 TO... τούτων an spuria? τὸ Al.: ra codd.: τοῦ Γ΄: τῶν Asc.° 
32 τρίγωνα, pr. AP Asc.°: τρίγωνον EJT 33 6 alt. om. AP 
34 τί ἢν εἶναι seclusi 35 διαιρετός ΕΤΤ Al.: ἀδιαίρετος A> 
b 1 εἴδους AP Ale: εἴδους εἷς ἘΠΡ 4 γὰρ] δὲ Ε ἣ μὴ ἔχει om. AP 
7 ἔχειν ἢ πάσχειν ΕἸΑΡ: : πάσχειν ἢ ΔῈ ip 10 ἀριθμῷ μόνως. 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τὰ μὲν yp. E? ἢ pr. ΕἸΡ Ale Asc.¢: om. Ἂν 
11 He. es Ell Asc.cs om. AP Al. ἔτι 111 yp. E ci. ΑἹ. : ἐπεὶ 
EA? Al. Asc. ἕν] ἕν συνεχείᾳ Jv Asc. 13 τὸ EJjr Al, 
Asc.®; τι AP 14 ὁπωσοῦν ἰδόντες ΑΡ 16 ἤδη ἔ ἔχειν ΑΡ 
18 ἑνὶ EJP ΑΙ. : ἕν AP Αϑο.9 ἀρχὴ EJT Asc.°: ἀρχὴ τοῦ Jaeger 
ἀριθμοῦ susp. Christ : cee, ἘΠ Jaeger 19 ἀρχή EJ Asc.°: 


ἑκάστου γένους ἀρχή AP: ἀρχή τινι εἶναί ἐστι Τ' γὰρ] δὲ Christ 


6. 10168 29 — 7. 1017415 


e > ἌΝ St a ~ / Ν a Υ̓ ἊΝ Ν 
ἕν. οὐ ταὐτὸ δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γένεσι τὸ ἕν. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ 
΄ lol x / εἰ 
δίεσις ἔνθα δὲ τὸ φωνῆεν ἢ ἄφωνον' βάρους δὲ ἕτερον καὶ 
, a ἃ A a ~ 74. re 
κινήσεως ἄλλο. πανταχοῦ δὲ TO ἕν ἢ TH ποσῷ ἢ τῷ εἴ- 
de ἀδιαίρετον͵ τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον, 
\ Ν / \ / , ᾿ \ Ν / 
TO μὲν πάντῃ καὶ ἄθετον λέγεται μονάς, τὸ δὲ πάντῃ 
καὶ θέσιν ἔχον στιγμή, τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ γραμμή, τὸ δὲ διχῇ 
x γμή, μοναχῇ γραμμή, χῇ 
> / Ny Ν / \ a A \ \ 
ἐπίπεδον, TO δὲ πάντῃ Kal τριχῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ TO ποσὸν 
σῶμα" καὶ ἀντιστρέψαντι δὴ τὸ μὲν διχῇ διαιρετὸν ἐπίπε 
we Be ρ ieee Xl p 3 
Ν fol ΄ a \ Ν 
dov, τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ γραμμή, TO δὲ μηδαμῇ διαιρετὸν κατὰ 
Ἂ A Ν Ν / « Ν Υ Ν ς Ν Ν 
τὸ ποσὸν στιγμὴ καὶ μονάς, 7) μὲν ἄθετος μονὰς ἡ δὲ θετὸς 
/ yy Ν Ν Ν Pye aah) ΄ 5) 4 Ν Ν ΕΣ 
στιγμή. ἔτι δὲ τὰ μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν ἐστιν ἕν, τὰ δὲ κατ 
ως XX Ν ἃς , Ν Ν > 5 7 ra lal 
εἶδος, Ta δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὰ δὲ κατ΄ ἀναλογίαν, ἀριθμῷ 
Ν μὰ {Ὁ ,ὔ 4 2 we ς - κι τὶ / 3 ΜᾺ ‘ 
μὲν ὧν ἢ ὕλη pla, εἴδει 6 ὧν ὁ λόγος εἷς, γένει δ᾽ ὧν TO 
\ lal a 
αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ ὅσα ἔχει ὡς 
Y + ¢) an» lal 
ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο. ἀεὶ δὲ τὰ ὕστερα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἀκολουθεῖ, 
oA “ pd “ \ aN “ “ > y > / - a 
οἷον ὅσα ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει ἕν, ὅσα δ᾽ εἴδει οὐ πάντα ἀριθμῷ" 
5» Ν / / ἃ “ \ yf “ Ν , 3 If 
ἀλλὰ γένει πάντα ἕν ὅσαπερ Kal εἴδει, ὅσα δὲ γένει OV πάν- 
ΡΝ rs 3 3 7 “ Ἂς 3 7) > / / 
τα εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ἀναλογίᾳ: ὅσα δὲ ἀναλογίᾳ ov πάντα γέ- 
ἣν Ν ‘ “ XxX AS Pd / , 
vet. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ ἀντικειμένως λεχθήσεται 
τῷ ἑνί: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ μὴ συνεχῆ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῷ διαιρε- 
Ἂν vy ~ Ὁ“ Ν Ν ΩΣ Ων \ 7 x Ἂς 
τὴν ἔχειν τὴν ὕλην κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ τὴν πρώτην ἢ τὴν τελευ- 
f Ἂς Ν lol \ , / \ a aN ων / 
ταίαν, τὰ δὲ τῷ τοὺς λόγους πλείους τοὺς τί ἣν εἶναι λέγοντας. 
Ν > 
Τὸ ὃν λέγεται τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ 
αὑτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μέν, οἷον τὸν δίκαιον μουσικὸν 
εἶναί φαμεν καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μουσικὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν 
ἄνθρωπον, παραπλησίως λέγοντες ὡσπερεὶ τὸν μουσικὸν οἶκο- 
tal “ / lal . 7 na a x a 
δομεῖν ὅτι συμβέβηκε τῷ οἰκοδόμῳ μουσικῷ εἶναι ἢ τῷ 
μὰ Ss > > Ν 
μουσικῷ οἰκοδόμῳ (τὸ γὰρ τόδε εἶναι τόδε σημαίνει τὸ συμ- 
, “ / “ Ν Ne nr ᾿) Zi \ 
βεβηκέναι τῷδε τόδε),----οὕτω δὲ Kal ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρημένων" τὸν 
\ A 
yap ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν Kal τὸν μουσικὸν ἄν- 
xX x a 
θρωπον, ἢ TOV λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, TO μὲν ὅτι 
b 24 ποσὸν A? et fort. Al.: ποσὸν καὶ ἣ ποσὸν EY Asc. et fecit J 
26 στιγμή. τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ (διαιρετὸν) Jaeger 31 δὲ om. AP ἐστιν 


Ε]Γ Αβο. : om. AP 33 μὲν οὖν ὧν AP εἷς EJT Α].9 Αϑ8ς.Ο: 
om. A> 35 δὲ A> Asc.c: δὴ EJT 36 ὅσα alt. ] 6 AY 1017 
2 δὲ] δὲ & EJ Asc. 6 λέγονται recc. 8 μουσικὸς E 9 τὸν 
alt.] τὸ Al. 10 λέγεται E ὡσπερεὶ A et ut vid. Al.: ὥσπερ 
EJ© Asc.° 12 rade E? τόδε om, E? 13 τῷδε τόδε EJ Asc.: 
τόδε τῷδε AUT 14 yap AP ΑἹ. : om. EJT 5... λέγομεν J 15 
τὸν λευκὸν] λευκὸν τὸν EJ 


b 
σι 


30 


σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


y a ~ fal ᾿ Ὁ} 
ἄμφω τῷ αὐτῷ συμβεβήκασι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε, 
/ 
τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅτι τούτῳ TO μουσικὸν συμβέ- 
“ S / τὰ \ Ν, \ > Ψ Ἔ 
βηκεν (οὕτω δὲ λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι, ὅτι ᾧ 
i? 5 las x SS Ν μεν ὮΝ \ 
συμβέβηκεν, ἐκεῖνο ἔστι») ---τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς 
μὴ 4 / δ , a > ΝΣ » A 

20 εἶναι λεγόμενα οὕτω λέγεται ἢ διότι τῷ αὐτῷ ὄντι ἄμφω 
Ἐς ἐγ δ “, Y 3 , cea: Xe 3. Ὡν yo τὰ 
ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι ὄντι ἐκείνῳ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅτι αὐτὸ ἔστιν ᾧ 
ε / μὰ che AN lal 2 SN ᾿ς bn Ie 
ὑπάρχει οὗ αὐτὸ κατηγορεῖται: καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δὲ εἶναι λέγεται 
ὅσαπερ σημαίνει τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας" ὁσαχῶς 
γὰρ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει. ἐπεὶ οὖν τῶν 

25 κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει, τὰ δὲ ποιόν, τὰ δὲ 

, Ν Ν , BS Ν tal δ , Ν, Ν , 
ποσόν, τὰ δὲ πρός TL, TA δὲ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, TA δὲ πού, 
Ν, Ἂν / € / , x ων ee ig AN 
τὰ δὲ ποτέ, ἑκάστῳ τούτων TO εἶναι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει" οὐθὲν 

BS ,ὔ Sey ς 7 ΕΣ Ν x ee A 
yap διαφέρει TO ἄνθρωπος ὑγιαίνων ἐστὶν ἢ TO ἄνθρωπος 
ξ y IO’ NSS: te 5) \ XN , ~ τὰν, 
ὑγιαίνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνθρωπος βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἢ τέμνων τοῦ ἄν- 
δ “ 

30 θρωπος βαδίζει ἢ τέμνει, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 
yw N i) 7 \ Sy “ 2 / \ Ν Ἂς > 
ἔτι TO εἶναι σημαίνει Kal TO ἔστιν OTL ἀληθές, TO δὲ μὴ εἶναι 
ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ ψεῦδος, ὁμοίως ἐπὶ καταφάσεως καὶ 
5 / Φ [τ ot τ if , 4 5 Ν 
ἀποφάσεως, οἷον OTL ἐστι Σωκράτης μουσικός, ὅτι ἀληθὲς 

a WN No Ν Vv / > , “ 5 i A 3 > 
τοῦτο, ἢ OTL ἔστι Σωκράτης ov λευκός, OTL ἀληθές' τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ 

yA € / » “ ca) ox \ a 
35 ἔστιν ἢ διάμετρος σύμμετρος, OTL ψεῦδος. ἔτι TO εἶναι ση- 
b , \ ies \ Ν , ε \ \ 14 , 
1017» paiver καὶ TO ὃν TO μὲν δυνάμει ῥητὸν τὸ ὃ ἐντελεχείᾳ 

lat lé a a 

TOV εἰρημένων τούτων' ὁρῶν τε yap εἶναί φαμεν Kal τὸ bv- 

/ € lal Ν \ 5 4 Ν Ν 3 / 
νάμει ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ, καὶ [ro] ἐπίστασθαι 

/ a fol 

ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ δυνάμενον χρῆσθαι τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ 

5 χρώμενον, καὶ ἠρεμοῦν καὶ ᾧ ἤδη ὑπάρχει ἠρεμία καὶ 
δ al a a 
τὸ δυνάμενον ἠρεμεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν" Kal 
\ « a“ y] n / Ν > \ \ ef nN 
yap Ἑρμῆν ἐν τῷ λίθῳ φαμὲν εἶναι, Kal TO ἥμισυ τῆς 
γραμμῆς, καὶ σῖτον τὸν μήπω ἁδρόν, πότε δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ 

, » 3 " / 
πότε οὔπω, ἐν ἄλλοις διοριστέον. 

216 αὐτῷ EJ Al. Asc.°: αὐτῷ ὄντι APT τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε ἘΠῚ 
Αδβο.ὃ: συμβέβηκε τῷ ὄντι AP 17 τὸ δὲ... συμβέβηκεν EJT ΑΙ. 
Asc. : om, AP 18 μὴ A> Al. Asc.: om. EJT 19 ἐκεῖνο AP Al.e 


Asc.° et fecit E: ἐκεῖνος JT 20 ἄμφω ὄντι AP 21 ἐκείνῳ 
EJ Asc. : ἐκεῖνο AYT 28 ἔστιν Christ ἢ τὸ EJT Asc.°: 
om. AP 29 οὐδὲ] ἢ EJT Asc, ἔστιν Christ 29-30 ἄν- 
θρωπον βαδίζειν ἢ τέμνειν ἘΠῚ 35 σύμμετρος Al. Bonitz: ἀσύμ- 
μετρος codd, I 1 ὃν] ὃν καὶ AP; ὄν, τὸ ὃν J ῥητὸν δυνάμει 
A>; δυνάμει yp. E Al. Asc. : γρ: ῥητὸν E Al, Asc. 2 ὁρῶντες yap 
φαμεν εἶναι AP 3 ὁρῶν AP Al, Asc.: ῥητῶς ὁρῶν EJT τὸ om. 
ut vid, Al., 560]. Bonitz 5 καὶ pr.| καὶ τὸ EJ Asc, ἤδη] δὴ AP 
τῆς] τῆ AP 


Ἢ. 1017816 — g. 101885 
8 Ovdcia λέγεται τά τε ἁπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον γῆ Kal πῦρ 
Ν “ \ “ na \ “ Ν \ Ἂς 
καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅλως σώματα καὶ τὰ 
ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα ζῷά τε καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ μόρια 
’, ef Ὁ fay 7 i =e o > 37 ξ 
τούτων" ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα λέγεται οὐσία OTL οὐ καθ᾽ UTOKEL- 
μένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα. ἄλλον δὲ 
τρόπον ὃ ἃν ἧ αἴτιον τοῦ εἷναι, ἐνυπάρχον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις 15 
ὅσα μὴ λέγεται καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου, οἷον ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ ζῴῳ 
μη γ μ ᾽ ] xX” τ ἜΤΟΣ 
ΝΜ re a 
ἔτι ὅσα μόρια ἐνυπάρχοντά ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁρίζοντά 
τε καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνοντα, ὧν ἀναιρουμένων ἀναιρεῖται τὸ 
“ Ὸ 2 )ὔ fa) “ Δ \ pay 2 
ὅλον, οἷον ἐπιπέδου σῶμα, ws φασί τινες, καὶ ἐπίπεδον 
γραμμῆς" καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς δοκεῖ εἶναί τισι τοιοῦτος 20 
> / > > Ν > ἊΝ ες ,ὔ Α x \ , 
(ἀναιρουμένου τε yap οὐδὲν εἶναι, καὶ ὁρίζειν πάντα)" ἔτι τὸ τί 
ἣν εἶναι, οὗ 6 λόγος ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἑκάστου. 
/ Ἂς: eS A / δὸς > 4 2 ΄ 3 
συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι, τό θ 
ε 7 7 a / 2 BA / \ A 
ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, Ὁ μήκέτι κατ ἄλλου λέγεται, καὶ ὃ 
x δ 9 nan 
ἂν τόδε τι Ov Kal χωριστὸν 3)" τοιοῦτον δὲ ἑκάστου 7) μορφὴ 25 
καὶ τὸ εἶδος. 
9 Ταὐτὰ λέγεται τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ 
\ \ \ \ τ 5. τὰ “ “- Sires Ὁ 
λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκε, 
καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μουσικὸν ὅτι θάτερον θατέρῳ συμβέβηκεν 
ρ μ ρ ρῳ συμβέβηκεν, 
τὸ δὲ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπος ὅτι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκεν" ἑκα- 30 
μ I : evn μβεβη 3 
τέρῳ δὲ τοῦτο Kal τούτῳ ἑκάτερον ἐκείνων, Kal yap τῷ av- 
θρώπῳ τῷ μουσικῷ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ταὐτὸ 
λέγεται, καὶ τούτοις ἐκεῖνο (διὸ καὶ πάντα ταῦτα καθόλου 
+ / > ἃς 2 Ν ᾿] las “ o Υ̓ ΘΡῈΞ ΜΝ 
οὐ λέγεται: οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ταὐτὸ 
ἣν Ἂς ’ Ἂς > / 2 ἘΣ πὰς ¢ / Ἂς Ξ 
καὶ τὸ μουσικόν: τὰ γὰρ καθόλου καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχει, τὰ 35 
δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτά" ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα 10184 
«ς lal / > Ν Ν lal Nv / 3 Sy vi 
ἁπλῶς λέγεται: ταὐτὸ yap δοκεῖ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης 
Ἂν» , \ Sy , > Cys a \ > ἊΝ 
εἶναι μουσικός" τὸ δὲ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν, διὸ οὐ πᾶς 
τ , 4 “ - + 6 . \ ἊΝ Ν [4 
Σωκράτης λέγεται ὥσπερ πᾶς ἄνθρωπο») ---καὶ τὰ μὲν οὕτως 
, ΨΥ Ν Ν 5 CEST Re a \ Ww LA ine 
λέγεται ταὐτά, τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὁσαχῶσπερ Kal TO ἕν᾽ καὶ 5 
Ὁ 16 τῶν ζῴων AP Asc. et αἱ vid ΑΙ. ; τοῦ (dou Τ' 17 ἐνυπάρχοντά 
... τοιούτοις EJ Al. Α5ς, : ἔστιν AP 18 τε EJT ΑἹ, ; om. A> 
22 ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός EJT: λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός ut vid. Al. 
23 κατὰ EJT Αϑς.ὃ : om. AP 25 ἢ ἘΠΤ Al.: τοιοῦτον ἦ AP 
τοιοῦτον EJT Al.e: τοῦτο AP 27 ταὐτὰ δὲ λέγεται JT Al.) Asc 
~ ua a ao ‘ A ‘ ΄ 
30 τὸ... συμβέβηκεν οῃη. E ὅτι] ὅτι τὸ μουσικὸν JT 31 καὶ τούτων 
AYJD ἐκείνῳ APT 32 τῷ] καὶ τῷ A> καὶ ὁ] τὸ AP 35 τὸ 
om. EJ 1018* 3 δὲ] yap EJ Al. Asc. 4 καὶ εἴ 5 τὰ om. AP 


5 ὁσαχῶσπερ ex Al. ci. Jaeger: ὅσα ὥσπερ EJ: ὥσπερ A? Asc. 
τὸ EJ ΑΙ. ; om. AP Asc.° 


10 


20 


25 


20 


35 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A 


Ν Cl a “ , Ων Ν δ , na “ρας / \ 
yap ὧν ἡ ὕλη pia ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὰ λέγεται καὶ 
ὧν ἡ οὐσία μία, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ ταυτότης ἑνότης τίς ἐστιν 
xX a x fol δ 
ἢ πλειόνων τοῦ εἶναι ἢ ὅταν χρῆται ὡς πλείοσιν, οἷον ὅταν 

Ψ; ΘΝ δ’. ας > ΑΝ ς \ Ν, “ 9. A . 
λέγῃ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ταὐτόν᾽ ὡς δυσὶ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῷ.----ἕτερα 

, e x Ν ΩΝ δ Ὁ a 
δὲ λέγεται ὧν ἢ τὰ εἴδη πλείω ἢ ἡ ὕλη ἢ ὁ λόγος τῆς 
n a td 
οὐσίας" καὶ ὅλως ἀντικειμένως TH ταὐτῷ λέγεται TO ἕτερον. 
/ / Ie, / Ν 
Διάφορα δὲ λέγεται ὅσ᾽ ἕτερά ἐστι τὸ αὐτό τι ὄντα, μὴ 

Ἷ ? “ > 2) ae BS / μὴ > 7 y we 

μόνον ἀριθμῷ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ: ἔτι ὧν 
, a 
ἕτερον TO γένος, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ ὅσα ἔχει ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ 

Ν. / / Ν 
τὴν ἑτερότητα. ὅμοια λέγεται τά τε πάντῃ ταὐτὸ πεπον- 

x / 

Oora, καὶ τὰ πλείω ταὐτὰ πεπονθότα ἢ ἕτερα, Kal ὧν ἡ 
, la \ 9. 5" “ 2 / lal bp 
ποιότης μία' καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐναν- 

Ων 
τίων, τούτων τὸ πλείω ἔχον ἢ κυριώτερα ὅμοιον τούτῳ. ἀντι- 
κειμένως δὲ τοῖς ὁμοίοις τὰ ἀνόμοια. 
> 7 / > 7 \ 5 7 Ν Ν 
Αντικείμενα λέγεται ἀντίφασις καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ 
, \ ¥ ‘ ec Ν > e , » 
πρός TL καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἕξις καὶ ἐξ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα 

€ td \ 7 ‘ WA Ν > / y, 
ai γενέσεις καὶ φθοραί Kat ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα 
παρεῖναι τῷ ἀμφοῖν δεκτικῷ, ταῦτα ἀντικεῖσθαι λέγεται 
x (eS x 5» e Ν / \ Ν, Ν Ν εἰ a 
ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστίν. φαιὸν γὰρ καὶ λευκὸν ἅμα τῷ 

Cs ᾽ ς . 8) Ὄ BI 5 > / b] -. / 
αὐτῷ οὐχ ὑπάρχει διὸ ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν ἀντίκειται. ἐναντία λέ- 

/ Ν, e “ fal lal na 

yerat τά τε μὴ δυνατὰ ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ παρεῖναι τῶν δια- 

/ lal an 
φερόντων κατὰ γένος, Kal τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν 
τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ 
lal Ἂς. lal lal \ My ‘ 
δεκτικῷ, Kal τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ὑπὸ THY αὐτὴν 

e . x n x 
δύναμιν, Kal ὧν ἡ διαφορὰ μεγίστη ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ κατὰ 

/ “Ὁ > ® Ν ΕΣ ” 9 / / Ν Ν 
γένος ἢ Kat εἶδος. τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ἐναντία λέγεται τὰ μὲν 

na nN Ν fal lal 
τῷ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ τῷ δεκτικὰ εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, 

an Ων n x fal 
τὰ δὲ TH ποιητικὰ ἢ παθητικὰ εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, ἢ ποιοῦν - 
x Ων Ων / Ων ε δ 
τα ἢ πάσχοντα, ἢ ἀποβολαὶ ἢ λήψεις, ἢ ἕξεις ἢ στερή- 
> lal ,ὔ > \ Ν ν»ὰ Ν οὗ μὴ lal 
σεις εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δὲ TO ἕν καὶ TO ὃν πολλαχῶς 

, > ca) 5 / \ Lo “ Ν a 
λέγεται, ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη Kal TdAAa ὅσα κατὰ ταῦτα 
λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, 
“ 3 = e bie} / / el Ν a 
ὥστ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον Kal ἑκάστην Katy yoplay.—é€repa δὲ τῷ εἴδει 

ἃ 8 ἢ pr. EJP Asc.c:om., AP ὡς πλείοσιν EJT Α1].9 Α58ς.ὃ : om. AP 
9 αὑτῷ] αὐτῷ A: αὗτο fecit E 12 δὲ EJT Ascl¢: om. AP μὴ 
AY Asc.e: καὶ μὴ EJ 15 πάντῃ AY Al.: om. EJT Asc. 16 ταὐτὰ 
Al.ia: ταὐτὸ codd.% 22 αἱ AP ΑἹ, : οἷον ai EJT Asc. 25 ἀντί- 


κειται] ἀντίκειται τούτοις ET 28 τῶν] τῷ EY 32 τῷ ταῦτα 
ἔχειν AP 35 τῶν τοιούτων] τούτων AP 


10 


9. 101886 — I1. 1018 31 


, a y b 
λέγεται ὅσα τε ταὐτοῦ γένους ὄντα μὴ ὑπάλληλά ἐστι, καὶ 1018 
id 2) a > an / + ἊΣ BA \ “ 5 lel 
ὅσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ὄντα διαφορὰν ἔχει, Kal ὅσα ev TH 

« ι ι 
3. 2 5) δ, ν Ν Ν ΕῚ 14 ef lat » > , 
οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει: καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα TH εἴδει ἀλλή- 
δ Ων ~ 
λων ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ λεγόμενα πρώτως, Kal ὅσων ἐν τῷ 
7 lay / » € 4 ef Ἣν bh 
τελευταίῳ Tod γένους εἴδει of λόγοι ἕτεροι (οἷον ἄνθρωπος 5 
Ων e x nan / c Ν , ed be) \ 
καὶ ἵππος ἄτομα τῷ γένει of δὲ λόγοι ἕτεροι αὐτῶν), καὶ 
“ 5 a 5 τῶν σις 4 » ya fe oe aN Ν lat 
ὅσα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα ἔχει διαφοράν. ταὐτὰ δὲ τῷ 
t t c t 
if 
εἴδει τὰ ἀντικειμένως λεγόμενα τούτοις. 
, \ “ δ » 7, ε » \ 
11 Πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα λέγεται ἔνια μέν, ὡς ὄντος τινὸς 
os / a cy cr 
πρώτου καὶ ἀρχῆς ev ἑκάστῳ γένει, τῷ ἐγγύτερον (εἶναι) ἀρχῆς 
\ x a r a n 
τινὸς ὡρισμένης ἢ ἁπλῶς Kal τῇ φύσει ἢ πρός TL ἢ ποὺ 
ΕἾ δ : mR \ 
ἢ ὑπό τινων, οἷον τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον τῷ εἶναι ἐγγύτερον ἢ 
ι 
A e an xX an , 
φύσει τινὸς τόπου ὡρισμένου (οἷον τοῦ μέσου ἢ τοῦ ἐσχάτου) 
a Ν Ἂς: 
ἢ πρὸς τὸ τυχόν, τὸ δὲ πορρώτερον ὕστερον" τὰ δὲ κατὰ 
χρόνον (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῷ πορρώτερον τοῦ νῦν, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν 
Ip al “. an na 
γενομένων, πρότερον yap τὰ Tpwika τῶν Μηδικῶν ὅτι πορ- 
ρώτερον ἀπέχει τοῦ νῦν: τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ νῦν, οἷον 
Show a , , x / / “ 9 
ἐπὶ τῶν μελλόντων, πρότερον yap Νέμεα [Πυθίων ὅτι ἐγ- 
4 fal fel lal an rn / 
γύτερον τοῦ viv τῷ viv ὡς ἀρχῇ Kal πρώτῳ χρησαμένων)" τὰ 
an / 
δὲ κατὰ κίνησιν (τὸ yap ἐγγύτερον τοῦ πρώτου κινήσαντος 2° 
, : a > Pte > Ν Ν \ o « n 
πρότερον, οἷον παῖς ἀνδρός" ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ αὕτη τις ἁπλῶς)" 
\ a 
τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν (τὸ yap ὑπερέχον TH δυνάμει πρότερον, 
καὶ τὸ δυνατώτερον" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐστὶν οὗ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν 


- 


ο 


- 
i> 


2. ᾿ 9 “ / \ Nia ne? “ Ν a , 
ἀνάγκη ἀκολουθεῖν θάτερον. καὶ τὸ ὕστερον, ὥστε μὴ κινοῦντός 
τε ἐκείνου μὴ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινοῦντος κινεῖσθαι ἡ δὲ προαί- 2 
3 / XN Ἂς Ν 7 ny > > \ 4 , 
ρεσις ἀρχή)" τὰ δὲ κατὰ τάξιν (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅσα πρός 
τι ἕν ὡρισμένον διέστηκε κατά τινα λόγον, οἷον παραστάτης 
τριτοστάτου πρότερον καὶ παρανήτη νήτης" ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ 
lal Ν ἊΝ ς If rd WA na Ν μ᾿ " 
κορυφαῖος ἔνθα δὲ ἡ μέση ἀρχή)"--ταῦτα μὲν οὖν πρότερα 
a , \ , " Ν , \ a , 30 
τοῦτον λέγεται TOV τρόπον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον TO TH γνώσει 
, c Nie an , / Ss Ν DS 
πρότερον ὡς Kal ἁπλῶς πρότερον. τούτων δὲ ἄλλως τὰ κατὰ 


σι 


by ἐστι] τέ ἐστι AP 4 ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ... 5 εἴδει] an ὄντων 
τελευταίων... εἰδῶν ἢ 7 ταῦτα J 9 πρότερα AP Asc.!: τὰ 
πρότερα ἘΠ 10 γένει EJT Α].9 Asc. 5110]. : om. AP τῷ Al, 
Bonitz: τὸ codd. Γ' Asc. Simpl.°: εἶναι addidi: post τῷ add. Jaeger 
15 τῷ] τὸ AP πορρώτερον AP Simpl.°: πορρωτέρω EJ Asc.° 
16 πρότερα recc. Τ' Asc. 17 ἐγγυτέρω recc. 19 τῷ νῦν OM, 
recc. χρησάμενοι AP 20 τὸ EJT Asc. Simpl.¢: τὰ A? Al. 27 
twa ex Al. ci. Jaeger: τὸν codd. © Asc.¢ 28 καὶ] καὶ ἡ EJ 


31 
καὶ] i) yp. E? 


35 


I01g9* 


Io 


15 


20 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Δ 


\ , \ Ν bs Ν ν Ν Ν Ν \ 
Tov λόγον Kal τὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. κατὰ μὲν yap τὸν 
> 
λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ 
οἱ a τ 
ἕκαστα' καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον δὲ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦ ὅλου 
fol n > 
πρότερον, οἷον TO μουσικὸν τοῦ μουσικοῦ ἀνθρώπου ov yap 
μὲ ς ἐ iv BA a / oe > 5 / 
ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὅλος ἄνευ τοῦ μέρους" καίτοι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται 
a / 
μουσικὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντος μουσικοῦ τινός. ἔτι πρότερα λέγε- 
ται τὰ τῶν προτέρων πάθη, οἷον εὐθύτης λειότητος" τὸ μὲν 
x “ > caw / BS Ν pb} Ψ Ν 
γὰρ γραμμῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πάθος τὸ δὲ ἐπιφανείας. τὰ 
Ν 3S 4 / , ΔΝ Ν Ν Ν , 
μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν 
\ Chay 2 “ > yy > BY ἡ > - Ἀπ ΥΨ 
καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ 
1) , i Ἣν ἐᾷ > ’ i 5 Ν Ν Ν Ν᾿ 
ἐκείνων μή" ἡ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο [ἰλάτων. (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ εἶναι 
lal an \ / & «ες 
πολλαχῶς, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρότερον, διὸ 7H 
Ν 3 
οὐσία πρότερον, ἔπειτα ἄλλως τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατ᾽ 
ἐντελέχειαν" τὰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ δύναμιν πρότερά ἐστι τὰ 
δὲ κατὰ ἐντελέχειαν, οἷον κατὰ δύναμωῳ μὲν ἡ ἡμίσεια 
τῆς ὅλης καὶ τὸ pepe τοῦ ὅλου Kal ἡ ὕλη ΤῊΣ οὐσίας, κατ᾽ 
ἐντελέχειαν δ᾽ ὕστερον: διαλυθέντος γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐντελέχειαν 
ἔσται.) τρόπον δή τινα πάντα τὰ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον λεγό- 
a / 
μενα κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεται" τὰ μὲν yap κατὰ γένεσιν ἐνδέχεται 
ἄνευ τῶν ἑτέρων εἶναι, οἷον τὸ ὅλον τῶν μορίων, τὰ δὲ κατὰ 
, e \ , ὩΣ ΚΙ { / Ν Ν > 
φθοράν, οἷον τὸ μόριον τοῦ ὅλους. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal τᾶλλα. 
, , ς Ν > Ν / x “- 
Δύναμις λέγεται ἣ μὲν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἢ μεταβολῆς 
259 ἘΣ ὩΣ ef e € 5) \ » Y ity} ἃ > 
ἡ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ 7) ἕτερον, οἷον 7) οἰκοδομικὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἣ οὐχ 
€ / I) n Bp) / b) 3 \3 ᾿] Ἂς 7 Ψ 
ὑπάρχει ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δύναμις οὖσα 
ὑπάρχοι av ἐν τῷ ἰατρευομένῳ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ 7 ἰατρευόμενος. 
ε Ν μὴ “ rs \ fal x ’ / / 
7 μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἢ κινήσεως λέγεται δύνα- 
> ir€ x @ eo ἡ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέ δ © of ( θ᾽ ἣν 
μις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ 7) ἕτερον, ἣ δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ ἡ ἕτερον (καθ᾽ ἣ 
γὰρ τὸ πάσχον πάσχει τι, ὁτὲ μὲν ἐὰν ὁτιοῦν, δυνατὸν αὐτό 
ω lad (eS } > Ἂς - / 9 Bet oN 
φαμεν εἶναι παθεῖν, ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ πᾶν πάθος ἀλλ᾽ ay ἐπὶ 
\ / \ ν ς a n n> > - x ὃς ΄ 
τὸ βέλτιον)" ἔτι ἢ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ᾽ ἐπιτελεῖν ἢ κατὰ προαί- 
Ny 
pew: ἐνίοτε yap τοὺς μόνον ἂν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ 


b 32 τὰ sup. lin. E 10199 4 ἐχρήσατο APT Asc. Simpl.°: ἐχρῆτο 
EJ 7 Tapev... 8 ἐντελέχειαν ΕἸΡ Asc.°: om, AP Simpl. © grat 


kat ro AP 11 ἔσται καὶ τρόπον AP 12 ταὐτὰ Bullinger 

16 7 AP Asc.: 7 EJY 7 ἘΠῚ Al.:om. AP Asc. 9 om, ADP iE 
19 ὅλως] οὕτως Jaeger 20 70m. A> Asc. A] ἧι Ε] ἢ om. APT 

Asc. καθ᾽... 23 βέλτιον post 26 πάσχειν transponenda ci. Christ 

21 μὲν οὖν ἐὰν fort, Al. δυνατὸν .. +22 εἶναι] παθεῖν ἢ δυνατόν φαμεν 

κα > , 

εἶναι αὐτό EjJr δυνατὸν] τὸ δυνατὸν AP; δυνατὸν δυνατὸν yp. E 23 


ἡ 1ΔὉ Al. Asc. ; ἢ ET 


11. 1018) 32 — 12, 1orgh 17 


a nN 

καλῶς δὲ ἢ μὴ ὡς προείλοντο, οὔ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν 

“Ὁ a 

ἢ βαδίζειν" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. ἔτι ὅσαι ἕξεις 

a Xx δ 

καθ᾽ ἃς ἀπαθῆ ὅλως ἢ ἀμετάβλητα ἢ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἐπὶ τὸ 

χεῖρον εὐμετακίνητα, δυνάμεις λέγονται: κλᾶται μὲν γὰρ 
Ν Ν / Ne 7, > “ 

καὶ συντρίβεται καὶ κάμπτεται καὶ ὅλως φθείρεται οὐ τῷ 

δύνασθαι ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι καὶ ἐλλείπειν τινός" 


& 


3 a Ν “ ihe / ὡς Ἄ / / Ἂς / 
ἀπαθῆ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἃ μόλις Kal ἠρέμα πάσχει διὰ δύ- 
ναμιν καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν πώ λεγομένης δὲ 
μ ἢ ῷ ἔχειν πώς. γομένης δὲ 
τῆς δυνάμεως τοσαυταχῶς, καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον 
iD NE Ν / > τς δ a \ Ν 
λεχθήσεται. τὸ ἔχον κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἢ μεταβολῆς (καὶ γὰρ 
Ν Ν , b | c / DN A eh ee 3 SN By 
τὸ στατικὸν δυνατόν τι) ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἢ ἣ ἕτερον, Eva δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ 
> ~ ἡ / 4 ef 3, IN yo L 
TL αὐτοῦ ἄλλο δύναμιν τοιαύτην, ἕνα δ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχῃ μεταβάλ- 
Lew ἐφ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δύναμιν, εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἴτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλ- 
AN Ν Ν , lal \ 4. ,ὔ 
τιον (καὶ γὰρ τὸ φθειρόμενον δοκεῖ δυνατὸν εἶναι φθείρε- 
δ > Ὁ a 59) Paws ca) Se x 
σθαι, ἢ οὐκ av φθαρῆναι εἰ ἣν ἀδύνατον" viv δὲ ἔχει τινὰ 
/ \ ere ‘ >) Ν. a ee / NS Ν 
διάθεσιν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους" ὁτὲ μὲν 
δὴ τῷ ἔχειν τι δοκεῖ, ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ ἐστερῆσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι" εἰ 
ὃ᾽ i στέ 7 ἐσ: ἕξ ’ cat Ν ΩΝ Υ 
Ἷ ρησίς ἐστιν ἕξις πως, πάντα τῷ ἔχειν ἂν εἴη τι, 
᾿] ἊΝ Ἂς ef an Υ̓ e Ν Ν »} ἧς 5 
[εἰ δὲ μὴ] ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν» ἕξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀρχήν ἐστι 
Ν « / xi na 7 \ ΄ / 9.5 
δυνατὸν [ὁμωνύμως καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐν- 
δέχεται ἔχειν στέρησιν" (εἰ δὲ μή, ὁμωνύμως)" ἕνα δὲ τῷ μὴ 
Χ Χ βρη μῆ; ὁμωνὺμ Ὁ μή 
“ Xx Ne) 
ἔχειν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ ἀρχὴν ἄλλο ἢ ἣ ἄλλο φθαρτικήν. ἔτι δὲ 
n x a “ a Ἃ 
ταῦτα πάντα ἢ τῷ μόνον ἂν συμβῆναι γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ γενέ- 
σθαι, ἢ τῷ καλῶς. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἔνεστιν ἣ τοιαύτ 
» ἢ τῷ . γὰρ x ἡ τοιαύτη 
N Ὄ a XX 
δύναμις, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ὀργάνοις" THY μὲν yap δύνασθαί φασι 
φθέγγεσθαι λύραν, τὴν δ᾽ οὐδέν, ἂν 7 μὴ εὔφωνος. ἀδυνα- 
μία δὲ ἐστὶ στέρησις δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς 
“ ¥ δ “ δ an Ὁ ΕΣ XN \ “ 
οἵα εἴρηται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ τῷ πεφυκότι ἔχειν, ἢ καὶ ὅτε 


225 προείλαντο AP 30 κἂν AP 31 ἃ Asc. et fecit E: ἂν 
711 μόγις AP Asc.e πάσχῃ AP 32 TO... 70 Jaeger: 
ro... τὸ codd. Asc. 35 ἡ ἘΠῚ Al.: om. AP ba εἰ εἰ μὴ ἢν 
δυνατόν AP 6 τὸ... τὸ YeCc. 7 ἕξις EJT Al. Α5ς.9 : om. AP 


8 ὥστε +++10 ὁμωνύμως ex Al. orton : idem ci. Christ, nisi quod εἰ 
δὲ μή, ὁμωνύμως ante ὥστε, non post στέρησιν scripsit : εἰ δὲ μὴ τῷ 
ἔχειν ἕξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀρχήν ἐστι δυνατὸν ὁμωνύμως, ὥστε τῷ τε ἔχειν τὴν 
τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἢ ἔχειν στέρησιν AP; ὁμωνύμως δὲ λεγό- 
μενον (λέγομεν. Yr) τὸ ὄν, ὥστε τῷ (τῴ τε ASC. γέ ἔχειν ἕξιν τινὰ καὶ ἀρχήν 
ἐστι δυνατὸν καὶ τῷ ἔχειν τὴν τούτου στέρησιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν στέρησιν 


ΕἸΤΡ et ut vid. Asc. 11 ἄλλο ex Al. scr. Bonitz: ἄλλῳ A QD: 
ἐν ἄλλῳ EJ ἢ om. A Asc. 13 καλοῖς ΑΡ ἔνεστιν ex ἕν 
ἐστιν fecit E 14 φασι δύνασθαι A» 16 ἀρχῆς AP Al: Ξ ἀρχῆς 


ἄρσις tis EJ: ἀρχῆς ἄρνησις Asc.° 17 ὅτε EJT Asc.®; ὅτι AP 


25 


320 


TOIg) 


σι 


-- 


ο 


20 


τὸ 
ve 


~ 


30 


09 


T0208 


σι 


Ιο 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


πέφυκεν ἤδη ἔχειν" οὐ yap ὁμοίως ἂν φαῖεν ἀδύνατον εἷναι 
Tad vas ΝΟ Ν Ν =) a 4 Ν 1 ant 3 7, 
γεννᾶν παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ εὐνοῦχον. ἔτι δὲ καθ΄ ἑκατέραν 
/ a > 4 > / lal , a 
δύναμιν ἔστιν ἀδυναμία ἀντικειμένη, TH TE μόνον κινητικῇ 
καὶ τῇ καλῶς κινητικῆ. καὶ ἀδύνατα δὴ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν 
fl γτικῇ. ) τὰ ἢ τὴ 
4 / ΝΜ , A 
ἀδυναμίαν ταύτην λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον, οἷον dv- 
4 \ 2Q 7. b) ΄, Ν Φ \ 3 / ΡῚ 
νατόν τε καὶ ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατον μὲν οὗ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐξ 
5" / 5 7 @ x Ν / / > 
ἀνάγκης ἀληθές (οἷον τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι 
Oo 7, 4 a \ a Kal sy a) 7 > id > 
ἀδύνατον ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ τοιοῦτον οὗ TO ἐναντίον οὐ μόνον ἀλη- 
\ " Ἂν ν᾿ 2 / > / ω Ἂς " / 
θὲς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη [ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι]; τὸ ἄρα σύμμε- 
Tpov οὐ μόνον ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος)" τὸ δ᾽ 
ἐναντίον τούτῳ, τὸ δυνατόν, ὅταν μὴ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ ἐναν- 
τίον ψεῦδος εἶναι, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἄνθρωπον δυνατόν" οὐ 
γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ καθῆσθαι ψεῦδος. τὸ μὲν οὖν δυνα- 
\ e ἃς , Ὁ ν Ν ~ 5 5 ’ fa) 
τὸν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, TO μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης Wed- 
dos σημαίνει, ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἀληθές [εἶναι], ἕνα δὲ τὸ ἐνδεχό- 
5 Ν ἊΝ Ν Ν Ν ε ΡῚ 7 
μενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι. κατὰ μεταφορὰν δὲ ἡ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ 
λέγεται δύναμις. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατὰ οὐ κατὰ δύνα- 
Ν Ν , SS ΄ , / \ 
μιν' τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα κατὰ δύναμιν πάντα λέγεται πρὸς 
τὴν πρώτην ἱμίαν»]: αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ 
ἢ ἣ ἄλλο. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα λέ δυνατὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔ 
ἢ . yap a λέγεται δυνατὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔχειν 
ἈΝ DA / / Ν Ν Ν ν > Ὧν 
αὐτῶν ἄλλο τι τοιαύτην δύναμιν τὰ δὲ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ δὲ 
ε if « / Ἂς Ν Ἂς - / ve «- / ω 
ὡδὲ ἔχειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα. ὥστε ὁ κύριος ὅρος 
Lal , [ x ν εἰ Ν Ν 5 LA 
τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως ἂν εἴη ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ 
\ eH 
7) ἢ) ἀλλο. 
Ποσὸν λέγεται τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἐνυπάρχοντα ὧν ἑκά- 
N A nn a 
τερον ἢ ἕκαστον ἕν τι καὶ τόδε TL πέφυκεν εἶναι. πλῆθος 
Ν » / 2“ 5 \ > , Ἂς x \ 
μὲν οὖν ποσόν TL ἐὰν ἀριθμητὸν 7, μέγεθος δὲ ἂν μετρητὸν 
ἢ. λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνά ἰς μὴ 
ἢ. γ ἦθος μ ρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συν- 
“ / » a a 
ex}, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ" μεγέθους δὲ TO μὲν ἐφ᾽ ev 


"18 φαμεν AP: φαῖμεν Bekker 19 καὶ 411. ΑΓ Al, Asc. : ὉΠ]. 
ΕΠ εὐνουχίαν J γρ. ἘΞ ἑτέραν ΒΕ] 20 δύναμιν EJ Asc.® ; τὴν δύναμιν 
21 δὲ ΒΤ ΞΟ 22 οἷον om. ut vid. Al., 560]. Christ 
25 οὗ] καὶ οὐ E 26 ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι seclusi 28 τὸ fort. om. 
Al., omittendum ci. Bonitz 70m. A» 32 εἶναι seclusi : habent 
codd. © Al. Asc.¢ 33 εἶναι E Al.: ἤδη JAT Asc, ev AP Al. : 
ev τῇ EJ Asc.® 34 τὰ EJ Asc.¢: om, ΑΡ 102071 πρώτην 
μίαν] πρώτην Al. Asc.: μίαν yp. Asc. 2 ἢ om. JA*T Al. Asc. 
7 om. E} δυνατῷ τὰ μὲν a δυνατὰ τὰ μὲν τῷ TF et fort. Al. 
3 ἄλλο] ad aliud Tr μὴ] τῷ μὴ ΕΠῚ Αβς. et fort, Al. 4 τῷ ὡδὶ 
ἔπι ΑΙ. 6 # om. ΤΑΡΤ Al. 8 ἔν τε fecit E 


12, 1019 18 — 14. 10207 


συνεχὲς μῆκος τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ δύο πλάτος TO δ᾽ ἐπὶ τρία βάθος. 

4 NX “Ὁ XS XA / > Ἂν cel Ν 
τούτων δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ πεπερασμένον ἀριθμὸς μῆκος δὲ 
γραμμὴ πλάτος δὲ ἐπιφάνεια βάθος δὲ σῶμα. ἔτι τὰ 


Ν Ζ' 2 (OS / ἊΣ Ν ΝΣ / 
ἐν λέγεται καθ᾽ αὑτὰ. mood, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
vy 


_ 
em 


Ὄ € Ν Ἂς 4 > ¢ td \ Ν 
οἷον 7 μὲν γραμμὴ ποσόν τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, τὸ δὲ μουσι- 
\ ~ ΄ a Ἂς ΩΣ εἰ μον SS > 
κὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τὰ μὲν Kat 
Wau og 5 Ve e ς Ν Ὑ 2 Ν a , na 
οὐσίαν ἐστίν, οἷον ἣ γραμμὴ ποσόν τι (ἐν yap τῷ λόγῳ τῷ 
τὰ δ. , \ ’ ς Ν Ν / Nee, 
τί ἐστι λέγοντι TO ποσόν τι ὑπάρχει), TA δὲ πάθη Kal ἕξεις 
n “4 3 Χ > / ζω \ Ν \ \ 3. Ἕ ἣν 
τῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶν οὐσίας, οἷον τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον, καὶ 20 
Ν \ / \ Ἂν Ν / x Ν Ν 
μακρὸν καὶ βραχύ, καὶ πλατὺ καὶ στενόν, καὶ βαθὺ καὶ 
i) te \ \ Ν a \ Ἂς Ν ἊΝ “ 
ταπεινόν, καὶ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα. 
μὲ Ἂς \ \ 4 \ \ Ἂν Ν lal Ν 
ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν καὶ μεῖζον καὶ 
ἔλαττον, καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα λεγόμενα, τοῦ 
fal / 2 δ / / / \ > ee BA - 
ποσοῦ πάθη καθ᾽ αὑτά" μεταφέρονται μέντοι καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα 25 
a Ν Ὁ ΤΩΡ fat SS Ν Ν , 
ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα. τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγομένων 
a Ἄς ὡς Ὁ ye er ᾽ν γ᾽ cy ss Ν 
ποσῶν τὰ μὲν οὕτως λέγεται ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ὅτι τὸ μουσικὸν 
ποσὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τῷ εἶναι ποσόν τι ᾧ ὑπάρχουσι, τὰ δὲ 
a > » 
ὡς κίνησις καὶ χρόνος" καὶ yap ταῦτα πόσ᾽ ἄττα λέγεται 
καὶ συνεχῆ τῷ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετὰ εἶναι ὧν ἐστὶ ταῦτα πάθη. 30 
/ > / Τὰ / a \ Ἂν 
λέγω δὲ οὐ τὸ κινούμενον ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἐκινήθη" τῷ γὰρ ποσὸν εἶναι 
a , an - 
ἐκεῖνο καὶ ἡ κίνησις ποσή, ὁ δὲ χρόνος τῷ ταύτην. 
Ν Ἂ , ef Ν 4 € Ν a ἄν 4 
14 [To] ποιὸν λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἡ διαφορὰ τῆς οὐσίας, 
Φ . Ρ ᾿ 
οἷον ποιόν τι ἄνθρωπος ζῷον ὅτι δίπουν, ἵππος δὲ τετράπουν, 
Ν , , a “ > / « a la) 
Kal κύκλος ποιόν TL σχῆμα OTL ἀγώνιον, ws τῆς διαφορᾶς 35 
τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιότητος οὔσης"---ἕνα μὲν δὴ τρόπον τοφοῦ 
a / «ς ’ ἮΝ > 7 e Ν « Ἂς 9 ig 
τοῦτον λέγεται 7) ποιότης διαφορὰ οὐσίας, Eva δὲ ws τὰ ἀκί- 
νητα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ ποιοί τινες, 
Ἂν « te \ Ν , “δ » 3 > 4 ΄ 
olov οἱ σύνθετοι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ἕν ὄντες ἀλλ᾽ ὧν μίμημα 
ΝΣ ἡ ‘ ἐν ΄ = rd ae eek ς , NBS 
τὸ ἐπίπεδον καὶ τὸ στερεόν (οὗτοι δ᾽ εἰσὶν of ποσάκις ποσοὶ ἢ 5 
/ Δ Ν “ a Ἂς \ AY € Le 
ποσάκις ποσάκις ποσοί), καὶ ὅλως ὃ παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπάρ- 
5 a Sows ΝΟ Ν Ἐν An eh mn n a > 
χει ἐν TH οὐσίᾳ: οὐσία yap ἑκάστου ὃ ἅπαξ, οἷον τῶν ἕξ οὐχ 


815 mood APY Al.: ποσὰ ἄττα EJ Asc] 17 αὑτὸ AP Ascle 
19 ποσὸν ἐνυπάρχει ex Al. scr. Bonitz 20 roalt.om. AP καὶ] 
καὶ τὸ AP 21 καὶ πλατὺ... 22 βαρὺ JL ΑΙ. : om. E: καὶ βαθὺ καὶ 
ταπεινόν om. AP 22 τὰ alt. EJ Al.c: om. AP 23 καὶ TO 
μεῖζον recc. 25 μεταφέρονται A> Asc.°: μεταφέρεται EJ 
27 τὰ I Jaeger: τὸ codd. Asc.°¢ 30 ἀδιαίρετα [7 ταῦτα EJT Α].9 
Asc.: τὰ AP 33 τὸ omittendum ci. Bonitz ἡ διαφορὰ EJT Al. 


Asc.l¢: ai διαφοραὶ AP 34 οἷον] ὥσπερ AP Asc. Ὁ 6-- ὑπάρχει 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν fort. ΑἹ. 7 ὃ Bonitz: τὸ codd. Al. Asc. 


15 


20 


25 


35 


TO? kes 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


ὃ δὶς ἢ τρὶς εἰσὶν GAN ὃ ἅπαξ' ἐξ yap ἅπαξ ἕξ. ἔτι ὅσα 
πάθη τῶν κινουμένων οὐσιῶν, οἷον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης, 
Ν , \ / ‘ i \ , Ν᾿ 
καὶ λευκότης καὶ μελανία, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ 
“ a Sew / \ 5 a Ν / 
ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καθ᾽ ἃ λέγονται Kal ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὰ σώματα 
/ 7 > >} Ν Ἂς 4 \ “ A 
μεταβαλλόντων. ἐτι KAT ἀρετὴν Kal κακίαν Kal ὅλως TO 
Ν Nas / \ Ν s / 4 / a Xk 
κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. σχεδὸν δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους λέγοιτ᾽ av 
τὸ ποιόν, καὶ τούτων ἕνα τὸν κυριώτατον' πρώτη μὲν γὰρ 
, € “ Seay , ΄ / Noth > “ 
ποιότης ἡ τῆς οὐσίας διαφορά (ταύτης δέ τι καὶ ἣ ἐν τοῖς 
5 a , / Ν / ’ n 3 Ἄν aK ’ 
ἀριθμοῖς ποιότης μέρος" διαφορὰ yap Tis οὐσιῶν, GAA ἢ οὐ 


e 


, ΩΝ 9 Ὁ , Ἂς Ν lod / 
κινουμένων 1) οὐχ ἡ κινούμενα), τὰ δὲ πάθη τῶν κινουμένων ἢ 


΄ 


tA \S ς “ 7 / 3 X Ἂς 
κινούμενα, καὶ at τῶν κινήσεων διαφοραί. ἀρετὴ δὲ καὶ 
iy “ / , XN \ a an 
κακία τῶν παθημάτων μέρος TL διαφορὰς yap δηλοῦσι τῆς 
a ὰ a N 
κινήσεως Kal τῆς ἐνεργείας, καθ᾽ ἃς ποιοῦσιν ἢ πάσχουσι Ka- 
a Ων 7 Ν 3 / » Ν Ν Ν ««ς«"» 
λῶς ἢ φαύλως τὰ ἐν κινήσει ὄντα' τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡδὶ δυνά- 
cal \ 3 “ 5 \ \ DEEN Wye) 4 
μενον κινεῖσθαι ἢ ἐνεργεῖν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δ᾽ ὡδὶ καὶ ἐναντίως 
, / > Ἂς 5 SN \ ἧς: \ / Ν 
μοχθηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν σημαίνει τὸ 
Ni EN “ 3. if Ἂς "4 , eh tal Ν 
ποιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι 
προαίρεσιν. 
Πρός τι λέγεται τὰ μὲν ὡς διπλάσιον πρὸς ἥμισυ καὶ 
Ν , \ “ / \ 
τριπλάσιον πρὸς τριτημόριον, Kal ὅλως πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς 
πολλοστημόριον καὶ ὑπερέχον πρὸς ὑπερεχόμενον' τὰ δ᾽ ws 
τὸ θερμαντικὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμαντὸν καὶ τὸ τμητικὸν πρὸς τὸ 
΄ Ἂν “ Ν Ν Ἂς Ἂν / Ἂς > 
τμητόν, καὶ ὅλως TO ποιητικὸν πρὸς TO παθητικόν: τὰ ὃ 
ὡς τὸ μετρητὸν πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ ἐπιστητὸν πρὸς ἐπιστήμην 
Ν > Ν Ν Ν / Ss Ν Ν “ ’ 
καὶ αἰσθητὸν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. λέγεται δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κατ 
5 A Pe. “ oe / Ν > Ν δ ‘ “ ᾿ 
ἀριθμὸν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ὡρισμένως, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἢ πρὸς ἕν (οἷον 
τὸ μὲν διπλάσιον πρὸς ἕν ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος, τὸ δὲ πολλα- 
/ 9 339 \ \ ¢e > ς / Ῥ e , 
πλάσιον κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἕν, οὐχ ὡρισμένον δέ, οἷον τόνδε 
ἢ τόνδε: τὸ δὲ ἡμιόλιον πρὸς τὸ ὑφημιόλιον κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν 
πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ὡρισμένον" τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιμόριον πρὸς τὸ ὑπεπιμόριον 
x ed v4 \ / \ \ ef Ν 2 
κατὰ ἀόριστον, ὥσπερ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς τὸ ἕν" τὸ ὃ 


Ὁ 8 ἐξ οπι. AYT II a] ὅσα AP καὶ EJ Al. Asc. : om. APT 
15 τι Tet fecit E: τις A*J 18 ai EJ Al. Asc.°:; om. A> post 
διαφοραί del. yap AP 23 τὸ alt. EJ Asc.¢: om. A> 26 mpos 
τὸ ἥμισυ AP 28 ὡς] ὡς πρὸς Ab 29 τὸ pr., alt., tert.om. E 
31 καὶ] καὶ τὸ] 33 ὡρισμένως JT Al, Asc.° γρ. Ἐς: idles 
EAP αὐτὸν Asc.° 34 ὡρισμένος] ὡρισμένος πρὸς ἕν A> 
102122 δ᾽ om. A» 3 ἀόριστον J Al. Asc.°: ἀορίστου AP: ἀορίστους 


ΕΓ 


14. 10208 — 15. 1021% 32 


« / A \ € /, / Dod: ΕΣ > ψ' 
ὑπερέχον πρὸς τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον ὅλως ἀόριστον κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν" 
ς Ν 5 \ / Ν Ν / Ν > ἈΝ > 
ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς σύμμετρος, κατὰ μὴ συμμέτρου δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐ 
/ a 
λέγεται, TO δὲ ὑπερέχον πρὸς τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτόν 
/ lat 
τέ ἐστι Kal ἔτι, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀόριστον' ὁπότερον γὰρ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, 
Ε RN 9 nm δι 
ἢ ἴσον ἢ οὐκ ἴσον)" ταῦτά τε οὖν τὰ πρός τι πάντα κατ᾽ 
/ a 
ἀριθμὸν λέγεται καὶ ἀριθμοῦ πάθη, Kal ἔτι τὸ ἴσον καὶ 
“ \ ϑ τοῖς > BA / Ν Ν \ a , 
ὅμοιον καὶ ταὐτὸ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον (κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ev λέ- 
γεται πάντα, ταὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ᾽ 
@ « ,ὔ ,ὕ » Ν - Ν \ « Ἂν δι ἃ a 
Ov ἡ ποιότης pia, toa δὲ ὧν TO ποσὸν ἕν' TO δ᾽ ἕν τοῦ 
ἀριθμοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ μέτρον, ὥστε ταῦτα πάντα πρός τι 
λέγεται κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν μέν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον)" τὰ δὲ 
ποιητικὰ καὶ παθητικὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ποιητικὴν καὶ παθη- 
τικὴν καὶ ἐνεργείας τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων, οἷον τὸ θερμαντικὸν 
\ \ \ 4 if \ / ἊΝ cal 
πρὸς TO θερμαντὸν ὅτι δύναται, καὶ πάλιν τὸ θερμαῖνον 
πρὸς τὸ θερμαινόμενον καὶ τὸ τέμνον πρὸς τὸ τεμνόμενον 
« ᾿ ere, a N yg) \ ᾽ SEN Suh 3 τ 
ὡς ἐνεργοῦντα. τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀλλ 
ἕν ¢ 
ἢ ὃν τρόπον ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται" αἱ δὲ κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι 
οὐχ ὑπάρχουσιν. τῶν δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κατὰ χρόνους ἤδη 
λέγονται πρός τι οἷον τὸ πεποιηκὸς πρὸς τὸ πεποιημένον 
καὶ τὸ ποιῆσον πρὸς τὸ ποιησόμενον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πατὴρ 
CY" ΄ 4 \ Ν Ἂς \ \ Ν 7 
υἱοῦ λέγεται πατήρ' τὸ μὲν γὰρ πεποιηκὸς τὸ δὲ πεπονθός 


£ > + + Ν / / er we} 7 
τί ἐστιν. ἔτι ἔνια κατὰ στέρησιν δυνάμεως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀδύνα- | 


Nene “ / Φ Ne ΡΣ Ν Ν a 3 
τον καὶ ὅσα οὕτω λέγεται, οἷον τὸ ἀόρατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ 
ἀριθμὸν καὶ δύναμιν λεγόμενα πρός τι πάντα ἐστὶ πρός τι 

nn “ > \ + / ESS og) Bh 3 SS Ν a 
τῷ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ 6 ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ TO 
BA \ 2 “ \ Ν δὴ Ν \ 2 \ \ Ν 
ἄλλο πρὸς ἐκεῖνο' τὸ δὲ μετρητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν καὶ τὸ 

Ν a BA \ DX / 4 ld 
διανοητὸν τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι πρός TL λέγονται. 
τό τε γὰρ διανοητὸν σημαίνει ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῦ διάνοια, οὐκ 

Bi sue / \ an ἡ 2 \ / Ν \ FEN 
ἔστι δ᾽ ἣ διάνοια πρὸς τοῦτο οὗ ἐστὶ διάνοια (δὶς yap ταὐτὸν 


25 σύμμετρος ἘΠΤ Al. Asc.°: σύμμετρον AP συμμέτρου SCripsi: 
σύμμετρον codd. T Al. Asc.°: συμμέτρων Apelt . ἀριθμὸς οὐ] ἀριθμὸν 
ἘΠΤ Al. Asc.°: ἀριθμοὶ οὐ Apelt : ἀριθμῷ Zeller 6 λέγεται AP 
Al¢ Asc.°: λέγονται EJT Apelt δὲ] γὰρ EJT Al. Asc.° 8 ἢ pr. 
EJ© Alc Asc.¢ : om. AP πάντα AP Asc.!: ἅπαντα EJ 10 κατ᾽ 
ἘΠ Al. Asc.: om, AP 11 μὲν yap EJT Ale: τὸ μὲν yap ταὐτὸ AP 
ἡ om. AP Alc ὅμοια... 12 pia hic EJT Al.: post ἕν (1, 12) A> 
13 πάντα πρός τι EJT Asc.f: μὲν ta πρός τι πάντα AP 20 κατὰ 
δύναμιν E 22 πρός ἘΛΑΡΓΡ Asc.°: τὰ πρός E*J 28 αὐτὸ ὅ 
ἐστιν om. fort. Al., secl. Jaeger 29 roult. AP Asc.e: om, EJ 
30 πρός τι] τι ἃ AP 32 πρὸς τὸ οὗ E 

2573-1 H 


ΤΟ21}" 


5 


ΙΟ 


20 


τ᾽ 
σε 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


“ὃ » 3 
εἰρημένον ἃν εἴη), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τινός ἐστιν ἡ ὄψις ὄψις, οὐχ 
a a a \ 
οὗ ἐστὶν ὄψις (καίτοι γ᾽ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο εἰπεῖν) ἀλλὰ πρὸς 

a x X BA a 5 ΄ δὲ δὶ \ 2. oN 
χρῶμα ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο TL τοιοῦτον. ἐκείνως OE δὶς TO AUTO 
a N > 
λεχθήσεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν οὗ ἐστὶν 7) ὄψις. τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ 
Ἀ 
ἑαυτὰ λεγόμενα πρός τι τὰ μὲν οὕτω λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἂν τὰ 
nt n eo an ‘4 
γένη αὐτῶν ἢ τοιαῦτα, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τῶν πρός τι ὅτι TO 
lal n > 
γένος αὐτῆς ἣ ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι πρός tu "ἔτι Kad 
ὅσα τὰ ἔχοντα λέγεται πρός τι, οἷον ἰσότης ὅτι τὸ ἴσον 
‘ < /, “ A Ὁ“ Ἂν ἊΝ Ν Ὁ» 4. 
καὶ ὁμοιότης ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον: τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον 
an = 
ἅνθρωπος πρός τι ὅτι συμβέβηκεν αὐτῷ διπλασίῳ εἶναι, 
a 5.1. \ lat / x N 4 > a 9. ὡς / 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν πρός TU ἢ TO λευκόν, εἰ TH αὐτῷ συμβέ- 
΄,ὔ \ n 3 
βηκε διπλασίῳ καὶ λευκῷ εἶναι. 
Τέλειον λέγεται ἕν μὲν οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν μηδὲ 
ὸ φΦ Ἄν " 
ν μόριον (οἷον χρόνος τέλειος ἑκάστου οὗτος οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω 
n n Ν Ν 
λαβεῖν χρόνον τινὰ ὃς τούτου. μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ χρόνου), καὶ τὸ 
» 9. Ν \ Ν Φ Ν » ς \ \ \ / 
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν Kal TO εὖ μὴ ἔχον ὑπερβολὴν πρὸς TO γένος, 
φ / 5 Ἂν Ν / 3 Ν “ Ν \ i‘ 
οἷον τέλειος ἰατρὸς Kal τέλειος αὐλητὴς ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος 
τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηθὲν ἐλλείπωσιν (οὕτω δὲ μεταφέροντες 
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν λέγομεν συκοφάντην τέλειον καὶ κλέ- 
/ 9 Ν \ 5 Ν, / > VA Φ / 
πτὴν τέλειον, ἐπειδὴ Kal ἀγαθοὺς λέγομεν αὐτούς, οἷον κλέ- 
od Ἂν Ἂν / 9. , \ € 2: Ἂς / 
πτὴν ἀγαθὸν καὶ συκοφάντην ἀγαθόν' καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ τελείω- 
ols τις" ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε τέλειον καὶ οὐσία πᾶσα τότε τε- 
λεία, ὅταν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ 
, cal XX Ψ,): / Ν᾽ φΦ ς / \ / 
μόριον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μεγέθους)" ἔτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος, 
lal » a / , Ας Ν Ἂς ΤΕ, Ά, 
σπουδαῖον (ὄν), ταῦτα λέγεται τέλεια" κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ 
/ / “ Sime! Ν \ / a 3 / / 5 Ν 
τέλος τέλεια, WOT ἐπεὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν ἐσχάτων τί ἐστι, καὶ 
ἐπὶ τὰ φαῦλα μεταφέροντες λέγομεν τελείως ἀπολωλέναι 
Ν 7 3 / “ Ἧς ἊΝ ,ὔ “ Ὁ Ν, 
καὶ τελείως ἐφθάρθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἐλλείπῃ τῆς φθορᾶς καὶ 


br γ᾽ om. AP Al.¢ Α5ς. 3 ὅτι ἐστὶν EJT Ale Asc.¢: om. 
Ab ‘ot ] ὄψις οὗ EJT Ale: ἡ ὄψις οὗ Asc.°, ci. Bonitz ἡ ΟΠ, 
ΑΙ.9 Asc.°, omittendum ci. Bonitz 5 70m. AP 6 πρός 
ΑΓ Al.: τῶν πρός EJ Asc. 7 οἷον] οἷον ἡ AP 9 ἅνθρωπος 
scripsi: ὁ ἄνθρωπος AP Asc.°: ἄνθρωπος EJ 10 εἰ EJ Al. Asc.°: 
ἡ AP 12 τὸ τέλειον AP μηδὲ ἕν] μηθὲν ἘΠΤῚ Al. Asc. 
13 χρόνος AP Al.: ὁ χρόνος EJ 14 καὶ τὰ AP 15 εὖ Ab 
ΑΙ. : τοῦ εὖ EJT ἔχοντι δ᾽ AP 17 ἐλλείπωσιν EJT Al. Asc. : 
ἐλλίπωσιν AP 20 kal... 21 τις Ε]Τ' Al. Asc.: om. AP 21 τότε 
EJ? Αβο. : om. AP καὶ] τι καὶ ἡ AP 22 ἐλλείπῃ EJT ΑΙ.6: 
ἐλλίπῃ AP 24 dv ex Al, addidi τὸ alt. AP Asc.°: om. EJ 
27 ἐλλείπῃ EJT Al. Asc.®: ἐλλίπῃ AP 


ΤΠ. ΤΟΣ 5, -— τὸ 1022725 


a rol 9. 3) Ὁ ΙΝ cal > / Ἂν Ν Vaart: Ν Ν 
τοῦ κακοῦ ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ἢ" διὸ Kal ἣ τελευτὴ κατὰ 
μεταφορὰν λέγεται τέλος, ὅτι ἄμφω ἔσχατα' τέλος δὲ 
καὶ TO οὗ ἕνεκα ἔσχατον. τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγόμενα 30 

, n 7 x ὡς a ἣν N x N 
τέλεια τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, TA μὲν τῷ κατὰ τὸ εὖ μηδὲν 
ἐλλείπειν μηδ᾽ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ ἔξω τι λαβεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ 
ὅλως κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει μηδ᾽ 

μὴ εχ Pi2 ONG oa μη 

> » a a x a 
εἶναί τι ἔξω: τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη κατὰ ταῦτα τῷ ἢ ποιεῖν τι IO22" 
τοιοῦτον ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ἁρμόττειν τούτῳ ἢ ἁμῶς γέ πως λέγε- 
σθαι πρὸς τὰ eens eee τέλεια. 

1] Πέρας λέγεται τό τε ἔσχατον ἑκάστου καὶ οὗ ἔξω μηδὲν 
»y “- / \ Φ Υ̓ Ii ΄ὔ ἈΝ ἊἋ 52 
ἔστι λαβεῖν πρώτου καὶ ob ἔσω πάντα πρώτου, καὶ ὃ ἂν ἢ 5 
~ / BN oy / \ \ / C3 
εἶδος μεγέθους ἢ ἔχοντος μέγεθος, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκάστου 

lal a5) ra € Vé ee a A > 3 a) Ὁ Lom ah 
(τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἣ πρᾶξις, καὶ οὐκ ἀφ᾽ οὗ----ὁτὲ 
δὲ ἄμφω, καὶ ad’ οὗ καὶ ἐφ᾽ ὃ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα), καὶ 7) οὐσία 
ἡ ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ" τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο 
πέρας" εἰ δὲ τῆς γνώσεως, καὶ τοῦ πράγματος. ὥστε φανε- τὸ 
ρὸν ὅτι ὁσαχῶς τε ἡ ἀρχὴ λέγεται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ τὸ 
πέρας, καὶ ἔτι πλεοναχῶς" ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ πέρας τι, τὸ 
δὲ πέρας οὐ πᾶν ἀρχή. 

18 Τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ εἶδος 

Ν ε 3. ΞΡ, Sew 12 2 a > 4 
Kal ἡ οὐσία ἑκάστου πράγματος, οἷον καθ᾽ ὃ ἀγαθός, 13 

TEN > , ¢ Ν 5 & / , Λ Φ 
αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, ἕνα δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον 


> ay 5 fod oy) ao \ ΝΥ “καὶ / ’ 

τὸ χρῶμα ἐν τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρώτως λεγόμενον 
> A Ν PD » > / Ν ς ς “ ΦΕΥ͂, Ν A 

καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, δευτέρως δὲ ws ἢ VAN ἑκάστου καὶ TO 


« , < J “ 4 S Ν 3. “ἃ >] cal Ν 
ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ πρῶτον. ὅλως δὲ τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ ἰσαχῶς καὶ 
AY Ὄ 
τὸ αἴτιον ὑπάρξει: κατὰ τί γὰρ ἐλήλυθεν ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐλή- 20 
xX 
λυθε λέγεται, καὶ κατὰ τί παραλελόγισται ἢ συλλελόγι- 
“δ lA \ y a a ox an »” XX 
σται, ἢ τί TO αἴτιον τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ 4 που λογισμοῦ: ah δὲ 
τὸ καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ κατὰ θέσιν λέγεται, καθ᾽ ὃ “τη κεν ἢ καθ᾽ ὃ βα- 
δίζει: πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τόπον σημαίνει καὶ θέσιν. ὥστε καὶ 
Ν >’ ΦΌΦΟΝ, na 3 / / & - \ 
TO καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι. ἕν μὲν yap 25 


b 28 τῷ ἐσχάτῳ AP Al.: τοῦ ἐσχάτου EJ Asc. 97] δ᾽᾿ἦΕῈ 33 μὴ] 


μηδ᾽ yp. E 1022° 1 τὰ] τὰ δὲ μεταξύ ἐστιν, τὰ yp. E καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
Ejr 2 τούτῳ] τοιούτῳ EJT ἁμῶς ut vid. I, fort. Al., Bekker: 
ἄλλως codd. 3 πρώτως codd. sed ὡς in ras, in E 4 τε om. EJ 
Asc! 5 kal... πρώτου om, E 7 καὶ alt. EJT Asc.: om. AP 
9 ἡ om. recc. 15 «ἀγαθός] ἀγαθὸς ὁ 6 “ἀγαθός Christ 16 πρῶτον T 
18 δεύτερον AP ὡς ἡ E Asc.: ἡ ὡς AP; ὡς J 20 ὑπάρχει 


ΑΙ. ἢ om, AP 22 τί] ὅτι EJr 24 τόπον... θέσιν AP Asc.: 
θέσιν... τόπον EJT 


Η 2 


To22) 


Το 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA Δ 


> % r ‘ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον; ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτὸν 
Καλλίας καὶ τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι Καλλίᾳ: ἕν δὲ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί 
ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον ζῷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτόν" ἐν γὰρ 
τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ζῷον" ζῷον γάρ τι ὁ Καλλίας. ἔτι 
ἃς be (eee) / , XN fa « fal 7, Φ ε 2 
δὲ εἰ ἐν αὑτῷ δέδεκται πρώτῳ ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινί, οἵον ἢ ἐπι- 
φάνεια λευκὴ Kal ἑαυτήν, καὶ ζῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾽ αὑτόν" 
ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μέρος τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ἣ πρώτῃ τὸ ζῆν. ἔτι 
Φ a \ 
οὗ μὴ ἔστω ἄλλο αἴτιον" τοῦ yap ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ αἴτια, τὸ 
ζῷον, τὸ δίπουν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρω- 
, 2 “ἤ / c + Ὁ / > > bs 
més ἐστιν. ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἣ μόνον δι’ αὐτὸ κε- 
χωρισμένον καθ᾽ αὑτό. 
a \ 
Διάθεσις λέγεται τοῦ ἔχοντος μέρη τάξις ἢ κατὰ τόπον 
δ bs / δ . ~ , δὰ ay x o 
ἢ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ κατ᾽ εἶδος" θέσιν yap δεῖ τινὰ εἶναι, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα δηλοῖ ἡ διάθεσις. 
. 
Ἕξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ 
ἴω Ων 
ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου, ὥσπερ πρᾶξίς τις ἢ κίνησις (ὅταν γὰρ 
τὸ μὲν ποιῇ τὸ δὲ ποιῆται, ἔστι ποίησις μεταξύ' οὕτω καὶ 
τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐσθῆτα καὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἐσθῆτος ἔστι μεταξὺ 
ἕξιο)"--- ταύτην μὲν οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν ἕξιν 
(εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ βαδιεῖται, εἰ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔσται ἔχειν τὴν 
Ν δ ¢ Ων 
ἕξων), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ᾽ ἣν ἣ εὖ 
BN n \ 7 Ν Ων ᾽ \ een x \ 
ἢ κακῶς διάκειται τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἢ πρὸς 
ἄλλο, olov ἡ ὑγίεια ἕξις τις" διάθεσις γάρ ἐστι τοιαύτη. 
ν ¢ / “ / / / \ \ 
ἔτι ἕξις λέγεται Av 7 μόριον διαθέσεως τοιαύτης" διὸ καὶ 
ἡ τῶν μερῶν ἀρετὴ ἕξις τίς ἐστιν». 

Πάθος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ποιότης καθ᾿ ἣν ἀλ- 
λοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, οἷον τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, καὶ 
\ Ν lg \ ᾿ς AS / Ν “ 
γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν, καὶ βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, καὶ ὅσα 


od 


ἄλλα τοιαῦτα' ἕνα δὲ ai τούτων ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις 


ἃ 26--27 καθ᾽ αὑτὸ Καλλίας ΑἹ], : om. EJT Asc. 27 Kal... Καλ- 
λίαν J: om. ut vid. Al. 29 ἔτι] ἕν AP 30 αὐτῷ ΑΡ δέδεικται 


ΙΝ αὑτοῦ Christ : αὐτοῦ codd. 31 ᾧ AP Al. Asc.¢: ζῶον E: 


ζῶν JT 33 ἔστιν AP Al. : ἔστιν τι EJT Α56.9 35 μόνον 
μόνῳ Asc, ia οἱ fort. Al. δι᾽ αὐτὸ scripsi: διὸ τὸ EAL®: διότι ΓΑΡΙ' 
γρ: EB κεχωρισμένον EJAY Al: ὡρισμένον Al. Asc. yp. Ε: 
κεχρωσμένον yp. Al, by τόπον EJ Asc.’ : τὸν τόπον AP 3 καὶ 
Ar Al.°; om. EJ Asc.° 6 ποιεῖται AP ὃ ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν Ἐ] 
9 eis... 10 ἕξιν ΕἸΡ Asc.:om.AP το ἢ οπι. Ε]Τ Α8.0.9 11 καὶ 
ΕΑ δ, δ. om, A 13 τοιαύτη AP 16 τὸ alt. EJP Α5..5 
Simpl.¢: om, AP 


20 


21 


13. 10228 26'— 93. 10239711 


δ ἴω 
ἤδη. ἔτι τούτων μᾶλλον at βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινή- 
σεις, καὶ μάλιστα ai λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν 20 
συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται. 
τ / / e Ν ’, δ SS ow n 
22 Στέρησις λέγεται Eva μὲν τρόπον av μὴ ἔχῃ TL TOV 
πεφυκότων ἔχεσθαι, Kav μὴ αὐτὸ ἢ πεφυκὸς ἔχειν, οἷον 
Χ ’ μὴ idl Xe, 
\ > 9 Lal / ed Ἂς δὰ Ν 
φυτὸν ὀμμάτων ἐστερῆσθαι λέγεται: ἕνα δὲ ἂν πεφυκὸς 
” δ SN τ δ Ν / we ΤᾺ @ yA + ¢ 
ἔχειν, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ TO γένος, μὴ ἔχῃ, οἷον ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος ὁ 25 
τυφλὸς ὄψεως ἐστέρηται καὶ ἀσπάλαξ, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὸ 
/ x XX > 3 , 7 i Ἂν Ν Ψ / 
γένος TO δὲ καθ᾽ αὐτό. ἔτι ἂν πεφυκὸς καὶ ὅτε πέφυκεν 
Ba \ wy € Ν ’ / rf \ > J 
EXEW μὴ ἔχῃ" ἡ yap τυφλότης στέρησίς Tis, τυφλὸς δ᾽ οὐ 
κατὰ πᾶ ἡλικί ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἣ TE ἔχειν, ἂν μὴ ἔχ 
σαν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἣ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ. 
@ 3 5 a \ 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν @ ἂν ἢ) (πεφυκὸς) καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ πρὸς ὃ Kal ὥς, 30 
x Ἂς Ἅ " ς 7 Φ τ τὰ 7 / 
av μὴ ἔχῃ ἱπεφυκός]. ἔτι ἡ βιαία ἑκάστου ἀφαίρεσις στέρησις 
/ a a “-- 
λέγεται. καὶ ὁσαχῶς δὲ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἃ ἀποφάσεις λέγον- 
ται, τοσαυταχῶς καὶ αἱ στερήσεις λέγονται: ἄνισον μὲν 
Ἂς n Ν By Ψ , \ / be Ν 
γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ἰσότητα πεφυκὸς λέγεται, ἀόρατον δὲ 
\ n ὅλ Ἂς ν᾽ na \ lal WN is ‘ ἡ 
καὶ τῷ ὅλως μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα καὶ τῷ φαύλως, καὶ ἄπουν 35 
\ ey Ἂς Ν᾽ 4 / \ “ με x Ν fat 
καὶ τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ὅλως πόδας Kal τῷ φαύλους. ETL καὶ TH 
μικρὸν ἔχειν, οἷον τὸ ἀπύρηνον' τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ φαύλως πως 1023% 
yo “A ΕΥ a n Ὁ 
ἔχειν. ἔτι τῷ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ τῷ μὴ καλῶς, οἷον τὸ ἄτμητον 
οὐ μόνον τῷ μὴ τέμνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ TO μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ μὴ 
μ D μὴ τέμν PD μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἢ μὴ 
καλῶς. ἔτι τῷ πάντῃ μὴ ἔχειν" τυφλὸς γὰρ οὐ λέγεται ὁ 
. ' ἢ Μμῆ εχ γα uy 
ἑτερόφθαλμος ἀλλ᾽ 6 ἐν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἔχων ὄψιν" διὸ οὐ 5 
al > \ δ ΄ x 7 δ o> ? Ν Ν \ 
mas ἀγαθὸς ἢ κακός, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἀλλὰ καὶ TO 
μεταζύ. 
28 Τὸ ἔχειν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, EL μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἄγειν 
Ν Ἂς ς a / Dy Ν ἊΝ € “ « / \ 
κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμήν, διὸ 
λέγεται πυρετός τε ἔχειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ οἱ τύραννοι τὰς 
, \ Ν > a ς 5) , “" δὲ νεῖν e » 
πόλεις καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ ἀμπεχόμενοι: Eva ὃ ἐν ᾧ ἄν 


ο 


b 19 τούτων JAYT, εχ τοιούτων fecitE 20 βλαβεραί Ε]Π 21 συμ- 


φορῶν ἘΠ Al. Asc.¢ 51η1ρ].Ὁ : ἡδέων AP 23 ἢ» 1 28 ἔχειν 
EJ? Asc.¢: om. AP 30 ἐν ᾧ EJT Al. Asc.: om. AP ἂν ἢ 
Ε]Γ ΑΙ. : ἐὰν AP; om. Asc. Christ: ἂν ἢ vel ἂν ci. Bonitz πεφυκὸς 
ex 1. 31 transp. Jaeger καὶ alt, et 31 ἂν om. AP 34 τὸ JAP 
ἰσότητα om. AP 35 τὸ APY μὴ ὅλως AP et fort. Asc. καὶ τῷ 
φαύλως om. AP Al. 36 τὸ ter AP ἔτι om. AP | 1023 I 
τῷ Εἰ τὸ ἘΞΑΡΡ Αϑβς.ὃ: τῷ ΕἸ] 2 τῷ ..» «τῶν δ τὸ κ᾿ «τὸ 
ΤᾺ» Αϑς.9 et fecit E 3 ἢ AP ΑΙ. : fro EJT 4 τὸ JAY et 
fecit E 6 καὶ τὸ om. A? ὃ λέγεται λέγεται αὶἴὁ τρόπον APT 


Α1.9 Αϑβς.5: om, EJ 8 ἄγειν EJT Ale Α58ς.6; ἄγον AP 


Τὸ 


20 


en 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ A 


Mi / « a a e Ἂς oy \ 4s lal 
τι ὑπάρχῃ ὡς δεκτικῷ, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς ἔχει TO εἶδος τοῦ 
n / 
ἀνδριάντος καὶ τὴν νόσον τὸ σῶμα' ἕνα δὲ ὡς TO περιέχον 
τὰ περιεχόμενα: ἐν ᾧ γάρ ἐστι περιέχοντι, ἔχεσθαι ὑπὸ 
τούτου λέγεται, οἷον τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἔχειν τὸ ὑγρόν φαμεν 
A Ν , >) / ἊΝ Ἂς fal Md “ & \ 
καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὴν ναῦν ναύτας, οὕτω δὲ καὶ 
Ν [τ + \ / + Ν “ bs Ν « “ 
τὸ ὅλον ἔχειν τὰ μέρη. ἔτι τὸ κωλῦον κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ 
a x na 
ὁρμήν τι κινεῖσθαι ἢ πράττειν ἔχειν λέγεται τοῦτο αὐτό, 
οἷον καὶ οἱ κίονες τὰ ἐπικείμενα βάρη, καὶ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ 
NG ν “ A γ Ν + ε ΄ ΕΣ 
τὸν "Ατλαντα ποιοῦσι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἔχειν ὡς συμπεσόντ᾽ ἂν 
4. Ν a “ \ A , , a 
ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥσπερ Kal τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές φασιν' τοῦ- 
Tov δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ συνέχον λέγεται ἃ συνέχει ἔχειν, 
ὡς διαχωρισθέντα ἂν κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ ὁρμὴν ἕκαστον. καὶ 
τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἑπομένως τῷ 


Τὸ ἔκ twos εἶναι λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶν 
a a Ὁ n A 
ὡς ὕλης, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, ἢ κατὰ TO πρῶτον γένος ἢ κατὰ 
\ Ὁ sy wn / Ν «ς ε! ἃς Ν »] 
τὸ ὕστατον εἶδος, οἷον ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἅπαντα τὰ τηκτὰ ἐξ 
“ ν ? « b) fa) (Xe A} / e a κα " a 
ὕδατος, ἔστι ὃ ws ἐκ χαλκοῦ ὁ ἀνδριάς" Eva δ᾽ ὡς ἐκ τῆς 
πρώτης κινησάσης ἀρχῆς (οἷον ἐκ τίνος ἡ μάχη; ἐκ λοι- 
δορίας, ὅτι αὕτη ἀρχὴ τῆς μάχης)" ἕνα δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ συνθέτου 
ΕῚ lal A \ a lal “ 5 ny “ Ἂς / 
ex τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μέρη 
\ O lal > / \ Ba \ > nn ied € , 
καὶ ἐκ τῆς ᾿Ιλιάδος τὸ ἔπος καὶ ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας οἱ λίθοι" 
/ \ / Ψ € ἐξ / ἃς \ vg / 
τέλος μὲν yap ἐστιν 1 μορφὴ, τέλειον δὲ TO ἔχον τέλος. 
Ν Ν «ς 3. an / ἃς 5 Φ d b) fal / 
Ta δὲ ws EK τοῦ μέρους TO εἶδος, οἵον ἅνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ δί- 
ποδος καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τοῦ στοιχείου: ἄλλως γὰρ τοῦτο 
δον 2. Ν > a 3 a a ‘ “ ε 
καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς ἐκ χαλκοῦ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητῆς yap ὕλης ἡ 
συνθετὴ οὐσία, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὕλης. 
Ἂς: Ν S Ὁ“ / Ν I ς Ν / , 
τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται, τὰ δ᾽ ἐὰν κατὰ μέρος TL τούτων τις 
ὑπάρχῃ τῶν τρόπων, οἷον ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τὸ τέκνον 
Ν ΕῚ lal ἊΝ / 4 " / Late ω Ν 
καὶ ἐκ γῆς τὰ φυτά, ὅτι ἔκ τινος μέρους αὐτῶν. ἕνα δὲ 


413 τὸ περιέχον Ε]Τ' Α5ς.ὃ : τὰ περιέχοντα A? Al. 14 τὰ EJT 
Al, Αβο.ὃ: καὶ AP περιέχοντι AP Asc.®: περιέχον J : περιεχόμενόν 
τι EE: περιεχόμενον Τ' 17 ἔχει EY αὐτοῦ AP Asc.¢ 18 αὐτό] 
ταῦτα AP 20 ποιοῦσιν ᾿Ατλαντα AP 21 καὶ οπη. Ε]Τ ροβῖ 
φασιν add. AP ἄτλας δ᾽ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ᾽ ἀνάγκης 
22 λέγεται... ἔχειν] ἔχειν λέγεται AP et fort. Al. 23 αὐτοῦ AP 
24 ὁμοιοτρόπως rece. 29 ὥστ᾽ AP ὡς om. EP THS nets SO 
λοιδορίας EJT et ut vid. Asc. : τοῦ πρώτου κινήσαντος, οἷον ἐκ λοιδορίας 
ἡ μάχη A? et fort. Al. 35 τὰ] τὸ ἅνθρωπος scripsi: 6 ἄνθρωπος 


EJ Asc.¢: ἄνθρωπος AP br ἐκ pr. AP et ut vid. Al.: ἐκ τοῦ EJ 


23. 1023%12 — 26. 1024°1 


rp A n e « / 
μεθ᾽ ὃ τῷ χρόνῳ, οἷον ἐξ ἡμέρας νὺξ καὶ ἐξ εὐδίας χειμών, 
ὅτι τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο' τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν τῷ ἔχειν μεταβολὴν 
> BA “ / “ Ν Ν la) > / Ν 
εἰς ἄλληλα οὕτω λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα, τὰ 
Ἂς n ἃς; ΝΥ 7, > pa / Φ 3 > / 
δὲ TO κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ἐφεξῆς μόνον, olov ἐξ ἰσημερίας 
ἐγένετο ὁ πλοῦς ὅτι per ἰσημερίαν ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ Διονυ- 10 
/ / “ ἃς Ν, / 
σίων Θαργήλια ὅτι μετὰ τὰ Διονύσια. 
Μέρος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον εἰς ὃ διαιρεθείη ἃν τὸ 
ποσὸν ὁπωσοῦν (ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀφαιρούμενον τοῦ ποσοῦ ἣἧ ποσὸν 
ι 
A / 4 e ny nf Ν o 7 / 
μέρος λέγεται ἐκείνου, οἷον τῶν τριῶν Ta δύο μέρος λέγεταί 
πως), ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὰ καταμετροῦντα τῶν τοιούτων 
, \ ᾿ ΄ a aA " Ν ε , ,ὕ 
μόνον" διὸ τὰ δύο τῶν τριῶν ἔστι μὲν ὡς λέγεται μέρος, 
Ν + a! LA oy a \ δ rs * 7 n ny 
ἔστι δ᾽ ws ov. ἔτι εἰς ἃ TO εἶδος διαιρεθείη ἂν ἄνευ τοῦ ποσοῦ, 
> an / / / \ Ν ΕΖ “ / 
καὶ ταῦτα μόρια λέγεται TovTov' διὸ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους φα- 
ἐν Ἃ - 
ow εἶναι μόρια. ἔτι εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἢ ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται 
ἂν “ἢ x \ > Ἃ \ oy \ ων 4 lol 7 
τὸ ὅλον, ἢ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος, οἷον τῆς σφαίρας : 
n lal ΩΝ “ Τὰ “ “ Ν ¢ 4 / 
τῆς χαλκῆς ἢ τοῦ κύβου τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς μέρος 
(τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἣ ὕλη ἐν ἧ τὸ εἶδος) καὶ ἡ γωνία μέρος. ἔτ 
ἐ ἡ ὕλη ἐν ἡ ἡ γωνία μέρος. ἔτι 
τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ δηλοῦντι ἕκαστον, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τοῦ 
fs a , , 
ὅλου" διὸ τὸ γένος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ μέρος λέγεται, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ 


- 


5 


το 
oO 


εἶδος τοῦ γένους μέρος. 28 
426 “Odov λέγεται οὗ τε μηθὲν ἄπεστι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται 
ὅλον φύσει, καὶ τὸ περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα ὥστε ἕν τι 
εἶναι ἐκεῖνα' τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς" ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἕν ἢ ὡς 
ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἕν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμε- 
νον ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, οὕτως ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ 30 
κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστου καὶ ἕν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, 
οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον θεόν, διότι ἅπαντα (Gar τὸ δὲ συνε- 
χὲς καὶ πεπερασμένον, ὅταν ἕν τι ἐκ πλειόνων ἢ, ἐνυπαρ- 
χόντων μάλιστα μὲν δυνάμει, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνεργείᾳ. τούτων 
δ᾽ αὐτῶν μᾶλλον τὰ φύσει ἢ τέχνῃ τοιαῦτα, ὥσπερ καὶ 35 
ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλέγομεν, ὡς οὔσης τῆς ὁλότητος ἑνότητός τινος. 
ἔτι τοῦ ποσοῦ ἔχοντος δὲ ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον, ὅσων 1το243 


"6 εὐδείας AP 11 τὰ om, AP 13 ὁπωσοῦν] 7 ποσόν ut vid, 


ΑΙ. : ὁποσηοῦν Τ' 17 διαιρεθείη EJ Al.: διαιρεθὴ AP 19 ἢ 
JIA» ΑἹ. : τι ἢ Ἐ} Γ΄ Α58..9 21 ἢ ὁ τοῦ AP 27 τὰ] ἕν καὶ 
τὰ AP 29 τὸ ὅλως EJT Α58ς.Ὁ ; ὅλον A? et fort. Al. 32 διότι 
A» et fort. Asc. : ὅτι EJ 34 μὴ] μὴ καὶ Τ' ἐνεργείᾳ ἘΠΤΡ ΑΙ. 
Asc.: ἐντελεχείᾳ AP 36 ἐλέγομεν A? et fort. Al. : λέγομεν EJT 
ἑνότητος ὁλότητύς J 102491 δὲ AP Α5ς.Ὁ : om. Ἐ])Γ 


5 


Io 


15 


20 


τ᾿ 
σι 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ Δ 


μὲν μὴ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφοράν, πᾶν λέγεται, ὅσων δὲ ποιεῖ, 
a 
ὅλον. ὅσα δὲ ἄμφω ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ὅλα Kal πάντα' ἔστι 
\ “ ¢ ς Ν ΄ € νι ὡς / a , € 
δὲ ταῦτα ὅσων ἡ μὲν φύσις ἡ αὐτὴ μένει τῇ μεταθέσει, ἡ 
Ν Ν Μ Ν Ν € / ‘ Ν “ ‘ 
δὲ μορφὴ ov, οἷον κηρὸς καὶ tudriov: καὶ yap ὅλον καὶ 
Ὁ / yo bs Ν “ Ss \ “ ς Ἂς 
πᾶν λέγεται: ἔχει γὰρ ἄμφω. ὕδωρ δὲ καὶ ὅσα ὑγρὰ 
καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον 
“ > / Ν (a) If \ / 3... 
ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾷ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται ἐφ 
\ nr € " δ Ὁ ie ὦ ΕΑ / * / ε Bee 2) / 
ols τὸ πᾶν ws ἐφ᾽ ἑνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις TO πάντα ὡς ἐπὶ διῃρημένοις" 
πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ μονάδες. 


Κολοβὸν δὲ λέγεται τῶν ποσῶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ 27 


/ fal > \ s Sie Ν , > 
μεριστόν τε δεῖ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ ὅλον. τά τε yap δύο οὐ κολο- 
Ν / > / τ > NS Ν 
βὰ θατέρου ἀφαιρουμένου ἑνός (οὐ γὰρ ἴσον τὸ κολόβωμα 
\ \ \ > / > > / 99) “ ° \ > / \ 
καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐστίν) οὐδ᾽ ὅλως ἀριθμὸς οὐδείς" καὶ 
x Ἄν > / lal / > / , a > , 
γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν δεῖ μένειν" εἰ κύλιξ κολοβός, ἔτι εἶναι κύ- 
λικα' ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς οὐκέτι ὁ αὐτός. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κἂν ἀνο- 
μοιομερῆ ἢ, οὐδὲ ταῦτα πάντα (ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἔστιν ὡς καὶ 
ἀνόμοια ἔχει μέρη, οἷον δυάδα τριάδα), ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ὧν 
“ Ὄ ΩΥ a 
μὴ ποιεῖ ἡ θέσις διαφορὰν οὐδὲν κολοβόν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ, 
> Ν - “ ᾿ δ Ν Ν > 7 / va yo 
ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἃ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν θέσιν ἔχει. ETL 
συνεχῆ: ἡ γὰρ ἁρμονία ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν καὶ θέσιν 
7 \ Ἂς ’ / \ Ν ΄, IQ Ψ “ 
ἔχει, κολοβὸς δὲ οὐ γίγνεται. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐδ᾽ ὅσα ὅλα, 
ION a ξ a / , IA > Ν lal ν 
οὐδὲ ταῦτα ὁτουοῦν μορίου στερήσει κολοβά. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ οὔτε 
τὰ κύρια τῆς οὐσίας οὔτε τὰ ὁπουοῦν ὄντα" οἷον ἂν τρυπηθῇ ἡ 
a BN 
κύλιξ, οὐ κολοβός, GAN ἂν τὸ οὖς ἢ ἀκρωτήριόν τι, Kal ὁ 
" > LES δ Ν fal 5 PSS > / 
ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἐὰν σάρκα ἢ τὸν σπλῆνα, GAN ἐὰν ἀκρωτή- 
, \ “ > a . >A \ ν / 2 Ν 
plov τι, καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πᾶν ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὴ ἔχει γένεσιν ἀφαιρεθὲν 
ὅλον. διὰ τοῦτο οἱ φαλακροὶ οὐ κολοβοί. 


J / \ Ν os 5 , \ [οὶ \ 
Γένος λέγεται TO μὲν ἐὰν 2) ἡ γένεσις συνεχὴς τῶν τὸ 
42 μὴ ποιῇ E 3 ἄμφω λέγεται καὶ ὅλον 1' πᾶν Ε]Τ Asc.? 

7 ὅλος EJT Asc’: ὁ δὲ πᾶς ὅλος AP καὶ EJT Asc.¢: ἢ AP ὃ μὴ 
κατὰ μεταφοράν AP πάντα EJT Α5ς.Ὁ: πᾶν A» 9 οἷς EJT ΑΙ. 
Αϑς.ὃ : ὅσοις A? τὸ alt. ex Al. scr. Christ: ra AP: om. EJ 
10 60m. J Asc.¢ 12 δεῖ αὐτὸ EJT ΑἹ, : om. AP 13 adnpy- 
μένου fecit E 14 λεῖπον fort. Al. ὅλως EJP Al. Asc.®: ὅλος 
Ab 15 ἔτι] ἐστιν E δεῖ εἶναι ἘΠῚ 16 κἂν ἀνομοιομερῆ ἢ 
ΕΤΤΡ Al. Asc.: καὶ ἂν ὁμοιομερῆ ἡ A: καὶ ἀνομοιομερῇ ἢ yp. E 
17 ὡς JAPT ΑΙ. : ὃς E 18 ὧν EJ Asc.: ὅσων AY 21 ἀνο- 
μοιομερῶν EJT Al. Asc.& 23 δεῖ] δὴ AP 27 r.0m. ἘΠ} οὔτ᾽ 
ἂν ἄλλο μὴ AY ἔχει recc, Α].9 Α58ς.ὃ; ἔχῃ Ε]Α» 29 ἐὰν ἢ] ἕν 


ἐὰν Ab 


28 


26. 10242 2 — 29. 1024) 26 


Li 3 , Ν 9 Ἂ ia Ie ed x 3 / la 
εἶδος ἐχόντων TO αὐτό, οἷον λέγεται ἕως Gv ἀνθρώπων γέ- 30 
τς Ὁ“ e x > € / Ν Ye re Ν ὮΝ > > 
vos ἢ, ὅτι ἕως ἂν ἢ ἡ γένεσις συνεχὴς αὐτῶν" τὸ δὲ ἀφ 
@ a eae 
οὗ ἂν ὦσι πρώτου κινήσαντος εἰς TO εἶναι" οὕτω yap λέγονται 
/ an 
“Ἕλληνες τὸ γένος οἱ δὲ Ἴωνες, τῷ of μὲν ἀπὸ “Ἕλληνος οἱ 
aD \ tt zc , \ fa) ς »} \ 
δὲ ἀπὸ Ἴωνος εἶναι πρώτου γεννήσαντος" Kal μᾶλλον οἱ ἀπὸ 
a / Ων “ [τ / \ AX 9. Ν a , ~ 
τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἢ τῆς ὕλης (λέγονται γὰρ Kal ἀπὸ τοῦ θή- 35 
Ἂν if e Ν Ν 
λεος τὸ γένος, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Πύρρας). ἔτι δὲ ὡς τὸ ἐπίπεδον 
a / a lol 
TOV σχημάτων γένος TOV ἐπιπέδων καὶ TO στερεὴν τῶν στε- 1024» 
ρεῶν: ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν σχημάτων τὸ μὲν ἐπίπεδον τοιονδὶ 
δ a lal 
τὸ δὲ στερεόν ἐστι τοιονδί: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον Tats 
a lal nan A 
διαφοραῖς. ἔτι ws ἐν τοῖς λόγοις TO πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον, ὃ 
, a Ὦ A 
λέγεται ἐν TH τί ἐστι, τοῦτο γένος, οὗ διαφοραὶ λέγονται at 


σι 


ποιότητες. τὸ μὲν οὖν γένος τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, τὸ μὲν 
κατὰ γένεσιν συνεχῆ τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἴδους, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον 
a τ / \ > < “ Ὁ Ἂς ς DS Nee 
κινῆσαν ὁμοειδές, TO δ᾽ ὡς ὕλη" οὗ yap ἡ διαφορὰ Kat 7 
Ῥ 2 7 ree) Ν᾽ ἈΝ Ἐς 7 aA 7 Ὁ of ᾿ 
ποιότης ἐστί, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὃ λέγομεν ὕλην. ἕτερα 
δὲ τῷ γένει λέγεται ὧν ἕτερον τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον καὶ το 
ἣν 5 4 / >) / > BA ᾽ > ’ 
μὴ ἀναλύεται θάτερον εἰς θάτερον μηδ ἄμφω εἰς ταὐτόν, 
o \ \ « “ e “ / \ vo 3 “ 
οἷον τὸ εἶδος καὶ 7) ὕλη ἕτερον τῷ γένει, καὶ ὅσα Kab ἔτε- 
ρον σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος λέγεται (τὰ μὲν γὰρ τί 
lod / 
ἐστι σημαίνει τῶν ὄντων τὰ δὲ ποιόν τι τὰ δ᾽ ὡς διήρηται 
Ψ ION Ν “ 5 / 3 2) BA L Anak} 
πρότερον)" οὐδὲ yap ταῦτα ἀναλύεται οὔτ᾽ εἰς ἄλληλα οὔτ᾽ 15 
εἰς ἕν τι. 
290 Τὸ ψεῦδος λέγεται ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον ὡς πρᾶγμα 
al a lal “δ 
ψεῦδος, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν τῷ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδύνατον 
εἶναι συντεθῆναι (ὥσπερ λέγεται τὸ τὴν διάμετρον εἷναι 
΄ δ Ν Ν lal / x a \ Ν 
σύμμετρον ἢ τὸ σὲ καθῆσθαι: τούτων γὰρ ψεῦδος τὸ μὲν 20 
aN \ S , [ἢ Ν > » la} ὡς So τος a 
del τὸ δὲ ποτέ: οὕτω yap οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα), τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔστι 
“ὦ »ν / 7 ΄ δ ἊΝ al > δ ny Ν 
μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μὴ 
ἔστιν (οἷον ἣ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια' ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι 
/ 5 ? > e Ε] lal Ν / / 
μέν τι, GAN οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν)"----πράγματα 
X cy rn Ὁ“ » x‘ n ἣν > 3. τὰς ΩΝ fal 
μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἢ TH25 
ἣν ἣν. πὰ by tes 7 \ » > / XS 
τὴν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν φαντασίαν μὴ ὄντος εἶναι’ λόγος δὲ Wev- 


431 ὁτιοῦν eos AP 40m. ΑΡ ἡ om. fort. Al. αὐτῶν συνεχής 


A» Asc.¢ 32-3 λέγονται of μὲν Ἕλληνες AP 36 οἱ om. EJT 
Asc.¢ δὲ om, AP by γένος AY Asc.¢: τὸ γένος EJ 4 ὃ 
ΕΓ Al.: om, AP 7 τὸ alt. om. E 8 ὕλη EJ Al.: ἡ ὕλη 


A> Asc.¢ 10 ὧν AP Asc.c: ὧν τε EJ 21 οὕτω] τῴ AP 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA A, E 


ἢ 


\ ε aA N » , \ co , it νον 
dns ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, 7) ψευδής, διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέ- 

Ἃ @ 5 Ν μὰ / @ i cal ΄ Ν ΄ 
ρου ἢ οὗ ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. 
Chee Ν , Da Ν ε Φ € ral Pi! 5 + re 
ἑκάστου δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ws εἷς, ὁ TOU τί ἣν εἶναι, ἔστι δ΄ ὡς 

pI \ > , > \ \ 1 Mie. , Φ Ss 

30 πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταὐτό πως αὐτὸ Kal αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σω- 
κράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός (ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός 
ἐστιν ἁπλῶς λόγος)" διὸ ᾿Αντισθένης ᾧετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν 
If ἃς lal 3; / , a 9 3 c / 3 Ὁ / 
λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ev ἐφ᾽ ἑνός: ἐξ ὧν συνέ- 
βαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι 
? ef , > 4 na ᾽ a / ᾿Σ Ν \ ny 
350 ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον TH αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ Kal TO 
ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, 
1025 ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυάδος λόγῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν 
οὕτω λέγεται ψευδῆ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ εὐχερὴς καὶ 
\ lal - ’ Ν .ς 3 e / 5 Ν 
προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ OL ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ 

in 9 > , \ ¢ DA 5» A nr 4 ’, 
Ol αὑτὸ, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις ἐμποιητικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λογῶν, 
ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγματά φαμεν ψευδῆ εἶναι ὅσα ἐμποιεῖ 

, a Ν Cy Ὁ ou / , , 
φαντασίαν ψευδῆ. διὸ ὁ ἐν τῷ Ἱππίᾳ λόγος παρακρούεται 
ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής. τὸν δυνάμενον γὰρ Ψψεύ- 
σασθαι λαμβάνει ψευδῆ (οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ 6 φρόνι- 
μο9)" ἔτι τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον βελτίω. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος 
: , N a 5) a ε Ν cna ΄, A 
10 λαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς---ἦὁ yap ἑκὼν χωλαίνων τοῦ 
ἄκοντος κρείττων---τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ μιμεῖσθαι λέγων, ἐπεὶ 
ef γε χωλὸς ἑκών, χείρων ἴσως, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἤθους, καὶ 


σι 


οὗτος. 
Συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται ὃ ὑπάρχει μέν τινι καὶ ἀληθὲς 80 
> tal ’ / eae las “ ΝΜ c > \ Ν ΄ὔ΄ 
εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔτε (ὡς) ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον 
+ 2 / La τᾷ a / an 7 
εἴ τις ὀρύττων φυτῷ βόθρον εὗρε θησαυρόν. τοῦτο τοίνυν συμ- 
Ἂν cal > , Ν ld A rs lal , y+ 
βεβηκὸς τῷ ὀρύττοντι τὸν βόθρον, τὸ εὑρεῖν θησαυρόν" οὔτε 
bs 5 Le WZ a > / KN Ν a 2) & Bee \ Ἂς 
γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τοῦτο ἐκ τούτου ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο, οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
πολὺ ἄν τις φυτεύῃ θησαυρὸν εὑρίσκει. καὶ μουσικός γ᾽ 
Ἢ σησαῦρ ρ ᾿ μ τ 
y+ 
20 ἄν τις εἴη λευκός" GAN ἐπεὶ οὔτε ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ 
Ἂν an 4 x ἌΝ / “ > . Ν 
πολὺ τοῦτο γίγνεται, συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ λέγομεν. ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ 


- 
σι 


b27 ἡ] ἢ εἰ. Al. ψευδῆ, διὸ ci. Christ 31 καὶ Σωκράτης om. AP 
1025*2 δὲ om. E 3 μὴ EJ Asc.¢: οὐ AP 4 αὐτάν 5 καὶ 
... papev APY ΑἹ. : φαμὲν καὶ πράγματα EJ Asc.° 6 φαντασίαν 
ψευδὴ EJ Asc.e: ψευδῆ φαντασίαν APT 6 E*J: om. E'AP 
8 οὕτως AP 9 ἑκόντα EJT Al. Asc.: εἰδότα AP φαῦλον rece. : 
τὰ φαῦλα EJAY et ut vid. Asc.: πράττοντα ra φαῦλα ex Al. ci. 
Jaeger 11 τὸ alt. om. AP 13 οὗτος recc. Al. Asc.: οὕτως 
A>; τοῦτο EJT 15 ws Asc.*, Eucken: δὲ AP; om, EJP 19 
y] δὲ AP ΑΙ. 20 οὔτε... οὔθ᾽] οὐκ... οὐδ᾽ AP 


29. 1024>27 — 1. 1025 τό 


ἔστιν ὑπάρχον τι καὶ τινί, καὶ ἔνια τούτων Kal ποὺ Kal ποτέ, 
ὅ τι ἂν ὑπάρχῃ μέν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διότι τοδὶ ἣν ἢ νῦν ἢ ἐν- 
ταῦθα, συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται. οὐδὲ δὴ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον οὐδὲν 
τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχόν" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀόριστον. συνέβη 
τῳ εἰς Αἴγιναν ἐλθεῖν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τοῦτο ἀφίκετο ὅπως ἐκεῖ 
ἔλθῃ, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἐξωσθεὶς ἢ ὑπὸ λῃστῶν ληφθείς. 
γέγονε μὲν δὴ ἢ ἔστι τὸ συμβεβηκός, GAN οὐχ ἣ αὐτὸ 
ἀλλ᾽ ἣ ἕτερον" ὁ γὰρ χειμὼν αἴτιος τοῦ μὴ ὅπου ἔπλει ἐλ- 
θεῖν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν Αἴγινα. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβη- 
kos, οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐ- 
σίᾳ ὄντα, οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν. καὶ ταῦτα 
μὲν ἐνδέχεται ἀΐδια εἶναι, ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδέν. λόγος δὲ τού- 
του ἐν ἑτέροις. 


EB 


€ ° Ν fal n ” (Neal ἊΝ 
Αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ αἴτια (ητεῖται τῶν ὄντων, δῆλον δὲ 
“ a ἃ ΄- 
ὅτι ἡ ὄντα. ἔστι γάρ τι αἴτιον ὑγιείας καὶ εὐεξίας, καὶ τῶν 
μαθηματικῶν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἴτια, καὶ ὅλως 
Ἂς laa BN iN \ 
δὲ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά TL διανοίας περὶ 
> ay Dee) , 9. ΩΝ " 7, δ « Υ͂ 4 Ν 
αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐστιν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας. ἀλλὰ 
ε » ͵ \ 
πᾶσαι αὗται περὶ ὄν τι Kal γένος TL περιγραψάμεναι περὶ 
, ΄ > > 4 SN ‘ » ε a SNe 
τούτου πραγματεύονται, GAN οὐχὶ περὶ ὄντος ἁπλῶς οὐδὲ 7 
» lal fal 4 
ὄν, οὐδὲ TOD τί ἐστιν οὐθένα λόγον ποιοῦνται, GAN’ ἐκ τούτου, 
at μὲν αἰσθήσει ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον αἱ δ᾽ ὑπόθεσιν λα- 
κ mS δ 
βοῦσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὕτω τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα τῷ γένει 
x XN ΩΝ ͵ 
περὶ ὅ εἰσιν ἀποδεικνύουσιν ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ μαλακώτερον" 
’ὔ an 
διόπερ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις οὐσίας οὐδὲ τοῦ τί ἐστιν 
5 n / ΕῚ lal 5 / A / fe 
ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς, ἀλλά τις ἄλλος τρόπος TNS 
, x \ / Va 
δηλώσεως. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι TO γένος περὶ ὃ 


ἘΠ ΤΟΝ ΚῚΣ 


8.22 τι EJT Al. Asc.°: om. AP 25 ἀλλὰ om. E 26 τῳ EY: 


τῷ J: τὸ A” Asc.: τῳ τὸ fort. Al. 28 δὴ om, T ἢ cum Al.¢ 
scripsi: 7 AP: καὶ EY Asc.: om. J 29 ὅπου EJ Asc.¢: οὗ AP 
Al. 30 ἦν] εἶναι A et sup. lin. E δὲ om. J 32 οἷον EJT 
Asc.c: ὥσπερ AP 33 μὲν. . « εἶναι] ἴδια αἴτια yp. Al. 


b3 δὴ AP Al. 4 ὑγείας EJ 5 καὶ pr. et 6 ἢ om, LT ὃ ov AY 
yp. E ΑἹ, Asc.: ev EJT 


30 


1025? 


σι 


20 


30 


10268 


σι 


Ιο 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ E 


νη ION / Ν Ν lal 4΄ ταν > 
πραγματεύονται οὐδὲν λέγουσι, διὰ TO τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δια- 
7 , ‘doa 3 “Ὁ tal \ > Ν > \ ἃς Sa 4 
volas τό τε τί ἐστι δῆλον ποιεῖν καὶ εἰ ἔστιν.----ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ἢ 
φυσικὴ ἐπιστήμη τυγχάνει odoa περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος (περὶ 
γὰρ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐστὶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἣ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ 
a a / 
στάσεως ἐν αὐτῇ), δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε πρακτική ἐστιν οὔτε ποιητική 
lal Ν Ν na 5 n a ε 5 Ne δ ὑς ἮΝ. Ων / 
(τῶν μὲν yap ποιητῶν ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι ἣ ἀρχή, ἢ νοῦς ἢ TE- 
\ lal a na 
xn ἢ δύναμίς τις, τῶν δὲ πρακτῶν ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, ἡ 
προαίρεσις" τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ πρακτὸν καὶ προαιρετόν), 
᾿ \ i rN , 
ὥστε εἰ πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική, 
δ Ἂν / x yy " Ἂς Ν \ “ 
ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, ἀλλὰ θεωρητικὴ περὶ τοιοῦ- 
τον ὃν 6 ἐστι δυνατὸν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ 
Ν , «ς μὰς \ AF ὧδ > Ν , “ΟΝ \ 7 
τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡς οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον. δεῖ δὲ τὸ τί 
5 ἣν 4 τὰ ΄ an " \ Ν ῃ « y 
ἣν εἶναι καὶ τὸν λόγον πῶς ἐστὶ μὴ λανθάνειν, ws ἄνευ γε 
τούτου τὸ ᾧγχτεῖν μηδέν ἐστι ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὁριζομένων 
καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ σιμὸν τὰ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ κοῖς 
λον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ 
Ν “Ὁ “ a \ Ν \ / cys € XN , 
μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι yap τὸ σιμὸν κοίλη pis), ἡ δὲ κοιλό- 
ἡ “ oO ’ ἃς Ν Ἂς ε 7 “Ὁ 
της ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς. εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ὁμοίως Te 
nw / Ὁ ἘΝ ’ \ / Ν > lal 
σιμῷ λέγονται, οἷον pls ὀφθαλμὸς πρόσωπον σὰρξ ὀστοῦν, 
ὅλως ζῷον, φύλλον ῥίζα φλοιός, ὅλως φυτόν (οὐθενὸς 
x » he ες i 4. ον 5 3 ΦῸΝ μ “ 
γὰρ ἄνευ κινήσεως 6 λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ ἔχει ὕλην), 
δῆλον πῶς δεῖ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖν καὶ ὁρίζε- 
Ν ἐμ Ν Ν lal 9 Na ny an lal 
σθαι, καὶ διότι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας θεωρῆσαι τοῦ φυσικοῦ, 
“ δ τὰ Lal “ μὰ la a Ν μὴ «ε Ν 
ὅση μὴ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρη- 
/ 2 \ 4 / Γ 3 ” \ € 
τικὴ ἐστι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων' ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι Kal 1) μαθημα- 
ἊΝ - 5 ’ > " uh Ἂν lal 4 n 
τικὴ θεωρητική; ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἀκινήτων καὶ χωριστῶν ἐστί, νῦν 
ἄδηλον, ὅτι μέντοι ἔνια μαθήματα ἢ ἀκίνητα Kal ἣ χωρι- 
ὮΛΟΨ, μ μασημᾶατὰ ἢ ῆ Hh K@P 
Ν Cal an ,’ / 7 3 Ly 4 ‘ -} (4 \ 
στὰ θεωρεῖ, δῆλον. εἰ ὃέ τί ἐστιν ἀΐδιον Kal ἀκίνητον Kal 
χωριστόν, φανερὸν ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι, οὐ μέντοι φυ- 
b 18 τε om. AP ἔστιν AP Al. Asc. : ἔστιν τοῦτο EJT 21 ἐν 
αὐτῇ ἘΠΤ1 Α5..Ὁ : ἐν ἑαυτῇ AP: ἡ αὐτή Schwegler 22 ποιητικῶν 
EJ Al. Asc.° (cf. 1064 11) 23 πρακτῶν EAPAL. sed sup. lin. 
tk ἘΠ: πρακτικῶν JV Asc.° (cf. 1064" 14) 24 καὶ] καὶ τὸ E?J 
25 ecom. AP πᾶσα AP Asc.°: ἅπασα EJ 26 ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρητική 
EJr Al. Asc. : om. AP 28 ws alt. ET: om. JAP Τ' Al. Asc. 


30 ποιεῖν ἐστιν 1] ἔστι δὲ τῶν AP Ale: τῶν δ᾽ ED: τῶν δὴ yp. E 
31 μὲν AP et ut vid. Al. : μὲν οὕτως ὑπάρχει EJT Asc. 33 τὸ Ε]Τ' 


Αδ5ς.Ὁ; τὸ μὲν AP 10268 4 ἀεὶ οἵη. AP 7 ἐστι EJjr Al, Asc. : 
tis ἐστι AP Al} 9 pevrot] μὲν οὖν E ἢ ΑΡ ἡ] μὴ Schwegler 
10 ἀΐδιον καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ χωριστόν AP ΑἹ. : ἀκ, καὶ did. καὶ x, EJ: ἀκ, 


καὶ x. καὶ aid, Τ' 


I. 1025>17 — 2, 1026> 3 


an \ rn / « / ION 
σικῆς ye (περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσική) οὐδὲ μαθημα- 
on 3 Ν / 5 - € Ν Ως Ν \ 
τικῆς, ἀλλὰ προτέρας ἀμφοῖν. ἢ μὲν yap φυσικὴ περὶ 
Ν Ν ΕΣ 3 > Se fa “By ὯΝ Les ΝΥ 
χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια 
‘ >) 7 ἊΝ ) Ν Ν Μ 9 , c b} “ c 
περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ" ἡ 
δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα 
μὲν τὰ αἴτια ἀΐδια εἶναι, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα: ταῦτα γὰρ 
wy ral fal n - [4 = x > 
αἴτια τοῖς φανεροῖς τῶν θείων. ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν elev φιλοσο- 
φίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική (οὐ γὰρ 
BA “ ν \ a « / > lat / / 
ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν TH τοιαύτῃ φύσει 
ι ͵ 
ἐν , Ν \ / ta) \ 
ὑπάρχει), Kal THY τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος 
εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱρετώ- 
ταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πό- 
\ 
τερόν ποθ᾽ ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περί τι γέ- 
\ a SS v4 ΟΣ ν ς a ἐν , PINOY IC) 
vos kal φύσιν τινὰ μίαν (od yap ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ᾽ ἐν 
a lal 9 ΕΣ € Ν ΤᾺ Ν ὩΣ 7 
ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, GAN ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία 
1 , See ε Ν / a 4 > Ν 
περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή)" εἰ μὲν 
οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, 1) 
φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη" εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, 
αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως 
“ , \ \ Try at’? EN ΄ Xs y fod 
ὅτι πρώτη" Kal περὶ TOD ὄντος ἣ ὃν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, 


τ 


. 43 \ Ἂς. ε / "» 
καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα 7) ὄν. 

2 AAA’ ἐπεὶ τὸ ὃν τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολ- 
λαχῶς, ὧν ἕν μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ 
ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, παρὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ 
ἐστὶ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας (οἷον τὸ μὲν τί, τὸ δὲ 

, X Ἂς ’ \ Ν tA A Ν / \ » + 
ποιόν, TO δὲ ποσόν, TO δὲ πού, TO δὲ ποτέ, καὶ εἴ TL ἄλλο 
σημαίνει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον), ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα τὸ δυ- 

/ \ Ψ vA ] \ X\ an / Ν » 
νάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ"----ἐπεὶ δὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, 

a \ a Ν Ἂν / 4 > te 2] \ 
πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ 


E, 2-4, cf. K. 8. 1064? 15 --- 1065* 26 


212 μαθηματικῆς ye ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρας προτέρας AP 14 χωριστὰ 
Schwegler: ἀχώριστα codd. T ΑΙ. 17 εἶναι om. EJ ΑΙ. 
18 θείων] θείων ἢ AP: αἰσθητῶν J yp. E yp. Al. ΤΟ οὐ τς: 
22 εἶναι an post 23 θεωρητικῶν ponenda? cf. K. 1064» 3-6 21 det 
Ab 22 τῶν EJT Al. Asc.: καὶ τῶν AP aiperorepar EJT Asc. 
25 τινὰ AP et ut vid. ΑἹ, : om. EJT Asc. 26 ἀλλ᾽] ὅτι T 27 ἢ 
ΑΓ Asc.°: ἐκείνη EJ καὶ πᾶσι yp. E 28 φύσεις Τ' 30 καὶ 
pr.] καὶ ἡ T 32 τίς J 35 ὡς τὸ] ὡς E: τὸ ὡς ci, Bonitz 
b2 καὶ E et ut vid. Al. Asc.: καὶ τὸ AP: καὶ ἐν 7 ἐπεὶ δὲ AP: ἐπειδὴ 
E 3 ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ] περὶ ταὐτό ἐστι E 


20 


30 


on 


Ξῷ 


20 


25 


35 


ΤΩΝ META TA ®YSIKA E 


\ ἌΞΩΝ ᾿ς al / > al Ν > / ΟῚ 
περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία. σημεῖον δέ" οὐδεμιᾷ γὰρ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπι- 
μελὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτε πρακτικῇ οὔτε ποιητικῇ οὔτε θεωρητικῇ. 

lat a a fal 
οὔτε yap ὁ ποιῶν οἰκίαν ποιεῖ ὅσα συμβαίνει ἅμα τῇ οἰκίᾳ 
γιγνομένῃ (ἄπειρα γάρ ἐστιν" τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαν τοῖς δὲ 
βλαβερὰν τοῖς δ᾽ ὠφέλιμον οὐθὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὴν ποιηθεῖ- 
σαν, καὶ ἑτέραν ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ὄντων" ὧν οὐθενός 
> « 3 ἊΝ / Ἂν ΣΟ Ν Ἂς / +99 ¢ 
ἐστιν 7) οἰκοδομικὴ ποιητική), τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὐδ᾽ ὁ yew- 
/ cal Ν ¢/ / a “4 95) > 
μέτρης θεωρεῖ τὰ οὕτω συμβεβηκότα τοῖς σχήμασιν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ 
ἕτερόν ἐστι τρίγωνον καὶ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχον. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ 
’ / 7 Ὁ Ξι Ἂς » , 4, ἊΝ 
εὐλόγως συμπίπτει" ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄνομά τι μόνον τὸ συμβεβη- 
, > \ / Ψ XX ᾿᾿ lal Ν. 

Kos ἐστιν. διὸ Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστι- 
Ἂς Ν \ AEN + 4, τὰν x € Sas a , 
κὴν περὶ TO μὴ Ov ἔταξεν. εἰσὶ yap οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι 
περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον 

ΕἾ 

ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν μουσικὸν καὶ γραμματικόν, καὶ μουσικὸς 
Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, καὶ εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἃν ἢ, μὴ ἀεὶ δέ, γέ- 
γονεν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν γραμματικὸς γέγονε, καὶ γραμ- 

Ἂν; δ 4, Ane Ν vA na lal , 
ματικὸς ὧν μουσικός, καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων 
ΟΣ ΄ x \ \ > Ἃ a nay: 
εἰσίν: φαίνεται yap τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. 
δῆλον δὲ καὶ. ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον 

, »ν ΝΜ / Ν / n Ν Ν 
τρόπον ὄντων ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβε- 
βηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως λεκτέον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ συμβεβη- 

’, 3 3 Ψ > J 4 ¢ 4 > an \ Ν Y dope } 
κότος ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, τίς 7. φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τίν 
| Oy oh wv ef Ἂς a 4 » Ν Ν (eo 7 
αἰτίαν ἔστιν: ἅμα γὰρ δῆλον ἴσως ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί ἐπιστήμη 
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ.----ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύ- 

Ba \ 9 2 lf > an Ν, Ν 
τως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγο- 
μένης ἀλλ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως, τὰ δ᾽ 
5 5 / Ν > Ba 2090 9s € > La να Ν / [7 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀεί, ὡς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, αὕτη 
μὰ Ν \ ey peer? 2 \ “ τὺ \ , A Ν 
ἀρχὴ καὶ αὕτη αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ συμβεβηκός" ὃ γὰρ 
x we PAD > oN 50° < δ εν BY hd (a West 3 
dv ἢ μήτ᾽ ἀεὶ μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τοῦτό φαμεν συμβε- 
βηκὸς εἶναι. οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ ἂν χειμὼν γένηται καὶ ψῦχος, 
τοῦτο συμβῆναί φαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πνῖγος καὶ ἀλέα, ὅτι 
SS Ν δ Δ ΠΑ ane aN \ Ν \ > + \ Ν Υ 
τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
λευκὸν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν (οὔτε γὰρ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), 
ζῷον δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν δὲ τὸν οἶκο- 

Ὁ ς πρακτικὴ οὔτε ποιητικὴ οὔτε θεωρητική J ἢ γινομένη J 
9 ὄντων] τοιούτων Cannan 13 ὄνομά τι Al, Asc. : ὀνόματι codd. 
Γ Ale 17 καὶ pr. EJjr Al. Asc. : ἢ A> 18 kal “Κορίσκος 
om. E 21 yap τι τὸ ἘΞ 30 πολύ] πολύ, τὰ δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ αἰεὶ 


οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ Jaeger 37 TO... οἰκοδόμον AY Al, ; τὸ τὸν 
οἰκοδόμον ὑγείαν ποιῆσαι EJT Asc. 


2. 1026 4 — 3. 1027%29 


Ρ , nA Αἱ 
δόμον» συμβεβηκός, ὅτι οὐ πέφυκε τοῦτο ποιεῖν οἰκοδό- ΤΟ278ὃ 
3 Ν 5 , 9 Ἂς 7. 3 ‘ μὰ \ ’ /, 
μος ἀλλὰ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ συνέβη ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἰκοδόμον. 
Ἂς a 7 BA 
καὶ ὀψοποιὸς ἡδονῆς στοχαζόμενος ποιήσειεν ἄν τι ὑγιεινόν, 
Ψ / / 
ἀλλ᾽ ov κατὰ τὴν ὀψοποιητικήν' διὸ συνέβη, φαμέν, Kal 
Bd c ti AS a > ΜῈ 2 Ν BS Ν ΟΥΑΙ 
ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων [ἐνίοτε] δυ- 5 
, 3) N « 7 “ 2 > 2 / ION ᾿ 
νάμεις εἰσὶν al ποιητικαί, τῶν δ᾽ οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις 
lot » x 
ὡρισμένη: τῶν yap κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων 
Ν Ν ν 4 5 Ν , “ > 2 \ > / 
καὶ TO αἴτιόν ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς. WoT ἐπεὶ OV πάντα 
2 \ 2 Sh ΜᾺ NY EAN EEN » Ἃ / > Ν SS 
ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ del ἢ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ 
tal «ς SEEN \ 7, 3 / aN \ Ν 
πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβη- το 
Ν » a Mine Sa ἐϑὰ +? «ς Φ. τον \ \ ς Ν ’, 
kos ὄν" οἷον οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικός 
> 2 ἊΝ ΄- Τὰ / Ν ont Ν ? Ν 
ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεταί ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται (εἰ δὲ 
4 ! 5 ν᾽ 2) Sor. Ψ Gs A poe ε 2 
μή, πάντ᾽ ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης)" ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐν- 
δεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκό- 
2 Ν Ν ἊΝ / 4 > / 2 Lee} ΜῈΝ 
τος. ἀρχὴν δὲ τηνδὶ ληπτέον, πότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ αἰεὶ 15 
»4) “ a, \ faoON ray 207 x ” Ν 
οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἢ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον. ἔστιν ἄρα τι παρὰ 
lal \ ¢ / Ὁ) oy ἊΝ > /, ρὲ Ν ΄ 
ταῦτα τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλὰ πό- 
Nee Ie ON \ 7 \ ~ J > \ € I δ yy 
τερον TO ὡς ETL TO πολύ, TO δ᾽ ἀεὶ οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἔστιν 
ΝΥ 3. \ Ν a ΄ “ ἧς “ἷ > 
ἄττα ἀΐδια; περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὕστερον σκεπτέον, ὅτι ὃ 
2 , > + “ , , 2 , Ν 
ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν" ἐπιστήμη μὲν 20 
lal oN a Xx a cal Ν “Ὁ 
γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ---πῶς γὰρ ἢ 
ἊΨ \ a Ν ΩΝ an x 
μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; δεῖ yap ὡρίσθαι ἢ τῷ ἀεὶ 7) 
n < > Ν \ 4 e “ >’ / \ 4 cal 
τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ TO πολύ, οἷον OTL ὠφέλιμον TO μελίκρατον τῷ 
« φυθον \ / \ Ν NX. a > ed ͵ 
πυρέττοντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ---τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέ- 
’ y+ e / δ \ ον SN « b} \ Ἂν Ν Ν 
yew, πότε οὔ, οἷον νουμηνίᾳ" ἢ ydp ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ 2 
τὸ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός ἐστι. παρὰ ταῦτα. τί μὲν 
ἢ νουμηνιᾳ μ 1 ρ . μ 
Φ 2 \ Ἀ Ν \ DS ise ay Ne: 3) , 
οὖν ἐστὶ TO συμβεβηκὸς καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν Kal ὅτι ἐπιστήμη 


on 


οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, εἴρηται. 
[2 9 > x 3 ὦ Ν Μ ἊΝ ‘ Ἐς 
83 “Ore δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἴτια γενητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ 
1027° 1 συμβεβηκός EJ et ut vid. Al.: κατὰ συμβεβηκός APT Asc. 


3 ἡδονῇ AP τινι JAY Al. Asc. 4 ὀψοποιητικὴν AP Asc.¢ et fecit 
E: ὀψοποιικὴν J 5 ἄλλων E Al. Asc.: ἄλλαι [4.1 ἐνίοτε seclusi, 


om. ut vid. Al. Asc.: αἰτίαι re καὶ ex Al. ci. Bonitz 7 γιγνομένων 
EJ ΑἹ, Asc.° : γενομένων AP ὃ ἐπεὶ AP Α].9 ΑΞς.ὃ; ἐπειδὴ EJ 
13 ὥστε... 16 ἀδύνατον hic codd. I Al.: ante 8 ὥστ᾽ collocanda 
ci. Bonitz ἔσται ἡ ὕλη AP αἰτία post συμβεβηκότος AP 
14 ἄλλως EJT Al. Asc. : om. AP 15 τήνδε AP Asc.! 16 εἴη 
ἄρα AP 18 τὸ pr.] τὸ μὲν yp. E: ἔστι μὲν τὸ Christ οὐδὲν Asc. 
21 πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἢ EJ 25 οὔ E et fort. Asc.: om. JAPT Al, ἢ 


pr.] 7 yp. E 26 τὸ pr. om. AP Asc. 29 γενητὰ EJ Al. Asc.le: 
γεννητὰ AP 


30 


1027> 


on 


10 


ΤΡ 


20 


ΤΩΝ META TA ΦΥΣΙΚΑ E 


ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι, φανερόν. εἰ yap μὴ 
ΕΝ, 3 2} / / 3. τἣν 3 a / \ 
τοῦτ᾽, ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάντ᾽ ἔσται, εἰ τοῦ γιγνομένου καὶ φθειρο- 
μένου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἴτιόν τι ἀνάγκη εἶναι. πότερον 
Ν ν Wg » Ewe \ , > ἊΝ / » 
γὰρ ἔσται τοδὶ ἢ οὔ; ἐάν γε τοδὶ γένηται" εἰ δὲ pH, οὔ. 
an XX aN + \ cf a “ 2 NS / 3 / 
τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἄλλο. καὶ οὕτω δῆλον OTL ἀεὶ χρόνου ἀφαιρουμέ- 
νου ἀπὸ πεπερασμένου χρόνου ἥξει ἐπὶ τὸ νῦν, ὥστε ὁδὶ ἀπο- 
tal , δ , 5} 57) a er Ips 3 
θανεῖται ἱνόσῳ ἢ] βίᾳ, ἐάν γε ἐξέλθῃ" τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν διψήσῃ" 
al Ss OS A \ A -“ 9 A a € ’ x > 
τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν ἄλλο' Kal οὕτως ἥξει εἰς ὃ νῦν ὑπάρχει, ἢ els 
lal , eo bs / an Ν ΡΝ 7 
τῶν γεγονότων τι. οἷον ἐὰν διψήσῃ" τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐσθίει ὃρι- 
/ an 5» » € f Ν + oe 2 ri ῬΣ / ΕΣ 
μέα: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἤτοι ὑπάρχει ἢ οὔ: ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποθα- 
lal δ B) 2 - ε 7 Ν oN «ς / ᾽ 
νεῖται ἢ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖται. ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ὑπερπηδήσῃ τις εἰς 
τὰ γενόμενα, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος: ἤδη γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῦτο ἔν 
if Ν Ν 9 > / BA / yi Ν 
τινι, λέγω δὲ τὸ γεγονός" ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα πάντα ἔσται τὰ 
ἐσόμενα, οἷον τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ζῶντα: ἤδη γάρ τι γέγονεν, 
φ x 2 f 2 “ 3. τὰν = 3 By , BY / 
οἷον τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ AUTO. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ, 
/ 5 35 Ὁ ΚΝ, \ , a “ἤ Lk Ἀ 
οὕπω, ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν τοδὶ γένηται. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς 
ΖΞ μ᾿ “ vA > > / ’ BA + > ε an 
βαδίζει ἀρχῆς, αὕτη δ᾽ οὐκέτι εἰς ἄλλο. ἔσται οὖν 7 TOD 
«ς / 3 + “ \ oY lel / 9. τὴν VA 
ὁπότερ ἔτυχεν αὕτη, καὶ αἴτιον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς ἄλλο 
>’ / b) > 5 5 \ la \ wy lal € 9, ‘\ ς 
οὐθέν. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀρχὴν ποίαν καὶ αἴτιον ποῖον 7) ἀναγωγὴ ἣ 
΄ , ε > ¢ ee ᾽ \ ey: Ew τς ? 
τοιαύτη, πότερον ws εἰς ὕλην ἢ ws εἰς TO οὗ ἕνεκα ἢ ὡς εἰς 
τὸ κινῆσαν, μάλιστα σκεπτέον. 
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀφείσθω 
a ἐν 
(διώρισται γὰρ ἱκανῶς): τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν, καὶ μὴ ὃν ὡς 
cal 2 Ν τ YA Τὰ 3 >» » Ν Ν 7 
ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ Tapa σύνθεσίν ἐστι Kal διαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ σύν- 
Ν \ 3 ΙΝ Ν Ἂς Ν 5 Ν Ν. 
ολον περὶ μερισμὸν ἀντιφάσεως (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὴν 
i eS fal / Ν > > , ὌΝ 
κατάφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ συγκειμένῳ ἔχει τὴν δ᾽ ἀπόφασιν ἐπὶ 
τῷ δι ἔνῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμοῦ τὴν ἀντίφα- 
Ὁ διῃρημένῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμ ] pa 
n Ν \ ed δ \ \ as 7 DA 
ow: πῶς δὲ TO ἅμα ἢ TO χωρὶς νοεῖν συμβαίνει, ἄλλος 
, / Ν \ «“ \ Ν Ν ¢ Ἂν BY 2 a 
λόγος, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἅμα Kal TO χωρὶς ὥστε μὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς 
ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι): οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς 
bp “ see \ Ν 5 \ 2 Ν \ ἊΣ 
ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κα- 
κὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, GAN ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ 


2 30 ἄνω Apelt 34 τούτου yp. E ἂν AP sup. lin. et 2: om. 
EJ Asc. ἄλλου J yp. E Asc. by ὅδε EJ Asc. 2 νόσῳ 
ἢ seclusi (cf. 1. 10): habent codd. T Al. τοῦτο... διψήσῃ om. AP et 
ut vid. Al. ὃ γένος 1" 10 αὐτῷ AY et ut vid. Α].: αὐτῷ 
σώματι ἘΠ 13 ἄλλο AP ΑἹ. : om. EJT Asc. 15 εἰς alt. 
om, AP 18 ἀληθῶς yp. E 19 mapa EJAY Al.: περὶ recc. 


24 τὸ alt. EJ Asc.c: om. AP Ale τὸ recc. Al.o: τῷ EJAY 25 
καὶ] τε καὶ E 27 εὐθὺς recc. ΑἹ], : εὐθὺ AP: om, ἘΠῚ 


Ὡἰῆς. 


3. 10278 20 --- 4. 1028°6 


Xe 2 5) 9583. 59 ες: “ Ν » tal “ \ 
Ta τί ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ" ---ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ 
\ “ Ἃ Ν ey “ 2 2 2 \ Sa 
TO οὕτως ὃν καὶ μὴ OV, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον" ἐπεὶ δὲ ἢ συμ- 
’, ΕΣ Ν € 7 ΩΣ 7 > 2 > ΕῚ Ὁ 
πλοκὴ ἐστιν Kat ἣ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς 
/ \ 2 Ὁ“ BA ¢ δ 2 7 Ἃ Ν ἊΝ 
πράγμασι, τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ὃν ἕτερον ὃν τῶν κυρίως (ἢ γὰρ τὸ 
ν δ πε. x “ NY Ἃ of \ + + / xX 
τί ἐστιν ἢ OTL ποιὸν ἢ OTL ποσὸν ἢ TL ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ 
διαιρεῖ ἣ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀλη- 
\ a a a 
θὲς dv ἀφετέον----τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ THs 
διανοίας τι πάθος, καὶ ἀμφότερα περὶ τὸ λοιπὸν γένος τοῦ 
» Ἂν, 3 Ν fal > / / Nn ἊΨ \ 
ὄντος, Kal οὐκ ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντο-----διὸ 
“Ὁ Ν > 7 / Ν GA gh 2 a \ ν 
ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω, σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ τὰ αἴτια 
νιν Ν 3 Ἂν e yx \ >) 3 ts / Ν 
καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἣ ὄν. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐν οἷς διωρισάμεθα περὶ 
τοῦ ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται 
τὸ ov.| 


b 28 ἐν] ἐν τῇ E 29 ὄντως Asc. 30 καὶ APT Al. Asc.: ἢ 
EJ 31 κυρίως AP Al. Asc.: κυρίων EJT 32 τι AP Al. Asc.; 
et\re ἘΠ 33 διαιρεῖ T et ut vid. Al., Bonitz: ἀφαιρεῖ codd. 
ἀληθὲς EJT Al. : ἀληθῶς AP Asc. 10282 2 τοῦ om. AP 4 φανε- 
pov . . . 6 ὅν damnavit Christ (cf. Z. 1028" 10), habet ΑἹ. : φανερὸν 
. .. ἕκαστον om. Asc. 5 ὅτ. .. 6 ov EJT Asc.: om. AP 
6 post ὄν add. σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστιν E'S IT 


2573.1 I 


30 


10282 


BOOK’ A 


(I) WispoM Is THE KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST CAUSES (CHS. I, 2), 


(A) Wisdom ts a knowledge of causes (ch. τὴ. 


980° 21. All men by nature desire to know, as is indicated by the 
love we have for our senses, even apart from their practical uses, and 
especially for that of sight because it tells us much about the differences 
between things. 

27. (1) Sensation is common to all animals. Further, 

28. (2) from sensation in some animals arises memory, which makes 
them intelligent, and, if they have also hearing, makes them capable of 
being taught. 

The other animals live by imagination and memory, with small share 
in ‘ experience ’, but 

b 28. (3) in man many memories of the same thing produce experi- 
ence. Experience may easily be confused with what are really its 
results, viz. 

9818 2. (4) science and art. Art arises when from many notions of 
experience there comes a single universal judgement. To judge that 
A was good for B, C, &c., when ill of disease JV, is a matter of experi- 
ence ; to judge that A was good for all men of a certain constitution 
when ill of a certain disease, a matter of art. 

12. Experience is often practically more successful than art, because 
it is of the particular and practice deals with particulars, and with 
universals only as concomitants of particulars. 

24. But knowledge and wisdom belong to art rather than to experi- 
ence, because artists know causes and men of experience only facts. 

30. For this reason too master-artists are thought to have wisdom 
rather than manual workers, who act by habit very much as lifeless 
things do by nature. 

by. In general, we think art more truly knowledge than experience, 
because it implies the power to teach. 

10. Further, though the senses have most to do with knowledge of 
particulars, we do not think them to be wisdom because they never 
tell us the ‘why’. 

13. At first the inventor of any art was admired, not only for the 
utility of his invention but for his wisdom ; later the inventors of arts 
that aim at giving pleasure were esteemed wiser than the inventors of 
useful arts ; 


A, 1. 980% 23 — 980 21 118 


20, it was only when both these kinds of art had been established 
that the arts which aim neither at pleasure nor at the necessities of life 
were discovered. They demand leisure ; and this is why mathematics 
was founded by the Egyptian priests. 

25. The difference between art, science, &c., is stated in the 
Lthics ; our present point is that every one takes wisdom to be con- 
cerned with first causes ; 

_ 2g. this is why the experienced man is thought wiser than the man 
who has only sensation, the artist than the experienced man, the master- 
artist than the manual worker, the theoretical than the productive arts, 


The purpose of this chapter is stated at 981 27. It is to show 
that σοφία is universally held to be concerned with the primary causes 
and principles. Though the chapter begins without any reference to 
σοφία, and seems to be merely tracing the development of mind from 
perception to science through memory, experience, and art, the under- 
lying intention throughout (cf. 981225, »1, 5, 10, 16, 18) is to 
bring out the implications of the words σοφός, σοφία, which are finally 
summed up in 981 27. For the transition from perception to science 
cf. An. Post. ii. 19. 

Jaeger has shown (Arzs/o/eles 68 ff.) that chs. 1, 2 are based on 
a fuller treatment of the same topics by Aristotle in the Protrepticus. 
Cf. for instance 980% 21-28 with Iamblichus, Profrepf. 43. 20-27, 
44. 9-27 (Pistelli), g81> £39824 2 with Arist. fr. 53 (Rose, 1886). 

9808 23. On the superiority of sight to the other senses cf. De Sensu 
437° 3, where, however, though sight is said to be superior πρὸς τὰ 
ἀναγκαῖα καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, hearing is said to be superior πρὸς νοῦν καὶ 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός (cf. g8oP 21-25). The passage in the De Sensu 
further explains how it is that sight πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς. It is 
because all bodies have colour, so that in seeing colour we see indirectly 
the common sensibles—figure, size, movement, number. Alexander 
assigns a different reason, that in colour itself there are many varieties, 
while by touch we perceive only pairs of opposites, hot and cold or dry 
and wet. 

29. τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη. De An. 4288 τὸ cites ants, 
bees, and grubs as animals not having φαντασία, which is implied in 
memory (De Mem. 451*14). But in view of 980? 23 and De Part, An. 
648° 5, 650» 25 difficulties have been felt about this statement, and 
Torstrik with some ancient authority emends the text so as to make 
it draw a contrast between ants and bees as having memory, and grubs 
as not having it. 

ber. The difficulties which have been felt about the reading of A> 
and Alexander are somewhat unreal. Aristotle first uses φρονιμώτερα 
and μαθητικώτερα as almost synonymous, and then by an after- 
thought distinguishes between them. Of the emendations the best 
is that of Bywater, who inserts τὰ δέ after φρονιμώτερα. 

φρόνιμος is not here used in the strict sense defined in Δ᾽, ΔΝ, 

i 


116 COMMENTARY 


1140? 20 ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ 
ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. φρόνησις as it exists in animals involves 
no Adyos. But its existence in animals, in this wider sense, is pointed 
out even in the L¢hics (11414 26; cf. De Gen, An. 753° 11). 

28. οἷον μέλιττα. Bees are here said to have memory, and not 
to have hearing. In 2715]. An, 627%147 Aristotle says it is doubtful 
whether they hear. In De An. 428% ro it is implied that they do not 
remember ; but see 980% 29 ἢ. 

24. κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἑῴων ἔστι. E.g. the ant (De 
Part. An. 650» 26). 

μανθάνει, as the reference to hearing shows, means ‘can be 
taught’. This is the force of the distinction between μαθεῖν and 
εὑρεῖν in De An, 4299. In Fest. An. 608° 17 we are told explicitly 
that animals which hear κοινωνεῖ τινὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας, 
both from one another and from man. 

26. The relation between φαντασία and μνήμη is stated in De Mem. 
451° 14. μνήμη 1S φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις. I.e., 
in order that we may have memory we must not only retain an image 
but also recognize it as standing for an object. Further, memory 
involves, while φαντασία does not, a sense of time (44928). The 
nature of φαντασία is discussed in De An. 4247 29—429%9 

ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν. It is not easy to see what Aristotle 
wants to say about ἐμπειρία, the connecting link between memory and 
art or science. Animals have a little of it; on the other hand it 
involves thought (981° 6). In principle it seems not to differ from 
memory. If you have many memories of the same object you will have 
ἐμπειρία; those animals, then, which have good memories will 
occasionally have it, and men will constantly have it. After having 
described it, however, as produced by many memories of the same 
object, Aristotle proceeds to describe it as embracing a memory about 
Callias and a memory about Socrates. These are not the same 
object, but only instances of the same universal; say, ‘ phlegmatic 
persons suffering from fever’. An animal, or a man possessing only 
ἐμπειρία, acts On such memories, and is unconsciously affected by the 
identical element in the different objects. But in man a new activity 
sometimes occurs, which never occurs in the lower animals, A man 
may grasp the universal of which Callias and Socrates are instances, 
and may give to a third patient the remedy which helped them, 
knowing that he is doing so because the third patient shares their 
general character. This is art or science—for here these two are not 
distinguished by Aristotle. 

What is revived by memory has previously been experienced as 
aunit. Experience, on the other hand, is a coagulation of memories ; 
what is active in present consciousness in virtue of experience has 
not been experienced together. Therefore (a) as embodying the 
data of unconsciously selected awarenesses it foreshadows a uni- 
versal; but (4) as not conscious of what in the past is relevant, 
and why, it is not aware of it as universal. 1. 6, experience is a stage 


A, 1. 980% 23 — 981° 18 117 


in which there has appeared ability to interpret the present in the 
light of the past, but an ability which cannot account for itself; when 
it accounts for itself it becomes art. 

Alexander suggests (4.15) that μικρόν is an intentional under- 
statement, and that Aristotle really means that animals have 710 ἐμπειρία. 
L. 28 γίγνεται δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις also suggests 
this, and ἐμπειρία does not seem to be elsewhere ascribed to the brutes. 
But the passage, though not very clear, on the whole seems to distinguish 
men from other animals by their possession of art, not by their 
possession of experience; and in point of fact the acquired instincts of 
animals exhibit the characteristics of experience as described above. 

9818 2, ἀποβαίνει δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις. At first art can only be acquired by experience; but it 
may be transmitted by teaching, so that there are people who have art 
without experience (I. 14). 

4. ὡς φησὶ Mddos. Polus was a well-known pupil of Gorgias, and 
this jingle is in Gorgias’ style. Polus makes the remark in Pl. Gorg. 
448 c, but it is implied that it also occurred in his work on oratory 
(ib. 462). 

8. Καλλίᾳ. Callias, the well-known patron of Protagoras and 
other sophists (cf. Pl. Afol. 20 a, Prot. 314 D, 315 Ὁ, Crat. 391 B, Xen. 
Symp. 1. 5, 4. 62). Prof. Taylor suggests, however, that Aristotle 
is reproducing ‘a personal trick employed by Plato in lecturing, .«. 
the trick of using members of the audience as the logical subjects of 
sample propositions’ (Varza Socratica 43). He thinks, therefore,’ 
that Καλλίᾳ refers to Callippus, the assassin of Dion, and Σωκράτει to 
the younger Socrates (for whom cf. Ζ, 103625). Now Coriscus, who 
is often used in this way, and sometimes coupled with Socrates (Zp. 
166} 32, De Part, An. 644° 25, De Gen. An. 767» 25, 768% 6), was very 
likely a member of Aristotle’s audience (cf. A. 101517 n.). But the 
association of Callias with Cleon in An. Pr. 43% 27, and with Themis- 
tocles in Soph. £7. 176% 1, and that of Socrates with Hippias in //et. 
1356 33 suggest that the famous Callias and the famous Socrates are 
meant. 

Prof. H. Jackson has conjectured with much probability, from the 
references to Callias in Z. 103324, 103426, An. Pr. 43% 36, that 
Aristotle had in his lecture-room a picture representing the scene in 
Pl. Prot. 3356, where Callias prevents Socrates from leaving the 
company (/. of P. xxxv. 195 f.). 

12. Jackson (/. of P. vi. 206) points out that τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ 
χολώδεσιν answers to τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ᾽ εἶδος ἕν ἀφορισθεῖσι, and πυρέτ- 
τουσι καύσῳ tO κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, SO that the second 7 must 
be excised. φλεγματώδης and χολώδης describe not diseases but 
natural ges. Cf. ἢ: 11813, Prodl. i. 9, 11, 12. 

πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν. The answer to μέν comes in|. 24 ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως. 

18, πλὴν ἀλλ᾽ 7 does not seem to be an Aristotelian combination, 
and the reading of A>, which omits πλήν, is probably the 
original one. 


118 COMMENTARY 


19. Σωκράτην. This is the usual form of the accusative in Xenophon, 
while Σωκράτη is the Platonic form. In Aristotle the genitive and 
dative are Σωκράτους, Σωκράτει.» Σωκράτη occurs in Zop. 160» 27, 28, 
Physe228% 3, but iniCa7. 1201... 18, (22, ΤΑ ΤῸ, τι τὴ te 
43°35 Σωκράτην is the better attested reading. It appears better to 
read it here and avoid hiatus. 

20. ᾧ συμβέβηκεν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. It is of course not an accident 
of Callias, as opposed to his essence and his properties, that he is 
a man; nor (as Bonitz says) a συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ αὑτό or property as 
opposed to his essence. συμβεβηκός is used simply to indicate that 
it is not directly man that the doctor cures, but directly Callias and 
indirectly man because Callias is a man. For this use of M. 
10877 19. 

b2-5. τοὺς... ἔθος. ‘These words, omitted by Ab' and Alexander, 
are sufficiently warranted by the other MSS, and by Asc. το. 6, and 
need cause no difficulty if they are treated as parenthetical and ὡς οὐ; 
ἄς. (I. 5) is taken to refer to the ἀρχιτέκτονες (8 30). 

In ll. 2, 3 ποιεῖν μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖν ἃ ποιεῖ is commonly read, and 
taken as going with τοὺς δ᾽, in which case εἰδότα must be supposed to 
have its gender by attraction. But E and Ab? read ποιεῖ. . . ποιεῖ for 
ποιεῖν. .. ποιεῖν, and this is clearly right. These words fall within 
the ὥσπερ clause and go with τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια. Aristotle begins by 
likening the action of χειροτέχναι to that of lifeless things, but proceeds 
to point out a confrast (that the latter act as they do by nature and 
the former by habit), which interrupts the construction and produces 
a not unnatural anacolouthon. 

7. ὅλως τε σημεῖον Tod εἰδότος. .. τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν. 
ΘΙ Aid. 1 τ 8 Ὁ, 

18. τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὐσῶν. διαγωγή is used of the contemplative 
life (e.g. A. τογϑῦ 14), and we might suppose that that is here in 
question. But ]. 21 and 98223 show that Aristotle has in mind 
a threefold division of τέχναι, (1) ai πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα (useful arts), 
(2) αἱ πρὸς διαγωγήν 98118, πρὸς ἥδονήν 21, πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ 
διαγωγήν 982» 23 (almost = fine arts), (3) ai μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ 
πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα 981» 21 (theoretical arts, or sciences), διαγωγή is by 
no means confined to the theoretical life (Z. MW. 1127 34, 11715 13, 
1176>12, 14, Pol. 1334717, 1339% 17, 13415 40). 

23. For the Egyptian origin of mathematics cf. Pl. Phaedr. 244. 
Herodotus (ii. 109) ascribes a more utilitarian origin to Egyptian 
geometry, viz. the need of remeasuring the land after inundations. 
Certain geometrical discoveries may have been made by the priests 
in the course of solving a problem with which they were specially 
concerned, that of the orientation of temples. But geometry with the 
Egyptians never advanced beyond the practical art of mensuration 
(Heath, G&. ALath. i. 120-128). Aristotle might also have referred to 
the debt which Greek astronomy owed to the astronomical observations 
of the Babylonian priests, for which cf. De Caelo 29248. ‘So far as 
the evidence of history extends’, Gomperz remarks (Greek Dhinkers, 


A. I. 981219 — 981) 28 11g 


i. 43), ‘an organized caste of priests and scholars, combining the 
necessary leisure with the equally necessary continuity of tradition, 
was at all times indispensable to the beginnings of scientific research. 
But its beginning and its end in such cases were only too likely to 
coincide, for when scientific doctrines are mixed up with religious 
tenets the same lifeless dogmatism will commonly benumb them 
both... . Thus we may account it a double blessing for the free 
progress of thought among the Greeks that their predecessors in 
civilization possessed an organized priesthood, and that they themselves 
lacked it.’ 

25. ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς, L. WV. vi. 1139 r4—1141> 8, τἄλλα τὰ ὁμογενῆ 
are φρόνησις, σοφία, νοῦς. The reference to the Z7/fzcs is found in all 
the MSS, and in Alexander and Asclepius, and the reasons alleged for 
treating it as spurious are illusory, ‘True, the difference between art 
and science has hitherto been ignored, as it often is in Aristotle ; but 
that is because he has been dealing with the difference between both 
of them and unreasoning experience. Now, however, the difference 
between art and science becomes important; it is just that which has 
already (J. 21) been indicated between systems of knowledge that aim 
at utility or pleasure and those whose end is in themselves; and 
nothing is more natural than to refer to the work in which the difference 
is most fully treated. It must not, however, be inferred that the L¢Azcs 
was written before Book A; the reference may easily have been added 
by Aristotle in a later revision. The question whether ZAics VI is 
the work of Aristotle is here irrelevant ; if it were not, there would still 
have been originally an Aristotelian Book VI covering much the same 
ground, 

Zeller thinks the Z7Azcs earlier thar the AZe/aphysics. It is certain 
at least that no undoubtedly genuine work of Aristotle quotes any part 
of the Metaphysics except A, which clearly must be considered 
separately and may have been written considerably earlier than the 
other parts. 

28. περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια. What Aristotle has shown with regard 
to σοφία is that (1) artists are thought to be wiser than experienced 
people because they know better, i. e. because they know the cause as 
well as the fact (ὃ 25), (2) master-artists are thought to be wiser than 
artisans for the same reason (ὃ 30), (3) none of the senses is thought 
to be wisdom, for the same reason (Ὁ 10), (4) the inventors of non- 
utilitarian arts are thought to be wiser than the inventors of utilitarian 
arts (Ὁ 18). The Me/aphysics being an essay in σοφία, Aristotle says 
his object in tracing in this chapter the development of thought has 
been to point out what is implied in the ordinary usage (ὑπολαμβάνουσι 
πάντες) of the words σοφός, σοφία ; and, as (1), (2), and (3) above 
clearly show, the implication is that σοφία is concerned with αἴτια or 
ἀρχαί. Aristotle says here that it is concerned with πρῶτα αἴτια. Wirth 
objects to πρῶτα, since Aristotle in this chapter only proves that 
wisdom is concerned with cer/azz causes (982 2), and does not prove 
till ch. 2 that it deals with firs/ causes (9828 5, " 9). But here (981> 


120 COMMENTARY 


27-29) Aristotle is not stating what he has proved, but what he is 
trying to prove; he proves half of it in ch. 1 and the rest in ch, 2. 


(B) Zhe causes, the knowledge of which is wisdom, are first 
causes (ch. 2). 


982* 4. It will become clear with what causes wisdom is concerned, 
if we consider the common views about the wise man. 

(1) He knows everything, as far as possible, without knowing the 
particulars one by one. 

(2) He knows things that are hard to know (which is why sensation 
does not imply wisdom). 

(3) He is more exact and (4) more capable of teaching the causes 
of things than others. 

(5) Knowledge pursued for its own sake is more truly wisdom than 
knowledge desirable for its results. 

(6) A governing science is more truly wisdom than a subordinate one. 

21. The more universal a science is, the better it fulfils the first 
condition ; and also the second, since its objects are furthest removed 
from sensation. 

25. The more primary its objects, the better it fulfils the third con- 
dition, since it is more abstract. 

28. The more it is concerned with causes, the better it fulfils the 
fourth condition. 

30. The knowledge of what is most knowable, i. e. of the first things 
and of the causes from which other things are known, best fulfils the 
fifth condition. 

b4. The knowledge of the final cause of the world best fulfils the 
sixth condition. 

4. All the characteristics of wisdom, then, point to its being the 
knowledge of first causes, including the final cause. 

11. ‘That it is not a science of production is clear also from the first 
philosophers or lovers of wisdom, Philosophy arose out of wonder, 
which implies the awareness of one’s ignorance (so that the lover of 
myth is in a sense a philosopher, myth being composed of wonders). 
If people philosophized to escape from ignorance, they were evidently 
pursuing knowledge for its own sake. 

22. This is indicated also by the fact that philosophy arose only when 
the necessities and pleasures of life had been provided for. Philosophy, 
the only science pursued for its own sake, is the only free science. 

28. Hence it might seem a privilege which God would grudge to 
man, if there is anything in what the poets say. But God is not jealous. 


A. 2. 982% 13-16 121 


983° 4. This knowledge is the most divine, (1) as being the most 
worthy of God, and (2) as being knowledge of the divine, since it 
is of first causes and God is a cause of all things. It is the least 
necessary but the best of all sciences. 

11. We begin by wondering that things are as they are, e.g. 
that the diagonal of the square is incommensurate with the side ; 

18, we must end in a state in which we should wonder if they were 
otherwise. 


982° 18. καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι. In 
]. 28, taking up the point here made, Aristotle says ‘the knowledge 
that contemplates the causes is διδασκαλικὴ μᾶλλον than the others’. 
The syllogism implied is : 

Knowledge that is διδασκαλικωτέρα is σοφία. 

Knowledge of causes is διδασκαλικωτέρα. 

Therefore knowledge of causes is σοφία. 

L. 13 is meant to state the major, 1. 28 the minor premise. τῶν 
αἰτιῶν is therefore out of place in]. 13. Baumann and Gomperz treat 
it as an interpolation from 1]. 29; but it is testified to by Alexander 
as well as by all the MSS., and similar carelessness is not uncommon 
in Aristotle. 

16, The description of ‘ wisdom’ as the ruling or most authori- 
tative science is difficult. It is easy to see how πολιτική can be 
described by Aristotle as exercising authority over such sciences 
as strategy (Z. VV. 1094> 2). It ascertains the end for man, and 
orders (ἐπιτάττει) strategy to devise means for the attainment of this 
end in particular circumstances. But σοφία is not a practical but 
a purely theoretical science; in what sense then does it issue com- 
mands? To see Aristotle’s meaning we must look to © 4-7, which 
supplies the minor premise answering to the major stated in ἃ 16-19. 
The argument is: 

The most authoritative science is σοφία. 

The science which knows the final cause is the most authoritative. 

Therefore the science which knows the ultimate causes, and among 
others the ultimate final cause, is σοφία. 

But the notion of ‘final cause’ here contains an ambiguity. The 
final cause, the study of which makes the science that studies it 
authoritative, is the end for the sake of which everything ough? to 
be done (τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον, Ὁ 5); it is only the science 
that studies this end, i. e. πολιτική, that can properly be said ἐπιτάττειν, 
and therefore, if Aristotle’s major premise is right, to be σοφία. But 
the science which Aristotle infers to be σοφία is that which studies 
τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ (7), 1. 6. the end towards which all 
creation 1: fact moves; and this is metaphysics. Thus an argument 
which could only prove ethics or politics to be the highest wisdom 
is used to prove metaphysics to be so. Aristotle gets into a similar 
difficulty in the Z7Azcs about the comparative claims of ‘politics’ and 


122 COMMENTARY 


metaphysics to be the supreme science, He describes ‘ politics 
as the architectonic science, and so seems to put it on a higher level 
than metaphysics ; but he sets this aside as a misinterpretation, and 
says that ‘politics’ does not use σοφία but ensures its coming into 
being, and issues orders not to it but for its sake (1145 8), 

It should be remembered that the present passage is a statement of 
ἔνδοξα, 50 that some looseness in the thought may be expected. 

21. Aristotle now proceeds to show that the characteristics of 
wisdom enumerated in Il. 8-19 belong to the universal science (I. 22), 
the science that deals with the most universal objects (24), with the 
primary objects (26, » 2), with causes (29, » 2), with the good or the 
best (Ὁ 6). Wisdom, then, will be knowledge of the first or most 
universal causes of things, and among others of the final cause. 

23. πως, i.e. potentially. Cf An. Post, 86% 22. 

τὰ ὑποκείμενα, the instances falling under the universal. The best 
parallel to this use of the word is in Am, Pos/, 918 αι, 

23-25. Aristotle usually, as here by implication, describes knowledge 
as proceeding from the particular, which is nearer to sense, to the 
universal, which is further from it. But for the complementary aspect 
of the truth, the advance from abstract to concrete, cf. Phys. 
184% 21- 14. 

25-28, Cf. Pl. PAzl. δὸ δ, An. Post, 84" 31, 

2g. μᾶλλον seems to go both with διδασκαλική and with τῶν αἰτιῶν 
θεωρητική. ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον practically = 7 τῶν πρώτων 
αἰτιῶν θεωρητική, and thus Aristotle shows that the science of first 
causes is worthier of the name of ‘ wisdom’ than the sciences that 
grasp secondary causes. 

be, There is a difficulty in the statement that the πρῶτα and αἴτια 
are μάλιστ᾽ ἐπιστητά. If all ἐπιστήμη presupposes these, which is 
Aristotle's constant doctrine, how can these themselves be objects of 
ἐπιστήμη P Strictly speaking they cannot, since ἐπιστήμη is demon- 
strative and demonstration cannot prove its own premises (Am, Pos/. 
100 το, ZV. 1140% 33, &c.). Really that which knows first princi- 
ples is νοῦς, or σοφία as including νοῦς, θὰ ἐπιστήμη is occasionally 
used as here in a wider sense in which it is not distinguished from νοῦς, 
In An. Post.72 19 the ἐπιστήμη Of ἄμεσα is said to be ἀναπόδεικτος. 
In An. Post. 88° 36 ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος is mentioned alongside of 
νοῦς ; but these may be only alternative expressions for the same thing, 
Even the constant use of the phrase ἐπιστήμη ἀποδεικτική suggests 
that ἐπιστήμη ἀναπόδεικτος Was not in ordinary usage a contradiction 
in terms, though Aristotle preferred to use ἐπιστήμη as implying 
demonstration. 

Jaeger argues that the argument requires τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια (cf. 1. 9 and 
B. 996" 33, which refers to the present passage), and that Alexander 
read it. He therefore proposes τὰ πρῶτά γ᾽ αἴτια and thinks that Ab’s 
reading arose from this by dittography. But Alexander may well 
have had καὶ τὰ (or καὶ) αἴτια (13. 24, 28), and Aristotle could quite 
well treat πρῶτα and αἴτια as synonyms, 


A, 2, 982% 21 — 983° 14 123 


4-7. For the argument cf. 916 ἢ, 

11, As St. Thomas observes, there is a point in the substitution 
of φιλοσοφησάντων, φιλοσοφεῖν 13, φιλόσοφος 18 for σοφία, σοφός, 
which have been used before. For Aristotle is now proving that the 
study is not practical but actuated simply by love of knowledge. 

12-13. διὰ yap... φιλοσοφεῖν. Cf, Pl. Zheae/. 155 D 

18. τὰ πρόχειρα. Alexander cites the questions ‘why amber attracts 
chaff-like substances ’ (a problem which interested Thales), ‘the nature 
of the rainbow’ (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers), 
and other meteorological problems. 

17-19. The argument is: 

Myth is full of things that excite wonder. 

He who wonders thinks he is ignorant. 

He who thinks he is ignorant desires knowledge. 

Therefore the lover of myth is a lover of knowledge. 

We may compare the interesting personal confession, probably from 
one of Aristotle’s letters to Antipater, ὅσῳ αὐτίτης καὶ μονώτης εἰμί, 
φιλομυθότερος γέγονα (fr, 1582? 14). 

22. τὸ συμβεβηκός is used here in a non-technical sense; it means 
‘the course of events’. 

23. πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγωγήν is co-ordinate with ἀναγκαίων, as is 
clearly shown by 981} 17. ῥᾳστώνη means physical comfort, διαγωγή 
mental enjoyment. The insertion of tov would make the meaning 
clearer, but is not necessary. 

24. pms is used here not in the strict sense defined in Δ᾽, Δ, vi. 
5, but in the wide sense in which it is not distinguished from σοφία or 
ἐπιστήμη. This is the regular usage in Plato and is not uncommon in 
Aristotle. Cf. Bonitz’s Index, 834 4-12. 

27. For the notion of a free science cf. Pl. Rep. 499 A, 536 E. 

28—983* 5. Cf. L.NV.1177> 31-33, Pl. Epin. 988 A, B. The opposite 
view is expressed in Epicharm. fr. 20 (Diels), Eur. Bacch, 395 f., 
427-432. 

80. κατὰ Σιμωνίδην, Fr. 3 Hiller, quoted already by Plato, Pros. 
341 E, 344 C. Simonides’ line continues ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν 
ἔμμεναι, on which Aristotle models the end of his sentence. 

983% 2. οὔτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερόν. Cf. Pl. Phacdr. 247A, Zim. 29. 

8. πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί is quoted as a proverb already by Solon, 
fr. 26 Hiller, Cf. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiographt, i. 371, 
il, 128, 615. 

6. In assigning to God knowledge of the causes of existing things, 
Aristotle is inconsistent with his account in Bk. A, in which God's 
thought has no object but Himself. He is speaking of God as 
commonly conceived. 

14. τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτόματα Alexander (18. 17) explains as τὰ ὑπὸ 
τῶν θαυματοποιῶν δεικνύμενα παίγνια, ἃ ἐξ αὑτῶν δοκεῖ καὶ αὐτομάτως 
κινεῖσθαι, i.e. the figures in something like a Punch and Judy show. 
Cf. the reference in the myth of the cave, Pl. Rep. 5148. St. Thomas’s 
(and Schwegler’s) view that τῶν θαυμάτων is predicate is sufficiently 


124 COMMENTARY 


refuted by the mode of reference to these puppets in De Gen. An. 
73410, 7418. The manuscript reading is intolerably harsh; it 
would require us to understand some such words as θαυμαστά ἐστιν 
after ταὐτόματα, and this is very difficult. Bonitz saw that rots... . αἰτίαν 
would come better after πᾶσι in 1. 16, but this would leave καθάπερ τῶν 
θαυμάτων ταὐτόματα without a satisfactory construction. Jaeger has 
put this right by supposing περί to have dropped out by haplography 
after καθάπερ. καθάπερ in the sense of οἷον is not common, but 
cf. Zop. 12416. tots... αἰτίαν is probably a marginal addition by 
Aristotle, which has been inserted in the wrong part of the text. 

15. τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμμετρίαν. I. 1053%17, Zop. 106% 38, 
1638 12, Phys. 221% 24, De Gen. An. 742% 27, E.N. 1112822 show 
that the reference is to the incommensurability of the diagonal of 
a square with the side, not to that of the diameter of a circle with 
the circumference. 

17. εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται. 1. 6. the natural supposition is 
that everything must be measurable by the smallest thing of its own 
kind, and accordingly that there must be a unitary line of which 
all other lines are multiples. 

18. κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν. The proverb is δευτέρων ἀμεινόνων (Leutsch 
and Schneidewin, i. 62, 234, li. 357). 

21-23. Bonitz raises the question whether the σοφία that Aristotle 
here claims to have stated the nature of is science in general or 
metaphysics. σοφία can be used in the wider sense (e. g. in the Lthics 
_it includes mathematics and physics, 11418 23, ἢ 1), and some of the 
marks of σοφία that Aristotle has here collected are characteristic not 
of one particular science but of excellence in any (982% 12-14). But 
from several phrases in the chapter (982° 4, 14-16, 25-28, b4, 8, 
983° 6) it is clear that he is establishing the nature of one among the 
sciences. Starting with the notion of σοφία simply as the most 
admirable form of knowledge, he has now determined it as knowledge 
of the primary or most universal causes, i. e. as metaphysics. 


(Il) THE KINDS OF FIRST CAUSE; CONFIRMATION OF OUR LIST BY A 
REVIEW OF THE DOCTRINES OF PREVIOUS PHILOSOPHERS (CHS. 3-10). 


(A) Account of previous systems (chs. 3-7). 
Early treatment of material and efficient causes (chs. 3, 4). 


983° 24. To know a thing is to know its first cause ; causes are of 
four kinds—the essence, the matter, the source of movement, the end 
or good. 

33. We have considered these in the PAyszcs, but it will be useful to 
study the views of our predecessors; we shall thus either find some 
new kind of cause or have our list confirmed. 


A, 2, 983% 15-223 125 


> 6. (1) Most of the earliest thinkers recognized only maverdal causes, 
i, 6. that out of which all things are generated and into which they pass 
when destroyed. Because such a substratum persists, they think 
nothing is really generated or destroyed. 

18. They differ about the number and nature of these causes, 
(a) Thales says the cause is water, presumably because (i) the nutri- 
ment of everything, and (ii) the seed of everything, is moist. 

27. Some think the ancient cosmologists held this view, since they 
made Ocean and Tethys the parents of generation, and made the gods 
swear by water. This speculation is doubtful, but at any rate Thales 
is said to have held this view (Hippo hardly deserves consideration). 

9848 5. (4) Anaximenes and Diogenes make air the first principle, 
(c) Hippasus and Heraclitus fire. 

8. (4) Empedocles adds earth and recognizes the four elements, 
which are eternal and merely change in number when combined 
or dissociated. 

11. (e) Anaxagoras says the principles are infinite in number ; 
practically all homogeneous substances are ‘generated’ and ‘de- 
stroyed’ thus, by congregation and disgregation. 

18. (2) Since the substratum cannot move itself, the facts forced 
philosophers to seek a source of movement. 

27. (a2) The oldest philosophers, who recognized only one sub- 
stratum, did not feel this difficulty ; (2) some of the monists, as though 
defeated by it, deny not only generation and destruction but all 
change. (c) The only monist who caught a glimpse of the efficient 
cause was Parmenides, and he did so only in so far as he recognized 
in a sense two causes. 

b 5. (d) It is easier for the pluralists to recognize it; e. g, they treat 
fire as a source of movement, and the other elements as passive. 

8 (e) Such causes being insufficient to generate the world, philoso- 
phers had to look again for the efficient cause. Neither a material 
element, nor chance, could be held responsible for the goodness 
in things. 

15. (i) When Anaxagoras said that reason was present in nature, 
as in animals, as the cause of order, he seemed like a sober man 
among drunkards—though he is said to have been anticipated by 
Hermotimus, 

20. These thinkers treated reason as the cause both of the good- 
ness in things and of movement. 

23. One might suspect that the first seeker after such a cause was 
Hesiod or Parmenides or whoever first treated love as a principle. 


126 COMMENTARY 


32. (ii) To account for the badness in the world as well as the 
good, Empedocles introduced love and strife. 

9854. These as the causes of good and evil must be good itself 
and evil itself, so that he is the first to treat good and evil as 
principles. 

1o. These thinkers had a notion of the material and efficient causes, 
but an inadequate one, for they use them but little. For 

18. (i) Anaxagoras drags in reason as an explanation only when he 
is in a difficulty, and 

21. (ii) Empedocles does not use his causes enough, nor con- 
sistently. When strife divides the All into its elements, it wazfes the 
portions of each single element; and similarly love dudes. 

29. Empedocles was the first who introduced (a) contrary efficient 
principles, (8) four material elements—though he treats them as two, 
opposing fire to the others. 

"4. Leucippus and Democritus treat the full or existent and the 
empty or non-existent as material elements ; 

10. they generate everything else by three differentiae—shape, order, 
and position. 

19. These thinkers, like the others, neglected to explain the origin 
of movement. This then is the extent to which the material and 
efficient causes were recognized by the earlier thinkers. 


983725. Thy πρώτην αἰτίαν, not, as often, the proximate, but the 
primary, ultimate cause (ἐξ ἀρχῆς 1. 24). Colle thinks that while τῶν 
ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτίων must mean absolutely first causes, τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν 
must mean the first cause peculzar to the particular kind of thing which 
is the object of the science in question. He therefore regards tore... 
γνωρίζειν as a gloss. But since the science in question here is meta- 
physics, the study of what is, simply as being, the distinction he draws 
is not relevant, and there is no reason to doubt these words. 

26. Here, as in the Phyzcs (19423), the doctrine of the four 
causes is introduced quite abruptly. Aristotle nowhere shows us how 
he reached it, nor offers any logical deduction of it. The best that he 
does is to show—what it is the main object of Book A to show—that 
these four causes are those that one after another came to light in the 
earlier history of philosophy, and that no others had come to light 
(993% 11). The doctrine is found in several of his works besides those 
that are very largely occupied with it (the PAyszcs and the Mesa- 
physics); but there is an almost complete* silence about it in the 
Organon. The one passage which refers to it is Am. Post. ii. 11. 
While in all other respects the notion of the four causes remains 
fundamentally the same in all the works in which it occurs, the place 
filled, in other references to the four causes, by the material cause is 
occupied in that passage by what is called τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοῦτ᾽ 


A. 3. 983% 25-29 12} 


εἶναι, and this is explained as the two premises from which a conclusion 
follows. Further, this cause is identified with the formal cause (948 34), 
while the material cause is never identified with the formal. The 
premises of a syllogism occur as an zmsfance of the material cause in 
Phys. 195% 18 (Δ. του 3} 20). 

27. τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. Though οὐσία is properly a non- 
committal word, meaning the most real element in a thing, wherever 
that is to be found—in the essence of the thing, the universal or class 
under which it falls, or its material substratum (Ζ. 1028 33)—yet 
Aristotle tends constantly to use it in the sense of that which he himself 
believes (Z. 1041» 7-9) to be the most real element in a thing, viz, its 
form or essence. ‘The use of it here as equivalent to τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is 
an anticipation of the result arrived at in Book Ζ. 

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ‘ the answer to the question, what was it to be so-and- 
so’. The phrase is a generalization from such phrases as τί ἣν αὐτῷ 
(sc. τῷ αἵματι) τὸ αἵματι εἶναι (P..A.649> 22). To state the τί ἢν εἶναι 
of a thing is to state its form in full (genus and differentia) without 
mentioning its matter. The only difficulty in the phrase, in its 
general form, is the imperfect tense. Why not τί ἐστὶν εἶναι ῦὺ Three 
answers have been given to this question. (1) ἦν is said to be 
a ‘philosophical imperfect’, referring to something stated earlier in the 
argument, and passages like ἐπεὶ ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι (A. 1071) 3), ‘since 
there are, as we saw, three kinds of substance’, are quoted as parallels. 
But the ‘ philosophical imperfect’ is used only when there has been an 
actual previous discussion of the subject in hand, which is the case in 
but few of the passages in which τὸ τί ἢν εἶναι is used. (2) The 
imperfect may be taken to represent duration. Cf: De Caelo 278%11 
τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἅπαν ἐν TH ὕλῃ ὑπῆρχεν, Rhef, 1363%8 οὗ πάντες ἐφίενται, 
τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθὸν ἦν, Pl. Theae/. 1564 ἀρχὴ ἧδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν. 
(3) The imperfect may be held to be an expression of Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the existence of form before its embodiment in a particular 
matter, for which cf. Z. 1032b11, 1034>12. The only difference 
between the last two explanations is that the third takes more explicit 
account of Aristotelian doctrine than the second. In this way it may 
more fully represent Aristotle's meaning. But Antisthenes is said to 
have anticipated Aristotle in the use of ἢν in this connexion by defining 
λόγος as ὃ τὸ τί ἦν, ἢ ἔστι, δηλῶν (Diog. Laert. vi. 1. 3). The phrase 
is discussed fully by Schwegler i in Excursus I to his edition of the 
Metaphysics. 

27-29. The argument is: 

The λόγος, definition, of a τος is the ultimate ‘reason why’ 
of it. 

The final reason w vhy i is a cause. 

Therefore the οὐσία or τί ἢν εἶναι (ΞΞ λό os) j Is a Cause. 

ἔσχατον is an adjective agreeing with λόγον. ‘The definition is the 
final thing to which the reason why is pushed back.’ πρῶτον, again, 
is an adjective, agreeing with τί (cf. >8 ἐξ οὗ πρώτου). ἔσχατον and 
πρῶτον are used, very awkwardly, with reference to the same thing. 


128 COMMENTARY 


It is what we come to last in the order of explanation, but it is 
objectively the first or most fundamental element in the thing. 

33. ἐν Tots περὶ φύσεως. Phys. li. 3, 7. 

bi, Aristotle’s review of his predecessors is made somewhat 
difficult to follow by the fact that he partly adopts the chronological 
order, and partly a logical order, taking up the four causes, or at least 
the material, the efficient, and the formal cause successively. Thus 
from ]. 6 to 9848 18 he deals with the material cause, and follows the 
treatment of it down to Anaxagoras. He omits the Pythagoreans, 
however, presumably as holding a more difficult view and one that 
demands fuller treatment. The discussion of them is not only 
postponed, but is divided into two parts, ch. 5, which is in the main an 
account of their views, and 989> 29g—g90* 32, which is in the main 
a criticism. The Atomists, Socrates, Plato, and the Platonists are 
similarly omitted, and this, as far as Socrates, Plato, and the Platonists 
are concerned, is no doubt due to the fact that the important part of 
their doctrine is not that which relates to the material cause. But this 
is not the case with regard to the Atomists. According to Aristotle 
they recognized only the material cause, and did not deal even with the 
question of the efficient cause (98519). The omission of them is due 
to their coming later in time; they are later tacked on to the discussion 
of the efficient cause, about which, as Aristotle holds, they had nothing 
to say (985> 4-20). Again, in discussing Empedocles’ views about 
the efficient cause, Aristotle adds a summary of his distinctive views 
in which his doctrine of the material cause is rather irrelevantly 
introduced (9858 31). 

2. περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. Aristotle does not mean either simply that 
these thinkers tried to reach the truth, as do inquirers in amy field, or 
that they studied the nature of truth, as an ‘ epistemologist’ does, but 
that they studied the truth in general, the ultimate nature of things. 
For this use of ἀλήθεια cf. A. 988% 20, a. 993 ὃ 30, ὃ 17, 20. 

5-6. ἢ yap... πιστεύσομεν. This gives us the link that connects 
all the remaining part of Book A together. Aristotle’s object is not to 
write a history of philosophy but to confirm by reference to earlier 
philosophers his own account of the primary causes, which, as we have 
seen, σοφία investigates. This purpose is reaffirmed in 986° 13, ὃ 4, 
12, 988% 20, 16, 993% 11. 

ἡ. τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει. Aristotle does not say that the earlier thinkers 
recognized the material cause. The ultimate material cause, according 
to him, is matter entirely unformed, while they, with the exception of 
Anaximander, only went back to some simple but yet definitely 
characterized form of matter such as one of the four elements. The 
causes they recognized were not matter, but only ‘of the nature of 
matter’. For the phrase cf. ἐν μορίου εἴδει De Caelo 268° 5, ἐν ὀργάνου 
εἴδει Pol. 1283 30; the usage is found several times in Plato. ἐν ὕλης 
εἴδει is especially common in Aristotle. 

- The word ὕλη occurs in its Aristotelian sense in an Orphic fragment 
quoted by Damascius—vdwp ἦν ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ὕλη (Diels, Vorsokr. ii. 


e393" 33-954) 22 129 


172. 9), but apart from this very doubtful evidence there is no evidence 
of its use in this sense by any thinker earlier than Aristotle. Frequently, 
however, it means wood as the raw material of shipbuilding or some 
other art (e.g. Pl. Phcl. 541, Zim. 69 a 6), and occasionally it is used 
of some material other than wood, e.g. Soph. fr. 743 Dindorf ot zap’ 
dkwove... ὕχην ἄψυχον δημιουργοῦντεςς. Uses like these had pre- 
pared the way for the technical use of the word by Aristotle. Prof. Burnet 
thinks (§ 148 n.) that the Pythagorean comparison of the structure 
of the world to the building of a ship may have led in the ‘same 
direction. 

13. φύσεως = ‘primary substance’, the meaning recognized in A. 
1014) 26; cf. rorg? 31 διασωζομένης τῆς πρώτης ὕλης with the phrase 
here, It is in this sense that many of the pre-Socratics are said to 
have written περὶ φύσεως. ᾿ φύσις has the same meaning inl. 17. In 
ll, 26, 27 it is used abstractly in the sense of ‘ character’. 

1g-14. τὸν Σωκράτην... ὅταν γίγνηται καλός is evidently a joke. 
Socrates was notoriously ugly. 

14. ἢ μουσικός, a reference to Pl. Prot. 335; cf. A. 1018% 2 ἢ. 

16. οὕτως οὐδέ κτλ. The sentence is grammatically complete at 
αὐτόν, but the preceding ὥσπερ brings out a clause with οὕτως by a kind 
of instinctive response. It is an instance of what Riddell calls the 
‘binary structure’ (Agology of Plato, 198). Cf. Β. 1002) 14-22, 
T. 1003%33->5, A. ro17#10, 102428, K. 1066 31-34, 1068) τι, 
Ἂν, ΤΟ7 5 7. 

17. It is necessary to read ἀεί with Bywater, or δεῖν with Wirth, 
instead of δεῖ, since the clause is still concerned with what the early 
philosophers thought. : , 

20. τῆς τοιαύτης... φιλοσοφίας, i.e. the search for the material 
cause of all things. 

QI. διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι. Cf. De Caelo 294% 
28. Aet. iii. 15. 1 says that Thales explained earthquakes in this 
way, but this may be doubted; cf. Diels, D. G. 225. 

22. λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν κτλ. Aristotle evidently had not-much 
evidence about the line of thought which led Thales to his belief in 
the primacy of water. He always speaks of Thales’ views with 
caution (A. 98422, De Caelo 294% 29, De An. 405* 19, 411° 8, Pol. 
1259*6, 18), and if Thales ever wrote anything it seems that Aristotle 
at least had never seen any work or fragment of a work of his. The 
two reasons he suggests for Thales’ doctrine (ll. 22-27) are ‘both 
physiological. At that period, as Burnet (2. G. P. § το) has pointed 
out, meteorological considerations are more likely to have prevailed ; 
Burnet therefore (as also Zeller and Doéring) suggests that Aristotle 
simply assigned to Thales the reasons which he knew to have influenced 
Hippo in treating water as the matter of all things. Both Aristotle 
(984*3) and Simplicius (Phys. 23. 22, De Caelo 615, 11) mention 
Hippo in connexion with Thales, and Aristotle (De An. 405» 3) 
ascribes to Hippo the second of the two reasons he here ascribes to 
Thales. Thales was doubtless influenced by the eastern and Egyptian 


2678-1 K 


130 COMMENTARY 


notion of the world as resting on an immense watery plain. Cf. 
Maspero, 77st. ane. des Temples de ? Orient, 24-30, 

27. εἰσὶ δέ τινες κτλ, Aristotle is probably thinking of Plato, who 
jestingly suggests (Cra. 4028, Theae/, 1528, 160p, 180C) that 
Heraclitus and his predecessors derived their philosophy from Homer, 
Hesiod, and Orpheus. Plato refers to Oceanus and ‘Tethys just as 
Aristotle doeshere, and uses the same word παμπαλαίους ( Theaet. 181 8). 
For a similar statement based on humorous suggestions of Plato’s ef. 
986 21 ἢ. The suggestion has no great historical value, as Aristotle 
himself admits (984* 2). He would not regard Hesiod, at any rate, as 
an anticipator of Thales, for in 984» 27, οϑοῦ 10 he refers to him as 
making chaos the first of all things, and ear/h the first of the elements 
in order of origin. Nor, again, would he regard Orpheus in this 
light, for though one of the main versions of the Orphic cosmogony 
makes water and slime the primitive elements, the version followed by 
Aristotle treats m7gh/ as the first principle, followed by earth and heaven 
(cf. A. 1071» 27, N. rogt» 4), and puts Ocean and ‘Tethys only in the 
fourth and fifth places. Cf. Zeller, i’. 122-125. Plato quotes two 
‘Orphic’ verses which ascribe an important function to Ocean and 
Tethys (Cra/. 402 8), but Aristotle did not believe in the authenticity 
of the so-called Orphic verses (fr. 1475 40). 

29. θεολογήσαντας. ‘This is Aristotle’s regular word in speaking 
of the early cosmologists as opposed to, the physicists (B, 10009, 
A. 1071> 24, 1075 26, N. 1091% 34, Meleor. 353% 35). 

80. ᾿᾽Ωκεανόν τε γάρ κτλ. Cf. Hom, 771. xiv. 201, 246. 

BI. τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ. Cf. Hom, Z/. ii, 755, Xiv. 271, Xv. 37. 
For the significance of the oath of the gods as securing their privileges 
in the dasmos cf. Cornford, Lrom Religion to Philosophy, ὃδ 10, 11. 

32. Christ is probably right in bracketing τῶν ποιητῶν, which comes 
in very awkwardly after Στύγα. 

9843 3. Hippo, an eclectic of the time of Pericles, is mentioned by 
Aristotle only in one other passage (De An. 4052), and there also 
with contempt. Alexander (26. 21) says he identified the first principle 
with the moist, not specifying this either as water or as air. But our 
other authorities, Simplicius (Phys. 23. 22, 149. 7, De Caelo 615. 11), 
Hippolytus (i. 16), and Philoponus (Phys, 23. 7, De An. 92. 3), all 
of whom represent ‘Theophrastus’ teaching on the subject, say that 
Hippo’s first principle was water, and this is more in keeping with the 
present passage. 

5. Diogenes of Apollonia was an eclectic of the fifth century who 
borrowed from Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Leucippus, as well as from 
Anaximenes. For his view about the primary element οἵ, fr. 5 Diels. 

7. Hippasus was a Pythagorean who, in all probability, lived some- 
what later than Heraclitus, and formed his system by a fusion of 
Pythagorean and Heraclitean elements. It may have been the promi- 
nence assigned by the Pythagoreans to fire as identical with the 
principle of limit (cf. 984» 4, 5 nn.) that led him confusedly to treat it 
as the one material cause. 


A, 3. 983 27 — 984" 10 131 


πῦρ... Ἡράκλειτος, Tor some judicious remarks on the place of 
fire in Heraclitus’ system cf. Burnet, Δ᾽, G. P.§ 69. The primacy of 
fire was not the first article of his creed, as that of water or air was in 
the creed of Thales or Anaximenes, but he thought that fire was the 
prime element just as literally as they thought that water or air was 
so. Fire is for him, however, not ‘what remains unaltered in the 
change of individual things’, but ‘that which through unceasing trans- 
formation brings this change about’ (Zeller, ἰδ, 822), 

10. ἀλλ᾽ ἣ πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι, συγκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα εἰς ἕν 
τε καὶ ἐξ ἑνός, Alexander gives, without choosing between them, three 
possible interpretations, which may be paraphrased thus: 

(1) ‘Except that they become few or many, being aggregated into 
one whole by love or segregated out of one whole by strife.’ 

(2) ‘Except that they seem to come into being, by virtue of the 
number of the parts of the same kind that are aggregated into one 
whole, and seem to perish when segregation takes place, because then 
the small homogeneous aggregates that remain escape our notice.’ 

(3) ‘But only the number or fewness of things comes into being, by 
reason of the segregation or aggregation of these elements.’ 

The third interpretation appears to take πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι in an 
impossible way, and need not be further considered. The other two 
differ in two respects. (@) The first interpretation takes πλήθει to 
mean ‘in respect of number’. ‘The elements do not come into being 
except in respect of number or fewness, i.e. they only come to be 
many or few. The second interpretation takes πλήθει to mean ‘ by 
reason of number’. The elements do not come into being, but fire, 
for example, seems to do so in virtue of the aggregation of many bits 
of fire, (ὁ) The first interpretation takes συγκρινόμενα εἰς ἕν to re- 
fer to the aggregation of unlikes by friendship ; the second takes it to 
refer to the aggregation of likes, owing to the segregation of unlikes, 
by strife. 

The second interpretation is in some respects attractive, but (@) it 
requires us to supply in thought οὐδ᾽ ἀπόλλυσθαι after οὐ γίγνεσθαι ; 
(ὁ) συγκρίνειν in an account of Empedocles’ views refers more 
naturally to the union of unlikes by love than to the incidental union 
of likes by strife ; (c) the first interpretation agrees better with fr. 17 of 
Empedocles, which Aristotle is evidently paraphrasing : 

δίπλ᾽ ἐρέω" τοτὲ μὲν yap ἕν ηὐξήθη μόνον εἶναι 
ἐκ πλεόνων, τοτὲ δ᾽ αὖ διέφυ πλέον᾽ ἐξ ἑνὸς εἶναι. 
καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, 
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν᾽ εἰς ἕν ἅπαντα, 
ἄλλοτε δ᾽ αὖ δίχ᾽ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει. 
(οὕτως ἧι μὲν ἕν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι) 
ἠδὲ πάλιν διαφύντος ἑνὸς πλέον᾽ ἐκτελέθουσι, 
τῆι μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφίσιν ἔμπεδος αἰών" 
ἧι δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, 
ταύτηι δ᾽ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. 

K 2 


132 COMMENTARY 


12. τοῖς δ᾽ ἔργοις ὕστερος. Alexander’s interpretation, ‘inferior 
in the merit of his works’, is supported by a parallel in Theophr. 
ap. Simpl. Phys. 26. 8 (τῇ μὲν δόξῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει πρότερος τοῖς δὲ 
χρόνοις ὕστερος), and is probably correct. Aristotle prefers Empedocles 
to Anaxagoras because he adopted fewer first principles, Phys. 188° 17, | 
189215; cf. De Gen. et Corr. 31413. Breier’s ‘more modern in 
the nature of his works’, which is commended by Bonitz and is to 
some extent supported by a comparison with 9895, 19, De Caelo 
308 30, interprets ὕστερος in a way which is probably without 
parallel. It is quite possible to take ὕστερος in its literal sense, as 
meaning that Anaxagoras wrote later than Empedocles though he was 
an older man. Empedocles was probably born shortly before 490 and 
Anaxagoras lived about 498-428, so that the statement might easily 
be correct. 

13-16. σχεδὸν yap... ἀΐδια, Anaxagoras held that the σπέρματα, 
flesh and the like, were ingenerable and indestructible; all that 
happened was that a number of portions of flesh, which were not 
recognized as such because they were present in wholes in which some 
other substance predominated, might be segregated out of these wholes 
and aggregated together and thus come to be recognized as flesh, or 
again mere go through the reverse process (fr. 17). This was true of 
all the ‘seeds’; why then does Aristotle qualify his statement by 
σχεδόν ὃ ‘The answer is that though Aristotle uses the word ὁμοιομερῆ 
in referring to Anaxagoras’ ‘seeds’, he included among ὁμοιομερῆ 
things which Anaxagoras did not include among the ‘ ‘seeds’, but 
treated as compounds, viz. the four elements of Empedocles (De Caelo 
302% 28, De Gen. et Corr. 31424). These were, according to 
Anaxagoras, not eternal, but were produced by combinations of 
“seeds”. 

14. The word ὁμοιομερῆ, though often used in ancient accounts 
of Anaxagoras, was probably invented by Aristotle; the common 
ascription of the word to Anaxagoras is due to misunderstanding by the 
Doxographi. The idea, though not the word, is found in Pl. Pro, 
320}. ‘The word means ‘things whose parts are similar to one another 
and to the whole things’. Aristotle uses it (1) of the elements (9928 7, 
Top. 135% 24- 6), (2) of ores, metals, and stones (Mefeor. 388" 14), 
(3) of animal and vegetable tissues such as flesh, bone, sinew, wood, 
bark (AZe/eor. 388 16). It is used more specially in sense (3), of organic 
tissues which are compounded out of the ultimate elements, and out of 
which are compounded the organs or ἀνομοιομερῇ such as the hand or 
the mouth. Anaxagoras’ own word answering to ὁμοιομερῆ is σπέρ- 
para (fr. 4, Diels i. 400. 31, 401. 14). While. Empedocles said that if 
you divide, say, blood, you resolve it into the four elements, Anaxa- 
goras said that however far you divide it you still get blood. 

καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ. In De Caclo 302% 28, De Gen. ef Corr. 314% 
24 Aristotle tells us that Anaxagoras treated the ὁμοιομερῆ, such as 
flesh and bone, as elements, and the elements recognized by 
Empedocles, such as fire and earth, as compounds. This account is 


A. 3. 984212 —984? 4 133° 


confirmed by many other authorities (cf. Zeller, i, 1210, ἢ. 1). On 
the other hand Aristotle here seems to place water and fire among 
Anaxagoras’ ὁμοιομερῆ, and a similar account is given by Simpl. Phys. 
ΓΟ τ ΘΟ, t3..26, Lucr.i.S4i. “Chere can be 
no doubt that the former view was really that held by Anaxagoras ; 
Aristotle’s account in the De Caelo and the De Gen. et Corr. is 
perfectly explicit. Some other interpretation must therefore be 
assigned to καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ. Bonitz points out that καθάπερ means 
not ‘as for example’ but ‘in the same way as’ (καθάπερ ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ 
goes not with what follows but closely with ὁμοιομερῆ, ‘the things 
which are homoeomerous in the manner of water or fire’), and finds 
an exact parallel in 9928 6 ws ὄντος τοῦ ἑνὸς ὥσπερ πυρὸς ἢ ὕδατος 
ὁμοιομεροῦς. Aristotle mentions water and fire because they were for 
him good instances of ὁμοιομερῆ ; the reference to them is confusing 
because they were 7104 instances of Anaxagoras’ σπέρματα. The state- 
ments of Simplicius, Philoponus, and Lucretius may be due to a mis- 
understanding of this passage. 

οὕτω may refer either back to the description of Empedocles’ views 
(Il. 9-11), or forward—‘in this way, viz. by aggregation and segrega- 
tion only’. : 

15. ἄλλως, ‘in any other sense’. Zeller’s emendation ἁπλῶς is 
unnecessary. 

17. τούτων means ‘these facts’ rather than ‘these thinkers’, for 
Empedocles (985* 2) and Anaxagoras (984% 15) had some notion of 
an efficient as well as of a material cause. 

ἐν ὕλης εἴδει. Cf. 983>7 n. 

27. ot μὲν οὖν κτλ. 1. 6., of the thinkers Aristotle has mentioned, 
Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus. 

20. ἔνιοί ye τῶν ἕν λεγόντων, i.e. the Eleatics. But really it was not 
the difficulty of finding a cause of change, but the difficulty of thinking 
out the nature of change, that led them to their doctrine of an un- 
changing universe. 

33- τὴν ἄλλην μεταβολήν, i.e. change of place, quantity, or 
quality. : 

bI, τῶν... ἕν φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, like τῶν ἕν λεγόντων * 30, in- 
cludes the Milesian school and Heraclitus as well as the Eleatics. 

4. The reference to two causes occurs (fr. 8, 1. 53) in the second 
part of Parmenides’ poem, that in which he professes to leave the 
truth of things and state the opinions of mortals: 


5 nw / Ν / > Ν / 

ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα 

ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης" δόξας δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας 

μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων (fr. 8. 50-2). 


At 9860 28 Aristotle describes the transition from the ‘way of truth’ 
to the ‘ way of opinion’ by saying that though Parmenides thinks that 
of necessity only τὸ ὄν exists, he is forced to follow the observed facts 
and therefore to admit two causes, τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν. 1.6. Parmenides 
is supposed to allow a lower order of reality to the sensible world and 


134 COMMENTARY 


to set about the explanation of it, even though this explanation is not 
in accordance with his account of true reality. Simplicius describes 
his procedure in the same way (P&ys. 39. 10). But this is incon- 
sistent with what Parmenides himself says in the verses quoted above, 
which imply that the second part of the poem merely states the false 
opinions of mortals—not of the average Greeks of his time, who 
would not have recognized the ‘way of opinion’ as their own, but of 
the popular philosophy of the day, i.e., as Prof. Burnet points out 
(Z.G.P. §§ 90, 91), of the Pythagorean philosophy. Aristotle 
either is simply mistaken, or knows that he is merely stating 
what occurs in Parmenides’ poem but does not belong to Par- 
menides’ own views. ws (Ὁ 4) perhaps gives some colour to the 
latter alternative. 

Aristotle tells us that the two causes recognized by Parmenides were 
the hot and the cold (98634, Phys. 188420). The μορφαί that 
Parmenides names are φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ and νὺξ ἀδαής (fr. 8. 56, 
59). Fire no doubt is hot and night is cold, but we have no evidence 
that these were the attributes which Parmenides treated as characteristic 
of them. Rather they are opposed as light and dark (cf. light and 
darkness in the Pythagorean list of contraries, 986425), and the 
mention of heat and cold is an accommodation to Aristotle’s own 
views, in which these played so important a part. 

Again, Aristotle several times says the two causes assigned by 
Parmenides were fire and earth (98634, Phys. 188420, De Gen. ef 
Corr. 318° 6, 330» 14, cf. Theophr. Phys. Op. fr. 4, Hippol. i. 11. 1). 
The identification of the second μορφή with earth must be regarded as 
a mistake. The second principle is night (cf. Simpl. PAys. 25. 16), 
and by this Parmenides means the Pythagorean ‘ mist’, ‘ air’, or ‘ void’ 
(cf. what Plato makes the Pythagorean Timaeus say, Zim. 58). 
Later in the history of Pythagoreanism, fire and earth probably came 
to be treated as the primary elements (cf. 77m. 31 8, and Burnet, ὃ 147), 
and this may explain Aristotle’s words. 

Finally, Aristotle says that Parmenides identified fire and earth with 
being and not-being (986 34, De Gen. ef Corr. 318% 6). The words 
of Parmenides are (fr. 8. 53): 


Ν ‘ vA , / 5 44 
μορφὰς yap κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν, 
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν. 


I.e. one of the two shapes they were right in recognizing, since it was 
of the nature of being ; the other they were wrong in recognizing, since 
it was of the nature of not-being. Considering the negative character 
of night or the void, we can have no hesitation in recognizing this as 
the μορφή of which Parmenides did not approve. If he had really 
meant earth, it would be harder to see why he should have con- 
demned it. 

Aristotle suggests that Parmenides caught a glimpse of the nature 
of the efficient cause, and meant one of the two μορφαί to serve this 
purpose. There is nothing in the fragments to show which of the two 


A. 3. 984° 5-11 135 


he meant, but Hippolytus (i. 11. 1) says fire was the active principle, 
and this is doubtless Aristotle’s meaning—cf. |. 6. 

5. τοῖς δὲ δὴ πλείω ποιοῦσι. Alexander and Bonitz think the 
reference still is to Parmenides; and, as we have seen, Aristotle does 
ascribe to him the principles ‘hot and cold, or fire and earth’. But 
this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the opposition τῶν μὲν ἕν 
φασκόντων εἶναι τὸ πᾶν and τοῖς δὲ πλείω ποιοῦσι. Further, μᾶλλον 
loses its meaning if the same person is being spoken about in the two 
opposed clauses. What other thinkers could be meant by οἱ πλείω 
ποιοῦντες ἢ A natural supposition is that the pluralists here referred to 
are those whom Parmenides attacks for being pluralists, viz. the early 
Pythagoreans, who identified their active principle, the limit, with light 
or fire, and their passive principle, the unlimited, with night, mist, or 
air (cf. 9868 25, Phys. 213> 22). But a comparison of 1]. 6-8 with 
985% 20-- 2, De Gen. εἰ Corr. 330” το (cf. Burnet, § 107) shows that 
Empedocles is referred to. The opposition of fire to all the other 
elements is not known to have been a feature of Pythagoreanism, and 
it is known to have been a feature of Empedocles’ doctrine, at least as 
conceived by Aristotle. Aristotle is doubtless thinking of the fact 
that fire plays a leading part in Empedocles’ account of the origin of 
the world and in his biology (cf. fr. 62, Burnet, §§ 112-15). 

There is one objection to the supposition that Empedocles is 
referred to. Aristotle includes him (985 2) among those who are said 
in the next sentence to have been pera τούτους. But this isno fatal ob- 
jection. Upto now Aristotle has been speaking of thinkers who either 
recognized no efficient cause at all or assigned a sort of efficient 
causality to one of the material causes. In the next sentence he passes 
to a later group of thinkers who recognized an efficient cause distinct 
from the material causes and in some sense taking the place of a final 
cause. Empedocles assigned efficient activity both to fire and to 
friendship and strife; he thus belonged to both groups, and yet one 
group may fairly be called later than the other. He was the last 
member of the earlier group and the first member of the later. 

8-11. It is not easy to see what Aristotle means by τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς 
and by τὴν ἐχομένην. Our first inclination would be to suppose that 
the former means the material and efficient causes, and (since Aristotle 
proceeds to speak of the cause of goodness in things) that the latter 
means the final cause. But it is not the case that Anaxagoras sought 
the final cause; he did not ask himself τίνος ἕνεκα; He sought the 
cause of the order in things, but he explained this not by an end to be 
fulfilled but by a pre-existent reason which ordered things. He entered 
on the line of thought which led others to believe in a final cause, but 
it led him to believe in an efficient cause, more distinctly conceived 
than it was by the thinkers who assigned to one of the material causes 
an efficient activity (Il. 5-8). Even those who spoke of love or desire 
as a cause (Il. 23-985® 10) did not think of this teleologically. ‘They 
did not regard it as choosing means with a view to an end, but simply 
as forming the elements, and the living things composed of them, into 

+ 


136 COMMENTARY 


certain unions, Thus, while the inquiry ‘what set things changing?’ 
did not lead to the notion of a distinct efficient cause, which is the 
proper answer to that inquiry, the question ‘why are things well 
ordered?’ did lead to that notion. These thinkers (Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras) did not arrive at the notion of a final cause at all, and 
they did not arrive at the pure notion of an efficient or mechanical 
cause, for they combined with the notion of force that of intelligence 
or else of desire. Cf. what Aristotle says in ]. 20, 988» 6, A. 10758. 
That τὴν ἐχομένην does not mean the final cause is shown further by 
the fact that Aristotle later (985211, ἢ 21) refers to the material and 
efficient causes as alone having been discussed. τὰς τοιαύτας ἀρχάς 
seems then to mean the material and material-efficient causes (the 
latter being what is referred to in ll. 5-8), and τὴν ἐχομένην the pure 
efficient cause. 

14. For Aristotle’s doctrine of τὸ αὐτόματον and τύχη see Z. 7, 
9, K. 1065% 27--" 4, and notes. 

15. τις, i.e. Anaxagoras. Cf. especially fr. 12. 

16. τὸν αἴτιον τοῦ κόσμου. πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς (Anaxagoras, 
fr. 14) suggests that κόσμος may mean ‘ order’ rather than ‘ universe ’. 
Aristotle constantly uses κόσμος in the sense of ‘universe’, but 
probably always with the notion of its being an ordered universe, 
Cf. οὐκ ἔστι κόσμος ὃ κόσμος GAN ἀκοσμία, fr. 1476” 45. 

17. οἷον νήφων ἐφάνη. ΟἿ Socrates’ account of his high expectations 
from Anaxagoras, Phaedo, 97 B. 

19. We have no independent confirmation of this story about 
Hermotimus. He is a highly legendary personage, whose soul was 
said to have often left his body and during its absence acquired informa- 
tion of events at a distance ; he was also said to have been one of the 
previous incarnations of Pythagoras. The connexion between him 
and Anaxagoras probably is simply that the separation of his soul from 
his body was thought to furnish an analogy to Anaxagoras’ distinction 
of mind from matter. So Zeller, i® 1267-9. Aristotle makes 
a suggestion similar to his present one in De An. 404% 25 ᾿Αναξαγόρας 
ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει τὴν κινοῦσαν Kal εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ὡς TO πᾶν ἐκίνησε 
νοῦς, but Archelaus is just as likely to be there referred to. 

20-22. ‘Those who thought thus posited the cause of the goodness 
in things, and at the same time the cause of movement, as a first 
principle. The efficient cause (love, or reason) was described as 
good, but it was used by these thinkers not in the way appropriate 
to what is good, viz. as the final cause of the universe, but simply 
as its efficient cause. Cf. 988> 6-11, where the point is made more 
distinctly. 

23. τὸ τοιοῦτον, i.e. something which was at the same time the 
cause of the goodness of things and of their movement. 

26. πρώτιστον μέν κτὰ. Fr. 13. Simplicius (PAys, 39. 18) connects 
this fragment with fr. 12, which describes the working of love, and 
Plutarch (για! 13. 756 f.) treats the subject of μητίσατο as being 
᾿Αφροδίτη. ᾿Ανάγκη, Δίκη, Γένεσις, and Φύσις have also been suggested, 


A. 3. 984514 — 4. 985% 25 137 


but Simplicius and Plutarch are probably right. In any case the verse 
belongs only to the ‘ way of opinion’. 

The best MSS. have πρῶτον, but πρώτιστον is found in the citations 
by Plato, Plutarch, and Simplicius, and is metrically more probable. 

27. πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα κτλ. Theog. 116-20. After εὐρύστερνος 
Aristotle omits the words πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, Further, the 
recognized form of the last line is 78° ἔρος, ds κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι 
θεοῖσιν. Aristotle seems in quoting from memory to have been con- 
fused by a reminiscence of such verses as Hom. 72, ii. 579, Xvi. 194, 
Hymn to Apollo, 315, 327. 

32. ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον. The promise is nowhere fulfilled. 

985% 3. In saying that Empedocles made love the cause of good and 
strife of evil Aristotle is thinking of such phrases as ἠπιόφρων Φιλότητος 
ἀμεμφέος ἄμβροτος ὁρμή (fr. 35. 13), ᾿Αρμονία θεμερῶπις (152. 
and again of the description of strife as οὐλόμενον, μαινόμενον, λυγρόν 
(frr. 17. 19, 115. 14, 109. 3) and as Δῆρις αἱματόεσσα (fr. 122. 2). 

5. For ψελλίζομαι in a similar connexion cf. 993215; elsewhere 
Aristotle expresses the same point by saying there is a lack of 
διάρθρωσις in early thinkers (986) 5, 989% 32, B. 1002) 27). 

10. kal... κακόν, omitted by Ab, Alexander, and Asclepius, was pro- 
bably suggested to some copyist by Alexander’s remark that something 
of the sort must be supplied to complete the sense. 

12. ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, Phys. ii. 3, 7. 

18. μηχανῇ, as is shown by the word παρέλκει, refers to the stage 
deus ex machina. 

20-21. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις... νοῦν. Cf. Socrates’ disappointment with 
Anaxagoras (Pl. Phaed. 98 B ἀέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ὕδατα αἰτιώμενον), 
and Laws 967 Β, et. A. 9886. Anaxagoras’ bold statement πάντα 
διεκόσμησε νοῦς (fr, 12) gives promise of a spiritual explanation of the 
world, which is never carried out in detail. Mind started the original 
vortex-movement, but the subsequent changes are explained in a 
purely mechanical way (frr. 9, 13, 15, 16, 19). Yet reason, though 
not conceived as absolutely immaterial (the description of it as 
λεπτότατον καὶ καθαρώτατον in fr. 12 implies that it is thought of 
simply as a very tenuous form of matter), is thought of as knowing and 
foreseeing (ib.). Anaxagoras, in fact, is on the verge of discovering 
a genuinely spiritual and teleological principle of explanation. 

23. For τὸ ὁμολογούμενον in the sense of ‘consistency’ cf. 989* 3, 
991} 27, B. 10008 25, An. Pr. 478 8. 

23-29. πολλαχοῦ... πάλιν. The same point is made in B, 1000 
26, "9. 

25, 27. ὅταν implies an indefinite repetition of the cycle of διάκρισις 
and σύγκρισις : this is also implied in ΠῚ. 17. 6, 26. 1, 12. 

25. στοιχεῖα. στοιχεῖον, properly ‘ one of a row’ (στοῖχος), appears 
to be first used of the regularly lengthening shadow on a sun-dial (cf. 
Aristoph. Zec/. 652). But in Plato it often means an element of 
spoken language, answering to γράμμα, an element of written 
language, and in Zheaet, 201 Ε it is metaphorically used of the elements 


138 COMMENTARY 


of any complex whole. The illustration in 985>17 shows how 
a transition might naturally be made from στοιχεῖον as ‘letter’ to 
στοιχεῖον as ‘element’. In Aristotle’s time the word was already 
in use in the latter sense; cf. 1. 32 τὰ . . . λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα, 
Phys. 184% 26, 204% 33, De Gen. et Corr. 328> 31, 3208 26, Meteor. 
339 5, De Part. An. 646% 13, De Gen. An. 736% 31. N. 1087) 13 
seems to imply that the word was regularly used in this sense by the 
Platonists. On the general history of the word cf. Diels, Hvementum,— 
Empedocles’ own word for elements was ῥιζώματα (fr. 6). 

27. συνίωσιν (sc. τὰ στοιχεῖα). For the plural verb with neuter plural 
subject cf. 9885, M. 1079220, An. Pr. 69>4, An. Post. 87>3, De Gen. 
et Corr. 3247» το, 337% 10, De Resp. 480> 15, De Part. An, 660° 33, De 
Gen, An. 717 11, 76225. The construction is especially common in 
the Metaphysics and in the Lthics (cf. Zell on L. NV. i. τ. 2, vi. 4. 4). 

80. τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν διελεῖν. Cf. Il. 2-4. 

32. Ta... λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα, Cf. 1, 25n. 

τέτταρα πρῶτος εἶπεν. Thales had made water the ultimate 
principle, Anaximenes air, Heraclitus fire. Anaximander had recog- 
nized, at the first remove from his ultimate element, two main 
sub-principles, the hot and the cold (Diels’, i. 16. 16, Zeller, 1.5 295 n.). 
Anaximenes is said to have given a list of the main forms of matter 
derived from air—fire, wind, cloud, water, earth, stones (Diels, 22. 24). 
Xenophanes had thought all things were earth (fr. 27), or earth and 
water (frr. 29, 33). Heraclitus had said that fire is transformed into 
sea, and half of the sea is earth (i.e. has just been transformed 
from earth into water by liquefaction), while half is πρηστήρ or fiery 
storm-cloud (i.e. has just been transformed from fire into water); in 
other words, he had recognized two subsidiary elements, water and 
earth (fr. 31, cf. Burnet, ὃ 71). Epicharmus may have recognized as 
elements water, earth, breath, and snow (fr. 49). Thus the way had 
been prepared for Empedocles’ theory ; but none the less it was highly 
original. When an earlier thinker named more than one element, he 
had not meant to draw up a list of ultimates from which everything 
else was derived while they were not derived from one another. The 
earlier thinkers were at bottom monists ; if they recognize a plurality 
of elements, it is only as variants of an ultimate unity. What Empe- 
docles did was to treat their secondary principles as primary principles. 
Further, to account for the variety of existing things his predecessors 
had had to admit qualitative changes in their elements ; Empedocles, 
starting with a variety of elements, thought no qualitative change in 
them need be supposed, but aggregation and disgregation of them 
would produce all the phenomena. The view of Heraclitus is 
specially likely to have influenced Empedocles, as it was itself in- 
fluenced by that of Anaximander; and the importance attached to the 
number 4 by the Pythagoreans may have led to the selection of that 
number of elements. Empedocles’ own theory became in turn the 
starting-point for that of Philolaus, who added one more element, 
the ‘fifth body’ of which the heavens are made. 


A. 4. 985% 27 —985> 12 139 


38. οὐ μὴν χρῆταί ye τέτταρσιν. Cf. 984b5 n. 

8. ἐκ τῶν ἐπῶν. Aristotle has in mind such passages as fr. 62, and 
probably others not now extant which implied more distinctly an 
opposition between fire and the other elements. 

4. The introduction of the Atomists here is somewhat con- 
fusing, since Aristotle has been dealing with the treatment by earlier 
thinkers of the effictent cause, about which the Atomists have nothing 
to say (1. 19). They ought to have been mentioned in the section 
dealing with the materzal cause (983 6—984 18), but Aristotle broke 
off that section when he came to Empedocles and Anaxagoras, who 
were the first to recognize efficent causes distinct from the elements. 
Cf. 983> 1 n. 

Little was known to the ancients about the life of Leucippus. 
Epicurus is said (Diog. x. 13) to have denied his existence and 
Lucretius never mentions him. Rohde tried to show that he never 
existed (Verhandl. der 34. Philologenvers., pp. 64-90) but has been re- 
futed by Diels (Verhandl. d. 35. Philologenvers., pp. 96-109). Leucip- 
pus is mentioned quite often by Aristotle, and Prof. Burnet suggests 
(δ 171 n.) that Epicurus purposely ignored him. 

ἑταῖρος Asc. interprets as ‘disciple’. Democritus was a disciple 
of Leucippus, but the word does not mean more than ‘associate’; 
Aristippus is said to have described Socrates as 6 ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν (Lhel. 
1398) 31). 

5. τὸ πλῆρες καὶ τὸ κενόν. Prof. Burnet (ὃ 175) suggests that 
Leucippus borrowed the terms from Melissus. Cf. Melissus, fr. 7. 
sub fin. Leucippus seems to have ‘flourished’ about 450. 

6. τὸ μὲν ὃν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὃν suggests a connexion between the Atomists 
and the Eleatics, which is well brought out by Burnet, § 173, and in- 
deed by Aristotle himself (De Gen. ef Corr. 324° 35—325% 32). 
Leucippus, Aristotle points out, conceded to the Eleatics ‘that motion 
was impossible without the void, that the void was not real, and that 
nothing of what was real was not real’. He thought he could recon- 
cile this with an admission of the reality of change, by holding that the 
real is a plenum but the plenum is not one, and that there is a not-real 
(the void). He in fact ‘gave the Pythagorean monads the character 
of the Parmenidean One’ (Burnet, p. 336). 

9. τὸ κενὸν τοῦ σώματος, the reading of all the MSS., does not give 
the right sense. We must read either τὸ σῶμα τοῦ κενοῦ (Fonseca), or 
τὸ κενὸν ἔλαττον τοῦ σώματος (Zeller), or (which is the least violent 
change) τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ σῶμα (Schwegler). W. Jaeger holds (Z/ermes, li. 
486 f.) that in careless writing οὐθὲν μᾶλλον can have the force of οὐθὲν 
ἔλαττον, but the passages he cites in support of this (g90* 15, B. 99633, 
Meteor. 356% 16) are to be otherwise explained. - 

II, 12. πάθεσιν... παθημάτων, a good instance of the identity in 
meaning of the two words, maintained by Bonitz (Arist. Stud. νὴ 
against Bernays. 

τὸ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν ἀρχὰς τιθέμενοι. The statement Is too wide. 
Anaximenes seems to have been the first to ascribe all changes to rare- 


140 COMMENTARY 


faction and condensation (Burnet, § 26), and Diogenes was almost the 
only later monist who followed his example. 

12. Alexander records the variant reading καὶ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματι- 
κῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, Where μαθηματικῶν is evidently an old corruption 
of παθημάτων and καὶ ὥσπερ has been put in to make some sort of 
construction. 

18. τὰς διαφοράς. The differentiae by which the Atomists ex- 
plained τὰ ἄλλα were of course not differentiae of both the ‘ material’ 
causes, the full and the empty, but only of the full, i.e. of the atoms. 

183-19. Of the three ‘ differences’ of the atoms, the only permanent 
characteristic of a given atom is shape (Phys. 1845 21, De Caelo 275» 
31, De Gen. δ᾽ Corr. 325>18, 326%15). The atoms are hence 
often called σχήματα or ἰδέαι (cf. Zeller, 1°. 1063 n. 3). The shapes 
were thought to be “infinite in number (Zeller, 1064 ἢ. 2). On the 
other hand two atoms might be at different angles to one another; 
cf. AH and AZ. This is a difference of bane Or two atoms 
making the same angle with one another may be on different sides of 
one another; cf. AN with NA. This is a difference of τάξις. 

Aristotle overlooks one difference which the atoms were supposed to 
have, that of size (Zeller, 1064-6). On the question whether they 
also differed in weight cf. Zeller, 1066-8, Burnet, ὃ 179. 

15. ῥυσμῷ. ῥυσμός is the regular Ionic form of ῥυθμός and is found 
in Archilochus (62. 7, Hiller), Anacreon (69. 2), and Callimachus 
(2p. 43. δ): Cf. βασμός, ἀνδροβασμός. ῥυθμός is used in the sense 
of ‘shape’ by Herodotus (v. 58), Hippocrates (De Artic. 62 (ii. 214. 2 
Kiihlewein)), Alexis (Drop. 1. 4), and Xenophon (Jem. iii, το. 10). 
Democritus wrote a book περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων ῥυσμῶν (fr. 5). 

διαθιγῇ. Both here and in H. 1042 14, De Gen. οἱ Corr. 315" 35, 
327° 18, Simpl. Pays. 28. 18, 180. 19 the MSS. vary between διαθιγή 
and διαθηγή, and the latter is the form that is found in Suidas; in 
Democr. fr. 223 κακοθηγίη occurs as a variant for κακοθιγίη. The 
word is commonly derived from διαθιγγάνω and supposed to mean 
‘mutual contact’. But διαθιγγάνω, in the only passage quoted by L. 
and S., . A. 634%9, means something quite different. Accordingly 
Prof. Beare has suggested (Greek 7) heories of Elementary Cognition, 37, 
and Hermathena, xxxv. 469) that διαθιγή is a dialectal form ‘of διαθήκη. 
διαθήκη Occurs in the sense-of διάθεσις in Democr. fr. g (cf. προσθήκη = = 
πρόσθεσι"), and this is just the sense we want (διάθεσις = τοῦ ἔχοντος 
μέρη τάξις, A. το22Ὁ 1). Hesychius gives θήγη = θήκη, θέσις, τάξις. 

There are two possible words, διαθιγή derived from διαθιγγάνω, and 
διαθήγη derived from διατίθημι. There does not seem to be, as 
Prof. Beare thinks, any intrinsic objection to the derivation of διαθιγή 
from διαθιγγάνω. The difference between AN and NA may naturally 
be described as one of ‘mutual contact’. Again, διαθιγή does not 
seem to be a possible dialectal form of διαθήκη; Prof. Beare has done 
nothing to show the possibility of this. The MS, authority is on the 
whole in favour of retaining the form διαθιγή, and if we retain it we 
must derive it from διαθιγγάνω. But the facts to which Prof. Beare 


A, 4. 985 12-21 141 


has called attention make it quite posszd/e that διαθιγή is an illusory 
form due to a mistaken derivation, and that διαθήγη should be restored 
everywhere. 

16. τροπῇ. τροπή in this sense occurs again in H. 1042) 14, 
De Gen. et Corr. 315» 35, 316%2, 327% 18. 

17. τὸ μὲν AxtA. Democritus was interested in the letters of the 
alphabet (cf. frr. 18'-20, De Gen. οἱ Corr. 31514, and Diels in 
Verhanal. der 35. Philologenvers. 109"), and the instances are probably 
due to him. 

18. Wilamowitz (Comm. Gr. iv. 27) points out that the only form of 
Zeta known to Aristotle was ZT, and accordingly reads τὸ δὲ I τοῦ H. 
This is confirmed by Philo, who has H and Z, and tries, though of 
course ineffectually, to show that these differ θέσει (de Aet., p. 34. 13, 
Cumont). 

19. περὶ δὲ κινήσεως κτλ. Aristotle complains elsewhere that the 
Atomists ascribed everything to necessity (De Gen. An. 789» 2), and 
that they did not say what the natural movement of the atoms is (De 
Caelo, 300 8). They assumed that the movement of the atoms is 
eternal, and gave no reason for it (A. 1071 32). It is true that they 
do not expressly call it natural, since they have not Aristotle’s 
distinction of natural and compulsory movement in their minds, but 
they would have had no difficulty in choosing this alternative, nor was 
their view any less satisfactory than Aristotle’s doctrine of the natural 
motion of bodies up, down, or in acircle. He is right, however, in 
saying (789> 2) that they had no notion of a final cause of the move- 
ment, 

21. τῶν δύο αἰτιῶν, the material and the efficient cause, cf. 8 12. 


Pythagoreans and Eleatics (ch. 5). 


985" 23. (1) Contemporary with and even earlier than these thinkers 
were the Pythagoreans, whose mathematical training led them to think 
the principles of mathematics were the principles of all things. 

26. Numbers were the first of these, and they thought they saw in 
numbers many resemblances to actual things and events (justice, &c., 
being identified with certain modifications of number); they saw that 
music, too, depends on number ; 

9861. hence they regarded the elements of numbers as elements 
of all things, and the universe as a number, They collected corre- 
spondences between numbers and things, 

6. and tried to make the correspondence complete ; e.g. they posited 
the counter-earth to bring the planets up to the perfect number ten. 

13. Our object is to see how the principles they recognize compare 
with our list. Evidently they treat numbers both as the material 
principle of things and as modifications and states of things, The 


142 ’ COMMENTARY 


elements of number are the’ even, which is unlimited, and the odd, 
which is limited ; unity is produced out of these two, and number out 
of unity, and the world is numbers. 

22. Other Pythagoreans recognize ten principles, arranged in two 
columns : 


limit unlimited 
odd even 

one plurality 
right left 

male female 

at rest in motion 
straight crooked 
light darkness 
good evil 
square oblong. 


27. Either Alcmaeon borrowed from these thinkers or they from 
him; he says most human things go in pairs, but has no definite list 
of pairs. 

b2. Both alike (a) treat contraries as first principles, and (4) treat 
the first principles as the mazter of which things are made. : 

8. The views of the pluralists may be gathered sufficiently from 
what has been said. 

10, (2) The views of the monists differ from one another both in 
merit and in the degree of their conformity to nature. The discussion 
of them does not fit into our inquiry into the causes, for they do not, 
like some of the physicists, mean by saying the world is one that it is 
generated out of a single matter; they entirely deny change. 

17. But it is pertinent to our inquiry to remark that Parme- 
nides is thinking of what is one in definition, Melissus of what is 
materially one; Xenophanes, the first of these monists, does not 
specify or recognize either aspect, but with reference to the universe 
says the One is the only God. 

25. Xenophanes and Melissus may be dismissed as too crude 
to deserve notice, but Parmenides has a more seeing eye. Claiming 
that there is no non-existent apart from the existent, he thinks that one 
thing alone, viz. being, exists ; 

81. but being forced to follow the phenomena, and holding that 
while only the one exists according to definition many things exist 
according to sensation, he posits two causes, hot and cold, i. e. fire 
and earth, which he connects with being and non-being. 

987° 2. (3) Summary of chs. 3-5. Thus we have found (a) the 


A. 5. 985° 23-29 143 


earliest thinkers recognizing one or more material principles, (2) some 
thinkers recognizing also one, or two, efficient causes, 

g. The thinkers earlier than the Pythagoreans speak rather ob- 
scurely about the causes, except for the points just mentioned ; 

1g. the Pythagoreans similarly recognize thetwo causes, but have these 
peculiarities—(i) they treated the limited (or one) and the unlimited 
not as characteristics of something else such as fire, but as themselves 
the substance of the things of which they are predicated, and 

20. (ii) they began to define things; but (a) they did this super- 
ficially, and (8) they supposed that the first thing to which a definition 
was applicable was the essence of the term defined, as if one were 
to identify ‘double’ and ‘two’ because two is the first thing that is 
double. This makes one number the essence of many things. 


98523. πρὸ τούτων seems to indicate that by οὗτοι Aristotle 
means the Atomists, about whom he has just been speaking, and not 
the general body of philosophers whom he has been discussing since 
9836. The Pythagoreans who were ἐν τούτοις will then be those of 
the end of the fifth century, such as Philolaus. 

ot καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι. Aristotle refers to the Pythagoreans 
occasionally as οἱ Ἰταλικοί or οἱ περὶ Ἰταλίαν, usually as of ἸΤυθαγόρειοι, 
but not infrequently as of καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι (cf. 989 29, De Caelo 
284> 7, 293% 20, Mereor. 342» 30, 3458 14). Ifthe shorter reading in 
986 29, 30 is the correct one, Pythagoras himself is only once men- 
tioned in Aristotle’s extant works (2/e/, 139814). For Aristotle he 
seems to be little if anything more than a legendary figure; there is a 
set of people commonly called Pythagoreans, but Aristotle will not 
vouch for the origin of any of their doctrines in Pythagoras himself. 

On Aristotle’s account of the Pythagoreans cf. A. Rothenbiicher, 
Das System der Pythagoreer nach den Angaben des Artstoteles; W. A. 
Heidel in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. xiv. 384-436, O. Gilbert, ib. xxii. 
28-48, 145-165, F. M. Cornford in Class. Quart. xvi. 137-150, 
XVii. I-12. 

25. τὰς τούτων ἀρχάς. What exactly they meant by these we shall 
see at 986217. On the Pythagorean view that the principles of 
numbers are principles of all things cf. Burnet, §§ 52, 142-147, 153, 
Milhaud, Philosophes-Géométres de la Gréce, 101-110. 

26. φύσει πρῶτοι, i.e. the simplest of mathematical objects. Rela- 
tively numbers were ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, spatial magnitudes ἐκ προσθέσεως. 
Cf. 982 26. 

27. ὁμοιώματα πολλά. For instances cf. N. 6, Sext. Emp, Adv. 
Math. vii. 94-109. 

29. πάθος here must mean πάθος καθ᾽ αὗτό, i, 6. συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ αὑτό 
or property. Oddness, evenness, &c., are cited as ἴδια πάθη of number 
in I. 1004 10. Strictly speaking, then, the text should mean that the 
Pythagoreans identified justice, &c., with some property of number 


144 - COMMENTARY 


such as oddness or squareness. At 990% 25, however, we learn that 
they thought injustice, &c., were actual numbers. But it is just one of 
Aristotle’s complaints about them that they confused a property like 
‘double’ with a number like 2 (987# 22), 

δικαιοσύνη. The Pythagorean description of justice as τὸ ἀντιπεπον- 
θὸς ἄλλῳ (LZ. Δ). 1132622) implies that it is treated as a square, 
a number in which each of two factors treats the other as the other 
treats it. In 77. 77. 1182" 11-14 we are expressly told that the Pytha- 
goreans treated it as a square number. Alexander tells us that it was 
the first square number (which agrees with 987 22), but that some 
identified it with 4, others with 9. Theol. Arithm. (p. 30 Ast), Asc. 
(34. 17), Syr. (130. 29), ps.-Al. (741. 5), and Philop. (PAys. 388. 30) 
say that it was 5, while Plutarch (de 75. ef Os. 75, p. 381f.) says 
it was 3. These writers, however, evidently represent a less trustworthy 
tradition. 

30. ψυχή τε καὶ νοῦς. Alexander says the Pythagoreans used 
ψυχή in the sense of νοῦς and assigned to it the number 1, since 
reason is μόνιμον καὶ ὅμοιον πάντῃ Kal ἀρχικόν. Similarly Hippolytus 
says (i. 15. 2) that the Pythagorean Ecphantus identified νοῦς and 
ψυχή. Asc. agrees that reason was represented by 1 (cf. Plut. Zpvz7. i. 
3. 8, 7. 18 Theo Smyrn., p. 98..1, 100. 5 Hiller, Stob. Zc/. i, 1), but 
says that soul was 2, since it has τὸ ποθέν ποι, i. e. moves from pre- 
mises to a conclusion. Elsewhere we read that soul was 4 (Plut. 
Epit. i. 3. ὃ, Sext. Emp. iv. 6), 6 (Syr. 130. 33, Procl. zz Zim. 223 δὴ 
or 216 (Syr. 130. 33, 188. 4). All that we can say with certainty is 
that Aristotle’s words imply that soul and reason were represented by 
the same number ; this number was in all probability 1. 

καιρός, Alexander tells us, was represented by 7, with reference 
to certain critical periods in human life (birth at seven months, cutting 
of teeth at seven months after birth, puberty at 14, maturity at 21— 
cf. N. 1093214, Theo, p. 103. 1—104.19). The sun, the cause of all 
critical periods, was supposed to come seventh of the heavenly bodies, 
counting towards the centre. Asc. gives further reasons for the 
connexion of καιρός with the number 7. 

τῶν ἄλλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἕκαστον. ‘Thus the point was 1, the line 2, the 
plane 3, the solid 4, the physical body, or body endowed with quality 
and colour, 5, the body endowed with soul 6, the body endowed with 
reason 7 (Procl. 27 7171. 340A, 223 8, Theol. Arithm., Ὁ. 55 Ast, Asc. 34. 
33, Sext. Emp. adv. Math. iv. 4, 5). Another tradition assigns the 
number 210 to body (Syr. 143. 6, 188. 3, ps.-Al. 767. 11), 1 to fire, 
3 to air, 7 to earth, 9 (? 10, since 1 X 3X 7 X 10=210) to water (Syr, 
143. 7), while another, with less probability, assigns 9 to water, 11 to 
fire, 13 to air (ps.-Al. 767. 12). Again, knowledge was 2 (Aet. i. 3. 
8, Theo, p. 98. 2), opinion 3 (Aet. ib., Asc. 34. 30, Theo, p. 98. 3; 
another tradition makes it 2, cf. Al. 39. 16, 75. 22, Asc. 65. 3), sensa- 
tion 4 (Aet. i. 3. 8, Theo, p. 98. 4). Daring was 2 (Plut. De 75. ef Os. 
75, Ῥ. 381f., Al. 74. 13), strife 2 (Plut. ib.), marriage 3 (Zheol. Arithm., 
p. 16), 5 (Al. 39. 8), or 6 (Stob. Ac/. i. 1. 10, Theol. Arithm., p. 33) 3 


A. 5. 985> 30 — 986" 8 | 145 


love, friendship, wisdom, and inventiveness were 8 (Theol. Arcthm., 
Ρ. 58): 

τι Pythagoras is said to have discovered the elements of the theory 
of musical harmony (Nicomachus, Harm. v, Ὁ. 244. 14 Jan, Diog. 
Laert. viii. 12, Iambl. Vet, νά. 115-121), and Burnet (ὃ 51) is 
inclined to credit this. The octave, the fifth, and the fourth were at 
any rate known to Philolaus and Archytas. Cf. Zeller, 1.5 507 f. 

33. Bonitz thinks that since in the next line πᾶσα ἡ φύσις means 
‘the whole of nature’, it can hardly in this line mean ‘the whole of 
thetr nature’, and therefore proposes πάντα for πᾶσαν, and this is to 
some extent confirmed by Alexander (38. 2). The proposal is 
attractive, but in view of Aristotle’s carelessness in using words or 
phrases in different meanings in close succession it is hardly necessary. 

986? 2. τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἁρμονίαν εἶναι. Aristotle tells us (De Cae/o 
ii. 9) that the sun, moon, and stars (including those now called fixed 
stars) were supposed by the Pythagoreans to move at speeds pro- 
portional to their distances from the centre of the universe, and to give 
forth accordingly high or low notes which together made an ἐναρμό- 
νιον φωνήν, a scale. This information is supplemented by Alexander 
(39. 22), who says the bodies that moved more slowly gave forth 
a lower, and those that moved faster a higher note. ‘The moon, the 
sun, Venus, and Mercury were at distances from the earth which were 
to one another as 1, 2, 3, 4, and so with the other planets. This 
account does not agree with the later Pythagorean astronomy with 
which Aristotle has made us familiar. The later Pythagoreans be- 
lieved that the middle of the universe was occupied not by the earth 
but by a central fire, which they called the ‘ hearth’ of the universe. 
Round this revolved ten bodies, in the following order—counter-earth, 
earth, moon, sun, the five planets, the heaven of the fixed stars, This 
belief in ten moving bodies could be reconciled with the notion of 
a celestial harmony only if account was taken of the fact that Venus 
and Mercury had the same apparent velocity as the sun, and if-the 
number of the notes was thus reduced to eight. But the evidence 
indicates that, in its earliest form at all events, the celestial harmony 
comprised only the moon, the sun, and the five planets. This agrees 
better with Alexander’s account, but he must still be wrong in saying 
that the distances of the sounding bodies were as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, since 
these are not the proportional lengths of the strings whose notes make 
up an octave. Cf. Zeller, 1.5. 537-542, Burnet, ὃ 152. 

7. προσεγλίχοντο. The word is found again in N. rogo? 31 
προσγλιχόμενοι ταῖς ἰδέαις τὰ μαθηματικά, and in Procl, 7 Tom. 25 Ὁ, 
where it is followed by an indirect question and means ‘to inquire 
earnestly’. It seems best to take it, with Alexander and Asclepius, to 
mean ‘they added it eagerly’, rod... εἶναι being a final genitive ; cf. 
Bonitz, Zndex, 149” 15-19. 

8. Various reasons for regarding ro as the perfect number may 
be seen in an extract in Theol. Arithm., p. 61 Ast from a work by 
Speusippus on the Pythagorean theory of numbers. A favourite 

2873-1 L 


146 COMMENTARY 


Pythagorean way of representing the number ro was as a τετρακτύς, 
i.e. by the following figure : 


The τετρακτύς was that by which they swore their most solemn oaths, 
and was called ὑγιείας ἀρχή (Aet. i. 3. 8, Luc. de lapsu im sal. 5, Sext. 
Emp. adv. Math. vii. 94-100, cf. Philolaus fr. 11, Porphyry, Vit. Pyth. 
20). On the various forms of τετρακτύς cf. Theo, p. 93. 1799. 23 
Hiller, and on its interpretation F. M. Cornford in Class. Quart. 
Xvil. I-4. 

11. Belief in the counter-earth* is ascribed definitely to Philolaus 
(Aet. ii. 7. 7, ili, 11. 3), but we have no means of knowing whether it 
originated with him. It is part of the late Pythagorean theory which 
denied that the earth was the centre of the universe ; the counter-earth 
was held to be between the earth and the central fire. Pythagoras 
himself probably held a generative theory. In the De Caelo (2938 23), 
as here, Aristotle charges the Pythagoreans with having introduced the 
counter-earth on purely @ przorz grounds. But according to Aetius 
ii. 29. 4, in his work on the Pythagoreans Aristotle said that some of them 
explained eclipses of the moon as being caused, sometimes by the earth, 
sometimes by the counter-earth; and with this we may compare De Cae/o 
293” 21, where Aristotle says that some (and they can only have been 
Pythagoreans) thought there might be many bodies near the centre 
of the universe, hidden from us by the interposition of the earth, and 
explained thus the greater frequency of lunar than of solar eclipses. 
Thus they had some facts to suggest the theory of a counter-earth. 
‘The history of the theory seems to be this. Anaximenes had assumed 
the existence of dark planets to account for lunar eclipses, and 
Anaxagoras had revived that view. Certain Pythagoreans had placed 
these dark planets between the earth and the central fire in order to 
account for their invisibility, and the next stage was to reduce them 
to a single body’ (Burnet, ὃ 151). Cf. Zeller, 1.5 532 n. 2. 

12, διώρισται. . . ἐν ἑτέροις. The subject is, as we have seen, 
dealt with in De Cae/o ii. 13. Alexander refers also to the now lost 
work on the Pythagoreans. Cf. a similar reference to this work, 
fr. 1513 8-20. 

16. The statement that the Pythagoreans made number the material 
cause of things may be compared with the statements that they, unlike 
the Platonists, thought that the numbers actually are the things 
(986% 2, 21, 987527, 30, M. 108317, N. rogo® 22), or are in the 
things (M. to80b1, Phys. 203% 6), or are the constituents of the 
things (990° 22, M. ro80b2, τῇ, 1r083h11, 18, N. 10go® 23, 32), 
or have spatial magnitude (M. 1080 19, 32). Aristotle insists that 
the Pythagorean theory of numbers as the substance of things was no 
mere symbolism, but a literal account of the nature of the physical 


A. 5. 9868 11-17 147 


world (989> 33, N. 1091®18). We are not to suppose that they 
deliberately rejected the notion that numbers are not spatial. Like 
all the pre-Socratics, they had not reached the notion of non-spatial 
reality. Presumably they thought of the number ro as deg, and not 
merely as being represented by, a set of bits of matter arranged as 
a τετρακτύς, and this is no more surprising than that Empedocles 
should think of love and strife, or Anaxagoras of mind, as material 
things. No doubt the statement that the Pythagoreans made number 
the matter of things presents their theory in the absurdest possible 
form, but Aristotle is merely bringing out the fact that they had not 
drawn certain distinctions which later philosophy made evident. On 
the whole subject cf. Zeller, 1,5. 483-495, Burnet, §§ 52, 143-146. 

17. καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις. Alexander suggests various 
interpretations—(1) that the numbers cause the πάθη καὶ ἕξεις of 
things and thus are an efficient cause, (2) that number is matter, the 
even is πάθος, and the odd ἕξις (this interpretation he ascribes to 
Aspasius), (3) that the even number is ὕλῃ and πάθος, the odd number 
ἕξις. Clearly none of these interpretations really interprets the text. 
πάθη and ἕξεις are to be distinguished, if at all, only as temporary and 
permanent modifications. The words are occasionally elsewhere 
coupled in a similar way, e.g. A. 1015534, 1020419, K. 106129, 
Phys. 223%18. But what can ἀρχὴ ds πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις mean? If we 
remember what Aristotle’s object is throughout his history of earlier 
thought, and notice that ws πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις is opposed to ws ὕλη, we 
cannot doubt that another of the four causes is meant. At 987%13 
Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans recognized two causes, and 
though his words there are difficult it seems likely that he means the 
material and the formal cause. In 987% 20 he says that they ‘ began 
to speak about the “ what ” and to define’, i. 6. to recognize the formal 
cause. He adds that this recognition was marred by their supposition 
that the first thing to which the-definition of a given term applied 
must be the essence of the term, e.g. that 2 must be the essence of 
‘double’. Is not the supposition that justice is the first square, which 
he has already alluded to, just of this nature? 4 was the first thing to 
which the definition of justice (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ) applied ; there- 
fore, they said, 4 was the essence of justice. Another point may be 
mentioned. Speaking of the relation between a thing and its formal 
cause, Aristotle says (987> 11) that the Pythagoreans called this 
relation ‘imitation’; we may connect this with the statement we have 
already had (985 32), that according to them all other things ‘seemed 
to have been made like to the numbers’. It seems clear, then, that 
Aristotle is hinting that they thought of numbers as in some sense 
formal as well as material causes. ἕξεις is a natural enough equivalent 
for εἴδη (cf. H. 1044» 32, A. 1070% 12). πάθη is more surprising, but it 
can be used as equivalent to ποιότης (M. 1083* 10) or διαφορά (De 
Gen. et Corr. 3158 0) or εἶδος (Meteor. 382% 29) ; a πάθος may be an 
element in the essence of a thing (De Part. An. 678* 32). Aristotle 
means, then, that the Pythagoreans thought the number which a thing 

L2 


148 COMMENTARY 


‘jmitated’ temporarily or permanently was a πάθος or ἕξις which made 
the thing what it was, temporarily or permanently. The use of 
two words which are not quite technical words for ‘ formal cause’ is 
appropriate when Aristotle is speaking of thinkers who did not clearly 
distinguish the various kinds of cause. 

From the words καὶ οὗτοι Bonitz infers that Aristotle must mean that 
the Pythagoreans explain the affections of things by the affections of 
numbers as earlier thinkers had explained them by the affections— 
condensation and rarefaction—of some material element. But it is 
impossible to get this out of τὸν ἀριθμὸν νομίζοντες ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ ὡς 
ὕλην τοῖς οὖσι καὶ ὡς πάθη τε καὶ ἕξεις, and καὶ οὗτοι may just as well 
only mean that the Pythagoreans like the other philosophers recog- 
nized no other causes than some of those which Aristotle himself has 
formulated To prove this is his main point throughout these 
chapters. 

18. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πεπερασμένον kth. The subsumption of the 
even under the indefinite, the odd under the finite, marks, as Heidel 
(Archiv fiir Gesch. der Phil. xiv. 390) observes, the meeting of ‘two 
streams of interest, the ethico-religious and the mathematico-scientific ’. 
In view of the fact that Pythagoreanism was primarily an ordered way 
of life, we are probably entitled to consider the opposition of the 
definite and indefinite the more fundamental of the two. It appears in 
the forefront in 986* 23, 987% 15, 990% 8, and the opposition of good 
and bad which runs through the συστοιχίαι (οἵ. £. NV. 10965 οἱ 
Πυθαγόρειοι... τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν) Connects 
itself much more naturally with that of definite and indefinite than with 
that of odd andeven. Definite and indefinite are the wider terms, and 
odd and even are the exemplification of them in a sphere which was 
to the Pythagoreans specially important, that of number. In later 
times (6. g. in the fragments of ‘ Philolaus’, 1-3, 11) odd and even re- 
cede into the background, and limit and the indefinite form by far the 
most important opposition.  Zeller’s argument (i.° 490-493) for the 
primariness of the opposition ‘odd and even’ does not do justice 
to the ethical element in Pythagoreanism. Cf. Heidel, 1. c. 388, 389. 

If we ask why the Pythagoreans connected the even with the 
indefinite, the odd with the definite, we find various reasons suggested 
by ancient writers. Aristotle gives the reason thus (Phys. 203° 13): 
περιτιθεμένων γὰρ τῶν γνωμόνων περὶ τὸ ἕν καὶ χωρὶς OTE μὲν ἄλλο & ἀεὶ 
γίγνεσθαι τὸ εἶδος, ὁτὲ δὲ ἕν. ae ie present considerable diffi- 
culties (for their meaning cf, Zeller, 55 ἢ. 3, Burnet, ὃ 48, Milhaud, 
P hilosophes- es de la Grece, ΕΣ I1y, Heath, Gk. ath. i. 83), 
but Stobaeus (i. 1. 10), Alexander (apud Simpl. Phys. 457. 12), 
Simplicius, Plone and Themistius agree in an interpretation 
which may be Παιδί ταῖσι by the following BeUress 


A. 5: 986% 18-20 149 


If you start with one dot and place a gnomon round it, and continue 
this process, you always get a figure of definite shape, the square; if 
you start with two dots you get a series of oblongs varying indefinitely 
in shape. Or, to put it arithmetically, the sum of the odd numbers up 
to any point is always a square, the sum of the even numbers is always 
of the form 2 (z+ 1), and the ratio of # to m+ 1 increases as 7 becomes 
larger. It is to be noted that ‘square’ and ‘ obleng’ occur in the list 
of opposites (1. 26) ; this confirms the view that the way of thinking 
we have just illustrated counted for much with the Pythagoreans. 
If it be remembered that the Pythagoreans described numbers through- 
out in what we should call zeometrical language, as triangular, square, 
oblong, gnomons, pyramidal, plane, solid (cf. Heath, G&. Math. i. 76- 
84), it will seem probable that Aristotle’s statement of the way in which 
they connected the odd with the definite, the even with the indefinite, 
is trustworthy. 

But Heidel (I. c. 392-397) has made it appear extremely probable 
that the terms were connected in another way as well: 


Se ee 


Let us first take ten, an even number (A). The process of halving, 
represented by the arrow, goes on without let or hindrance, there 
being no limit set to it bya solid unit. But if we take eleven, an odd 
number, we find that the unit added sets a limit, preventing the 
indefinite continuance of the process (B).’ Heidel’s theory appears to 
offer the best explanation of several passages in Greek authors (Stob. 
i, 1.10, Nicom. Arthm. i. 7. 2, Plut. De Vita et Poest Homert 145, De 
E. 8, p. 388 a, B, Qu. Rom. 102, p. 288 ἢ, Simpl. PAys. 455. 20), 
and is quite in the spirit of early Pythagoreanism. 

1g. According to Alexander and Theo Smyrnaeus the number 1 
was regarded by the Pythagoreans as both odd and even and was 
called ἀρτιοπέριττος, because when added to an even number it makes 
it odd, and when added to an odd number makes it even (Al. 40. 20, 
41. 12, Theo, p. 22. 5 Hiller). Theo says that Archytas took this 
view. Sir T. Heath suggests alternatively (Ga. Math. i. 71) that 
the unit was called even-odd because it was the principle of even as 
well as of odd numbers. For this view cf. Theo, p. 99. 24—1I00. 8. 
Mr. F. M. Cornford points out (Class. Quar?. xvii. 3) that in the signifi- 
cance it ascribes to the numbers 1, 2, 3 the Pythagorean scheme falls 
into line with the early cosmogonies, in which ‘there is (1) an 
undifferentiated unity. (2) From this unity two opposite powers are 
separated out to form the world order. (3) The two opposites unite 
again to generate life’. 

20. τὸν 8 ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τοῦ évds. The Pythagoreans do not seem to 
have made 1 the generative principle of the other numbers as the 
Platonists generated them from 1 and the indefinite dyad. ‘They 


150 COMMENTARY 


started with 2 as the first even and 3 as the first odd number, and 
generated the later numbers from these, 4 by squaring 2, 5 by adding 
2 and 3, &c. (cf. Zeller, 1.5 505-507). But since 1 combined oddness 
and evenness, 2 and 3 may be said to have been produced by a sort 
of dismemberment of 1. 

22. ἕτεροι implies that the ten pairs of opposites were no essential 
part of the Pythagorean system. Definite and indefinite, odd and 
even, were the only fundamental antitheses. Zeller refers the longer 
list, not improbably, to Philolaus. The list is referred to in Z£. WV. 
1096 8 (cf. 1106 29, De Caelo 285%10). InN. 109311 Aristotle 
may have a slightly different list in view, since he mentions the 
powers of certain numbers, which do not occur here ; there, however, 
he may be referring to a Platonic list. Plut. de /s. ef Os. 48, p. 370E 
gives a slightly different list; Simpl. PAys. 181. 22 gives one with 
seven, Porph. V7. Pyth. 38 one with six, pairs of opposites; Al. 694. 
Ig mentions οὐσία and τρίγωνον among the goods. Aristotle knew 
that further contrarieties were noted by the Pythagoreans ; 6. g. they put 
‘above’ and ‘before’ among the goods (Simpl. De Caelo 386. 20). 
This precise list is of no special importance ; but probably it acquired 
a certain vogue among the Pythagoreans owing to its recognizing just 
ten pairs of contraries. 

23. συστοιχία is a rather puzzling word in Aristotle. Origi- 
nally it meant a line of soldiers, for instance, or chorus singers, and it 
came to mean a line or list of cognates. Its application to the Pytha- 
gorean doctrine (cf. N. 109312) must be distinguished from the 
wider use in I’. 1004» 27, K. 1066 15, A. 1072 31, and from a quite 
different application which it has in I. 1054» 35, 1058 13. 

24. ἕν πλῆθος. We have already seen (1. 18n.) that ‘odd’ 
gnomons added to an odd number always produce one figure, the 
square, while ‘even’ gnomons added to an even number produce 
a plurality of differently shaped oblongs. Accordingly unity was 
thought to be connected with oddness and definiteness, plurality with 
evenness and indefiniteness. 

δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν. Milhaud suggests that δεξιόν refers to the 
regular (πεπερασμένον) movement of the fixed stars ‘to the right’, 
ἀριστερόν to the irregular movement of the planets ‘to the left’ 
(Pl. Zim. 36c). The view that the planets move from west to east, 
the other stars from east to west is ascribed in Plut. Δ}. ii. 16. 2 to 
‘the mathematicians’ and to Alcmaeon, and in Theo. 150. 12 to 
Pythagoras himself, to whom it may actually go back. Cf. Burnet, 
§ 54. There are obviously other reasons which may have led to the 
inclusion of ‘the right’ in the ‘column of goods’. As an instance of 
this inclusion οἱ. the Pythagorean rule that the right shoe should 
be put on first (fambl. Vit. Pysh. 83). 

ἄρρεν θῆλυι Plut. Qu. Rom. 102. 288 c-x, De Δ΄. 8, 388 a-c 
gives ingenious reasons for the connexion between τὸ ἄρρεν and 
τὸ περιττόν. The Pythagoreans called the odd numbers male, the 
even female (Zeller, 1.5 461 ἢ. 1). It is to be noted that Plato com- 


A. 5. 986% 22-26 ΤΡῚ 


pares the functions of the limiting form and the indefinite matter 
to those of father and mother respectively (Zim. 50 Ὁ), and that 
Aristotle himself uses the same illustration in 9885. He thinks the 
male contains the formative, the female the material principle (De Gen. 
An. 729% 9, 28, 7308). Ordinary Greek thought regarded the father 
as supplying the essential principle in generation, and the mother as 
furnishing only the nourishment necessary to the seed; cf. Aesch. 
Lum. 658-661 : 

οὐκ ἔστι μήτηρ ἡ κεκλημένου τέκνου 

τοκεύς, τροφὸς δὲ κύματος νεοσπόρου, κτλ. 

25. ἠρεμοῦν κινούμενον. Aristotle gives in Phys. 201) το ff. the 
reason why movement was connected by the Pythagoreans and Plato 
(e.g. Zim. 57 Ε) with otherness, inequality, and not-being. It was 
because movement ‘ was thought to be indefinite’. The inclusion of 
the moving and the resting among the indefinites and the definites 
respectively may be connected with the evidently old notion of the 
gnomons (cf. 1]. 18n.). The figure produced by putting an odd- 
numbered gnomon round an odd number never changes in shape ; 
that produced by putting an even-numbered gnomon round an even 
number changes shape at each stage. And, more generally, it was 
natural that movement or variation should be connected with the 
indefinite, and stability with the definite. 

εὐθὺ καμπύλον. This is a particular application of the opposition 
of unity and plurality. The straight line is that which has one direction 
throughout, the crooked line that which changes its direction. 

φῶς oxétos. These are the principles that are criticized in the 
“way of opinion’, Parmenides’ account of the current (presumably 
Pythagorean) beliefs of his time (fr. 8. 53-59, 9. 1-4). Cf. 984>4 n. 
There is reason to believe that the Pythagoreans identified darkness, 
air, and void. One of the many ways in which the Pythagoreans 
applied the notion of the limit and the unlimited was to think of the 
world as formed by the gradual ‘ drawing and limiting’ (N. 1091217) 
of the boundless air (Phys. 204% 31) outside the universe (203% 7) by 
the limit. ‘The Pythagoreans said there was a void, and it entered 
into the universe itself from the boundless breath, the universe breath- 
ing in even the void’ (213 22). Cf Burnet, ὃ 53. The Pythagoreans 
probably also connected φῶς with the bounding coloured surface of 
things (xpovd in Pythagorean language = émipdvera, De Sensu 439° 31), 
σκότος with the unexplored, indefinite interior. Cf. Gilbert in Archiv 
Sir Gesch. der Phil. xxii. 150. 

26. ἀγαθὸν κακόν. Though good and evil are technically sub- 
ordinate members of their συστοιχίαι, Aristotle refers to the positive 
list as the ‘column of goods’ (Z. WV. 10966), and in this he is 
justified. It must have been because they were thought inferior, rather 
than because they were thought to be even or unlimited, that the left 
side and the female sex, at least, were put into the second column; 
the inference seems to have been that because they were bad and the 
bad was unlimited, they must be unlimited. 


152 COMMENTARY 


τετράγωνον ἑτερόμηκες,. The connexion between the square, the 
odd, and the limited has been pointed out in]. 18 ἢ, ἑτερομήκης is 
used primarily of a rectangle whose adjacent sides are of unequal 
length. From figures it was transferred to numbers; here it would 
naturally mean a number having unequal factors, Plato uses both 
this word and προμήκης more widely (Zheae/, 148 a) of all numbers 
other than squares; the later Pythagoreans distinguished them. 
Nicomachus (Arzshm. ii. 17) defines the former as having one factor 
greater than the other by 1, the latter as having one factor greater than 
the other by more than 1, 

27. Alemaeon is commonly described as a Pythagorean (Diog. 
Laert. viii. 83, Iambl. Ve. Pyth. 104, 267), and he certainly dedicated 
his book to eminent Pythagoreans (fr. 1), Aristotle does not class 
him as an ordinary Pythagorean, because in the regions of physiology 
and medicine he was a decidedly original thinker. 

29. ἐγένετο τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἐπὶ γέροντι Πυθαγόρᾳ, and δέ are omitted 
by Ab, and there is no trace of them in Al.; they are probably 
a later addition, though the statement is likely enough to be true 
(cf. Iambl. Vet. Pyth, 104). The suspiciousness of the words is in- 
creased by the fact that Aristotle only once elsewhere mentions Pytha- 
goras, and nowhere claims any knowledge of his date. Cf. 985> 23 ἢ, 

81. This declaration of the twofoldness of ‘most human things’ was 
made by Alcmaeon the basis of a theory according to which ἰσονομία 
of the δυνάμεις wet and dry, cold and hot, sweet and bitter, &c., was 
the source of health, and μοναρχία the source of disease (fr. 4)—a view 
which influenced greatly the later Pythagoreans. 

Ὁ 9, τούτων, the Pythagoreans mentioned in ὃ 22-26, and Alemaeon, 

4. τῶν ἑτέρων, the Pythagoreans in question, 

6. τὰ στοιχεῖα must be the ἀρχαί referred to in 1. 3, i.e, not the 
numbers but the principles contained in the columns of opposites, 
Though Aristotle here treats both limit and the unlimited as material 
causes, in 988426 he treats only the latter as the material cause, 
I.e., though the Pythagoreans treated things as being made of 
(πεπλάσθαι ἐκ) limit and the unlimited as if these were both in the same 
sense elements of things, yet limit from its very nature is not a 
material element but a regulative principle, a foreshadowing of 
Aristotle’s own ‘form’ as the unlimited is of ‘matter’. In 17 we 
have already seen that Aristotle ascribes to the Pythagoreans an 
obscure recognition of the formal principle. ᾿ 

8. τῶν... πλείω λεγόντων τὰ στοιχεῖα. Aristotle refers to the 
thinkers discussed from 984® 8 onwards, grouping Empedocles, Anaxa- 
goras, the Atomists, and the Pythagoreans together as pluralists, 

12. τοῦ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν cannot mean ‘in respect of naturalness’, 
which, besides not being in point here, would be rod κατὰ φύσιν. It 
must mean ‘in respect of conformity to the nature of the sensible 
world’, This was just the point in which the Eleatics, who denied 
the existence of plurality and change, were lacking ; cf. the description 
of them as ἀφύσικοι which Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Aristotle 


A, 5. 986% 27 — 986) 21 153 


(Adv. Math. x. 46), Parmenides, however, according to Aristotle, 
ge more attention to the nature of things than Melissus did (cf, 
gl) 

εἰς μὲν οὖν τὴν νῦν σκέψιν κτλ. The inquiry about the Eleatics 
is foreign to Aristotle’s purpose because they denied the existence of 
plurality, and without plurality the notion of a cause is unmeaning, 
Cf. Phys. 184 25—185° 4. 

19. τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἑνός. Aristotle’s reason for this  state- 
ment may be seen from the opposition between κατὰ τὸν λόγον and 
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν in |, 32, He conceives of the first part of Parme- 
nides’ poem as stating what we have to think about the world 
(ἐξ ἀνάγκης ... οἴεται 1. 29), the second part as stating what sensation 
tells us about it. In this he is influenced no doubt by the repeated 
identification, in the first part, of what can be thought with what 
is (fr. 5, 6. 1, 8. 34-36). Similarly in Phys. 185> 7, arguing against 
the Eleatics, he points out that when they say all things are one they 
may mean by ‘one’ either ‘continuous’ or ‘indivisible’ or ‘ having 
the same definition ’, like μέθυ and οἶνος. Parmenides is presumed to 
use ‘one’ in the third sense, His argument is ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὃν ἕν 
σημαίνει (1878 1). I.e, all things share the definition of being and 
therefore are one in definition, κατὰ τὸν λόγον. This seems to 
describe Parmenides’ method of argument correctly ; but as regards 
result he does not mean merely that what is is embraced under one 
common definition. He means that it is ἐν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην, one solid 
material whole; the denial of ‘that which is not’ is, among other 
things, the denial of a void. 

20. τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Simpl. Phys, 87. 6, 10,1 argues that 
Melissus denied the corporeality of the real, but this isa misinterpreta- 
tion of the words preserved in fr. 9, which are really part of a refuta- 
tion of the Pythagorean plurality of reals (Zeller, 1.6 770 n. 2, Burnet, 
§ 169). The one, which Melissus declares to be ‘infinite in magni- 
tude’ (fr. 3), is clearly something material. 

ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον. Cf, Parm, fr. 8. 32, 33, 42, 43. 

ὁ δ᾽ ἄπειρόν. Cf. Mel. fr. 3. 

21, πρῶτος. Plato’s remark (Soph. 242 Ὁ) that ‘the Eleatic school 
began with Xenophanes and still earlier’ is not to be taken very 
literally, He only means that something like Eleatic views might be 
found occasionally expressed in the old poets; he says the same 
of the views of Heraclitus (Zheac/. 179), Even his treatment of 
Xenophanes as a founder of the school is probably not very seriously 
meant. Xenophanes was a religious teacher rather than a philosopher, 
Cf. 983» 27 ἢ, 

21-23. évioas... διεσαφήνισεν. No other instance of ἑνίζειν is quoted, 
and no other instance of διασαφηνίζειν in Aristotle, ἑνίζειν is a natural 
enough coinage on the analogy of μηδίζειν, &c., and means ‘ to become 
a partisan of the One’. Cf. Pl, Zheae/. 18146 τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται, 
(quoted by Burnet, ὃ 61 n.), διασαφηνίζειν, though not found else- 
where in Aristotle, is‘ found in Xenophon, 


154 COMMENTARY 


22. τούτου λέγεται γενέσθαι μαθητής. The life of Xenophanes 
may probably be dated approximately at 565-475. Whether we date 
the birth of Parmenides about 540, or about 514 (Burnet, § 84), it is 
quite possible that he may have been a pupil of Xenophanes. But 
Aristotle speaks with hesitation, and there is no independent confirma- 
tion of his words, which may be based merely on Pl. Soph. 242 Ὁ. 
Xenophanes may have visited Elea, the home of Parmenides, but it is 
unlikely that he founded a school there (Burnet, § 55). Parmenides’ 
early associations were Pythagorean (Burnet, § 84). 

οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν. Asclepius, Ueberweg (PAzlol. 26. 709), Zeller 
(1.5 631 n.), and Burnet (ὃ 60) take this to mean that Xenophanes did 
not pronounce in favour either of a finite or of an infinite world. But 
in De Caelo 294* 23 Aristotle tells us that Xenophanes said the earth 
was ‘rooted to infinity’, and quotes a verse of Empedocles in which 
he attacks those who believed in boundless depths of earth and 
heights of air. Aristotle’s words here probably refer not to the 
question whether the world is finite, which was mentioned only 
parenthetically, but to the general question in which Aristotle is 
mainly interested, the question what sort of cause the Eleatics recog- 
nized. οὐθὲν διασαφήνισεν is in fact explained by the words that 
immediately follow. 

23. τῆς φύσεως τούτων οὐδετέρας, ‘the nature of either of these 
causes’. With τούτων we must understand τῶν ἀρχῶν or τῶν 
αἰτιῶν (Il. 3, 5). ‘The two causes are, of course, the λόγος and ὕλη 
referred to in ll. 19, 20. 

24. οὐρανόν is here used in the last of the three senses distinguished 
in De Caelo 278" g—21, i.e. ‘ the material universe’. 

ἀποβλέψας, ‘with a view to’. The word has in Aristotle lost its 
literal meaning. 

τὸ ἕν εἶναί φησι τὸν θεόν, ‘he says that the One (i.e. the universe) 
is the God’ (i. e. the only God, in opposition to the many gods of the 
poets), Cf, fr. 23. 

27. ἀγροικότεροι. Elsewhere Aristotle calls Melissus’ line of argu- 
ment ἐριστικός, ἀσυλλόγιστος, φορτικός (Phys. 185%8, το, 186% 8, 9). 
Aristotle thinks meanly of Melissus (1) because he substituted material 
unity for the conceptual unity recognized by Parmenides (but on this cf. 
1. το n.), (2) because of certain alleged defects in an argument in which 
Aristotle supposes him to be trying to establish the spatial infinity of the 
world (Soph. £7. 167» 12-20 ; but on these arguments cf. Burnet, ὃ 166). 
For a defence of Melissus cf. Offner, in Archiv fiir Gesch. der Phil. iv. 
12-33. 

28. μᾶλλον βλέπων. Parmenides is similarly ranked higher than 
Melissus in Phys. 185% το, 1862 8, Pl. Ζεαεί. 183 Ε. 

30. Cf. Phys. i. 3. Parmenides’ mistake, Aristotle points out, was 
that while he only proved that there is one single term which includes 
everything that is, viz. ὄν, he thought he was proving that there is only 
one thing, the truth being that the one term ov is applicable to many 
things, 


A. 5. 986) 22 —987% 10 155 


81. Cf. 984> 4n. 

τὸ ἕν. In view of 1]. 14, 29 and Al. 45. 3 there is much to be said 
for Christ’s proposal of τὸ dv ἕν. Or perhaps τό should be excised, as 
Bywater suggested. 

9872. Aristotle now sums up what he has said from 983? 6 
onwards. 

4-9. The construction here is somewhat confused. It is not clear 
whether the accusatives in Il. 4-6 are governed by παρειλήφαμεν or by 
τιθέντων. The general structure of the sentence leads us to expect 
accusatives epexegetic of ταῦτα as παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ... παρά τινων IS 
epexegetic of rapa τῶν συνηδρευκότων. Yet to take the accusatives in 
ll. 4-6 as governed by παρειλήφαμεν involves (1) taking σωματικὴν τὴν 
ἀρχήν to mean ‘we have received the principle bodily’, i.e. we have 
received it stated as something bodily ; (2) supplying παρά before τῶν 
μέν and τῶν δέ; and (3) taking ἀμφοτέρων .. . τιθέντων as a genitive 
absolute—all of which are rather awkward. It seems, then, that the 
accusatives in ll. 4-6 are governed by τιθέντων, and that this construc- 
tion has taken the place of an epexegetic object of παρειλήφαμεν such 
as Aristotle meant to have proceeded to. This originally intended 
construction appears however in |. 9, where ταύτην can only be the 
object of παρειλήφαμεν. Christ thinks that this construction prevails 
in the whole latter part of the sentence (Il. 7-9), and excises τιθέντων 
in 1]. 8 as an emblema from 1. 7. This would be attractive if it made 
the sentence a good one, but it leaves the difficulty of the first part 
untouched ; considering the general confusion of two constructions 
which the sentence shows, τιθέντων in 1. 8 is not surprising. 

5. τῶν μέν, i. e. Thales, Hippo, Anaximenes, Diogenes, Hippasus, 
Heraclitus (984* 2-8), Melissus (986? 19). 

τῶν δέ, i.e. Leucippus and Democritus (985? 4-20), though τῶν 
πρώτων (987% 4) does not apply very well to these. 

9. τῶν μέν, i. 6. Parmenides (9840 3), Anaxagoras (984> 15-22). 

τῶν δέ, 1. 6. Empedocles (985% 2-10). 

10. τῶν ᾿Ιταλικῶν, the Pythagoreans. Cf. οϑη8 31, 988% 26, AZe/eor. 
342) 29, and οἱ περὶ τὴν ᾿Ιταλίαν De Caelo 2938 20. Pythagoras came 
from Samos but founded his society at Croton, and soon had disciples 
in many of the cities of Magna Graecia. The society at Croton was 
broken up and the members who remained in Italy established them- 
selves at Rhegium. Most of them gradually migrated to Greece, but 
towards the end of the fifth century many returned, and in the fourth 
century the school was re-established at Tarentum. ‘There were, 
however, important settlements of Pythagoreans in Greece, at Thebes 
and at Phlius, 

μορυχώτερον. The MSS. and the Greek commentators give here 
a large number of variants, which are best explained as attempts 
to interpret the hapax legomenon μορυχώτερον, which is recorded by 
Alexander as a variant. μαλακώτερον (A? yp. E) and μετριώτερον (E) 
have probably found their way into the MSS. from Alexander’s and 
Asclepius’ paraphrases. Alexander gives σκοτεινότερον and μαλακώτερον 


156 COMMENTARY 


as alternative interpretations of μορυχώτερον ; the former is probably the 
real meaning. Diels (/ermes, x]. 301-306) has thrown much light on 
the word. It is probably akin to μοριφόν, which Hesychius interprets 
as σκοτεινόν, μέλαν, and to ἀμυδρῶς, ἀμαυρῶς, which occur in similar 
contexts, 985% 13, 988% 23, 0038 13. μορύσσειν occurs in Hom. Od. 
ΧΙ, 435, and is explained as = μολύνειν, ‘to soil’. Μόρυχος occurs 
as a name of Dionysus, and as a personal name both in Athens and 
in Syracuse. 

18. δύο μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν... τρόπον looks at first sight 
as if it should be interpreted, in the light of δυοῖν αἰτίαιν τυγχάνουσι 
κεχρημένοι (1. 11), as the material and the efficient cause. But 
recognition of the efficient cause is nowhere else attributed to the 
Pythagoreans. It is distinctly implied in one passage (9904 8-12) 
that they did not recognize it. Aristotle might have treated their 
‘unlimited’ as a material, their ‘limit’ as an efficient cause, but 
he does not do so. He treats the numbers, and the elements of 
numbers—limit and the unlimited—alike as material causes (986? 6). 
Nor can Aristotle mean, as Alexander suggests (47. 5), that the 
Pythagoreans recognised two material causes, the limit and_ the 
unlimited; for he has not referred in this summary to any other 
thinkers as recognizing two material causes, so that κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν 
τρόπον would be out of place. We must suppose, then, that κατὰ τὸν 
αὐτὸν τρόπον means that like ‘the others’ (1, 11)—Parmenides, Anaxa- 
goras, and Empedocles—they stated two causes, and like them stated 
these obscurely. But while the others had recognized the material 
and the efficient causes, the Pythagoreans recognized the material and 
the formal. Aristotle then comments first (ll. 15-19) on their treat- 
ment of the material cause, and next (Il. 20-27) on their treatment of 
the formal, We have already interpreted 986217 as ascribing some 
recognition of the formal cause to the Pythagoreans, 

18. τὸ ἕν is used here as synonymous with τὸ πεπερασμένον in |. 15. 
Cf. N. rogt*® 14-18. καὶ τὸ ἕν in], 16 seems to have been mistakenly 
added by a copyist who looked forward to |. 18. 

22. Aristotle has, as τε implies, two complaints against the 
Pythagoreans. First, they defined superficially. E.g, they defined 
justice as τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς ἄλλῳ, a definition which (ZV. 1132 23) 
does not answer to the nature of justice. Secondly, they asked what 
is the first thing of which you can predicate ἀντιπεπονθός, and, since 
they thought numbers the simplest, most intelligible things in the 
world, they answered that it must be anumber. The first number that 
is ἀντιπεπονθός, i.e. the first product of two factors that treat each other 
in the same way, is 4. Therefore, they said, 4 is the ἀντιπεπονθός. 
I. 6. they reason that because 4 is the first ἀντιπεπονθός therefore it is she 
ἀντιπεπονθός. Thus they are wrong both in saying that the dvturerov- 
θός is justice and in saying that 4 is the ἀντιπεπονθός. 

26. tows non dubitanits est, sed cum modestia quadam asseverantis, 
Bz. Ind. 347533. Cf a. 995°17, T. 1005%6, 10, A. 1015» 33, 
H. 10264 15. 


A. 5. 987% 13-28 154 


27. πολλὰ τὸ ἕν ἔσται. Alexander gives alternative interpretations, 
(1) that friendship, for instance, will be each of several numbers 
of which the definition of friendship (e. g. τὸ ἰσάκις ἴσον) is predicable, 
(2) that a number will be each of several things whose definition is predi- 
cable of it. Bonitz thinks that both of these points are implied. But, 
as Aristotle has said only that the firs/ number of which a definition 
was true was identified with the thing defined, the second must be the 
true interpretation. 

ὃ κἀκείνοις συνέβαινεν. E.g. τ was both the point and réason, 
4 Was justice and the solid, 2 was opinion and daring. Cf. 985» 29, 30. 

28. τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, the earlier and the later of the 
thinkers before Plato. Jaeger brackets καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, treating τῶν 
ἄλλων as a variant reading for τῶν πρότερον; but this is unnecessary, 


Plato (ch. 6). 


9878 29. Plato’s system has some features that distinguish it from 
that of the Pythagoreans. (1) He was familiar from youth with the 
Heraclitean doctrines of Cratylus, that sensible things are in a constant 
flux and that there is no knowledge of them. These views he never 
abandoned, but 

by, (2) when Socrates, instead of studying the physical universe, 
tried to find the universal in morals and fixed attention for the first 
time on definitions, Plato accepted his procedure, and thought that 
definition must be of non-sensibles because sensibles were always 
changing. 

7. These non-sensibles he called Forms ; sensibles were called after 
them, and existed by participation in them. Only the name ‘par- 
ticipation’ was new; the Pythagoreans had already said that things 
exist by ‘imitation’ of numbers. But they neglected to discuss the 
nature of this relation of things to the Forms, 

14. Further, he recognizes mathematical objects as existing between 
sensibles and Forms, differing from sensibles by being eternal and 
unchangeable, from Forms by there being many of the same kind. 

18. He thought the elements of Forms were the elements of all 
things, ‘the great and the small’ being the material, ‘the one’ the 
formal cause ; the numbers were made out of the great and the small 
by participation in the one. 

22. He agreed with the Pythagoreans (1) in considering unity a 
substance and not an attribute, (2) in making numbers the causes of 
the essence of everything else ; he differed from them (1) in treating 
the indefinite as a dyad, composed of the great and small, (2) in 


- 


158 COMMENTARY 


treating the numbers as existing apart from sensibles, (3) in treating 
mathematical objects as an intermediate class. 

29. The separation of the one and the numbers from things and 
the introduction of the Forms were due to his studies in dialectic, of 
which the Pythagoreans were innocent ; the treatment of the material 
cause as a dyad was due to the possibility of generating the primary 
numbers neatly from a dyad as out of a plastic material. 

9881, Yet this is contrary to the facts. These thinkers derive 
plurality from matter and make the form generate once only; but 
(4) only one table is made out of one piece of matter, and the man who 
imposes the form, though he is one, produces the many tables, and 
(2) the female is impregnated by a single copulation, while the male 
impregnates many females ; yet these are analogous to matter and form. 

47. Plato, then, has used only the material and the formal cause; 
the Forms are the formal cause of other things, and ‘the one’ of the 
Forms, while in both cases the matter is the great and the small. 

14. Further, he has made his two elements the cause of good and 
evil respectively, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did. 


9878 30. τούτοις, 31 τῶν ᾿Ιταλικῶν, i.e. the Pythagoreans (cf. 987% 10, 
9888 26). 

30. ἀκολουθοῦσα. It is doubtful whether this means that Plato’s 
system was based on the Pythagorean, or merely that it resembled it. 
The word can have the latter meaning (cf. Poe? 1449> 9 ἡ μὲν οὖν 
ἐποποιία τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ ... ἠκολούθησεν), but Aristotle evidently wishes 
to assert more than a casual resemblance between Pythagoreanism 
and Platonism, though he describes Cratylus and Socrates as the 
persons who chiefly influenced Plato, 

32-8. This passage should be compared with M. 1078» 12-32, 
which gives more detail, The passage in M is immediately followed by 
another, 1078> 34—1080* 8, which (with the exception of 1079» 3-11) 
reappears almost word for word in A. 990? 2—gg1b9. ‘The main 
difference between 987% 32-- 8 and the parallel passage in M is the 
fact that Plato is not mentioned in the latter. This is in accordance 
with the general method of MN; Plato is only once mentioned in 
these books (M. 1083 32), and Speusippus and Xenocrates are not 
mentioned at all, though all three are under discussion throughout. 

The priority of A can be deduced with fair certainty from a com- 
parison of ggo>2—gg1g with the parallel passage in M; and this 
conclusion is confirmed by the fact that while B refers back to A 
(995 5, 9968, 14, 997} 4) and M to B (1076? 39, » 39, 1086 34 (?), 
b15), A never refers back to B nor B to M. 

32. ἐκ νέου te γάρ κτλ. ‘The reference to Cratylus and Socrates is 
made in defence of the immediately preceding statement that Plato’s 
philosophy differed in certain respects from the Pythagorean. 1. 6,, 


A. 6, 9878 30 — 987) 8 159 


Aristotle, at any rate, views Socrates as standing outside of the 
Pythagorean school and exercising an independent influence on Plato. 

συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ, Aristotle’s statement must be 
accepted in preference to that of Diogenes (iii. 6) and Olympiodorus 
(Vit. Plat. p. 2. 49 Westermann) that Plato became Cratylus’ disciple 
only after the death of Socrates. If Diogenes’ statement, that Plato 
was twenty when he first was taught by Socrates, is to be believed, 
there was plenty of time before this for him to study under Cratylus. 
(Prof. Burnet argues that ‘the nephew of Charmides must have known 
Socrates ever since he could remember’; Diogenes’ remark, γεγονὼς 
εἴκοσιν ἔτη διήκουσε Σωκράτους, ‘he went through a course of Socrates’ 
conversation ’, is quite compatible with this.) Diogenes may have been 
misled by two remarks in the Cratylus which imply that Cratylus was 
considerably younger than Socrates (429 D, 440 D). 

Plato studied under Cratylus at Athens, but the vivid and contemp- 
tuous picture which he gives ( Zheae/. 179 D—180p) of the Heraclitean 
school depicts it as still, in 399 B.c., located at Ephesus. The Cratylus 
indicates no great respect for its efforts in the field of etymology. 

For the philosophical views of Cratylus cf. Τί roro#12, and for 
Cratylus generally cf. Jackson in Cambridge Praelections, 1906, 1-26. 

33. ἁπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The distinction of sensibles and in- 
telligibles was unknown to Heraclitus. If he thought there was no 
knowledge of sensibles, this does not mean either that he was a com- 
plete sceptic or that he thought there was knowledge of intelligibles. 
What he thought was that appearances were illusory and that the 
reality of things was the πῦρ ἀείζωον, which was a material thing though 
it was not perceived by our senses. 

ba. περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν. Cf. M. 107817, De Part. An. 
642° 28, Xen. Mem. i. 1. 11, iv. 7. 2-8. Socrates says, in Pl. Apod, 
19 C, 26D, that he had no more than the ordinary man’s knowledge of 
physical science. Xenophon represents him as interested in nature 
only in so far as it contributed to human uses, and as valuing the 
teleological study of it only in so far as it promoted piety (AZem. i. 4, 
iv. 3). The statements of the Platonic Socrates might be regarded 
as instances of his ‘irony’, and Xenophon’s statements may be to 
some extent discounted as being in the direct line of his apologetic ; 
but Aristotle is hardly likely to have been mistaken on the point. 
And Plato’s account in the Phaedo (96) represents him as having 
abandoned physical science quite as a young man, Cf. Zeller, 11. 1. 
132-141. 

4. πρώτους The Pythagoreans had already ‘ begun to define’, but 
their efforts had been superficial (8 20-27). 

διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον. Bonitz interprets this as propler insilas et fixas 
animo feracliteas opiniones. As Apelt points out, a nearer reference 
may be found for the words in the clause beginning ἀδύνατον γάρ. 
Similar instances of τοιοῦτον referring forward and being taken up by 
γάρ are found in Β. 998 το, E. 1026 22, De An. 408? 1. 

8. ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε. For the history of the words ἰδέα, εἶδος cf. 


160 COMMENTARY 


Taylor, Varza Socratica, 178-267, and for a criticism of his views cf. 
Gillespie in Classical Quarterly, vi. 179-203. It may be noted that 
Aristotle in speaking of Plato, just like Plato himself, uses both words 
without distinction. 

I find myself in agreement with the conclusions of Prof. Gillespie, 
viz. ‘that in the time of Socrates the words εἶδος and ἰδέα show two 
trends of meaning in the general vocabulary of science. The first is 
mainly physical, but without mathematical associations: including 
many gradations of meaning from the popular to the technical: the 
form of a bodily object—occasionally used for the bodily object itself, 
like our own words “form”? and “shape”, but always distinct from σῶμα: 
sometimes the outer visible form or shage: often the inner form, the 
structure, nature, φύσις, a specially physical conception : often extended 
to the nature of objects other than bodily: in one treatise of rhetorical 
character passing, by an easy transition, nearly, if not quite, into the 
metaphysical notion of essence. The second is semi-logical, classifi- 
catory ; used especially in such contexts as “there are four forms, 
kinds ” of anything, whether a substance like the “ moist ” or a disease 
or what not... In this line of development the later meaning of 
species is but a single step further. Prof. Taylor seems to have made 
out a case for the employment of εἶδος in the Pythagorean mathematics 
in the sense of geometrical “ pattern” or “figure”. But there is no 
evidence whatsoever to show that this highly specialized meaning was 
a determining factor in the other developments; it seems to have been 
a collateral growth.’ The meanings of the two words in Plato ‘show 
much greater affinity to the current scientific usage in both its ten- 
dencies than to the specialized mathematical meaning’. Thus the 
linguistic evidence ‘bears out the statement of Aristotle (JZe/aph. i. 
987% 31 sqq.) that the Platonic εἴδη were derived from another source 
than Pythagoreanism’. Prof. Gillespie thinks that the key to Plato’s 
use of the words is to be found in Craz. 386 sqq. ‘In this passage 
we have two formulae equated with each other. The first, αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι 
κερκίς, represents the object of defining thought as opposed to the 
object of sense ...: it can be easily shown to have arisen from the 
dialectical question τί ἐστιν ; in this aspect the “idea” is derived from 
τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις... σκέψιν, as Aristotle puts it (ibid. 987>31), The 
second formula, τὸ τῆς κερκίδος εἶδος, uses εἶδος in the sense of nature, 
form, φύσις (a frequent synonym for it in the Cratylus), thus bringing 
it into close connexion with the scientific conception of εἶδος as form. 
We may perhaps express the difference thus: the “idea” is αὐτὸ ὃ 
ἔστιν ἕκαστον Or οὐσία primarily in its épestemological and onfological 
aspects, εἶδος primarily in its sczen/zfic aspect as cause of the particulars, 
conceived on the analogy of causation in the arts. Thus the name 
εἶδος has nothing to do with the doctrine that the ideas are numbers, 
a doctrine which Aristotle, our only authority for it, always treats as 
concerned with the relation of the ideas to their elements.’ 

τὰ δ᾽ αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα κτλ. Prof. Burnet, G. P. ὃ 233, remarks 
that Aristotle ‘here insists rather on the distinction of sensible things 


A. 6. 98729 161 


from the forms than on that of the forms from sensible things, and he 
implies that this is what distinguished Plato from Socrates. We have 
seen reason already for believing that Socrates recognized no reality in 
sensible things apart from the forms, and Aristotle’s language here 
confirms this view.’ The question whether Socrates had a full-blown 
theory of Ideas is too large a question to be dealt with here, but 
Aristotle’s evidence is not in favour of that view. It is Plato who is 
here said to have called the non-sensible objects of definition Ideas, 
and in the parallel passage in Book M Socrates is represented as 
having only prepared the way for the ideal theory by attempting to 
reach universal definitions, and as not having taken the further step of 
attributing separate existence to universals and calling them Ideas— 
a step which ‘the others’ (i.e. Plato) took (1078 30). It is clear that 
in that passage it is the substantial existence of universals, not that of 
sensibles, that Plato in distinction from Socrates is said to have believed 
in. The occasions on which Aristotle connects the ideal theory with 
any name are surprisingly rare, but in them all it is Plato and not 
Socrates that is mentioned (i.e. apart from this chapter, in Z. 1028? 19, 
A. 10708 18, Phys. 203%8, 209? 33). 

Apart from the general question it may be doubted whether the 
current interpretation of παρὰ ταῦτα as ‘apart from the Ideas’ is the 
right one. It involves the supplying of εἶναι after παρὰ ταῦτα. This, 
however, is difficult; it is more natural to take λέγεσθαι with παρὰ 
ταῦτα as well as with κατὰ ταῦτα, and to translate ‘and he said the 
sensibles were called after these and were called what they were called 
by virtue of their relation to these’. For this sense of παρά cf. L. £. 
12287 35 6 yap θρασὺς παρὰ τὸ θράσος λέγεται παρωνύμως, Pl. Cras. 
399 A πολλάκις ἐπεμβάλλομεν γράμματα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐξαιροῦμεν, παρ᾽ ὃ βουλό- 
μεθα ὀνομάζοντες. It is the sense implied in the common Aristotelian 
word παρώνυμος. 

9. πάντα. A. 1070718 ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει 
is commonly interpreted to mean that Plato recognized Ideas only of 
natural as opposed to artificial objects, and if that interpretation be 
right the passage conflicts with the present one. Plainly, however, all 
that that passage tells us is that Plato said there were Ideas of all 
natural objects. In any case the statement here is true of the ideal 
theory as we find it in the Republic, where we are told that there is an 
Idea answering to every group of things (596), and where we read 
of Ideas of bed and table (596 8, 5978; cf. the Idea of shuttle, (σα, 
389 B) 

κατὰ μέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συνωνύμων [τοῖς εἴδεσιν]. 
If we keep the reading of AP and Al., two interpretations may be 
suggested: (1) ‘Most of the things that have the same name and 
nature as the Forms exist by participation in them’ (Al. 50. 24). 
But on the Platonic view a// the things that are συνώνυμα with the 
Forms exist by participation inthem. The things of which there were 
no Forms, if there were any such, were no exception to this rule, and 
this interpretation must therefore be reiected. (2) ‘ The many par- 


2673-1 M 


162 COMMENTARY 

ticulars, which are συνώνυμα with the Forms, exist by participation in 
them’ (Al. 51. 6, Bonitz 90. 3). But such a definitive use of the 
genitive appears impossible. Two other readings suggest themselves. 
(1) We may with E read τῶν συνωνύμων ὁμώνυμα τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ‘most of 
the things that have the same name and nature have the same name as 
the Forms by virtue of participation in them ’,—most, not all, because 
some συνώνυμα have no Forms answering to them (ggo? 10-17). But 
Aristotle has in the previous clause said that according to Plato all 
sensibles get their name from the Forms ; and immediately after he says 
quite generally that according to Plato all things exist by participation 
in Forms(l. 12), He is ignoring, then, the later view of some Platonists 
(and possibly of Plato) that some sensibles had no Forms answering 
to them. It seems best therefore (2) to excise τοῖς εἴδεσιν, as Prof, 
Gillespie has proposed (/. of P. xxxiv. 151), and translate ‘ the many 
(sensibles) exist by participation in their συνώνυμα the Forms, In 
990» 6, 991#6, where Aristotle is crzfic’zging. the ideal theory, he calls 
the Form ὁμώνυμον, implying that it has no real common nature with 
the particulars (for the difference between ὁμώνυμον and συνώνυμον cf. 
Cat. 1* 1, 6); here, where he is s/a/zng the theory, he has no objection 
to using the word which implies the common nature that Plato thought 
there was (cf. I. 1059213). Plato has only the word ὁμώνυμον, which 
he uses without drawing the distinction which Aristotle draws between 
the two words (Parm. 133 Ὁ), and the insertion of ὁμώνυμα in some 
MSS. may be due to a reminiscence of this. In confirmation of his 
reading Prof. Gillespie points out that there are two other places in the 
chapter where there is some reason to suppose that a reference to the εἴδη 
has been inserted by a later hand—ll. 14, 22; cf. notes on ll, 12, 21. 

10. τὴν δὲ μέθεξιν τοὔνομα μόνον μετέβαλεν. It is surprising 
that Aristotle should describe the change from μίμησις to μέθεξις as 
only verbal. The former term indicates that the Form and the par- 
ticular are like one another, i.e. are two instances of the same kind 
of thing, which involves a profound misunderstanding of the relation 
between a universal and its particulars; while the latter term describes 
the relation in a way which if metaphorical is not misleading. It is 
clear, however, that Plato did not draw any such clear distinction 
between the two terms, while Aristotle, convinced as he was that Plato 
illegitimately ‘separated’ the Form from the particulars, thought that 
he could not have believed in a relation of genuine immanence between 
them, and must therefore have meant by ‘ participation’ nothing other 
than ‘imitation’. 

Profs. Burnet and Taylor have recently argued that the ideal theory 
was no discovery of Plato’s, but was already familiar to Socrates, and, 
possibly through Socratic influence, to a whole body of Pythagoreans. 
In the Phaedo (744 ff.) the theory that equal things are imitations of 
the ‘ equal itself’ is familiar to the Pythagorean Simmias. Three out 
of the seven speakers in the dialogue are Pythagoreans. The Ideas are 
represented as ‘something we are always talking about’(76p). Phrases 
like αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι, αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό are treated as well known (6. g. in 75D). 


A. 6. 987 10-12 163 


Aristotle’s evidence is against the view that Socrates held the ideal 
theory (cf. 1. 8n., M. 1078> rrn.), but the extent of the affinity which 
he recognizes, here and in ἃ 30, between Pythagoreanism and the ideal 
theory, has not been sufficiently emphasized by historians of philosophy. 
Socrates has commonly been regarded as the chief influence on Plato’s 
philosophy; Aristotle evidently regards Plato as having owed more to 
the Pythagoreans, and may have thought that he owed as much to the 
Heracliteans (®32->1). The dialogues are sufficient evidence that 
Socrates exercised a great influence on Plato, but the view that Plato 
took over from Socrates the ideal theory is in conflict with the two 
oldest authorities other than Plato himself, viz. Xenophon and Aristotle, 
and rests mainly on the hypothesis that the dialogues must be 
historically true. Some degree of historical verisimilitude there must 
no doubt be in a dialogue which introduces historical persons, but the 
amount of it that is necessary is very much a question of personal 
taste. It is possible to believe with Aristotle that Socrates had no 
‘ideal theory’, and yet find nothing outrageous in Plato’s dramatic 
presentation of him. 

It is easy to see how the elaborate theory of ideal numbers, which 
plays so large a part in the Platonic system as described by Aristotle, 
should have led him to describe Plato’s system as ‘for the most part 
following the Pythagoreans’ (8 30) ; it is more surprising that the ideal 
theory itself should be described as differing only verbally from the 
Pythagorean doctrine. Aristotle sees that in principle Plato and the 
Pythagoreans alike broke with the earlier tradition and were trying to 
discover a non-sensible reality behind sensible things, the universal] 
which is manifested in particulars but is different in kind from them, 
And he holds that the interest of both was metaphysical, while the main 
interest of Socrates was ethical. 

11. For the description of the Pythagoreans as holding that 
things ‘imitate’ the numbers cf. 985 33, Aristoxenus ap. Stob. Zc/, 
i. pr. 6 (p. 20. 5 Wachsmuth), and the letter attributed to the wife of 
Pythagoras in which she declares him to have said that things were 
made not of but according to number (ib. i. ro. 13). Cf. the 
description of number ascribed to the followers of Hippasus (Iambl, 
in Nicom., p. 10, 20 Pistelli}—rapddevya πρῶτον κοσμοποιίας. Yet 
Aristotle elsewhere repeatedly ascribes the other view to the Pytha- 
goreans (cf. 986%17n.), He does not mean that the Pythagoreans 
thought that things ‘imitated’ numbers which existed separately from 
the things (this, he thinks, is one of the differences between them and 
Plato, 1. 27), but that they thought the external, sensible nature of things 
to be modelled on their inner, numerical nature. Cf. Burnet, Z. G, P., 
§ 153. It is probable, however, that the sixth-century Pythagoreans 
treated things as ‘imitating’ number, i.e. as exhibiting numerical 
relations, while those of the fifth century treated number as the very stuff 
of which things are made, So F. M. Cornford in Class. Quart. xvi. 143. 

12. Πλάτων δὲ μεθέξει. Prof. Jackson (/. of P. x. 294), holding 
that not numbers but Ideas play in the Platonic system the part that 

M 2 


164 COMMENTARY 


numbers play in the Pythagorean, and that τῶν εἰδῶν must be connected 
with the Platonic term μέθεξις and not with the Pythagorean term 
μίμησις, omits τῶν εἰδῶν in]. 14 and inserts it after μεθέξει here. He 
argues that though here Aristotle represents the relation of the particular 
to the number in the Pythagorean system as identical with the relation 
of the particular to the Idea in the Platonic, it does not follow that the 
Platonic number is identical with the Platonic Idea. The remark is 
true, but the following considerations prove that in this chapter the 
Platonic Ideas and numbers are treated as identical : 

(1) Mathematical objects are in 1. 15 said to be intermediate 
between sensibles and Ideas, and in], 28 to be intermediate between 
sensibles and numbers. 

(2) In 1. 18 the Forms, in 1. 24 the numbers, are said to be the 
cause of all other things. 

(3) the MS. reading is right in ]. 22, the Forms and the numbers 
are expressly identified there. But, though on different grounds from 
his, I think Prof. Jackson right in rejecting the MS. reading, 

(4) Prof. Jackson thinks that the numbers are the formal causes of 
the particulars, while the Ideas are the types of the particulars ; but in 
9882 10 the Ideas are expressly said to be the formal causes of all 
other things, and his attempt (p. 291) to explain this away is not 
successful. It is true that in 987» 29-31 Aristotle distinguishes τὸ τὸ 
ἕν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι from ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσα- 
γωγή. But this does not mean that the numbers and the Ideas were 
different things. The assigning of causal significance to numbers 
was common to the Pythagoreans and to Plato; the conception of 
them as existing apart from things, and the introduction of Ideas (i.e. 
the treatment of them as Ideas, as universals and objects of definition, 
cf. 1. 7) were the result of Plato’s dialectical studies. The Ideas were the 
same as the numbers, but ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγή lays stress on a fresh 
feature of Plato’s originality. 

Prof. Jackson’s view is that the One is the formal element of the 
Ideas, the numbers the formal element of particulars, and he claims 
that the doctrine can be found not only here but in the PAr/ebus. But 
to this view the following considerations seem fatal : 

(1) The view rests largely on the emphasis Prof. Jackson lays on the 
phrase (PAz7. 24 c) αὐτό (τὸ ποσόν) τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον. Emphasizing the 
τε, he insists that τὸ ποσόν and τὸ μέτριον must be two different things. 
τὸ ποσόν is what Aristotle calls the numbers; it is any sort of deter- 
minateness the imposition of which on the indefinite produces definite 
particular entities, e.g. particular illnesses. τὸ μέτριον is what Aristotle 
calls the One; it is that unique determinateness the imposition of 
which on the indefinite produces an Idea, e.g. the Idea of health. 
Both Ideas and particulars belong to the μικτόν (25 8), but while the 
components of the Idea are the indefinite and the μέτριον (the One), 
the components of the particulars are the indefinite and the ποσόν (the 
numbers). 

This is not the place to embark on a detailed discussion of the 


“ 


A. 6. 987> 14 165 


metaphysics of the Phzlebus, but the following remarks may be 
made: 

It is true that earlier (15 a—c) Plato has propounded the relation of 
the Idea to its particulars as a problem requiring discussion, and that 
a definite answer would be given to this problem if we viewed the Idea 
not as an element in the particulars but as standing outside them, 
being composed of elements analogous to those of which they are 
composed, and being a type which they more or less closely resemble. 
But it cannot be said that the passage 23 c-27c in any degree works 
out this suggestion, or that the functions of τὸ ποσόν and of τὸ μέτριον 
are really distinguished. On Prof. Jackson’s theory, for example, 
particular diseases or instances of bad weather should be composites 
more or less closely resembling those other composites, the Idea of 
health and the Idea of good weather; but in point of fact they are 
treated as indefinites out of which by the imposition of limit health and 
good weather are produced (25 £, 26). It is in fact impossible to find 
any clear relation between the metaphysics of the PAzlebus and the 
ideal theory. Plato is working out a new analysis of reality without 
troubling himself about its relation to his old analysis. Further, the 
implications which Prof. Jackson finds in the new analysis, (a) that the 
relation of particulars to Ideas must henceforth be described by Plato 
as imitation and not as participation, and (6) that all Ideas save 
those that are natural types must be abandoned, are not accepted by 
Plato in the later dialogues. On (a) cf. Prof. Taylor in A/ind, v. 307- 
311, 320-322, and on (4) ib. 304, 305, 313-315, and my notes on 
990 13, 14, 16, 9916. It is worth noting that 987» 9-13 indicate 
that Aristotle at least was not aware of an earlier period in which Plato 
spoke of participation and a later in which he spoke of imitation. 

(2) Nor does Aristotle’s positive account of the theory agree with 
Prof. Jackson’s. In this chapter, as we have seen, the Ideas are 
identified with the numbers, i.e. with the ideal as distinguished from 
the mathematical numbers; and for this cf. 9919, M. 1080) 12, 
TO81# 21, 1086212, N. 1090416, » 33, rog1» 26, The numbers are 
said to be outside the particulars (Il. 27, 30), while Prof. Jackson holds 
that they are the formal element in them.—For a criticism of Prof. 
Jackson’s theory cf. Zeller in δ σό. der Berl. Akad. 1887, 197-220. 

It is clear, then, that τῶν εἰδῶν is not needed with μεθέξει. On the 
other hand it would be better away from 1. 14. The statement there, 
as the plural ἀφεῖσαν shows, is meant to apply to the Pythagoreans as 
well as to Plato, and τῶν εἰδῶν is therefore out of place, though in view 
of Aristotle’s frequent carelessness in such matters we cannot be sure 
that he did not write it. It seems more likely to be, as Prof. Gillespie 
suggests (7. of P. xxxiv. 152), a gloss like τοῖς εἴδεσιν in |. 10 and τὰ 
εἴδη in |. 22 than to have been transferred, as Prof. Jackson thinks, 
from ]. 12. 


(Six 


tt Akins Arik ἢ 


14. ἀφεῖσαν ἐν κοινῷ ζητεῖν. Plato devotes a considerable part fry ’Prsdimd2u> 


of the Parmentdes to this problem, but no positive solution is left in. 


«He ἃ. ὧν κοινῷ Ce 


. 3 é δ Faso pt, fw Ha behig 
possession and the question may fairly be said to be left open, meee da 
ko7 O34, 


166 COMMENTARY 


Aristotle’s remark to some extent confirms the view thatthe Phz/edus does 
not bear directly on the relation of particulars to Ideas (cf. previous note). 

According to the usage of ἀφιέναι, the phrase seems to mean 
‘they left before the world for discussion ’, rather than ‘ they omitted to 
discuss before the world’. 

ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά κτλ. The doctrine of the ‘intermediates’ 
is again referred to in 1. 28, 9918 4, > 29, 992 τό, B. 995 17, 997? 2, 
12, 99847, 100213, 21, K. 10596, A. 1069834, M. 1076%19, 
10778 11, 1086% 12, N. 1090? 35, and is again ascribed to Plato by name 
in Z. 1028? 19. It is discussed by Zeller, ii. 1. 780-784, Robin, Zheorze 
Platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres, §§ 100-106, 126-129, Cook 
Wilson in C. R. xviii. 248, 249, 251-253, 257-259, Adam, Republic, ii. 
159-163. 

Plato’s theory must be distinguished from a Platonist theory, referred 
to in B. 9982 7, M. 1076 33, which treats mathematical objects as 
entities intermediate between Ideas and sensibles but as existing in and 
not apart from the latter. 

Among the intermediates were included not only numbers but also 
geometrical figures (991 29, B. 9972). The ground of Plato’s 
belief in mathematical objects as a distinct class of entities is indicated 
clearly enough in the present passage. An arithmetical statement 
such as that 2 and 2 makes 4 is not about the number 2 simply, for the 
number 2 evidently exists only in the singular, whereas the statement is 
about two 2’s and cannot be stated without reference tothem. On the 
other hand we are not thinking of any particular sensible pairs 
of things when we say that 2 and 2 makes 4. Hence, Plato thought, 
there must be 2’s which are the objects of arithmetic, and are different 
from the number 2 and from sensible 2’s. Similarly geometrical 
propositions imply the existence of triangles, &c., which are neither the 
universal of triangle, &c., nor sensible things having an approximately 
triangular shape. 

The doctrine appears to be right with regard to the objects of 
geometry, and wrong with regard to those of arithmetic. The truths 
of arithmetic are true, without any qualification or hypothesis, of 
ordinary pairs of things ; if two X’s are added to two X’s, then, what- 
ever X may be, four X’s, neither more or less, are the sum. And 
there is no reason to suppose any special class of 2’s, other than 
ordinary pairs of things, for the proposition to be true of. It may 
seem difficult to suppose that all the pairs of things in the world are 
what the statement is about, since it is clear that we: do not think in 
detail of all the actual pairs. But it is equally clear that we do not 
think in detail of all the mathematical 2’s, if such a class of things be 
supposed to exist, so that there is nothing to be gained by supposing 
them to exist. The statement ‘2 and 2 makes 4’ is no more 
difficult in this respect than ‘all men are mortal’; in the one we are 
judging about all the particular men in the world, without thinking of 
them in detail, and in the other we are judging similarly about all the 
particular pairs in the world. The propositions of geometry, on the 


A. 6. 987> 14 167 


other hand, are not true directly of the approximately triangular 
sensible objects in the world, for instance. They are statements 
about triangles, and /hese are not triangles. Nor are they statements 
about triangularity, though they imply truths about triangularity. 
They are statements about pure spatial figures, ‘ 

Aristotle rejects the ‘intermediates‘ outright. He believes in 
mathematical objects, but not as existing ‘apart’ from sensibles, but 
as elements in their nature (M. 2, 3). The merits of his controversy 
with Plato, like the merits of his attack on the ideal theory, depend on 
the sense in which Plato ascribed ‘separate ’ existence to the entities in 
question. If Plato meant that the objects of mathematics are some- 
thing different from universals and different from material things, then, 
as far as geometry is concerned, he was right. If he meant that they 
exist, or could exist, where there are no material objects, this amounts 
to thinking that there is, or could be, empty space, and our view of his 
doctrine will depend on our attitude towards this question. We have no 
evidence sufficient to indicate which of the two things he meant ; only 
it is clear that if he meant the former, he was badly misunderstood 
or misrepresented by Aristotle. Neither of these is an impossible 
hypothesis. 

There has been much discussion of the question whether the doctrine 
is to be found in any of Plato’s dialogues. Syrianus (4. 16) connects 
it with the Divided Line in the Republic (509 D—511E); Alexander 
and Asclepius do not refer to any dialogue. Aristotle refers this theory 
distinctly to Plato and not, as he does many other doctrines, vaguely 
to ‘those who believe in the Forms’. But he is, of course, as likely 
to be thinking of Plato’s lectures or conversations as of his dialogues. 
There are passages in more than one dialogue which, if taken strictly, 
imply the existence of ‘intermediates’ of the sort here described. 
Thus in Phaedo 74 c Plato speaks of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα, which he distinguishes 
from sensible equals; these, since they exist in the plural, cannot be 
the Idea of equal. But he does not point out this latter difference ; he 
is interested simply in distinguishing the Idea of equal from sensible 
equals, and does not notice the third kind of entity which he has 
incidentally mentioned. Again in Ref. 526A he speaks of the ἕν 
which is ἴσον ἕκαστον πᾶν παντί: he distinguishes it from sensible 
single things and ought to, but does not, distinguish it from the Idea 
ofone. Andin PA. 56 & he speaks of μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης... μηδε- 
μίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσαν, but distinguishes these true arithmetical 
units only from sensible units and not from unity. Again, the 
description of mathematical studies as leading the soul towards being 
(Rep. 523 A, 525 A, C, 526 B, 527 B) seems to imply that mathematical 
objects are not themselves in the full sense being. Yet the only 
entities mentioned are the knowable Idea and the sensible particular. 

In all these passages we seem to see Plato on the verge of 
recognizing the intermediates as a separate class, but never doing so. 
And probably the same must be said of the Divided Line. The logic 
of the simile requires that the objects of διάνοια should be a distinct 


6s COMMENTARY 


class of entities, and not distinguished from those of νόησις as Ideas 
known in one way from the same Ideas known in another way; and 
the doctrine of the intermediates would have enabled him to remedy 
this defect. Yet it seems impossible to say that the doctrine is actually 
stated in the passage. The Republic up to this point, like all the 
dialogues which probably belong to the same period, has divided the 
contents of the universe into Ideas, the objects of knowledge, and 
particulars, the objects of sense; the natural thing is to suppose that 
Plato is here subdividing each of these into two parts. If, instead, he 
were setting up in the objects of διάνοια a class of intermediates, it 
would not be in his manner to introduce the new doctrine with so 
little indication of its novelty and so little attempt to indicate his 
meaning. Should we not have expected a reference to ‘units’ or 
‘triangles’ in the plural, such as we find in the other passages quoted 
above, and a statement of the reason for believing in intermediates, 
such as Aristotle here gives? We find no such reference or statement, 
and we find the objects of διάνοια illustrated by τετράγωνον αὐτό, 
διάμετρος αὐτή (510D). These phrases might stand for perfect 
particulars as well as for Ideas (though αὐτός is, of course, one of the 
commonest ways of referring to an Idea); they could not well 
be used of the former if it were essential to the argument to 
distinguish them from the latter. Further, the objects of διάνοια 
(including τὰ μαθηματικά) are said to be νοητά when studied in 
connexion with the first principle, the Idea of good (καίτοι νοητῶν 
ὄντων μετ᾽ ἀρχῆς, 511 D). It seems, then, that Plato does not state, as 
he had undertaken (509 D) to do, a difference between the objects of 
διάνοια and of νόησις ; his whole stress is on the difference between 
their methods. (Sir Thomas Heath has pointed out that in £. vii. 
342 A—c, where Plato says that with regard to every ov (and the circle is 
taken as the chief example) five things are involved—the ὄνομα, the 
λόγος, the εἴδωλον (the three conditions of knowledge), the ἐπιστήμη, 
and the thing itself, there is no objective entity intermediate between 
the εἴδωλον (the painted or carved circle) and the circle itself.) But it 
is quite likely that reflection on the logical requirements of the simile 
led Plato very soon to formulate the doctrine of the intermediates. It 
may have been connected with the remoulding of the doctrine of the 
Divided Line into a classification of entities as either νοητά, ἐπιστητά, 
δοξαστά, Or αἰσθητά (Simpl. on De An. 404» 18-21). There is one 
passage in which τὰ μαθηματικά (or rather τὰ γεωμετρικά) are recog- 
nized as a distinct class of entities, viz. Zzm. 50 .c, where τὰ εἰσιόντα 
καὶ ἐξιόντα are geometrical figures distinguished both from τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, 
the Ideas, of which they are μιμήματα, and from the sensible things 
produced by their entrance into the ἐκμαγεῖον, space. 

19. τἀκείνων στοιχεῖα πάντων φήθη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. 
Aristotle states the doctrine more exactly in 988®11. The elements 
of the Ideas were the One and the great and small; the elements of 
sensible things were the Ideas and the great and small. Thus the 
elements of the Ideas together formed the formal element in sensibles, 


A. 6. 987 19-20 169 


but these had also a material element akin to the material element in 
Ideas. 

20. τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν. This way of describing the 
material principle is ascribed to Plato by name again in 988#13, 
26, Phys. 187417, 203%15, 20935. Various synonymous ex- 
pressions are found—ro ἄνισον, M. 1075233, N. 1087'5, 10, 1088» 
29, 1089» 6, 11, 1091" 31, 1092? 1, ἡ ἀνισότης, B. 1001" 23, τὸ ἄπειρον, 
987> 26, Phys. 2038 5, τὰ ἄπειρα, Phys. 2038 15, 206 28, τὸ μὴ ὄν, 
Phys. τοῦδ. It is referred to as ἃ δυάς in 987” 26, 33, 0888 13, 
M. 1083812, Phys, 192411, as ἡ Tod ἀνίσου δυὰς Tod μεγάλου καὶ 
μικροῦ in M.1087>7. In all these expressions Aristotle appears to be 
referring to the doctrine of Plato himself; there are certain other 
expressions about which it is harder to make out whether it is Plato or 
some of his followers that used them. ‘Thus the expression ἀόριστος 
δυάς (M. 10814 14, 22, > 21, 25, 32, 10827 13, > 30, 1083) 36, 1085» 7, 
N. 1088415, > 28, 1089835, 10g1*5) requires special treatment. 
There is reason to suppose that the use of the word πλῆθος as 
a substitute for τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν (N. 1087'6, 27, 1091} 31, 
1092% 28, 35, cf. A. 1075% 33, M. 1085233, ἢ 56) was peculiar to 
Speusippus. We learn that some Platonists treated various forms of 
μέγα καὶ μικρόν as the material principle of spatial magnitudes, and 
the πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον as the material of number (N. 1087” 16, ro8g 11, 
cf. A. 9928 τό, N. 1088718, > 5); and that some preferred to use the 
more general antithesis of ὑπερέχον καὶ ὑπερεχόμενον (N. 1087” 18). 
Others again preferred to call this principle the ἕτερον or ἄλλο 
(N. 1087» 26). 

The meaning of the doctrine is best brought out in PAys. 206> 
27 :-- Πλάτων διὰ τοῦτο δύο τὰ ἄπειρα ἐποίησεν, ὅτι Kal ἐπὶ τὴν αὔξην 
δοκεῖ ὑπερβάλλειν καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν. 1.6. the 
indefinite or material principle is represented as ‘the great and the 
small’ because it is entirely indeterminate in quantity and may be 
drawn upon to an infinitely great or an infinitely small extent. 
Aristotle complains (206) 30) that Plato does not proceed to use the 
principle for what it is worth; there is no infinitely small number, 
since 1 is the smallest, and Plato does not recognize infinitely great 
number but makes ro the greatest. 

Further light is thrown on the conception, or on Aristotle’s inter- 
pretation of it, by PAys. 209" 33: Πλάτωνι μέντοι λεκτέον... διὰ τί 
οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τὰ εἴδη Kal οἱ ἀριθμοί, εἴπερ TO μεθεκτικὸν ὁ τόπος, εἴτε TOU 
μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεθεκτικοῦ εἴτε τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ἐν 
τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραφεν. 1.6. Plato has in the Zimaeus described 
the receptive element as χώρα, which he identifies with matter 
(209 11), while in the ἄγραφα δόγματα (209 14) he has described it 
as ‘the great and the small’. In either case Aristotle holds that 
Plato means nothing other than ‘place’, and, since the material 
principle is an element in the Forms or ideal numbers as well as in 
material things (987 19, 988° 13, Phys. 2038 9, 207429), Aristotle 
concludes that Plato ought to have represented the Forms as having 


170 COMMENTARY 


spatial position. For the same reason he thinks Plato should, in con- 
sistency with his principles, have represented the Forms as subject to 
movement (992> 7). Again, if mathematical numbers are to have the 
same principles as ideal numbers, they must be the same thing 
(N. τοφοῦ 36). But there can be little doubt that, as Zeller points out 
(ii. 1.4.751-762), Aristotle is here misunderstanding or misrepresenting 
Plato. ‘The great and small which is the material principle of ideal 
numbers can only be plurality not yet determined as any particular 
number (not that that is an easy or satisfactory conception); ‘the 
many and few’ is indeed a better expression for it (N. 1087) 16). 
On the other hand the great and small which is the material principle 
of sensibles is, as the Zzmaeus clearly enough says, space not yet 
determined as any particular figure. Such distinctions, whether made 
by Plato or not, were, as we have seen, part of the Academic doctrine. 
Lengths were derived from the long and short, planes from the broad 
and narrow, solids from the deep and shallow—all of them forms of 
the great and small. Some Platonists, just because the great and 
small was specially appropriate to spatial magnitudes, the many and 
few to numbers, preferred to call the material principle in general by 
the wider name of the exceeding and exceeded. ‘The great and 
small’, if thus interpreted, is an apt enough expression for the 
element of indefiniteness which there is in all things, without implying 
that it is the same kind of indefiniteness that is present in sensibles 
and in Ideas. Aristotle’s objection might be turned against himself ; 
it might as well be said that because he assigns ὕλη to mathematical 
objects (Z. 1036" 9), he is making them the same kind of thing as 
bronze and wood. 

Aristotle, as we have seen, refers the doctrine to Plato’s ἄγραφα 
δόγματα (Phys. 209 14, 35). Simplicius (Phys. 545. 23) identifies 
these with Plato’s lectures On the Good, of which notes were taken by 
Aristotle as well as by other pupils (Simpl. 151. 8, 453. 28). 

Though neither Aristotle himself nor Alexander, Asclepius, 
Syrianus, nor Simplicius connects the doctrine with any of Plato’s 
dialogues, Porphyry (ap. Simpl. PAys. 453. 30) connected it with the 
Philebus, and this seems to be in fact the only dialogue in which the 
doctrine is foreshadowed. PAr/. 23 c-26 8 divides the whole contents 
of the universe into the following elements: (1) τὸ ἄπειρον, (2) τὸ 
πέρας, (3) the unity formed by the commixture of these, (4) the cause 
of the commixture. The first class is said to consist of all the things 
which admit of τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον or οἵ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα, and 
this is illustrated by the things which may be hotter or colder, drier or 
wetter, more or less, faster or slower, greater or smaller. The second 
class is said to consist of the things which do not admit of differences 
of degree but do admit of equality, doubleness, or any numerical ratio, 
This, it is fairly clear, is a description of the limited rather than of 
limit, and there is a certain amount of confusion between the two; 
the second class, which is first (23 c) called πέρας, is later (24 a) called 
τὸ πέρας ἔχον. Similarly, after the above account of it, which is an 


A. 6. 987) 21 171 


account of the limited, we get a second account, which is rather 
an account of limit ; it is described as ‘ that which makes the contraries 
cease to be at variance with each other, and makes them symmetrical 
and harmonious by inserting number’. The third class is illustrated 
by health, music, good weather, beauty, strength, and all good qualities 
of soul; all of these are produced by the introduction of limit into 
what would otherwise admit of unlimited differences of degree, 
e.g. high and low notes or cold and hot weather. This class in 
general is called μικτὴ καὶ γεγενημένη οὐσία. Finally, reason is said 
to belong to, or to be akin to, the fourth class (30 Ὁ, 31 A). 

Without attempting a detailed exposition of this passage, we may 
point out certain things in it which seem to be clear. By the un- 
limited Plato means that which is quantitatively indeterminate, though 
qualitatively it is determined, e.g. as temperature or sound; and by 
limit he means quantitative determination. Heat and cold, or the 
height and lowness of notes, are apparently not thought of as different 
degrees of the same thing, but as distinct and opposite qualities, for 
quantitative determination is described as a ratio (of equality, double- 
ness, &c.) between heat and cold, or between height and lowness. It 
is by no means clear what, precisely, the third class is meant to 
include. Evidently in amy actual state of the body the temperature, 
and the dryness or humidity, of its parts, will have some definite 
determination, so that any bodily state should be viewed as belonging 
to the third class, the class of things in which determinateness has been 
imposed on the indeterminate ; but only the healthy state is mentioned 
as belonging to this class. It looks as if Plato recognized only quite 
simple ratios between small integers as conferring determinateness 
(cf. N. 1092) 27 ἐν εὐλογίστῳ ἀριθμῷ). Again, there is no hint in the 
Philebus of the elaborate doctrine of which Aristotle tells us, according 
to which the great and small played a double part, that of uniting with 
the One to form the Ideas, and that of uniting with the Ideas to form 
particular things (9888 11); Prof. Jackson’s gallant effort to trace this 
in the dialogue is not successful (cf. 987>12n.). Plato appears 
to be putting forward a fresh analysis whose relation to the ideal 
theory he has not thought out. But in the description of the un- 
limited as τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον we cannot fail to see an anticipation 
of the description of it as τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, and we must suppose 
that the doctrine of the P/z/ebus was the starting-point from which 
Plato worked in developing the later doctrine. 

21. οὐσίαν. οὐσία is strictly a non-committal word meaning 
the true reality of things, whatever that may be (Z. 1028» 33)—whether 
matter or form or the compound of both, But since Plato thought 
the reality of things lay in their form, the word here, as often, means 
form in opposition to matter. 

ἐξ ἐκείνων yap κατὰ μέθεξιν τοῦ ἑνὸς [τὰ εἴδη εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, 
Alexander and Bonitz think that τοὺς ἀριθμούς is added in apposition 
to τὰ εἴδη to indicate that it is the Platonic idea-numbers and not εἴδη 
in some other sense, i, e, species such as Aristotle himself believed in, 


172 COMMENTARY 


that are meant. But the apposition is extremely awkward, and the 
meaning of τὰ εἴδη would have been perfectly clear in this context 
without any addition. This interpretation must therefore be rejected. 
Nor is Zeller’s interpretation, ‘out of the great and the small the 
Forms become numbers by participation in the One’, a tenable one ; 
it mistranslates εἶναι, ignores τούς, and attributes to Plato a doctrine 
of which we have absolutely no evidence. It seems clear that either 
τὰ εἴδη OF τοὺς ἀριθμούς must go. Prof. Jackson’s τὰ εἴδη εἶναι τὰ ὡς 
ἀριθμούς presupposes a distinction of εἴδη ὡς ἀριθμοί and εἴδη in some 
other sense, which does not agree with Aristotle’s general account of 
the Platonic doctrine. 

As far as the sense goes, it does not matter whether we cut out τὰ 
εἴδη OF τοὺς ἀριθμούς, but Prof. Gillespie has pointed out three reasons 
for preferring the former course (/. of P. xxxiv. 153). (1) There is 
in ]. τὸ a reference to the εἴδη which is pretty certainly spurious, and 
in 1. 14. one which is not improbably so. It looks as if at some point 
quite early in the history of the text these three glosses may have been 
inserted by a single hand. (2) τοὺς ἀριθμούς is the more expressive 
of the two phrases, ‘because it shows that the εἴδη are ἀριθμοί in 
respect of their origin... The Forms are spoken of again lower down 
as numbers, and the most appropriate place for the substitution of the 
new term is in this sentence’. (3) Aristotle does not often end 
a sentence with the unemphatic word εἶναι. For these reasons it 
seems better to omit τὰ εἴδη, as Zeller latterly preferred to do. 

26. δυάδα. Aristotle uses this word freely in speaking of 
Plato's material principle, and we may safely suppose that Plato used 
it himself. It is not so clear that he used the phrase ἀόριστος δυάς, 
for a discussion of which see M. 1081414 ἢ. 

ZI. διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγένετο σκέψιν. The best commentary 
on this, apart from 9871-8 above, is to be found in two other 
passages dealing with the Platonists—A. 10694 26, where Aristotle 
says that they treat universals as substances διὰ τὸ λογικῶς ζητεῖν, and 
contrasts them with the older thinkers, who treated particular things as 
substances ; and M. 1084» 23, where he says that they adopted an 
erroneous theory of units because they at the same time considered 
them from the point of view of mathematics and therefore treated 
them as the constituents of numbers, and ἐκ τῶν λόγων τῶν καθόλου 
ἐθήρευον and therefore dwelt on the unity that is predicable of any 
number. Similarly the Platonists are called οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις in 
Θ. 1050 35. The phrase used here is pretty clearly a reminiscence of 
Phaedo 100 a, where τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα, ‘one who 
studies things by the method of definitions’, is Socrates’ description of 
his own method. The point seems to be this. The Pythagoreans 
were doing what the other pre-Socratics did, trying to find the 
ultimate constituents of things, and they (so Aristotle thinks, at least) 
thought of numbers as being constituents of things very much as other 
thinkers had thought of water or air as being their constituents, i.e. 
as the very stuff of which they are made. Plato, on the other hand, 


A, 6. 987> 26-34 173 


following in the footsteps of Socrates, was interested in the universal 
character of a set of things, and this led to two differences between his 
doctrine and the Pythagorean. (1) He did not view the One and the 
numbers as the stuff of which things are made, but as their formal 
principle, and hence placed them ‘apart from’ sensibles, and (2) he 
did not confine himself to the Pythagorean language about ‘numbers’, 
but spoke of ‘Forms’ or Ideas and thought of them as essentially the 
eternal objects of definition (cf. 1]. 1-8). 

Prof. Jackson suggests a connexion between this passage and 
Pl. Poi. 285 A, where ‘ the Py thagorean misinterpretation of their own 
principle’ of measurement is ascribed ‘ to their want of familiarity with 
the dialectic process’. But when Plato ascribes their mistake to τὸ μὴ 
κατ᾽ εἴδη συνειθίσθαι σκοπεῖν διαιρουμένους, he means merely that they 
did not distinguish two kinds of measurement; and Aristotle can 
hardly be referring to anything so little obvious from the context. 

82. οἱ yap πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετεῖχον. Diogenes (viii. 57, 
ix, 25) and Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. vii. 7) tell us that Aristotle 
called Zeno the inventor of dialectic. The Pythagoreans, at any rate, 
were dogmatic and not dialectical in their procedure (cf. ἃ 20-25), 
In M. 107825 Aristotle says even of the time of Socrates that 
διαλεκτικὴ ἴσχυς οὔπω ἦν, but there he seems to be speaking with some 
irony, and using διαλεκτική in its less favourable sense. 

38. Aristotle here represents the reason for Plato’s description of the 
material element as a ‘ dyad’ as having lain in the facility of deducing 
the numbers from a dyad. ‘The actual reason, as we can see from the 
Philebus and from Phys. 206» 27 (quoted in note on |. 20), is that the 
quantitatively indeterminate can vary indefinitely in do¢h directions. 

84. τῶν πρώτων. Alexander (57. 12) explains this as the odd 
numbers, i.e. those that are prime (πρῶτοι) to 2, and further on 
(57: 28) as the prime numbers generally. The first seems an im- 
possible interpretation. ‘Prime number’ is a proper enough sense for 
πρῶτος ἀριθμός (cf. 1. 10528, An. Post. 73% 40), but we can hardly 
read ‘prime to 2’ into it here, especially as it is not the number 2 but 
the indefinite dyad that is being spoken of. The other interpretation 
(which appears not to belong to the genuine text of Alexander) is as 
difficult. If the function of the indefinite dyad is to double (M. 1081» 
21, 1082% 13, 1083 35), it cannot with the aid of the One produce 
anything but the powers of two, i.e. it cannot produce multiples of odd 
numbers any more than it can produce prime numbers, so that ‘ except 
the prime numbers’ does not state the exceptions adequately. Asclepius 
thinks that the dyad meant is the two factors by whose multiplication 
the composite numbers are produced ; but this does not in the least 
agree with what we learn in books M and N about the Platonic 
generation of numbers. Trendelenburg and Schwegler thought that 
πρώτων meant ‘ideal’, as in M. τοϑοῦ 22, 10814 4 (cf. πρώτη δύας in 
10818 23, &c.), while Brandis combined the two views and thought 
ideal odd numbers were meant. But Aristotle is telling us why Plato 
made the One and the indefinite dyad the principles of zdea7 numbers 


174 COMMENTARY 


(cf. ll. 18-22), and there would be no sense in saying that he did so 
because the numbers excep/ the ideal numbers could be easily 
generated from these principles. If we turn to what might appear the 
most relevant passage in Plato, Parm. 143 c—144 A, we find that 2 is 
generated by the addition of two units, 3 by the addition of 1 to 2, and 
other numbers by the multiplication of 2 and 3 or of their powers. 
(Clearly the prime numbers higher than 3, and all their multiples, are 
incapable of being produced in this way ; but Plato probably does not 
mean the account to be exhaustive.) The Parmenzdes does not help 
us, for there is no question there of the indefinite dyad; the numbers, 
including 2, are produced by the ordinary processes of addition and 
multiplication from 1 (cf. M. 10844). Further, being so produced, 
they cannot be the ideal numbers, which are inaddible (cf. M. 10832 
34); they are simply mathematical numbers. But ideal numbers 
must be referred to here. 

Prof. Jackson suggests that, since in Phys. 219> 6 number is said to 
mean the thing numbered as well as that by which we number it, τοὺς 
ἀριθμοὺς ἔξω τῶν πρώτων Means the ἀριθμητά arising from the union of 
a great and small with wmbers, viz. the multitude of particulars, while 
ol πρῶτοι would be those arising from the union of a great and small 
with the Ove, viz. the Ideas. Besides involving a theory about the 
teaching of the P/z/edus which seems untenable (cf. ll. 12, 20, 21 nn.), . 
this involves the necessity of getting out of the one word πρῶτοι a 
highly technical sense which the word bears nowhere else. Besides, 
it is hardly reasonable to explain the fact that Plato made the material 
principle of the Ideas (cf. 1]. 18-22) a dyad by the fact that the 
numbers could be easily generated from a dyad wth the exception of 
the ideal numbers. 

We have had to reject the view that τῶν πρώτων = τῶν περιττῶν, but 
we might, with Heinze, read τῶν περιττῶν. This would be confirmed 
by Ν, τορι 23 τοῦ μὲν οὖν περιττοῦ γένεσιν οὔ φασιν, ὡς δηλονότι τοῦ 
ἀρτίου οὔσης γενέσεως, where Aristotle says that the Platonists denied 
that odd number is generated. But it is inconceivable that after 
putting forward the One and the indefinite dyad as the generating 
principles of numbers they should have said that half the numbers are 
not generated at all. The true explanation of the statement in 
N. rog1® 23 is probably that given by Syrianus, that Aristotle is 
reasoning from Platonic language which was not meant to be taken 
literally. Cf.n.ad loc. The Platonists did generate odd numbers, 
but they did not do so εὐφυῶς, for the production of them by inserting the 
One itself into the middle of an even number (M, 1083? 29, 1084* 36) 
involved a departure from their general principle with regard to the 
generation of the numbers, The general principle is that the One is 
the formative agent, and the great and small is a material which has 
the property (a strange one, as Aristotle proceeds to point out in 988 
1-7) of duplicating the Form that is imprinted on it; ἣ yap ἀόριστος 
δυὰς δυοποιὸς ἦν, M. 108335, cf. 1082413. What the indefinite 
dyad, on this assumption, can most obviously do is to produce the 


A. 6. 987° 34 175 


series 2, 4, 8 (N. τορτᾶ 10). But secondly, if 3 and 5 were imprinted 
on it, it would turn out 6 and το. What it can zof do is to produce 
the odd numbers. To produce these, the One has illegitimately to be 
used not, or not merely, as a formative agent, but as an actual part of 
the number generated. 

Thus ἔξω τῶν περιττῶν gives an excellent sense, if we take it as repre- 
senting not a part of the Platonic view but a criticism of it. Neither 
the MSS., however, nor the Greek commentators know any reading 
but ἔξω τῶν πρώτων, and the corruption is not a likely one. It seems 
possible to keep the MS. reading in the sense of ‘except the prime 
numbers’, if we suppose Aristotle to have forgotten for the moment 
the number 9. Some of the Platonists, at any rate, treated 10 as the 
limit of the numerical series (M. 1084 12, cf. A. 1073820). Within 
this limit they could quite neatly generate, as we have seen, all the 
numbers except the prime numbers (3, 5, 7) and the composite 
number 9. Or, even without supposing the limitation to 10, we may 
suppose Aristotle to have forgotten the whole class of composite odd 
numbers. 

Another interpretation of ἔξω τῶν πρώτων has been suggested 
tentatively by Prof. Taylor. According to this Aristotle means that 
given the One and the indefinite dyad Plato can generate all the 
numbers except one and two. He supposes that Aristotle identifies 
the One and the indefinite dyad with the numbers one and two, and 
in effect charges Plato with assuming these numbers instead of 
generating them. This view is an attractive one; the main difficulty 
is that elsewhere one is not treated as a number, but is opposed to the 
numbers (cf. N. 1088* 6-8 n.); according to the Pythagorean definition 
ἀριθμός is πλῆθος μονάδων. But Aristotle’s familiar phrase εἷς ἀριθμῷ 
implies that in some sense one is a number. 

It is difficult to trace the lineaments of Plato’s theory through the 
medium of Aristotle’s external and unsympathetic account. In certain 
respects we may be sure that his account is misleading. That a 
principle which can only double should be put forward as one of 
the principles active in the production of all the ideal numbers, odd 
and even alike, is incredible. Aristotle ascribes to the indefinite dyad 
the function in the generation of ideal numbers which might be 
assigned to 2 in an ordinary theory of mathematical number such as is 
expressed in the Parmenides—the function of multiplying some other 
number by 2 (for other instances of misinterpretation of the indefinite 
dyad by Aristotle cf. 999" 19 n., 991 31 n.); and this forces him to 
assign to the One also a function (viz. that of accounting for the odd 
unit in odd numbers) which can hardly be that which Plato assigned to 
it. We may take the PAz/ebus as our starting-point, but it seems that 
Plato must have advanced in two respects beyond the analysis there 
offered. (1) Number is there presupposed and not generated; one of 
the two ultimate elements, the limited, consists of the various ratios 
I: 1, 2: 1, &c., and no attempt is made to get behind these to any- 
thing more ultimate. (2) The indefinite has determinate quality 


176 COMMENTARY 


although not determinate quantity; its instances are already qualified 
as temperatures, sounds, &c. Thus both number and quality are pre- 
supposed. In the theory of ideal numbers Plato seems to have left 
quality out of account, and to have tried to generate number. The 
great and small is thought of as pure indeterminate quantity, not 
qualified and not determined as any particular quantity, but capable 
of indefinite increase and indefinite diminution. The function of 
the One was to act as a limit to these movements, to check them 
at certain points, and at each such check a number was produced. 

988*1. éxpayeiou. The word is Platonic. In Plato it means 
sometimes a plastic material, sometimes a copy taken in such 
a material, sometimes a pattern or archetype. Here it is evidently 
used in the first sense, as in Zheaef. 191 c, 196A, Zim. 50, and 
Aristotle doubtless had in mind the last-named passage, where Plato 
uses the word to describe the material principle. 

2. ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πολλὰ ποιοῦσιν. ‘The point is not simply that in 
Plato’s doctrine multiplicity proceeds from matter. It does so in 
Aristotle’s own system just as certainly (cf. A. 1069 30, 1074 33). 
What Aristotle is criticizing is a special feature which he thinks he 
detects in Plato’s theory of matter. He thinks Plato means that from 
a single union of form and matter a plurality of products results. 
Cf. M. 10822 13, ‘ the indefinite dyad took the definite dyad and made 
two dyads’. As against this he points out that from a single portion 
of matter only one product can be got by a single application of 
form; the form must be applied to many portions of matter if 
a plurality of objects is to be produced. We can hardly doubt (cf. 
previous note) that Aristotle is here misrepresenting Plato’s view. 
Each number must have been produced by a separate union of form 
with matter; though Plato would have been hard put to it to explain 
how different numbers are produced if the One is always the same and 
the great and small contains in itself no reason why it should be 
checked at one point rather than another on each occasion, 

3. The use of ὕλη here illustrates well how the word passed from 
its ordinary to its technical meaning. 

4. τράπεξα. The instance was probably suggested by Pl. Rep, 
596 a. 

εἷς dy, ‘though one’. 

5. τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ. Plato actually (Zim. 50D) compares 
the material cause to a mother and the active cause to a father, 
and Aristotle himself thinks of the male and female as contributing 
respectively form and matter to the offspring. Cf. 986° 24 n. 

9. δυοῖν .aitiaw μόνον κέχρηται. Aristotle ignores various sug- 
gestions of an efficient cause in Plato—the self-moving soul of 
Phaedrus 2485, Ὁ, Laws 891-899, the demiurge of Soph. 265 Β- and of 
Tim. 28 ς ff., the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως οἵ Phil. 23 Ὁ, 26 E—27 B, and various 
suggestions of a final cause—-the ultimate good or οὗ χάριν of Phil. 
20D, 53, the object of the creator’s purpose in Z7m. 29 Ὁ ff., and in 
Laws 903c. He doubtless thinks Plato’s treatment of these causes 


A. 6, 98841 — 7. 988% 30 17 


inadequate, but that does not justify him in speaking as if Plato had 
ignored them entirely. Cf. Pr1-14 ἢ. 

14. ἔτι δὲ τὴν τοῦ εὖ κτλ, The origin of good is distinctly ascribed 
to limit in Pl. 221]. 25z—263B. Cf. A. 10759 35, N. rog1> 13, ZL. 
12182 24. 

15. ὥσπερ φαμέν κτλ. Cf. 984> 15, 9852 2. 


Summary account of the treatment of the four causes by earlier thinkers 
(chaz). 


988218. Our account has shown that our predecessors have recog- 
nized no causes other than our four, and that they have recognized 
these, though obscurely. 

23. (1) Some describe the first principle as maf/er, making it one or 
more than one, corporeal or incorporeal ; e.g. Plato, the Pythagoreans, 
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and all who describe it as air, fire, water, or 
something intermediate between fire and air. ᾿ 

838. (2) Some have recognized a source of movement in friendship 
and strife, reason, or love. 

84. (3) No one has described the essential cause clearly, but the 
Platonists come nearest to it; they treat the Forms and the One not 
as the matter of sensibles and of the Forms respectively, nor as the 
cause of movement (they describe them rather as causes of rest), but 
as imparting to them their essence. 

b6. (4) The jival cause they mention in a way, but not as such, 
(z) Those who speak of reason or love treat these as a good, but as 
the source of movement, not its object ; and (4) those who say the 
One or Being is the good treat it as the essential, not the final cause. 
Thus they treat the good as a cause only incidentally. 

16. Thus our predecessors confirm our account of the number and 
nature of the causes. Let us next discuss the problems arising out of 
the earlier treatment of them. 


In chs. 3-6 Aristotle has given us his account of previous thinkers ; 
in this chapter he summarizes this history with reference to the early 
treatment of the four causes; in chs. 8 and g he will proceed to 
criticize this treatment. 

9884 20. τῆς ἀληθείας. Cf. 983> 2 n. 

21. ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, ie. Phys. il. 3, 7. 

26. οἱ δ᾽ ᾿Ιταλικοὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. Cf. 986° 6 n. 

80. πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον. Such a substance is 
referred to again in Phys. 1847214, De Gen. οἱ Corr. 328 35, 3328 21. 
A substance intermediate between wa/er and air is referred to in 

2573-1 N 


178 COMMENTARY 


9892 14, Phys. 203° 18, 205% 27, De Caelo 303 12, De Gen. et Corr. 
332% 213; a substance intermediate between water and fire in Phys. 
1893. The ancient commentators for the most part (e.g. Al. 
60. 8) explain these passages as referring to Anaximander; but such 
vagueness in referring to so well-known a thinker would be surprising, 
and in spite of the occurrence in some of these passages, especially 
De Caelo 303» 12, De Gen. οἱ Corr. 332% 25, of language which reminds 
us of Anaximander, Phys. 187% 20 shows clearly that he is not meant. 
He is there mentioned by name, and his view, ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐνούσας τὰς 
ἐναντιότητας ἐκκρίνεσθαι, is expressly distinguished from the belief in 
an intermediate substance out of which all other things are produced 
by densification and rarefaction. (Phys. 204% 22-29 seems to draw 
the same distinction.) 1.6. Anaximander believed in a primary 
substance which had no such definite character as would be implied 
in being intermediate between two of the four commonly recognized 
elements, but which contained the potency of them all. Its absolute 
indefiniteness distinguishes it from the principles believed in by the 
other early physicists, and perhaps explains the omission of his view 
in Aristotle’s survey. Cf. Zeller, i.° 283-291, Diels, Vors. i. 18. 
10-21. 

The view in question probably belongs to a somewhat later period 
of speculation, since it mediates between the views of Heraclitus and 
Anaximenes, between those of Thales and Anaximenes, or between 
those of Thales and Heraclitus. It takes its origin from the thought 
of Anaximenes, since he was the first thinker who treated density and 
rarity as the characteristic mark of the different kinds of matter. 
Simplicius (Phys. 25. 8, 149. 13, 151. 21) says that Nicolaus and 
Porphyry referred the belief to Diogenes of Apollonia, but claims to 
have seen Diogenes’ treatise, De Natura, and says it treats azr as the 
principle. This is also Aristotle’s account of Diogenes’ view (9848 5, 
De An. 405% 22). Zeller and Diels conjecture that it was Idaeus of 
Himera that believed in the intermediate substance, but of this there 
is no evidence, and the only author who mentions Idaeus (Sext. ix. 
360) says definitely that he believed in air as the primitive substance. 
We must be content to refer the belief in an intermediate substance 
to some member or members of the school of Anaximenes, which 
evidently lasted for a considerable time and had much influence (cf. 
Burnet, §§ 31, 122). 

32. By οὗτοι Aristotle evidently means thinkers who did not 
recognize an efficient cause; i.e. the reference is solely to the Ionian 
thinkers indicated in ll. 29-32. 

34. ἔρωτα. Aristotle is thinking of Parmenides and perhaps of 
Hesiod. Cf. 984» 24. : 

be, Bonitz’s conjecture of τὸ ἕν for ra ἐν is, in view of #11, Ὁ 6, 
certainly right. 

οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐντεῦθεν κτλ. The uselessness of the ideas as efficient 
causes is a favourite point with Aristotle, cf. 99111, > 4, 9928 25, A. 
19715 14, 1075» 28, 


A. 7. 988% 32 — 988? 19 179 


6-11. Cf. 984> 20-22 ἢ. 

11-14. The Platonists, who say the One or the existent is the good, 
are making goodness an accident of the formal cause as Anaxagoras 
and Empedocles make it an accident of the efficient cause ; in neither 
case is the good made a cause in its own right, as the end of being 
and becoming. Aristotle ignores the distinctly teleological view which 
Plato expresses in some dialogues. Cf. ὃ 9 ἢ. 

19. τινὰ τρόπον τούτων is peculiar, and Bywater’s proposal to read 
τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον is probably right. 


(B) Criticism of previous systems (chs. 8-10). 
(a) The pre-Platonic systems (ch. 8). 


988» 22. (1) Those who recognize one material principle, and that 
a bodily one, make several mistakes. (a) They ignore the existence 
of incorporeal entities. (4) Though they are trying to explain 
generation and destruction, they do away with the cause of movement. 
(c) They do not recognize the essential cause. 

29. (4) They recklessly make any of the simple bodies (except 
earth) the first principle, without considering how the simple bodies 
are generated from one another. It makes a great difference to their 
relative priority whether they are produced by congregation or segre- 
gation. 

34. (i) In one way the body out of which the others are produced 
by congregation, i.e. the finest, would seem the most elementary. 
Those who make fire the principle conform best to this argument, 
and it is confirmed by the fact that none of the later monists made 
earth the principle, while each of the other elements has got 
a vote, 

9898 8. Yet most people make earth primary—cf. Hesiod. 

15. (ii) But if what is later in generation is prior in nature, and the 
product of concoction is later in generation, water will be prior to air 
and earth to water. 

19. (2) Equal difficulties beset those who recognize more than one 
material principle. (a) As for Empedocles, (i) we see things generated 
from one another in a way which implies that fire and earth do of 
remain themselves eternally, (ii) He treats the question whether the 
cause of movement is single or double neither rightly nor plausibly. 
(iii) Such thinkers do away with alteration, for in order that cold 
should come from hot or vice versa there would have to be one 
substance which becomes fire and water, which he denies, 

N 2 


180 COMMENTARY 


30. (4) If we ascribe two elements to Anaxagoras, we shall be 
bringing out fairly the implication of what he says. His saying that 
all things were originally mixed is absurd, because (i) this implies 
a previous unmixed state, (ii) it is not everything that can be mixed 
with everything, (iii) if attributes were mixed with substances they could 
exist apart from them. 

b4. Yet if we make his views articulate there is something modern 
in them. When nothing had been separated out, nothing true could 
be said of the then existing substance ; 

12. for it to have any particular character, something would have had 
to be already separated out, but all things were mixed save reason. 

16. Thus he recognizes the One, which is simple and unmixed, 
and the Other, which is like our ‘ indefinite’ before it participates in 
a form; though his language is neither right nor clear, his views 
approximate to later views and to the facts. 

21. (3) While these thinkers are at home only in discussions about 
generation, destruction, and movement, those who recognize non- 
sensibles as well as sensibles evidently study both kinds, and deserve 
more consideration with a view to the study that lies before us. 

29. (2) The Pythagoreans use stranger principles than the physicists, 
because they take them from the non-sensible, unchangeable world of 
mathematics. 

33. Yet all their discussions are about nature; they observe the 
facts about the material universe and use up their principles on it, as 
if they agreed with the physicists that what is is just what is sensible, 
though their principles are more suited to act as steps up to the higher 
kinds of reality. 

9908 8. But (i) how can there be movement if only limit and 
unlimited, odd and even are presupposed, or how without movement 
can there be generation, destruction, and the movements of the stars? 

12. (ii) Even if we grant, or they can prove, that spatial magnitude 
is composed of these principles, how can differences of weight be 
explained? They must be speaking about sensibles as much as about 
mathematicals ; they say nothing expressly about sensibles presumably 
because they have nothing sfecza/ to say about them. 

18. (iii) How can number and its modifications be the causes of 
physical things and events, if there is no number other than that 
of which the physical universe is composed ? 

22. They place opinion, opportunity, &c., in various parts of the 
universe, and state, as their proof, that each of these is a number and 
that a plurality of the spatial objects composed of numbers is already 


A, 8. 988 22 — 989" 15 181 


present in each region just because these modifications of number are 
appropriate to the several regions. Is the number, which e. g. opinion 
is, the same as the corresponding number in the physical universe ? 

29. Plato says not; he makes the one set of numbers intelligible, 
the other sensible. 


Christ thinks that chs. 8-10 (of which part of ch. 9 agrees almost 
verbally with M. 5 and part of 4) were not originally included in this 
book, but were added later, when Aristotle determined to omit M and 
N and to finish the JZe/aphysics with A. The relation between 
A. 9 and M. 4 and 5 must be considered later, but it may be said at 
once that the grounds for Christ’s suggestion are insufficient. 

988» 22. ὅσοι κτλ., ‘those who posit the unity of the universe, and 
some one kind of thing as its matter’, The first point in the 
description would apply to the Eleatics as well as to the school of 
Miletus ; the second applies to the latter only. 

28-32. Bekker prints ἔτι δὲ τὸ... ἐστι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τὸ KTA,, 
presumably understanding some such words as ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν 
as predicate of the whole sentence. But in this construction the 
nominative ἐπισκεψάμενοι is difficult if not impossible. Bonitz, how- 
ever, supposes Bekker to take τὸ τιθέναι and τὸ λέγειν as objects of 
ποιοῦνται and to understand πῶς as meaning πῶς ἔστι. Bonitz himself 
takes τὸ λέγειν and πῶς so, but points out that there is no connexion 
in sense between τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν... τὸ τί ἐστι and οὐκ ἐπισκεψάμενοι. 
He therefore places a colon afier τὸ τί ἐστι and would understand 
ἁμάρτημά ἐστι as the predicate of this first clause, while he takes 
To... λέγειν to be governed by ποιοῦνται. But τὸ λέγειν ποιοῦνται is 
very difficult, and it is much better to take πῶς ποιοῦνται together and 
to read with Bywater ro... τιθέναι, τῷ . . . λέγειν, taking these, in 
spite of the intervening sentences, as depending in thought on 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν in |, 24. 

gi. For τὴν. .. γένεσιν ποιοῦνται = γίγνονται cf. De Part. An. 
6468 31. 

34. TH μὲν yap. The response to this comes in 989% 15 εἰ δ᾽ ἔστι, 
the μέν clause being meanwhile summed up in 989812 κατὰ μὲν 
οὖν κτλ. 

989" 5-6. οὐθεὶς... στοιχεῖον. Prof. Burnet has remarked (G. P., 
§ 10) on the marked divergence of the Milesian philosophy from the 
earlier cosmology, implied in the fact that none of the physicists treated 
earth as a primary form of body, though it was very prominent in the 
cosmologists, as late as Pherecydes. Theophrastus agreed with 
Aristotle in making no exception of Xenophanes, though later writers 
did so (Diels, i. 52. 20). 

το. Cf. Hes. Zheog. 116, already quoted in 984» 28. 

14. ἀέρος μὲν πυκνότερον κτλ. Cf. 988% 30 ἢ, 

15. τὸ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερον τῇ φύσει πρότερον. Aristotle derives this 
principle from the facts of growth. The seed or the child is not 


182 COMMENTARY 


intelligible except in the light of what it becomes; it is a potency 
which we can understand only when we know what it is the potency of. 
Cf, @. 10508 4, Phys, 261% 13. 

16, πεπεμμένον. καὶ συγκεκριμένον, cf. AZefeor. 380° 4. 

17. Aristotle allows some value both to the argument in 9880 34— 
989% 2 and to that in 989%15-18. ‘There is thus something to be 
said for making either of the extremes, fire or earth, the ultimate 
element, but nothing for assigning this position to air or water. 

21. τὰ μὲν ταὐτά, Of the four objections raised against the school 
of Miletus, the first (988> 24) and the third (> 28) apply equally to 
Empedocles. 

23. ὡς οὐκ ἀεὶ διαμένοντος κτλ. According to Empedocles each of 
the four elements did remain unchanged into any of the others. The 
apparent generation of one from another was really the ἔκκρισις of it 
out of the other. But in De Caelo iii. 7 Aristotle tries to show that 
this account is unsatisfactory, that the ‘elements’ really are produced 
out of one another and therefore are not elements at all. 

24. ἐν τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, De Calo iii. 7. This phrase and ἐν τοῖς 
φυσικοῖς may refer to works other than the P&ys7cs, such as the De 
Caelo or the De Gen. οἱ Corr.; cf. H. 1042» 8, K. 1062> 31, A. 10732 
32, M. 1086? 23. 

25. πότερον ἕν ἢ δύο θετέον. Cf. 985% 23-29. ‘Since according to 
Empedocles love can do the work of strife and strife that of love, 
should he not recognize only one motive principle?’ The criticism, 
however, is beside the mark, for according to Empedocles love can 
separate only likes. To account for the separation of unlikes as well, 
two principles must be supposed. 

26-30. dws... φησιν. These words, omitted by A» and Alexander, 
are found in the other MSS. and in Asclepius. ‘This points to a very 
early divergence of the tradition, but there is no reason to regard the 
words as not genuine. They are quite suitable in the context, and the 
objection which they raise—that Empedocles does not provide a 
permanent substratum for change—is a truly Aristotelian one. Empe- 
docles meant to provide four such substrata, but Aristotle has already 
in ll. 22-24 argued that the four ‘elements’ do not really persist 
unchanged. 

81. δύο λέγειν στοιχεῖα, i.e. mind and the mixture of all other 
things. In calling the ‘mind’ of Anaxagoras an element, Aristotle is 
treating it as a material, not, as in 984> 15, as an efficient principle; 
and this is justified by Anaxagoras’ own language, since he describes 
it as λεπτότατον (fr. 12). He was aiming at the notion of an immaterial 
substance, but did not reach it. 

32. The subject of ἠκολούθησε is ἐκεῖνος. -So Al. 68. 12, and 
cf. 9938 23. 

33- Tots ἐπάγουσιν αὐτόν, ‘to those who led him on to it’. It is 
phrases like this (cf. An. Post. τὸ 21, 24, 812 5, De Caelo 2684 20) 
that best show the origin of the technical meaning of ἐπαγωγή. 

ἀτόπου yap ὄντος xt. Aristotle takes the statement which we may 


A, ὃ. 989 16 —ggo* 18 183 


suppose Anaxagoras to have made (cf. fr. 12), that all things ‘ were 
mixed’, and argues that this implies a previous process of mixing and 
a still earlier unmixed condition. ‘The argument appears to be purely 
verbal. } 

θ1, τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι κτλ. This is true only of thorough chemical 
combination, which is what Aristotle meant by μῖξις (cf. De Gen. εἰ 
Corr. 1. 10), but not what Anaxagoras meant; he thought of 
a mechanical mixture. 

8. τὰ πάθη... χωρίζοιτ᾽ ἂν τῶν οὐσιῶν, Aristotle is thinking of 
such passages as fr. 4, where wet and dry, hot and cold, bright and 
dark, are mentioned alongside of the substance earth, or fr. 10, where 
black and white, heavy and light, are mentioned alongside of hair and 
flesh. But Anaxagoras means wet substance and dry substance, &c. 
The neuter of the adjective (τοῦ διεροῦ, κτλ.) is always open to this 
misunderstanding. Again Aristotle’s argument is somewhat captious. 

7. εἰπεῖν is an epexegetic infinitive; ‘true to say’. Cf. Τὶ 1006 
29, &c. 

15. τοῦτον δὲ ἀμιγῆ. Cf. fr. 12. 

20. It seems better to read τοῖς νῦν φαινομένοις with the MSS,, 
even though viv does not appear in Alexander’s commentary. If viv 
be omitted, μᾶλλον has to be taken with παραπλήσιον, which is awkward 
in view of the distance between the words. τοῖς viv φαινομένοις μᾶλλον 
means ‘what is now more clearly seen to be the case —now, when 
the distinction of form and matter has been clearly recognized. 

29. ot... καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι, cf. 985 23 ἢ. 

34. For the Pythagorean ‘ generation of the heavens’ cf. N, 10918 
13; for their interest in astronomy and physics cf. 986% 10, Ν, 6. 

990? 5. ὥσπερ εἴπομεν refers to 989? 31. 

12-14, Aristotle’s point is: ‘Even if geometrical magnitudes could 
be generated from the odd and even, how could the physical properties 
of bodies be explained from these principles ?’ 

15-16. Casaubon’s proposal to interchange μαθηματικῶν and αἰσθη- 
tav derives some support from Al. 73. 2, but the manuscript reading is 
probably right. The Pythagoreans mean to be giving an account of 
sensible objects as well as of mathematical; this is why they have said 
nothing about any of the elements, viz. because they have nothing 
Special to say of them but mean their account of mathematical bodies 
to apply to these also. Aristotle is not ignoring the Pythagorean 
derivation of the four elements from various geometrical figures (for 
which cf. Burnet, § 147). His point is that they have given a purely 
mathematical account of the elements, edentz/ying them with geometri- 
cal figures and having nothing to say of their distinctive sensible 
qualities. 

W. Jaeger holds (Hermes, lii. 487) that οὐθὲν μᾶλλον has the force 
of οὐθὲν ἔλαττον, but this can hardly be right. Cf. 985>9n. 

18-22. ‘ How can number be the cause of what exists and happens 
in the material world, and at the same time that of which the world is 
composed?’ This would make number the cause of number. 


184 COMMENTARY 


19. τὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πάθη. Cf. 985» 29 Π. 

20. οὐρανόν, 22 κόσμος. Philolaus used οὐρανός in the sense of ‘ the 
sublunary region’, κόσμος in the sense of ‘the region of the sun, 
moon, and planets’ (Stob. i. 22. 1, cf. Epznomzs 997 8); and W. R. 
Newbold in Archiv fiir Gesch. der Phil. xix, 214, thinks that Aristotle 
is using the words in this sense. But Aristotle nowhere else recognizes 
the distinction. Elsewhere in his remarks about the Pythagoreans 
he uses the words as equivalent, and for the most part the Pytha- 
goreans seem to have used them so (Zeller, 1.5 548 ἢ. 3). Nor does 
the distinction in any way help the interpretation of this passage ; 
it would rather divert attention from the difficulty which Aristotle 
wishes to emphasize, i.e. how can numbers be the causes of things and 
at the same time the things themselves? 

23. δόξα was identified with the number 3 (or 2), καιρός with 7 ; 
for the evidence cf. 985 30n. They are not identified with the same 
number ; it is difficult therefore to suppose that they were assigned to 
the same region of the universe. Accordingly Luthe has proposed 
ἐκεῖ δέ, and Zeller 4, for καί in 1. 23, while Diels reads δόξα καὶ (τόλμα, 
ἐν τῳδὶ de) καιρός. τόλμα is stated by Alexander (74. 13) to have been 
identified with 2, but there isno reason to suppose that Alexander had 
itin his text. His paraphrase (74. 7) rather confirms the reading ἐκεῖ δέ. 

ἄνωθεν ἢ κάτωθεν, further from or nearer to the centre of the 
universe. 

24. ἀδικία. We do not know with what number this was 
identified. Alexander knows another reading ἀνικία (cf. Asc. 65. 18, 
20), which he identifies with 5, and explains by reference to the triangle 
whose sides are in the ratio 3 : 4: 5, so that the square on the hypotenuse 
is not ‘conquered by’ the squares on the other two sides. The word 
is apparently not found elsewhere, and the object which it would indi- 
cate is not of the same type as the others mentioned here, so that we 
should probably prefer the reading of the MSS. of. Aristotle, viz. ἀδικία. 

κρίσις is probably ‘ decision’. This use of the word is as old as 
Parmenides (fr. 8. 15). Asclepius says (65. 13) that 6 was called 
κρίσις because it is the first number that can be divided into two odd 
numbers, 1 not being a number. On the other hand Stobaeus (i. 1 
pr. 6, p. 20. 13 Wachsmuth) remarks that the Pythagoreans thought 
the κρίσεις of diseases were at odd numbers of days, and this would 
point to their having identified κρίσις with an odd number. 

μῖξις, Asc. 65. 15 tells us that 12 was called ‘ mixture’, because it 
can be divided both into the even numbers 6 and 6 and into the odd 
numbers 3 and 3. But it seems unlikely that the Pythagoreans went 
beyond ro in their identification of things with numbers (9868 9). 
Mixture is more likely to have been identified with 5, the first ‘mixture’ 
of odd and even. 

25. It is somewhat surprising that the existence of certain συνιστά- 
μενα μεγέθη in a certain place should be given as the reason for 
placing certain abstractions, such as opinion, there. Accordingly 
Bonitz proposes to read τούτων ἕν ἕκαστον ... συμβαίνῃ de. He 


A. ὃ, 990% 19-26 185 


takes the first of these two clauses to give the whole of the ἀπόδειξις, 
and the second to state an awkward result with which the Pythagoreans 
are confronted, viz. that the place where they put one of the abstrac- 
tions is already occupied by συνιστάμενα μεγέθη ; how then are they 
to state the relation between the two? The proposal is an attractive 
one, but is open to two objections, (1) that ἀπόδειξιν λέγωσιν prepares 
us for something more elaborate than the single clause ὅτι τούτων ἕν 
ἕκαστον ἀριθμός ἐστιν ; (2) that there is no reason for the unusual and 
very emphatic combination ἕν ἕκαστον, For these reasons it seems 
better to read with Alexander μὲν ἕκαστον and to retain συμβαίνει with 
the MSS. and Alexander. The proof is not very well stated; συμβαί- 
ver... μεγεθῶν is really irrelevant and the point comes in διὰ... 
ἑκάστοις. ‘ They allege, as proof, that each of these is a number, and 
that in this place there is already a plurality of the magnitudes com- 
posed of numbers just decause the qualities of number that constitute 
these are connected with these groups of places.’ Since opinion and 
the like are also constituted by qualities of number, this does afford a 
proof, good enough for the Pythagoreans, that opinion and the like 
are localized in these same places. 

26. ἤδη πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν συνισταμένων μεγεθῶν, Alexander (74. 12) 
takes this to mean that while at the centre of the universe there is τὸ 
ἕν, in the next region there are τὰ δύο, i.e. opinion and daring, in the 
next region to that presumably three corresponding things, and so on. 
This interpretation is unsatisfactory because (1) ἤδη implies that there 
are already things o/her than opinion, &c., assigned to the various 
regions, and (2) μεγεθῶν, spatial magnitudes, is inapplicable to opinion 
and the like. The μεγέθη must be spatial objects of some kind. 
One naturally thinks of the Pythagorean cosmology with its ten 
bodies ranged in order from the centre of the universe outwards— 
counter-earth, earth, moon, sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, 
heaven of the fixed stars. One of the versions of Alexander (alt. rec. 
gr. in Hayduck) connects opinion, which was identified with 2 (unless 
the tradition connecting it with 3, for which cf. 985» 30 n., is the more 
correct), with the region of the earth, and opportunity, which was 
identified with 7, with the region of the sun and moon. In 38. 20, 
also, Alexander connects opportunity with the sun. But these sugges- 
tions are misleading, for (1) the earth can be reckoned as the second 
body only if we count from the centre, and the sun as the seventh only 
if we count from the outside ; but we cannot be meant to combine the 
two modes of counting. (2) πλῆθος is not explained by this interpreta- 
tion. In the cosmology only one star is assigned to each region 
(except that of the outer heaven), but Aristotle speaks of a plurality of 
μεγέθη in each region. πλῆθος cannot mean, as Zeller takes it to 
mean, the ordinal number of each heavenly body. Aristotle must 
mean that in each of the regions of the universe there is a multitude 
of extended bodies composed of numbers. Now Pythagoras is said 
to have regarded earth as built up out of cubes, fire of tetrahedra, air 
of octahedra, water of eicosahedra, the outer sphere of dodecahedra 


186 COMMENTARY 


(Aet. ii. 6. 5). We read in the scholia to Euclid (Heiberg’s Euclid, 
vol. v, p. 654, quoted by Burnet) that the Pythagoreans knew only the 
cube, the tetrahedron, and the dodecahedron, while the other two 
regular solids were discovered by Theaetetus ; but later Pythagoreans 
probably used Theaetetus’ discovery to complete the correspondence 
of the elements with the regular solids. ‘They further reduced the 
regular solids to numbers, in accordan@e with their general principle 
(Speusippus, ap. Zheol. Arithm. pp. 61-63 Ast). Thus each of the 
elements is a μέγεθος συνιστάμενον, composed of a particular number. 
συνισταμένων = συνισταμένων ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ch 1. 21 τὸν ἀριθμὸν 
τοῦτον ἐξ οὗ συνέστηκεν 6 κόσμος. Proclus similarly speaks of the 
Pythagorean construction of the elements out of the regular solids as 
τὴν TOV κοσμικῶν σχημάτων σύστασιν (Diels, i. 346. 2). On the history 
of this doctrine cf. Heath, Gk, Mash. i. 158-162. The various regions, 
then, of which Aristotle is speaking are probably those of the elements. 
In one region there is already a plurality of portions of fire, because 
the number of fire is proper to that region; in another a plurality 
of portions of air, and so on. 

The emendations proposed by Zeller and Luthe in this line do 
nothing to aid the interpretation. 

27. τὰ πάθη ταῦτα, the properties of number, or the numbers 
exhibiting certain properties (for the confusion between these cf. 
985° 29 n.), which constitute the συνιστάμενα μεγέθη. 

τοῖς τόποις ἑκάστοις, as the plural ἑκάστοις Shows, means ‘ the several 
groups of places’. Each portion of fire, for instance, occupies one 
place: fire altogether occupies a group of places. 

πότερον οὗτος κτλ. is to be interpreted in the light of ll. 21, 22. 
‘Is this number, which we must suppose each of these abstractions 
(opinion, &c.) to be, the same number that is exhibited in the material 
universe ?’ The question raised inll, 18-22 was,‘ How can numbers be 
the causes of the things and events in the universe, and at the same time 
the universe itself?’; in ll. 22-29 Aristotlé puts a different question, 
‘How can numbers be opinion, &c., and at the same time be the 
substance of the material universe?’ He wants a distinction to be 
drawn between abstract number as the cause of the nature of things 
and concrete number as the substance of the things themselves, and 
he assumes that the only number with which opinion, for instance, can 
possibly be identified is abstract number. Thus the question how the 
number which is the cause of things can also be the substance of things 
is substantially the same as the question how the number which is, e.g., 
opinion can be the number which is the substance of a material thing. 

29-32. Aristotle says nothing here of the distinction which he else- 
where (e. g. 987> 14) attributes to Plato between the Idea of a number 
and the many mathematical or ‘intermediate’ instances of that 
number. He is thinking of passages in which this distinction is 
blurred, and intelligible number in general is opposed to concrete or 
denominate numbers, ὁρατὰ ἢ dara σώματα ἔχοντες ἀριθμοί (Rep. 
5285 Ὁ), such as στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο (Phil, 56d). 


A. 8. 990% 27-31 187 


81. ταῦτα means not, like τούτων in |. 29, opinion and the like, but 
material things, the συνιστάμενα μεγέθη. 


(b) Zhe theory of Ideas (or Forms) (ch. 9). 


990? 33. Objections: (i) It supposes Ideas to exist in order to 
explain sensibles, but in doing this it merely doubles the number 
of things to be explained. 

"8. (ii) Of the ‘proofs’ of the theory, some prove nothing, others 
would prove the existence of Ideas of things of which we Platonists 
think there are none. (a) The arguments from the existence of the 
sciences would prove that there are Forms of all things of which there 
are sciences. (8) The argument of ‘one over many’ would prove 
that there are Forms of negations. (y) The argument from the 
possibility of thinking when the object has perished would prove that 
there are Forms of perishable objects. (8) Of the more accurate 
arguments some lead to Ideas of relative terms, others posit the 
‘third man’. 

17. (iii) In general the arguments about the Forms destroy what the 
school of Ideas thinks more important than the Ideas; number 
becomes prior to the dyad, the relative to the absolute. In various 
ways the opinions about the Ideas conflict with the first principles of 
the theory. 

22. (iv) According to the view on which the theory is based there 
will be Forms of many things besides substances (for there can be a 
single concept, or a science, of other things); but according to the 
logical requirements of the theory and the opinions actually held, if the 
Forms are shared in there are Forms only of substances. 

29. For (a) each is shared in not as an accident of something else 
but as something not predicated of a subject (i.e. not as anything that 
shares in doubleness shares in eternity because doubleness is eternal), 
so that the Forms must be substances. But (f) the same names must 
indicate substance in the sensible world as in the ideal (else what is 
meant by calling the Idea ‘one over many’? If the Ideas and the 
things that share in them fave the same form, there is something 
common, for instance, to the Idea of two and the particular two, 
as there is to the perishable two and the particular mathematical two ; 
and if they have not the same form, they have only their name in com- 
mon, as Callias and a statue may both be called ‘a man’), 

9918 8. (v) The main question is, what do the Forms contribute 


188 COMMENTARY 


either to eternal or to transient sensibles? (a) They cause no change 
in them, (8) they contribute nothing to the knowledge of them (for, 
not being in them, they are not their substance), nor (y) to their being 
(if they were in them-they might perhaps be their causes as white is of 
the whiteness of that in which it is mixed; but this view of Anaxa- 
goras and Eudoxus is easily refuted). 


1g. (vi) Other things are not composed of Forms in any 
ordinary sense; and to call the Forms patterns and say other things 
share in them is empty metaphor. For (a) what is it that works with 
its eye on the Ideas? (β) A thing can be or become like another 
without being copied from it. (y) There will be many patterns, and 
therefore Forms, of the same thing; to a man there will answer 
the Forms of animal, biped, and man. (δ) Not only will the species 
be the pattern of the individuals, but the genus will be the pattern of 
its species, so that the same thing will be pattern and copy. 

by, (vii) How can the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist 
apart from the things? In the Phaedo they are said to be causes 
both of being and of becoming. Yet (a) even if the Forms exist, the 
things that share in them do not come into being unless there is a 
moving cause, and (8) many things, e.g. houses, come into existence 
though we say there are no Forms of them, and therefore other things 
also may be or come into being owing to similar causes. 

g. (viii) If the Forms are numbers, how will they be causes? 
(a) If it is because things are other numbers, how will the one set of 
numbers act as causes forthe otherset? The fact that the former are 
eternal, the latter not, makes no difference. (A) If it is because things 
in this world are numerical ratios, like a harmony, evidently they are 
ratios of something, and the numbers themselves will be so too, and not 
really numbers. 


21. (ix) From many numbers one number is produced, but how can 
one Form be produced from more than one? If it is produced not 
from numbers but from the units in them, what of the units? If they are 
specifically alike, many paradoxes ensue, and so too if they are unlike 
(both the units in one number and those in different numbers); for 
how will they differ, if they are subject to no affections ? 

27. (x) They must set up another kind of number, with which 
arithmetic deals, and all the so-called intermediates ; then (a) from 
what principles are these produced, and (8) why are they inter- 
mediate ? 

81. (xi) Each unit in the indefinite dyad must come from a prior 
dyad, which is impossible. 


A. 9. 991% — 992 189 


9928 1. (xii) What constitutes the unity of the number when 
grasped collectively ? 

2, (xiii) If the units are dissimilar, then (just as people name not 
the general term body but fire and earth as the elements) the different 
kinds of unit should have been named; but they speak as if the One 
were always alike in kind, in which case the numbers it gave rise to 
would not be substances. If there is a ‘ one itself’ and this is 
a principle, ‘one’ must have more than one meaning. 

10. (xiv) We derive lengths from the long and short, planes from 
the broad and narrow, bodies from the deep and shallow. But 
(a) these principles being generically different, how can the plane 
contain a line or the solid a plane? The broad is not the genus of 
the deep, for then a body would be a kind of plane. 

19. (8) From what will the points contained in lines be derived ? 
Plato opposed the point as a geometrical dogma, and applied the name 
of ‘principle of the line’, a thing he often posited, to the ‘indivisible 
lines’, Yet they must have a limit, so that the argument that 
establishes the line establishes the point. 

24. (xv) In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of sensible 
phenomena, we have abandoned this search (for we say nothing of the 
efficient cause), and name other substances without showing how 
they can be the substances of these ; participation is nothing. 

2g. (xvi) The Forms have nothing to do with the final cause 
at which both reason and nature aim ; mathematics has taken the 
place of philosophy, though it is said that we ought to study it for the 
sake of other things. 

θα, (xvii) The underlying substance is stated too mathematically ; 
(a) the great and the small are predicates of matter rather than 
matter; they answer to the rare and the dense of the physicists. 

(8) If these are movements, the Forms will be moved; if they are 
not, whence did movement come? ‘The theory is fatal to physics. 

g. (xviii) They do not prove that all things are one; even if we 
grant that the universal is a genus (which it sometimes cannot be), they 
only establish the existence of a separate One-itself. 

1g. (xix) It cannot be stated how the ‘things after the numbers ’— 
lines, planes, solids—exist or can exist, or what function they have ; 
they cannot be either Forms or ‘intermediates’ or perishables, but 
must form a fourth class. 

18. (xx) To seek the elements of all things that are, without dis- 
tinguishing the various senses of ‘be’, is absurd; only the elements of 
substances can be discovered. 


190 COMMENTARY 


24. (xxi) If we are to discover the elements of all things we cannot 
know anything before, as the man who is learning geometry knows no 
geometry before; but all learning, whether by deduction, definition, or 
induction, implies previous knowledge. Nor can we have this supreme 
knowledge all along without knowing it. 

993% 2. (xxii) As it may be disputed whether ζ is a compound of σ 
and 6 or a distinct sound, so there may be dispute about the elements 
of being. 

ἡ. (xxiii) If the elements of all things are the same, we ought to 
know even those sensible things which we do not perceive, which is 
impossible. 


A considerable part of this chapter, 990" 2—gg1? 9, is almost 
verbally identical with M. 1078 > 34—1079> 3, 10795 12—10808 8, 
The following differences may be noted: 

(1) Book A says (990 4) σχεδὸν yap ἴσα---ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω---ἐστὶ τὰ 
εἴδη τούτοις. M puts the case more strongly (1078? 56)---πλείω γάρ 
ἐστι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα αἰσθητῶν ws εἰπεῖν τὰ εἴδη. 

(2) Where A says δείκνυμεν, οἰόμεθα, φαμεν, βουλόμεθα (οοοῦ 9, 
11, 16, 19, 23, 991» 7), M says δείκνυται, οἴονται, φασιν, βούλονται 
(τογοῦ 5, 7, 12, 14, 20, 10808 6). 

(3) M has a section (1079» 3-11) which does not appear in A. 

(4) There are many slight divergences ; sometimes A and sometimes 
M adds an explanatory word or phrase. Cf. M. 1078 34—1080? 8 ἢ. 

Of these points the first two are the most significant. The use of 
the first person implies that Aristotle speaks of himself as a Platonist. 
Jaeger argues with much force (Z*ést. 33-35) that Book A must have 
been read before a Platonic circle, and that this was probably the 
circle that gathered round Hermias at Assos.- If this conjecture 
be right, the book may be dated 348-345 B.c., when Aristotle is known 
to have been living at the court of Hermias. In M Aristotle no 
longer speaks of himself as a Platonist, and permits himself at one 
point (1078» 36), as we have seen, to exaggerate an objection which 
was stated more moderately in A. M, then, belongs to a later 
period, at which Aristotle was no longer in touch with Platonists. 
This inference about the comparative date of the two versions agrees 
with that suggested by the references in B to A and by those in M to 
B, for which see 9872 32-8 ἢ. 

The occurrence of these two versions of the same passage may 
have been the reason why the authenticity of A was doubted in 
antiquity (Al. 196, 20, Syr. 23. 9). Really it is an indication of the 
genuineness of both books. That Aristotle should have used in one 
context what he had written in another is much more likely than that 
a forgery should have found its way into the text when there was 
already a genuine passage covering the same ground. 

It is to be noticed that the use of the first person in the sense of ‘ we 


A. 9. 990? 2-11 ΤΟΙ 


Platonists’ is not confined to this passage. It is common to A and 
B, and confirms the other indications of a close connexion between 
these books; cf. 992% 11, 25, 27, 28, B. 99753, roo2b14. The 
same tone may be detected in /’. V. 10968 13. 

990? 2. That τούτοις means individual things, not, as Alexander and 
Bonitz suppose, classes of things, is shown by τωνδὲ τῶν ὄντων, |. 1. 
ἴσα is not to be taken very strictly. One Idea was common to many 
particulars; but, on the other hand, one particular shared in many Ideas, 
so that, speaking very roughly, Aristotle says their numbers are equal. 

6. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον κτλ. The evidence about the text is some- 
what puzzling. In ]. 7 E and Al., as well as the corresponding 
passage in M, have τε, which is omitted by AP and by Asc. Again 
F, Τί Asc., and M have ἄλλων, while Ab and Al. have ἄλλων ὧν. 
- Bonitz argues that τῶν ἄλλων forms no proper contrast to καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, 
and therefore punctuates (as Bekker does) after ἐστι (szc) and not after 
οὐσίας, and would omit re, and interpret (reading ἄλλων ὧν) ‘ for each 
class of things there is something (an Idea) of the same name, even for 
those things other than substances which have a unity over the plurality 
of particulars’. 

te, however, is very strongly attested, and the objection to it is 
removed if we interpret τῶν ἄλλων in the light of the whole phrase 
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ Tas οὐσίας, and not of καθ᾽ 
ἕκαστον merely. The question remains whether ὧν should be read. 
The balance of evidence is against it, and the construction without it is 
at any rate not more difficult than that which we get by reading it. 
The whole sentence, with re and without ὧν, will mean: ‘for to 
each thing there answers an entity having the same name as it and 
existing apart from the substances, and in the case of non-substantial 
things there is a one-over-many.’ 

ὁμώνυμον. Aristotle uses this word rather than συνώνυμον, partly 
because it is Plato’s own word, partly perhaps to suggest that there 
is no common nature shared by the Idea and the particular and that 
therefore the one can do nothing to explain the other—the point which 
he has been making in ll. 1-4. Cf. 9879 n. 

8. τοῖς ἀϊδίοις is In 9018 9 expanded into τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, 
i.e. the heavenly bodies. Similarly τοῖσδε is expanded into τοῖς 
γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις. 

9. δείκνυμεν, ‘we Platonists prove’. For the use ofthe first person 
cf. note at beginning of chapter. 

II. οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα = ὧν οὐκ οἰόμεθα, cf. Bonitz, /ndex, 539% 14-47. 
The things of which according to Aristotle the Platonists did not think 
there were Ideas are: 

(1) the objects of some ‘sciences’ (I. 12), i.e., probably, arzefacta 
(cf. 991} 6, A. 10708 18). 

(2) negations (I. 13). 

(3) perishable things (1. 14). 

(4) relative terms (1. 16). 

It is quite clear that Platonism soon departed from the doctrine of the 


192 COMMENTARY 


Republic (596 a) that there is an Idea answering to every group of 
things. Xenocrates defined the Idea as αἰτία παραδειγματικὴ τῶν κατὰ 
φύσιν ἀεὶ διεστώτων (Procl. 2: Parm. i. 888. 18 Cousin), and Diogenes 
Laertius represents Plato himself as making the Ideas αἰτίας twas καὶ 
ἀρχὰς τοῦ τοιαῦτά εἶναι τὰ φύρει διεστῶτα οἷάπερ ἐστὶν αὐτά (iii. 77). 
The doctrine of the school is well stated by Syrianus, who says there 
are not Ideas of bad things (107. 8), of negations (107. 10), of things 
changeable (107. 12), of ‘parts which are not also wholes’, like the 
hand or the head (107. 14), of the accidental attributes of bodies, like 
sweetness (107. 18), of ‘composites, like wise man’ (107. 21), of 
hybrids (107. 26), of the products of the imitative arts (107. 31), or 
of things that depend on choice or chance (107. 34), but only of 
universal and perfect substances and of what contributes to their 
natural state, e.g. of man and of wisdom (107. 38). Again he says 
there are not Ideas of inessential relations such as higher and lower, 
right and left, neighbouring, and so on(111. 12), nor of attributes that 
belong to bodies only, but that there are Ideas of attributes that belong 
‘both to souls and to bodies and to natures’, such as likeness, 
equality, greatness (114.5). Cf. similar statements by Plotinus (v. 9. 
το init.), Proclus (77 Rempudl. i. 32. 17 Kroll, 2 Parm. v. p. 815. 15— 
833. 23 Cousin). 

It is hard to say to what extent Plato himself limited the class 
of things of which there are Ideas. The only relevant passage in 
which Aristotle mentions Plato by name is A. 10708 18, and here he 
only says that Plato ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἔστιν ὁπόσα φύσει, that there are 
Ideas of all natural objects, though Aristotle there seems to infer that 
Plato thought there were ποῦ Ideas of artificial objects. In the period 
represented by such dialogues as the Phaedo and the Republic we find 
Ideas of types which Aristotle says the Platonists repudiated, e. g. 
(1) of bed and table (Rep. 5968, 597 0), of shuttle and auger and 
of every kind of tool (Crat. 3898, 6), (2) of the negations of self: 
control, courage, &c. (Rep. 402 0), of ugly, bad, and unjust (ib. 475 8, 
476 A), (4) of equal, greater, and less (Phaedo 744,75 C, 1008). Prof. 
Jackson has tried to show (/. of P. x. 253-298, xi. 287-331, xiii. 1- 
40, 242-272, Xiv. 173-230, xv. 280-305) that there is a ‘later theory 
of Ideas’, represented by the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophistes, 
Politicus, Philebus, and Timaeus, in which Plato excludes all Ideas 
save those which are natural types of the species of animals and of the 
four elements. This is a theory of Ideas, it will be observed, which 
outdoes even Syrianus in exclusiveness. For a trenchant criticism of 
Prof. Jackson’s view cf. Prof. Taylor in Mind, v. 304, 305, 313-315; 
Apart from other objections to this view, which it would take too long 
to enter upon, it may be enough to point to the Ideas of unlike, other, 
ugly, bad in Zheae/. 186 a, and of other and not-being in Soph. 254 8, 
256 ν. If not many instances of Ideas of the kinds in question are to 
be found in the late dialogues, this is because the ideal theory has 
in general receded considerably into the background and Plato has 
become interested in other speculations. It would seem that this 


ἈΠΟ O90 TIT 3 193 


development of the ideal theory, like so many other developments of it 
about which Aristotle tells us, either belongs to a very late period 
of Plato’s life and is not expressed at all in the dialogues, or does not 
belong to. Plato but only to his followers. We have, really no means 
of deciding between these two possibilities. 

11-15. The very concise mode of reference to the arguments for the 
Ideas seems to imply that the arguments had been carefully named and 
tabulated ; τὸ ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν and τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος are evidently 
technical names current in the school. The ‘arguments from the 
sciences ’ must have been arguments on the lines of Rep. 479 A—480 A, 
Tim, 51 D—52 a. Such arguments have already, in 987% 32-- το, been 
described as the main reason for the belief in Ideas, The general 
form of the argument is : 

If knowledge exists, there must exist an unchangeable object 
of knowledge. ‘ 

Knowledge does exist. 

Therefore there exists an unchangeable object. 

Sensible objects are changeable. 

Therefore there exist non-sensible realities, 

Alexander (who seems to rely on the first book of Aristotle’s 
De Ideis) gives three arguments ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. (τ) If every 
science does its work with reference to one identical object and not to 
any of its individual instances, there must be in the case of each 
science something apart from sensible things which is eternal and is 
the pattern of the objects of each science ; and of this nature is the 
Idea. (2) The objects of sciences must exist ; now the objects of the 
sciences are things other than the particulars, for these are infinite and 
indefinite, but the objects of the sciences are definite ; there are, there- 
fore, things other than the particulars, and these are the Ideas. (3) If 
medicine is the science not of this health but of health simply, there 
must be a health-itself; and if geometry is not the science of this 
equal and this proportionate but of the equal simply and of the 
proportionate simply, there must be an equal-itself and a proportionate- 
itself, and these are Ideas, 

If we ask what the objects of science were, of which the Platonists 
of Aristotle’s time did not recognize Ideas, the answer probably is, 
‘the objects of the productive sciences, or arts’. It will be noticed 
that there is no express reference in this passage to the Platonists’ 
denial of Ideas of manufactured objects (for which cf. 991» 6). This 
is most easily explained if we suppose that they are referred to in the 
words πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι, and Alexander interprets the 
words so. 

18. τὸ ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν is the argument for the existence of Ideas from 
the existence of groups of particulars (Rep. 596 a, cf. Phaedo 74). 

kat τῶν ἀποφάσεων. It is not absolutely necessary to suppose any 
change in the Platonic theory in this respect. It is true that Ideas of. 
the vices, of the ugly, the bad, the other, the unlike, and not-being, are 
referred to in Plato’s dialogues, but these are privations with a positive 


2678-1 Oo 


194 COMMENTARY 


meaning of their own, not bare negations. There was no need to 
suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by 
participation in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by 
non-participation in the positive Idea. 

14. κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος τῶν φθαρτῶν. This objection stands 
on ἃ different footing from the two that precede and the one that follows. 
In these others Aristotle is arguing that certain arguments for the 
Ideas involve the existence of Ideas which the Platonists repudiated, 
though the Platonism of the Phaedo and the Republic admits them. 
Here he is arguing that one of the arguments for the Ideas involves 
the existence of Ideas which neither Plato nor any Platonist ever ad- 
mitted. In a sense they did admit Ideas of perishables, e. g. an Idea 
of horse. But Aristotle means that they ought in consistency to have 
admitted Ideas of the particular perishable horses. There must be an 
Idea of horse, they say, since we ‘could think of the horse even if all 
horses had died. Then, Aristotle argues, there must be an Idea of 
each perishable horse, since we can have an image of it when it has 
died. 1. ς., if thought implies the existence of its object, so does 
memory. 

15. ot ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων. There is no reason to suppose, with 
Alexander (83. 29), that Aristotle means the arguments which prove 
the existence of the Idea as a παράδειγμα, in contrast to the preceding 
arguments which merely prove the existence of κοινόν τι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ 
ἕκαστα. ‘The distinction would be a difficult one to maintain, and 
is not suggested by Aristotle’s words. The point rather is this (it has 
been well brought out by Prof. Jackson in /. of P. x. 255): Aristotle 
has previously pointed out certain consequences of Platonic arguments ; 
he now points out certain zmplications actually stated (λέγουσι can mean 
nothing else) in Plato’s more accurate arguments, though unwelcome 
to his successors. Plato’s argument in the Phaedo (74 a—77 A) and 
in the Republic (479 A—480 a) states the existence of Ideas of relative 
terms (cf. 990 τι n.), and his argument in the Parmenzdes (132 A, B, D— 
133 A) States the difficulty of the ‘third man’. 

16. ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ᾽ αὐτὸ γένος. A change in Aristotle's mode 
of expression is to be noted here. He does not say that Platonic 
arguments lead to a belief in Ideas of relations, and that yet the 
Platonists deny the existence of such Ideas. He says that Platonic 
arguments lead to Ideas of τὰ πρός τι, ‘which, we maintain, do not 
form an independent class’. Arguments like those in the Phaedo lead 
to belief in an Idea, 6. g., of the equal. Yet we do not suppose that all 
things which happen to be equal to other things form a separate class 
771 rerum natura; such a class would include things which in essentials 
differ from each other ; such a classification would cut across any 
natural classification of the contents of the universe. This points not 
to a change in the Platonic theory but to a difficulty which the Platonic 
theory, in the form familiar to us from the dialogues, must have 
presented to Aristotle and to orthodox Platonists alike. 

17. τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον. The argument which ‘mentions the third 


ΝΟ, 9908 14-17 195 


man’, Alexander tells us, is the argument that since a particular man 
is like the ideal man in being a man, there must be a ‘ third man’ in 
which both share. But he mentions various other forms of ‘third 
man’ argument. (1) There is an argument which was ‘used by the 
sophists’. When we say ‘man walks’, we mean neither the Idea of 
man(which is motionless) nor any particular man; we must, then, 
mean a man of some third kind. (2) Phanias (a pupil of Aristotle) in 
his book against Diodorus Cronus says that Polyxenus the sophist 
(a contemporary of Plato) used the following argument: If man 
exists by participation in the Idea of man, there must be some man 
who ‘will have his being in relation to the Idea’. But this can 
neither be the ideal man, who zs an Idea, nor a particular man. 
Therefore it must be a third man. (3) Alexander gives in the third 
place an argument which appears to be the same as that which he says 
is used here, except that it points out that the same regress may 
be repeated ad endefintlum. 

Thus ‘the third man’ was a phrase that was applied to various 
forms of argument; but that which Aristotle means here is doubtless 
that which Alexander supposes him to mean, and which occurs in 
Parm. 132 A, Β, D—133 A. But the instance of man is not there used by 
Plato, and Aristotle probably has in view not the argument in the 
Parmenides itself, but an argument of the Academic school based 
on it. Alexander, followed by Bonitz, interprets (83. 34) λέγουσιν 
as meaning “ciodyovow, ‘involve’, as if the ‘third man’ were merely a 
consequence implied in some Platonic argument, but the word cannot 
well mean this. What Aristotle says is that the Platonic argument, not 
his own inference from it, ‘ mentions the third man’, 

The ‘third man’ argument depends on the positing of the Idea as 
an individual substance outside fhe particulars and imitated by them 
(this is stated expressly in Soph. £7. τῇ οὗ 3). Aristotle himself would 
escape it by saying that there is no such Idea but only a universal 271 
the particulars. There is not an ideal man but only man-ness, and as 
man-ness is not a man there is no reason to suppose a ‘third man’ 
predicable of man-ness as well as of man. The question whether the 
argument is valid as against Plato depends on the further question 
whether Plato really did describe the Idea as if it were just a sort 
of fresh particular, an αἰσθητὸν ἀΐδιον as Aristotle calls it; and 
on this we can hardly enter here. It is clear from the Parmenzdes that 
Plato saw the difficulty ; that, as Prof. Jackson says, ‘he had in reserve 
a reformed doctrine which was, or seemed to be, safe from attack on 
this side’ (/. of P.x. 256) is more doubtful. What the Parmenddes 
itself suggests is rather that he saw the need for a restatement of the 
ideal theory but did not see his way to such a restatement (τι ἄλλο δεῖ 
ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει, 133 A). 

Before writing the Parmenzdes, Plato had pointed out that the 
supposition of /wo Ideas, say of bed, would lead to yet another Idea 
(Rep. 597c); and Zim. 31 a gives another argument analogous to the 
‘third man’. Aristotle refers to the ‘third man’ argument in 

Ο 2 


196 COMMENTARY 


Z. 1039% 2, Soph. Μ᾽]. 178% 36; in K. 1059) 8 the phrase is used, with 
a play upon words, in a different connexion. 

On the assumption that λέγουσιν means ‘involve’ and not ‘men- 
tion’, surprise has been felt at Aristotle’s failing to say that Plato has 
actually anticipated his objection in the Parmenzdes, and Ueberweg, 
among others, used this as an argument against the authenticity of the 
Parmenides, Baumker has tried (Athen. Mus. xxxiv. 82) to explain 
the absence of a reference to the Parmenides here by the supposition 
that the argument was invented not by Plato but by Polyxenus the 
sophist, and that thus Plato is in the Parmenzdes merely quoting a 
Megarian attack on the ideal theory. But Baumker’s interpretation 
of the ‘third man’ argument ascribed to Polyxenus by Alexander is 
untenable ; whatever the argument means, it is not identical with the 
argument in the Parmenzdes; and it is the latter that Aristotle has 
in view in Soph. £7, 178 36—179* 10, and, we may be sure, here too. 
On this side also, then, our interpretation of λέγουσιν is confirmed. 
On the difficulties in the supposition that in the first part of the 
Parmenides Plato is merely quoting Megarian attacks on the Ideas, 
cf. Prof. Taylor in Avind, v. 316-318. 

18. βουλόμεθα, the reading of E and Asclepius, is pretty certainly 
right. βούλονται of λέγοντες εἴδη is doubtless a gloss introduced from 
Book M, and E has illogically combined of λέγοντες εἴδη with 
βουλόμεθα. 

19. συμβαίνει γάρ κτλ, i.e. number, being the Idea under which 
the dyad falls, must be prior to it; thus the Platonic arguments depose 
the very first principles of the Platonic theory from their place of 
dignity. ἡἣ δυάς probably means the indefinite dyad, as it does in 
M. 1081 18, 1083%12. It can be referred to simply as ‘the dyad’ 
because it has been already referred to more explicitly in 987 20, 

δ, 33: 

It is to be noted that Aristotle is not quite fair in assuming that the 
indefinite dyad is an ordinary member of the class-of 2’s. We have 
already (987 34) found him misinterpreting the indefinite dyad some- 
what similarly. Cf. οοι 31 n. ‘ 

20. kal τὸ πρός τι τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτό, sc. πρότερον, to be understood 
from πρώτην. It is natural to take this, with Alexander (86, 5), 
as repeating in a different form what has just been said. “1. 6, the 
relative term number will be prior to the supposed self-subsistent 
dyad.’ Bonitz thinks that number is not a relative term, and therefore 
interprets ‘and the relative term great-and-small will be prior to the 
supposed self-subsistent Ideas’. But it is harder to get this out of the 
Greek. Number no doubt is in the category of quantity (Ca/. 4» 23), 
but that is no reason why it should not be also in the category of rela- 
tion (Caf. 11837). Certainly it is the number of something, as 
Alexander points out (86. 5), and πρός τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται ὅσα αὐτὰ 
ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται (Caz. 68 36). This interpretation is 
confirmed by the fuller form of the argument in M. 1079% 17. 

29-991*2, We may best attack the interpretation of this difficult 


A. 9. 99018 — 991% 2 197 


argument by bringing out the implications of the parenthesis in 
990” 31-34 εἶναι. If anything ‘shares in the double itself’, it shares 
in eternalness, since the double itself is eternal. But for A to share 
thus (incidentally) in B does not give it the character B, according to 
the Platonists, for no Platonist would say that a sensible thing which is 
double of something else is therefore eternal. ‘Therefore the Ideas, 
sharing in which gives particulars the character expressed by the name 
common to them and the Ideas, cannot be shared in gua predicates of 
a subject, as ‘eternal’ is a predicate of the double itself. Therefore 
they must be substances. But the same words must indicate substance 
in this sensible world as in the ideal world. ‘Therefore the things of 
which there are Ideas must be substances. ‘This conclusion, stated in 
1, 29, is established by the premises (1) οὐσία τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν (which 
is itself proved in ll. 29-34) and (2) ταὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν σημαίνει 
κἀκεῖ. Bonitz argues that the substantiality of the Ideas must be 
assumed, not proved, and would therefore read οὐσίας or οὐσιῶν 
in 1. 34, and, since then ταὐτὰ ... κἀκεῖ must give a reason for this 
conclusion, he reads ταὐτὰ yap for ταὐτὰ dé. The argument according 
to him is: ‘The particulars must share in the Ideas-gwa-substances, 
not gua-predicates, and must therefore themselves be substances, 
for the same names indicate substance in the sensible as in the ideal 
world’, This agrees with Alexander’s interpretation, but (1) if 
Aristotle were assuming that the Ideas are substances, ταὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα 
οὐσίαν σημαίνει κἀκεῖ would in itself prove that there are Ideas only of 
substances, and the rest of the argument would be otiose. (2) Alexan- 
der probably read οὐσία in 1. 34 (see Al. 91. 11, 12), though he ignores 
it as long as possible and interprets it loosely when he comes to it ; 
and we cannot safely infer from 91. 2 that he read ταὐτὰ γάρ: Since 
Aristotle has a@ready in |, 29 said τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι. 
μόνον, it is hard to see how οὐσιῶν or οὐσίας, if it had been the original 
reading in 1. 34, could have been corrupted into οὐσία. 

Schwegler’s conjectures, ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν οὐσία τὰ εἴδη, ταὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα, 
and ὥστ᾽, εἰ ἔσται, οὐσία τὰ εἴδη" ταὐτὰ δὲ ἐνταῦθα, are no more likely to 
be right than those of Bonitz. 

29. οὐ γὰρ. . . μετέχονται, ‘they are not shared in as acci- 
dents of a subject that is directly shared in’, 

QQI® I. ἢ τί ἔσται κτλ. ‘If the same words are not to indicate 
substance in the sensible as in the ideal world, what is the relation 
between the two worlds, and why should an Idea be posited for each 
group of particulars ; what community of nature would there be between. 
the one and the many if it were a substance and they were not?’ 

2. καὶ εἰ μέν κτλ. This is not introduced as if it were a fresh argu- 
ment against the Ideas, and if it were, it would merely repeat the ‘ third 
man’ argument which Aristotle has already referred to in 990} 17. 
Rather it seems to confirm the close relation between particulars 
and Ideas which he has asserted in the words ταὐτὰ ἐνταῦθα οὐσίαν 
σημαίνει κἀκεῖ, If there is not this close relation, there is a mere 
ὁμωνυμία. 


198 COMMENTARY 


4. τῶν πολλῶν μὲν ἀϊδίων. δέ, the mathematical 2’s. Cf. 987 15. 

τὸ δυάς. The common reading is τὸ δυὰς εἶναι, but this is an impos- 
sible form, and we must either omit εἶναι with ET Al. and M. 1079" 36 
or read τὸ δυὰς σημαίνει with Bywater (/. of P. xxviii. 246). 

5. T αὐτῆς, Bonitz’s emendation of ταύτης, is clearly right. Cf. 
Z. 1040» 33, M. 1079* 36. 

9. διαπορεῖν here seems merely to mean ‘to raise a difficulty’, 
as in I. 10099 22, M. 1079» 21, 1085%25. More often it means ‘to 
work through the difficulties’, as in B. 995% 28, 35, °5, 996% 17, 
K. 1059% 19, » 15, M. 10868 19, or ‘to establish by discussion of the 
difficulties’, as in B. 999% 31, M. 1086% 34. 

τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν, the heavenly bodies. ; 

12,13. This argument is met by Plato in Parm. 134 Ὁ; this is 
one of the points relied on by Siebeck for the proof of his theory that 
the Parmenides (with the Sophdst and the Philedus) was directed 
against criticisms urged by Aristotle in discussion. ‘The theory has 
but little evidence in favour of it. 

15. ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ, ‘as white is the cause of 
whiteness to the white thing by being mixed in it’. 

16. Anaxagoras held (cf. fr. 12 ad fin.) that each thing owes its 
apparent character to the preponderance of one of the infinitely 
numerous ‘seeds’ in it. For Aristotle’s criticisms of the theory cf. 
989° 33, Phys. i. 4. 

17. Eudoxus is the famous astronomer mentioned in A. 1073 17. 
He seems to have ‘flourished’ about 365 B.c. We have no further 
information about his views on the question referred to here. But he 
is commonly said to have been a friend of Plato, or a Platonist (Al. 
o7. 17, Ase, 86.11, (10. Divi. 11. 42. 89, Ley. 1. 4a) 22 ΙΓ ΠΟ. eae 
p- 656 Casaubon, Procl. 7 Zucl. p. 67. 3 Friedl., Plut. Adv. Colot. 
32, p. 1126p, Philostr. V. Sop. i. 1), and his theory seems to have 
been an ideal theory which rejected the transcendence ascribed to the 
Ideas by Plato and described them as immanent in particulars ; which 
is perhaps the reason why he is sometimes described as a Pythagorean 
(Diog. Laert. viii. g1, Iambl. zz Micom. Arithm. p. 10. 17 Pistelli). 
This would seem to be not so very different from Aristotle’s own 
theory of the universal immanent in particulars; the difference would 
be that Eudoxus thought of the Ideas still as substances in the fullest 
sense, while Aristotle holds that one substance cannot inhere in 
another, and therefore treats universals as not substances in the 
proper sense of the word. For his criticism of a theory similar to that 
of Eudoxus cf. B. 998? 7 n. 

20. Kat οὐθένα τρόπον κτλ. Alexander hesitates between two inter- 
pretations, ‘in any of the usual senses of éx’ (for which cf. a. 994% 22, 
A. 24) and ‘in any of the ways in which the Platonists are wont to 
derive them’. As Aristotle has said (98713) that they did not 
specify the nature of the relation between particulars and Ideas, the 
former interpretation is the more likely. 

22. τί γάρ ἐστι κτλ. Aristotle ignores the account (Z7m. 28 ο, 29 a) 


A. 9. 991% 4 — 991 13 199 


of the Demiurgus as making the world with ‘the eternal’ for his 
pattern. Even if he were entitled to regard this as ‘ poetical meta- 
phor’, there is still the Reason which is the αἰτία τῆς μίξεως (22 211, 
23 p)—though there indeed there is no distinct reference to the Ideas 
and no use of the notion of a ‘pattern’. 

23. te gives the connexion better than the other reading γάρ: the 
sentence introduces a fresh objection. Alexander is said by Bonitz to 
have read γάρ, but this is not clear from 102. 6. In this part of Bk. 
A, Aristotle somewhat affects the stringing together of sentences by 
τε, a usage which specially characterizes Bks. viii-x of the Evhics. 
Cf. 989% 26, οροῦ 17, g91*27, 99257, 9, 18, and Eucken, De 
Aristotelis dicendi ratione, i, 14. 

81. ὡς γένος εἰδῶν. τῶν ὡς γένους εἰδῶν (‘the species as species of 
a genus’) seems to have been Alexander’s reading (105. 25) and is 
found in all the MSS. in M. 1079 34. εἴδη is often thus qualified 
when Aristotle is speaking of species of a genus in distinction from 
Platonic Forms (cf. Z. 10385, I. 1057> 7, 1058822, M. 1085 24). 
The reading of the MSS. here, ὡς γένος εἰδῶν, puts the same relation 
from the other end, ‘the genus as genus of species’. 

b 3. Cf. Phaedo 100 Ὁ. 

6. ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἴδη εἶναι. In A. 1070%18 Aristotle says expressly 
that Plato ἔφη ὅτι εἴδη ἐστὶν ὁπόσα φύσει, and it is apparently implied 
that he did of recognize Ideas of objects other than natural objects. Now 
in Rep. 596 B, 597 C, Crat. 389 B, c we find Ideas of bed, table, shuttle, 
auger; cf. the story about Plato and Diogenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 53) in 
which Plato is represented as speaking of tableness and cupness. It 
does not seem possible with Bonitz to treat these references as not 
seriously meant, for they agree with the principle of Rep. 596 a that there 
is an Idea answering to every group of things with a common name. 
We find, however, in Soph. 265 Β a distinction sharply drawn between 
natural objects which are the products of God’s demiurgic activity, 
and the products of human art, and in the Z?maeus the Ideas appear 
not in a logical character, as universals in general, but as patterns ac- 
cording to which God exercises his demiurgic activity. The argu- 
ment from their non-appearance in the Zimaeus in any other capacity 
is not conclusive, but it is poss7le that when he wrote the Zzmaeus 
Plato had altered his conception of the Ideas in the way indicated. It 
is also possible that Plato merely denied that there were Ideas answer- 
ing to the products of the zmzfative arts—their original being not an 
Idea but an actual material object ; and that his followers extended this 
ban to Ideas answering to the products of the useful arts. Cf. ggo> 
11 n., Introduction, pp. xlix—li. 

8. For the construction διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἵας = διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας 
δι οἵας cf. Μ. 1086 29, Ath. Pol. iv. 2 ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Tédovs . . . οὗπερ. 

13-21. The argument is: If numbers are said to be the causes of 
things because particular things are numerical ratios between certain 
subject-matters (cf. the description of the animal body as due to the 
mixture, in a certain ratio, of the four elements, 77m. 73 B, c), then the 


200 COMMENTARY 


numbers also should be ratios between certain (no doubt different) 
subject-matters. Thus for ἀριθμός in 1. 18 we should expect λόγος ἐν 
ἀριθμοῖς. But the stress is on ἄλλων τινῶν ὑποκειμένων. Aristotle is 
willing for the moment to adopt the Platonic description of the Ideas 
as numbers, so long as it is clear that they must have a substratum, 
For the use of ἀριθμός where λόγος would be stricter cf. De An. 4318 
23. The distinction is pointed out, though rather awkwardly, in the 
next sentence. ‘Man-himself, whether he is in a sense (τις) a number 
or not, yet will be a numerical ratio and not a number’, i.e, not a 
number in the proper sense. ἁπλῶς, which Bonitz would insert after 
ἀριθμός in}, 20, would make the meaning clearer, but is not absolutely 
necessary. 

14. ἐστὶν ἕν γέ τι ὧν εἰσὶ λόγοι. The meaning must be ‘the things 
between which they are ratios are some one class of things’. οὗ 
has been proposed for ὧν, but Alexander read ὧν (108. 20), and the 
plural is wanted, since a ratio involves two terms. 

20. ‘ Nor can it be inferred on these grounds that it will be a parti- 
cular number’. Jaeger may, however, be right in inserting ἰδέα, so as 
to make the statement general, ‘nor can it be inferred on these grounds 
that any idea is a number’, Alexander interprets so, but did not read 
ἰδέα (109. 20, 30, ττο. 1). 

22. ἐν τῷ ἀριθμῷ (A?) is preferable to ἐναρίθμων, which does not 
seem to occur in this sense. 

23. cite yap ὁμοειδεῖς κτλ The same dilemma is stated in 
M. 1080* 18, where ὁμοειδεῖς and μὴ ὁμοειδεῖς are represented by 
συμβληταί and ἀσύμβλητοι. 

25. The commonly accepted reading, μήτε αἱ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις μήτε 
αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι πάσαις, is taken to mean ‘(if) neither the units in the 
same number are homogeneous with each other, nor those in one 
number with those in another’, and that this must be the general 
meaning is clear from M. 10808 18-29, 1081» 35-37. In M Aristotle 
recognizes the possibility that units in the same number might be 
thought to be addible while those in different numbers were not. But 
ai αὐταί cannot mean ‘the units in the same number’, and Bywater 
accordingly proposed to read with S αὐταί, so as to give the sense ‘if they 
are not homogeneous, neither the units in the number themselves with 
one another, nor the other units—i.e. those in other numbers—all with 
all’. It is to be noticed, however, that A> Al.l read μηδὲ αἱ αὐταί, and that 
Alexander’s paraphrase (1 12. 5) εἰ γὰρ μήτε ἐκεῖναι ἀλλήλαις ὁμοειδεῖς, 
μήτε πᾶσαι πάσαις ὁμοειδεῖς μηδὲ αἱ αὐταὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος takes αἱ αὐταί 
as = αἱ αὐταὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος and as explanatory of ὁμοειδεῖς. Alexander 
probably read μηδὲ at αὐταὶ ἀλλήλαις, μηδέ κτλ., with the meaning 

‘while if they (the units in a number, cf. 1. 22) are not similar 
in kind and (in that sense) the same, and if the other units (i.e. 
the units in other numbers) are not similar in kind all with all’. 

27. ὁμολογούμενα τῇ νοήσει, ‘consistently with the way in which 
we think about units’. 

28. A comma, as Prof. Cook Wilson has pointed out, is necessary 


A. 9. 991» 14°— 992" 6 201 


after ἀριθμητική. πάντα τὰ μεταξὺ λεγόμενα is co-ordinate not with 
ἡ ἀριθμητική but with ἕτερον γένος ἀριθμοῦ. For τὰ μεταξύ cf. 987> 
14. 

81. τῇ δυάδι may mean (1) the indefinite dyad, or (2) the number 2. 
Alexander and Bonitz take it in the former sense, and the argument 
then is: The indefinite dyad must have units in it, like any other 2, 
and these must be derived from the principles which the Platonists 
treat as the principles of all number, viz. the One and the indefinite 
dyad. Thus there will be an indefinite dyad before the indefinite 
dyad, which is impossible. ἡἣ δυάς sempliceter can be used thus in the 
sense of ‘ the indefinite dyad’ (cf. gg0b 19 n.); this interpretation is, 
however, open to the objection that Aristotle does not say ‘the units 
ought on Platonic principles to be derived from a prior dyad’; he 
says that they are so derived. This suggests that the other interpreta- 
tion is probably the true one, viz. ‘the units in the number 2 each of 
them, according to the Platonists, come from a previous 2 (the in- 
definite dyad), which is impossible ’—doubly impossible, because it 
makes 2 prior both to 1 and to itself. For ἡ δυάς sempliciter used of 
the number 2 cf. M. 1081 19, Ν. τοροῦ 22. 

Whichever be the true interpretation, Aristotle does injustice to the 
notion of the indefinite dyad by supposing it to be a number like other 
numbers. The Platonists meant by it simply that of which in- 
definitely much or indefinitely little can be taken, or plurality in the 
abstract. For other instances of Aristotle’s misinterpretation of it 
cf. 9870 34 n., ggo 19 ἢ. 

9928 1. ἔτι διὰ τί ἕν κτλ. Aristotle puts the same point in a slightly 
more expanded form in H. 1044% 2-5. ‘Ifa number contains several 
units (and particularly, we may suppose Aristotle to have meant, 
if these units are different in kind, as some Platonists held), what is 
it that makes the number a unity and not a mere aggregate—of this 
the Platonists have given no account.’ Aristotle here does not do 
justice to Plato’s conception of number. Plato’s point in distinguishing 
the Idea of 2, for instance, from the mathematical or intermediate 2’s, 
was just that the number 2 is not itself a plurality composed of units, 
though no doubt it presupposes them. Cf. 987% 14 n. 

6. εἴτ᾽ ἔστι τι κοινόν, τὸ σῶμα, εἴτε μή. In De Gen. ef Corr. 
320> 23 Aristotle says there is no κοινὸν σῶμα ; i.e. matter, wherever 
it exists, is already qualified by some combination of the πρῶται 
ἐναντιώσεις, hot and cold, wet and dry, and is thus already fire, air, 
water, or earth, or some compound of them ; unqualified matter is an 
abstraction which never exists apart. 

νῦν δὲ λέγεται κτλ., i.e. in making the One and the indefinite dyad 
the principles, the Platonists speak as if the One were the same in kind 
wherever it is found, just as portions of fire small or large are the same 
in kind, But the numbers that can be built up out of precisely similar 
1’s are not substances but ordinary mathematical numbers differing 
from one another merely in the number of their units (cf, Μ, 10818 5). 
If there are ideal numbers, which is what the Platonists are thinking of 


202 COMMENTARY 


when they make the One-itself a first principle, the units are different 
in kind, and ‘one’ or ‘ unit’ has a variety of meanings ; they ought to 
distinguish these. For them to make unity in the abstract their first 
principle is as wrong as it would have been for Empedocles to make 
body in the abstract his first principle when he believed there were 
four ultimately irreducible kinds of body. 

Aristotle treats the One, which the Platonists made one or the first 
principles of number, as meaning the unit out of which the numbers 
are built up. Since they believe in a qualitative difference between the 
numbers, they should believe, he argues, in a qualitative difference be- 
tween the units, and they should specify this and not make the One in 
the abstract their first principle. But he seems to be misunderstanding 
the One as we have before (987 33, 991} 31) found him misunder- 
standing the indefinite dyad. The One is different from the units 
involved in a number, just as the indefinite dyad is different from the 
number 2 whose function is to double that which is multiplied by it. 
The indefinite dyad is plurality not yet determined as any particular 
number, and the One is the formal principle the application of which 
to the indefinite dyad forms definite numbers. There is here a 
difficulty for the Platonists; if the material principle and the formal 
principle are both always the same, how is it that now one number 
and now another is produced? It would seem that different formal 
principles are needed. But Aristotle’s view that qualitatively different 
material principles—povades duapopor—are needed seems to be mis- 
taken ; and so is his treatment of the One here as if it were a material 
principle like Empedocles’ elements. 

10-19. We know from 988®11-14 that the Platonists treated 
the great and small as the material principle both of the Forms and of 
sensible things. Now it is the zdea/ numbers that Aristotle has been 
discussing since 991 9; presumably therefore it is zdea/ lines, planes, 
and solids that he now proceeds to discuss. ‘These were, however, not 
thought of as being, strictly speaking, Ideas; they are distinguished 
from the ideal numbers (of which Aristotle has been speaking up to 
now), but in the phase of Platonism which he is considering all the 
Ideas were regarded as ideal numbers (9910 9). We are dealing 
in this passage, in fact, with a class of entities which some of the 
Platonists interposed between the Ideas and the mathematicals—en- 
tities which Aristotle refers to as ‘ the things after the numbers’ (gg2> 
13), ‘the classes later than number’ (M, 10858 7), or ‘the things after 
the Ideas’ (M. 1080 25). These are the universals of the different 
kinds of line, plane figure, and solid; they have the property which 
distinguishes Ideas from mathematicals, that of existing only in the 
singular number (987» 17), and they would have been called Ideas 
were it not that the Platonists had identified all Ideas with numbers. 
Their status is most clearly indicated in 992? 13-18. 

Being quasi-Ideas, they were naturally supposed by the Platonists to 
have a great and small as their material principle, or rather various 
forms of the great and small; the material principle of lines was the 


A. 9. 992% 10-20 203 


long and short, that of planes the broad and narrow, that of solids the 
deep and shallow. With regard to the formal principle Aristotle in 
one passage speaks vaguely of this as the One or some number 
(B. roor 24). But from other passages we learn that the prevailing 
tendency was to treat the numbers 2, 3, and 4 as the formal principles 
of the lines, planes, and solids respectively (Z. 1036» 13, M. 1084 37— 
b2, N. rogoh 20-24). Thus, of the various ideal entities, numbers 
were derived from x and the many-and-few (N. 1089» 12), lines from 
2 and the long-and-short, planes from 3 and the broad-and-narrow, 
solids from 4 and the deep-and-shallow. The notion must have been 
somewhat as follows: Consider the long-and-short, i.e. indefinite ex- 
tension in one dimension ; two limiting points in this are necessary 
and sufficient to determine a line. Now suppose the extension to be 
broad-and-narrow as well, i.e. to be indefinite extension in two dimen- 
sions; three points in this are necessary and sufficient to determine 
the simplest plane figure, the triangle. Now suppose the extension to 
be deep and shallow as well, i.e. to be indefinite extension in three 
dimensions; four points in this are necessary and sufficient to 
determine the simplest solid, the tetrahedron. It is this same mode of 
derivation that *is referred to in De An. 404 18-21, where τὸ πρῶτον 
μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος means the numbers 2, 3, and 4. (In 
M. τοϑρ 32 we read of another Platonic mode of derivation of 
spatial magnitudes, in which the point is the formal principle and 
something ‘akin to plurality’ is the material principle. This answers 
to the derivation of numbers from the One and plurality, and there 
is reason for assigning both these doctrines to Speusippus ; cf. 10852 
52. ἣν 

It ἡ be seen that the mode of derivation of the ideal magnitudes 
does in fact treat them as ‘ after’ the Idea-numbers, for the numbers 
2, 3, and 4 are the formal principles involved in the formation of 
lines, planes, and solids respectively. 

Aristotle’s argument in ll. ro-19 might be turned against himself. 
He is as far removed as Plato from making the solid a Ad of plane, 
the plane a kind of line. How, then, if they are three definite kinds 
of thing, can there be a plane ina solid or a line in a plane? His 
answer no doubt would be that though he treats them as different 
kinds he does not derive them from independent principles. He 
makes the plane the ἀρχή of the solid and the line the ἀρχή of the 
plane, and thus gets a connexion between them which he thinks the 
Platonists cannot on their principles get. 

Ig. ἔτι at στιγμαί xth.: i.e., since points cannot be deduced 
from any kind of great and small, how can they be present in 
lines ? 

20. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν τῷ γένει κτλ. We have no further direct informa- 
tion about Plato’s rejection of the point and assertion that there are 
indivisible lines, The doctrine is frequently ascribed to Xenocrates 
(Proclus, 7x Zim. 36 8, ii. 246 Diehl, ἐν Lucl. 279. 5 Friedlein, Al. 120. 
6, 766. 33, Them. Phys. 12. 6, Simpl, Phys. 138. 14, 140. 12, 142, 


204 COMMENTARY 


16, De Caelo 563. 22, 665. 7, Philop. Phys. 83. 20, 84. 20, Syr. 124. 
2). The treatise De Lenecs Lnsecabihbus is apparently directed against 
Xenocrates’ view, and begins by stating the reasons which had led to 
the view. These are as follows: 

1. Since that which admits an infinite number of divisions is big, 
what is little will admit only a finite number of divisions (9684 2-9). 

2. Since the Idea of line is the first of all lines, it cannot have 
parts ; for if it had, they would be prior to it (9-14). 

3. Since elements are the things to which there is nothing prior, 
and parts are prior to the whole, the elements can have no parts (14-- 
18). 

) Zeno’s argument: (1) Since a body moving along a line must 
reach the half-way point before it reaches the end, a moving body 
would have to touch an infinite number of points in a finite time un- 
less there are indivisible lines (18-23). (2) Even if it does so, there is 
the difficulty that thought, the quickest of movements, will come into 
contact with an infinity of objects, i.e. will count them, in a finite 
time ; which is impossible (23- 4). 

5. TE we suppose that all commensurate lines are actually measured, 
there will be a length by which all of them are measured, and this must 
be indivisible, since otherwise the unit would be multiple (> 4-14). 

This is probably a full list of the reasons for which various thinkers 
had believed in indivisible lines, and Plato’s reason or reasons 
are probably to be found among them. In the absence of any 
very definite evidence the ascription to him of any one of the reasons 
must be conjectural, but a conjecture may be attempted. (1) In the 
first place the suggestion naturally presents itself that it was really the 
ideal line that Plato held to be indivisible. The ideal line of course 
would be so, as every Idea must be so. ‘ Lineness’ is clearly not 
divisible into lines (cf. gg1 21). The author of the De Liners Lnseca- 
bilibus seems to think that reflection about the Idea of line was one of 
the reasons for the belief in indivisible lines (986% 9-14), and in De 
Gen. ef Corr. 316% 12 the reason given for the belief of ‘ some’ in in- 
divisible lines is that if there are none the ideal triangle will be many. 
Porphyry has some such notion in mind when he says (af. Simpl. 
Phys. 140. to) that Xenocrates believed in entities divisible in quantity 
but τῷ εἴδει ἄτομα καὶ πρῶτα. Syrianus (]. c.) and Proclus (7 Zim. 
170) similarly hold that Xenocrates was δε ἘΠ the indivisibility 
only of the ideal line. Asclepius explains the belief away still more 
completely (102.17). We might suppose that Plato was thinking only 
of the ideal line, and that Xenocrates, who identified the Ideas with the 
objects of mathematics and therefore ‘spoke un-mathematically about 
the mathematical’ (M. 1080 22, 28), spoke of indivisible mathematical 
lines where Plato had spoken only of the Idea of line as indivisible. 
But this suggestion is open to serious objections. (4) It does not ac- 
count for the statement that Plato ‘ opposed the point’. The existence 
of points is evidently not affected by a belief in an indivisible Idea or 
universal of line. (4) It does not account for the plural τὰς ἀτόμους 


Aa Oi209226 205 


γραμμάς. This might no doubt be a careless expression on Aristotle’s 
part, but the presumption is that it is not. 

(2) In the second place an attempt has been made to connect 
Aristotle’s statement with the doctrine of minimal triangles in the 
Timaeus, ‘The minimal triangles, it is argued, must have been 
thought of as having minimal sides (cf. De Lin. Insec. 968% 14-18), 
A similar notion is involved in the attempt of Antiphon to square the 
circle. There is, however, no evidence that Plato believed his triangles 
to be mathematical minima. We are only told that the solids com- 
posed out of them were so small as to be invisible (568). Yet this 
suggestion seems to be on the right lines in so far as it ascribes to 
Plato a belief in genuine mathematical lines which were indivisible ; 
only it is not clear that this belief is to be found in the Zimaeus. 

Plutarch (Quaest. Plat, v, 2, 3) ascribes to Plato the view that the 
circle is composed of very small straight lines.. It is quite possible 
that Plato tried thus to reduce the circle to straight lines, and if he did, 
he would probably have thought of these lines as indivisible. But, as 
Apelt observes (Berfrdge 268), Plutarch seems to be reading between 
the lines of the Zzmaews rather than recording an independent tradition, 
and his view is made somewhat improbable by the ‘high and almost 
holy significance ἡ which Plato ascribes to the circle. 

(3) Another interpretation of the passage has been given by Milhaud 
(Philosophes-Géométres de la Gréce 340-343 and Archiv fiir Gesch. der 
Phil, xvi. 386-390). He takes Aristotle to be saying that Plato 
attacked the notion that the point was the element of which the line 
was made up, and called it rather the generative principle of the line; 
and that this—viz. that the line cannot be divided into pozm/s—was 
what he meant when he posited his ‘indivisible lines’. No doubt 
ἐνυπάρχειν, Which is here used, is a word which is used in expressing 
the relation of a στοιχεῖον or constituent part, in distinction from other 
ἀρχαί, to that of which it is a part (A. 1013 4, 7, 24, τοι 48 26). This 
interpretation also avoids the difficulty involved in taking ἐκάλει to 
mean ‘he spoke of’, and gives it a more natural meaning—*‘he called 
the point the first principle of the line’, But (2) the more natural 
meaning of τούτῳ τῷ γένει is ‘the class of points’, not ‘the class of 
points considered as constituent parts of the line’. (2) ‘ Indivisible 
lines’ would be a strange name for lines which can be divided into 
shorter lines though not into points. Milhaud’s argument from the 
use of ἄτομον in Pl, Soph. 229 Ὁ is unconvincing. (4) Aristotle 
evidently implies that points do ἐνυπάρχειν in the line; the only 
question is, how on Platonic principles they can do $0 (ἐκ τίνος 
ΣΌΝ ο: Ἰ. 19). But Aristotle does not believe, any more than 
Plato, that a line can be put together out of points (B. roo1 18, Phys. 
21518, 2319 24, 2418 3); the point is not the constituent element 
but the limit of the line (1. 23). There is, then, no opposition meant 
between the point as ‘present in the line’ and as ‘principle of 
the line’. If Plato’s doctrine had been merely what Milhaud holds it 
to have been, Aristotle could have agreed with every word of it; but 


206 COMMENTARY 


in fact he regards it as absurd (Phys. 206417, De Caelo 299" 12). 
(4) The treatise De Lin. Jnsec., which at least reflects Aristotle’s 
teaching accurately, contains no reference to any such theory of 
indivisible lines as Milhaud suggests. (6) In M. 1084 37 we have, in 
an account of Platonic views, the words ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα 
μέχρι ποσοῦ, οἷον ἣ πρώτη γραμμὴ (ἣ) ἄτομος, εἶτα δυάς. Here there is 
no doubt that δυάς stands for the line (cf. Ζ. το86} 13, H. 10438 33), 
so that γραμμὴ ἄτομος must stand for the point or for what took 
its place in Plato’s theory. There is, however, this much truth 
in Milhaud’s view, that the doctrine of indivisible lines may have been 
adopted as if it were the only alternative to the Pythagorean con- 
struction of the line out of points. The truth lies in a third view, 
which is Aristotle’s own, that the line is constructed out of dvzs7ble 
lines, i.e. is infinitely divisible. 

(4) Again, a doctrine which denied the existence of the point and 
substituted for it indivisible lines can hardly be identical, as Prof. 
Burnet suggests (G. P. § 239), with the doctrine which described the 
line expressly as ‘the fluxion (ῥύσις) of the point’ (Simpl. Phys. 722. 
28, Procl. 2 Luci. i. p. 97. 6 Friedlein). Simplicius uses this phrase 
in explaining Av7sfo/le’s view, of which it is a not unfair paraphrase. 

(5) Once more, Simplicius’ interpretation of Xenocrates’ doctrine 
(142. 16-27) is not satisfactory. He cannot believe that so good 
a mathematician could have denied the infinite divisibility of the line, 
and therefore thinks the doctrine was that there are lines which are 
indivisible by reason of their smallness but are divisible by nature, and 
can therefore be divided when they are added to ‘ other bodies’ and 
these bodies are then divided. A straightforward belief in absolutely 
indivisible lines is at least no more unreasonable than this, and it is 
possible to show with much probability from Aristotle’s references to 
the doctrine that such a straightforward belief was what Plato actually 
held. This is certainly the belief which Aristotle means elsewhere 
when he refers to ‘the indivisible lines’ (PAys. 206%17, De Caelo 
299% 12). And in one passage he practically tells us Plato’s reason 
for the belief. In Phys. 187%1, after stating two arguments used by 
the Eleatics, he says ‘some yielded to both the arguments; to 
the argument that all things must be one if ‘being’ always has 
one meaning they yielded in holding that not-being is, and to the 
argument from bisection they yielded in positing indivisible magni- 
tudes’. Now from the similarity of this passage to N. 10892 2-6 
it seems clear that Aristotle is referring to the ‘not-being’ of the 
Sophistes in the Physics as he is in the Metaphysics, and the Greek 
commentators interpret the passage of the Physzcs so. But they think 
that the second half of the sentence in the PAyszcs refers not to Plato 
but to Xenocrates. It seems clear, however, that the ‘some’ who 
‘gave in’ to the one argument are the same persons who gave in to 
the other, and that Plato in particular is meant; otherwise Aristotle 
would have said ‘ some gave in to the one argument and some to the 
other’, Thus Plato’s doctrine of indivisible lines is in effect said to be 


ἌΣ 924092 821-2 2 207 


due to his accepting ‘the argument from bisection’, i.e. the argument 
propounded by Zeno which in the De Linezs Lnsecabilibus also (968% 
18-23) is stated to have been one of the reasons for the belief in 
indivisible lines. This is the argument which is called Zeno’s 
‘first argument’ in Pays. 239>11 (cf. 233%21, Zop. 1608), 
I,e. Plato was influenced by the really serious difficulty which meets 
any one who tries to think out the nature of the infinitely divisible, 
i.e. by the vicious infinite regress which it seems (but only seems) 
to involve. At the same time it is possible that there was some con- 
fusion in his mind between the mathematical line and the ideal line, 
which of course must be indivisible. Aristotle, as we have seen, 
says that one of the reasons for the belief in indivisible lines was 
the reflection that otherwise the zdea/ triangle would be many (De Gen. 
et Corr. 316 12). But this sounds more like Xenocrates, who, as 
Aristotle tells us, confused the ideal with the mathematical. 

The present passage suggests yet another reason which may have 
led Plato to deny the existence of points. The point, if it was to be 
real, should have been a combination of form and matter. Now 
a matter could be assigned to the line, the plane, and the solid 
(the long and short, &c.), but no such matter could be assigned to 
the point, since it had no dimensions at all. We have, however, no 
evidence to show that this difficulty was in Plato’s mind. 

The imperfects διεμάχετο, ἐκάλει, ἐτίθει indicate that Aristotle is 
thinking of frequently repeated oral teaching of Plato. Heiberg 
makes the interesting sug ggestion that it was the influence of Plato that 
led to the supersession of στιγμή by σημεῖον as the ordinary word for 
a point in Greek geometry (Adh. zur Gesch. der Math, xviii. 8). 
στιγμή Claims reality for that which has position but no magnitude, 
while σημεῖον means simply a conventional mark, Aristotle uses 
στιγμή more Often than σημεῖον, but only the latter word is found in 
Euclid and later. 

The imperfects probably also indicate that Book A was written after 
Plato’s death in 348-347. The most probable date is 348-345; cf. 
Pp» xxii, 

With the expression ἀρχὴ γραμμῆς cf, Pl. Laws 894A δῆλον ὡς 
ὁπόταν ἀρχὴ λαβοῦσα αὔξην εἰς τὴν δευτέραν ἔλθῃ μετάβασιν καὶ ἀπὸ 
ταύτης εἰς τὴν πλησίον, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ἐλθοῦσα αἴσθησιν σχῇ τοῖς αἰσθα- 
νομένοις, Which according to the most probable interpretation refers to 
the successive generation of the three dimensions, culminating in 
a solid body. 

On the whole subject cf. Zeller, ii. 1.4 1017, 1018, Apelt, Beztr. 
263-268, Robin, Zhéorte Platonicienne, §§ 112, 215. 

διεμάχετο Πλάτων ds ὄντι γεωμετρικῷ δόγματι. ‘This is interesting 
as an instance of the procedure of dialectic τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα 
(Rep. 533 ¢)- 

21, 22. If the ordinary punctuation be retained, to give its due 
value to ἐκάλει we must translate ‘but what most people call the 
point he called the principle of the line, and this is what he meant in 


208 COMMENTARY 


his frequent assumption of indivisible lines’, But the single accusative 
after ἐκάλει and the two accusatives after ἐτίθει are both somewhat 
awkward, and it seems better to get rid of both awkwardnesses 
by treating τοῦτο δὲ πολλάκις ἐτίθει, as parenthetical. 

25. εἰάκαμεν, λέγομεν, 27 φαμεν, 28 λέγομεν. For the first person 
cf. ἢ. on ch. 9 ad 2,111. 

οὐθὲν yap λέγομεν κτλ. Cf. 98829 ἢ. 

29. πρότερον εἴπομεν, Cf. 9018 20. 

ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις κτλ. Difficulty has been felt about this, since 
science is concerned even more essentially with the formal than with 
the final cause (Z. 10316, 20). But the clause is not meant to 
define the nature of the cause in question (that comes in the second 
clause), but only to emphasize its importance, It says no more than 
the opening words of the Evhics, πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος... 
ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ, and the proposed alterations of the text are 
unnecessary. If any were to be made, that of Rolfes, ὃ περί τινας 
ἐπιστήμας (ὃ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας Ab), would seem the best. 

33. τοῖς viv. The reference is primarily to Speusippus. Cf. A, 
1069 26 ἢ. 

φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν κτλ. Cf. Pl. Rep. 531 D, 533 B-E. 

b 4. ot φυσιολόγοι, cf. g85> 11, 12 ἢ. 

4. περί re κινήσεως κτλ. ‘If the great and small is movement, the 
Ideas will be in movement; and if it is not, how can sensible things, 
which have no elements other than the Ideas and the great and small, 
be in movement?’ 

Jaeger’s ἔστ᾽ ἐνταῦθα (for ἔσται ταῦτα), though attractive and to some 
extent confirmed by Asclepius, is not necessary. ‘The above interpre- 
tation makes good sense of the MS, reading. For this identification 
of movement with the indefinite or material principle cf. Phys. 201» 
20, Eudemus af. Simpl. Phys. 431. 8, 13. We are reminded of the 
restless movement ascribed to the material principle in Z?m. 52 D—53 A 
(cf. 57 5). 

10. τῇ γὰρ ἐκθέσει. ἔκθεσις, ἐκτίθεσθαι have two main senses in 
Aristotle. They mean (1) the ‘setting out’ of particular instances by 
which the truth of a conclusion (in the third figure) is confirmed. 
Thus the syllogism ‘All S is P, All S is R, Therefore some R is P’ is 
confirmed by ‘setting out’ a particular S, e.g. N; we shall then see 
clearly that some R is P, since Nis Rand NisP. This usage occurs 
in An. Pr, 289 23, © 14, 3089, 11, 12, 531, 54935. (2) They mean 
the ‘setting out’ in the appropriate syllogistic form of the terms occur- 
ring in an argument previously stated in unsyllogistic form. This 
usage occurs in Am. Pr. 488 1, 25, 29, 49> 6, 33, 50" 1. 

There are occasional less technical uses. In Soph. 1]. 179% 3-5 
ἐκτίθεσθαι means ‘ to isolate in thought’ (universals from their particu- 
lar instances). In Phys. 235%28-30 it means ‘to pick out for 
separate treatment ᾽ν in Poe/. 1455» τ it means ‘to set out in general 
form’. In the A/efaphysics we have in addition to the present passage 
Z. 1031 21 ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἀνάγκη ἕν τι εἶναι ἄμφω, 


A. 9. 992% 25 — 992? 24 200 


M. 1086" 9 ταύτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγομένας (οὐσίας) ἐξέθεσαν, 
N. τοροῦ 17 κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἑκάστου παρὰ τὰ πολλά. Β, 1003* 10, 
commonly quoted as an instance of ἐκτίθεσθαι, 566 Π18 to require 
emendation. In 108610, where alone in Aristotle the verb is in 
the active, it clearly means ‘they (the Platonists) assigned separate 
existence to’ (the universals). In the other three passages of the 
Metaphysics ἔκθεσις is generally described as referring similarly to 
the hypostatization of universals; but in the Z passage there seems 
to.be no special reference to Platonic views, and in all three passages 
ἔκθεσις seems to refer to a method or procedure rather than to a doctrine. 
Alexander describes the procedure in a passage which seems to rest on 
knowledge of Academic method (124. 9—125. 4). The Platonists, he 
says, took particular men by way of example and observed the likeness 
between them and reduced them all to ‘this unit’ (man). They then 
noted the likeness between horses, between dogs, &c. They then 
observed what was common to men, horses, dogs, &c., and so rose 
to higher and higher units till they reached that of αὐτοουσία, which 
embraced everything. This exhibition of terms in a ‘tree of Porphyry’ 
has some affinity to the second of the technical senses of ἔκθεσις, and 
there can be little doubt that it is what Aristotle here means. Cf. 
ps.-Alexander’s account of ἔκθεσις in N. rogo® 17 (see ἡ. ad 106.). 

The senses of ἔκθεσις are discussed fully in Maier, Sy//. des Ar. ii. τ. 
310-320, 2. 141-9. 

11. ἂν διδῷ τις πάντα, ‘if we grant all their assumptions’, i.e. that 
there is an Idea answering to every common name. In point of fact, 
Aristotle thinks, not every universal is a genuine class, or can 
be supposed to have an Idea answering to it. A genus is a common 
term which indicates an element in the essence of that of which it is 
predicated (Zop. 108 22). The universals that are not genera, 
of which Aristotle is thinking, may be negative or relative terms 
(cf. 990» 13, 16), or the widest universals like ὄν and ἕν (B. 998? 22, 
H. 1045) 6). 

18. τὰ μετὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς, the entities which are to geometrical ob- 
jects as the ideal numbers are to arithmetical numbers. Cf. ® ro-19 ἢ. 

18-19. τὸ τῶν ὄντων ζητεῖν στοιχεῖα, ἀδύνατον εὑρεῖν. One. or 
other infinitive is superfluous. Richards proposes to read τά for τό 
and to omit ζητεῖν or read ζητοῦντας. But the two infinitives are not 
out of keeping with Aristotle’s style. 

21. ἐκ τίνων γάρ «td. Cf. H. 10448. Actions, affections 
like eclipse or sleep, and properties like straightness have not the 
elements form and matter as substances have. The substances 
which do the actions and have the affections or properties may 
be called their substrata as the matter of a substance is called its sub- 
stratum, but the relation is not the same in both cases. The substratum 
of a substance is something contained in it; the substratum of a 
property is something implied by it. 

22. τῶν οὐσιῶν, SC. τὰ στοιχεῖα εὑρεῖν. 

24—993"2. Aristotle here attacks the notion of an all-embracing 

2573-1 te 


210 COMMENTARY 


science like Plato’s dialectic. He first (24-33) shows that there 
cannot be a science which proves the whole nature of reality ; a science 
cannot be demonstrative throughout but must start with immediately 
known premises. The only alternative that he considers is that the 
science of reality should be present in us from birth, and this sugges-~ 
tion he disposes of without difficulty (33-993° 2). Aristotle himself 
would adopt a third view, that knowledge of the first principles is not 
fully present in us at birth, but can be attained by reflection (which is 
not proof) on what is implied in certain particular propositions which 
any one can see the truth of as soon as he reaches years of intelligence 
(cf. An. Post. ii. 19). ἘΝ g. the law of contradiction can be recognized 
if we will only reflect on what is implied in our knowledge that some 
particular thing cannot be not-itself. It might seem that this third 
alternative was open to the Platonists as well as to Aristotle, but there 
is a further point to be noticed. Aristotle is not speaking of meta- 
physics, the knowledge of the gevera/ nature of being, and showing 
that this cannot be either demonstrative throughout or innate. He is 
attacking the possibility of a science which should deduce the whole 
concrete nature of reality from certain principles common to all 
realities—a science such as Plato sketches under the name of dialectic. 
Besides the principles common to all reality, Aristotle holds that there 
are principles peculiar to the various departments of reality (An. Pos?. 
76 16), and that without the knowledge of these, which is gained by 
reflection on particular perceptions (993" 7, De An, 432% 7), the con- 
crete nature of reality cannot be known, 

992) 31. ἢ πάντων ἢ τινῶν. πάντων, as Alexander says (131. 10), 
applies to definition and induction, τινῶν to demonstration. In 
demonstration it sometimes happens that the minor premise is not 
known before the conclusion but simultaneously with it (da. Post. 
71" 17); in definition and induction the data must be known before- 
hand. 

81. ἡ, 32 καὶ ἡ, Bonitz’s emendation of 31 %, 82 7, is shown to 
be right by καὶ ἡ in 1. 33 and is confirmed by Al. 130. 18, 20. 

993%1. εἰ καὶ τυγχάνοι σύμφυτος οὖσα, an allusion to the Platonic 
doctrine of ἀνάμνησις (AZeno 81 ο, Phaedo 72 1). 

2-7. How, asks Aristotle, are we to know when we have got to the 
ultimate elements in our analysis? There can always be difference of 
opinion about this, as there can be about the question whether the 
letter ζ is further analysable or not. 

5. τὸ fa κτλ. The ancient grammarians similarly derive ¢ from o 
and ὃ (Dion. Thrax, p. 14 Ullig, Dion. Hal. De Comp. Verb. 14. 48, 
Kiihner, ὃ 3.14). ‘Thus in Aeolic Ζεύς, κωμάζω, &c., are represented 
by Σδεύς, κωμάσδω, and in Attic ᾿Αθήνασδε becomes ᾿Αθήναζε. In 
N. 1093*20, on the other hand, € is grouped with € and wy as if 
it stood for do; but cf. r093%24 ἢ. Curtius thought that ¢ had the 
sound of ds in ancient Greek. Blass (Pronunciation of Ancient Greek, 
115-125) holds that in Attica and in central Greece it had the sound 
of sd until Hellenistic times, when it acquired in popular speech the 


A. 9. 992» 31 — 9937 10 21ι 


sound of soft s, and that it had the value of /s or ds only in the old 
Cretan and Italian dialects. The change of ¢ to a voiced sibilant 
(English z) seems, however, to have begun earlier than Blass 
allows. Attic inscriptions begin to confuse o and € as early as 340 
B. C. (ἐπεψήφισεν = -ζεν I. G. ii. 117% 3, Σεύς 7047. το, cf. Meisterhans- 
Schwyzer, pp. 88, 92). Lagercrantz, Zur Griechischen Laut- 
geschichte,%25-149, and Lambert, de Dralecto Aecolica Quaest. Select. 
g—60, argue that ¢ had the sound of a double soft s. Thus the 
discussion to which Aristotle refers has not yet been settled. 

8-10. If all things were produced from the same elements, colours 
would have the same elements as tones, and a man who has hearing 
would necessarily know colours. 

ταὐτά, Schwegler’s emendation of ταῦτα, is confirmed by Al. 133. 
22, 134. 5, and by Bessarion’s translation. 

Q-10. ὥσπερ. .. στοιχείων. There is no sufficient reason for re- 
garding these words, with Christ, as a gloss on ]. 5 of μὲν... 6 εἶναι. 
οἰκείων Means ‘ proper to sound’, not to each sound. 


Epilogue (ch. 10). 


993% 11. Thus all earlier thinkers are seeking our four causes and 
no others, but they conceive them vaguely, as is natural in the infancy 
of philosophy. 

17. E.g. Empedocles says bone exists by virtue of the ratio of its 
elements, i.e. by its essence. But then flesh, and everything else, will 
be the ratio of its elements, for it exists by reason of this and not of 
its matter, fire, earth, &c. This is a consequence implicit in what he 


says. 
24. We must next review the difficulties that may be raised about 


the four causes; we shall then be better able to deal with other 
difficulties. 


Jaeger in his discussion of this chapter (S/wd. 14-21) argues that the 
opening words refer back more naturally to chs, 3-6 than to chs. 8, 9, 
and in effect duplicate the opening words of ch. 7; and that the 
closing words (ll. 25-27) refer not to Book a as Alexander supposes, 
nor to B as Bonitz supposes (for the questions which Aristotle promises 
to discuss are distinguished from the ὕστερον ἀπορίαι, which must be 
those of B), but to chs. 8, 9, and duplicate the closing words of ch. 7. 
In spite of the difference between the contents of the middle parts of 
chs, 7, 10 the chapters are really alternative versions, of which ch. 10 
is shown to be the later by the reference to B in 993% 27; ch. 7 was 
written before Aristotle had any thought of linking A with B. The 
editor who reduced Aristotle’s manuscripts to order failed to notice the 

Rae 


212 COMMENTARY 


distinction between two sets of problems which is drawn in 9038 25-27 
and therefore thought the end of the chapter referred simply to B and 
accordingly put the chapter at the end of A. Jaeger points out that 
there is a tendency for ‘erratic passages’, which were difficult to 
place elsewhere, to be placed at the end of books. Cf. E. 1027) 25— 
10288 3, H. 6, Θ. το, K. 1065 26— 1069 14, M. 10868 21—1087® 25. 

‘This reasoning is not convincing. Jaeger himself points out that 
ch. 7 tries to show that earlier thinkers did somehow recognize the 
four causes, while ch. 10 emphasizes rather the fact that they did 
so very inadequately. This is surely more natural if ch. 10 was meant 
to come where it does, afer the detailed criticism contained in chs, 8, 9. 
Again, it is hardly likely that this very slight chapter was meant to take 
the place of the much fuller treatment in ch. 7. The reference to B 
in 9038 27 is no indication of late date; there are many indications 
that A and B belong to about the same period of Aristotle’s thought ; 
cf. note on ch. 9 ad zt. ‘Finally, there is no difficulty in supposing 
that ὅσα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις (I. 25) refers to the 
problems raised in B. Those problems are similarly said to arise out 
of the topics discussed in A (9955). Jaeger asks, what then are the 
‘Jater problems’ referred to in 993%27? But the problems of B are 
similarly described as only the first of the problems which the 
philosopher must discuss (995% 25); we are not to suppose that 
Aristotle had a definite second set of problems in mind. It seems 
fair to conclude that this chapter is in its proper place, and that 
its concluding sentence refers forward to B. 

993° 11. ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, Phys. 11. 3, 7. 

16. The vulgate reading νέα τε κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς οὖσα καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, 
‘being young at the beginning and at first’, is an extraordinarily 
pleonastic phrase, and with this reading there seems to be no 
explanation of re. The best reading appears to be that proposed by 
Diels (Hermes, xl. 303), νέα τε kai kat’ ἀρχάς. τε καί occurs in S and 
in the Aldine edition. καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, which is omitted by Al. (63. 31) 
and Bessarion, is probably a gloss on καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχάς. 

17. The reference is to Empedocles fr. 96: 


« Ν Ν > / > 3 / , 
ἡ δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισι 
Ν ΄ an > Ν / ,ὔ ages my 
τὼ δύο TOY ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε Νήστιδος αἴγλης, 
͵ὕ .¢ / “ Ν 2 Dt / Ν , 
τέσσαρα δ᾽ Halcrow τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα λευκὰ γένοντο 


ΞΑρμονίης κόλληισιν ἀρηρότα θεσπεσίηθεν. 


This means that bone contains two parts of earth, two of water, and 
four of fire (so Aet. v. 22; the statements of Theophr. De Sensu 23 
and Simplicius De An. 68. 10 appear to be mistaken), Empedocles 
has previously been described as recognizing a material cause (98 4* 8) 
and an efficient cause, and the latter in two ways (984 6, 985 33, 
985% 5). Here for the first time he is said to have had an inkling 
of the formal cause ; the first recognition of this is elsewhere ascribed 
to the Pythagoreans (987* 20) or to Socrates (987 3). 

19. Bekker’s reading, σαρκὸς (EF) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστου (Moerbeka, 


A. 10, 9939 11-26 213 


ἕκαστον MSS.) εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἢ μηθενός (AP) leaves τὸν λόγον εἶναι 
without any predicate, and it is difficult to ‘understand’ a predicate 
such as οὐσίαν or φύσιν, ‘is the substance of flesh, &c. Bonitz 
therefore rightly proposed to read σάρκας (A>) or σάρκα (T) καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἕκαστον εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἢ μηδὲ ἕν (Ε). In De Part. An, 642" 21 
Empedocles is similarly described as ¢dentzf/ying the bodily parts with 
their ‘ratio of mixture’, σάρκας is preferable to σάρκα, aS accounting 
better for the corruption. Once σάρκας had been corrupted to 
σαρκός, μηθενός naturally followed. The plural σάρκες is common in 
Aristotle. The readings proposed by Schwegler (σάρκας .. . ἕκαστον 
εἶναι κατὰ (Or κατὰ τὸν) λόγον, ἢ μηθέν), Karsten (twa ΤΥ for τὸν 
λόγον, Bekker's reading being otherwise retained), and Christ (εἶναι 
αἴτιον for εἶναι, Bekker’s reading being otherwise retained) are less 
probable than that of Bonitz. 

24. δεδήλωται καὶ πρότερον. Alexander refers this to g89* 30, where 
Aristotle has similarly pointed out the implications of Anaxagoras’ 
theory (985% 4-10 might also be mentioned). But ὅσα δὲ περὶ τῶν 
αὐτῶν τούτων ἀπορήσειεν av τις Shows that the reference is more general ; 
it is to Aristotle’s whole account of earlier thought about the first 
principles. 

26, ἐπανέλθωμεν πάλιν, Alexander and Asclepius think this refers 
to a, but the topics there discussed can hardly be described as arising 
out of Aristotle ; the reference seems pretty clearly to be to B, Cf. 
note at beginning of chapter. 


BOOK a 


The numbering of this book as Book a implies that those responsi- 
ble for the arrangement of the MZefaphysics in books felt it to be 
something of an excrescence on the general structure of the work, 
Doubts were early felt about its authorship, A scholion at the 
beginning of the book in one of the oldest manuscripts (E) says that it 
was commonly regarded as the woik of Pasicles of Rhodes, a pupil of 
Aristotle and a nephew of Eudemus; and it is probably a confused 
reminiscence of this tradition that leads Asclepius (4. 20) to say that 
Book A was supposed to be the work of Pasicles, Alexander thinks 
that a is the work of Aristotle, and the contents and style are quite in 
keeping with this view, ‘The tradition about Pasicles is likely to have 
some basis, and the truth may be that the fragment was recovered from 
his notes of Aristotle’s lectures. 

It appears from 995° 14-19 that the book, or fragment of a book, 
is an introduction not to metaphysics but to physics or to theoretical 
philosophy in general. 


214 COMMENTARY 


Book a. 
General considerations about the study of philosophy (ch. 1). 


998° 30. The study of the truth is difficult in that no one can hit 
with precision the part he wants to hit, easy in that the target is too 
big to be entirely missed. The small results attained by each thinker 
make together a considerable total. 

θη. Further, the difficulty lies not in the facts but in our reason, 
which is dazzled by the very brightness of the object. 

11. We must be grateful not only to those whose opinions we take 
over, but to the earlier thinkers whose superficial views gave the mind 
the necessary practice in thinking. 

1g. Philosophy is rightly called the knowledge of the truth (cf. 830, 
17). For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, that of practi- 
cal knowledge being action; if the latter studies the truth, it is not 
eternal truth but that which is of the moment and relative to an object. 

23. Now we cannot know the truth without the cause ; that which 
gives other things a certain character itself has that character in the 
highest degree, so that what makes other things true is itself most true. 
Hence the first principles of eternal things are most true, being always 
true and the source of all truth; thus what has most being has most 
truth. 


993% 30. On the precise meaning of ἀληθείας cf. A. 983» 2 ἢ. 

by, Brandis’s conjecture πάντως derives some support from Al. 138. 
12, 139. II, 20, 140. 3, but the sense required for πάντως is not that 
which it generally has in Aristotle, viz. ‘in all circumstances’, ‘in any 
and every case’. The opposition required is that between μηδένα and 
πάντας, as is shown by the following words, καθ᾽ ἕνα μὲν. .. ἐκ πάντων δέ. 

2. If φύσεως means nature in the narrower sense in which it is the 
subject of physics and not of metaphysics (ἣ οὐσία ἡ τῶν ἐχόντων 
ἀρχὴν κινήσεως ἐν αὑτοῖς 7 αὐτά, A. 101514), this confirms the 
suggestion already made, that the book is an introduction to physics 
rather than to metaphysics. But the word may mean more widely 
‘the nature of things ’ and be practically equivalent to ἀλήθεια ἃ 30, 

5. τίς dv θύρας ἁμάρτοι ; cf. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemio- 
grapht, ii. 678. 

6. τὸ 8 ὅλον τι ἔχειν κτλ. Aristotle has already implied (in τίς ἂν 
θύρας ἁμάρτοι ;) that no one entirely misses the nature of things; the 
difficulty of the study, he now adds, is shown by the fact that while this 
is the case, we cannot often hit the precise part of the nature of things 
that we are aiming at. Cf. Phys. 184% 23, An. Pr. 67% 20. 

12. Richards points out that the only dative that properly goes with 
κοινοῦσθαι is that of the person with whom something is shared, not 


a, ΤΟ δ 3079930 24 215 


of the thing shared, and therefore suggests τὰς δόξας. The dative 
is, however, possible, by a quasi-personification of the δόξαι. 

14. τὴν γὰρ ἕξιν «th. The construction, as Bonitz observes, is 
proleptic. ‘They formed our ἕξις by practice’, i.e. by practice they 
transformed a natural δύναμις into a trained ἕξις. 

15. Timotheus, the famous poet and musician, was a Milesian, but 
worked chiefly in Athens. He died in 357, and is said to have been 
born.in 446. 

16. Not very much is known about Phrynis. The main references 
in ancient literature are Ar. Vud. 971, Plut. de Alus. 6.1133 8. He 
and Timotheus were ridiculed in Pherecrates’ Chron, 

17. The best reading appears to be ἐπὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, which 
seems to have been read by Alexander (144. τα ἢ). For the con- 
struction cf. B. 996% 21, 10022 21, &c. περὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας 
ἀποφηναμένων is possible but less natural. 

24. ἕκαστον δὲ μάλιστα κτλ. ‘Each thing, in virtue of which a 
common nature belongs to the other things that have that nature, it- 
self is (i.e. has that nature) in a higher degree than the other things.’ 


Impossibility of (1) an infinite chain of causes, (2) an infinite variety 
of kinds of cause (ch. 2). 


99421. The causes of things do not (1) form an infinite chain, nor 
(2) present an infinite number of kinds. (τ) (4) Neither of material, 
efficient, final, nor formal causes is there a series which is infinite 
in the upward direction. 

11. For in a chain of terms the first is the cause of the rest, but in 
an infinite series all the terms except the given result are middle terms, 
so that since there is no first there is no cause. 

1g. Nor (4) is the chain infinite in the downward direction. 
«A comes from B’ (if we exclude the case of mere temporal succession) 
either (i) as the man from the boy or (ii) as air from water. 

25. (i) is the emergence of the developed from the developing ; the 
developing is a middle term between not-being and being; to say that 
the savant comes from the learner means that he who is learning 
is becoming a savant. (ii) on the other hand implies the destruction 
of the B out of which A comes. 

gi. Hence process (i) is not reversible, but (ii) is. In neither case 
can the series be infinite ; the middle terms involved in (i) imply a last 
term, and the terms in (ii) revert into each other ; the destruction 
of either is the genesis of the other. 

b6, (Return to upward direction.) The prime ma/erza/ cause, being 
eternal, cannot be thus destroyed. Since generation is not infinite 


216 COMMENTARY 


in the upward direction, (it presupposes an eternal cause, but) a cause 
which produces effects only by being itself destroyed is not eternal. 

9. Since the fiza/ cause is something which is not for the sake 
of anything else, those who posit an infinite series are destroying the 
very nature of the good, and abolishing reason; for reason always acts 
for an end which is a limit. 

16, The formal cause cannot be reduced ad injint/um to another 
definition fuller in expression, for (i) the earlier definition in such 
a series is more of a definition than the later ; 

20. (ii) to say that it can is to abolish knowledge ; it is implied that 
we cannot know until we reach the unanalysable terms involved in the 
definition. We cannot know an infinite series; the case is not like 
that of a line, which is infinitely divisible but can be apprehended by 
stopping the process of division; the whole line must be apprehended 
by something in us that does not move from part to part. Nothing 
infinite can be, and at any rate the notion of infinity is not analysable 
ad infinitum, 

27. (2) If the Azwds of cause were infinite, knowledge would be 
equally impossible; for to know a thing is to know its causes, but what 
is additively infinite cannot be traversed by thought in a finite time. 


Aristotle has in the first chapter shown that the philosopher must 
above all know ras τῶν αἰεὶ ὄντων ἀρχάς, since these are the cause 
of the truth of all that depends on them. He now sets himself to show 
that there are ἀρχαί, that the series of causes is not an infinite one, and 
also that there is not an infinite number of kinds of cause; i.e. that 
causes are not infinite in number vertically (εἰς εὐθυωρίαν) nor in kind 
horizontally. Bonitz’s doubts as to there being any real connexion 
between the two chapters are not justified. 

Aristotle first (994* 3-19) shows that the series of causes cannot be 
infinite in the upper direction, i. e. that if we are seeking the cause of a 
given effect, we are not led on without limit from causa to causa causae. 

994° 6-7. τοῦτον... νείκους, The reference to Strife shows that 
Aristotle is taking an illustration from the cosmology of Empedocles. 
According to this, the sun was πυρὸς ἄθροισμα μέγα (Diog. Laert. 
viii. 77). 1. 6. it was formed by Strife, which leads to the segregation 
of the elements from each other and the aggregation of each together. 
The same impulse which formed it was doubtless thought to give it its 
motion, And the sun in turn, being fire, acts on the other elements 
(cf. A. 9846, 9851), and in particular on air (Aet. ii, 8, 2). 

17. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον Alexander interprets as κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
(151. 26). The actually infinite would be the same as the infinite 
κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν ( 30), as opposed to the infinitely divisible (ἄπειρον 
κατὰ διαίρεσιν Phys, 204% 7, or δυνάμει τε καὶ ἐπὶ καθαιρέσει 206” 13). 
But if τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον meant this, καὶ ὅλως τοῦ ἀπείρου would extend 


a. 2. 99426 — 994) 1 r 217 


the statement to the potentially infinite or infinitely divisible, of which 
it is not true that all its parts are μέσα ὁμοίως μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. 

This is true only of the actually infinite, and τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον must 
refer to some species of the actual infinite. Presumably τὰ ἄπειρα 
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον Means infinite discrete series such as are here in 
question, and ὅλως τὸ ἄπειρον includes also infinite continua, e.g. 
infinite time. 

18. μέχρι τοῦ νῦν. Christ’s suspicion of these words is unjustified, 
Aristotle is assuming throughout this section a present effect whose 
cause is being sought for. μέχρι excludes τὸ viv from the general 
statement, cf. B. 998" 29. 

19. That the series of causes is finite in the downward direction, 
i.e. that if we start from a given cause, we are not led on without limit 
from effect to more distant effect, Aristotle proves only for material 
causes (19 -" 6). 

22. μή is not infrequently used thus, setting aside an irrelevant 
suggestion, cf. Phys. 186814, 15, Hdt. iii. 127, The use of ἐκ in the 
sense of ‘after’ is irrelevant, since that after which something else 
comes is in no sense its ὑποκείμενον or material cause, But there are 
two cases in which A comes strictly from or out of B, that in which B 
retains its substantial nature but develops, and that in which B 
disappears and its substratum takes on a new and opposite substantial 
nature. The second case is γένεσις proper; the first may be either 
change of quantity (αὔξησις), as when a boy becomes a man, or 
of quality (ἀλλοίωσις), as when an ignorant person becomes learned. 
But it is not coextensive with αὔξησις and ἀλλοίωσις : Aristotle is 
thinking only of those cases in which the change is development 
towards an end (τελείωσις) and cannot be reversed (I. 32). 

The manuscript variations in ]l, 22-24 point to early corruption, and 
Jaeger supposes μὴ... Ὀλύμπια to be a gloss by a copyist familiar 
with Δ. 1023» 10f. These words were, however, read by Alexander 
(154. 7-15), and the reading ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὡς in 1], 23 f& makes the sentence a 
good one without involving any great departure from the manuscripts. 
Jaeger’s punctuation and excision of ὡς in |. 25 make that sentence 
grammatically more correct, but the sentence as it stands in the 
manuscripts is not un-Aristotelian. 

bx, The manuscripts read ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι μετά κτλ. Bonitz has tried to 
emend the passage by omitting, with Alexander, ἔστι. He takes Aris- 
totle to mean ‘that which is generated is not generated from the gene- 
ration but after it, i.e. from that which has already been generated’. 
But this can only mean ‘a man is not generated by the generation of 
a boy but only from a boy who has already been generated’, On this 
view τῆς γενέσεως and τὴν γένεσιν do not refer to the γένεσις which is 
implied in γίγνεται and in τὸ γιγνόμενον : they refer to the generation of 
the boy, not to that of the man. But the generation of the boy is not 
referred to anywhere in the context ; and γίγνεται, γενέσεως, γιγνόμενον, 
yéveow must surely all refer to the only generation which is in question, 
that of the man from the boy. We might try to save the text by inter- 


218 : COMMENTARY 


preting ‘for that which comes to be does not come to be merely from 
the coming to be, butis necessarily affer the coming to be’. Between 
man and boy there is not merely such a relation that out of a boy a 
man can be produced; it is part of the very nature of the man that he 
should be the later stage, should come after the generation. But it 
is illegitimate to insert a ‘merely’ which is not in the Greek, and it 
seems likely that the true solution is that of Christ, who reads ἀλλ᾽ ὃ 
ἔστι. The sense then is ‘it is not that which is coming to be something 
that comes to be as a result of the coming to be, but that which is 
after the coming to be’. τὸ γιγνόμενον then retains the sense it has in 
425, 28. 

This sense of ἐκ then includes the notion of ‘after’, which consti- 
tutes the sense rejected in 422 (cf. De Gen. An. 724221); but it 
includes also the notion that B is in some sense the substratum of A. 

4. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων μεταξύ, 1. 6, the intermediates in the first kind 
of change (ὡς ἐκ παιδὸς ἀνήρ), cf. ἃ 27-29. There must be some 
limit to such a process of development. 

5. τὰ 8 εἰς ἄλληλα ἀνακάμπτει. The second kind of change (ὡς ἐξ 
ὕδατος ἀήρ) is not a development up to a perfect state of maturity, but 
may go on indefinitely. But there is not an indefinite series of new 
effects. The process returns on itself; the air which came from 
water turns again into water. 

6-g. This sentence is very obscure. Aristotle has in ἃ 11-19 
given a general argument which applies to all the four causes, to show 
that there must always be a first cause. This, he apparently assumes, 
must be eternal. In @19—) 6 he has been showing that there must be 
a limit to the series of material causes in the downward direction. 
Now he returns to the upward direction, and shows that the prime 
material cause must be indestructible. There are two difficulties: 

(1) It seems pointless to say that the first cause must be indestructi- 
ble because it is eternal; eternalness so obviously implies indestructi- 
bility. But the remark is explained by what immediately precedes. 
Aristotle has just been speaking of one kind of material cause which 
is destroyed when that of which it is the cause is produced. ‘This 
leads him to remark that the prime material cause cannot be of this 
nature; rather it is to its effect as boy to man, as the undeveloped to 
the developed. (2) ἐπεὶ... . εἶναι can be understood only if taken as 
elliptical: ‘since becoming is not infinite in the upward direction, 
(there must be an eternal first cause, but) that which is the first thing 
by whose destruction something came to be cannot be eternal’. 

g-27. Having at 1. 6 returned from the downward to the upward 
direction, and shown that there is an eternal ultimate material cause, 
Aristotle now shows that there is an ultimate final cause (g-16) and an 
ultimate formal cause or definition (16-27). 

9. It is not clear that Alexander read ἐπεί, so that there is no need 
to question the reading of most manuscripts, ἔτι. [{ἐπεί were read, 
we should have to take the apodosis as beginning with ὥστε, and this 
would be difficult with so short a protasis. _ 


Oz. 994" 4-6 210 


16. ἀλλὰ μήν KTA. ‘But neither can the essence be reduced (sc, 
ad tnfintfum) to another definition fuller in expression. For the earlier 
definition is always more of a definition, and the later less of one; 
but where the first term of a series has not the required character, the 
next has not it either.’ The definition of ‘man’ as ‘rational animal ’ 
may be reduced to the fuller definition ‘ rational sensitive living sub- 
stance’, but this process cannot be carried on indefinitely. For this 
Aristotle gives two reasons, the first in ll. 18-20, the second in Il. 20— 
23; ἔτι, not, as Bonitz says, δέ, is what answers to τε]. 18 (cf. Bonitz, 
Index, 749» 39, 40). Of the first of these reasons Alexander’s second 
interpretation (162. 6-10) may be the right one. ‘ Rational sensitive 
living substance’ is more of a definition than ‘ rational animal’, since 
it leaves less unexplained ; but if itin turn could be reduced to a prior 
definition and so ad znfinttum, there would be no first in the series (no 
completely full definition), and therefore no second either. There 
would in fact be no definition at all, and ‘ man’ (and all other terms) 
would be indefinable. The argument is, on this view, an application 
to the formal cause of the general argument in ἃ 11-19. It is difficult, 
however, to take 6 ἔμπροσθεν to refer to the definition which is arrived 
at later, and Alexander’s first interpretation (τότ. 10—162. 6) is 
probably right. ‘ Rational animal’, on this interpretation, is more of 
a definition of man than ‘rational sensitive living substance ’, which is 
rather a definition of the definition of man; and if ‘ rational animal’ is 
not a correct definition of man, neither will any definition such as 
‘rational sensitive living substance’ be a proper definition of it. 

20, τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, scientific knowledge; 21. τὸ γιγνώσκειν, every- 
day knowledge. 

21, τὰ ἄτομα must mean the most universal terms, those not 
analysable into genus and differentia. This use of ἄτομα seems to 
be without parallel in Aristotle (cf. B. 995% 29n.), but may be com- 
pared with the use of ἀμερῆ in An. Post. roo? 2, and of ἀδιαίρετον in 
A. 1014» το, H. 104335, M. 1084 14, De An. 4308 26. 

22. οὕτως, i.e. actually. The line is only potentially infinite, i.e. 
infinitely divisible, and one can apprehend it by checking the process 
of division (στήσαντα) and taking it κατ᾽ ἀθρόα μόρια (Al. 164.9). But 
an actually infinite series cannot be apprehended. 

25. τὴν ἄπειρον, the infinitely divisible line. 

25-26. ἀλλὰ... ἀνάγκη is very difficult. Bonitz says ‘ quid signi- 
ficent, non possum nisi obscura quadam divinatione assequi. Sicuti 
linea infinita est propterea, quod potest dividi in infinitum, similis in 
materia cernitur infinitas, quae potest infinitas in se recipere qualitates. 
Sed cogitari eam semper oportet tamquam quae insit uni cuidam 
ex iis rebus, quae motu ac mutatione ex ea procreantur, τὴν ὕλην ἐν 
κινουμένῳ νοεῖν ἀνάγκη᾽. This is perhaps as much as can be made of 
the received text. But it is obviously unsatisfactory. The variety of 
readings in Alexander points to early corruption, I read, with hesita- 
tion, τὴν ὅλην οὐ κινουμένῳ, which at least connects better with what 
precedes (διόπερ. . . διεξιών being parenthetical), ‘It is not possible 


220 COMMENTARY 


to apprehend the line without calling a halt to the process of dividing, 
but the whole line also must be apprehended by something in us which 
does not move (in thought) from part to part.’ For the use of οὐ κινου- 
μένῳ Ch. τῷ ἠρεμῆσαι Kal στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν 
λέγομεν Phys. 247) το, ἵστησι γὰρ ὃ λέγων τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ 6 ἀκούσας 
ἠρέμησεν De Int. 16% 20, ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει 
μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει De An. 407* 52. 

26. καὶ ἀπείρῳ κτλ. ‘And nothing infinite can exist; and if 
it did, at least the notion of infinity is not infinite’, i.e. it is analysable 
into a finite number of marks. The remark is irrelevant to Aristotle’s 
main point, the finitude of the causal series; but the reflection is not 
unnatural in view of the context. 

30. τὸ ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν, in Opposition to τὸ ἄπειρον κατὰ 
τὴν διαίρεσιν, is the actually as opposed to the potentially infinite ; 
1.6, to the infinitely divisible. Cf. ἃ τὴ ἢ. 


Different methods appropriate to different studies (ch. 3). 


994> 32. Our attitude towards lectures is determined by our habits ; 
the unfamiliar seems unintelligible. The strength of habit is shown 
by the laws, in which the mythical element prevails by force of habit 
over our knowledge of its childishness. 

9958 6. Some demand mathematical proof, others examples, others 
the authority of the poets; some demand accurate treatment every- 
where, others are pained by it either because they cannot follow it or 
because they think it ungentlemanly. We ought to be educated with 
regard to the method to be expected before we begin the actual study ; 
we cannot study two such difficult things at once. 

14. Mathematical accuracy is to be expected only in the study of 
immaterial objects, and hence is not suited to natural philosophy. If we 
ask first what nature is, we shall see what natural philosophy is about. 


With the whole chapter cf. Z. WV. i. 3. 

995 84. On the connexion between law and myth cf. A. 1074) 3. 

7. παραδειγματικῶς. Asclepius cites Plato’s dialogues as an in- 
stance of paradeigmatic discussion, discussion by means of examples 
taken from everyday life. 

10, συνείρειν = ἐπακολουθεῖν (Al. 168. 5), ‘to follow the connexion 
of thought’. For similar uses cf. Bonitz, Judex, 726 36-38. 

12, ἀνελεύθερον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ is no doubt suggested by Pl. ΖΖεαοί. 
184 σ. 

18. ὡς ἅτοπον (without ὄν) may be compared with Po/, 125529 ὡς 
δεινόν, Pl. Gorg. 495 ὡς ἕτερον τὴν ἀνδρείαν τῆς ἐπιστήμης δύο ταῦτα 
ἔλεγες ; 

17. tows Alexander explains as being used because the heavenly 


a, 2, 994 26—3. 99519 221 


bodies though part of φύσις have not matter. But they have ὕλη 
τοπική (H. 1042» 6), and form no exception to the general statement. 
ἴσως is simply an instance of the modest form of statement character- 
istic of Aristotle. Cf. A. 9878 26n. 

σκεπτέον πρῶτον, as Alexander says (169. 19—170. 4) may mean 
either ‘we must consider first, in the present treatise, what nature is ’, 
or ‘aman must consider what nature is before turning to metaphysics’. 
If the first meaning be assigned to the phrase, book a must be treated 
as a preface to a general work on theoretical philosophy, and therefore 
as no part of the Je/aphysics; if the latter be adopted, the sentence 
simply says that physics should be studied before metaphysics, and on 
this view a might stand as a genuine part of the A/efaphysics. But 
διὸ... δῆλον ἔσται seems clearly to promise an immediate inquiry 
into the meaning of ‘nature’; and neither B nor any subsequent 
book fits on to these closing words of a. 

1g. kal... ἐστιν, These words are irrelevant, and are omitted 
by Alexander, who, however, states (174. 25) that the words 
were inserted here in order that there might be something in a for 
B. 9955 to refer to. But in fact B does not in any sense take 
its start from these words. 


BOOK B 
Sketch of the main problems of Metaphysics (ch. 1). 

995° 24. We must first enumerate the questions that should be first 
discussed. 

A preliminary discussion of problems is useful. (1) A problem is 
like a bond which we cannot unloose until we understand its nature. 
(2) A student who has not discussed the difficulties does not know the 
direction in which he should move, nor even whether he has found 
what he is looking for. (3) The man who has heard the contending 
arguments is best able to judge between them. 

b4. The problems are; (1) Is it the business of one science to know 
the causes? 

6. (2) Should the science that studies the first principles of sub- 
stance also study the first principles of demonstration ? 

10. (3) Does one science study all substances? If more than one, 
are they all akin, or are only some of them to be called forms of 
Wisdom ? 

18. (4) Are there non-sensible substances ; if so, are they of more 
than one kind, e. g. Forms and mathematical objects ? 

18. (5) Is the study a study of substances only or also of their 
essential attributes? Whose business is it to study same and other, 


222 COMMENTARY 


like and unlike, and the other topics of dialectical discussion, and their 
essential attributes ? 

27. (6) Are classes, or constituent parts, the first principles of things ? 

29. (7) If classes, are zufimae specres or summa genera more of the 
nature-of principles and separately existing entities ? 

81 (8) Above all, is there a cause apart from matter? Has it 
separate existence? Is it one or more than one? [5 there anything 
apart from the concrete thing? Do some concrete wholes have 
separately existent forms and others not, and if so, which have them ? 

996*1. (9) Are the principles, whether formal or material, limited 
in number or in kind? 

2, (10) Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things the 
same? Are they all imperishable or are the former perishable ? 

4. (11) The hardest question: Are unity and being substances or 
attributes ? 

g. (12) Are the principles universal or individual ? 

10. (13) Do they exist potentially or actually ? Does their poten- 
tiality or actuality imply movement ? 

12. (14) Are mathematical objects substances, and if so are they 
separate from sensible things ? 


995° 26. αὐτῶν. Bk. B being continuous with Bk. A, αὐτῶν (like 
τούτων 993% 24) refers to the first principles which formed the subject 
of that book. 

28. διαπορῆσαι, cf. A. gg1® 9 ἢ. 

81. τοῦτο, i.e. the existence of a ‘knot’. 

b4—996°15. The ἀπορίαι of Bk. B, with the passages of the 
Metaphysics in which they are discussed, may be set out as follows: 

(1) Does one science investigate all kinds of cause? 9955, 6 = 
996" 1τ8-- 26, cf. ΤῸ 1, 2, 

(2) If it does, should it also discuss the axioms? οοδὴὺ 6-10 = 
996” 26—997 15, cf. Τ᾿, 3. 

(3) Does one science, or more than one, deal with all substances? 
If more than one, are they all forms of Wisdom? 995» 10-13 = 
997° 15-25, cf. I. 2. 1004* 2-9, E. 1. 

(4) Are there non-sensible substances? If so, are there more than 
one kind of them? 995” 13-18 = 9978 34—0998" το, cf. A. 6-10, 
M. 1-9, N. 

(5) Does one science discuss the essential attributes of substances as 
well as substances themselves? What science inquires into the same 
and the other, like and unlike, contrariety, prior and posterior, &c., 
and their attributes? 995 18-27 = 997° 25-34, cf. T. 2. 1003” 32— 
1005® 18. 

(6) Are classes, or constituent parts, the principles of things? 
995 27-29 = 998" 20-) ra, cf. Z. 10, 13. 


Β, I. 995% 26— 9954 223 


(7) Are summa genera or tnfimae species more of the nature of prin- 
ciples and substances? 995> 29-31 = 998» 14—99098 23, cf. Ζ. 12. 
1038 το, and Z. 13. 

(8) Is there any cause apart from matter? Has such a cause 
separate existence? Is there one such cause, or more? [5 there any- 
thing apart from concrete wholes? Do some concrete wholes have 
separately existent forms and others not, and if so, which have them? 
995” 31-36 = 999% 24- 24, cf. Z. 8, 13, 14, A. 6-10, M. το. 

(9) Are the principles limited in number or in kind? 99621, 2 = 
999> 24— 10008 4, cf. A. 4, 5, M. το. 

(10) Are the principles of perishable and of imperishable things the 
same? Are the former perishable? 996 2-4 == 10002 5—10018 3, 
cf. Z. 7-10, A. 1-7. 

(11) Are unity and being attributes or substances? 996% 4-9 = 
roo14 4--Ὁ 25, cf. Ζ. 16. 1040» 16-24, I. 2. 

(12) Are the principles universal or individual? 99629, to= 
1003% 5-17, cf. Z. 13-15, M. το. 

(13) Do they exist potentially or actually? Does their potentiality 
or actuality refer to movement? 996% ΤΟ, 11 = 1002) 32—10032 5, 
cf, ®. 1-9, A. 6, 7. 

(14) Are mathematical objects substances, and if so are they 
separate from sensible things? 996% 12-15 = τοοιῖῦ 26—1002) 11, 
cf. M. 1-3, 6-9, N. 1-3, 5, 6. 

The whole of B. 2-6 is thus accounted for, except 1002» 12-32, 
which forms a sort of appendix to 1001 26—1002 11. Further, IT. 1- 
3, Ἐν 1, Z. 7-10, 13-16, Θ. 1-9, I. 2, A-N are more or less directly 
occupied with answering the questions raised in B (though as regards 
A it must be noted that this book does not refer to Band seems to have 
been an independent treatise). I’. 4-8 forms a natural appendix to the 
discussion of the second dzopia, and I a natural appendix to the dis- 
cussion of the fifth. E. 2-4 and Θ, ro deal with subjects not touched 
on in the ἀπορίαι, but naturally arising out of them. Ζ. 1-6, 11, 12, 
17, and H are very closely bound up with the chapters of Z which dis- 
cuss the ἀπορίαι. Only A and K stand outside. the programme here 
laid down for study. Aristotle makes no attempt to preserve the 
order of the problems or to discuss them in exactly the form in which 
they are raised, but references in I, 1004% 33, I. 1053 το, M. 10768 
39, Ὁ 39, 1086* 34 (?), » 15 show that he has them more or less in 
view. 

The ἀπορίαι 1-3, 5 form a group of questions regarding the scope 
of metaphysics. They are restated continuously in B. 2, and they are 
all discussed in T. 1-3. The fourth question is of a different type; it 
comes alter the first group in B. 2, and is discussed not in Τ' but in A- 
N. It is similar in character to the eighth, eleventh, twelfth, and 
fourteenth questions. Questions 6-11 are taken in the same order in 
B. 3,4. The remaining three are taken in the reverse order in B. 5, 6. 
Thus the order in B. 2-6 follows that of B. 1 in the main, but not 
closely, and at one point distinctly improves on it. 


224 COMMENTARY 


In K. 1, 2 the problems reappear in an order more akin to that of 
Β. 2-6 but not entirely agreeing with it. 


Problem (1) _ is restated in 1059* 20-23 (34-38). 
"4 (2) " »,. 23-26 
» (3) » »» 26-29 
» (4) ᾿ » 38-Par 
7 (5) " 29-34 
ie (6, 7) 5s 1059» 21—I060% 1 
3 8) . 1060 3-27, Ὁ 23-28 
ἡ (9) "» 1060 28-30 
᾽ν (10) 4 1060% 27-36 
Ἢ (11, 14) - » 36-19 
~ (12) 1060) 19-23 
4 (13) does not appear in K. 


5. Aristotle does not say that he has raised this difficulty ἐν τοῖς 
πεφροιμιασμένοις, i.e. in Bk. A (which he has not done), but that the 
difficulty concerns the subject discussed there, viz. the first principles. 
The wrong interpretation of this passage led to the interpolation in 
a. 995° 19. 

10. τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. It is not very clear what other univer- 
sal starting-points of knowledge or axioms Aristotle recognizes. The 
law of excluded middle is the only one, besides the law of contradiction, 
that is mentioned in B. 2 or discussed in T. In An. Post. 76% 41, 
77% 30 he gives as a κοινὴ ἀρχή the law that if equals be taken from 
equals the remainders are equal. Clearly certain others of Euclid’s 
κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι have an equal right to be included, but Aristotle makes 
no attempt at a complete list. 

12-13. The problem here stated is nowhere restated separately, 
and may be treated as an appendix to that in Il. 10, rr. 

16. οἱ ποιοῦντες κτλ. Plato and his school, cf. A. 987” 14. 

20-27. This problem is not restated in B and may be treated as an 
appendix to that in ll. r8-20. ‘The two are treated together in I. 
Same, other, like, unlike, contrary, prior, posterior, &c., are here 
distinguished from the συμβεβηκότα καθ᾽ atta of substances. In 
I’. 1003 33-36 they are described not as συμβεβηκότα but as εἴδη τοῦ 
ἑνός and rod ὄντος. In Τὶ 1004 1-6, 1005" 11-18 on the other hand, 
they are described as πάθη or ὑπάρχοντα οἵ being as such. They are 
further described as ἐναντιώσεις τοῦ ὄντος (K. 10615). The con- 
cepts regarding which Aristotle here asks whose business it is to 
discuss them, he himself discusses in Bk. I. 

20. τοῖς ἀτόμοις, ‘the individuals’, So in 99816, g99%12, 15, 
I. 10582 18, 19, 20. In A. 1018» 6, Z, 10348 8, I. 1058» το, K. 1089» 
36 the word is applied to the ‘indivisible species’. In B. 998» 29° 
either meaning seems possible. Cf. a. 99421 ἢ. 

31-34. These problems are not restated in this form in the later 
chapters, but are really involved in the next group (34-36). The 
whole group (31-36) is the most important of all (995 31, 9998 24). 


B. 1. 995 5 — 996° 11 225 


9968 1-2. αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις must mean the elements of, i.e. the 
characteristics named in, definitions; and ai ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ must 
mean the constituent material elements of things. It is the same 
distinction that is drawn in Ζ. 11. 

6. ἔλεγεν (E' AP) may be retained, the singular being due to the 
nearer subject Πλάτων. Cf. 996% 33, 1001%13, and Kiihner, ii. 1. 
§ 370. 2 (f). 

8-9. Love was, of course, on Empedocles’ view, not ‘he ὑποκείμενον 
but one of six elements all of which are ὑποκείμενα. Aristotle pre- 
sumably mentions it here because of its unifying power, the notion 
being that the other elements are merged in love. Strictly speaking, 
on Empedocles’ view they are not merged in love but merged in one 
another owing to the operation of love. Aristotle identifies the sub- 
stratum with φιλία more doubtfully in roo1® 14. 

ὄλλος δέ τις = Hippasus and Heraclitus, ὁ δὲ Gwp—Thales—# ἀέρα 
—Anaximenes and Diogenes. Cf. A. 98427, ο83Ὁ 20, 98425. 

11. ἔτι πότερον κτλ. This problem is not restated in B, and must 
be treated as an appendix to the question δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. The 
potency which does not refer to movement is explained in ©. 6. 


Pros_EmMs 1-5 (ch, 2.). 


Lirst problem. 


9968 18. Is it the business of one science to study all the kinds of 
causes? τ, (a2) How can it be soif they are not contrary? (6) Many 
things have not all the kinds of cause; e.g. unchangeable things have 
no efficient or final cause. 

29. Hence mathematics never uses final causes in explaining things, 
and was therefore regarded by some of the sophists as inferior-even to 
the mechanical arts. 

by, 2, On the other hand, if there are several sciences of causes, 
which is the science we are looking for? Which cause must we know 
if we are most truly to know the thing caused? A thing, e. g. a house, 
may have all four causes, 

10. (a) Qua most authoritative, knowledge of the final cause might 
seem to be what we want; but (2) gua dealing with what is most in- 
telligible, knowledge of substance or the formal cause. For it is better 
to know what a thing is than what it is not, and τυλαΐ it is rather than 
its quantity, quality, &c, In other cases, where the term to be defined 
is not a substance but an attribute that can be demonstrated, we know 
it when we know its formal cause. But (c) with regard to change, we 
understand this best when we know the efficient cause, which is the 


25731 Q 


226 COMMENTARY 


opposite of the final cause; thus the study of each of these causes 
would seem to be the work of a different science. 


Second problem. 


26. Is it the business of one science to study the first principles of 
demonstration as well, e.g. the law of excluded middle or of contra- 
diction? Does the same science study these and study substance ? 
If different sciences do so, which of them is the science that we are 
looking for? 

33- Zhes?s. (a) It cannot well be the business of one science, for 
why of one more than another? Nor can it be the business of all. 
Therefore itis not the task of the science of substance (any more than 
of any other). 

9978 2. (ὁ) How can there be knowledge of these first principles ? 
What they are is evidently familiar enough; if ‘her truth is to be 
proved, they will have to be shown to be attributes of an underlying 
genus, and so, since all demonstrative science uses the axioms, all 
attributes that can be proved will be attributes of a common genus. 

11. Antithesis. If the science of substance and the science of the 
axioms are distinct, which is the more authoritative? The axioms are 
the principles of all things, and who can study them if not the 
philosopher ? 


Third problem. 


15. Is there one science of all substances? Zes’s. If not one, 
which kind of substance does the supreme science study? An/itheszs, 
One science cannot well study them all. For if one science studies all 
substances, and one science studies all the axioms, these two sciences 
or one compounded out of them will study αὐ attributes. 


Lifth problem. 


25. Does the science of substances study their attributes also? 

30. Thesis, If it does, the science of substance will be demonstrative, 
which it is not thought to be. An/sthes’s. If not, which science 
studies the attributes of substance ? 


Fourth problem. 


34. Are there non-sensible substances, and if so, are there more 
than one kind of them, e.g. Forms, and ‘intermediates’ which are the 
objects of mathematics? 

bg. (A.) We have already stated how the Zurms are said to be causes 
and substances. Not least of the many difficulties of the theory is that 


Β, 2. 996% 20-22 22 


involved in making the non-sensible realities the same as the sensible 
except that they are eternal; to make them eternal sensibles is like 
making the gods eternal men, 

12. (B.) Zhesis. The belief in the z/ermediates involves many 
difficulties. (a) On the same showing there will be heavens and 
heavenly bodies apart from the ideal and the sensible; but how can 
they be either immovable or movable? 

20. (ὁ) There will be intermediate objects of optics and harmonics, 
i.e, intermediate sensibles, and therefore intermediate senses, and 
therefore intermediate animals, 

25. (c) If geometry differs from mensuration only by being of non- 
sensibles, there will be a medical science intermediate between the ideal 
medical science and that which we know, and therefore intermediate 
healthy objects. 

32. (d) It is not the case that mensuration is of sensible objects; if 
it were, it would have perished when they perish. 

84. Antithesis. Astronomy is not concerned with sensible things, 
The movements of the heaven are not like those of which astronomy 
speaks any more than sensible lines are like those of geometry. 

9988 7. Some say that intermediates exist, but 77 sensible things. 
The difficulties of this view may be briefly indicated. 

τι. (a) At this rate the Forms might be in sensibles. (4) There 
would be two solids in the same place. (c) The intermediates, being in 
moving sensibles, could not be unmovable. (ὦ) The view is open to 
all the difficulties of the former view, in an exaggerated form. 


9962 18~ 26. Lirst ἀπορία. 


Aristotle answers the question in I’. 1, by saying that metaphysics 
studies all the causes or principles of being gua being. ‘The precise 
difficulties raised here, however, are not solved. 

20. Aristotle assumes (1) that of different yévy there are in general 
different sciences, but (2) that of contraries there is one science. The 
γένη τῶν αἰτίων being different and not contrary, how can there be one 
science of them ? 

21. ἔτι δὲ πολλοῖς κτλ. This, as Colle has.pointed out, becomes 
intelligible as an objection to there being one science of all the kinds 
of cause, only if that be taken to mean that a science which apprehends 
one kind of cause necessarily apprehends them all. If the objects of 
certain sciences are unaffected by some kinds of cause, those sciences 
will know some kinds of cause without knowing all. 

23. τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. Jaeger argues that Aristotle would not have 
asked ‘how can unmoved things have a cause of movement? ’, and 
that the meaning must be ‘ how can there be among unmoved things 
one which causes movement in other things?’. He therefore reads 


Ω 2 


228 COMMENTARY 


ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, Which may have been read by Alexander (181. 34 f., 
37, 182. 3) and Asclepius (152. 18), and is found in 1, 27 and in the 
parallel passage K. 1059* 18, as wellas in A. 1072» τ, But the argu- 
ment in ll. 23-27 implies the question ‘how can unmoved things have 
a final cause ?’, and ἐν rots ἀκινήτοις in 1. 27 only puts this in another 
way, ‘how can there be a final cause in the case of unmoved things ?’ 
At |. 23 ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις may be only Alexander’s and Asclepius’ para- 
phrase of τοῖς ἀκινήτοις. 

29. In M. 1078%31-b5 Aristotle shows that τὸ καλόν, if not τὸ 
ἀγαθόν, has a place in mathematics, 

32. Aristippus is called a sophist because of his subjectivistic or 
Protagorean theory of knowledge, for which see Zeller, ii. 1. 347-352. 
The Cyrenaics are said to have eschewed physics and logic as well as 
mathematics because of their ‘ uselessness’ (Diog. Laert. ii. 92, Sext. 
Math, vii. 11, ps.—Plut. in Eus. Pr. ΖΦ. i. 8, 9, cf. Diog. ii. 71, 79). 
In this both the Cynics and the Epicureans agreed with them. 

33. προεπηλάκιξεν, For the singular cf. 1. 6 n. 

by, The thesis that ove science cannot study all the causes has been 
stated in ἃ 20-1; Aristotle does not now, as in most of the other 
ἀπορίαι, proceed to state the antithesis. He only points out that if 
different sciences study the different causes it is hard to say which of 
them is Wisdom or first philosophy. Alexander’s conjecture in 1, 24 
would give us the antithesis. 

It is to be noticed that in this book ἀλλὰ μήν is used both in passing 
from thesis to antithesis (997211, 34, 999% 29, "27, r002® 15, 
Ὁ 30), in passing to a new problem (996° 26), in passing to a new 
argument (9991, roo1) 19), in pointing out that thesis and antithesis 
cannot be combined (99811), and in adding a fresh step to an 
argument (998° 27, 999% 21, 5, r001% 29, 10028 4). 

8. τῶν πάλαι διωρισμένων. Aristotle is referring to the characteristics 
of Wisdom or first philosophy stated in A. 982° 8-19. 

10-24. Aristotle gives reasons for regarding knowledge of the final 
(11. 10-13), of the formal (13-22), and of the efficient cause (22-24) as 
being Wisdom. He does not suggest that knowledge of the material 
cause could be Wisdom, doubtless because knowledge of the matter of 
a thing is not positive knowledge of the thing but only knowledge of its 
οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ (Al. 187. 12). 

14. διωρίσθη. A. 9824 32-- 2, 

οὐσίας, as often, means essence or formal cause. 

15. μᾶλλον μὲν εἰδέναι κτλ. ‘ The man who recognizes the nature of 
a thing by its being so-and-so knows it better than the man who 
recognizes it by its not being so-and-so.’ 

19. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Aristotle has first (1. 15) spoken of the case 
in which we directly know what a thing is. Now he refers to the case 
in which the knowledge is reached by demonstration (καὶ ὧν ἀποδείξεις 
εἰσί is epexegetic of ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις). Substances are defined in the first 
way (λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἀναπόδεικτος, An. Post. 94* 11), attributes or 
operations in the second (συλλογισμὸς τοῦ τί ἐστι, πτώσει διαφέρων τῆς 


B.. 23) 996% 26,— 997 2 229 


ἀποδείξεως, ib. 94% 12). The definition, ‘the squaring of a rectangle is 
the finding of a (geometrical) mean between the sides’, is an abbre- 
viated form of the syllogism ‘a rectangle can be squared because a 
mean can be found between its sides’. (The problem is solved by the 
finding of a mean proportional in Eucl. vi. 13, but otherwise in ii. 14.) 
Cf. Aristotle’s account of the definition of eclipse (An. Post. 90" 15- 
18, 938 30-- 7) and of thunder (ib. 93 7-12, 94% 3-7). 

24. dot ἄλλης κτλ. This follows strictly not from what has been 
said in b 1-24, but from what was said ἰῇ ἃ 2ο- τ, In view of this 
difficulty Alexander conjectured ὥστ᾽ οὐκ ἄλλης. The argument then 
would be: ‘the knowledge of each of three causes has a claim to be 
regarded as Wisdom; therefore each of the three causes must be 
studied by a'science none other than Wisdom’. Cf.l.1 n. It is pos- 
sible, however, to take ὥστ᾽ ἄλλης not as summing up the whole 
section Ὁ 1-24, but as suggested by the opposition Aristotle has just 
(Ὁ 24) pointed out between the final and the efficient cause. 


996" 26—997? 15. Second ἀπορία. 


26-27. καὶ περὶ. .. πλειόνων. In view of 995” 6-10, 996 31— 
997% 2, 0978 11-15, I’. 10052 19 we must take th’s to mean ‘ whether 
it is the task of one science to study the axioms as well as the four 
causes’. But in K. 1059* 23 the question is put in the form ‘is it the 
task of one science or of more than one to study the axioms?’. 
It looks as if the writer of K had read the present passage hastily and 
ignored the significance of καί 

Aristotle answers the question in I’. 3 by saying that metaphysics 
studies the axioms as well as the ἀρχαί of being. 

28. τὰς κοινὰς δόξας. This phrase is the ancestor of κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι; 
Euclid’s term for the axioms. P. Tannery held that the phrase κοιναὶ 
ἔννοιαι, is a late interpolation due to Apollonius (c. 50 B.c.), but there is 
no sufficient basis for this view. Cf. Heath’s Lucid, 1, 221-222. 

30. ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται, cf. 995% 10 ἢ. 

33-997° 2. Aristotle here argues dialectically that it cannot be the 
special business of the science of substance any more than of any of 
the other sciences to study principles common to all reasoning. The 
fallacy of the argument is pointed out in I. 3; the science of substance 
is not a special science like geometry, but the science of being as such. 

34. The proposals to amend γεωμετρίας (σοφίας Schwegler, ταύτης 
ἢ γεωμετρίας Christ) are obviously unnecessary. 

35- ἁπασῶν δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεται, sc. because all the sciences would then 
overlap. 

9978 2-11. Aristotle assumes that if there is a science of the axioms, it 
must either define or demonstrate them; cf. the two kinds of things 
that have to be ‘foreknown’, ὅτι ἔστι and τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι, An. 
fost, 71*11. We do not need a science to enable us to define the 
meaning of the axioms (Il. 3-5); and if they could be demonstrated 
then all demonstrated facts would belong to one genus. The latter 


230 COMMENTARY 


proposition is proved thus (ll. 5-11). If the axioms are supposed to 
be demonstrable, then (1) there must be some underlying genus (περί 
τι), (2) some of the axioms must be πάθη proved about this genus 
(τινῶν), (3) since every proof must start with something unproved, 
some of them must be unproved ἀξιώματα (ἔκ τινων). (Thus the sup- 
position that the axioms are demonstrable must be corrected into the 
supposition that some of them can be demonstrated from others 
which are indemonstrable.) For these three implications of proof cf. 
An, Post. 75% 39, 76°11, 21. Now all demonstrative sciences use 
the axioms as their premises, and the conclusions of proof must 
be about the same genus as the premises (this is not stated but 
is clearly assumed ; cf. ib. 75® 38, 7685). Therefore if axioms are 
demonstrable, all δεικνύμενα belong to one genus and all the sciences 
become one—which for Aristotle is a reductio ad absurdum. 

The argument is designed only to raise difficulties, and overlooks 
two points, (1) There is a third way in which there may be a science 
of axioms. Metaphysics, as Bk. Τ' shows, neither defines nor demon- 
strates them, but commends them to common sense by showing the 
absurd consequences of their denial. This is not strictly science since 
it is not demonstrative, but in face of scepticism it is a real service 
which philosophy may perform. (2) Aristotle ignores the difference 
between κοιναί and ἴδιαι ἀρχαί (An. Post, 72% 14-18, 7637-41). Each 
science must have principles dealing with the same genus with which 
its conclusions deal, but it also uses principles common to all the 
sciences, i.e. the axioms. 

5. ΝΣ not distinguished from ἐπιστῆμαι, cf. A. οϑιΡ 25 ἢ, 


997 15-25. Third ἀπορία. 


Aristotle answers this question in I. 2, 10048 2-9, E. 1 by pointing 
out that the three main kinds of entity are studied by three sciences, 
those that exist independently but are mutable by physics, those that are 
immutable but do not exist independently by mathematics, those that 
are immutable and exist independently by theology. But the last of 
the three really studies the general nature of all substances ; it is ‘ uni- 
versal because it is first’ (E. 1026® 30). 

22-25. If the περὶ o, the subject genus, viz, all substances, be the 
object of one science, and if the ἐξ ὧν, the axioms, be the object of one 
science, no matter whether these two sciences be identical or not (this, 
the question just discussed in the previous ἀπορία, is still undecided), 
then the συμβεβηκότα (= πάθη, 1. 7) will be the object of one science, 
i.e. of these two sciences if they are identical, or of one compounded 
out of them if they are not. The plural αὗται can still be used, 
for even if the sciences are one in fact they are described differently ; 
one is the science of substance, the other the science of the axioms. 
It seems best to take ἐκ τούτων μία as ‘one compounded out of these’ 
(Al. 193. 6). It might mean simply ‘one of them’, but if one science 
knows the substances, another the axioms, it would not be natural to 


B. 2. 997% 5 — 997? 32 231 


suggest that one of them alone could know the attributes inferred from 
the axioms to belong to the substances. It is hard to get Bonitz’s 
‘one dependent on these’ out of the Greek. 


9978 25-34. fifth ἀπορία. 

Aristotle answers this question in I. 2. 100332—1005818 by 
saying that the science which studies substances must study also their 
general attributes, 

30-g2. The argument is: if Wisdom is the science of substance 
and is demonstrative, it must be demonstrative of substance; but sub- 
stance or essence cannot be demonstrated (Am, Post. ii. 3-8). The 
fallacy is obvious ; really Wisdom defines substances and demonstrates 
their attributes. 


9973 34—9987 I9. Fourth ἀπορία. 


Aristotle answers the problem by asserting in A. 6-10 the existence of 
certain non-sensible substances, viz. God and the pure forms that move 
the planetary spheres, and by denying in M and N the substantiality of 
Ideas and mathematical objects. 

bg. λέγομεν, cf. A. ggog n. 

4. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, A. 6. 

7. οὐρανῷ, the sensible universe, οἵ. A. 986» 24 n. 

12. It is of course a mistake to describe the Forms as ‘eternal 
sensibles’, They were certainly not thought of as sensibles at all. 
Aristotle’s point, however, is that, in his view, the Platonists treated the 
Forms too much as akin to sensibles. They did not grasp the nature 
of the universal as something essentially 2” particulars, but placed it 
outside the particulars and thus made it a particular itself. If not 
eternal sensibles, the Forms were at least eternal particulars, It is, how- 
ever, a mistake to say, as Aristotle does here and in £. Δ. 1096? 3, 
that the Platonists rested the whole difference between Ideas and 
particulars on the eternity of the Ideas. That they are eternal was 
only one way out of several of describing their nature. 

16. τούτων, ‘of the mathematical sciences’, referring to 1. 2. 

2I. ἡ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἁρμονική, the mathematical as opposed to the 
experimental study of musical harmony. 

25. περὶ ποῖα. Bonitz reads παρὰ ποῖα and cites Il. 28, 29, 31 in 
support. But the cases are not parallel. There Aristotle is speaking 
of a science apart from that of medicine, of healthy things apart from 
those which are sensible. Here he is speaking of the relation between 
certain sciences and certain objects, and παρά is inappropriate. Its 
occurrence in Jl. 28, 29, 31 has led to its intrusion here in some 
manuscripts. 

* 26. γεωδαισίας. This science, as Heath observes (Gk. A/a/h. i. 16), 
was not confined to land-measuring, but covered generally the practical 
measurement of surfaces and volumes. Cf. Geminus af. Procl. 271 
Eucl. i, p. 39. 20—40. 2. 

32. The difference between geometry and mensuration, like that 


232 COMMENTARY 


between arithmetic and harmonics (Az. Pos?. 87% 33), is that one is 
not καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου and the other is. This does not mean that there 
are separately existing non-sensible planes for geometry to study, nor 
that mensuration studies only particular visible fields. Both sciences 
alike deal with certain universal attributes of certain classes of sensible 
things in abstraction from other attributes (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως). Geometry 
studies planes in abstraction from the underlying matter (μὴ καθ᾽ 
ὑποκειμένου); mensuration studies planes not in abstraction from 
matter but in abstraction from any particular kind of matter. 

998" 3. ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, “ but along a line, as Prota- 
goras used to say’. Protagoras,as we should expect, appealed simply 
to the visible circle. He is said (Diog. Laert. ix. 55) to have written 
a book περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων, in which he presumably expressed similar 
views; and he displays contempt for mathematics in Plato’s Profagoras 
(318.p,£). Burnet suggests (G. P. ὃ 91) that it was from taking the 
common-sense view thus opposed to the mathematical view in questions 
about commensurability that he was led to use the curious phrase 
‘man is the measure of all things’, The similar views about 
mathematics referred to in N. 1089 21, An. Post. 76» 39, 87> 37 may 
perhaps be assigned to Protagoras, cf. Apelt, δε γᾶρε, 261. Sir T. 
Heath suggests (G&. Mash. i. 179) that it was against such attacks 
on geometry that Democritus wrote his work, ‘On the contact of 
a circle and of a sphere’. 

5. ἕλικες. For the belief in spiral movements of the planets cf. Pl. 
Tim. 39 a, Tim. Locr. 97 Ὁ; Theo Smyrn, p. 178. 13, 179. 4, 186. 12, 
200, 24, 203. 18 Hiller, 

ὅμοιαι περὶ ὧν, ‘like those about which’. 

W. Jaeger holds. (Zermes, lii. 488) that, as we have τοιαῦταί εἰσιν 
οἵας in]. 1 and τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει φύσιν in 1]. 6, so here we need words 
expressing identity of nature, not mere similarity. Alexander has 
(200. 23) τοιαῦται droias 6 ἀστρολόγος λαμβάνει, and Jaeger would 
accordingly read οἷαι περὶ ὧν. But Alexander is evidently paraphras- 
ing, and may well be paraphrasing ὅμοιαι. 

6. τὰ σημεῖα. Schwegler takes this to mean the constellations. 
The word is found in this sense as early as Euripides (Jon 1157, Rhes. 
529); but this meaning is unparalleled in Aristotle, and it is better to 
take the word with Alexander as meaning the points which the 
astronomer uses as symbols of the stars, This carries out the 
opposition which is being stated between sensible things and the objects 
of mathematics; σημεῖα as ‘constellations’ could not be opposed to 
the stars which compose them, 

ἡ. εἰσὶ δέ τινες κτλ. This view is mentioned again in M. 10764 33, 
38-b11. In N. 10904 20 it is ascribed to the Pythagoreans, But 
Aristotle is speaking here of people who believe in the Forms as well 
as in the mathematicals (Il. 7, 8, 12), so that some Platonists must be 
meant. Schwegler suggests Eudoxus, cf. A. 991®14-18; but 
Alexander in his commentary on that passage says that Eudoxus 
believed in the presence of /deas in sensible things (and in saying so 


B. 2. 998% 3-10 233 


appears to depend on statements of Aristotle’s in the dialogue De Jde7s ; 
v. Al. 98. 21), while the persons here referred to evidently do not 
believe in the immanence of Ideas but only in that of mathematicals 


(1 τ} 


10, τὰ τοιαῦτα. For τοιοῦτος referring forward cf. A. 987) 4 ἢ. 


ProstEms 6, 7 (ch. 3). 
Sixth problem. 


9988 20. Are the genera, or the simplest constituent parts, the first 
principles of things ? 

Thesis. (a) The elements of speech are the constituent parts. 
(2) The elements of geometry are the propositions whose proof 
is involved in the proof of other propositions. 

28. (c) Those who said that bodies have one element, or more than 
one element, meant their constituents, not the genera of them. 
(4) Generally, if we want to know the nature of a thing, we investigate 
ils parts, 

"4. Antithes’s. (a) If we know things by their definition, and 
genera are the starting-points of definition, they must be the first 
principles of the things defined. (4) If to know things is to know 
their species, genera are at any rate the first principles of species. 
(c) Some of those who named unity, being, &c., as elements of things 
were thinking of them as genera. 

11. We cannot say that do/h genera and constituents are first 
principles, for then there would be two definitions of the essence of a 
thing, which there cannot be. 


Seventh problem. 


14. If classes are first principles, is it swmma genera or infimae 
species that are so? 

Thesis, (a) If the more universal is more of a principle, the swmma 
genera will be so, 1. 6, being and unity. 

22. But neither of these can be one genus of existing things. For 
the differentiae of each genus must be, and be one each, but the genus, 
if it is taken apart from its species, cannot be predicated of its differentiae, 
But if unity and being are not genera they are not first principles, 

28. (2) The terms in which the genus is combined with successive 
differentiae will all be genera, and still more so the differentiae them- 
selves, so that there would be an infinite number of first principles. 

9998 1. (c) Even if unity is of the nature of a principle, still if the 


234 COMMENTARY 


indivisible is one and indivisibility means primarily indivisibility in 
kind, the ¢xjimae speczes will be more truly one and therefore more 
truly a principle. 

6. (4) Where terms are respectively prior and posterior, that which 
is predicable of them does not exist apart from them ; thus there is no 
such thing as number or figure apart from the particular numbers 
or figures, and if these genera do not exist apart from the species, 
a fortiort no other genus does. But individuals are not prior or 
posterior to each other. 

16. Antithes’s. The principle should exist apart from that of 
which it is a principle, but why should one suppose an znfima species 
to exist apart from its members, except because it is universally 
predicated of them? But at that rate the more universal classes, 
i.e. the swmma genera, would be more truly principles, 


9988 20-) 14. Sixth ἀπορία. 


This problem is nowhere answered explicitly by Aristotle, but 
in Z. το we learn that the ἐνυπάρχοντα or parts of a thing are 
included in its definition only when they are included in its form; 
while in Z. 13 we learn that universals (among which the γένη 
named in this problem are included) cannot constitute the substance 
of individuals. The nature of an individual cannot, in fact, be 
exhausted by naming either the classes under which it falls or the parts 
which it includes. 

25. τῶν διαγραμμάτων, as Asclepius says (174. 9), means geometrical 
propositions rather than figures, cf. A. 1014%36, Cat. 14% 39. 
Θ. 10518 22, Soph, £71. 175% 27 are difficult cases of the use of the word. 

26. στοιχεῖα. For this use cf. A. 1014%35, Cal. 14839, 70. 
158> 35, 16324.  Llements of geometry were written (1) by 
Socrates’ contemporary Hippocrates of Chios (Procl. 7 Luci. p. 66. 7 
Friedlein) ; (2) by Leon (born ¢. 410) (ib. 20); (3) by Theudius of 
Magnesia, whose work was the geometrical text-book of the Academy, 
and was no doubt that used by Aristotle. Theudius’ Z/ements were 
the immediate precursor of those of Euclid, who flourished c. 300. 
The term is frequently used of elementary propositions without special 
reference to geometry (cf. Bonitz, Zndex, 702 53—703* 10), and in this 
usage Aristotle was anticipated by Xenophon (JZem. ii. 1. 1). 

80. τὰ μετὰ τούτων. Christ reads, with AP, τὰ μεταξὺ τούτων. 
Empedocles does not seem to have treated air and earth as inter- 
mediate between fire and water. Rather he opposed fire to all the 
other elements (A. 9851, de Gen. ef Corr. 330% 20). But Aristotle, 
for whom fire is the hot and dry, water the cold and moist, might 
naturally treat air (hot and moist) and earth (cold and dry) as bridging 
the differences between them (though /Aey bridge the difference no less 
between air and earth). It is preferable, however, to read τὰ μετὰ 
τούτων, Which is the better supported reading. 


B. 3. 998% 25 —gQ98) 28 230 


998" τ. With the vulgate reading the structure of the sentence 
is somewhat loose. Since AP reads καὶ τότε γνωρίζει in 1. 2, Christ 
suggests (Opel) καὶ τότε γνωρίζει, but ἀθρεῖ would be more likely 
to have fallen out immediately after ἀθρεῖν. The reading εἰ... 
ἀθρεῖν, ἀθρεῖ---- οἷον κλίνην----ὀξ dv... συγκειμένων, καὶ τότε γνωρίζει Would 
give a good sense. But neither emendation is very probabld, and 
it seems preferable to accept the traditional reading, as a not unnatural 
blend of two constructions which can easily be supplied. 

9. τινες. The Pythagoreans and Plato made unity and being 
elements of things (996®6); and Plato made the great-and-small 
an element (987? 20). 


14—99Q? 23. Seventh ἀπορία. 


Aristotle answers this question by saying in Z. 12. 103819 
that the last differentia (or zmfima species) is the substance of a thing, 
and in Z, 13 that no universal ever constitutes the substance of an 
individual. 

Bz. takes 998 17—g99* 1 as presenting the thesis (that swmma 
genera are the first principles), 999% 1-16 the antithesis, and 9998 16- 
23 as returning to the thesis. But a study of the arguments shows 
that 998 20—g999*16 is directed to showing that summa genera 
cannot be the principles, 9992 16-23 to showing that cufimae species 
cannot be so. 

16. τῶν ἀτόμων, cf. 995” 29 ἢ. 

24-26. ‘Neither (1) can species be predicated of their proper 
differentiae, nor (2) can the genus, if it be taken apart from its species, 
be predicated of its differentiae’, The first point is made here 
for the sake of completeness though irrelevant to what Aristotle is 
proving. The reasons why species cannot be predicated of their 
differentiae are given in Zop. 1445-11. (a) The differentia extends 
more widely than the species. If A is defined as a B (genus) which is 
C (differentia), C as well as B is wider than A. (6) If ‘man’ is pre- 
dicated of its differentia, the differentia will be a sub-species— 
a kind of man. (c) If the species isfpredicated of its differentia it is 
prior to it; but in reality it is posterior. 

The reasons why a genus cannot be predicated of its differentiae are 
given ib. 1448 36-3. (a) If it were so predicated, the genus would 
be predicated of the species many times over, since it would be 
predicated of each of the successive differentiae which constitute the 
species. (4) If ‘animal’ is predicable of each of its differentiae, each 
of them will be either a species or an individual, since ‘an animal’ 
always means one or the other. The genus, then, is predicated not of 
the differentiae, but of the species of which the differentiae are also 
predicated. 

28—gg9*1. This argument does not seem to bear on the question 
whether the swmma genera or the imfima species are ἀρχαί. Rather, as 
Alexander partially sees (207. 9), it bears on the question whether the 
genera are ἀρχαί at all. Aristotle in fact does not treat the two ques- 


236 COMMENTARY 


tions as entirely independent. In 1]. 14-16 he raises the question 
whether the highest or the lowest genera are ἀρχαί, as a further 
difficulty in the view that genera are ἀρχαί. Thus a reference to the 
earlier question amidst the discussion of the later is not unnatural. 
Lines 28-30 seem to mean ‘further, the intermediate terms (species) in 
which the summum genus is combined with the successive differentiae, 
right down to the indivisibles, will be genera (and therefore ἀρχαί) --- 
though only some are in fact commonly held to be so’. The point 
lies in the clause which is not expressed but can easily be supplied 
from 1. 28 εἴπερ ἀρχαὶ τὰ γένη ; and itis the same point as is expressed 
in 1. 32, viz. that those who think the genera to be ἀρχαί will find an 
unconscionable number of ἀρχαί on their hands. This is fatal to their 
view, since it is in the pursuit of unity that they make the genera ἀρχαί. 

29. τῶν ἀτόμων, sc. εἰδῶν, says Al. (207. 28), and this usage is not 
uncommon (cf. 99529 n.). But the individuals may equally well 
be meant (cf. 1. 16, 999% 12). On the first interpretation, μέχρι may 
be either inclusive or exclusive ; on the second, it must of course be 
exclusive. 

30. viv... οὐ δοκεῖ, if our view of the passage be right, does not 
state Aristotle’s objection to the theory. He does not mean that 
in fact not all the intermediate terms are genera though the theory 
requires that they should be; he himself can call all the species except 
the zzfimae species (and sometimes even these) genera. Rather he 
points out incidentally that common usage does not recognize them all 
as genera, either because some of them have no single names (Al. 207. 
14) or because a genus combined with a privative differentia is not 
thought to make a genuine class (Al. 207. 17, cf. De Part. An. i. 3). 
In any case the remark is parenthetical. 

81. τὰ γένη, the genera just referred to, i.e. those below the 
summum genus, If Ais defined as a B (genus) which is C (differen- 
tia), C is wider than A (cf. Zop. 1445-11) and therefore more of an 
ἀρχή. Aristotle ignores his own doctrine that the differentia should be 
one which is confined to the genus and therefore no wider than the 
species (702. 143% 31, cf. Ζ. 1038% 9). : 

32. ἄλλως te κἄν τις κτλ The higher up in the scale of genera 
one begins in enumerating the ἀρχαί, the more ἀρχαί one will have to 
recognize, 

999%1. Aristotle returns to the view, disproved in 998 19-28, 
that unity is one of the dpya/. . He now deduces from it a consequence 
fatal to it. Even if unity zs (ye) more of the nature of an ἀρχή, it is 
best found not in a summum genus like unity itself but in an τ για 
Spectes. 

2-3. ἀδιαίρετον δὲ... εἶδος. This antithesis, which appears also in 
De An. 430» 14, seems to be identical with the antithesis in I. 1053> 6 
between the indivisible in quantity and the indivisible in quality. 
There, however, indivisibility in quantity, here indivisibility in form, is 
said to be the prior kind of unity. The present argument is, it must 
be remembered, purely dialectical. But perhaps the two statements 


B. 3. 998> 29 — 999% 12 237 


are not really contradictory. In I Aristotle is dealing with the mean- 
ing of the word ‘one’, and finds that its original meaning is ‘a 
measure’. It is properly quantities that are measured; therefore 
‘one’ refers primarily to quantity. But the essential nature of a 
thing is found in form rather than in quantity (cf. T. τοι οὗ 24), so that 
indivisibility in form or species is more important than indivisibility 
in quantity. 

5-6. οὐ γάρ... ἀνθρώπων appears to be a note to the clause τὰ δὲ γένη 
διαιρετὰ εἰς εἴδη. Genera are divisible into species (for man, which is 
not divisible into species, is not the genus but the species of individual 
men). 

6-10. Aristotle states here the rule that where one of two species is 
prior to the other their common predicate is nothing separable from 
them. Instances of such priority are the different numbers or figures 
or forms of government. If you set number, for instance, on one 
side as that in which the various numbers agree, and ask what it is in 
which they differ, you find that this too is number. ‘Numberness’ 
does not exist apart from the rest of the nature of the numbers, but 
penetrates their whole nature, and exists only in the various numbers. 
Remove- the genus number, and you remove the differentiae of the 
numbers as well. Zeller argues (ii. 1. 683-686) that the ideal 
numbers are meant. Now according to the Platonists ideal numbers 
had, and mathematical numbers had not, this relation of priority and 
posteriority (M. 1080» rr), so that if Aristotle had only the Platonists 
in view here, he could only mean the ideal numbers. But the principle 
he here states is not a specially Platonic one. It was accepted by the 
Platonists (Z. WV. 1096817), but also by Aristotle himself (Pod. 
1275° 34, cf. De An. 414 21). Hehas notin his mind the distinction 
between ideal and mathematical numbers, but simply the plain fact 
that the number 2 is prior to the number 3 because there can be two 
things without there being three, but there cannot be three without 
there being two. On the whole question cf. Cook Wilson in Classical 
Review, xviii. 247-260, esp. §§ 1, 7. 

8. πρώτη τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἡ Buds. The Greeks did not reckon one 
as a number but opposed it to number. Cf. N, 1088% 4-8, Phys. 
220% 27. 

II. τούτων γάρ κτλ The Pythagoreans and Plato, of whom 
Aristotle is now speaking (cf. 996 6), attached peculiar importance to 
numbers and figures, and, as he says, would find it hard to say that 
there are separate genera of anything, if not of these. 

12. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀτόμοις. Among the individuals (for the meaning of 
ἀτόμοις cf. 995% 29n.) there is no priority, and therefore there can 
conceivably be a separate genus of them. Aristotle suggests dialec- 
tically, then, that while to certain species there cannot answer any genus 
which is παρὰ ταῦτα, to individuals there does answer an 7znjfima 
spectes which is παρὰ ταῦτα. But this is in contradiction with his 
doctrine that the universal is always κατὰ πολλῶν, never παρὰ τὰ 
πολλά. 


238 COMMENTARY 


Prosiems 8-11 (ch. 4). 
Eighth problem, 


999° 24. Thesis. If there is nothing apart from individual things, 
how can we know the infinitely many individuals? All the things we 
know we know by virtue of their having some common characteristic. 

29. Antithests. If there is something apart from the individuals, it 
must be either zujimae species or summa genera; and we have shown 
that it cannot be either. 

32. If there is something apart from the concrete whole, does 
jt exist apart from all concrete wholes or only from some? Theszs. If 
there is nothing apart from the individuals, there will be (a) nothing 
knowable, (ὁ) nothing eternal or unchangeable, and therefore {c) no 
generation, 

> 6. For (i) generation implies an ultimate ungenerated material ; 

8. (ii) If generation and motion exist there must be a limit to 
them; a thing is not coming to be unless it can actually come to be, 
and as soon as it has come to be it is (and is no longer coming into 
being). 

12, (iii) If matter must exist apart from the individual, still more 
must form. 

17. Antithesis. If form exists apart, in which cases does it do so? (a) It 
obviously cannot exist apart in the case of all individuals, 6, g. individual 
houses. (ὁ) The form of all the individuals cannot be one, for then 
the individuals would be one; nor can their forms be different. 
(c) How does the matter become each of the individuals? How are 
matter and form combined in them ? 


Ninth problem. 


24. Zhests. If the principles are one only in kind, none of them 
will be one in number, not even unity or being, and knowledge will 
be impossible. 

27. Antithesis. If they are one in number, not in kind like the 
principles of sensible things, there will be nothing apart from the 
elements. It is as if the letters were limited in number; all literature 
would be confined to the alphabet, since no letter could be repeated. 


Tenth problem. 


1000* 5. Are the principles of perishable and imperishable things 
the same? Thess. If they are, why are some things perishable, 
others imperishable? (4) The theologians say that the gods who did 


δ. ἄς, 9990"— 1001" 239 


not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal, but this explanation 
was only meant to satisfy its authors and does not satisfy ws. 

1g. (4) Those who use more scientific methods give no explanation, 
and indeed the supposition is unreasonable ; the principles cannot be 
the same, 

24. Empedocles, the most consistent of these thinkers, makes strife 
the cause of destruction, but it is equally true that in his system it 
generates everthing except the One, i.e. God; if there were no strife, 
all things would be one. 

(0 8. Hence his God is less wise than all other beings, for He has no 
strife in Him, and knowledge is of like by like.) 

11. Similarly love is not the cause of being any more than ot 
destruction. Empedocles assigns no cause for the change from the 
reign of love to that of strife save that this is the nature of things. 

17. He alone is consistent, however, in not making some things 
perishable, others imperishable, but all perishable except the ele- 
ments ; but this does not answer our problem. 

23. Antithests. If the principles are different, (4) are they im- 
perishable or perishable? (i) If perishable, (a) they presuppose pre- 
vious principles (for things perish by resolution into what they come 
from) ; but this is impossible. (@) How will perishable things exist 
if their first principles are thus shown not to be first principles ? 

2g. (ii) If imperishable, how can some imperishable principles 
produce perishable things, others imperishable things ? 

32. (2) No one has attempted to distinguish the principles of 
perishable from those of imperishable things, 


Lleventh problem, 


10o1* 4. The hardest and most important question: Are being and 
unity the substances of things, or attributes implying a substratum ? 

9. Plato and the Pythagoreans take the former view ; the physicists, 
on the other hand, reduce the one to something which is considered more 
familiar—friendship, fire, or air; those who posit more than one 
element make the one and being as numerous as the principles they 
allege. 

19. Thesis. (a) If we do not make unity and being, the most 
universal terms, substance, no other universal will be a substance. 

24. (4) If unity is not a substance, number will not exist apart 
from sensible things. 

27. Antithests. If there is a One itself and a Being itself, unity 
and being must be their substance, for there is no other term that 
is universally predicated of them, But if they are substance, (4) how 


240 COMMENTARY 


can there be anything beside them? What is other than being is not, 
so that according to Parmenides’ argument all things will be one and 
this will be being. 

by, Whether unity is or is not a substance, number cannot be 
a substance. We have seen why it cannot if unity is not a substance ; 
if it is, what can produce another than ‘he One? It must be not-one, 
but everything is either one or a plurality of ones. 

7. (Ὁ) If the One itself is indivisible, according to Zeno’s principle 
it will be nothing; for that which does not make things bigger is on 
his view nothing real, the real being the solid, which alone makes 
things bigger in whatever way it is added to them. 

13. Zeno’s view is a vulgar one; a thing may be indivisible and yet 
be, for it may add to the number of things though not to their size. 
But how can magnitude be produced out of one or many such 
indivisibles? It is like making a line out of points. 

19. (c) If one supposes number to be produced out of the One itself 
and something else, still we, must ask how the product can be now 
a number, now a spatial magnitude, if the pre-existent principle other 
than the One is always the same thing—inequality. Magnitudes cannot 
be produced out of this combined either with One or with a number. 


9995 24- 24. Eighth ἀπορία. 


This problem is not very different from that discussed in 9978 
34—998% 19, but is raised from a different point of view. There 
Aristotle had in mind the Platonic doctrine of the separate exist- 
ence of Forms and mathematical objects, and confined himself to 
arguing against this. Here he considers on its own merits the ques- 
tion whether the existence of perishable individual objects itself implies 
the existence of other realities. To this his answer will be an affirma- 
tive one, which may be summed up thus: (1) every concrete substance 
includes as elements eternal matter and eternal form, which, however, 
exist only as united in a concrete substance (Z. 8). (2) Besides this 
there are pure forms which exist separately, viz. God and the beings 
that move the planetary spheres (A. 6-10). Cf. Ζ. 13, 14, M. το. 

26. τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. In this phrase the plural ἕκαστα sometimes 
retains its proper meaning, so that the phrase means ‘ things arranged 
according to their several groups’ (e.g. An. Post. 97> 29, H. A. 539» 
15). But more often, as here, τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα is used simply as the 
plural of τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, in the sense of ‘individuals’ (e.g. Z, 1039" 
28, 30, K. 1060% 3, M. 107796, An. Post. 71923, 1. ΓΝ. 1141) τό, 
1143® 32). And sincera καθ᾽ ἕκαστα can mean ‘ the individuals’, even 
ὃ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα is used in the sense of ‘ the individual’ (Z. 1035? 2). 

27. For δέ 7 apodos? with an adversative suggestion cf, K. 1059» 
33 n., A. 1071%24, 107510, Phys. 215>15, Pol. 1287» 13. 


B. 4. 9998 26 — 999? 14 241 


32. ἄρτι διηπορήσαμεν, 0088 21---ο090ὃ 23. 

33. Jaeger supposes λέγω δὲ σύνολον to have fallen out by ditto- 
graphy after σύνολον, and refers to 995" 35 in support of his reading. 
But the insertion of these words seems unnecessary, and is not sup- 
ported by Alexander (211. 22). 

br. ἢ παρ᾽ οὐδέν. The question, which individuals have something 
(a form) apart corresponding to them, suggests to Aristotle the question 
whether any have. Thus the end of the sentence takes a form 
inconsistent with the beginning. 

8. εἰ μή τις κτλ. Aristotle presumably is thinking of Protagoras 
(cia Ply Prog 151 Ὁ): 

4. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ πάντα φθείρεται. This requires some correction. 
The heavens and the heavenly bodies are sensible but not perishable 
(A. 10698 30). But they are ἐν κινήσει, which is Aristotle's main 
point. ; 

6. ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί te kTA. ‘For there must be something that 
comes to be, i.e. something out of which something is produced.’ 
Alexander takes τὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον to refer to that which is produced, 
but a reference to this would be irrelevant, and it is preferable to take 
it as referring to what is in 1. 7 more clearly described as ἐξ οὗ 
γίγνεται. 

8. εἴπερ. .. ἀδύνατον. That there is an upper limit to the chain of 
material causes has been proved in a. 2; that the first material cause 
cannot have come out of nothing is assumed as self-evident. 

8-12 appears to be not, as Alexander says (213. 26), another 
τ argument for the existence of a beginning of generation, but an argu- 
ment for the existence of an end of generation, which must (it is 
assumed) be eternal and therefore παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. The difficult 
part of the argument is that in ll. rr, 12, which seems to mean ‘and 
that which is incapable of completing the process of coming into being 
cannot be coming into being, while that which has completed the 
process must forthwith be’ ; i.e. the becoming of anything implies that 
sometime it will not be becoming but will be. 

12. It is only now that Aristotle comes explicitly to the existence of 
forms, which is what he had in mind in the framing of the problem 
(cf. ©33— 1 with b rz, 18, and note the reference to the possibility of 
knowledge in ἃ 27, >2; it is form and not matter that makes know- 
ledge possible). The proof of the eternal existence of matter (> 5-8) 
is a preliminary to the proof of the eternal existence of form (Ὁ 12-16) ; 
and the ‘limit of generation’ whose existence is proved in Ὁ 8-12 is 
simply form. 

ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ἡ ὕλη ἔστι, Sc. παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. This can be 
supplied in thought because the subject of the whole section is the 
question whether ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα (ὃ 26, cf. ἃ 30, 31, qa a4 
by, 2). Matter has been shown to exist παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα because 
it is ungenerated while they come into being (> 4-8). 

14. οὐσίαν and 6 are not related as antecedent and relative; 6... 
γίγνεται is in apposition to τὴν οὐσίαν, so that a comma is required. 


2573-1 R 


242 COMMENTARY 


14-15. εἰ yap... παράπαν. This, as Colle points out, is an answer 
to a supposed objection. (‘Nor can it be said that merther form nor 
matter exists,) for’, &c. 

19. οὐ γὰρ ἂν θείημεν kth, cf. A. gg1P 6. 


24—1000* 4. Ninth ἀπορία. 


In Z. 14, M. το Aristotle raises this same question with regard to 
the Ideas. In A. 4, 5 he points out that a principle such as form, 
privation, matter, moving cause, actuality, or potency is only analogi- 
cally the same in its various manifestations ; all things, however, have 
a prime mover which is numerically identical. 

25-27. The argument may be paraphrased thus: If a principle 
discovered by analysis of one thing can only be one in szzd with 
a principle discovered by analysis of another thing, no two things will 
ever have a numerically identical principle; but if there is not this, if 
there is not a ἕν ἐπὶ πάντων, how is knowledge possible? Even unity 
or being (the favourite principles of Plato and the Pythagoreans, 
9968 5) will not be the same in two things; the unity or being of one 
will be only {κε that in the other. εἰ μὲν... τὸ ὄν and καὶ τὸ ἐπίστα- 
σθαι... πάντων seem to form a single argument, and should be 
separated only by a colon. 

1000%1, The sentence beginning with ὥσπερ οὖν has no principal 
clause, and Bonitz (following Fonseca) therefore proposed to read 
ὥσπερ ἄν with a comma before it, treating 999 33100081 τὸ γάρ... 
τούτων as parenthetical. But later, in the Judex Aritstolelicus, he 
recognized ὥσπερ οὖν κτλ. as an elliptical sentence (the principal 
clause is very easily supplied). Cf. ©. το498 3, Am. Pr. 34% 22, 
Soph. El. 1781, Rhet. 1408” 24, ὥσπερ γάρ in Meteor. 390% 4, ὥσπερ 
in M. 1087% 7, καθάπερ in Pol, 1275* 14, De Caelo 279% 30. Cf. also 
Z. 1031° 8, and Vahlen, Poev. ed. 3, p. 276. 


1000* 5—1001? 3. Tenth ἀπορία. 


Aristotle nowhere answers this question in so many words. But in 
Z. 7-9, A. 1-5 he states the principles of perishable things, and 
in Z. το, A. 6, 7 he points out the difference between these and the 
principles of imperishable things. 

9. θεολόγοι, cf. A. 983> 29 n. 

το. Cf. Pl. Soph. 243 ὅτι λίαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ὠλιγώ- 
ρησαν' οὐδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἴτ᾽ ἐπακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε 
ἀπολειπόμεθα, περαίνουσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι. 

12, τὰ μὴ γευσάμενα κτλ. So Thetis pours ambrosia and nectar 
into the nostrils of the dead Patroclus to make his flesh imperishable 
Lil, X1x. 3S). 

27. Cf. A. 985% 23-9. 

28. By τὸ ἕν and ὁ θεός Aristotle means (cf. > 3, A. 985% 28, De 
Gen. et Corr. 315° 7, 333% 21) the Σφαῖρος of Empedocles, i.e. the 


B. 4. 999» 14 — 1000 29 243 


universe in the period when Love is all-pervasive and the elements 
are thoroughly united with one another. Empedocles calls this θεός in 
ieee. 

2g. ἐξ ὧν kth, fr. 21. g-12. By ἐξ ὧν Aristotle means ‘out of the 
four elements + love and strife’; in the original, however, it looks as if 
only the four elements were meant. Simplicius has the line in the 
form ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ᾽ ὅσα τ᾽ ἣν ὅσα τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται. 

Ὁ, ὅταν γάρ κτλ., fr. 306, Stobaeus gives the whole verse 


“ δὲ , 5 » ν a 
των O€ συνερχομένων ες εσχᾶάτον ἰστατο Νεῖκος. 


Aristotle as usual quotes from memory. ‘The meaning is made 
clear by fr. 35. When the various elements had come together by the 
force of love, love occupied the centre of the vortex and controlled the 
movement, while strife was banished to the lowest or outermost edge 
and thus deprived of power; things then were one just because strife 
was not in them but outside them. 

6. γαίῃ μέν rh, fr. 109. 

9. Cf. A. 985% 23-9. 

14. ἀλλ᾽ ὅτε δή KTA., fr. 30. 

ἐνὶ μελέεσσιν, sc, of the ΘΡΠαΙΓΟΒ. 

15. πλατέος παρ᾽ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου, Cf. Ar, Ach. 1126 κατάγελως 
πλατύς, broad, flat, or downright mockery. ἐλαύνειν is, as Bonitz 
says, used in the same sense as in such phrases as τάφρον ἐλαύνειν. 
There may, further, be a play on ὅρκος and ἕρκος, cf. Hesiod Zheog. 
726 τὸν (Tdprapov) πέρι χάλκεον ἕρκος ἐλήλαται. The oath ‘ is called 
“broad” because it is a barrier or fence’, Cornford, L’rom Religion to 
Philosophy, 237. Cornford seems wrong, however, in identifying this 
barrier with Strife. 

The language is reminiscent of what Hesiod says about the great 
oath of the Gods by which the province of each was guaranteed 
(referred to in A. 983 31). ‘The whole verse means ‘ which has been 
traced for love and strife in turn as the result of a mighty oath’. The 
oath may be supposed to have been taken by Necessity or by the gods, 
like the 

᾿Ανάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, 


3. / ᾿ Ψ 
ἀΐδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὁρκοις, 


of which we read in fr. 115. 

27. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον κτλ, That there should be ἀρχαί prior to 
ἀρχαί is impossible whether it be supposed that there are absolutely 
primary ἀρχαί or that there is an infinite regress; for ἀρχαί that have 
ἀρχαί prior to them are not ἀρχαί αἱ all, Alexander suggests (221. 34) 
that perhaps τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον should be treated as parenthetical, but 
this seems to give an inferior sense. 

2g. εἰ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀναιρεθήσονται, ‘if we are going to decide that their 
so-called ἀρχαί are not dpxaé’. The supposition that there are first 
principles of their first principles logically annihilates their first princi- 
ples; for that which has a principle prior to it cannot be a first 

R 2 


244 COMMENTARY 


principle. But if the supposed first principles of perishable things are 
thus annihilated, how can these things ever exist ? 

roor* 1. Ofthe MSS., only A> reads λέγειν after ἑτέρας. Alexander 
has μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰρηκέναι, from which Bonitz conjectured εἴρηκεν or 
τὴν ἀρχὴν εἴρηκεν. Vahlen (Poet. ed. 3, p. 158) is probably right in 
defending ἐγκεχείρηκεν without λέγειν, Which is easily understood from 
the following clause (cf. T. 1005» 2, De Caelo 292 12, Pol. 1313» 31, 
Rhet. 1363° 27, 1372> 36, Poet. 145318, 14541). 

2. τὸ πρῶτον ἀπορηθέν, the question whether perishable and im- 
perishable things have the same principles, discussed in 10002 5—) 22, 
in distinction from the question whether the principles of perishable 
things are perishable, discussed in 1000? 23—10018 1, 

ἀποτρώγουσιν seems to mean, as Schwegler says, ‘gulp off’. The 
meaning ‘nibble at’, which Bonitz prefers, would require the genitive. 


1001 4-- 25. Eleventh ἀπορία, 


Aristotle answers this problem in Z. 16, 1040 τ6--24, I. 2 by assert- 
ing that being and unity are not substances but attributes; in M. 8. 
1083% 20—1085* 2 he argues against the separate existence both of 
unity and of number. 

12. Bonitz’s emendation, τοῦ ἑνί for A»’s τὸ ἕν, is certainly right. 

14. Cf. 9968 n. 

15. ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ κτλ., cf. A. 984% 7, 5. 

21. ταῦτα γάρ κτλ. The argument is: ‘Since the most universal 
terms, being and unity, are not substances, no universals can be sub- 
stances’. It certainly follows that they cannot be substances merely 
because of their universality, and it was because of their universality 
that the Pythagoreans and Plato, whom Aristotle has in view, declared 
them to be substances, so that the argument is a sound one. 

26. ὅπερ. ‘The unit is precisely what a certain kind of one is’. 
When A is ὅπερ B, B is not merely predicable of A but has the same 
intension; A and B are two names implying the same set of attributes. 
τὰ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνοντα ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο ἢ ὅπερ ἐκεῖνό τι σημαίνει, ‘the 
terms that indicate the essence of a thing are those that indicate either 
it or that of which it is a kind’ (Am. Post, 83° 24). If B is the essence 
or definition of A, Aristotle says ‘ A is ὅπερ B’; if B is the genus of A, 
he says ‘A is ὅπερ B τι᾿ (cf. Bonitz, Zudex, 5348 6-22). So here 
the unit is identical with one kind of one, presumably that kind which 
is not thought of as having parts but as perfectly simple. The distinc- 
tion between ὅπερ ἐκεῖνο and ὅπερ ἐκεῖνό τι is, however, frequently 
dropped, and we find ‘A is ὅπερ B’ when B is the genus of A. 
In fact ὅπερ comes almost to stand for the relation of genus to species 
(cf. Bonitz, Zudex, 533° 44-55): 

28. καθόλου. ‘ For there is nothing other than unity and being that 
is universally predicated of the particular things that are one and 
existent (cf. Il. 21, 22); nothing, therefore, other than unity and being, 
that can be the substance of the one itself and being itself’. καθόλου 


B. 4. 100191 —1001b7 245 


is read by all the MSS., Al., Asc., and Syr., and Bonitz’s καθ᾽ οὗ does 
not seem to be necessary. His explanation ignores αὐτῶν and gives 
no good sense to ἀλλὰ ταῦτα αὐτά. 

82. Parmenides’ argument, summed up in the line 

od γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι" μὴ ἐόντα (fr. 7), ‘ 

is this: anything. other than ‘what is’ must be something that is not; 
but what is not is not; therefore-nothing other than ‘ what is’ is. 
The universe, then, has only one thing in it, ‘ what is’, i.e. the universe 
itself; there is no plurality of any sort in the universe. This is the 
argument which Aristotle now uses to refute the Platonists. So long 
as ‘ being’ is treated, as Aristotle himself treats it, as a predicate, there 
is room for plurality in the universe. But if ‘ being’ be made a sub- 
stance, it follows, he says, that there is nothing other than being, and 
the universe is a single substance without plurality. It is to be 
noticed that τὸ ov covers an important ambiguity. For Parmenides it 
means ‘ what is ’, 1. e. the universe ; for the Platonists it means ‘ being’, 
i.e, the attribute of existence. It is this abstraction that they make a 
substance, and there is nothing in this to prevent their recognizing 
other substances. Plato was quite equal to pointing out the falla- 
ciousness of the principle τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν. 

bx, In 8 29-Ὁ γε Aristotle has argued that if unity and being are sub- 
stances, there cannot be anything else. Now he proceeds to a fresh 
point; that number, which the Pythagoreans and the Platonists treated 
as the substance of the universe, cannot be a substance. If unity is 
not a substance, number cannot be a substance, for the reason given 
in 224-27; if unity zy a substance, the same difficulty arises as was 
in ἃ 41-ῦ g pointed out with regard to being. If unity is a substance 
there can be nothing else, just as if being is a substance there is 
nothing else. Any one other than the one itself (unity) must be not 
one; but everything that is, either is one or includes ones ; what is 
other than unity, then, would be either non-existent or composed 
of non-existent units; there is, then, only one thing in the universe, 
unity. 

7. εἰ ἀδιαίρετον κτλ, Bonitz supposes that this assumption is taken 
from Parmenides, and it certainly is found in him— 


οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοῖον (fr. 8. 22). 


But though the subject of this statement in Parmenides is the One, 
that means the universe and not the abstract principle of unity whose 
substantial existence Aristotle is attacking. If Aristotle is basing an 
attack on the Platonists on this dictum of Parmenides, he is guilty of 
the same confusion that was pointed out in® 32 ἢ. But we must take 
this clause in connexion with the rest of the sentence, Aristotle does 
not ascribe to Zeno an attack on the One in any sense of ‘ the One’ ; 
all that he ascribes to him is the principle that that which neither makes 
things greater by being added to them nor less by being subtracted 
from them is not real. But this principle must have had some con- 


246 COMMENTARY 


text in Zeno’s thought, and if, as seems probable, its context was 
an attack on ‘the One’ in some sense (cf. frr. 1, 2, and Diels, 1.3 170. 
16-38), what is likely to have been the One which he was attack- 
ing? Not the Parmenidean One which is just what he himself 
believed in, but the Pythagorean indivisible units which he made 
it his business to attack (cf. Burnet, £.G.P. §§ 158, 159, 161). 
In fact Zeno’s argument is evidently directed against what is indi- 
visibly small, which is by no means what Parmenides meant when he 
called his One indivisible. What Zeno is attacking is the building up 
of the world out of points or units (1. 13, cf. Simpl. Pys. 99. 10), 
between which the Pythagoreans did not clearly distinguish. The 
argument attributed to him here is part of one of his refutations 
of pluralism, viz. the proof that if Being were many it would have to. 
be both infinitely small and infinitely large (cf. Zeller, 1.5 749). 

ἀξίωμα, ‘postulate’, as in M. 10778 31. 

II-I2, πὼς μέν, end to end; πὼς δ᾽, lying along one another. 

13-18. ‘But, since Zeno’s arguments are of a low order, and an 
indivisible thing can exist, in such a way that we can defend it even 
with reference to his argument (i.e. by pointing out that an indivisible 
unit will increase what it is added to, in number though not in size)— 
yet how can a magnitude be composed of such a unit or several such 
units?’. Bonitz correctly explains the construction by saying that 
Aristotle meant the first clause to be followed by something like 
τοῦτον μὲν ἐατέον, OTL ἐνδέχεται ἀδιαίρετόν τι εἶναι... ἀλλὰ πῶς δή 
κτλ., and that ἀλλά remains though the intended μέν clause has been 
absorbed in the protasis. ‘The anacoluthon would be removed by 
reading, with Apelt (following AP), ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δὴ οὕτως, θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς. 
But Alexander had οὗτος, and the run of the sentence as punctuated 
by Apelt is unnatural. 

14. φορτικῶς. Aristotle's opinion of the younger Eleatics may be 
inferred from the fact that he uses the same epithet of Melissus in 
Phys. 185% το. 

15. καὶ οὕτως καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. It seems impossible to make any- 
thing of this, and it is best to treat καὶ οὕτως as originally a marginal 
gloss referring to the variant οὕτως in 1. 14. Fonseca’s ὄντως is 
ingenious, but the word is not used by Aristotle. 

21. ἄλλου μὴ ἑνός τινος. Cf. A. 987 20 ἢ. 

23. For the Platonic description of the material principle as the 
unequal cf M. 1087 5, 1088) 32, 1089» 6-15, 1091} 35. 


ProstEM 14 (ch. 5). 
Fourteenth problem. 


1001» 26. Are numbers, bodies, planes, points substances? Zheszs. 
If not, what are the substances of things? Affections, motions, relations, 
states, ratios do not indicate substance, for they require a substratum 


B. 4. IOO1® 11 —5. 1001} 32 247 


and are not individual. The four elements are more like substance 
than heat, cold, &c., which are their affections. But body is less 
substantial than surface, surface than line, line than unit and point, 
since these are what determines body, and can exist without it while 
it cannot exist without them. 

1002? 8. Hence, while most thinkers and the earlier thinkers 
thought substance was body and everything else was its attributes, the 
later and those reputed wiser held that substance was numbers. If 
these things are not substance, nothing is substance or real, for their 
attributes can hardly be called real. 

15. Anitthests. (a) If it is agreed that lines and points are more 
substantial than bodies, but we do not see what sort of bodies they can 
be substances of (for they cannot be in sevszble bodies), there is no 
substance. (4) These are all mere divisions of body. 

20. (c) Any one figure is as much present in a solid as any other. 
If the Hermes is not determinately present in the marble, neither is 
the surface, line, point, or unit in the solid. If body is more substantial 
than its affections, and these things are more substantial than body, 
and these are not substance, what zs substance ? 

28. (4) If substance passes from not being to being or vice versa, 
this implies becoming and perishing; but points, lines, and surfaces 
do so without becoming or perishing. When bodies touch, one surface 
is produced ; when they are parted, two surfaces are produced; the 
surfaces pass out of or into being with the union or separation of 
the bodies. If the surfaces are generated and perish, what are they 
generated from ? 

b5. So too the present moment cannot become or perish, and yet 
is always different ; it cannot, then, be substance. All these entities 
alike are mere limits or divisions. 


1001» 26—1002) 11. Fourteenth ἀπορία. 


The belief in the substantiality of numbers and mathematical objects 
is discussed and refuted in M. 1-3, 6-9, N. 1-3, 5, 6. M. 2 refers 
especially to geometrical objects; M. 6-8, N. 5, 6 especially to 
numbers. 

27. τὰ σώματα, mathematical solids. 

32. τόδε τι. The meaning of this phrase is discussed by Prof. 
J. A. Smith in Classical Review, xxxv (192 1) ΤῸ: Three views, he 
points out, are possible. (1) It may be held to mean ‘this, i.e, any, 
member of the class of somewhats’, i.e. to be the generalized form of 
such phrases as ὅδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος. It has been suggested that the Greek 
for this would be τό τι τόδε ; but that would be ambiguous, for it might 


248 COMMENTARY 


equally be inter preted as the generalized form of such phrases as 6 tis 
ἄνθρωπος. τόδε τό τι Would be free from any such objection, and on 
the analogy of ὅδε ὁ ἄνθρωπος would be the correct we ay of expressing 
this meaning. (2) It may be taken to mean ‘a this’, i.e. to be the 
generalized form of such phrases as ἄνθρωπός τις. Prof. Smith objects 
that itis an anachronism to ascribe to Aristotle the conception of a class 
of this’s, and that the Greek for ‘a this’ is simply τόδε (cf. τόδε ev τῷδε, 
τόδε τοιόνδε). He holds that τόδε τι means (3) something which is 
both singular, a ‘this’, and possessed of a universal nature, a some- 
what, 1. 6.) 1s a πρώτη οὐσία. : 

On the whole I incline to the second view, For, generally speaking, 
it is singularity and not the possession of a universal nature that Aristotle 
seems to have in mind when he uses the phrase, e. 8. Cat. 3Ὁ 12 τόδε τι 
σημαίνει, ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δηλούμενόν ἐστιν. And in that 

context τόδε TL IS Opposed to ποιόν TL, W here τι seems to mean simply 

‘a’; if τι referred to the possession of a general character it would 
reduplicate ποιόν. It is natural, then, to suppose that in τόδε τι also 
τι means ‘a’. It is true, however, that τόδε alone also means ‘a this’ ; 
τόδε and τόδε τι Seem to be interchangeable. 

1002* 8. ot pév κτλ, is concessive ; the real point comes with ot δ᾽ 
Lore 

11. οἱ 8 ὕστεροι. Bonitz thinks that the Pythagoreans are meant, 
not the Platonists, because ‘Plato’s philosophy could not be rightly 
included within these narrow limits of mathematical objects’ and 
because in Z. 2, while this view is mentioned in 1028) 15, Plato’s 
view is not mentioned till 1o28>19. Alexander thinks that’ both 
the Pythagoreans and Plato are meant (230. 12), and he is probably 
right. 

20-28. Aristotle argues here that all the surfaces involved in a solid 
must be in the same position with regard to existence, so that if, as he 
assumes, the surfaces that will bound a solid not yet cut out of the 
original solid do not yet exist, none of the other surfaces involved in 
the solid exist. So too as regards the relation between surface and 
line, and between line and point. 

27. μηδέ, which Christ wishes away, is undoubtedly difficult. The 
meaning probably is ‘if these are not even instances of substance’— 
not to speak of their being the most real substances, as the Pytha- 
goreans and the Platonists believed. 

32. τὰς δὲ στιγμάς KTH, cf. Ε΄, 1026” 23 ῃ. 

b 3-4. ‘For it will not be suggested that the point, indivisible as it is, 
was divided into two’. If it were, there might be a gradual process ; 
but as it is, the two points come into being in an instant. 

6. On τὸ νῦν cf. Phys. iv. 13. 


B. 5. τοοδ 8 —6, 1002) 13 249 


PROBLEMS 12, 13 (ch. 6). 


100212. \WWhy should one look for Forms distinct from sensible 
things and from the intermediates? TZheszs. If it is because mathe- 
matical objects, while unlike things in this world in another respect, 
‘are like them in that there are many of one kind, so that their first 
principles cannot be limited in number (as the letters of the alphabet 
are not limited in number but only in kind), and hence, if there are 
not entities other than sensibles and mathematical objects, there will 
be no substance one in number, but only in kind, and the first 
principles will be limited only in kind :—if, then, the principles must 
be limited in number, there must be Forms. 

27. Even if the supporters of the theory do not express themselves 
well, this is what they mean when they gay that each of the Forms is 
a substance and none is an accident. 

30. Antitheszs. If we posit the Forms, so that the principles are 
one in number and not merely in kind, we have seen the difficulties 
that follow. 


Thirteenth problem. 


32. Do the elements exist potentially or in some other fashion? 
Thesis. If in some other way, there will be something prior to the 
first principles; for the potentiality is prior to the actual cause, and 
what is possible need not become actual. <Avsthesis. If the elements 
exist potentially, it is possible that everything that is should not be, 
for even that which is not yet is capable of being, since that which 
is not comes to be, but nothing incapable of being comes to be. 


Twelfth problem. 


100g? 5. Are the principles universal or individual? Thesis. If 
universal, they are not substances, for no common predicate is a this, 
but only a such, while substance is a this; if the common predicate 
is to be a this and a single thing, Socrates will be several animals, 
himself and man and animal. 

13. Anitithesis. If the principles are individuals, tHey cannot be 
known, so that there must be universal principles prior to them if 
there is to be knowledge of them. 


1002 12-32. Aristotle discusses here a problem not raised in ch. 1 
but akin to problems 5 and 9. 
1g. τὰ μεταξύ, cf. A, 987? 14n. 


250 COMMENTARY 


14. τίθεμεν, cf. A. ggo? gn. 

14-26. For the mode of structure of the sentence, a long protasis with 
εἰ (or ἐπεί) followed by a short protasis with εἰ, ἐάν, or εἴπερ, cf. An. 
Post. 93% 3-9, 98> 16-21, Zop. 111° 33-67, Phys. 223% 12-20, 264 
22-31, De Caelo 290% 7-12, 299» 7-10, Rhet. 13872 27-32. LI. r4- 
22 are an instance of ‘ binary structure’. Cf. A. 983> τό πη. 

24. Alexander’s ἀλλ᾽ εἴδει is very attractive. If καὶ εἴδει be kept, 
ἀριθμῷ καὶ εἴδει must be taken to mean ‘in number as well as 
in kind’, 

81. εἰρήκαμεν, ggg? 27—1000% 4. 

32—1003? 5 Thirteenth ἀπορία. 


The second half of the problem stated in 996® 10, 11, whether the 
potentiality or actuality of the first principles refers to movement or 
not, is not here discussed. 

The relation of potency to actuality is discussed in ©, 1-9; the 
material element is described as potential, the formal as actual, The 
priority of actuality is proved in @. 8. In A. 6, 7 it is shown that the 
universe must have a first mover which is through and through 
actual. 

32. σύνεγγυς δὲ τούτων. This problem is akin to the previous one 
because while the individual exists actually, the Form has no separate 
existence but may in some sense (even if not accurately) be said to 
exist potentially. 


1003* 5-17 Twelfth ἀπορία. 


For the answer to this problem cf. Z. 13, 14, where Aristotle argues 
that no universal can be a substance; Z. 15, where he argues that no 
individual can be defined; and M. ro, where he attempts to state the 
relation of universal to individual in such a way as to solve this 
paradox.—The problem is closely akin to the ninth. 

10. The manuscript reading would require the rendering ‘if the 
common predicate zs 20 de a this and 27 zs /o be posszble to set it out apart 
from the particulars’ (for the meaning of ἐκθέσθαι cf. A. 992? 10 n.)—an 
intolerable zeugma. I-had thought of ἐκθέσθαι (eé€orar), and Jaeger 
proposes (δεῖ) ἐκθέσθαι (to which 9998 30 offers, as he remarks, a good 
parallel), but Richards’s ev θέσθαι (cf. 1. 12 τόδε τι καὶ ἕν) is better. 
The corruption goes back beyond Alexander (cf. 236. 8). 


BOOK fr 


Our subject—being as such (ch. 1). 


1003* 21. There is a science which investigates being as being, 
and is different from the sciences that investigate special parts of 
being. 


B. 6. 10026 14 —T. 1. 10037 21 251 


26. The first principles which we are seeking must belong to 
something in virtue of its very nature. If the early thinkers, who 
sought the elements of the things that are, were looking for these first 
principles, the elements must be elements of being gua being ; and so 
we too must grasp the first causes of being gua being. 


100321, Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις kth. ‘There is a science which 
investigates that which is, as being, and the attributes that belong to 
it in virtue of its own nature’—i.e. as being. This description of 
metaphysics distinguishes it from other sciences not by its method 
but by its subject. Other sciences cut off a part of that which is and 
study this as possessing certain special features; metaphysics studies 
all that is, and studies it simply as being. When Aristotle describes 
metaphysics as a science studying the attributes of that which is, as 
being, we are, in view of his description of science as demonstrative, 
tempted to suppose him to mean that it syllogistically deduces the 
properties of that which is, from the mere fact of its being. But it 
seems clear that from bare being no properties can be deduced. 
Again, does τὸ ὄν mean that which is, taken collectively? Is it the 
attributes of the universe that he proposes to investigate ? Or does he 
mean that which is, taken distributively? Does he propose to investi- 
gate the properties which anything that is must have because it is? 
In the former case, metaphysics would have some of the characteristics 
of history; its subject—the universe—is an individual, and its pro- 
positions will be singular propositions. Only in the latter case will its 
propositions be universal; that they are meant to be so is strongly 
suggested by the fact that it is called a science. But what important 
attributes are really common to a// existing things? And is not the 
drawing of distinctions as much a part of metaphysics as the recognition 
of identities ? 

To these questions Aristotle nowhere gives explicit answers ; but 
his attitude towards them may be divined from what he says. In the 
first place, though he calls metaphysics a science, he does not suppose 
that it is demonstrative through and through. No science is that. 
Every science starts with ὁρισμοί and ὑποθέσεις, unproved definitions 
of all its terms and unproved assumptions that there exist objects 
corresponding to the chief of those terms. These unproved pro- 
positions are its ἀρχαί. In some cases they are so obvious that they 
may be simply stated without discussion, as in geometry. In other 
cases the learner must be directed to facts of experience which warrant 
the assumptions, as in physics, In others, as in ethics, he must have 
lived a certain kind of life if he is to be ready to accept the assumptions. 
In the last two cases the statement of the assumptions is preceded or 
accompanied by some sort of argument which is not meant to be 
cogent deduction (¢ha¢ works only from principles to their conclusions), 
but to bring home to the learner’s mind propositions which in time 


252 COMMENTARY 


he will see to be self-evident though at first he may doubt or 
deny them. 

Now if metaphysics is a science, we should expect it to behave 
. towards the κοιναὶ ἀρχαί as the special sciences do towards the ἴδιαι 
ἀρχαί. The definitions it assumes will be definitions of terms not 
confined to one department of reality but found throughout reality— 
terms such as matter and form, substance and accident, quality and 
quantity, potency and actuality, unity and plurality. And in fact we 
find such a collection of unargued definitions in Book A. It is true 
that we find arguments about the proper definition of these terms in 
other books, such as ZH@I. But these are not meant to be strict 
deductions. They are ἔλεγχοι meant to remove misconceptions and 
to bring the learner to admit what is ultimate and self-evident 
truth. 

So too with regard to the ὑποθέσεις, the assumptions of existence. 
The chief of these are the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. 
It may seem strange to describe these as assumptions of existence, 
but this is Aristotle’s way of describing them (Am, Pos/. 71213). ὅτι 
ἔστι is his way of referring to synthetic propositions, as τί ἐστι is his 
way of referring to analytic propositions. And in Book I these laws 
are treated in the way appropriate to the treatment of ἀρχαί; they are 
not demonstrated but they are commended to the mind of the reader 
by an ἔλεγχος, a pointing out of the absurd consequences of their 
denial. 

So far metaphysics is doing only the preliminary work of a science, 
the formulation and in some cases the commendation of definitions and 
hypotheses. Does it ever proceed to the main work of science, the 
drawing of conclusions from these? It seems that the answer must be 
- in the negative. The procedure throughout the Je/aphysics never 
becomes deductive; it always remains aporematic. A moment’s 
comparison of its procedure with that of geometry, for instance, will 
show the difference. Aristotle’s frequent description of metaphysics 
as the science of principles itself suggests that it is not meant to get 
beyond principles to conclusions. It may be noted that the method 
is substantially the same in nearly all Aristotle’s writings. The chief 
exception, perhaps, is the Prior Analytics; formal logic is naturally 
capable of being treated somewhat similarly to the exact sciences. In 
almost all his other works the method is the aporematic method which 
is indeed that proper to philosophy. In particular, there is no trace 
in him of the view apparently held, e.g. by Plato, that metaphysics 
can prove the principles of the special sciences, Each science starts 
with principles that are unprovable. 

Aristotle has in the main two ways of stating the subject-matter 
of metaphysics. In one set of passages it is stated as τὸ ὃν ἡ ὄν, 
the whole of being, as such. This view is expressed throughout Book I, 
and occasionally elsewhere (E. 1025 3, K. 1060} 31, 1061» 4, 26, 31); 
it is implied also in the description of σοφία as being occupied with 
the first causes and principles, sc. of reality as a whole (A. 981} 28, 


Darigel 002% 2528 253 


9829). But more frequently metaphysics is described as studying a 
certain part of reality, viz. that which is χωριστόν (exists independently) 
and ἀκίνητον, while physics studies things that are χωριστά but not 
ἀκίνητα; and mathematics things that are ἀκίνητα but not χωριστά. This 
view of the subject of metaphysics is expressed most clearly in E. 1026 
15, but is implied in such passages as K. 10644, A. 10691, Phys. 
192% 34, 1946 14, De An. 403> 15. On this view metaphysics studies 
not being as a whole but the highest kind of being, and when viewed 
in this way it may be called θεολογική (E. 1026219, K. 1064» 3). 
These two views of the business of metaphysics have been made (by 
Natorp) a ground for splitting up the We/aphysics into two. In E an 
attempt is made to reconcile the two views. The question is raised 
(1026%23) whether first philosophy is universal or deals with a 
particular class of things, and the answer is given that in studying one 
kind of being, οὐσία ἀκίνητος, it is φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως 
ὅτι πρώτη. In studying the nature of pure being, form without matter, 
philosophy is in effect coming to know the nature of being as a whole. 

Both views are genuinely Aristotelian, but the narrower view of the 
scope of metaphysics is that which is more commonly present in his 
works, and more in keeping with the distrust of a universal science 
expressed in the Posterior Analytics. 

25. For τὸ συμβεβηκός in the sense of ‘necessary attribute’ cf. 
A. 1025 30 and Bonitz, Jndex, 713» 43—714* 10. 

26-32. The argument is peculiar : 

(1) The principles we seek must belong to some φύσις in virtue of 
its own character. 

(2) The elements τῶν ὄντων sought for by our predecessors are 
the principles we seek. 

.. (3) The elements τοῦ ὄντος must be τοῦ ὄντος 7) ὄν. 

.. (from (2) and (3)). The principles we seek are τοῦ ὄντος 7 ὄν. 

26-27. ἐπεὶ δὲ. .. ζητοῦμεν. This has been established in 
Ile Wee 

27-8. Alexander, apparently reading καθ᾽ ards, thinks the clause 
means ‘clearly they must be self-subsistent causes of some kind of 
thing’. But the self-subsistence of the causes is irrelevant to the 
purpose of the chapter. Bonitz therefore rightly reads, with EJ, καθ᾽ 
αὑτήν. (The reading αὑτάς is due to the same confusion which pro- 
duced the reading atra in]. 22.) He interprets the clause, however, 
as meaning ‘clearly they must be causes of some self-subsistent kind 
of thing’. But the self-subsistence of the φύσις is equally irrelevant. 
The meaning must be ‘clearly they must be causes pertaining to some 
kind of thing in virtue of its own nature’; i.e., in point of fact, to 
being in virtue of its own nature (rod ὄντος 7 ὄν). It is not the self- 
subsistence of either the causes or the φύσις that is in point, but the 
essential relation between the two. The causes studied by the special 
sciences are ἀρχαὶ τοῦ ὄντος but not 7 ὄν; only those studied by 
metaphysics are τοῦ ὄντος 7 ὄν. 

28-32. Schwegler proposed (I. 29) τοιαύτας ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν ὡς ἀναγ- 


- 


254 COMMENTARY 


καῖον (dv?) τὰ στοιχεῖα κτλ., Omitting διό in 1]. 31. The changes would 
improve the logic of the passage but are not absolutely necessary 
and are unsupported by testimony. 


We must therefore study (1) substance—the central mode of being to 
which the other modes are related, (2) the species of being, (3) the 
species of unity, (4) the species of substance, (5) the species of plurality, 
Confirmations of the view that these form the subject of philosophical 
study (ch, 2). 


1003* 33. (1) Being has many meanings, but these are related to 
one thing, not merely equivocal (cf. the meanings of ‘healthy’ and 
‘medical’); they are all related to sawds/ance, and therefore are dealt 
with by one science. Meanings related to some one thing are ina 
sense univocal, and therefore the subject of one science. 

b16. A science deals especially with that part of its subject which is 
primary. Therefore the philosopher must grasp the principles of 
substances. 

19. (2) Of every class of things there is one sense and one science, 
e.g. the single science of grammar investigates all articulate sounds, 
Therefore a science that is one in genus will study all the species of 
being, and its species will study the several species. 

22. (3) Being and one are, like principle and cause, one not in 
definition but in that the one is predicable wherever the other is. One 
man = man, and existent man= man. ‘One exzsfenf man’ = ‘one 
man’ (being inseparable from it whether in coming to be or in ceasing 
to be), and ‘ ove existent man’ = ‘existent man’. The one is there- 
fore nothing apart from the existent. And, further, the substance of 
anything is essentially one and essentially existent. 

33. Therefore the species of unity are also the species of being, and 
will be investigated by the same science,—viz. the same, the like, and 
other such terms. Nearly all contraries can be reduced to these heads 
(sc. being and not-being, or one and many)—cf. our ‘Selection of 
Contraries’, 

1004°2. (4) There are as many parts of philosophy as there are 
kinds of substance, and one part of philosophy, as of mathematics, will 
be primary, and others derivative. 

9. (5) Unity and plurality are opposites, and opposites are dealt 
with by the same science, for light is thrown on a term by the study 
either of its negative (in which merely the absence of the term is 
indicated) or of its privative (in which a definite underlying nature 


Pr 2.51003" ——(TO0 8" 255 


is further implied), Therefore the science which discusses the species 
of unity will discuss also the species of plurality—the other, the dis- 
similar, the unequal—and therefore also contrariety, for this is a sort of 
difference and difference is a sort of otherness. 

22. These, like unity, will have different meanings, but the different 
meanings can still be discussed by one science. In each case the de- 
rivative meanings must be viewed in their relation to the central 
meaning. 

gi. In deciding that the same science will discuss substance and 
these its properties, we have solved one of our problems, It is 
characteristic of the philosopher to be able to discuss all things. Who 
else would consider such questions as, Is Socrates the same as Socrates 
sitting ? 

Ὁ 5. As the arithmetician considers number and its proper attributes, 
the philosopher considers being and its proper attributes. The 
mistake made by some people is not that they study the attributes, but 
that they ignore substance, which is prior to its attributes, 

17. That the attributes fall within the scope of philosophy is indicated 
by the fact that they are discussed by the dialectician and the sophist, 
who ape the philosopher in the generality of their discussions. 
Dialectic differs from philosophy in its method—it is critical where 
philosophy gives positive knowledge; sophistic differs in the life- 
purpose it implies—it is merely the appearance of wisdom, 

27. Of every two contraries one is privative, and all contraries can 
be referred to being or unity and its privation not-being or plurality 
(e.g. rest to unity, motion to plurality). Now almost all thinkers 
agree that existing things are composed of contraries (odd and even, 
hot and cold, limit and unlimited, friendship and strife), Since, then, 
unity and plurality are the subject of one science, being as such will be 
the subject of one science. 

1005" 6. Even if unity has many meanings, it (and its contrary) still 
have a primary meaning to which the others are related—even if unity 
is not a universal and is not separate from particular things which are 
one, but has in its meanings only a unity of reference or a serial unity. 
Therefore it is the business of the metaphysician to investigate being 
and these its properties: the geometer assumes these properties and 
considers their application in his special sphere. 

13. Clearly, then, it is the work of one science to discuss being as 
being and its essential attributes, substances and their attributes, — 
both those mentioned and others such as prior and posterior, genus 
and species, whole and part. 


2656 COMMENTARY 


1003° 33-)5. τὸ δὲ ὃν λέγεται... ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν... οὕτω δὲ 
καὶ τὸ ὃν λέγεται, a good instance of ‘binary structure’ (Riddell, Apology 
of Plato, p. 198, ὃ 209). Cf. A. 98316 ἢ. 

33. πρὸς ἕν. Terms which are πρὸς ἕν or ἀφ᾽ ἑνός or κατ᾽ 
ἀναλογίαν ἕν (Z. N. 1096 27) are intermediate between συνώνυμα, 
which are καθ᾽ ἕν and have both a common name and a common 
definition (Ca/. τὰ 6), and ὁμώνυμα, which have only a common name 
(ib. τῷ 1). ὑγιεινόν and ἰατρικόν answer to the definition of the third 
class recognized in the Cafegortes alongside of συνώνυμα and ὁμώνυμα; 
Viz. παρώνυμα, things called by a name derived from some other name 
(τὸ 12), or, to put the matter in a less purely grammatical form, things 
called by a common name and, though not having the same definition, 
yet definable by their various relations to one single thing. ‘ Being’ 
has not always the same meaning, but it is no mere accident that all 
‘beings’ are so called; all stand in some relation to οὐσία, the primary 
ὄν. Other terms which are in this respect like ‘being’ are ‘one’ 
(1. 1053 22, H. 10456, K. 1059» 33) and ‘good’ (£. WV. 1096» 27). 
Alexander (242. 5) names also figure and number. But these have 
not the wide range of the terms in question; number is contained in 
the category of quantity (Ca/. 4> 23) and figure in that of quality (ib. 
τοῦ 11). The Schoolmen grouped ens, unum, bonum with res, aliquid, 
verum as the ¢ranscendentalia. 

If we ask what reason Aristotle offers for denying that being, unity, 
and good are proper ‘ synonymous’ terms, we must turn to Β. 9989 
22, K.1059>31. Being and unity cannot be genera because no genus 
is predicable of its differentiae, while being and unity are predicable of 
all terms whatever and therefore if they were genera would be 
predicable of their differentiae. For the reasons why a genus cannot 
be predicated of its differentiae cf. B. 998> 24-26 n. 

b 5. For δέ 7 apodost after a comparison cf, Plat. Prof. 326 5, 
3284 ἢ, Meteor. 355%15, £. NV. 1094214, A. 1075210. Cf. also 
B. 999° 27 ἢ, , 

12-18. οὐ... μιᾶς, an irregular combination of the constructions οὐ 
γὰρ μόνον τῶν Kal? ἕν λεγομένων ἐπιστήμη ἔστι pia and οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ 
καθ᾽ ἕν λεγόμενα ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι μιᾶς. 

I9—1004* 31. This section consists of three sub-sections, (1) 19-36, 
in which Aristotle specifies various εἴδη οἵ τὸ ἕν which are at the same 
time εἴδη of τὸ ὄν, viz. the same, the like, &c. (36-1004* 2 is probably 
out of place, v.n. ad Joc.) ; (2) 1004* 2-9, in which he says that there 
are branches of philosophy answering to the various kinds of οὐσία, by 
which he doubtless means ‘ first philosophy’ or ‘ theology’ dealing with 
substances which are χωριστά and ἀκίνητα, and physics dealing with 
those which are χωριστά but not ἀκίνητα (ἘΠ, 1026%13—19—mathematics, 
which is there mentioned as a third, does not deal with οὐσίαι but with 
ἀχώριστα, things that have no separate existence); (3) 1004 9-31, in 
which he points out that philosophy will study the opposites of the εἴδη 
of τὸ ἕν mentioned in (1). It is obvious therefore that sub-section (2) 
breaks the continuity of the thought. Alexander wished to insert it at 


7 1003332 1003) 26 257 


1003" 22; Schwegler and Natorp, with more probability, to insert it 
al 1003? 19. 

20-22 may mean either of two things. (1) Alexander and Bonitz, 
reading τὰ δὲ εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν, take it to mean, ‘ Wherefore to study 
all the species of being as such is the work of a science generically one, 
and to study the various species is the work of its various species’. 
To this it may be objected (a) that the opposition of ὅσα εἴδη and τὰ εἴδη 
is not a good one, (6) that there is no trace elsewhere in Aristotle of 
a division of philosophy into species studying identity, likeness, &c., 
respectively, and (c) that such a division would cut clean across that re- 
ferred to in sub-section (2). Therefore (2) Schuppe, Natorp, and Apelt, 
reading with the manuscripts τά τε εἴδη τῶν εἰδῶν, translate ‘ wherefore 
to study the various species of being as such, and the species of the 
species, is the work of the same science as studies the genus’. But 
the other interpretation is very much the more natural, and the 
objections to it can easily be met. It is not, however, necessary 
to read δέ for τε. 

22. εἰ δή κτλ. The protasis extends to dv τι (33) and the apodosis 
begins irregularly with ὥστε, as often happens in Aristotle after a long 
protasis. 

23. τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις, or, as Alexander says (246. 31) κατὰ τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον, i.e. in the sense that whatever is existent is one and what- 
ever is one is existent. Such terms Alexander describes as ἑτερώνυμα, 
a word not found in Aristotle. 

24. ἀρχή and αἴτιον differ (Al. 247.15) as τὸ ἐξ οὗ and τὸ δι᾿ ὅ. 

25. οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὁμοίως (sc. ὡς τὰ ἑνὶ λόγῳ δηλούμενα) ὑπολάβωμεν, i. 6. OUF 
case is still stronger if being .and unity are πολυώνυμα (Al. 247. 27, 
cf. H/. A. 489% 2), i.e. two words which would be defined in exactly 
the same way. 

26-33. Bonitz treats ταὐτὸ... ὄν τι as defending the statement (25, 
26) that the case is still stronger if being and unity are πολυώνυμα. 
But (1) surely this needs no argument, (2) it is unlikely that Aristotle 
would devote so much space to detailing the consequences of an 
identification which he is himself far from making, and (3) if he did so 
he would almost certainly state its consequences in the future indicative 
or in the optative with ἄν, not in the present indicative, which we find 
throughout the argument in 1], 26-33. διαφέρει... μᾶλλον (25, 26) 
must therefore be taken as parenthetical, and 1], 26-33 as being aimed 
at showing that being and unity are one κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον (cf. Al. 
249. 22). 

26. 1 have restored the true reading of APT, which was evidently 
also that of Alexander, ταὐτὸ γὰρ εἷς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ dv 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος 


One man = man (τῷ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις) 
Existent man = man οὗ 9 9 
(.*. One man = existent man bs δ ” 


py One == existent " κ᾿ προ τ 
27-30. Alexander supposes Aristotle to be arguing that as ἔστιν 


2573-1 5 


258 COMMENTARY 


ἄνθρωπος avOpwros means no more than ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος (cf. Asc. 236. 
27), 80 ἔστιν dv avOpwros and ἔστιν εἷς ἄνθρωπος convey the same 
meaning as ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος and therefore as one another, i.e. everything 
that is ὄν is ἕν and everything that is ἕν is ὄν. But ἔστιν dv (or εἷς) 
ἄνθρωπος cannot be treated as really parallel to ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρω- 
πος: the latter is a mere tautology, but ὦν and εἷς differ from ἄνθρωπος 
‘in λόγος though not in ὑποκείμενον. 

One point seems to be clear. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνός implies that 
in what precedes Aristotle has spoken not of τὸ ἕν but of τὸ ὄν. None 
of the recorded readings, then, is satisfactory. We may suppose 
(1) that Aristotle wrote οὐχ ἕτερόν τι δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπαναδιπλού- 
μενον τὸ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὧν ἄνθρωπος (ὦν appears in Τ' and Syr. 
and in the quotation in Asc.), ‘Nothing is added if we repeat our- 
selves and say “he is a man and an existent man ” (it is clear that his 
humanity and his existence are not separated either in their coming to 
be or in their ceasing to be); and what we have said of existence we may 
say of unity, so that clearly the addition of “existent” and of “one” 
has the same significance’ (i.e. that of bringing out a feature already 
implied though not expressed in ‘man’), ‘and unity is nothing apart 
from existence’. 

But 11]. 27-29 are then a rather tame repetition of Il. 26-247 ταὐτὸ... dv 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, and, further, ἔστιν is somewhat suspicious ; there 
is no point in the change from the terms ‘ existent man’ and ‘man’ to 
the propositions ‘he is a man’ and ‘he is an existent man’, It 
seems better (2) to suppose that there is an ἐπαναδίπλωσις here 
additional to that in ὧν ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπος, and of this Syr.’s phrase 
εἷς ὧν ἄνθρωπος (61. 7) preserves a trace, I read therefore τὸ εἷς 
ἄνθρωπος καὶ εἷς ὧν ἄνθρωπος. ‘One existent man’ adds nothing to 
‘one man’; the two things are inseparable whether in coming to be 
or in ceasing to be; and similarly ‘ ove existent man’ adds nothing to 
‘ existent man’, 

33. The meaning of ὅπερ here is sufficiently indicated by its 
opposition to κατὰ συμβεβηκός. For an exact account of its meaning 
in Aristotle cf, Bonitz, Zudex, 533> 36 —534* 23. 

33-35. Cf. B. 995% 20-27 ἢ. 

33- τοῦ ἑνὸς εἴδη. But it must be noted that ἕν and ὄν are not really 
genera (B. 998> 22, H. 10456, I. 1053 22). 

36. καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀντικειμένων is read only by the inferior manuscripts 
S, 1b, the Aldine edition, and perhaps by Alexander (250.9). It seems, 
however, to be implied by the next sentence. But that sentence 
(1. 36-1004% 2) seriously disturbs the argument. After 1004% 2-9, 
which, as we have seen, is probably out of place, there follows an 
argument to show that the science which studies being, unity, and their 
species, must study also the opposites of these. The implication in 
1003) 36—1004"2 that it must do so is thus premature. It may 
be suggested that σχεδὸν... ἐναντίων is a mere variant of πάντα 

. ἡμῖν (1004) 33—r1005"1) wrongly inserted here, and that καὶ 
τῶν τούτοις ἀντικειμένων Was added later to lead up to these words, 


T. 2, 10035 27 — 1004? 13 250 


1004% 2. τῇ ἐκλογῇ τῶν ἐναντίων. Cf. ἐν τῇ διαιρέσει τῶν ἐναντίων 
I, 105.4% 30, and [. 1004» 34. Alexander elsewhere refers simply to 
the (now lost) De Bono (Bk. I1) for a discussion of this subject (262. 
18, 23, 615. 14, 643.2, 695. 26), but here (250.17) he supposes that 
besides the discussion in the second book of the De Bono there was 
a separate treatise entitled “ExAoyi τῶν ἐναντίων. The reference may 
not improbably be to the work περὶ ἐναντίων mentioned in the 
catalogues of Diogenes Laertius and Hesychius. For its nature see 
Rose, fr. 115-121 (= 118-124 Teubner). 

2-9. This section answers the third problem set in Book B (995" 
10-13, 997% 15-25). 

5. If we are right in supposing that 10048 2-9 should come before 
1003? 19-36, a reference to τὸ ἕν here is out of place and Natorp is 
right in excising it. ᾿ 

8. πρώτη τις, arithmetic; δευτέρα, plane geometry ; ἄλλαι ἐφεξῆς, 
solid geometry, astronomy, harmonics, &c¢. 

10. τῷ δὲ ἑνὶ ἀντίκειται πλῆθος. The recurrence of these words in 
]. 16 is suspicious. What we should expect is a general argument 
proving the major premise that one science studies opposites ; then the 
minor premise ‘ unity and plurality are opposites’; and then the con- 
clusion ‘one science studies unity and plurality’. These words, then, 
at first sight seem appropriate in 1. rr and not in]. το. Luthe there- 
fore would cut them out here. But (1) the preceding and the 
following clause do not run very naturally if taken continuously, and 
(2) it is certain that Alexander had τῷ δὲ ἑνί κτλ. in I. ro, and not 
certain that he had these words in 1. 16. It seems preferable there- 
fore to excise the words in |. τό. 

12. Schwegler’s emendation ἢ yap ἁπλῶς λέγομεν seems to be re- 
quired, though it is not clear that Alexander had not the same reading 
as our manuscripts (cf. Al. 253. 1, 6). 

18. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν κτλ, Alexander interprets (1) (253. 10), ‘ Here the 
difference, i.e. the negative, is added to “‘ one” everywhere except in the 
case of the positive term which occurs in the negation’. 1. 6. ‘not- 
one’ is true of everything except what is one. (2) (253. 16) ‘where 
the difference, i.e. the negative, is added to “one”, everything is in- 
dicated except what is denied’. In other words, the negative ‘ not- 
one’ is applicable to everything except the one, to which from its very 
form it is inapplicable. The privative of ‘one’ on the other hand, 
is applicable only to those things which, though not one, belong to the 
genus, and have the underlying nature, which is susceptible of the 
predicate ‘one’. 

These are obviously forced interpretations. The use of διαφορά for 
the negative particle would be unique; in fact διαφορά expressly implies 
a distinction within a genus and is not appropriate to bare negation 
(cf., for example, 1. 1054» 25, 1055% 26). Theuse of τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει 
for the positive term would be very strange. Further, if ἔνθα... 
πρόσεστι is taken to be a relative clause, as in Alexander’s second 
interpretation, the supplying of τὰ ἄλλα πάντα δηλοῦται With παρὰ τὸ ἐν 

5.2 


260 COMMENTARY 


τῇ ἀποφάσει is extremely difficult, not to say impossible. Bonitz avoids 
the latter difficulty by interpreting ‘here, i.e. in negation, (only) the 
difference, i.e. the negation, is present over and above what is 
comprised in the negation, i.e. the quality denied’. Thus he retains 
the objectionable interpretation of διαφορά and of τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει, 
inserts an illegitimate ‘ only’, and gives no account of τῷ ἑνί, In fact, 
on his interpretation either τῷ ἑνί or παρὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει is 
superfluous. Schwegler’s emendation παρὰ τὸ ἕν, ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει does 
not meet the difficulties. We may suggest, with some hesitation, 
that τῷ ἑνί and ἡ should be omitted, -and that the passage 
should be interpreted as follows: ‘ Here, i.e. in privation, difference 
is present over and above what is implied in bare negation; for 
negation implies the absence of the attribute in question, but in 
privation there is also an underlying nature of which the privation 
is asserted’, διαφορά is then used in its proper sense of specific 
difference within a genus as opposed to the mere ‘otherness ’ which 
subsists between a term and its bare negative. For ἔνθα μέν referring 
to the latter of two cases mentioned cf., for example, Po/. 1308? 7. 
For the absence of a clause opposed to the μέν clause cf. Waitz on 
lis 7. τατος 

Bullinger interprets ἔνθα μέν as we have done, but gives an inde- 
fensible explanation of τῷ ἑνί. 

21. διαφορά κτλ. Contrariety is μεγίστη διαφορά (1. 1055% 4), 
διαφορὰ τέλειος (1055°16'. Difference is ‘otherness which makes the 
genus itself other’ (10584 7, cf. 1054> 23-31, A. 10188 12-15). 

29. Bonitz is clearly right in taking κατηγορίᾳ to mean not 
‘category’ but ‘predicate ’—‘ in the case of each of the predicates in 
question’, 1. 6. the same, other,&c, Bullinger interprets ‘we must explain 
the term in each category by reference to its primary sense, i. e. its sense 
in the category of substance’; but the order of the words is strongly 
against this. 

30. Natorp urges that ἐκεῖνο is the subject of ἔχειν (cf. 1005% 14, 
Al. 256. 16), but it seems more likely to be object. 

83. ἕν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπορήμάσιν, viz. the fifth problem (B. 995” 18-27, 
997° 25-34). The discussion extends from 1003) 32 to 1005% 18. 

34. πάντων. Bz. understands ὅσα τῷ ὄντι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὑπάρχει, but the 
natural interpretation is quite general, ‘all things’. Cf.» 20, A. 9824 8, 

b 1-6. Cf. B. 995» 20-27 n. 

3. εἰ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον is discussed in I. 1055° 19-23, τί ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον 
in 1055*3-17, 23-33, 38-20, ποσαχῶς λέγεται in 1055* 33-38, 
b 20-25. 

25. πειραστική, i.e. it makes trial of the opinions of others (Soph. 
Lil. 171» 3-4). In Soph. El. c. 2 πειραστικοὶ λόγοι are one of the four 
kinds of of ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγοι and are distinguished from διαλεκτι- 
κοί, the latter being οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων συλλογιστικοὶ ἀντιφάσεως, the 
former οἱ ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ καὶ ἀναγκαίων εἰδέναι τῷ 
προσποιουμένῳ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην. In Soph. El. τόρ» 25, 171) 4, 
however, peirastic is treated as part of dialectic, while in 1719, 


τ 2p LOCA Sa fa 1 OOF 1.6 261 


172%21 dialectic is described as being peirastic. Thus Aristotle 
has no settled distinction between the terms, 

27. συστοιχία, οἵ, A. 986% 23 ἢ. 

831-89. ot μέν, the Pythagoreans; οἱ δὲ θερμόν, Alexander suggests 
the thinkers who generated things by μάνωσις and πύκνωσις (sc. Anaxi- 
menes)or else Parmenides. Parmenides’ ‘way of opinion’ is doubtless 
what Aristotle has in his mind, cf. A. 984» 4 n., 986» 33. 

32-33. οἱ δὲ πέρας, the Platonists ; οἱ δὲ φιλίαν, Empedocles. 

84. εἰλήφθω γάρ κτλ. Cf. ἃ 2 ἢ, 

1005* 2. εἰς γένη ταῦτα πίπτουσιν, Tor the phrase cf. A, 1013) 16, 
IN LO 15. 7, 

6. tows, cf. A. 987% 26n. 

9. ἢ χωριστόν. For this question cf, B. 996* 4-9, 1001%4-) 25, 
Z. 1040» 16-24, 1. 2, M. 1083* 20—1085°% 2, 

10. ἴσως, οἵ, A. 987% 26 ἢ. 

11-18. Cf. B. 995> 20-27 n. 

13. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. Alexander explains that the geometer does not 
speculate about the meaning of ‘ contrariety’ and the like but merely 
presupposes such terms and uses them. On this view ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐξ 
ὑποθέσεως does not mean ‘except ev Aypothest’ but ‘but only proceeds 
from the assumption of them’. This is, of course, Plato’s view of the 
relation of the sciences to philosophy. Bz, on the other hand inter- 
prets ‘except in so far as pertains to the object set before itself by 
geometry ’ (τὸ ὑποτεθὲν τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ). Alexander’s interpretation is 
amply confirmed by E. 1025) 11 ai δ᾽ (some of the sciences, which are 
there, as here, being distinguished from philosophy) ὑπόθεσιν λαβοῦσαι 
τὸ τί ἐστιν. For the use of ἀλλ᾽ ἤ οἵ, Ζ. 1038" 14 ἢ, 

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κτλ. Aristotle has now answered the fifth of the © 
problems in Book B (995? 18-27, 997" 25-34). 

16. τῶν... εἰρημένων, i.e. ‘contrary’, ‘perfect’, ‘real’, ‘one’, ‘the 
same’, ‘other’, mentioned in]. 12. Thus the things which were in 
1003 21-36 treated as εἴδη τοῦ ὄντος are now (presumably to avoid 
clashing with the division of τὸ ὄν into the categories) described as 
attributes of being or of substance. 


We must study also the axioms and, primarily, the law of contradiction 
(ch. 3). 


1005*1g9. The philosopher must also consider the things that are 
in mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things— 
of being as being. They are used in the special sciences in so far as 
they apply to the special subjects. 

29. No special science inquires into their truth; some physicists 


202000 COMMENTARY 


have done so, and. naturally enough, because they thought they were 
inquiring into being in general. But since there is some one who 
stands higher than the physicist, it belongs to him—the student of the 
universal and of primary substance—to investigate the axioms. Physics 
is a form of philosophy, but not the primary form. 

bg, The essays of some people at determining the conditions under 
which statements should be accepted as truth are due to ignorance of 
logic, which should be learned before one approaches the study of any 
science. 

5. It belongs to the philosopher, then, to study the starting-points 
of syllogism. He who knows most about a genus must be able to 
state the best-established principles of the genus, and therefore the 
philosopher must be able to state the best established of all principles, 
i.e. those about which one cannot be deceived, which are best known 
and rest on no hypothesis, and which must be known if one is to 
know anything. 

18. The best established of all principles is that the same attribute 
cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in 
the same respect—with any qualifications which may be “necessary in 
order to guard against objections. This corresponds to the definition 
of the best-established principle. For no one can suppose the same 
thing to be and not to be—the alleged doctrine of Heraclitus. 

25. For a man need not believe everything that he says; if 
contrary attributes cannot attach to the same subject, and any 
belief is, as an attribute of the thinker, contrary to the contradictory 
belief, obviously no one can at the same time believe the same thing 
to be and not to be. And therefore every one in argument falls back 
on this ultimate law, on which even the other axioms rest. 


In this chapter Aristotle discusses the second of the problems in 
Book B (995 6-10, 996” 26—997* 15). 

1005* 20, τῶν... ἀξιωμάτων. ‘The only axioms or κοιναὶ ἀρχαί dis- 
cussed by Aristotle in this book are the laws of contradiction and of 
excluded middle; but the principle that if equals be taken from equals 
equals remain is included among the axioms in K. 1061» 20, An. Post. 
762 41, > 20, 77% 30. This principle is strictly of a sort intermediate 
between κοιναί and ἴδιαι ἀρχαί, for, while extending beyond the bounds 
of any one science, it does not extend beyond the sciences of quantity, 
since equality is a proprium of quantity (Cas. 64 26, cf, A. 10214 12), 

31. τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, presumably thinkers who developed the 
sceptical elements in Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Demo- 
critus. Cf, 10062. 

ba-5, Alexander would place this sentence after δῆλον, |. 8, arguing 
that it has more affinity with what follows (cf 1. 5 with 1.17) But 


lr. 32 1005% 20 — 1005) 14 263 


as Bz. points out it connects directly with what has been said in 
* 29-31 and is quite in place. 

Certain persons had evidently introduced into discussions of ἡ ἀλήθεια, 
i.e. of the ultimate nature of reality (cf. A. 983> 2 n.), an inquiry 
into the conditions under which beliefs are to be accepted as true. 
This question, Aristotle points out, should not be mixed up with 
questions about the nature of reality. It belongs to logic, which you 
should study before you approach such questions. And if you study 
it you will learn that proof should not be always expected, that there 
are ἀρχαί which neither need it nor admit of it (1006 5-8, cf. 
Am Post. 1.3). 

Antisthenes is perhaps referred to here and in 1006* 5-8 (where the 
word ἀπαιδευσία recurs), 1009 20-22, ΤΟΙ 7-13, ror2%21. Cf. 
H. 1043? 24 οἱ ᾿Αντισθένειοι καὶ of οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι, A. 1024> 32 
᾿Αντισθένης wero εὐήθως. τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας may be 
an allusion to his book called ᾿Αλήθεια. Aristotle’s refutation of these 
thinkers turns on the necessity of a fixed meaning for ὀνόματα (ch. 4), 
and is described as ἔλεγχος . .. τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου καὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς 
ὀνόμασιν (L009 21}: this recalls the saying of Antisthenes ἀρχὴ παιδεύ- 
σεως ἣ TOV ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις. Further, Antisthenes’ theory implied 
that ‘there is no such thing as contradiction or (we may almost say) 
as falsehood’ (A. 1024) 34), so that he would naturally be referred to 
in 1006* 5-8 among the opponents of the law of contradiction. 

These arguments for supposing Antisthenes to be referred to are 
stated by Maier (Sy//. d. Ar. ii. 2.15 ἢ. 2). Maier seems to follow 
Diimmler too readily in scenting allusions to Antisthenes in Plato. 
Bz. thinks that the τινές here referred to are the τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι of 
ἃ 41, and if so the reference cannot be to Antisthenes. But it is 
equally possible that others besides the physicists had discussed the 
apxat of knowledge. 

8. Aristotle has now answered the second problem raised in Book B, 
whether metaphysics should study the axioms. He now proceeds to 
show what the chief of the axioms is, to refute its opponents, and 
to indicate the reasons that led to their opposition. Cf. the summary 
in rorz> 13-15. 

14. ἀνυπόθετον is used quite in the Platonic sense of the word. With 
this we may compare Aristotle’s use of ὑπόθεσις as synonymous with 
συνθήκη (An. Pr. 502 τό, 18, ZV. 1133* 29, " 21), and the common 
use of ἐξ ὑποθέσεως where it is often implied that the premise is not 
known but merely assumed, ‘This has to be distinguished from two 
other senses of ὑπόθεσις, (1) quite general = ἀρχή, cf. Jud. Ar. 796 59— 
797% 15, (2) technical = the assumption of the existence of one of the 
primary objects of the science one is studying, An. Post. 72% 20. 
ὑπόθεσις in the latter sense has this in common with the sort of 
hypothesis Aristotle has in mind here, that it is not a necessary 
preliminary to all knowledge (cf. 1005” 15 with Av. Post, 72% 14-21) ; 
but it is a necessary preliminary to the knowledge of the particular 
science to which it belongs. 


264 COMMENTARY 


1g. It is to be noticed that the law of contradiction is for Aristotle 
primarily a law of being, ‘the same attribute cannot at the same 
time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same 
respect’, 

25. Ἡράκλειτον. For his doctrine cf. roro* 10, 1012%24, 34, 
K, τού 32, 1063) 24. 

οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον κτλ. Aristotle is not accusing Heraclitus of 
insincerity, but suggesting that he did not express his meaning exactly, 
or did not understand the full meaning of the words he used. Cf. 
Κ. 1062 34, 

26-32. Aristotle here restates the law of contradiction in a new 
form, ‘ contrary attributes cannot at the same time belong to the same 
subject’ (contrast 1. 19 n.). The connexion between the two forms 
is established in rorr» 15-22. Meantime the new form of the law of 
being is made the basis of a law of thought, ‘the same man cannot at 
the same time suppose the same thing to be and not to be’, the holding 
of contrary suppositions being an instance of the having of contrary 
attributes, 


The law of contradiction established by pointing out the difficulties 
involved in tts denial (ch. 4). 

1005” 35. There are some—e.g. many physicists—who say (1) 
that the same thing can be and not be, and (2) that it can be 
judged both to be and not to be. We have (1) assumed that a 
thing cannot both be and not be, and (2) shown this to be the least 
dubitable of all principles. 

1006# 5. The demand that we should prove the law argues a lack 
of education ; the educated man knows what should be proved and 
what should not. The attempt to prove everything leads to an 
infinite regress, and nothing can be suggested which is fitter than this 
law to be an indemonstrable principle. 

11. It is possible to prove the law by refuting our opponent, if he 
will but say something. If he will not, he need not be argued with 
and is no better than a vegetable. If one used demonstration one 
might be thought to be begging the question; when our opponent 
himself assumes the point we are arguing for, there is proof by way of 
refutation, not of demonstration. 

18. We begin by assuming not that our opponent must affirm or 
deny something (which might be thought a pefitio principi), but that 
he means something (if he does not he cannot have intelligent inter- 
course with himself, nor with any one else). If this be granted, we 
can go on to argue, for we have a fixed point,—and the responsibility 
rests with our opponent, And he who grants this grants that some- 
thing is true though unproved. 


Γ. 3. 1005 19-32 265 


First Proof. 


28, (1) The words ‘is’ and ‘is not’ have a definite meaning, so 
that not everything is ‘so and not so’. (2) ‘Man’ means some one 
thing ; let this be ‘two-footed animal’. In meaning one thing it is 
implied that if ‘man’ means so-and-so, then if A is a man, so-and-so 
is what being a man means for A. 

84. It does not matter if a word has several meanings, if only they 
are limited in number ; for a separate word might be assigned to each 
meaning. If the meanings are unlimited, no account can be given of 
the thing. Not to mean one thing is to mean nothing, and if words 
mean nothing rational intercourse with others is destroyed, and even 
with oneself, for if we do not think one thing we do not think at all. 

biz. Let us assume, then, that words have one definite meaning. 

13. (3) ‘ Being man’, then, does not mean the same as ‘not being 
man’, if ‘man’ not only signifies something about one subject but 
has one meaning. 

15. (If signifying something about one thing were the same as having 
one meaning, ‘musical’, ‘ white’, and ‘man’ would mean -the same 
thing, and all things would be one—the same thing called by different 
names.) 

18. It will not be possible to be and not be the same thing, except 
by equivocation, just as that which I call man, others may call not- 
man. The question, however, is whether the same thing can be man 
and not man actually, not verbally. 

22. If ‘man’ means the same as ‘not-man’, ‘ being man’ is ‘ being 
not-man’, ‘Being man’ and ‘being not-man’ will be, like ‘garments’ 
and ‘clothes’, two expressions for the same meaning. But it has 
been shown that the meanings are different. Ἐ 

28. According to the above definition, if anything is a man it is 
necessarily a two-footed animal; and then it is impossible for it not to 
be a two-footed animal, for necessity means just the impossibility of the 
opposite. It cannot, therefore, be true to say that the same thing is 
and is not a man, 

34. (4) As ‘being man’ has a fixed meaning, so has ‘not being 
man’. If ‘ being.white’ and ‘being man’ are different in meaning, 
‘being man’ and ‘ being not-man’ are much more different. If, then, 
opposites are one, all things are one, and as all things are not one our 
point is proved, if our opponent will only answer our question, 

1007" 8. If he answers ‘A is B and not B’, he is not answering 
the question. The same thing may be man and white and many 
other things, but if I ask whether it is man, I ought not to get the 


266 COMMENTARY 


answer, ‘ Yes—and white and tall’. The accidental attributes are 
innumerable—let a man name either all or none of them. And 
similarly even if the same thing were man and not-man, my opponent 
should not add ‘and not-man’ any more than he should add the other 
accidental attributes. 

20. Our opponents are really making away with substance and 
essence. They must say that all attributes are accidental. For if 
there is such a thing as being essentially a man, this will not = being 
not-man or not being man,—yet these are its contradictories. To 
signify the substance of a thing means just that the essence of the 
thing is nothing else; but if the thing’s being A = not being A, or 
being not A, its essence zez// be something else. Our opponents must 
therefore say that nothing can be defined—that all attributes are 
accidental. The distinction between substance and accident is just this : 
whiteness is accidental to man because he is not essentially white. 

33. But if all things are accidental, there will be no original 
substratum for accidents to inhere in. ‘This means an infinite regress, 
which is impossible because not more than two accidents can be 
combined, (a) An accident can be an accident of an accident, only 
if both are accidents of the same subject. The white can be musical, 
and the musical white, because man is both. But (2) ‘ musical’ is an 
accident of Socrates, not in the sense that both are accidents of 
something else. These are the two sorts of accidental proposition. 
But we cannot go on to say that something else is ‘an accident, in the 
second sense, of white Socrates,—for such a collection of attributes 
makes no unity. Nor, in the first sense, is ‘ musical’ really an accident 
of ‘ white’, for it is no more so than ‘ white’ is an accident of ‘ musical’. 
Thus in either case we are brought back to substance ; but we have 
shown that if there is such a thing as substance, the law of contradiction 
is true. 

Second Proof. 

b18. If all contradictories are compatible, all things will be one. 
The same thing will be both ship and wall and man, if we can in- 
differently either assert or deny a predicate of any subject, as the 
Protagoreans must admit. For, according to them, if any one thinks 
the man is not a ship he is not, and therefore (if contradictories are 
both true) is, a ship. This lands us in Anaxagoras’ ‘all things 
together’; these thinkers seem to be speaking of the indeterminate— 
that which exists only potentially; in fact, that which is not, instead 
of that which is. 

29. But they mus/ admit that any predicate may be affirmed and 
denied of any subject. For if not-A is predicable of A, not-B will 


Γ. 4. 10072— τοοῦ" 267 


a fortiort be predicable of A. If, then, A is B, it is also not-B; and 
if it is not B, it must be not-B more than it is not-A. Since, then, 
A zs not-A, it is @ fortior7 not-B, and therefore B. 


Third Proof. 

1008* 2. Our opponents will have to deny the law of excluded 
middle. For if A is man and not-man, it will also be neither 
man nor not-man, whether we treat this as two propositions contra- 
dictory of the former two, or as one contradictory of the former one. 


Lourth Proof. 


4. Their denial of the law of contradiction must be either total or 
partial. (1) If partial, the exceptional cases are admitted to have an 
attribute and not its contradictory. 

12. (2) If total, then (4) where we may affirm we may deny, but 
where we may deny we may not always affirm—in which case there 
is something which definitely is not; and if something is known not 
to be, the opposite affirmation will be still better known. 

18. Or else (ὁ) where we may affirm we may deny, and where we 
may deny we may affirm. ‘Then either (i) we may not say separately 
‘Ais B’ and ‘Ais not B’,—but then our opponent is not saying 
what he professes to say, and ultimately nothing is; how then can he 
talk or walk? And it follows also that all things will be one—the 
same thing will be man, god, ship, and the contradictories of these. 

27. Or else (ii) we can say separately that ‘A is B’ and ‘A is not 
B’—in which case again all things are indistinguishable, and, further, 
all statements are true and all are untrue, and our opponent admits 
his own statement to be untrue. And clearly argument is useless 
with such an opponent, who will say nothing definite. 


Lifth Proof, 


34. If where affirmation is true negation is false, and vzce versa, the 
same thing cannot at the same time be truly affirmed and denied. 
But this might be called a pefitio principit. 


Sixth Proof. 
be, Are the judgements ‘A is B’ and ‘ A is not B’ false, but the 
judgement ‘A is B and not B’ true? (1) If this statement is true, what 
is the meaning of saying that the nature of things is such? (2) If this 
statement is false, but less false than the other two, then things are to 
this extent determinate—this judgement at least is true and not false. 


268 COMMENTARY 


(3) If all judgements are alike false and true, he who thinks so can say 
nothing, and is no better than a vegetable. 

12. From this point of view it is easy to see that no one really is in 
this state of mind. Why does one walk to Megara and not remain 
at rest, when one thinks one ought to walk there? Clearly we judge 
one thing, 6. g. to see a man, to be better, another to be worse. And 
if so, we must judge one thing to be a man, another not to be a man, 
and so on. The practice of our opponents refutes their theory ; 
practical judgements at least do not obey their rule. 

27. If they say that they do not know but merely think some things 
to be better, and others worse, they should be all the more careful about 
the truth, as a sickly man must be more careful than a healthy one, 


Seventh Proof. 


gi. Even if every A is both B and not B, there is a more and a less 
in the nature of things; three is at least not as even as two. The 
statement which is less false is more true, and there must be some 
truth which it is nearer. Even if there is not, we have at least got rid 
of the extreme view which would make definite thought impossible. 


1005 35. Maier, Syllogzsték des Artsfoteles, ii. 2. 7. τὰς 1, tries to show 
by a comparison of 1006 15-17, 10074 10-14 with Simpl. in Phys. 
120. 12 ff., that the Megaric school among others is referred to, but 
the evidence is not definite enough, though the suggestion is highly 
probable, 

αὐτοί te. These words, which are excised by Christ, are quite in 
place. ‘There are some who both themselves say that the same thing 
can be and not be, and say that it is possible to judge so.’ Le. they 
maintain the possibility of contradiction-(1) in fact—‘ A may be both 
B and not B’, and (2) in belief—‘a man may judge that A is B and 
also that A is not B’. 

1006% 2, πολλοὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως, e.g. Heraclitus (1012%24, 34) 
and the Heracliteans (τοιοῦ ro), Empedocles (1009 15), Anaxagoras 
(10098 27, ἢ 25), Democritus (1009 27, P 11, 15). 

4. διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν refers to too5h 22-32; the law of thought 
has been proved from the law of being. 

5-8. Cf. 10055 2-5 ἢ. 

6. ἀπαιδευσίαν, sc. τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, Cf. 1005? 3. 

13. γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον κτλ. ‘It is absurd to seek to give an 
account of our views to one who cannot give an account of anything.’ 

26-28. The whole sentence is excised by Bz., on the assumption 
that there is no trace of it in Alexander’s commentary. But 6 τοῦτο 
συγχωρῶν, Tov ἅπαξ συγχωρήσαντα τοῦτο (Al. 275. 2, 6) refer to it. 
Only the last clause, of which there is no trace in Alexander, should 
be omitted, as an intruder from 1. 30. 


lr. 4. 1005 35 — 1006) 22 269 


28. Aristotle has shown in 1, 21 that all judgement must have 
meaning. Coming to details, he now begins by pointing out that 
the ‘is’ or ‘is not’ in a judgement must mean something. (Alexander 
takes τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι to be thus explicative of τὸ ὄνομα. An equally 
good sense can be got by taking τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι τοδί to be ule 
object of σημαίνει.) Next (1. 31) he goes on to the predicate, e. 
‘man’, and points out that it too must have meaning. 

82. εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν κτλ. ‘If “man” means X, then if anything is 
a man, its being man will be being X,’ 

bya. κατ᾽ ἀρχάς, * 21, 31. 

15. Having one signification is not the same thing as signifying 
something about one subject. If it were, ‘musical’, ‘white’, and 
‘man’ would have one signification, so that all things would be one; 
for they would be συνώνυμα. In spite of Bz,, Alexander must be 
right in saying (280. 19) that συνώνυμα is used in the sense of 
πολυώνυμα (for which cf, 37. .44. 489% 2). What is συνώνυμον, strictly 
speaking, has a single name as well as a single definition (Ca/. τὰ 6) ; 
but, the singleness of the definition being the important thing, which 
distinguishes συνώνυμα from ὁμώνυμα, Aristotle uses the word here 
even of things which have one definition but different names, Cf, 
Top. 162 37, 167% 24, Rhet. 1.405% 1, 

18, καὶ οὐκ ἔσται κτλ,, ‘and it will not be possible to be and not be 
the same thing’. 

22-28. It is hard to see the point of this section, and it comes near 
to reasoning in a circle. Alexander feels a difficulty, and Suggests 
that ὥστ᾽ ἔσται κτλ. |, 24 follows in sense either on ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα 
1, 22 or on ἄλλοι μὴ ἄνθρωπον καλοῖεν 1. 20, the intervening words 
being parenthetical. Neither of these suggestions appears to help the 
sense. In εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει ἔτερον τὸ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μὴ ἄνθρωπος, 
Aristotle seems to be pursuing the suggestion in]. 19 of an equivocation 
in the meaning of ‘man’ whereby what A calls ‘man’, B calls 
‘not-man’, If there is such an equivocation, he now proceeds, —if 
‘man’ means nothing other than ‘not-man’, clearly ‘not being man’ 
will mean nothing other than ‘being man’, so that ‘being man’ will 
be ‘being not-man’; for they will be one. For this is what being 
one means—being like ‘garment’ and ‘cloak’, i.e. two names the 
account (or meaning) of which is one ; and if ‘being man’ and ‘ being 
not-man’ are to de one, they will have to mean one thing. | But it had 
been shown that they mean different things’ (se. i in 11. rr—-15, where 
the difference in meaning between ‘ being man’ and ‘not being man’ 
was inferred from the necessity of there being a single meaning for 
*man’), so that we need not consider further the consequences of the 
hypothesis that ‘man’ and ‘not-man’ are two names for the same 
thing. 

In Il. 24, 25 Aristotle says that the identity (i.e. identity in meaning) 
of being man and being not-man would follow from their being one. 
He defends this in 1], 25-28. τὸ μουσικόν, τὸ λευκόν, and ἄνθρωπος are 
one in a sense (i.e. they are predicable of one subject) and yet are not 


270 COMMENTARY 


identical in meaning. But this sense of being one has been rejected 
(Il. 15-18). Being one is to mean having one meaning (Il. 25-27), 
and therefore if being-man and being-not-man are one, they will be 
identical in meaning. 

26. λώπιον does not seem to be found before Aristotle; it is 
a diminutive of the poetical words Ady, λῶπος (cf. λωποδύτης). 

27. σημανεῖ seems to have been read by Alexander (ἕν ἔσται onpai- 
vovta 281. 25) and to be required by the sense and the idiom. 

30. ἐσήμαινε, ‘was assumed to mean’, sc. in ® 32. 

34. Aristotle passes from his argument derived from the necessity 
of a fixed meanitig for ‘ being man’ to one derived from the necessity 
of a fixed meaning for ‘not being man’ or ‘being not-man’. Christ 
thinks that the notion now referred to must be definitely the latter of 
these two, ‘being not-man’, and accordingly reads μὴ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι 
in 100721. -But, though Aristotle recognizes the verbal difference 
between μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ and μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι, he evidently treats 
them as logically equivalent (10074 24, 28, and cf. 100625 with 
1006) 13, 21, 24, 34). When he wishes to compare the relation 
of the positive to the negative notion with the relation of τὸ λευκὸν 
εἶναι to τὸ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι he naturally passes (1007* 2) to the form τὸ 
μὴ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. 

ΙΟΟ 6. πρότερον ἐλέχθη, 1006? 17. 

80. τοιοῦτος λόγος, i.e. οὐσιώδης λόγος (Alexander 287. 7). 

34. Alexander’s conjecture καθ᾽ οὗ for καθόλου is plainly nght. The 
same emendation should be made in @. 1049% 28. If all things are 
accidental, there will be no first thing which is the subject, since the 
accidental always means the predication of something about a subject. 

bg. ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω, in the direction of the predicate. 

10. οὐ yap γίγνεταί τι ἕν ἐξ ἁπάντων, i.e. ‘Socrates, who is white, 
is also a and ὁ and ¢, and so ad ¢nfinitum’ is not really a single 
statement at all. 

16. ἔσται ἄρα τι κτλ., ‘even if we start with accidental predication, 
we come to something that signifres substance’. In the vulgate read- 
ing καὶ ὡς οὐσίαν σημαῖνον, ὡς is superfluous. I have therefore read 
καὶ ws, ‘even so’, Cf. De Caelo 302» 24, De Sensu 444 5, and D. G.C. 
329 3, where Prof. Joachim has made the same correction. 

17. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο κτλ. ‘ But we have shown that if this is so, contra- 
dictories cannot be predicated at the same time.’ The original proof 
in 1006% 28—1007 20 depended on the assumption that there is some- 
thing which each term essentially means, that there is an ‘essence of 
man’, &c. Now the opponents of the law of contradiction deny the 
existence of essence; they say that ‘A is B’ always means ‘ A happens 
to be B’. Aristotle has therefore had to show (1007 33— 17) that 
this view is incorrect, and has thus supplied the link which was 
necessary in order to make the original proof complete. 

23-25. εἰ γάρ κτλ. ‘This is not meant to prove that followers of 
Protagoras must admit that contradictories are compatible. That 
they do so is assumed here (εἴπερ ἡ ἀντίφασις ἀληθής); that they 


Tr. 4. 1006 26 — 1008? 2 27K 


must do so is proved in ch. 5. The present sentence shows that 7. 
they do so they must make ‘all things one’. 

25. kai γίγνεται δή κτλ. The phrase is borrowed from Phaedo 72¢ 
ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ ᾿Αναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Cf. fr. 1 
of Anaxagoras (Diels), 

28. ‘For it is that which is potentially and not actually that is 
indeterminate. 1,6. A cannot be actually both B and not B, 
but may be potentially both B and not B. It is only that in which 
Opposite actualities are still latent that can truly be said to be 
(potentially) each of two opposites, or to be indeterminate. 

29. ἀλλὰ μὴν λεκτέον γ᾽ κτλ, Cf. M. 10828 1-15 ἢ. 

33. The logic of the passage requires Ab’s reading ἢ τριήρης ἢ οὐ 
τριήρης. The vulgate reading is due to homoioteleuton. 

1008*1g. We may place a comma either (with Alexander and Bonitz) 
after or (with Bekker and Christ) before ἀνάγκη. In ll. 13-15 the 
word to be understood with the infinitives is not ἀνάγκη but ἔστιν, ‘it 
is possible’, and we should expect φάναι to be in the same con- 
struction here and ἀνάγκη to go with what follows, But if it does, 
ἀληθὲς διαιροῦντα λέγειν must be construed differently in ll. 19, 21. 
In 1. το the construction will be ‘one must either be saying what is 
true when one divides’; in 1. 21 ‘if it is not trué to speak dividing’ ; 
i.e. asserting ‘A is B’ and ‘A is not B’ separately. This objection 
is less serious than the objection to taking ἀνάγκη with φάναι. 

21. οὐ λέγει te ταῦτα, ‘he does not say what he professes to say’. 

23. πρότερον εἴρηται, 1006 17, 10072 6. 

ZI. οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως, a reminiscence of Theae?. 183 a. 

b2. The question is, ‘Is the man who thinks either that A is B, or 
that A is not B, wrong, but the man who thinks both right?’ 
According to the reading of A and Alexander, two alternatives are 
suggested in ll. 3-7: (1) If the latter is not right, what is meant by 
saying ‘such is the nature of things’? Surely this view means that 
things have zo nature. (2) If he is not right, but more right than the 
man who thinks that A is B or that A is not B, then a determinate 
character is already assigned to things. 

The obvious third possibility, that the man who thinks both 7s 
right, is omitted, and the omission is unaccountable. Alexander twice 
(297. 33, 298. 6) introduces this possibility, but it is not clear that he 
had it in his text. 

If we follow the reading of EJ, the two alternatives mentioned are: 
(1) If the man who thinks both is right, what is meant by saying that 
such is the nature of things? (2) If he is not right, but the man who 
thinks definitely that A is B or that A is not B is more right, a deter- 
minate nature is already assigned to things. 

This can hardly be the meaning. The second alternative is just 
that which Aristotle’s opponents would not admit, so that no statement 
of the consequences of it has any force as against them, One may 
feel sure at any rate that 7 in |. 5 is needed. On the other hand EJ 
are probably right in not reading μή in 1. 3. Without μή the sentence 


272 COMMENTARY 


may be interpreted in either of two ways. ‘What is meant by saying 
that the nature of things is such?’ I.e. (1) what intelligible account 
can be given of a state of things in which, whatever A and B ar e, the 
only truth is “A is both B and not B’? Or, (2) they have no right to 
say that the nature of things is such as they describe it, for it 
will be true only to say that it both is and is not such. 

15. I have restored the reading of AP and Alexander, βαδίζειν 
δεῖν. The point is, as the corresponding instance of the precipice 
shows, not that a man cannot think both that he is walking to Megara 
and that he is not, but that he cannot think both that he ought to 
walk to Megara and that he ought not. 

ἕωθεν is bracketed by Christ as due to diltography of εὐθέως, but 
may be defended by reference to νύκτωρ ro1o’ ro. In both cases 
Aristotle seems to be thinking of people who may dream something 
foolish but do. not act on it when they wake up. 

19-27. The admission of objective truth in judgements of value, 
Aristotle contends, involves the admission of objective truth in judge- 
ments of fact. ‘There is no sense in saying that ‘it would be a good 
thing to see a man’ is objectively true, if everything that is a man can 
with equal truth be said not to be a man. Judgements of value are 
meaningless apart from judgements of fact. 

Further, people’s actions show that they ascribe objective truth to 
judgements of value, and therefore also to judgements of fact. 

27. ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ χεῖρον, a reminiscence of Zheae/. 171 R— 
172 B. 


Refulation of the argumen!s for the denial of the law of contradiction, 
and for asserting that all appearances are true (ch. 5). 


1009'°6. The denial of the law of contradiction stands or falls with 
the theory of Protagoras. (1) If everything that is thought is true, 
every statement must be both true and false, for many people make 
contrary judgements and each believes the other to be wrong. And 
(2) if everything both is and is not, all opinions must be true, for the 
opinions people hold are opposite to one another. 

16. Those who are led to this view by real difficulties can easily 
be cured, because it is their way of thinking and not their arguments 
that we must meet; those who argue for the sake of argument can 
only be cured by refuting their very words, 

22. (1) For the former, the view that contradictories are alike true 
arises from observation of the fact that in the sensible world contraries 
come from the same thing. If that which is not cannot come to be, 
the thing must have previously had both the contrary qualities—cf. the 
‘everything in everything’ of Anaxagoras and Democritus. 


80. We shall reply that (a) they are in a sense right, but also in 


- 


Γ, 4. 1008) 15-27 273 


a sense wrong because they forget that being has two senses. The 
same thing is potentially, but not actually, possessed of contrary 
qualities. (4) We shall ask them to admit another kind of substance, 
which is unchangeable. 


38. (2) The belief that all appearances are true comes also, to some 
people, from observation of the sensible world. (a) Truth, they think, 
should not be tested by merely counting heads, and people have 
contrary opinions, so that if the majority were ill or mad, the healthy 
or sane minority would (if counting heads were decisive) be judged to 
be ill or mad. 


by, (6) Again, the sensations of other animals conflict with ours, 
and a man’s own sensations vary with time, and there is no reason for 
calling one truer than another. Cf. Democritus. 

12, (c) They identify thought with sensation, and sensation with 
physical impression. This view is found in Empedocles, Democritus, 
Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and even (it is said) in Homer. If the great 
masters are so sceptical about truth, the beginner may well despair. 

to1o*1, The ground of this opinion is the identification of reality 
with the sensible world, in which there is much of the indeterminate. 
These thinkers reflected that the sensible world is always changing, 
and that about the changing nothing true can be said. Hence the 
extreme view of the Heracliteans like Cratylus, who would not commit 
himself to saying anything at all, and held that so far from entering 
the same river twice, one cannot enter it even once, 

15. We answer: (a) It is not so certain that the changing, when it 
is changing, is not. That which is losing an attribute still has some- 
thing of what it loses ; of that which is coming to be, something must 
already be. If something is perishing, there must ὅδ something which 
perishes, and if something is coming to be, there must Je something 
out of which, and something by whose agency, it comes to be. 

22. (4) Qualitative change is different from quantitative. Quantity 
may be always changing, but it is in respect of their quality that we 
know things. 

25. (c) It is only a small part—the part that immediately surrounds 
us—even of the sensible world that exhibits constant change; it would 
be more reasonable to deny change of the universe because the greater 
part is unchanging, 

82. (4) We must try to convince these thinkers too that there is an 
unchanging reality. After all, those who deny the law of contradiction 
imply that all things are at rest rather than in motion, for if all things 
have already all attributes there is nothing for them to change to, 

2573-1 it 


274 COMMENTARY 


Further arguments against the Protagorean view. 


θα, (a) Even if the senses cannot be deceived about their special 
objects, imagination is not the same thing as sensation. 

8. (6) Surely people cannot really feel doubtful whether things are 
such as they appear at a distance or near at hand, to the sick or to 
the healthy, the weak or the strong, the sleeping or the waking. 
᾿ For (i) people do not as a matter of fact put their dreaming fancies 
into action. 

11. (ii) Regarding the future, as Plato says, the opinion of the man 
who knows and that of the Jayman are not equally valid. 

14. (iii) The opinion with which a sense furnishes us about its own 
object is more valid than that which it suggests regarding the object 
of another (even a kindred) sense. No sense contradicts itself at the 
same moment about the same object, nor at different moments with 
regard to the actual sensation, but only with regard to the object. 
A wine may taste sweet at one time and not at another, if it or the 
taster has changed, but sweetness is always the same definite character, 
which everything that is to be sweet must mecessarzly possess. But 
these theories destroy necessity as they destroy substance. 

30. (c) In general, if only the perceptible exists, there would be 
nothing if there were not living beings; for there would be no 
sensation. But there must be, independent of sensation, substrata 
which cause the sensation; for sensation is not its own object, and 
there must be something prior to sensation, for the mover is prior to 
the moved. The fact that sentient being and semswm are correlative 
makes no difference to the argument. 


100Q° 7. εἴτε is answered by καὶ εἰ |. 12. 

18. Bias. This means intellectual, not physical compulsion. Cf. 
rorm15 and Zop. 105° 16 ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον... ὃ δὲ 
συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον. 

20-22. Cf. 1005” 2-- ἢ. 

21. The sense demands that ἴασις shall go with τούτων and ἔλεγχος 
with τοῦ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ λόγου, and Alexander (303. 14) takes the words so. 

21-22, τοῦ ἐν TH φωνῇ λόγου and τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν are alternative 
ways of speaking of the same thing; 7’ therefore is to be omitted, with 
A> and apparently Alexander (303. 12). 

34. οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ὄν would have to mean ‘not according to the 
same sense of “being” ’. But it is doubtful Greek for this. Alexander 
seems to have read κατὰ ταὐτό" ὃν δυνάμει κτλ. (304. 20-22), but it is 
better to treat ὄν as an emblema, 


87. ἄλλην τινὰ οὐσίαν κτὰ. ‘Another substance is contained among 
existing things.’ 


Γ, 5. 100g® 7 — 1009? 30 275 


bY. ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια, ‘the “truth in appearances” 
doctrine’. 

11-33. Bonitz argues that Aristotle attaches too much importance to 
isolated phrases of the early thinkers. Certainly neither Empedocles 
nor Democritus nor Parmenides nor Anaxagoras can fairly be charged 
with consistent sensationalism. Empedocles’ denial of the reality of 
generation and destruction ; Democritus’ denial of the reality of the 
secondary qualities ; Parmenides’ antithesis between the way of truth 
and the way of opinion (it is from the latter that the passage quoted 
from him comes) are sufficient evidence of a rationalistic strain in them ; 
and as for Anaxagoras, all that Aristotle cites against him is a traditional 
obiter dictum, itself capable of a harmless enough interpretation. They 
did not deliberately identify thought with sensation, but in their time 
the two things had not been clearly distinguished, so that it was im- 
possible for them to be definitely either rationalists or sensationalists. 

18. τὴν ἕξιν, clearly ‘their bodily state’, and παρεόν, ‘the object 
present to sense’ (so Al. 263. 7, Phil. in De An. 485. 24); only 
thus can the identification of φρόνησις with ἀλλοίωσις be established. 
But Empedocles failed to distinguish, rather than expressly identified 
them, Diels’s translation of πρὸς παρεόν, ‘nach dem jeweiligen 
korperlichen Verhiltnis ’ (Emp. fr. 106), is less likely to be right. 

20-21. ὅσσον... παρίστατο = fr, 108. 

22-25. Theophr. De Sensu 3 quotes this fragment(fr. 16) in the form 


ε Ν ε / Ἄς δῇ. A / / 
ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ᾽ ἔχειν κρᾶσιν μελέων πολυπλάγκτων, 
τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν. 


Aristotle is probably as usual quoting from memory, but his 
παρίστᾶται (for which Diels compares ἔρᾶσαι Theocr. 1. 78, ἔρᾶται 
ib. 2. 149, Sappho fr. 13) is more likely to be the original form than 
the easier παρέστηκεν. I have restored ἑκάστοτ᾽, the best attested 
reading (EJ Theophr.). 

25. τὸ yap πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα. πλέον in the other passage of 
Parmenides in which we find it (fr. 9. 3 Diels) means ‘full’, but the 
first line of the present fragment suggests that Theophrastus’ inter- 
pretation of τὸ πλέον as τὸ ὑπερβάλλον is right (cf. Asc.). Thought 
varies according as the hot or the cold in one’s body predominates ; 
it is better and purer when the hot predominates. 

25-28, Anaxagoras was not a subjectivist; he believed in the 
objective validity of science, and can have meant by this remark little 
more than that we can find good or evil in the world according to the 
presumptions with which we approach it. 

28. Aristotle does not commit himself to this interpretation of 
Homer, and in A. 983 33 he declines to rationalize Oceanus, Tethys, 
and Styx into a philosophy. 

30. κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα. The phrase, quoted again in De An. 
4043 30, is not to be found in the text of Homer, and 71, xxiii. 698 κὰδ δ᾽ 
ἀλλοφρονέοντα μετὰ σφίσιν εἷσαν ἄγοντες does not refer to Hector. 
For similar instances of loose quotation from Homer cf. Jud. Ar. 

te? 


276 COMMENTARY 


507. 52. In De An, 404% 29 Democritus is said to have quoted the 
phrase, and he may have had it in his text of Homer. 

31-33. These lines bring out most clearly the fact that Aristotle is 
taking φρόνησις as meaning knowledge, not merely thought. 

88. τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν is a proverbial phrase, cf, Leutsch and 
Schneidewin, Paroemiographi Graect, ii. 677. 

1010" 6, Ἐπίχαρμος, fr. 252 Kaibel. ‘Timaeus αὐ. Clem, S/rom. 1. 
14. 64. 2 says that Xenophanes was contemporary with Epicharmus 
(jl. c. 486), but another account makes him considerably older (born 
c. 618). We cannot be sure of his date, but the most probable 
view is that he was born about 565 (Burnet ὃ 55). In Zheael. 
152k Epicharmus appears in opposition to the Eleatics, as main- 
taining the eternal becoming and perishing of all things. Diogenes 
Laertius (iii, 12) has preserved several verses of his in the Heraclitean 
vein, Schwegler suggests that Epicharmus may have said of Xeno- 
phanes οὔτ᾽ εἰκότως λέγει οὔτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, While Zeller and Gomperz think he 
said the views of Xenophanes were true but paradoxical, Gomperz 
suggests the line 


εἰκότως μὲν οὐκ ἔφα τόδ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἀλαθέως ἔφα. 


12. Cratylus is especially important in view of the fact that accord- 
ing to Aristotle (A. 987" 32) his was the earliest philosophical influence 
under which Plato came. 

15-35. Bz. rightly points out that in these arguments Aristotle only 
succeeds in showing that there are unchanging elements in the universe, 
not that there is no change (which he would not have wished to show) 
nor that change is reconcilable with the law of contradiction, But 
most certainly the reconciliation is not to be achieved, as Bz. suggests, 
by making the law of contradiction apply not to things but only to 
notions. Rather it is to be met by emphasizing the ἅμα in the law of 
contradiction; once this is done, no fact of change can impair its 
validity. 

16. Christ’s instinct was not at fault in suspecting the phrase ἔχει 
τινὰ ἀληθῆ λόγον, which is unexampled in Aristotle. ἀληθῆ does not 
occur in A? and does not seem to have been read by Asclepius ; 
it is doubtless a gloss, 

22. Bekker is probably right in reading ἰέναι εἰς ἄπειρον. εἶναι ἐπ᾽ 
ἄπειρον occurs in most manuscripts in a. 994" 3, and els ἄπειρον οὔσης 
in Pol. 1258" 1. But in the former A) reads ἰέναι, and in the latter 
ἰούσης is an easy emendation, A. 1074" 29, Pol. 1257” 25, 26, 24 
are not very good parallels to the manuscript reading in the present 
passage. 

23. The change of quality here contrasted with change of quantity 
is not alteration but generation and destruction. This is change κατὰ 
τὸ εἶδος Or κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, and One sense of τὸ ποιόν is ἡ τῆς οὐσίας 
διαφορά (A. 1020) 14, cf. Cas. 3" 20, Soph, 1, 178” 37), 

33. πάλαι, 1009" 36. 

» 2-3. With the manuscript reading we must interpret ‘ first they say 


r. 5. roog> 31 — 1010) 16 277 


that not even sensation is false if it be of an object peculiar to one sense; 
but imagination is not the same as sensation’. ‘£ Not even’ here is 
pointless, and it is difficult to supply ‘they say’. Alexander (as Bz. 
pointed out) and Asclepius seem to have read οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἡ αἴσθησις μὴ 
ψευδής, and this is probably right. ἀλλά τ apodosi after a conditional 
clause is common in Aristotle (cf. Jud. Ar. 33% 42), but is irregular 
enough, especially in the double negative form oid’... ἀλλ᾽ οὐ, to 
account for the corruption. 

2. τοῦ ye ἰδίου itself contains a criticism of the sensationalist view. 
‘Our first point is that not even if perception is true—not percep- 
tion in general, as /key say, but perception of an object peculiar to 
one sense’, &c. For the most part Aristotle holds that perception of 
the ἴδια αἰσθητά is infallible (De An. 418%12, 427412, 430” 29, De 
Sens 442» 8), butin De An. 428 18 he says ‘it is true or has aslittle 
falsity as possible’. 

8. ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταὐτὸν TH αἰσθήσει, In Zheae/. 152 Plato says 
φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτόν, but Aristotle has assigned a special 
meaning to φαντασία. He uses it often in the general sense, correspond- 
ing exactly to φαίνεσθαι, and meaning ‘ appearance to sense or thought ’. 
But it also means the action of the mind which we call imagination, 
and is then defined as κίνησις ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν 
γιγνομένη (De An. 4298 1) or αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής (Rhet. 1370% 28). 

3-9. There is no real difficulty, Aristotle thinks, in distinguishing 
the normal from the abnormal. So in the £Azcs he defines virtue by 
reference to the φρόνιμος and thinks that it is easy to recognize the 
φρόνιμος. Cf. his answer to the question why men like to be in the 
society of the beautiful: τυφλοῦ τὸ ἐρώτημα (Diog. Laert. v. 1. 20). 

8. πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν κτλ. The objection is borrowed from 
Theael. 15} E sq. 

12. ὥσπερ kat Πλάτων λέγει, Zheae/. 171 E, 178 ὁ Sq. 

15. ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου καὶ ἰδίου, i.e. the perception κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
by one sense of the object of another sense, as of the sweetness of an 
orange by sight, is not equally valid with the perception of the object 
proper to the sense in question. For the doctrine of perception κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός (which is really not perception but inference) cf, De An. 
4184 20. 

16. τοῦ πλησίον kat τοῦ αὑτῆς. Alexander interprets ‘nor, of the 
objects of the sense itself, is the perception of the near no more valid 
(than that of the distant)’, But the supplying of ἢ τοῦ πόρρω is 
difficult, and, further, the reference to the distance of the object has 
already been made in ]. 5 and would be a mere repetition here. The 
first difficulty, but not the second, is met by Bz.’s conjecture of ἄποθεν 
for αὑτῆς, which is to some extent confirmed by Asc. 282. 3. 
Probably Bullinger and Goebel are right in supposing Aristotle to mean 
that a sense perceives its own object more accurately than it perceives 
κατὰ συμβεβηκός the object of a cognate sense. Taste and smell are 
cognate senses (De Sensu 440" 29 σχεδὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, οἵ. 
4435 7, De An. 42τὸ τό, 26). This distinction is more akin to that 


278 COMMENTARY 


mentioned in the first part of the sentence than that between a near 
and a distant object. 

19-30. Bz. thinks that Aristotle here comes round to the true form 
of the law of contradiction, in which it refers to the eternal identity of 
the notion, not to the impossibility of contradiction in a thing at a given 
time. The distinction, however, which Aristotle draws is not that 
between thing and notion but that between the combination of subject 
and attribute and the bare attribute. A subject which now has one 
attribute may later have another, but the attribute remains always self- 
identical and never becomes its opposite. 

82. μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ... αἰσθήματα, ‘neither the sensible qualities nor 
the sensations’. Alexander's interpretation seems in one place (315. 35) 
to presuppose the reading μηδὲ τὰ αἰσθήματα, which Christ adopts. 
But elsewhere (316. 20) he implies a reference to both αἰσθητά and 
αἰσθήματα, though perhaps in the reverse order to that in EJ. A?’s 
reading μηδὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι 15 to be explained by homoioteleuton, A 
reference merely to αἰσθήματα would be rather pointless ; the interesting 
thing is the statement that if the senses disappeared the sensible 
qualities would disappear. This is in accordance with Aristotle’s 
usual doctrine : ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν 
ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς, De An. 425" 25. Apart from 
the αἰσθητικόν, the αἰσθητόν has a merely potential existence. Cf. the 
whole passage 425 25—426>8. On the other hand in the Caéegories 
(7> 36—84 12) he argues that the αἰσθητόν is prior to the αἴσθησις and 
not destroyed by its destruction ; but there τὸ αἰσθητόν seems to mean 
the sensible body, what Aristotle here calls τὸ ὑποκείμενον. It is true 
that he there describes θερμόν, γλυκύ, πικρόν as persisting as well as 
body when αἴσθησις is destroyed, but this may be reconciled with his 
other statements if we take it to mean that when sensation ceases 
something persists which is capable of being perceived, when there is 
sensation again, as hot, sweet, or bitter. 

IOII2 1, κἂν εἰ λέγεται κτλ. In Cas. 7" 15—8* 12 it is argued that 
though most terms which are πρὸς ἄλληλα are ἅμα τῇ φύσει so that 
neither exists in the absence of the other, the relation of the knowable 
to knowledge and of the perceptible to perception is an exception. 
In A. 15 one of the three kinds of πρός τι, that of which the 
measurable, the knowable, the perceptible are instances, is said to be 
πρός τι because something else is relative to it; i.e. it is implied that 
these terms are logically prior to their correlatives. 


Refulation of Protagoras continued (ch. 6). 


IO1I? 8. Some of our opponents, whether genuinely convinced or 
arguing for argument’s sake, ask who is to decide which is the healthy 
man, and generally who is to judge. ‘This is like asking whether we 
are asleep or waking. All such questions imply the demand for 


r. 5. 1010 19g — 6, τοι 2 270 


a proof of everything ; our opponents forget that the starting-point of 
demonstration is not demonstration. Our genuine opponents can 
easily be persuaded of this. 

15. Those who demand to be refuted by a ‘knock-down’ argument 
ask for what is impossible, since they claim the privilege of self- 
contradiction—a claim, it is true, which contradicts itself. But we 
can argue as follows: (a) Unless all things are relative, it is not 
the case that all that seems is true; for what seems always seems 
to some one. ‘Those, therefore, who are willing to subject their view to 
discussion must say, not that that which seems is, but that it is for him 
to whom it seems, when it seems, to the sense to which and under the 
conditions under which it seems. Otherwise they will contradict 
themselves, for the same thing may seem honey to the sight but not 


to the taste, 
28. For to those who maintain the theory in its unqualified form, 


because the same things appear different to different people, at 
different times, or to different senses, we may answer that things do 
not appear with contradictory attributes to the same sense, in the 
same respect, manner, and time, With these qualifications, my 
sensation is true. Or perhaps our eristic opponents will answer 
‘only true for you’. They must, in fact, make everything relative, 
so that nothing has come into being or will be unless some one has 
first thought it. If anything has come into being, or will be, without 
any one’s having thought so, all things are not relative to opinion. 

by, (6) If a thing is one, it is one in relation to one thing or to 
a definite number of things; if the same thing is half and equal, at 
all events its equality is not relative to that which is double of it. 
(i) If, then, in relation to a thinker, man is that which is thought, the 
thinker cannot be aman. (ii) If everything is in relation to a thinker, 
the thinker will be in relation to an infinite number of specifically 
different things. 

13. We have shown, then, that the law of contradiction is the most 
indubitable of all laws, what absurdities follow from its denial, and on 
what grounds the denial rests. Now since contradictories cannot be truly 
predicated of the same subject, the same thing cannot have contrary 
attributes. For of two contraries one is a privation of substance, i.e. 
the denial of a predicate to a definite subject class. If a subject has 
contrary attributes, then, it has them in different respects, or one in 
a particular respect and another without qualification. 


1011® 8. ταῦτας What Aristotle has been discussing immediately 
before is the doctrine that whatever appears is true, and it is this, 


280 COMMENTARY 


rather than the denial of the law of contradiction, that ratra refers to. 
It is this that he endeavours to refute inl. 17 sqq. He divides the 
supporters of this view into ‘those who are convinced’ and ‘ those 
who maintain it for the sake of argument’. Yet he says (1. 10) that 
they are evidently πού convinced. He must mean that, though con- 
vinced by the considerations adduced in 100g 2-11 that everything 
that appears is true, they are not convinced, to the extent of expressing 
their conviction in practice, that there is any real difficulty in dis- 
tinguishing health from disease or waking from sleeping. 

What Aristotle says in ll. 6-13 is said as though it applied to both 
types of believers in πᾶν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀληθές. Yet he continues 
(1. 13), ‘these can easily be persuaded, but those who are satisfied 
only with compulsion in argument are asking what is impossible’. 
The latter are clearly οἱ τοὺς λόγους τούτους μόνον λέγοντες, and οὗτοι 
(J. 13) must be οἱ πεπεισμένοι (]. 3). οὗτοι then implies that in ll. 6--13 
it is the honest believers that he has had in view. If you point out to 
them that their actions are inconsistent with their theory (1. 11) 
and that a study of logic would have shown them that demonstration 
must not be expected everywhere (Il. 11-13, cf. 10053), they. 
will give up their view. But those who argue merely for the sake 
of argument are harder to deal with. Arguments from practice will 
not appeal to them, and it is no use pointing out that their views are 
inconsistent, since they hold that contradictories can both be true 
(Il. 15, 16). Nevertheless, in the hope of finding them-accessible to 
argument somewhere, Aristotle proceeds in 1, 17 to point out weak-. 
nesses in their view. 

Christ (Stadia 65) proposed to meet the difficulty about οὗτοι by 
reading οὗτοι. . . λέγοντες 1. 16 before εἰσὶ δέ τινες 1. 3. But the 
accepted order can be interpreted as above, though no doubt. the 
passage is a confused one. 

6. τῶ ἀπορεῖν κτλ, The question here dismissed by Aristotle is 
mentioned by Plato (Zheact. 1588) and plays an important part in 
Descartes (Jed. i. 1). 

7-13. Cf. 1005» 2-5 ἢ. 

18. ἀποδείξεως yap ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν, cf. Post An. i. 3. 

15. τὴν βίαν, cf. 1009 18. 

16. ἐναντία γάρ κτὰ. (1) Alexander interprets: ‘They demand 
to be made to contradict themselves, when the very substance of their 
theory is self-contradiction.’ But this interpretation of ἐναντία... εἰ- 
πεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν is difficult to accept. (2) Bullinger interprets: ‘ They 
claim the right to make contrary statements, while their very demand 
that they shall be refuted logically (1. 15) implies the contrary of this’, 
since logical proof implies the law of contradiction. But since the 
first ἐναντία means ‘mu/ually contrary statements’, the second ἐναντία 
must also mean this, or the epigram is spoilt. (3) The most natural 
meaning of the words in themselves is perhaps, ‘their claim to the 
privilege of self-contradiction is in itself a self-contradictory claim ’,— 
as Aristotle points out, e.g., in ror2? 15-17. This does not connect 


Γ, 6. τοι1ὃ 6-28 281 


50 readily as Alexander's interpretation with the preceding words, ot 
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὴν βίαν μόνον ζητοῦντες ἀδύνατον ζητοῦσιν, but the 
connexion intended may be that since the claim of these thinkers is 
a nakedly self-contradictory one, they are not likely to be convinced 
by any refutation, which could only amount to pointing out con- 
tradictions in their view. It is, however, not so much because their 
claim is self-contradictory, but because it is a claim to the privilege of 
self-contradiction, that no refutation they can meet with will satisfy 
them (ἀδύνατον ζητοῦσιν). It is better therefore (4) to take ἐναντία yap 
εἰπεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν as giving the reason for the previous words, and εὐθὺς 
ἐναντία λέγοντες aS a Supplementary criticism, akin to that expressed 
in 1012» 15-14. ‘For they claim the privilege of self-contradiction— 
a claim, it is true, which from the outset contradicts itself.’ This 
seems on the whole the best interpretation. (5) It has been suggested 
that the words mean ‘for the instant they contradict themselves, they 
claim that they have a right to do so’, For this construction we 
might compare JMe/eor. 371° 6 σβέννυσιν εὐθὺς γιγνομένην. But most 
readers will probably feel that Aristotle would have expressed this 
meaning otherwise. (6) Richards’s (ov) ἀξιοῦσιν, ‘they demand that 
we shall not contradict ourselves, when //ey contradict themselves from 
the outset’ gives no satisfactory connexion with the previous clause. 

24. 7, ‘to the sense to which it appears’. This is inserted to meet 
the difficulty that what appears of a certain quality to one sense may 
per acctdens appear of a contrary quality to another (so Al. 319. 37— 
320. 7, cf, τοῖο" 14-19 and τῇ αὐτῇ ye αἰσθήσει TOIL" 34), 

és, Alexander (320. 7-14) explains this as meaning ‘for that organ 
to which it appears’, and supposes it is inserted to meet the fact that 
if one eye is healthy and the other diseased, a thing may look both 
white and not white. This seems to be what is conveyed by τῇ αὐτῇ 
γε καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθήσει in |. 34; ὥς answers rather to ὡσαύτως in 
1. 35. ΒΖ. is therefore probably right in supposing that the reference 
is to differences such as those of distance (cf. τοῖο" 5, 6), ‘ What 
appears w is x at the distance at which, and generally under the 
conditions under which, it appears αν 

The effect of the sentence is that if the people who believe that 
appearances are true wish their view to bear discussion (ὑπέχειν λόγον) 
they must qualify the statement in such a way as to avoid asserting 
the absolute existence of anything. ‘The necessary qualifications of 
their view will deprive it of half its meaning, since they will restrict 
the authority of sense to the precise circumstances in which the 
sensation occurs. But instead of pointing this out Aristotle goes on 
to say (1.24) that if they do not qualify their statement, they will break 
the law of contradiction—which of course to them is no objection 
at all. 

28-81. πρός ye Tos... ἀληθῆ. Aristotle meant to continue with 
something like ῥᾳδία ἡ ἀπάντησις (Al. 321. 1), ‘we can easily reply’, 
but instead the actual reply is given in 1. 34 ἀλλ᾽ ov τι τῇ αὐτῇ, &c. 
Jaeger points out that Alexander (321. 3) treats καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάνθ᾽ 


282 COMMENTARY 


ὁμοίως εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ not as part of the statement of the Pro- 
tagorean theory (as our interpretation takes it to be) but as the begin- 
ning of Aristotle’s reply, the statement of an absurd consequence 
following from the theory. He therefore supposes some such words 
aS ἐροῦμεν ὅτι συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς τὸ πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι to have 
dropped out by homoioteleuton after ἀληθὲς εἶναι (1. 30), and takes 
οὔτε... οὔτε... GAN οὔ τι... (Il. 31-34) to form a continuous state- 
ment of the situation with regard to contradictions of the senses. But 
the inserted words are somewhat pointless when the Protagoreans have 
just been described as τὸ φαινόμενον φάσκοντας ἀληθὲς εἶναι. Further, 
while οὔτε yap ... ἕν refers to the contradictions of the senses which 
prima “acre lend colour to Protagoras’ theory, in ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι... χρόνῳ 
Aristotle takes his stand on the fact which enables him to refute the 
theory. For these reasons I prefer Bonitz’s interpretation. But 
οὔτε yap... ἕν Should not be put within brackets, as it is by Bonitz, 
since τἀναντία φαίνεται has to be understood with τῇ airy... αἰσθήσει. 

29. τὰς πάλαι εἰρημένας αἰτίας, οἵ, roog®38—ro1o*®15. These 
reasons are briefly summarized in ΤΟΙ 1ἃ 31-34. 

33. ἡ μὲν yap ἁφή κτλ. The famous experiment of holding an 
object between two crossed fingers is referred to again in De Jnsomn. © 
46020, Probl. 958514, 959*15, 965%36. The reason for the 
illusion given in 965%37, διότι δυσὶν αἰσθητηρίοις ἁπτόμεθα, is in- 
sufficient. If that were the whole explanation we should feel the 
object as two when we hold it between two fingers in their ordinary 
position. The reason rather is that we are perceiving one object with 
two organs which are not used to being in contact with a single 
object. 

34. For ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι... ye, the reading of all the best manuscripts, ef. 
Phys, 258” 22, Pol. 1282" 11, Cat. 6%2, De Caelo 271%18, De Sensu 
439% 32. Bz.’s conjecture οὔ ro. is apparently not supported, as he 
thinks, by Al. 322. 2. 

θα, τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀληθές κτλ. ic. τὸ φαινόμενον ἂν εἴη ἀληθὲς ᾧ φαί- 
νεται καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται καὶ ἡ καὶ ὥς (8. 22). But if this is so, these 
thinkers must always state this qualification (» 1-3); they*must make 
everything relative to opinion and sensation (Ὁ 4, 5), which is absurd 
in view of the fact that things often happen without being thought of 
beforehand (ἢ 5-7). 

7. ἔτι εἰ ἕν κτλ. ‘Further, if a thing is one, it is relative to one 
thing or to some determinate number of things ; and if the same thing 
is both half and equal, still the equal as such is not relative to the 
double to which the half as such is relative. From this two con- 
clusions follow: (1) ‘If, in relation to the thinking subject, man and 
the object of thought be the same, man will not be the thinking subject 
but the object of thought.’ This argument may be put thus: If 
man is man simply because he is thought to be so, his being is 
comprised in a relation to a thinking subject. In this relation he can 
only be that which is relative to thinking subject, viz., object of 
thought ; and since the relation is his whole being he cannot also be 


Γ, 6. 10114 29— 1011) 19 283 


a thinking subject. 1.6. if the esse of man be fered’, he cannot 
percipere. Which is absurd. 

(2) The second argument may be put thus: ‘If everything is 
relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject is relative to an 
infinite number of specifically different things’, and therefore, since 
each relative term has a correlative different from that of any 
other relative term (ll. 7-9), the thinking subject will have to include 
in it an infinite number of specifically different aspects, so that 
definition of it will be impossible. Which is absurd. 

The balance of authority is in favour of πρὸς ἄπειρα in 1. 12, but 
evidently ἄπειρα would give a good sense. 

13-15. The summary here given covers the contents of 1005> 8— 
ΙΟΙΙΡ 12, dm... φάσεις, cf. 3. 1005) 8-34 5 τί συμβαίνει τοῖς οὕτω 
λέγουσι, cf. ch. 4 ; διὰ τί οὕτω λέγουσι, cf. chs. 5, 6. 

18. οὐχ ἧττον, ‘no less than it is a contrary’. For the doctrine cf. 
I. 1055 11-29. Contrariety is στέρησις τελεία (1055" 34) OF πρώτη 
(@. 1046) 14). 

19. οὐσίας δὲ στέρησις, ‘and privation of the positive, substantial 
nature —more commonly in this connexion called εἶδος. 


Law of excluded middle proved (ch. 7). 


1011" 23. (1) We start by defining truth and falsehood. Falsehood 
is saying of that which is that it is not, or of that which is not that it 
is; truth is saying of that which is that it is, or of that which is not 
that it is not, Therefore he who says that a thing is or is not says 
what is either true or false; but if the subject is a middle term between 
contradictories, neither that which is nor that which is not is being 
said to be or not to be. 

29. (2) The middle term will be either a real intermediate (as grey 
is between black and white) or a neutral (as that which is neither man 
nor horse is intermediate between them). In the latter case it cannot 
change, for change is from not-A to A or from A to not-A; but the 
intermediates that really exist are constantly being observed to change. 
In the former case there would be change to white which was not from 
not-white—but it is never observed. 

1012° 2. (3) The law may be proved from the principle that thought 
must either affirm or deny whenever it is true or false, which follows from 
the definition of true and false judgement (the former means affirming 
or denying in one way, the latter affirming or denying in another). 

5. (4) There must be a middle between every two contradictories, 
if the theory is genuinely maintained ; so that (on the logical side) a 
man can say what is neither true nor untrue, and (on the metaphysical) 


284 COMMENTARY 


there will be a middle between being and not-being, and therefore 
a sort of change other than generation and decay. 

g. (3) In classes in which the denial of one term implies the 
assertion of its contrary there must still be a middle (e. g. a number 
which is neither odd nor not odd); but the absurdity of this is seen 
from the definition of such contraries. 

12. (6) The denial of the law multiplies indefinitely the number of 
reals. If besides A and not-A there is B which is neither, there will 
be also C which is neither B nor not-B, D which is neither C nor not- 
C, and so on. 

15. (7) A negation indicates merely the absence of a positive 
quality, so that there is no room for a middle between negation and 
affirmation. 

17. Some thinkers have been led to this, as to other paradoxical 
beliefs, by the failure to cope with eristic arguments; others by the 
demand for a proof of everything. In answering all alike we take our 
stand on definition, which is implied in all significant speech. 

24. While the saying of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, 
seems to make all statements true, the view of Anaxagoras, that there 
is a middle between contradictories (for his ‘ mixture’ can be called 
neither good nor not good), seems to make all statements false. 


ror» 28. The reading of Al.¢ and Bz., καὶ ὃ λέγων τοῦτο (sc. τὸ 
μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως), gives a less good sense than that of EJT Asc.°, καὶ 
ὁ λέγων. Aristotle has laid it down (ll. 26, 27) that to say of τὸ ov 
that it is not or of τὸ μὴ ov that it is is false, and that to say 
of τὸ ov that it is or of τὸ μὴ ov that it is not is true, It does 
not follow from this that to say of τὸ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως that 
it is or that it is not is either true or false, since τὸ μεταξὺ 
ἀντιφάσεως is just neither ὄν nor μὴ ov. Rather it follows that to 
say of anything (which is the sense we get if we omit τοῦτο) that it 
is or that it is not is either true or false. But (28, 29) our opponent, 
in saying that τὸ μεταξὺ ἀντιφάσεως is, is not saying either of τὸ ov or 
of τὸ μὴ ov that it is or that it is not, and therefore his statement is 
neither true nor false; which is absurd. ‘Therefore τὸ μεταξὺ ἀντι- 
φάσεως is not anything. It is to be noted (1) that Aristotle does not 
assume merely that to say of what is that it is not or of what is not 
that it is is false, and that to say of what is that it is or of what is not 
that it is not is true, but that these are the definitions of falsity and 
truth, i.e. are convertible propositions. It is only on this assumption 
that it follows that the opponent, who maintains the existence of what 
neither is nor is not, is saying what is neither true nor false. (2) That 
the opponent is assumed to admit (@) the correctness of the definition of 
truth and falsity, and (4) that every judgement must be either true or 


r. 7. ror» 28 —1or2* 3 285 


false. Thus Aristotle is inferring the metaphysical form of the law of 
excluded middle—that there is no objective intermediate between 
contradictories—from the logical form. The argument thus has value 
only ad hominem. But of this Aristotle is well aware; he knows that 
first principles cannot be demonstrated. 

29. ἔτι ἤτοι κτλ. The μεταξύ may be thought of either as a genuine 
intermediate, coming somewhere between the contradictories, or as 
between them merely in the sense of being neither of them. On the 
latter supposition, it cannot change (for change is from not-good to 
good or from good to not-good, but the μεταξύ is neither good nor 
not-good); but wherever there is a μεταξύ, we can observe it changing 
into the extremes between which it lies (for change is just from 
extreme to extreme, from extreme to intermediate, or from inter- 
mediate to extreme). Therefore there is no such thing as a μεταξύ 
of contradictories in the sense of a mere neutral between them. But 
secondly, if the μεταξύ is a genuine intermediate, since there can 
be change from intermediate to extreme there can be change from 
what is not not-white to white; but this is evidently not the case.—The 
argument is again necessarily circular. 

35. AP reads ἢ ἡ ἀντίφασις, EJT (and perhaps Asc.) εἴη ἄν τις. 
Bz. thinks that Alexander read ἡ ἀντίφασις, εἴη ἄν τις, and that this is 
probably the true reading. But Alexander seems to have read καὶ 
οὕτως ἡ ἀντίφασις, εἰς λευκὸν οὐκ ἐκ μὴ λευκοῦ ἡ γένεσις (329. 36—330. 
4). καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἀντίφασις would be difficult to interpret strictly, and 
probably εἴη ἄν τις is the true reading. Bz.’s argument that καὶ οὕτως 
εἴη ἄν τις κτλ. would imply that the same conclusion had been shown 
to follow from the previous supposition is not conclusive. On either 
supposition, change from the μεταξύ would imply change from what 
is not not-white to white, and this is enough identity to justify καὶ 
οὕτως. 

ΙΟΙΩΔΙ. νῦν δ᾽ οὐχ ὁρᾶται. There is of course transition to white 
from grey, which is not s¢mplicrfer not-white. But the transition is 
from grey gua not-white; it is the specks of black in the grey that 
change to white. 

2. διάνοια and νοῦς are sometimes used indifferently, e.g. De An. 
4338 2, cf. 4298 23 ; sometimes they appear as species of one genus, 
e.g. De An. 41418, An. Post, 89> 7; sometimes νοῦς appears as one 
of the ἕξεις of διάνοια, 6. g. An. Post. 1006. In the first sense either 
term is used for the whole intellectual faculty, in the second διάνοια 
is specialized so as to denote discursive, and νοῦς so as to denote 
intuitive thought (for the distinction cf. ®. ro). It is probably in this 
sense that Aristotle here uses the words διανοητόν and νοητόν. 

3. The editions print τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ δῆλον ὅταν ἀληθεύῃ ἢ ψεύδηται. 
But the construction of ὅταν κτλ. as dependent on ὁρισμοῦ is difficult 
and (I think) unexampled in Aristotle. It is better to treat τοῦτο . . 
δῆλον as parenthetical. Alexander seems to have taken it so (330. 
20-23). The argument then is: ‘Thought always either affirms or 
denies, whenever it is true or false; it is true when, and only when, 


286 COMMENTARY 


it puts subject and predicate together in one way either by affirmation 
or by negation; false when, and only when, it puts them together in 
another way, again either by affirmation or by negation. (But it 
is always true or false. 1.6. it always affirms or denies.)’ 1, 6, the 
actual process of thought confirms the law of excluded middle, 
which states that one mus/ always affirm or deny (1011? 24). The 
argument, as Bz. says, comes very near to the first, but is distinguish- 
able from it. 

ἐξ δρισμοῦ, i.e. from the definition of true and false as stated in 
1011) 26 or in ΤΟΙ 28 4. 

8. μεταβολή τις, i.e. another substantial change. Of course there 
are other, non-substantial, kinds of change—alteration of quality, 
change of size, motion in space, 

9. ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις γένεσιν κτλ. If there is a middle between contra- 
dictories, there will be a middle also between terms which are ex v7 
Jormae contraries but ev vz maferiae contradictories as applied to 
a particular genus, e.g. odd and even in number. 

11. tod ὁρισμοῦ. Alexander thinks the definition of number is 
meant; but number is defined simply as ποσὸν διωρισμένον Or πλῆθος ἑνὶ 
μετρητόν OY πλῆθος μέτρων, μονάδων, Or ἀδιαιρέτων (Index Ar. 94* 8-12). 
The definition of number should contain no reference to odd or even; 
rather, odd and even are defined by reference to it (An. Post. 73% 39). 
Aristotle is probably thinking of a definition of even as ‘the quality 
of the numbers that are not odd’. Bz.’s view that he means the 
definition of the ἄμεσον ἐναντίον does not appear so likely. 

In any case, as Bz. remarks, the principle that there cannot be 
a middle between contradictories, which from their nature as contra~ 
dictories exclude it, cannot well be proved by an appeal to 
contraries, which so far as their being contraries goes might have 
a middle between them. But it is sometimes more easy to see the 
truth of a principle in a particular type of case than in its general 
form, and there is an ad hominem value in the appeal to the very 
obvious fact that every number is either odd or even. 

13. πάλιν γὰρ ἔσται κτλ. Bz.’s interpretation is: If besides A and 
not-A there is B which is neither, there will be C which is neither 
A nor B, and D which is neither not-A nor B, and so on. But (1) this 
does not translate the Greek, and (2) there is nothing in the opponent’s 
premises which drives him to this conclusion. A and B, not-A and 
B, not being contradictories, he is not bound to say there is a middle 
between them. The true interpretation must be that given by Alexander. 
If besides A and not-A there is B which is neither, then besides B and 
not-B there will be C which is neither, and so on. ‘For again it will 
be possible to deny B both in the direction of its affirmation and of its 
negation, and the term thus produced (“neither B nor not-B”) will 
be something.’ πρὸς τὴν φάσιν κτλ.,, is difficult, but no other inter- 
pretation seems possible. 

16. EA) read ἀποπέφυκεν, which gives no sense. J reads ἀποπέ- 
φηκεν, and Al.’s ἀποφάσκει (333. 22) confirms this. I can find no 


Ds 7; Tora" 38—25 284 


other instance of the perfect of φημί, but ἀποπέφηκεν appears more 
likely than Christ’s conjecture ἀποπέφακεν. 

19. λόγους ἐριστικούς. It is not clear what particular argument 
Aristotle has in view. Alexander cites the argument (334. 22) that 
since contraries are produced from the same thing, they must have 
been contained in it, so that it neither was nor was not either of them, 
and the further argument (334. 35) that ‘neither is nor is not’ is not 
the same as either ‘is’ or ‘is not’ and therefore must be intermediate 
between them. As regards the first of these arguments Bz. objects 
that it cannot be called eristic since in roog 22-25 it (or rather a 
similar argument leading up to the denial of the law of contradiction) 
was described as arising from a study of sensible facts. Alexander 
may be right; an argument derived from a study of facts may be 
turned to an eristic use, or an argument invented for eristic purposes 
may seem to simple people to present a difficulty naturally arising out 
of the facts. But the reference may be more general—to eristic 
arguments aiming not at disproving the law of excluded middle but 
at bamboozling the simple-minded by disproving both a proposition 
and its contradictory. In face of such arguments the simple-minded 
may be ready to say ‘the proposition is neither true nor not true’. 

21. διὰ τὸ πάντων ζητεῖν λόγον, cf. 1005” 2-5 n. 

22. ἅπαντας τούτους, i.e. both the classes just mentioned. 

ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ. Aristotle has in his defence of the law of contradiction 
(1006® 18 sqq.) used an argument derived from the necessity of a fixed 
meaning for every term; he has also in his defence of the law of 
excluded middle (τοῖα 25) used an argument derived from the 
definitions of truth and falsity. If we suppose him to be thinking of 
the earlier argument, there is no very close connexion between 10128 
24-28 and what precedes it. On the other view 22-28 forms 
a continuous argument. Heraclitus makes everything true, Anaxa- 
goras makes everything false; but the very definitions of truth and 
falsity (1011 26, 27) show both these views to be mistaken. So 
Al. 336. το. But the text does not naturally suggest this connexion. 
Lines 22-24 point clearly to the general argument ; cf. ἐκ τοῦ σημαίνειν 
τι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι αὐτούς With 1006% 21. Lines 22-24 say briefly with 
regard to the law of excluded middle what Aristotle has shown at 
length with regard to the law of contradiction, that it is implied by 
the necessity of a fixed meaning for every term, Aristotle then 
concludes his discussion of the law of excluded middle by pointing 
out that while (the clause is in sense subordinate) the doctrine of 
Heraclitus makes all judgements true, that of Anaxagoras implies 
a μεταξὺ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως and thus makes all judgements false. And 
with this note the next chapter directly connects itself. 

25. λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Aristotle may have in mind 
such sayings of Heraclitus as that it is the same thing to be good and 
to be bad (Zop. 15930, Phys. 185 21, and frr. 58-62 Diels). But 
more probably the reference is to the doctrine of πάντα ῥεῖ, cf, τοιοῦ 
10-1ρ. 


288 COMMENTARY 


Falsity of the views thal all judgemenis are true, or that all are false, 
that all things are at rest, or all in motion (ch. 8). 


1012*29. These discussions show the error of the sweeping state- 
ments that no judgements are true, or that all are true. (1) These 
statements stand or fall with the remark of Heraclitus that all judge- 
ments are true ad false. 

bg. (2) There are evidently contradictories which are not both true, 
and some which are not both false, though the latter seems more 
possible in view of what has been said. Our argument must start by 
defining truth and falsehood. If that which it is true to assert is just 
that which it is false to deny, everything cannot be false. And if 
everything must be either affirmed or denied, both statements cannot 
be false. 

18. (3) These theories are open to the common objection that they 
refute themselves. He who says everything is true must admit that his 
opponent’s view is true and therefore his own false; and he who says 
everything is false must include his own view in the indictment. Nor 
will it do for the former to say ‘only my opponent’s view is false’, nor 
for the latter to say ‘only my view is true’. If they do this they must 
admit an indefinite number of exceptions; e.g. the latter must hold 
that the view which says the true view is true is itself true. 

22. Nor is it true to say that all things are at rest (for then the same 
things would be always true—or false; but there is change in this 
respect—the very holder of the view at one time was not and again will 
cease to be), nor that all things are in motion (for then everything 
would be false—a view which has been disproved—and further- that 
which changes must itself de something), Nor are all things at one 
time resting, at another moving; there is something which always 
moves the things that are moved, and the first mover must be itself 
unmoved. - 


IOI2* 32. τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι is Aristotle’s favourite 
instance of what is not only false but impossible, οἵ, A. 9838 το, 
Θ. 10476. 

bi-2. ‘So that if the statements taken separately are impossible, 
the combination of them is impossible too.’ 

2. ἀντιφάσεις εἰσίν, presumably in the realm of pure thought, where 
one judgement is plainly true and its contradictory plainly false; in 
judgements of sense there may seem to be some ground for holding 
that contradictories may both be true. The opponents of the law of 
contradiction should oppose it in the former case as well as in the 
latter. 


r. 8. 10122 32 ΤΟΙΣ] 289 


4. καίτοι δόξειέ γ᾽ ἂν κτλ. From Heraclitus’ doctrine of flux 
(τοιοῦ 7-15) the natural conclusion is that every statement becomes 
false before we have finished making it; and according to Anaxagoras’ 
doctrine of mixture (10094 27) every statement which either asserts or 
denies the identity of a mixture with any of its elements must be 
false. 

6. ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, 10068 18--22. 

9. The tradition is much divided as to the reading here. Neither of 
the manuscript readings makes sense, but with a minimum of alteration 
we get an excellent sense by reading εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ἄλλο τὸ ἁληθὲς φάναι ἢ 
(ὃ) ἀποφάναι ψεῦδός ἐστιν. Asclepius has ὅπερ, which is doubtless his 
interpretation of 6. ‘If the true-to-say (i.e. what it is true to say) is 
nothing other than what it is false to deny.’ φάναι dependent on ἀληθές, 
while good Aristotelian Greek (Az. Post. 28> 29 is perhaps the clearest 
instance, but Bz. cites many cases in Lud. Ar. 32% 23-26 and in his 
note on A. 989 7), is a peculiar enough idiom to have given rise to 
corruption. 

12. θάτερον yap μόριον κτλ., ‘for one and only one side of a con- 
tradiction is false’. 

14. τὸ θρυλούμενον, e.g. by Plato, Zheae/. 171 A 8564. 

22-31. Alexander tells us that this section was omitted in some 
manuscripts as being more appropriate to physics than to metaphysics. 
The suspicion is unfounded. Aristotle apparently makes little effort in 
his actual treatment to keep the domains of physics and metaphysics 
absolutely distinct. 

28. ‘Further, what changes must be something that is,’ 

30-31. ἔστι... κινούμενα, Alexander, no doubt rightly, takes this to 
refer to the πρῶτος οὐρανός or sphere of the fixed stars, which is always 
moving the whole physical universe, being itself an ἀεὶ κινούμενον. On 
the other hand God, who moves thisfis an det ἠρεμοῦν (kal... αὐτό 


lear): 


BOOK Δ 


‘The subjects treated of in this book fall into certain groups which 
may be arranged thus : 
1. ἀρχή. 2. αἴτιον. 3. στοιχεῖον. 
4. φύσις. δ. ἀναγκαῖον. 
6. ἐγ: 7. ὧν. ὃ. οὐσία. 
9. ταὐτά. το. ἀντικείμενα. 
Il. πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα. 
12. δύναμις. 
12. ποσόν. 14. ποιόν. 15. πρός τι. 
2613.1 υ 


290 COMMENTARY 


16, τέλειον. 17. πέρας. 
18. καθ᾽ ὅ. 
10. διάθεσις. 20. ἕξις. 21. πάθος. 22. στέρησις. 23. ἔχειν. 
24. ἔκ τινος. 25. μέρος. 26. ὅλον. 27. κολοβόν. 
28, γένος. 
29. ψεῦδος. 
30. συμβεβηκός. 
‘ Beginning’ (ch. 1). 


101234. ἀρχή means (1) the starting-point of movement (e. g. the 
beginning of a road), 

ΙΟΙ88 1. (2) the best starting-point (e.g. for learning a subject), 

4. (3) that part of a thing from which genesis begins (e.g. the keel 
of a ship), 

7. (4) the external starting-point of genesis or movement (efficient 


cause), 

10. (5) that which moves something else at its will (e.g. the ἀρχαί in 
cities), 

14. (6) that from which knowledge of a thing starts (causa cogno- 
scendt). 


16. ‘Cause’ has the same variety of meanings, for all causes are 
ἀρχαί. What is common to all ἀρχαί is to be the starting-point, 
whether internal or external, of being, becoming, or knowledge. Thus 
nature, the elementary constituent, thought, will, essence, final cause 
are all ἀρχαί. 


Aristotle offers in this chapter quite a different classification from 
that in A. 3. There he takes ἀρχή in a slightly technical sense, for 
which ‘ principle’ is perhaps the nearest equivalent, and states the four 
main principles of things—the material, the formal, the efficient, and 
the final. Here he takes the word as it is used in ordinary language, 
in which it means not only various kinds of beginning but also ‘rule’ 
and even ‘ruler’. Only the fourth sense here recognized coincides 
with one of those recognized in A. 3. The material, formal, and final 
principles, however, find a place in the rough list he gives at the end 
of the chapter (τοι 38 20, 21). 

10132. οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου κτλ. Aristotle is referring to the 
πρότερον καὶ γνωριμώτερον ἡμῖν as Opposed to the πρότερον καὶ 
γνωριμώτερον ἁπλῶς which comes in Il, 14--τό. 

4-7. ἐνυπάρχοντος... μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντος, as if not ὅθεν but ἐξ οὗ had 
preceded. 

5. οἱ μὲν καρδίαν, Empedocles (A. 84. 97 Diels), Democritus (B. 1. 
10 Diels), Aristotle himself (De Somno 456*°5, De Vita 468 28, 
469° 4, 17, De Resp. 478° 33, P. A. 6474 31). 


Nein ga O mor 2 2 201 


6. οἱ δὲ ἐγκέφαλον, Alcmaeon (A. 8 Diels), Hippo (A. 3 Diels), 
Plato (Z’m. 44D). 

9. ἡ μάχη ἐκ τῆς λοιδορίας, cf. 1023%30, De Gen. An. 724% 28. 
From the latter passage it appears that the reference is to a poem by 
Epicharmus of the ‘ House- that Jack built’ type. It has been con- 
jectured that the original verse was ἐκ διαβολᾶς λοιδορησμός, λοιδορη- 
σμοῦ δ᾽ ἐκ μαχά (Lorenz, Lpicharm. 271), For a similar instance of 
ἐποικοδόμησις by Epicharmus cf. fr. 44 Lorenz. 

16. ai ὑποθέσεις is used as in Ὁ 20 in the general sense of ‘premises’. 
Cf. Index Ar. 796 59—797% 15. 

17. πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἴτια ἀρχαί. Sometimes Aristotle distinguishes ἀρχή 
from αἴτιον as being the first in a series of causes (De Gen. εὐ Corr, 
3248 27, α. 0945 1) but much more often they are treated as synonymous, 
Though, however, they coincide in denotation, there is a difference 
between their definitions (I. 1003” 24 n.). 

20. φύσις may mean here, as Alexander supposes, the matter of the 
thing (cf. ro14 26). Or it may mean the power of initiating move- 
ment which is in living things (1014 18). In either case it falls, like 
στοιχεῖον, under the heading of ὅθεν πρῶτον γίγνεται ἐνυπάρχοντος, 
though the instances given in 1. 4 are of a different type. 

20-21. διάνοια and προαίρεσις answer to οὗ κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινεῖται, 
τὰ κινούμενα (1. 10). 

21. οὐσία does not answer exactly to any of the senses of ἀρχή above, 
but has most affinity with ὅθεν γνωστὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρῶτον (1. 14). 

τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, as Aristotle proceeds to observe, refers both to the sense 
of ἀρχή given in ll. 7-10, and to that given in ll. 14-16. The end 
which a thing serves is both the efficient cause of it and what renders 
it intelligible. 

22. τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. For the difference cf. M. 1078431, 
Rhet. 1366% 33, L. L. 1248> 18, AZ, MM. 1207» 29. 


‘Cause’ (ch. 2). 


1013 24. ‘Cause’ means (1) the material cause, 

26. (2) the form, pattern, or definition (formal cause), 

29. (3) the principle of change or rest (efficient cause), 

82. (4) the final cause (of means to a final cause some are 
instruments, others actions). 

»4. A thing may have causes of more than one of these kinds (and 
this not merely incidentally), and what is the cause of a thing in one 
sense may be its effect in another. 

11, That which by its presence causes one thing, by its absence 
causes the contrary. 

16. All causes fall under}these four”types. (1) Letters are the 
cause of syllables, the material is the cause of artefacfa, the elements 

(eB 


292 COMMENTARY 


are the cause of bodies, and the premises the cause of the conclusion 
in the sense of ‘that out of which’. 
22. (2) But the essence, whole, synthesis, or form also falls under 
‘that out of which’. 
23. (3) The seed, the doctor, the adviser, and in general the agent 
fall under the efficient cause. 
25. (4) Other things are causes in the sense of final cause; this is 
the good or the apparent good. : 
29. Cutting across this classification there are various distinctions, 
[ 82. (1) that of causes commensurate with the effects, and the 
classes that include these (particular and universal) ; 
34. (2) that of proper and incidental; incidental causes include 
(a) the subject of that attribute which is the cause proper, 
(2) classes including the subject, 
(c) other attributes of it ; 
1014*7. (3) that of potential and actual. 
10. Of effects also we may distinguish the specific and the generic. 
13. The combination of the cause proper with an incidental cause 
may be described as the cause of a thing. 
15. Thus there are six kinds of cause, 
(1) the individual cause, 
(2) the genus of the individual cause, 
(3) the incidental cause, 
(4) the genus of the incidental cause, 
(5) the combination of (1) and (3), 
(6) the combination of (2) and (4). 
19. Any of these may be either actual or potential. But while the 
actual and particular causes exist just so long as the effects do, the 


potential do not. 


This chapter is almost word for word identical with Phys. 194 23— 
1050 21. Asc. 305. 19 tells us that ‘they’ (the editors of the MJefa- 
physics) ‘said that some parts of A had been lost, and they supplied 
the deficiency out of Aristotle’s own writings’. That the chapter 
belongs originally to the Physics is suggested by the fact that the 
classification of the senses of αἴτιον does not follow that of the senses 
of ἀρχή, though Aristotle has said in ch, 1 that ἰσαχῶς... λέγεται 
(1013%16). Bz. thinks that the reference to αἴτια in ch, 1 makes 
ch, 2 superfluous, and that it is an interpolation from the Physics. 
But when the mode of composition of Aristotle’s works is borne in 
mind, doublets need create no suspicion. Aristotle probably himself 
inserted the passage in both works. 

The main other passage on the four causes (apart from A. 983% 26-32, 


DNS 2. LOI B08 5 end ORAM 79 293 


which agrees with the present passage) is Av. Post. ii, τι. The 
general account there agrees with the present account, but instead of 
the material cause we have one which is called τὸ τίνων ὄντων ἀνάγκη 
τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι, and is in fact the causa cognoscendt, the premises of a 
syllogism, This appears in the present chapter as an zusiance of the 
material cause (1013? 20). The conception of the material cause in 
its wider sense occurs in De Gen. οἱ Corr. 318%9, 335%5, Meteor. 
342% 28, P. A. 640? 5, G. A. 715% 9, 762 τ, 778» 8, as well as in the 
Physics and the JZLetaphysics. 

IO1Z® 35. καὶ ὅσα δή κτλ. The principal verb must be supplied 
from the context. ‘We assign in the same way the causes of those 
things which’, &c. 

b16. eis τέτταρας τρόπους πίπτει. For this phrase cf. T. 1005? 2 ἢ. 

17-23. At the beginning of the chapter Aristotle distinguished that 
ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος and the εἶδος or παράδειγμα; he now 
includes both under the ἐξ οὗ, which is of two kinds, the ὑποκείμενον 
and the τί ἣν εἶναι. Matter and form are similarly called the évurdp- 
xovra αἴτια in A. 1070) 22. 

22. τὸ ὅλον, Alexander points out, here means not the unity of form 
and matter but the ὁλότης or τελειότης Which supervenes on the parts. 
It is the σύνθεσις or form of combination of the elements. 

30-34. The antithesis between the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον and the περιέχον is 
not exactly that of specific and generic, nor that of individual and 
universal, It secms to include both of these as varieties, The language 
here points to the former, but » 35, 10148 22 show that the latter is 
also intended. 

34. The chapter so far has dealt with proper causes ; Aristotle now 
passes to incidental causes. If the sculptor is the proper cause of the 
statue, then (1) if the sculptor is Polyclitus, Polyclitus may be called the 
cause ; (2) since Polyclitus is a man and man is an animal, ‘a man’ 
or ‘an animal ” may be said to be the cause ; (3) if Polyclitus is white or 
musical, ‘a white (man)’ or ‘a musical ney? may be called, more 
remotely, the cause. (2) and (3) answer to the distinction in the 
Categories (ch. 2) between τὸ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου and τὸ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, 
while (1) answers to the ὑποκείμενον itself. 

10143 7. παρὰ πάντα κτλ. For παρά referring to two independent 
and intersecting lines of division cf. E. 1026% 35,1. It is unnecessary 
to excise it, with Bz. 

12. καὶ χαλκοῦ τοῦδε ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ ὅλως ὕλης. It is surprising to find 
ὕλη described as an effect. Bz. therefore takes the sentence to mean 
that this statue, a statue, or (more generally) an image may be said to 
be the effect, as (ὁμοίως καί) this bronze, bronze, or matter may be 
said to be the cause. But the genitives χαλκοῦ, &c., are on this view 
quite inexplicable, and the structure of the sentence does not suggest 
this way of taking*xaé. It seems better to suppose Aristotle to mean 
that the metal-worker may be said to produce this bronze, bronze, or 
(in general) material, sc. for the sculptor. Cf. ae 1045 33 ποιοῦσιν 
αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς αἱ δ᾽ εὐεργόν, by ἡ δὲ ὡς ποιητικὴ τῆς 


294 COMMENTARY 


ὕλης. Alexander gives both interpretations, Simpl. cz Pays. the 
latter. 

16. τὸ μὲν πλῆθος ἕξ. The cause of a statue may be said to be (1) 
a sculptor, (2) an artist, (3) Polyclitus, (4) a man, (5) a sculptor, 
Polyclitus, (6) an artistic man. 

20. τὰ μὲν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ Ta καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. Aristotle has treated the 
antithesis of καθ᾽ ἕκαστον and περιέχον and that of ἐνεργοῦν and κατὰ 
δύναμιν as distinct. But here he suggests that the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον is the 
same as the ἐνεργοῦν (καί being explicative). This is partly justifiable. 
For the universal is never operative save in so far as it is realized in 
individuals; it is not ‘the artist’ but a particular artist who actually 
produces a house (cf. A. 1071%17-24). But within the individual 
artist there is a further distinction between potentiality and actuality ; 
the οἰκοδόμος is different from the οἰκοδομῶν. In 1]. 23 strict logic 
would require ὅδε 6 οἰκοδομῶν (which is the reading in the Physics), 
but owing to the confusion between the ἐνεργοῦν and the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον 
Aristotle writes ὅδε 6 οἰκοδόμος. 


‘Element’ (ch. 3). 


1014 26. ‘Element’ means (1) the primary constituent which is 
indivisible into parts specifically different from itself, e. g. letters of the 
alphabet, the physical elements. 

85. So too we speak of the elements of geometrical proof or of 
proof in general. 

bg. (2) Whatever is one, small, and capable of many uses ; and so 
whatever is most universal, e.g. the unit, the point. 

g. Hence genera are said by some to be elements, and more so 
than their differentiae. 


On the treatment of στοιχεῖον in this chapter cf. Diels, Evementum, 
23-32. 

10148 26. ἐνυπάρχοντος marks the difference between στοιχεῖον and 
ἀρχή or αἴτιον. Thus ὕλη, στέρησις, εἶδος are στοιχεῖα ; the external 
efficient cause is ἀρχή but not στοιχεῖον (A. 1070» 22, Phys. 189? 16). 

27. ἀδιαιρέτου... εἶδος. Diels (23 n. 3) says that the definition 
ought to have run ἀδιαιρέτου, ἢ εἰ dpa, εἰς ἕτερον εἶδος (sc. ἀδιαιρέτου): 
this would have distinguished the case of the letters, which are 
indivisible, from that of the physical elements, which are only divisible 
into μόρια ὁμοειδῆ. But Aristotle’s definition applies correctly enough 
to both cases. A long vowel can be divided, but only into shorter 
vowels of the same kind. 

32. λέγουσιν ot λέγοντες. Aristotle frequently réfers to elements in 
this sense as τὰ καλούμενα Or λεγόμενα στοιχεῖα (e.g. Phys. 187 26, 
Meteor. 339” 5, P. A. 6468 13). It is clear that this usage of the word 
was not yet fully established. 


A. 2. 10142 16 — 3. roi4> to 295 

85. τῶν διαγραμμάτων. For the meaning cf. B. 9984 25 n., and for 
this use of στοιχεῖον cf. 9988 26 n. 

36. καὶ ὅλως τὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων, cf. Pol. 1295* 34. 

bg. Diels prefers the reading of Alexander, of πρῶτοι τῶν τριῶν, and 
interprets it with Alexander as meaning syllogisms in the first of the 
three figures, But there is not much point in a reference to the first 
figure in particular, and it seems better to follow EJ. Aristotle 
means then ‘the primary syllogisms which (as opposed to sorites) 
have only three terms and only one middle term’. 

4. ἐπὶ πολλὰ ἢ χρήσιμον. To this sense, as Bz. observes, may be 
referred the use of στοιχεῖον in the sense of τόπος, an argument 
applicable to a variety of subjects (Zop. 120% 13, 121? 411, 15118, 
Rhet. 1358 35, 1306} 21, 1403717). 

6. For the omission of τό with the infinitive cf. Z. 10307 1-2 n., 10315 
II, 1033°32, An. Pr. 67>13, Pl. Menex. 24734, Symp. 194D 3, 
Rep. 493 D1, 523 E5. 

8-g. To account for the accusative ἀρχάς in ]. 9. we must omit d.0 
and read δοκεῖν (with EJ), and treat καὶ τὸ ἕν... εἶναι as going with 
ἐλήλυθε (like τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου στοιχεῖα εἶναι). 

Aristotle is referring to Pythagorean and Platonic views (οἵ, A. 
9864 1, B. 3, Z. 1028 15-18, A. 10694 26-28, &c.). 

10. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν, the reading of AP and of the lemma in 
Alexander, gives a better sense than εἷς yap ἔστι λόγος αὐτῶν. τὰ 
καλούμενα γένη here must mean summa genera, and these are indefinable 
since they cannot be analysed into genus and differentia. 


‘Nature’ (ch. 4). 


1014" 16. φύσις means (1) the genesis of growing things, 

17. (2) the part from which growth begins, 

18. (3) the internal principle of movement in natural objects. 

20. Growth is.the drawing of increase from something without by 
contact and concretion or accretion, 

26. (4) the unshaped and unchanging matter from which natural 
objects are produced ; 

32. in this sense one or more of the four elements is said to be the 
‘nature’ of natural objects ; 

85. (5) the essence of natural objects ; 

1015% 3. thus we say a thing has not its nature till it has its form, 
A natural object is the union of (4) and (5). 

7. Thus both the first (which may mean either the proximate or the 
ultimate) matter, and the form which is the end of the process of 
becoming, are nature. 

11. (6) Essence in general. 


296 COMMENTARY 


13. The primary meaning is ‘the essence of things that have 
a principle of movement in themselves gua themselves’; the other 
meanings are derivatives of this. 

17. Nature in this sense is the principle of movement of natural 
objects, present in them potentially or actually. 


The senses of φύσις are discussed also i in Phys. ii. τ, and the two 
chapters correspond as follows : 
1014) 16, 17 to 193% 12-18. 
18-20 to 1926 8—193? 2. 
26-32 to 1934 9-17. 
$2535 101034 17.590: 
35—I1015* 5 to 193° 30} 12. 

There is nothing in the Physzcs answering to 1014 17-18, 20-26, 
ΙΟΙΡ8 6-19. 

1014} 17. οἷον εἴ τις ἐπεκτείνας λέγοι τὸ υ, i.e. SO as to bring out 
the derivation of φύσις from φύω, in most of the tenses of which v is 
long. It seems doubtful whether φύσις ever had this meaning of 
‘birth’ or ‘growth’. In the single passage of Homer in which the 
word occurs, Od. x. 302-3 ὡς dpa φωνήσας πόρε φάρμακον ἀργει- 
φόντης | ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας, καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε, it may be translated 
‘growth’ but more likely means ‘nature’. Diels cites it as meaning 
Entstehung in two fragments of Empedocles, fr. 8 (quoted below 
ro15# 1) and fr. 63 ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις" ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός .. .» 
but in the first of them it seems to mean ‘substantial, permanent 
nature’, and in the second ‘substance’; and the general meaning in 
the pre-Socratics is pretty much the same, ‘stuff’ or ‘material’. The 
references I have traced to φύσις in the meaning of γένεσις are Pl. Laws 
892 ὁ φύσιν βούλονται λέγειν γένεσιν τὴν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα, Ar. Phys. 19312 
ἔτι δ' ἡ φύσις ἡ λεγομένη ὡς γένεσις ὁδός ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν, and the 
present passage ; and these seem to be ‘learned’ references to ἃ sup~ 
posed etymological meaning. But, as Prof. Burnet points out (Z. G. P.* 
363) though φύομαι means ‘I grow’, ‘the simple root φυ is the 
equivalent of the Latin fu and the English de, and need not necessarily 
have this derivative meaning’. On the whole subject cf. Burnet 10-12, 
363-364. 

17. ἕνα δὲ ἐξ οὗ κτλ. This does not mean simply, as Alexander takes 
it to mean, the matter of which a natural object is made; that sense— 
the sense in which the word was used by many of the pre-Sccratics 
who wrote περὶ φύσεως (cf. Diels, Vorsokr. Index 650% 41 sqq.)—comes 
in 11, 26-35. What is referred to here is the inherent starting-point 
of growth (ἐξ οὗ φύεται), and Bz. is probably right in supposing that 
the seed is meant. 

20-26. τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, τὸ συμπεφυκέναι, τὸ προσπεφυκέναι are not 
three alternative modes of growth. τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, contact between the 
growing thing and its nutriment, is the first condition, but there must 
be in addition either τὸ συμπεφυκέναι oF τὸ προσπεφυκέναι, either the 


A. 4. 1014 17 — 101541 297 


complete absorption of the nutriment by the living body or the looser but 
still organic attachment of the embryo to the parent (the opposition 
between the two cases is, however, not well thought out, for in the 
latter case also there must be a complete absorption of the nutriment). 
For the opposition between ἁφή and σύμφυσις or συνέχεια cf. Κ. 
10694 5-12. 

26. ἀλλὰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, Thus there is σύμφυσις and συνέχεια 
between bone and muscle, but not qualitative identity. 

27. The reading τῶν φύσει ὄντων is confirmed by Al., Asc., and by 
Phys. 193%10 (and Simpl. and Phil. ad Joc.), where also similar 
instances are given, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ᾽ ὁ χαλκός. 
Otherwise ΑΡ᾽Β τῶν μὴ φύσει ὄντων would have had strong claims to 
consideration, as the examples given are actually artificial, not natural 
objects. It is highly unlikely that both here and in the PAyszcs οἷον 
should have the force assigned to it by Bz., that of introducing not an 
example but a comparison. Rather, the statue is introduced as an 
example of τὰ φύσει ὄντα because gua bronze it does exist by nature. 
Later, however, forgetting that he has so described the statue, Aristotle 
says (1. 32) that this usage applies a/so to τὰ φύσει ὄντα. 

ἀρρυθμίστου ‘unshaped’ in comparison with that which is made out 
of it. 

28. ἀμεταβλήτου ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς αὑτοῦ, ‘not capable of being 
changed from its own potency’. ἐκ = ‘out of’, not ‘by virtue of’; 
this is shown by Phys. 193226 καὶ τούτων μὲν (sc. τῶν στοιχείων) 
ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἀΐδιον (od yap εἶναι μεταβολὴν αὐτοῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν) ; cf. 1014» 31 
διασωζομένης τῆς πρώτης ὕλης. 

IOI5* 1. φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἐόντων κτλ. fr, 8 Diels. The full form of 
the fragment is 


ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω. φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάντων 
θνητών, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή, 

3 Ν / 

ἀλλὰ μόνον κτλ. 


Plutarch (Adv. Col, 11124) takes φύσις = γένεσις. Subsequent 
scholars have followed him in this and have interpreted θανάτοιο τελευτή 
as = θάνατος; Plutarch himself reads θανάτοιο γενέθλη, which also 
practically = θάνατος. But Prof. Lovejoy argues (Philosophical Review, 
Xviii. 371 ff.) that Empedocles can hardly have said ‘there is no death 
of mortal things’, and that his point must be that things other than the 
four elements have no permanent nature and are always dying. It is 
clear that Aristotle interprets φύσις in Empedocles as = permanent 
nature; if he had interpreted it as = γένεσις he would have quoted 
Empedocles in illustration of the first sense of φύσις (1014 τύ, 17), 
not of the fifth. So, too, in De Gen. εὐ Corr. 333 13-18 we have 
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἡ ἑκάστου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μόνον “‘ μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε 
puyevtov” . . . τῶν δὴ φύσει ὄντων αἴτιον τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν, καὶ ἣ ἑκάστου 
φύσις αὕτη, περὶ ἧς οὐδὲν A€yer’ οὐδὲν ἄρα περὶ φύσεως λέγει, Where again 
φύσις in Empedocles is interpreted by οὐσία, permanent nature. In 
De Gen. et Corr. 314 7, where Aristotle again quotes the passage, it 


298 COMMENTARY 


is not clear whether Aristotle interprets φύσις as = γένεσις OF = οὐσία, 
but in the light of the other two passages of Aristotle the latter seems 
more probable. In JZXG. 975» 6 φύσις is taken as = γένεσις. 

It is another question what Empedocles himself meant by φύσις. 
Prof. Lovejoy’s argument is not conclusive against the older inter- 
pretation. It would be quite possible for Empedocles to say ‘(so- 
called) mortal things do not really come into being and pass away in 
death’. But though Aristotle recognizes γένεσις as a meaning of 
φύσις (1. 16), this is perhaps merely an acknowledgement of the 
derivation of the word. There seems to be no other passage in the 
pre-Socratics in which φύσις has this meaning; in Emp. fr. 63 ἀλλὰ 
διέσπασται μελέων φύσις" ἡ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός ..., which Diels cites in his 
Index under this sense, Burnet’s ‘substance’ seems more likely to be 
the correct translation. On the whole therefore Prof. Lovejoy’s view 
seems to be the more probable. Cf. ror4? 17 ἡ. 

2. διάλλαξις. AZXG. 975" 15 paraphrases this by διάκρισις, Aetius 
by διάστασις, Plutarch by διάλυσις. Diels translates Austausch 
(interchange), but though διαλλάττειν usually means ‘to change’ or 
‘exchange’, that meaning is rather pointless here. Aetius’ and 
Plutarch’s interpretation is confirmed by such passages as Hippoc. 
de Victu i. 6 προσίζει yap τὸ σύμφορον τῷ συμφόρῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀσύμφορον 
πολεμεῖ καὶ μάχεται καὶ διαλλάσσει ἀπ᾿ ἀλλήλων, Xen. Hell. iv. 3. 3 
διαλλάττειν τὴν χώραν, Pl. Soph. 223 Ὁ τὸ... ἐξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν 
διαλλάττον, 2. WV. 116125, ττόρῦ 24, 11764 10, 

6. ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, i.e. the matter (ἐξ οὗ πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ εἶναι) 
and the form. 

8. ἡ ὅλως πρώτη. ‘This is not a reference to materia prima in the 
technical sense in which it is used by the schoolmen, but only to what 
is, if we may so put it, comparatively ultimate. Water is not maéerza 
prima, qualityless matter. 

10. εἰ πάντα τὰ τηκτὰ ὕδωρ, cf. 1023%28. This is the doctrine of 
the Zimacus (58D). Aristotle’s own doctrine (Jefeor. 382» 31) is that 
things capable of being solidified and melted are composed either of 
water, or of water and earth. 

17-19. καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ... ἐντελεχείᾳ : i.e. φύσις in the fifth sense is 
also φύσις in the third. 

18-19. δυνάμει, as the soul is present in the seed; ἐντελεχείᾳ, as it 
is in the grown animal—so Alexander. 


‘Necessary’ (ch. 5). 


ΙΟΙ58 20. ‘Necessary’ is applied to (1) (@) a condition without 
which one cannot live, 

22. (4) that without which the good cannot be or come to be, 

26. (2) the compulsory, i. 6. that which hinders something and resists 
its impulse, 


A. 4. 1015%2— 5. 1015> 15 299 


838. (3) that which cannot be otherwise ; 

35- to this sense the others may be referred. 

"6. In this sense too demonstration is necessary; its necessity 
depends on the necessity of the premises. 

g. All things that are necessary are so either by reason of some- 
thing else or in their own right. What is so in the latter sense is the 
simple, that which can only be in one way. ‘Therefore if there are 
eternal and unchangeable entities, nothing compulsory or unnatural 
can pertain to them. 


Aristotle recognizes in this chapter three main senses of ‘ necessary ἡ, 
answering to the three which are briefly mentioned in A. 107211. 
1015* 20-26 answers to οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τὸ εὖ, 26-33 to τὸ Bia ὅτι παρὰ 
τὴν ὁρμήν, 33— 9 tO τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς. The first of 
the three is sometimes referred to as τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως (Phys. 199) 34, 
De Somno 455° 26, P. A. 639” 24, 6428 9). We get the first and the 
third in P. A. 639» 24, 642% 32, the last two in E. 1026) 28, An. Post. 
94" 37. 

ΙΟΙ58 25. τὸ πλεῦσαι εἰς Αἴγιναν iva ἀπολάβῃ τὰ χρήματα. Christ 
connects this ingeniously with the reference in the 13th Platonic letter 
(3628) to Plato’s sending for money to one Andromedes of Aegina, 
presumably a banker. 

29. Εὔηνος, of Paros, a sophist and elegiac poet of the time of 
Socrates. The line quoted is fr. 8 in Hiller, and is quoted also in 
dehelsea70? 10, 1... 1223 31: 

30. Σοφοκλῆς, El. 256 ἀλλ᾽ ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ᾽ ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν. 

86. τό τε γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον κτλ., “ἃ thing is said to do or suffer 
what is necessary in the sense of compulsory ’. 

b 8. ἁπλῶς, i.e. not with a qualification nor merely ad hominem. 

g. The point he has made, that the necessity of demonstration 

depends on the necessity of the premises, leads Aristotle to divide ra 
ἀναγκαῖα in general into those which are so in their own right and 
those which are so derivatively. ‘That which is necessary in the first 
sense is the simple (I. 12), whose nature admits of no variation; in 
other words the eternal and unchangeable (1. 14). What is necessary 
in this sense cannot be subject to necessity in the sense of compulsion 
Ils Tag) 
; A nae τὰ ἀναγκαῖα in the senses explained in ἃ 20-33, and some 
of τὰ ἀναγκαῖα in the senses explained in ἃ 33--ῦ 9 (i.e. the conclusions 
of demonstration) are derivative ἀναγκαῖα. It is only τὰ πρῶτα, the 
ultimate premises of demonstration, that are necessary in their own 
right. 

15. οὐδὲν ἐκείνοις κτλ. Since they can only be in one condition, 
they cannot be in a condition that is forced on them or contrary to 
their nature. Jaeger argues for the reading οὐδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις, but οἵ, 
B. 996% 23 ἢ, 


300 COMMENTARY 


‘One’, ‘Many’ (ch. 6). 


101516. Things that form a unity may do so (1) acctdenially, as 
(2) ‘Coriscus’ and ‘ the musical’ (or ‘ musical Coriscus ’), 
(6) ‘the musical’ and ‘the just’, 
(c) ‘musical Coriscus’ and ‘just Coriscus’, 


20. The two things in (6) are one because they are attributes of one 
substance ; those in (a) are one because one is an attribute of the other 
(so too (4) ‘ musical Coriscus’ is one with ‘Coriscus’ because one part 
of the complex is an attribute of the other); those in (ες) because 
‘musical’ and ‘just’ are attributes of one substance. 

28. Similarly (6) ‘man’ and ‘musical man’ are one, either because 
‘musical’ belongs to ‘man’, which is one substance, or because both 
‘man’ and ‘musical’ belong to one individual, though in different ways. 

36. (2) Things essentally one are so (a) by continuity; things con- 
tinuous by nature are more one than those made continuous by art. 

1016* 5. The continuous is that whose movement essentially is and 
must be one, i.e. indivisible in time. Contact does not constitute 
continuity. 

9. The continuous is the more one if it has no bend, because then 
its motion must be simultaneous. 

17. (4) (i) Because their substratum is one in kind, i.e. indistin- 
guishable to sensation. The substratum referred to may be either the 
proximate or the ultimate. 

24. (ii) Because their genus is one. Horse and man are one 
because they are both animals ; isosceles and equilateral are one figure 
because they are both triangles. 

32. (c) Because their definitions are indistinguishable. 

ba. That is most fully one which thought cannot divide in respect of 
time, place, or definition—especially if it be a substance. A thing is 
one in that respect in which it is indivisible. 

6. Most things that are one are one by virtue of some relation to 
what is directly one; those things are primarily one whose substance 
is one in continuity (cf. 1015 36—1016 17), kind (1016 17-32), or 
definition (32- 6). 

11. In some things we require unity of form as well as continuity 
before we call them one. 

17. (3) To be one is to be a starting-point of number, or the first 
measure of a genus. Different genera have different units. 

23. In every case the unit is indivisible either in quantity or in kind. 
In quantity there is the absolutely indivisible and positionless (the unit), 


A. 6. 101516 — 101671 301 


the absolutely indivisible which has position (the point), that which is 
divisible in one, two, or three dimensions (the line, the plane, the 
solid). 

gi. Again, there is unity in number, species, genus, or by analogy. 
Each of these implies those that follow it, but not vice versa. 

10172 3. ‘Many’ has senses corresponding to the three kinds of 
essential unity. 


There is a partial correspondence between this chapter and I. 1, 
which may be shown as follows: 

1015) 36—10164 17 = 10527 19-21. 
10162 32—) 6 = 10524 29-34, 

1016 11-17 = 10524 22-28, 

1016) 17-31 = 1052) 15—1053? 8. 

In I. 1 the accidentally one is expressly excluded from consideration ; 
the one in matter and the one in genus do not reappear as such; and 
interest is concentrated chiefly on the primary meaning of ἕν, viz. 
measure. The senses treated of in 1015 36—10168 17, 1016) 17-31, 
4 32-» 6 reappear in Phys. 185) 7. 

1015 16-34. By an ἘΠ unity Aristotle means one grounded 
on a de facto conjunction, not on the essential nature of that which 
forms the unity. The various kinds of accidental unity referred to are 

(a) that cf substance and accident (Il. 17, 22), 

(ὁ) that of accident and co-accident (19, 21), 

(ὦ that of substance + accident and the same substance + another 
accident (20, 26), 

(4) that of substance + accident and substance (23-26), 

(6) that of genus +accident and genus (29). 

Of these (a) is the primary kind on which the others depend, 

17. Κορίσκος occurs again as an example in E. 1026 18, Z. 10374 7; 
also in An. Pr., Top., Phys., Parv. Nat., P.A., G.A., £.&. Coriscus 
of Scepsis was a member of a school of Platonists with whom Aristotle 
probably had associations while at the court of Hermias at Assos, 
¢. 347-344. He is one of those to whom the (genuine) Sixth Letter of 
Plato is addressed. Cf. Zeller ii. 1. 982 ἢ, 1, Jaeger, List. der Met. 
34, 35, and Arzs/, 112-117, 268. 

20. μουσικὸς Κορίσκος kat δίκαιος Κορίσκος, the reading of Alexander, 
is what the sense requires, for this is the kind of unity referred to in 
1. 26 καὶ 6 μουσικὸς Κορίσκος δικαίῳ Κορίσκῳ. 

28. For the distinction between γένος and καθόλου cf. A. 992” 12, 
Z. 1028 34. τὸ καθόλου includes differentiae and properties as well 
as genus. 

33. tows, cf. A. 987% 26 ἢ. 

1016? 1. φάκελλος, the form given by most of the manuscripts, is 
a corruption. In H. 104217 all the manuscripts give φάκελος, the 
ordinary form. ‘That this is the correct form is evident from metrical 
considerations (Eur. Cyc/, 242, Ar. Ran, 839). The manuscripts in 


302 COMMENTARY 
Hdt. iv. 62, 67 give φάκελος, those in Thuc, ii. 77 φάκελλος. Crénert, 
Mem. Graec. Herculanensits 75, relies on φακελῳν in Philodemus, Phes. 
i. 74. 21 Sudhaus (one of the most carefully written of the Philodemus 
papyri), and on φάκελος in Hesych. and Ltym. Magn. as against 
φάκελλος in Aen. Tact. 78. 3 Hug and in Suidas. The corruption is 
due to the false analogy of the Latin diminutive, and survives in the 
modern Greek φάκελλος, ‘an envelope’. 

5. The continuous is better defined in Phys. v. 3 without reference 
to movement, which is not really an element in the notion. 

6. ‘One motion’ is defined more exactly in PAys. v. 4 as that in 
which both 6 and ἐν 6 and ὅτε κινεῦται are one. 

ἀδιαίρετος δὲ κατὰ χρόνον, i.e. So that when one part moves all must 
move. Contrast ]. 11 ἐνδέχεται μὴ μίαν εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ σκέλους. 

9. ἄλλο συνεχὲς οὐδέν must clearly be the predicate, not the subject 
of the clause depending on φήσεις. The translation therefore is: ‘you 
will not say that these are one piece of wood, or one body, or one 
continuum at all’. 

16. μόριον ἔχον μέγεθος. to exclude, “as ΒΖ. observes, the case of 
a straight line rotating round its end form‘. Strictly, of course, a point 
is NOt a μύριον at all. 

17-17. Unity of the substratum in kind (Il. 17-24) and unity of genus 
(24-32) are introduced as if they were different types of unity, and 
these with unity by continuity (1015> 36—1016%17) and unity of 
definition (10162 32— 1} make four kinds. But in 1016 9 and ror7? 4 
Aristotle speaks of only three. εἴδει in 1016 9 might refer to either 
unity of the substratum in kind, or unity of genus; τῷ διαιρετὴν ἔχειν 
τὴν ὕλην κατὰ τὸ εἶδος 1017* 4 refers clearly to unity of genus. But 
it seems that these two are not distinguished so strongly by Aristotle 
from one another as they are from the other two. Unity of genus is 
introduced not by ἔτι, the usual mode of introducing a new sense, but 
by λέγεται δ᾽ ἕν καί, and this sense is said to be analogous to the second 
(ll. 27, 28). Both these kinds of unity are unity of substratum ; but in 
the one case it is the material substratum, in the other the genus as 
substratum of the differentiae, that is in question. 

It is to be noted also that the second, third, and fourth senses may be 
considered as forming a group opposed to the first. They are all forms 
of unity τῷ εἴδει as opposed to τῷ ποσῷ (ἢ 23). 

18. ἀδιάφορον... ὧν = ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν ἐν τούτοις ὧν. 

20. τὸ πρῶτον might mean either the prime or the proximate matter 
(cf. 101527); but ἔσχατον in 1. 23 means ‘ultimate’, so that πρῶτον ὁ 
presumably means ‘ proximate’. τὸ τελευταῖον πρὸς τὸ τέλος must then 
mean ‘last, counting from the end’. 

23. ὕδωρ yap ἢ ἀήρ. Aristotle himself connects χυμοί rather with 
moisture (De An. 4228 το, 17), and so wine is said to be a form of 
water (AZezeor. 382 13, 3892 27). But oil he calls a product of air 
(384° 1) or of air and water (384215, 388231). His remark here is 
thrown out rather at a venture. Only ὕδωρ, not ἀήρ, is meant to apply 
to τὰ τηκτά, and for this cf. ro15® ro n. 


A. 6. 1016% 5 — 101656 303 


28-32. Having pointed out that different species are ‘one’ if they 
belong to the same genus, Aristotle now points out that zzfimae species 
of the genus ~, if this is itself a species of the genus y, are said to be 
‘one γ᾽ but not ‘one x’. The isosceles and the equilateral triangle 
are one (kind of) figure but not of triangle (really, this is true not only 
of zujfimae spectes but of any included in a genus that is itself included 
in another). ‘Sometimes they are said to be the same in respect of 
the higher genus (if they are zzfimae species of their genus), viz. of the 
genus above the genera of which their proximate genus is one.’ τὸ 
ἀνωτέρω τούτων, which it seems best to read with Alexander, is epexe- 
getic of τὸ ἄνω γένος, and τούτων, it seems, must mean the proximate 
genus and its co-ordinate genera; otherwise ἀνωτέρω τούτων would 
have to mean not ‘above these’ but ‘higher above these’, which it 
cannot mean. But the words are suspiciously like a gloss. 

32. From generic unity Aristotle now proceeds to specific. 

33. ἀδιαίρετος πρός, ‘indistinguishable from’. For this sense of 
ἀδιαίρετος Cf, De An. 427% 2, 6. 

34. Tov δηλοῦντα τί ἣν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα. The accusative appears 
to be found only once elsewhere in Aristotle with τί ἢν εἶναι (Ζ. 1029» 
14), and is suspect there, so that τί ἦν εἶναι should in all probability be 
regarded as a gloss, 

835. πᾶς λόγος διαιρετός. Every definition may be analysed into 
genus and differentia. 

> 2. χρόνῳ: The individual when growing may be distinguished 
from the same individual when wasting away (8 35), in time, even if 
not τόπῳ or λόγῳ, and so the individual at a single time is more fully 
one than the same individual at different times. 

τόπῳ. Different members of a species may be distinguished τόπῳ 
even if not χρόνῳ or λόγῳ, and are thus less truly one than a single 
individual. 

3. λόγῳ. Different aspects or attributes of the same individual may 
be distinguished λόγῳ even if not χρόνῳ or τόπῳ, and are thus less 
fully one than a single individual under a single aspect. This, then, is 
the most fully one of all things. 

καὶ τούτων ὅσα οὐσίαι. Aristotle no doubt means that since the 
other categories are dependent on substance, the unity of things in 
them depends on the unity of substance. 

5. οἷον εἰ ἣ ἄνθρωπος kth. ‘Eg. if two things are indistinguishable 
qua man, they are one (kind of) man’, as the isosceles and the 
equilateral triangle were said to be one figure because they are both 
triangles (8 31). 

6. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα. Alexander illustrates the different cases as 
follows : 

τῷ ἕτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἕν. Honey is one with honey because it affects 
things similarly, 

ἢ ἔχειν. Musician is one with musician. 

ἢ πάσχειν. One thing which is heated is one with another thing 


which is heated. 


304 COMMENTARY 


ἢ πρός τι εἶναι ev. Those who live to the east are all on the ‘right’ 
side of the world, and thus share in a sort of unity. 

9. ἢ συνεχείᾳ, cf. 1015” 36—1016" 17. 

ἢ εἴδει, cf. 1016 17-32 (see 10162 17-17 n.). 

ἢ λόγῳ, cf. 1016* 32- 6. 

11. ἔτι δ᾽ ἔστι. It seems better to read ἔτι with JTT yp. E than to 
read ἐπεί with the other manuscripts and suppose that the apodosis 
is forgotten after the two parentheses in Il. 13-16, 16-17. Alexander 
conjectured ἔτι for ἐπεί. 

17-1017* 3. Aristotle now passes from the enumeration of various 
kinds of things that are one to a definition of the meaning of ‘one’— 
the meaning ‘which καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγὺς TO ὀνόματί ἐστι, τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐκεῖνα, 
as he says in making the same transition in I. 1052» 6. 

17-18. τὸ δὲ Evi... εἶναι. ‘To be one is to be a starting-point of 
number’, i.e. (as ll. 18-21 show Aristotle to mean) to be the minimum 
countable unit, or recognizable member of a certainclass. The clause 
as thus interpreted seems to need no emendation. 

1g. Christ’s emendation δέ for γάρ is not necessary. ‘For the first 
measure is the starting-point ; for it is that by which first we recognize 
a class that is the first measure of that class.’ 

22. δίεσις, the smallest interval in music. Philolaus meant by it 
a minor semitone (Boethius, /ws/. Mus. iii. 5, 8, pp. 277, 278 Friedl.). 
Aristoxenus, the pupil of Aristotle, recognized three varieties of δίεσις---- 
the enharmonic (a quarter-tone), the chromatic (one-third of a ἐποιοῦ 
and the hemiolian (three-eighths of a tone) (Aristox. i. 21, iii. 61). 
Cf. Theo, p. 65. 11 Hiller, and 1. 1053715 ἢ. 

23. τῷ ποσῷ answers to the unity of continuity (1015 36—1016* 17); 
under τῷ εἴδει are summed up the other forms of unity discussed in 
1016817-h6. Cf. 417 ἢ. 

25. τὸ δὲ πάντῃ καὶ θέσιν ἔχον στιγμή. Cf. the Pythagorean 
definition of the point as μονὰς θέσιν ἔχουσα (Proclus mm μοὶ. 
Ρ- 95. 26). 

26. τὸ δὲ μοναχῇ, sc. διαιρετόν. 

31—1017 3. While in 1]. 24~—31 Aristotle has distinguished what we 
may call various degrees of intensity of unity τῷ ποσῷ, he now distin- 
guishes various degrees of intensity of unity τῷ εἴδει. This section 
answers to ὃ 17-- 6 as the preceding passage answers to 1015 36— 
ΙοΙόϑ 17. 

33. γένει δ᾽ ὧν τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας. It is surprising to 
find genus treated as co-extensive with category, and Bz. therefore 
takes κατηγορίας ‘in a more universal and primary sense’, so that ὧν 
τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας Means ‘the things to which the same 
predicate is attributed’. Bz. thinks that Aristotle has in mind certain 
main classes within each category, classes each of which has a charac- 
teristic set of predicates; e.g. number, which has the characteristic 
predicates ‘odd’, ‘even’, &c. There is, however, a strong pre- 
sumption against taking σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας in a sense other than 
its ordinary meaning of ‘category’, which it bears for example in 


Δ, 6. 1016 9 — 101745 305 


1017" 23, E. 1026° 36. Further, in 1024" 12-16, where genus in one 
sense is identified with σχῆμα κατηγορίας, the examples given show 
that σχῆμα κατηγορίας Means a category, and not one of its sub- 
divisions. The same identification of genus with category is implied 
in I. 1054” 29, 35, 1058813, Phys. 2279 4. A. 1024> 12-16 is fatal 
to Bz.’s interpretation in all these passages. The doctrine that is 
really implied is that the categories are the only genera proper, since 
they are the only genera that are not also species. 

34. kat ἀναλογίαν. For ἀναλογία as a relation between things 
in different categories cf. 2. 7. 1096? 28. 

ὡς ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο, cf. N. 109318 ἐν ἑκάστῃ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος κατη- 
γορίᾳ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὡς εὐθὺ ἐν μήκει οὕτως ἐν πλάτει τὸ ὁμαλόν, ἴσως 
ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ περιττόν, ἐν δὲ χροιᾷ τὸ λευκόν. 

1Ο178 1-ὦ. ὅσα δὲ γένει... ἀλλ᾽ ἀναλογίᾳ. Alexander explains that 
‘as man is to man, horse is to horse ; as man is animal, horse is animal’. 
This, however, is hardly adequate, and it seems more likely that it is 
by mere inadvertence that Aristotle has extended the principle of 
‘the greater unity implies the less’ to a case in which it is hard to 
attach any definite meaning to it. 

3-6. In this short list of the senses of ‘many’, Aristotle gives 
senses answering to the first sense of ‘one’ (1015> 36—1016# 17), 
the second (10164 17-24), and the fourth (10162 32-6); the third 
(10168 24-32) is doubtless merged in the second. Cf. 101617 ἢ, 

5. ἢ τὴν πρώτην ἢ τὴν τελευταίαν, cf. 101 58 ὃ n., 10168 20. 


; 


‘ Beng’ (ch. 7). 


1017 7. What ‘is’ may be (1) accidentally. 
(a) The just is musical, 
(4) the man is musical, 
(c) the musical is a man, 

18. (a) because both are accidents of the same subject, and this 7s ; 
(ὁ) because the predicate is an accident of the subject, and the 
subject zs ; 

(c) because the subject is an accident of the predicate, and the 
predicate zs. 

22. (2) The types of essential being answer to the forms of 
designation (categories), substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, 
passivity, place, time ; 

27. for any predication like ‘the man is walking’ can be put in the 
form ‘the man walks’. 

81. (3) ‘Being’ sometimes means truth, ‘ not-being’ falsity, e.g. in 
the emphatic ‘ Socrates 7s musical’, ‘ the diagonal zs 710} commensurate 
with the side’. 

2578-1 x 


306 COMMENTARY 


35. (4) ‘Being’ means being either potentially or actually ; 
» 6. this distinction applies to substances as well as to other things. 


10172 7--" 9. The same four senses of ‘ being’, (1) τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: 
(2) τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, (3) τὸ ὡς ἀληθές, (4) τὸ δυνάμει καὶ 
ἐντελεχείᾳ, reappear in E, 1026%33-> 2, (2), (3), and (4) appear in 
@. 10512 34- 2, N. 1089 26-28, cf. A. 1069? 27. 

4-22. For τὸ dv... τὸ... κατὰ συμβεβηκός cf. Τὴ, 1026? 2—1024? τό. 
The discussion of accidental being in the present passage answers 
closely to that of accidental unity in 1015 17-34. ὗ 

10-18. παραπλησίως λέγοντες ὡσπερεὶ... . οὕτω δὲ καί KTA., an instance 
of ‘binary structure’, as often with ὥσπερ in Aristotle. Cf. A. 
983 τό n. 

15. τὸ μέν refers to τὸν λευκὸν μουσικὸν ἢ τοῦτον λευκόν, 16. τὸ δ᾽ to 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὅταν μουσικὸν λέγωμεν. The three modes of accidental 
being mentioned in 1], 8-10 and again in 13--τ8 and in 20--22 are as 
follows :—X is accidentally Y when (1) Y is an accident of X, (2) X is 
an accident of Y, or (3) X and Y are accidents of Z. (2) and (3) 
evidently rest on (1), and (1) itself rests on the fact that X zs in a non- 
accidental sense. ‘To these copulative uses of ‘is’ Aristotle adds in 
ll. 18, 19 an existential use of it, ‘the not-white is’, This, however, 
can easily be turned into the copulative form ‘ the not-white is existent’, 
which rests on ‘ something that exists is not-white’ just as .‘ the white 
is man’ rests on ‘the man is white’; or (if we prefer to put it so) it 
rests on ‘some substance is existent and not-white’ as ‘the white is 
musical’ rests on ‘the man is white and musical’. 

QI. ἢ ὅτι αὐτό κτλ., ‘or because that to which belongs as an accident 
that of which it is itself predicated, itself exists’. ‘The musical is 
a man’ presupposes the existence of the man. 

22-30. So far Aristotle has been examining τὸ ὃν τὸ κατὰ συμβε- 
βηκός, i.e. the being which is implied in a proposition like ‘the man 
is musical’, the being which is nothing but an accidental and, it may 
be, merely temporary connexion between subject and attribute. He 
now proceeds to τὸ ὃν τὸ καθ᾽ αὐτό, which must, if the opposition is to 
be a proper one, mean the being which is a necessary connexion. 
This sense of being, like ‘accidental being’, will be capable of being 
illustrated by propositions. Four kinds of proposition exhibit such 
a connexion—those in which there is predicated of a subject its 
definition, its genus, its differentia, or its property. Now ‘essential 
being’ is said to fall into kinds which are either identical with or 
correspond to the categories. But propositions of which the subject 
belongs to one category, the predicate to another, will not readily lend 
themselves to a classification answering to the categories; nor will 
the connexion of subject and predicate be in such a case of the most 
direct, essential kind. Now where the predicate is a property of the 
subject, subject and predicate may be in different categories, so that it 
is not propositions of this kind that Aristotle has in view. Again, where 
the predicate is a differentia of the subject, they may be in different 


BINT, LOU] 7-22 307 


categories—the differentia of a substance, for example, is a quality 
(1020 33); so that such propositions are not intended here. And 
where the predicate is the definition of the subject, the same difficulty 
arises, so far as the differentia included in the definition is concerned. 
The only propositions in which from the nature of the case subject 
and predicate must be unambiguously in the same category are those 
in which the predicate is the genus of the subject. These, then, 
are the propositions which Aristotle has in view here. Being fer se is 
asserted in as many different ways as there are categories (Il. 22-24). 
I, e. if we examine propositions in which the B which A is said to de 
is the genus of A, we shall find that the being which is implied has 
different meanings according to the category to which subject and 
predicate belong. ‘Man is an animal’; ‘is’ takes its colour from 
the category to which the terms it connects belong. ‘White is 
a colour’; ‘is’ here has a different colouring. Now if we take any 
such proposition and push the question ‘ what is so-and-so’ as far as 
we can in the direction of generality, we come to one or other of ten 
supreme kinds. ‘ Man is an animal. An animal is a living thing. 
A living thing is a substance.’ ‘White is a colour. Colour is 
a quality.’ We can go no further. ‘Substance is a what?’ We 
can only say that it is a kind of entity, and that is all we can say 
of quality too. Thus essential being has ten ultimate meanings or 
colourings answering to the ten ultimate kinds of things that are. 

The conception of the categories as the ultimate types of answer 
to the question ‘what (i.e. what kind of thing) is so-and-so’ is best 
expressed in Z0p. 103” 27-37 δῆλον δ᾽ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι ὃ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων 
ὁτὲ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὁτὲ δὲ ποιόν, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριῶν. 
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκειμένου ἀνθρώπου φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ζῷον, 
τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ οὐσίαν σημαίνει" ὅταν δὲ χρώματος λευκοῦ ἐκκειμένου 
φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον λευκὸν εἶ εἰναι ἢ χρῶμα, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποιὸν σημαίνει ae 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων᾽ ἕκαστον yap τῶν τοιούτων, ἐάν τε αὐτὸ περὶ 
αὑτοῦ λέγηται ἐάν τε τὸ γένος περὶ τούτου, τί ἐστι σημαίνει. 

Aristotle makes his meaning unnecessarily obscure by citing 
(10174 27-30) propositions which do not assert essential being at all. 
‘The man is healthy ’, ‘ the man is walking’, ‘the man is cutting’ are 
purely accidental propositions just like ‘the man is musical’. But 
these propositions serve as well as essential propositions would to 
illustrate the point he is at the moment making—that ‘is’ takes its 
colour from the terms it connects. ‘The man is walking’ means 
nothing more or less than ‘the man walks’; the kind of being that 
is implied can be learnt only, and completely, by considering the 
terms connected by it. From the occurrence of these examples 
Maier infers (Syl. des Ar. ii, 2. 328 ἢ. 1) that it is by inadvertence 
that Aristotle associates the categories exclusively with essential being. 
He holds that the classification of being according to the categories 
cuts clean across the classification of it into essential and accidental. 
But it is most unlikely that so important a statement (which recurs in 
KE, 1026° 34-36 ὧν ἕν μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. . . παρὰ ταῦτα 

X 2 


308 COMMENTARY 


δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγοριας) Should be due to carelessness. It 
is much more in Aristotle's manner to use an example which while 
illustrating his immediate point obscures his main meaning. Accidents, 
of course, fall within the categories (70. 103 23-25), for the 
categories include everything that is. But the categories are the most 
general answers possible to the question ‘what is so-and-so fer se’, 
and in this sense they are the ultimate kinds of essen#zal being. 

It may seem surprising that Aristotle, while dwelling on the two main 
senses of the copulative ‘is ’—those in which it indicates respectively 
accidental and essential being—should say nothing of the existential 
‘is’, which nevertheless is presupposed in his account of accidental 
being (τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε 1. τό, cf. ll. 19, 20, 21). The reason 
is that, though logically the existential ‘is’ may be distinguishable 
from the copulative, metaphysically it is not. To be is either to be 
a substance, or to be a quality, or to be in some other of the 
categories, for nothing can be without being of some kind. 

Apelt goes, however, too far when he treats the doctrine of the 
categories as being essentially a classification of the senses of the 
copulative ‘is’ (Beitr. zur Gesch. ὦ. gr. Phil. 106-131). The 
present passage, which is perhaps that on which he most relies, pre- 
supposes the doctrine of the categories and 77/ers from it the existence 
of corresponding senses of essential being, which is a form of copulative 
being—émel οὖν τῶν κατηγορουμένων τὰ μὲν τί ἐστι σημαίνει; τὰ δὲ 
ποιόν, . .. ἑκάστῳ τούτων τὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ σημαίνει (Il. 24-27). 

28. τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας. ‘The phrase occurs also in E. 102 68 
36, Phys. 2270 4, and in the singular in 1016 34, I. 105429. In 
102413 we have σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος, in @. 1051®35 τὰ 
σχήματα TOV κατηγοριῶν. 

25-27. The full list of ten categories occurs only in Οὐαλ, 1» 25-27, 
Top. 103” 20-23. The present list of eight is common, cf. Az. Post. 
832 21, Phys, 2255, and shorter lists are commoner still. 

31-35. For τὸ ὃν ὡς ἀληθές cf. E. 4, Θ. το. 

The cases in which being means truth and not-being falsity are 
distinguished both from the accidental and from the essential sense of 
being. Evidently then an ordinary sentence of the type ‘A is B’ 
can hardly be used to illustrate this third sense, since it must be an 
instance of either the essential or the accidental sense. What we 
want is a proposition in which the truth or the falsity of another 
proposition is stated, and such propositions we find in those of the 
form ‘A zs B’, ‘A zs not B’, where the ordinary proposition ‘A is B’ 
is pronounced true or false. That this is what Aristotle has in mind 
is indicated by the emphatic position of ἔστι, οὐκ ἔστι in Il. 33-35. 

We can have ‘ being as truth ’ 

(a2) ἐπὶ καταφάσεως, where an affirmative proposition is pronounced 
true, as in ‘Socrates zs musical’, 

(ὁ) ἐπ᾽ ἀποφάσεως, where a negative proposition is pronounced true, 
as in ‘Socrates 7s not-pale’ ; 

and ‘ not-being as falsity’ 


A. 7. 1017%23—10179 309 


(4) ἐπὶ καταφάσεως, where an affirmative proposition is pronounced 
false, as in ‘the diagonal of the square zs of commensurate with 
the side’ 

(4) ἐπ᾽ ἀποφάσεως, where a negative proposition is pronounced false, 
as in ‘the square on the diagonal zs o/ not-commensurate with the 
square on the side’. (Aristotle does not illustrate this case.) 

85. Bz.’s reading σύμμετρος for ἀσύμμετρος is required by the sense, 
and amply confirmed by Alexander. 

35-" g. For τὸ ὃν δυνάμει Kal ἐντελεχείᾳ οἱ, @. passim. 

There is a difficulty about Aristotle’s classification of the senses 
of being. While the first three senses seem to answer to three types 
of judgement, 

(1) A is (accidentally) B, 

(2) A is (essentially) B, 

(3) A zs B (= it is true that A is B), 
the fourth answers not to a type of statement co-ordinate with these, 
but to two senses in which each of them may be taken (τὸ μὲν δυνάμει 
ῥητὸν τὸ δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων). 

1017} 1. ῥητόν has caused much difficulty to the editors, Elsewhere 
in Aristotle the word occurs only in its ordinary meaning of ‘stated, 
fixed’, which cannot be the meaning here. Yet it is not satisfactory to 
excise the word, for it occurs in all the manuscripts and as a variant in 
Alexander and Asclepius, and no plausible reason has been suggested 
for its intrusion if it is spurious. It seems quite possible to retain it, 
and it even makes the construction more natural (for τὸ εἶναι σημαίνει 
καὶ τὸ Ov TO μὲν δυνάμει TO δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων 15 Not Easy 
to construe). ‘ Being or “is” means, further, that some of the things 
we have named (i.e. of the judgements referred to under accidental 
being, essential being, and being as truth) can be sazd by virtue of 
a potentiality (resident in the subject), others by virtue of an actuality.’ 

ῥητῶς before ὁρῶν in |. 3 seems to be spurious; it is not found, as 
ῥητόν), τ is, in Ab, Al., Asc, 

6. ὁμοίως δὲ kal ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν. Aristotle passes now from attributes 
like ‘seeing’, ‘knowing’, ‘resting’ to substances, and among these 
he includes the half line which is inthe whole line in the sense that it 
is potentially there. A line is not, on his own view, a substance; the 
example is a concession to Pythagorean and Platonic views (cf. 1. 19). 
Cf. also 102020 ἢ. It is not necessary with Apelt to regard καὶ τὸ 
, ἡμισὺ τῆς γραμμῆς as interpolated from @. 1048* 33. 

9. ἐν ἄλλοις, Θ. 9. 


‘Substance’ (ch. 8). 


1017’ 10. ‘Substance’ is applied to (1) the simple bodies, or in 
general bodies, the animals and stars composed of them, and the parts 
of these; these are called substances because they are not attributes 
but subjects, 


310 COMMENTARY 


14. (2) the internal cause of being in such things, e. g. the soul, 

17. (3) the limits which are present in bodies and define their 
individuality, and whose destruction involves the destruction of the 
bodies, e.g. planes, lines, numbers, 

21. (4) the essence, 

23. Thus substance means (1) the ultimate subject which is never 
a predicate (cf. ll. 10-14), 

(2) what is individual and separable, i.e. the form (cf. 14-22). 


With the senses of ‘substance’ recognized in this chapter cf. those 
recognized in Ζ. 2, 3. 1017? 10-14 answers to 1028? 8-13, 1017? 17-21 
to 1028> 15-18. The formal cause of corporeal things (14-16) and 
the essence (21, 22) are not included among the generally recognized 
senses mentioned in Z%. 2, but essence is mentioned in the less 
superficial list given in Z. 3. 1028 34-36. 

1ΟΙ7Ρ 11. καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. For the probable meaning cf. H. 
10428 ἢ. 

12. faa. In Z. 10289 Aristotle says more accurately ‘animals and 
plants’. 

δαιμόνια, 1. 6. the heavenly bodies, as appears from Ζ. 1028) 12, 
H. 1042%10. They are often called θεῖα, e.g. E. 1026218, 20, 
A. 107 4° 30. 

17. μόρια. It is only loosely that planes, lines, and points can be 
said to be farts of solids, planes, and lines. According to Aristotle 
they are boundaries, not parts by whose summation the wholes are 
mace up. 

δρίζοντά τε καὶ τόδε τι σημαίνοντα, marking off individual from 
individual. The individual solid is bounded by planes, the plane by 
lines, the line by points. 

10. τινες, 20 τισι, Pythagoreans and Platonists. 

21. ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. That which is the substance of a thing in this 
sense is also its substance in the second sense (ll. 14-16)—cf. Ζ. 17. 
Thus soul is the substance of the animal in this sense (Z. 1035? 15) as 
well as in the second. But while substance in the second sense is the 
form of sensible bodies only, in the fourth the notion is widened so as 
to include the essence of anything. 

22. οὗ ὃ λόγος ὁρισμός, cf. Z. 10307 6 ff. 

23. The last three of the four senses mentioned earlier are now 
brought under the common heading of form, ‘ which being a this is also 
capable of separate existence’. The first of the four is now called τὸ 
ὑποκείμενον ἔσχατον, which (it is evident from ἢ], 10-14) means not 
prime matter but the individual which comprises both matter and form. 

25. The form is said to be (1) τόδε τι. It is more often the concrete 
unity of matter and form that is so described, but form is the element 
that gives individual character, and so the form is sometimes called 
τόδε τι (cf. H. 1042 29, Θ. 10494 35, A. 10708 11, 13-15, De Gen. οἱ 
Corr. 318” 32). 


Neo: 1017) 11-25 311 


It is said to be (2) χωριστόν. This is difficult, for Aristotle’s doctrine 
is that form is in general not separable from matter (cf. A. 1070# 13) ; 
soul, for example, is not separable from body, but only that part of it 
which is reason. χωριστόν must mean only ‘ Separable in thought or 
definition ’, Gir, Lal, 1042% 26 ἔστι ὃ ovcia... 6 λόγος καὶ 7 μορφή, ὃ 
τόδε τι ὃν τῷ λόγῳ χωριστόν ἐστιν, and Phys. 193” 4 τὸ εἶδος οὐ χωριστὸν 
ὃν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 


‘ The Same’, ‘ Other’, ‘ Different’, ‘ Like’, ‘ Unlike’ (ch. 9). 


1017 27. Things are ‘ the same’ (1) accidentally. 

(a) ‘the white’ is identical with ‘the musical’ because they are 
attributes of the same subject ; 

(4) ‘the man’ with ‘the musical’ and vce versa because one is 
an attribute of the other ; 

(c) ‘the musical man’ with ‘the man’ or ‘the musical’, and vice 
versa. * 

33. Because these identities are accidental, none of them can be 
generalized (as in ‘ every man is the same as the musical’), for universal 
propositions are essential. 

1018 5. (2) Essential identity means (4) unity of matter (i) in kind 
or (ii) in number, or (6) unity of essence. Identity is unity of being of 
two or more things, or of one thing treated as two or more. 

g. Things are called ‘other’ if (1) their kinds, (2) their matters, or 
(3) their definitions are more than one (cf. (a) (i), (a) (ii), (2) above). 

12. Things are called ‘different’ if they are other, being at the 
same time one—not in number but in species or genus or by analogy ; 
also things of different genus, contraries, and things that have their 
otherness in their essence. 

15. Things are ‘like’ if in all respects or most they have the same 
attributes, or if their quality is the same, or if they agree in the greater 
number or the more important of the attributes in respect of which 
things suffer alteration. ‘Unlike’ has the opposite senses. 


Aristotle’s best classification of the types of identity is found in Zop. 
I. 7. He recognizes there : 
(1) identity in number, i.e. of the same thing differently designated, 
(a) as of ἱμάτιον and λώπιον, or Of ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν and ἄνθρωπος, 
(6) as of τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν and ἄνθρωπος, 
(c) as of τὸ καθήμενον and Socrates. 
2) in species, as of man with man, 
νὴ in genus, as of horse with man. 
The triple classification, identity in number, species, genus, is 
common in Aristotle, identity by analogy being sometimes added, In 
I, 1054% 32- 3 we have 


312 COMMENTARY 


(1) identity in number, answering to (1) (6), (1) (¢) in Zop. 1. 7, 
(2) identity in definition and number, answering to (1) (a) 
(3) identity in definition, answering to (2). 

The reference to ὕλη in the present classification (1018? 6) indicates 
that this list has greater affinities with the list of types of unity in ch. 6. 

(1) Accidental identity (1017 27—10184 4) answers to accidental 
unity (1015 16-34). 

(2) Essential identity (a) of matter (i) in εἶδος (10184 6) answers to 
unity of the substratum in εἶδος (10164 17-24), 

(ii) in number (10184 6) answers to continuity (1015” 36 ~ 1016# 17), 

(2) of οὐσία (10188 7) answers to unity of λόγος (1016 32-- 6). 

At the same time (1) answers to (1) (¢) of the Zopzcs ; (2) (a) (i) to 
(2); (2) (8) to (1) (a). (2) (2) (ii) is a type not treated of in the Zoprcs. 

1017” 27—1018* 3. The accidental senses of ταὐτό answer to the 
accidental senses of ‘one’ given in ch. 6. The cases are as follows; 

(1) The white = the musical, cf. 1015? 21, 

(2) man = the musical and wie versa, cf. 1015” 22, 

(3) musical man: = the musical or man and vce versa, cf. 1015” 24. 

30-81. ἑκατέρῳ. . . ἐκείνων, each of the simple terms ‘man’ and 
‘musical’. τοῦτο, the complex term ‘ musical man’, 

33. διό, because these are accidental unities, 

1018*1, The text seems to be improved by the insertion of a colon 
after καθ᾽ αὑτά. Aristotle establishes the fact that accidental judge- 
ments are never universal by the premises (1017? 35, ror8* 1), 

Universals are essential, 

Accidents are not essential. 

Then he goes on ‘ Accidents (though, as we have seen, they cannot 
be predicated of universal subjects but require the subject to be qualified 
by a τις) are predicated of particular subjects ἁπλῶς, without any 
qualification’. 

2. The reference to ‘ musical Socrates’ is borrowed from Pl. Phaedo 
60 D—6r1 B, where Socrates tells Cebes of the words which haunted him 
in dreams, ’Q Σώκρατες, μουσικὴν ποίει καὶ ἐργάζου. 

5. ὁσαχῶσπερ. Jaeger’s emendation explains the origin of the 
otherwise mysterious reading ὅσα ὥσπερ, and gives a more forcible 
sense than AP’s ὥσπερ. Alexander’s τοσαυταχῶς... ὁσαχῶς (377.17 Ff.) 
points in the same direction. 

9-11. The three senses of ‘ other’ here given do not answer exactly 
to the senses of ‘the same’ given in ll. 5-9. There is not there 
anything that answers obviously to τὰ εἴδη πλείω. But the two 
classifications really reduce themselves to the same, thus: 

ἡ ὕλη μία εἴδει )ς τὰ εἴδη πλείω, 
ἡ ὕλη μία ἀριθμῷ IC ἡ ὕλη πλείω, 
ἡ οὐσία μία © ὁ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας πλείω. 

Specific difference of matter is equivalent to difference of species. 
For another classification of senses of ‘other’ cf. I. 1054» 14-18. 

11. ἀντικειμένως. In 1, 1054'19 Aristotle points out that the 
opposition is not contradictory opposition (for τὰ μὴ ὄντα are neither 


) 


A. 9. 1017 27 — 10184 18 313 


the same as nor other than other things), but is that of ἕξις to 
στέρησις. 

12. μὴ μόνον ἀριθμῷ Alexander interprets as meaning ‘only they 
must not be one in number’, taking μὴ μόνον as = μόνον μή. With this 
Bonitz compares E, 1025) 27 οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, 
οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον. οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον is, however, not a very close 
parallel to μὴ μόνον ἀριθμῷ, and it is doubtful whether it has the 
meaning corresponding to that which Alexander and Bonitz assign to 
μὴ μόνον ἀριθμῷ. <A different reading and punctuation seem preferable 
in that passage. ἢ 

But in the present passage the interpretation seems to be right. Cf. 
Eur. Cycl. 219 ὧν ἂν θέλῃς ov, μὴ ᾽μὲ καταπίῃς μόνον, ‘provided only 
that you don’t swallow me’. 

I, 1054? 24—10552 similarly insists that διάφορα must, while 
ἕτερα need not, be the same in some respect. 

Both the present passage and that in Book I and many others 
recognize that things in different genera may be διάφορα, and this 
is prima facte inconsistent with the usual account of διαφορά as existing 
only within a genus (cf. I. 1055826). The same inconsistency is 
found in the account of contraries, but cf, 1. 25 n. 

13-15. Bz. complains that we have here a cross division, since ὧν 
ἕτερον τὸ γένος are simply the things which are τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναλογίᾳ, which 
Aristotle has already referred to, and ὅσα ἔχει ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἑτερότητα 
are simply those which are τὸ αὐτὸ γένει, while τὰ ἐναντία do not imply 
a sense of ‘ different’ co-ordinate with the others here mentioned. It 
is, however, no part of Aristotle’s object to avoid cross division. He 
is simply giving the statements that might naturally be given of the 
meaning of ‘difference’, and if these overlap it is his business to state 
them nevertheless. 

14. ὅσα ἔχει ἐν TH οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἑτερότητα, cf.» 2,3. Alexander gives 
various alternative explanations: (1) that contraries are meant, (2) that 
Aristotle means things that without being contraries have some element 
of contrariety, as earth gua dry is contrary to water gua wet, (3) that he 
means things which have the same underlying subject but differ in 
definition, as ‘counterfeit’ and ‘drachma’, 

Aristotle’s language, however, is reminiscent of I. 1058% 7 λέγω yap 
γένους διαφορὰν ἑτερότητα ἣ ἕτερον ποιεῖ τοῦτο αὐτός. Difference is 
otherness which is not merely in the matter but enters into the very 
essence of the thing and constitutes a genuine differentiation of the 
genus. 

15-18. Bz. again complains of overlapping in the definitions, but as 
has been remarked on ]. 13 the objection is beside the mark. 

The senses of ‘like’ recognized in I. 1054} 3-13 are 

(1) ‘the same in εἶδος though not identical in number’, e.g. ‘like’ 
geometrical figures, 

(2) ‘having the same εἶδος and not differing in degree’, 

(3) ‘having the same πάθος in different degrees’, 

(4) ‘having more qualities the same than different’. 


314 COMMENTARY 


Of the senses recognized in the present passage the first answers 
roughly to (1) and (2) in this classification, the second and fourth to 
(4), the third to (3). 


‘Opposite’, ‘Contrary’, ‘Other in species’, ‘ The same in 
species’ (ch, το). 


10184 20. The term ‘opposites’ is applied to contradictories, con- 
traries, relative terms, positive terms and their privatives, the termini 
of generation and destruction, and incompatible attributes or their 
elements. 

25. ‘Contraries’ are attributes differing in genus and incapable of 
belonging to the same subject; the most different attributes in the 
same genus or in the same subject-matter or falling under the same 
faculty ; things whose difference is greatest absolutely or in genus or in 
species. 

81. Other contraries are so called by virtue of some relation (e.g. 
that of possession, reception, action, passivity) to these. 

85. The senses of ‘the same’, ‘other’, ‘contrary’ must vary with 
the senses of ‘ one’ and those of ‘ being’ (the categories). 

38. Things ‘other in species’ are those which, being of the same genus, 
are co-ordinate ; those which being in the same genus have a difference ; 
those which have a contrariety in their essence ; contraries, or con- 
traries per se; things whose definitions differ in the zzfima spectes ; 
attributes of the same substance which have a difference. 

b 7, ‘The same in species’ has corresponding meanings. 


The first four kinds of opposites here named constitute Aristotle’s 
ordinary list of the kinds of opposite, cf. I. 10552 38, 1057233, Caz. 
11> 17, Zop. 109 17, ii. 8, v. 6. Waitz finds in the other two (Il. 21-25) not 
separate kinds of opposite but marks by which opposites may be recog- 
nized; but Bonitz points out that Aristotle’s words do not suggest that 
these two are in a different position from the other four; and also that 
these marks are 7107 characteristic of τὰ πρός τ. He finds therefore in 
the discrepancy between this list and Aristotle’s ordinary list of opposites 
evidence of the late origin of Book A, A is much more likely to be of 
quite early origin. if we remember that Aristotle is jotting down the 
usages of ‘opposite’ in ordinary speech, we shall find no difficulty in 
a divergence from his own scientific classification. 

1018* 25-35. The first two senses of ἐναντίον answer to Caz. 142 19 
ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις 
γένεσιν ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι. 

The recognition of things differing in genus as one kind of con- 
traries is found in Cat. 14° 20, 70). 153° 36. Elsewhere ἐναντία are 


A. 10. 10188 25 —1018) 4 315 


said to be necessarily in the same genus, Cav. 64 17, An. Post. 73” 21, 
De Gen. οἱ Corr. 324% 2, and this is iniplied also in I. 4. The apparent 
inconsistency is removed if we remember that a genus may itself be 
a species of a wider genus. Thus the contraries, justice and injustice, 
which are in the contrary genera virtue and vice (Ca/. 14 22), are both 
included in the wider genus of ἕξις, and good and bad, which are 
contrary genera (148 24), are included in the genus of quality. It is 
evident that contraries must at all events be in the same category, 
even if they are not both included in any narrower genus. 

In fact yévos here is used in a looser sense than in Bk. I, where 
difference of genus implies the absence of a common matter and the 
impossibility of change from the one class to the other (1054) 28, 
10578 26). 

Of the senses of ‘contrary’ recognized here, the first (1. 26) does 
not appear in I. 4, the second (27) appears in 1. 4. 1055 27 f, the third 
(28) in 1055 29, the fourth (29) in 1055*31. The fifth (30) is rather 
a general summary of the senses than a distinct one; the sixth (31) 
appears in 1055° 35. 

28. καὶ τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ. This may be 
another way of putting the previous definition ; or it may be ἃ narrower 
definition, for, as Alexander says, rational and irrational, though 
differentiae of the same genus, are not found in the same δεκτικόν or 
ὕλη (δεκτικόν = ὕλη, Cf. I. 1055* 29 f.). That which is ever rational is 
never irrational. But in De Somno 453” 27 Aristotle says that con- 
traries are always in the same δεκτικόν. Maier thinks that the 
reference is to ἐναντιότητες ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ as Opposed to 
those ἐν τῷ λόγῳ (I. 1058" 1), i.e. to oppositions such as that of male 
and female (the same seed being capable of becoming male or female, 
ib. 23). But it is doubtful if the meaning is so definite as this. 

29. τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, e. g. of the objects of a single science 
(I. 1055" 31). 

38. dor... κατηγορίαν. Christ brackets these words and thinks 
there is no trace of them in Alexander, but they are paraphrased in 


AlN Santas 
On ἕτερα... . τῷ εἴδει cf. I. 8. 
"1. ο, καὶ ὅσα... διαφορὰν ἔχει. This is a wider definition than 


the previous one, since it will apply even to τὰ ὑπάλληλα, 1. 6. to species 
one of which includes the other. 

2-3. καὶ doa... ἔχει. Alexander illustrates by the case of water and 
fire, which, though not contraries, are characterized by contraries, cold 
and wet as opposed to hot and dry. Bonitz thinks this definitign is 
either wider than the foregoing, by including even things that are in 
different genera, or narrower, by excluding differents that are not 
opposites. The point of ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐναντίωσιν ἔχει Seems, however, to 
be to exclude things which have contrary attributes that arise from their 
matter and do not enter into their essence. Cf.#14n., I. 1058) 14, 22. 

4. τὰ λεγόμενα πρώτως excludes the contraries mentioned in ἃ 31-35, 
which are contrary only by standing in some relation to contraries. If 


316 -*COMMENTARY 


A and B, for instance, possess contrary qualities C and D, it does not 
follow that A and B are different in species. 

4-5. ὅσων... ἕτεροι. With the manuscript reading this can only 
mean ‘those things whose definitions differ in respect of the zxfima 
species’. But this use of ἐν with ἕτερος is surprising (the closest parallel 
I have found is Poet. 1448% 16 ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ Kal 7) τραγῳδία 
πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν) ; and we should expect ‘ differ in respect 
of the last dzfferentia’. Alexander’s words ὧν ἀτόμων εἰδῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ 
γένει ὄντων (383. 37) suggest the reading ὅσων, ὄντων τελευταίων τοῦ 
γένους εἰδῶν, οἱ λόγοι ἕτεροι, Which gives a good sense. If d6vrwy were 
once corrupted into ἐν τῷ, the remaining changes would follow. But 
in 384. 26 Alexander presupposes the manuscript reading. 

7. ὅσα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα ἔχει διαφοράν. Alexander explains this 
as meaning (1) individuals of the same species, or (2) bodies which are 
different though not contrary, as earth and water. But individuals of 
the same species could not be called ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, and it is difficult to 
see in what sense earth and water are ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ. (Bonitz’s notion 
that Alexander had a negative before ἔχει is a mistake; see Al. 384. 
28 and the context.) The natural meaning of the words seems to be 
‘attributes which may belong to the same substance (at different times) 
and which have a difference’, as hot and cold are in the same 
substance iron and have a difference. Cf. ἃ 28 τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα 
TOV ἐν ταὐτῷ δεκτικῷ. 


‘Prior’, ‘ Posterior’ (ch. 11). 

1018» 9. ‘Prior’ means (1) that which is nearer some beginning 
determined absolutely or relatively, e. g. in respect of 

12. (a) place, 

14. (ὁ) time, 

19. (ε) movement, 

21. (4) power, 

26. (¢) arrangement ; 

30. (2) the prior in knowledge 

(a) in respect of definition, e.g. the universal as against the par- 
ticular, the accident as against the complex of substance and accident, 

(2) in respect of sensation, e. g. the particular. > 

87. (3) Attributes of things fer se prior are themselves said to be 
prior. 

1o1g*2. (4) The prior in nature and substance, i.e. that which can 
be without another, while the other cannot be without z¢ (a Platonic 
distinction), (If we take account of the varieties in the meaning of being, 

(a) substratum or substance is prior to attribute, 

(4) part as against whole, matter as against concrete substance, is 
prior in potentiality, posterior in actuality.) . 


A, 16210184 ἐπε hI 101904 4 317 


11. “All the senses of ‘prior’ depend on this last sense. E. ¢. the 
whole can exist without the part in generation, the part without the 
whole in dissolution. 


In Cat. 12 we have the following classification of the senses of 

prion 2 : 

(1) in time, 

(2) τῷ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, 

(3) κατά τινα τάξιν, e.g. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. 

(4) The better is prior τῇ φύσει. 

(5) Of two reciprocating terms, the cause is prior to the effect τῇ 
φύσει. 

In the present passage, priority in time ((1) in the Cafegories) is 
included in a wider type, τῷ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι ἀρχῆς τινός (1018) g~29). 
(2) in the Categories answers to the fourth main sense in the present 
passage (τοιοῦ 2-4). (3) in the Cafegories answers roughly to (2) in 
Book A (1ror8? 30-37). (4) and (5) in the Cafegorzes do not appear 
distinctly in A but can be brought under the very wide first sense. 

More cursory distinctions of various senses of priority are found in 
Phys. 260> 18, 261° 14 (cf. De Gen. An. 742221, A, 989%15, 
@. 1050° 4, M. 1077219, Rhef. 1392%20), 265922, Ζ, 1028" 32, 
1038) 27, Θ. 1049 11, M. 10747 2. 

1018) 21. ἁπλῶς, without qualification, by its own nature. Cf, 
Ἰ, τι ἁπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει. η 

27. κατά τινα λόγον. It is impossible to assign any suitable 
meaning to κατὰ τὸν λόγον in this context, and Jaeger seems to be right 
in reading κατά twa λόγον, ‘ina certain ratio’ (cf. λόγῳ τινι G. A. 740» 
32, 767%17). Alexander’s ἔν τινι λόγῳ (386. 10) points to this read- 
ing, and τόν came in owing to the copyist’s running his eye on to κατὰ 
τὸν λόγον in |, 31 f. 

38—I019° 1. τὸ μὲν... ἐπιφανείας, Aristotle assumes that the line 
is prior to the plane, which it is in the sense explained later, τοῖο 8, 

1019*4. The reading ἐχρήσατο is better attested than ἐχρῆτο. 
There seems to be no passage in Plato in which this distinction is 
drawn (Apelt’s attempt to find it in 777. 34c is not successful) ; 
Aristotle is thinking doubtless of an oral utterance of his master. 
Trendelenburg conjectures that Aristotle has in mind Plato’s doctrine 
of the priority of one ideal number relatively to another, cf. B. 9998 8, 
M. 6; we cannot be sure whether Aristotle is thinking of this or of 
some more general statement about the meaning of ‘ prior’. Mutsch- 
mann in his edition of Drviszones Artstofelicae, p. xvii, holds that 
here and in De Gen. ef Corr. 330° τό, P. A. 6429 12 there is a refer- 
ence to an actual Platonic book of Divisions ; but the reference in the 
other two passages may be to the Sophzs/es and the Politicus. 

ἐπεὶ δέ κτλ. Aristotle has used the word εἶναι in his statement of 
this final sense of ‘prior’ (I. 3). He therefore now considers what 
bearing the different senses of ‘be’ (ch. 7) have on the senses of 


318 COMMENTARY 


priority. He takes first the distinction between substance and the 
other categories (1017° 22~30). Since substance zs in a fuller sense 
than the other categories, it is prior to them. 

Next, he has distinguished being potentially from being actually 
(1017* 35- 8). Now ‘the part is prior potentially, posterior actually ’. 
Aristotle’s meaning is hard to seize and is not very satisfactory. He 
seems to mean that in considering a whole we should naturally say 
‘the whole cannot exist without the parts, but they can exist without 
it, and therefore (according to 1. 3) they are prior’; but that when we 
reflect we find that in the whole the parts do not exist actually. The 
half-line does not exist till the whole has been cut in two; the matter 
does not exist till the concrete thing has been resolved into its com- 
ponents. Actually, therefore, the parts will exist only when the whole 
has ceased to exist; ‘actually they are posterior to it’, But the 
existence of the whole presupposes the potential existence of the 
parts; ‘in respect of potentiality they are prior to it’. 

8. ἡ ἡμίσεια τῆς ὅλης, sc. γραμμῆς, as 10177 shows. Cf. Ζ. 
1039* 6 n., @. 10482 33 n., De Somno 448? 4, το. 

12. ταῦτα, not ‘the distinction of potentiality and actuality ’, though 
this is what has been last mentioned. It is not true that all the mean- 
ings of ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ can be reduced to this. Rather, as 
the next words show, Aristotle means that all the senses of ‘ prior’ can 
be reduced to that named in 1. 3, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα 
δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων μή, and in this he is saying what can easily be seen to 
be true. Lines 4-11 are a parenthetical comment on 1. 3, and there is 
no difficulty in supposing Aristotle now to revert to 1. 3. 

What does Aristotle mean by saying that the whole can in 
respect of genesis exist without its parts? He means that when the 
whole exists the parts do not exist actually (cf. 1. 4n.). But one 
would naturally suppose that just as the whole is resolved into its 
parts so it is generated out of its parts, so that κατὰ γένεσιν as well as 
κατὰ φθοράν the parts would be prior. This is so where a whole is 
produced by the mere aggregation of parts, but probably Aristotle has 
in mind organic wholes in which, for instance, the branches do not 
exist before the whole tree, and have a separate existence only when 
cut off from an already existing tree, and in which, again, the tree can 
replace its lost branches by others. But the whole thought in ll. 4-14 
is somewhat loosely expressed. ; 

14. Tada, the first three senses of ‘ prior’. 


‘ Potency’, ‘ Capable’, ‘ Incapacity’, ‘ Incapable’, ‘ Possible’, 
‘ Impossible’ (ch. 12). 


ΙΟΙΘ 15. ‘ Potency’ means (a) a principle of change in something 
other than the thing changed or in it gua other, 

20. (4) a principle enabling a thing to be changed, by another or by 
itself gva other, (i) in general, or (ii) for the better, 


& 


A. ΤΙ. 1019 8-14 3 319 


23. (c) the power of producing change successfully, 

26. (d) the power of being changed successfully, 

26. (6) a state in virtue of which a thing cannot be changed, or 
cannot easily be changed, for the worse. 

32. Similarly the ‘ potent’ or ‘ capable’ means 

(1) (a) that which has potency (a), 

35. (2) that which has potency (4), 

θα, (6) that which has a potency of changing for the worse or for 
the better. 

3. For even that which is destroyed must have been capad/e of being 
destroyed. Things are capable sometimes by virtue of having some- 
thing, sometimes by virtue of being deprived of something. If privation 
may be called a ‘having’, all things that are capable are so by virtue 
of having something—if not by having a positive disposition, then by 
having its privation. 

10. (4) That which has potency (¢), 

11. (6) that which has potency (c), 

(/) that which has potency (d). 

15. ‘Incapacity’ is the privation of such a power (a) in any subject, 
or (@) in one which naturally has it, or (y) in one which naturally has 
it, when it naturally would have it. Again, it may be the opposite of 
potency (a) or (4) or of potency (c) or (4). 

21. ἀδύνατον has a corresponding sense (1), but it means (2) that 
whose contrary is necessarily true. 

27. So too δυνατόν means (2) (a) that whose contrary is not neces- 
sarily false (in ]. 31 ‘that which is not necessarily false’), as well as 
(2) that which is true, and (c) that which may be true. 

33. The sense of δύναμις in geometry is metaphorical. 

34. Sense (2) of δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον does not imply a δύναμις ; 
all the varieties of sense (1) imply δύναμις in sense (4). (a) is thus the 
primary sense of δύναμις. 


The treatment of δύναμις and its cognates in this chapter answers 
closely to that in ©. First, in 1019? 15-32, Aristotle explains the 
varieties of δύναμις in its primary sense of ‘ power ’ rather than ‘ poten- 
tiality ’ (δυνάμεως ἣ λέγεται μάλιστα κυρίως Θ. 1045» 35)—the sense that 
is treated of in ®. 1-5. Then he speaks of the corresponding senses 
of δυνατόν (8 32- 15), and of ἀδυναμία (Ὁ 15-21). Then, having men- 
tioned that ἀδύνατον has corresponding senses (21), he proceeds to say 
that ἀδύνατον has another meaning (‘impossible’ as distinct from 
‘incapable’) which does not imply a positive power but a purely 
logical relation between subjects and predicates (22-27), and that 
δυνατόν has a corresponding meaning (27-32), as well as two others 


AS COMMENTARY 


(32, 33). This passage (22-33) presupposes that secondary meaning 
of δύναμις (‘ potentiality ’ as opposed to ‘ power’) which is explained 
in Θ. 1048%27-» 9. Finally he traces the first group of meanings of 
δυνατόν (cf. ἃ 32-6 15) back to the primary definition of δύναμις as ἀρχὴ 
μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἡ ἄλλο (τοτοῦ 35—1020" 6). 

1019*19. What answers ἴο ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅλως is not ἡ δ᾽ |. 20, since that 
also introduces a general sense. The general sense οἱ δύναμις intro- 
duced by ἡ μὲν οὖν ὅλως is opposed to the narrower sense introduced 
in 1: 23. Jaeger, finding a difficulty in ὅλως, would read οὕτως (cf. 
TOI8® 4, 1019" 2, 1020% 27, 1021» 4), but this does not seem necessary. 

20-26. Christ proposes to transfer καθ᾽ jv ... 23 βέλτιον after 
πάσχειν 1. 26. We thus get the following kinds of δύναμις : 

(1) power of changing something else (15-20), 

(2) power of being changed by something else (20), 

(3) power of changing something else successfully (23-26), 
(4) power of being changed successfully (26, 20-23). 

This is the classification which we get in ©. 1046* 10-13, 16, 17 
(1046* 13-15 answers to 1019* 26~—32). It is clear, however, that Aris- 
totle introduces a complication which does not occur in @, viz. the 
distinction of the power of being changed for the better, from the power 
of being changed in general. This is not the same as the distinction 
between the power of acting or being acted on simply and that of acting 
or being acted on καλῶς ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν. The same two distinctions 
occur with regard to τὸ δυνατόν. The latter distinction is applied both 
to active and to passive potencies (4 23-26, cf. ταῦτα πάντα ἢ 12), the 
former only to passive (ἢ 20-23, cf.» 2). (Alexander may not have had 
before him καθ᾽ ἣν... πάσχει τι and may have read ὁτὲ μὲν οὖν ἐάν, 
but otherwise had our traditional text.) 

23-26. The powers mentioned here as instances of the power to 
produce change are, as it happens, powers of producing change in one- 
self gua other. 

26. ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν, ‘in the case of passivity’. Cf. τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν 
Θ. 1047 35 and the uses of ἐπί quoted in Bz. /ndex 2688 32-46. 

32. Jaeger is probably right in reading to... τῷ ἴοΥ τὸ... τό. τῷ with 
the infinitive is the normal mode of expression in this context (8 29 f,, 
» 6-10, 12 f.), and τό and τῷ are very often confused in manuscripts. 

32-15. Aristotle now gives the senses of δυνατόν answering to 
those of δύναμις. 

4 33—35 answers to (a) above, ἃ 35—" 1 to (4), ἢ 10-11 to (e), 11-15 
to (c) and (d). 

br, αὐτοῦ is an objective genitive depending on δύναμιν, ‘ power over 
ifs Ciprozots: 

ἕνα δ᾽ ἐάν κτλ. It is not evident at first sight how this sense differs 
from that mentioned in ἃ 35—» 1, The point seems to be that in ἃ 35— 
» x Aristotle speaks of a power in A of being changed by B, and in 
» 1-3 of a power in A of ‘changing’ simply. The difference is that 
between a thing’s being changed by another and by itself gua other 
cf. 2 20 ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου ἢ 7) ἕτερον). 


A. 12. 1019% 19 — 1019? 32 321 


6. εἰ δ᾽ ἡ στέρησίς ἐστιν ἕξις πως. This, according to Aristotle, 
it is; a privative term differs from ἃ merely contradictory one by 
implying a positive nature; ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πώς ἐστιν Phys. 193” 10. 
Only that which has a positive nature in virtue of which it might have 
had sight can be called blind; other things that do not see must only 
be called “ not- -seeing’. Cf. ch, 22. 

8-10. The readings both of EJP Asc. and of A> are unintelligible, 
and their common archetype was evidently corrupt. On the other 
hand Alexander had a text which presented no difficulty to him, and 
his paraphrase of which (392. 10-18) gives a clear and satisfactory 
sense, Reasoning from his paraphrase to what the reading before 
him must have been, we get one which agrees substantially with that 
of AP except that in AP the order is dislocated, and with that of EJT 
Asc. except that in them εἰ δὲ μή, ὁμωνύμως has disappeared and the 
unmeaning ὁμωνύμως δὲ λεγόμενον τὸ ὄν has been inserted. Jaeger 
conjectures plausibly that the latter phrase is a truncated form of the 
gloss ὁμωνύμως δὲ λέγομεν Gv τὸ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν (a reference to Cat. 
1° 1 ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν). 

22. οἷον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἀδύνατον, ‘i.e. both δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον 
are used as follows’. 

26. ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι is plainly a gloss. For this usage of ἀνάγκη 
cf. Pl. Gorg. 475 B 8, 499B 2. 

27. The impossible being that whose opposite is necessarily true, we 
should suppose the possible to be that whose opposite is o/ necessarily 
true, but Aristotle defines it as that whose opposite is not necessarily 
false. But in the next sentence he loosely reverts to the form we 
should have expected here ; he describes the possible as that which is 
not necessarily false, i.e. that whose opposite is not necessarily true. 
Both descriptions are true of the possible; it would be not possible but 
impossible if its opposite were necessarily true, and not possible but 
necessary if its opposite were necessarily false. Similarly in De Ini. 
224 15-17 τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι is said to follow from τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι. 
The difficulty would be to some extent got over if, as Alexander seems 
to have done, we were to omit τό before δυνατόν in |. 28. Aristotle 
would then be saying ‘the opposite of this (i.e. that whose opposite is 
not necessarily true) is possible when the opposite is not necessarily 
false’. But the difficulty is not entirely removed, for in ll. 29, 30, the 
fact that the opposite is not necessarily false is treated as if it were the 
sole condition of possibility, while in 1. 31 the fact that the proposition 
itself is not necessarily false is treated as the sole condition. It seems 
clear that Aristotle is in some confusion. 

I have rendered ἐναντίον by ‘opposite’; it has not here its strict 
meaning of ‘ contrary’; Aristotle is thinking rather of the contradictory 
opposite. 

32. τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι if retained must = ὃ εἶναι ἀληθές ἐστιν, εἶναι being 
epexegetic of ddnbes—‘ that of which it is true to say that it is’ 
τούτεστι τὸ ἤδη ὑ ane ὃ ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν εἶναι Al. The analogy 
of τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι T, 1012” 9, ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν An, Pr. 28> 29 is not 


2678-1 Y 


322 COMMENTARY 


very close, and there is little doubt that εἶναι is an emblema from the 
next line. 

It is rather surprising to find this included among the senses of 
‘possible’ (it is so also in De Jnt. 2328). Alexander explains that 
the merely existent is reckoned under the possible because, like it, it is 
intermediate between the necessary and the impossible. 

τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἀληθὲς εἶναι. It is not clear how this differs from 
the first sense, τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ψεῦδος. ἐνδεχόμενον never implies, as 
δυνατόν sometimes does, the presence of a positive power to be or do 
the thing in question. But the first definition of δυνατόν here (30-32) 
has defined it without any such implication. 1. 6. 11 is τὸ δυνατόν as the 
possible, not as the capable, that the first definition defined, and thus 
the third definition seems in no way to differ from it. We must as be- 
fore (10184 13-15 ἢ.) fall back on the reflection that Aristotle is stating 
the various answers that might be given to the question ‘ what do you 
mean by dvvarév?’ If two of these answers amount to the same thing, 
that is no reason why he should not set them both down. 

The difference between δυνατόν and ἐνδεχόμενον is, as Waitz 
(Organon, i. 376) says, that the former is opposed to ἐνεργοῦν, the latter 
to ὑπάρχον, or again that the former expresses real, the latter logical 
possibility or the absence of self-contradiction. But while ἐνδεχόμενον is 
never used in the former sense, δυνατόν is sometimes used in the latter. 
Cf.@. 1047224, where δυνατόν is defined much in the same way in which 
ἐνδεχόμενον is defined in An. Pr. 32818. In fact τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον = τὸ 
δυνατὸν τὸ μὴ κατὰ δύναμιν (1o1g» 34). For the difference between the 
two terms cf. @. 1050 13, De Caelo 274» 13. 

33. ἡ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ λέγεται δύναμις, cf. ©. 104628. A square is 
called a δύναμις because it is ὃ δύναται ἣ πλευρά (Al. 394. 35). Cf. 
Euc. £7. X. Def. 4 ai δυνάμεναι αὐτά = ‘the straight lines the squares on 
which = those areas’. In Rep. 587D, Zim. 316 the word means 
‘a square’, but in Zheae?. 148 a (cf. 147 Ὁ, Pol. 266 B) it is defined as 
a line incommensurate with another line but whose square is commen- 
surate with that of the other; e.g. the diagonal of the square is a dvva- 
pus in relation to the side. Putting it arithmetically, a δύναμις is (in 
those passages) the square root of an integral non-square number ; 
but Plato does not put it arithmetically. 

Plato says (Zheaet. 167) that Theodorus of Cyrene wrote περὶ 
δυνάμεων : Theaetetus carried the theory much further. For its history 
cf. Heath, Zhe Thirteen Books of Euchds Elements, iii. 1-10. 

34-35. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ δυνατά, those explained in » 27-33; τὰ δὲ 
λεγόμενα κατὰ δύναμιν, those explained in ἃ 33-) 1 5, 

οὐ κατὰ δύναμιν, i.e. they do not imply a positive power such as has 
been described in ® 15-32. 

1020° 1. τὴν πρώτην [μίαν] Bekker and Bonitz bracket μώαν. 
Alexander seems not to have read it, and Asclepius treats πρώτην and 
μίαν as alternative readings. πρώτην μίαν probably arose from ἃ being 
expanded differently in different manuscripts (cf. G..A. 742% 29, Poet, 
145016). The manuscript reading is defended by Vahlen (Poet. 


A, 12, 1019) 33—13. 1020713 323 
Ρ. 127), who refers to ©, 1046410 πρὸς πρώτην μίαν. But τήν makes 
the combination more difficult to accept. 
2. TO τὰ μὲν ἔχειν KTA., ‘ because in some cases something else has 
such a power over them’. For αὐτῶν depending on δύναμιν cf. org) 1. 
4. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα, i.e. in the first sense, referred to in 
ΤΟΥ 211, 22) 


‘ Quantity ’»(ch. 13). 


102027. ‘Quantity’ means that which is divided into constituents of 
which each is individual. (1) Numerable quantity is plurality; it is 
divisible into non-continuous parts. (2) Measurable quantity is magni- 
tude; it is divisible into continuous parts, in one, two, or three dimen- 
sions. Finite plurality is a number, finite length a line, finite breadth 
a plane, finite depth a solid. 

14. Things are quantitative (@) fer se or (ὁ) incidentally. 

17. (2) Things quantitative fer se are (i) entities whose definition 
involves quantity (e.g. the line), or (ii) attributes of such entities 
(e.g. much, long). 

23. ‘Great’, ‘small’, ‘greater’, ‘smaller’ are of the latter type, but 
are applied metaphorically to non-quantitative things. 

26. (ὁ) What is incidentally quantitative is so (i) as the musical is 
quantitative because its subject is so, (ii) as movement is quantitative 
because the distance moved through is so, and as time is quantitative 
because movement is so. 


The distinction between πλῆθος and μέγεθος answers to that in Caf, 
4> 20 between τὸ διωρισμένον and τὸ συνεχές, except that ‘the con- 
tinuous’ is a wider conception than ‘magnitude’, including time as one 
of its proper kinds (contrast 4 24 with 10204 29). The distinction in 
the Categories between τὸ ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων and τὸ 
οὐκ ἐξ ἐχόντων θέσιν is not noticed here. The two kinds of ποσὸν κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός (1020715, 26, 28) are recognized in Caz. 5» 1, 3, though 
without distinction. The distinction between ποσὰ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν and 
their πάθη (1020 17) is not found in the Ca/egories, 

1020° 8, ἕν τι καὶ τόδε τι. This is doubtless to distinguish the 
division of a quantity into parts from the analysis of a subject into 
attributes or the division of a genus into species. So Alexander. 

12. It is of course not exact to say that breadth is continuous in two 
and depth in three dimensions, Aristotle uses a convenient brachy- 
logy. 

13. TO πεπερασμένον goes with μῆκος, πλάτος, βάθος, as well as with 
πλῆθος. The definition of number as πλῆθος πεπερασμένον is antici- 
pated by Eudoxus’ definition of it as πλῆθος ὡρισμένον (Iambl. 77 
Nicom. Ar. Introd. το. 17). For other definitions cf. Z. 1039% 12, 
I. 1053* 30, 1057°3, M. 1085» 22, N. 108895, Phys. 2077 (ἕνα 

Va 2 


324 COMMENTARY 


πλείω καὶ πόσ᾽ ἄττα). Mr. F. M. Cornford (Class, Quart. xvii, 8 n.) 
suggests (rightly, I think) that the present definition ‘ goes back to the 
characteristically Pythagorean conception of number as the product 
of the union of πέρας and azewpov’; whereas such definitions as 
σύνθεσις μονάδων (Z. 10392 12), πλῆθος μονάδων (I. 10537 30) represent 
‘the crude, and so to say materialistic, view which may well have been 
shared by the Egyptians and the Pythagorean mathematicians or 
number-atomists’ of the sixth century. 

16. τὸ μουσικόν is presumably a man or an instrument, both of which 
are σώματα, and therefore indirectly quantitative. 

19. I read with the manuscripts τὸ ποσόν τι ὑπάρχει; Alexander’s 
τὸ ποσὸν ἐνυπάρχει (which Bz. adopted) is probably simply his para- 
phrase of this. For ὑπάρχειν in this sense cf. 10224 28. 

20. A line is not strictly a substance; it has no separate existence, 
but can only be separated in thought (M. 3). But it is the subject of 
which long and short are attributes ; it is a step nearer to substantiality 
than they are, and hence Aristotle treats it, relatively, as it were, as 
a substance. Cf. 10176 ἢ, 

22. βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον. It is noticeable that βαρύτης and κουφότης are 
named among gualztes (Ὁ 10). Nor is the difficulty removed by the 
transition to the nominal form. The fact is that βαρύ and κοῦφον are 
out of place here among the purely mathematical attributes. They 
are quantities, says Alexander, in so far as they mean excess or defect 
of ῥοπή, qualities in so far as they cause the things that possess them 
to move up or down. According to Aristotle’s view earth naturally 
moves down, fire up. Thus, if one piece of earth is heavy and another 
light, the difference is one of degree and comes under quantity (though 
only in the ‘ transferred’ sense mentioned in 1. 25); but the difference 
between earth and fire is one of quality. Cf. De Caelo iv. 1. P 

23. In (αἱ, 5 15 ‘ great’ and ‘small’ are said to be not quantities but 
relative terms. According to that view there is no such thing asa great 
or small per se (contrast 10208 24 with 5) 16). 

25. καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλα, to things which are not quantities, such as pain or 
disease. ‘Intensive quantity’ is thus treated as a metaphor. 

ZI. ὃ ἐκινήθη, ‘that through or along which it was moved’. Aris- 
totle’s account is as follows: A spatial magnitude (μέγεθος) is a ποσὸν 
καθ᾽ αὑτό; movement, since it is through a μέγεθος, is a ποσὸν κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός; and time, since movement takes place in time, is also 
a ποσὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός (cf. Phys. 219” 1 ὃ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς εὐ στ 
It is space that is directly measurable; movement, through space ; 
and time, through movement. In the Categor ves (5» 3) a movement is 
said to be SONG because the time it occupies is πολύς : in the present 
passage the quantity of the time is said to depend on the quantity of 
the movement. The latter view is also that of the Physics (219* 13), 
where in iv. 10, 11 the relation of time to movement is elaborately 
discussed. The more elaborate view of the Physics and the Mefa- 
physics seems clearly to be the later. The fact noted in Phys, 220” 23 
that movement and time mutually determine one another, so that either 


ἃς τῳ, LO2O%sTO—32 1 325 


can be used as a measure of the other, accounts for the possibility of 
such a view being held as is expressed in the Caéegories. 

Movement and time, though classed as only per accédens quantities, 
are distinguished from ordinary per acczdens quantities such as ‘ the 
musical’ or ‘the white’, Aristotle means doubtless that the relation 
of the former to the quantities per seis not casual as is that of the latter. 
All extension is a possible if not actual theatre of movement, and al 
movement occupies time. 

Why then, it may be asked, are not movement and time classed 
among the quantities per se which are πάθη καὶ ἕξεις of the things that 
are quantities in the primary sense (1. 19)? The answer is that 
movement along a line, and the time of the movement, are not related 
to the line as its length is. The movement is not an attribute of the 
line, but an event of which the line is one element, and the time is 
another element in the movement, and only so related to the line. 


‘ Quality’ (ch. 14). 

1020 33. ‘Quality’ means (1) the differentia of the essence of 
a thing, 

bg, (2) that which is present, besides quantity, in the essence of 
unchangeable (mathematical) objects, e. g. the ‘ planeness’ or ‘ solidity ’ 
of composite numbers, 

8. (3) the affections of changeable substances, in respect of which 
they change, 6. g. heat, 

12. (4) goodness and badness. 

13. These fall under two main senses, of which the first is the more 
proper ; (2) is a variety of (1), 

18, and (4) of (3). 

23. Goodness and badness indicate quality primarily in the case of 
living things, especially those which have purpose. 


In Cat. 8 we have the following classification of the kinds of 

quality : 

(1) (a) ἕξις (6. 5. the virtues) and (4) διάθεσις (e. g. disease), 

(2). ὅσα κατὰ (a) δύναμιν φυσικὴν (e.g. the power of boxing) ἢ 
(2) ἀδυναμίαν (e.g. softness), 

(3) παθητικαὶ ποιότητες, i.e. (2) powers of producing a sensuous 
πάθος, 6. δ. sweetness, (6) results of πάθος, 6. g. paleness, 

(4) Figure, straightness, &c. 

The first two senses here are omitted in the Ca/egorzes, which aims 
at distinguishing quality more rigidly from substance or essence ; but 
the first sense is recognized in Zop. 122» 16, 1288 26, Phys. 2268 27. 
Sense (3) here answers to sense (3) of the Ca/egories. Sense (4) seems 
to be included in sense (1) of the Caéegorves. 


326 COMMENTARY 


10204 35. Since the quality of τὰ μαθηματικά comes under the second 
sense of quality, the introduction of the circle here seems out of place. 
But in the end Aristotle reduces the first two senses to one (Ρ 15), and 
further it seems that, in spite of the general reference to τὰ μαθηματικά, 
Aristotle has only numbers in mind in speaking of the second meaning 
(cf. 15 ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ποιότης). In fact the analogy between 
(4) numbers and (6) lines, planes, and solids is the whole basis of his 
recognition of the second meaning as a separate one. Besides their 
quantitative character, as larger or smaller sums of units, numbers have 
a quality according as they are prime, composed of two factors, or 
composed of three, and therefore analogous to lines, planes, or solids, 
respectively ; and furiher as they have equal or unequal factors and 
are therefore analogous to squares or to rectangles, to cubes or to 
parallelepipeds. 

b 4, μὴ μόνον ἐφ᾽ ev ὄντες KTh., i.e. geometrically representable not 
merely as a line, but as a surface (because they are the products of two 
factors) or as a solid (because they are the products of three). Prime 
numbers were called εὐθυμετρικοί or εὐθυγραμμικοί (lambl. 2 Nicom. 
p. 27. 3 f. Pistelli), or γραμμικοί (Theo, p. 23. 12 Hiller, Zheol. Arithm. 
pp. 61, 62). This last name for them seems to go back to Philolaus 
(c. 440 B.C.). 

6. ὃ παρὰ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπάρχει ἐν TH οὐσίᾳ. This is difficult, as 
Aristotle goes on to say that the οὐσία of a number is what it is once, 
i.e. does not include the fact that it is the product of two or more 
factors. It looks as though Alexander read ὑπάρχει καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 
(399. 831, 400. 1), and one “might be tempted to read this or ὑπάρχει τὸ 
ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ. But ὑπάρχει is thus left rather awkwardly isolated; and 
Aristotle says in ]. 15 that this characteristic of numbers is a differentia 
of them, so that it must be included in their οὐσία. It is better, then, 
to keep the manuscript reading and put up with the inconsist- 
ency. 

7. Bz.’s ὃ ἅπαξ is not (as he thinks) supported by Alexander (399. 
39), but seems to be a necessary emendation, 

8. We now pass to qualities which do not always attach to their 
subjects, separable accidents as opposed to the differentiae mentioned 
in 333-Ὁ 2 and the properties mentioned in » 2-8, These are the 
παθητικαὶ ποιότητες Of Cat. οὃ 28, the παθητικὰ ποιά of Phys. 2267 29. 

10. βαρύτης καὶ κουφότης, cf. ἃ 22 ἢ, 

12, κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν. Finally Aristotle mentions non-physical 
attributes which, however, like the physical attributes in the third class, 
are attributes in respect of which their subjects may change, and are 
attributes of subjects which gua acting are κινούμενα. : 

17-18. τὰ δὲ a0}... διαφοραί. The clause has no expressed predi- 
cate; the meaning seems to be: ‘ The differentia of substance is the 
first kind of quality (I. 14)... the affections of things moved and the 
differentiae of movements (are the second kind).’ A better grammatical 
construction might be got by omitting ai and treating everything after 
πάθη (or after τὰ δέ) as predicate. But αἱ is well attested, and the way 


A. 14. 1020 35 — 1020? 24 327 


of taking the clause suggested above, though grammatically inferior, is 
perhaps more natural. 

23. μάλιστα κτλ. “ἀγαθά and κακά may be found in all the cate- 
gories ; it is particularly in the form in which they are found in living 
things and especially in men, viz. virtue and vice, that they are quali- 
ties.’ So Alexander. More probably, however, Aristotle is not 
suggesting that goodness and badness are ever anything but qualities, 
but that they are qualities which are most properly said to be found in 
living things, above all in men. 

24. τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν, i.e. men. 


‘ Relative’ (ch. 165). 


1020? 26, ‘ Relative’ terms are so (1) as that which exceeds to that 
which is exceeded, (2) as the active to the passive, (3) as the measured 
to its measure. 

82. (1) The first kind are related numerically, either (a) indefinitely 
or (4) definitely, (i) to a number or (ii) to 1, e.g. 

(6) (ii) 2 to 1, 
(a) (ii) 2 to 1, 
(ὁ) (i) 3 to 2, 
(a) (i) w+1 to xz. 

10213. The exceeding and exceeded are related quite indefinitely 
as to number, since number is commensurate but the amount by 
which the exceeding exceeds the exceeded is quite indefinite. 

g. In another way ‘ equal’, ‘like’, ‘the same’ are relations of this 
numerical type; for sameness is oneness of substance, likeness one- 
ness of quality, equality oneness of quantity, and ‘one’ is the beginning 
and measure of number. 

14. (2) The active and the passive imply (a) potency, e. δ. θερμαν- 
τικόν and θερμαντόν, or, (ὁ) activity, e.g. θερμαῖνον and θερμαινόμενον. 
(Numerical relations have no activities in the sense of movement.) 

21. Some relative terms implying potency also refer to particular 
times, e.g. that which has made is relative to that which has been 
made (father to son), that which will make to that which will be made. 
Some relative terms imply privation of power, e.g. ‘incapable’, 
‘ invisible’. 

26. Relative terms of type (1) or (2) are relative in the sense that 
what they are can only be stated by reference to something else, but 
(3) the measurable, the knowable, the thinkable are called relative 
because other terms are relative to them. 

81. To call a thing thinkable implies that there is thought of it, 
but thought is not properly described as relative to ‘that of which it 


328 COMMENTARY 


is the thought’, which would be tautologous; and sight is not ‘of 
that of which it is the sight’, but of colour. 
bg. (i) Things that are fer se relative are 
(a) things that are relative in mode (1), (2), or (3), 
(6) members of classes which are relative in one of these 


modes, or 
(c) attributes in virtue of which their subjects are relative in one 


of these modes. 
8. (ii) Things that are incidentally relative are so 
(a) as a man is relative because he is double of something, or 
(6) as ‘the white’ is relative if the same thing is double and 


white. 


The account of relative terms in Caz. 7 does not classify them, but 
it recognizes the special nature of the relations of knowledge and 
perception to their correlatives (cf. 10214 29-» 3 with 7} 22-84 12). 
In I. 1056 35 τὰ πρός τι are divided into τὰ ὡς ἐναντία, which answer 
loosely to the first two kinds mentioned in this chapter, and τὰ ὡς 
ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, Which answer to the third. The first two kinds 
reappear in Phys. 200 28. In Zop. 125% 33- 4 we get a classification 
from a different point of view. 
1020” 32—1021 8, The passage is difficult, and the commentators 
do not offer any very satisfactory account of it. To begin with 
(1. 33) Aristotle gives a summary classification, ἢ ἁπλῶς (ἀορίστως) 
ἢ ὡρισμένως πρὸς αὐτοὺς (= ἀριθμοὺς) ἢ πρὸς ἕν. This may be supposed 
to be a threefold list : 
(a) ἁπλῶς, 
(41) ὡρισμένως πρὸς αὐτούς, 
(ὁ ii) ὡρισμένως πρὸς ἕν ; 

or a fourfold one, 
(ai) ἁπλῶς πρὸς αὐτούς, 
(aii) ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἕν, 
(ὁ 1) ὡρισμένως πρὸς αὐτούς, 
(ὁ ii) ὡρισμένως πρὸς ἕν. 

But in what follows Aristotle distinguishes five relations, indicated 
by διπλάσιον, πολλαπλάσιον, ἡμιόλιον, ἐπιμόριον, ὑπερέχον, and it is 
hard to see how these fit into the earlier classification. ὴ 

Let us start with the hypothesis that the classification is a fourfold 
one. It can be understood in this way. The distinction between 
ἁπλῶς (or κατ᾽ ἀόριστον, Sc. ἀριθμόν) and ὡρισμένως (Or κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν 
ὡρισμένον) is that between a general “fe of ratio, which requires for 
its expression the use of a variable, and a definite ratio which can be 
expressed in terms of definite numbers. The distinction between 
“πρὸς αὐτούς and πρὸς ἕν is that between a ratio which (fractions being 
barred) requires for its expression two numbers other than 1, and 
a ratio of which 1 is one of the terms. (Bz. objects that this would 


A. 15. 1020 32 — 10214 19 329 


require πρὸς τὸ ev, but since Aristotle uses (10218 3) πρὸς τὸ ἕν of the 
same relation which he had previously described as πρὸς ἕν (1020? 35), 
the distinction does not seem very serious. For é without the article = 
the number 1 cf. Zop. 135» 26.) 

Now the relation of the double to its half (2 : 1) is described (1. 34) 
as πρὸς ἕν ἀριθμὸς ὡρισμένος, i.e. as belonging to type (J ii) The 
instance evidently agrees with our description of that type. 

The relation of that which is many times something else to that 
something (7: 1) is described as κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἕν, οὐχ ὡρισμένον 
δέ, οἷον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε. Here the last words show that ὡρισμένον goes 
with ἀριθμόν, not with ἕν, Thus κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἕν, οὐχ ὡρισμένον 
δέ = ἁπλῶς πρὸς ἕν. This is type (a ii), and it answers to our account 
of that type. 

The relation of that which is half as big again as something else to 
that something (3: 2) is described as κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν 
ὡρισμένον, and since this is opposed in the next line by κατὰ ἀόριστον, 
it is evident that ὡρισμένον goes with the first, not with the second 
ἀριθμόν. Thus this is related ὡρισμένως πρὸς αὐτούς (type ὁ i). 

The relation of the ἐπιμόριον to the ὑπεπιμόριον (I +2: 1, or n+ 1 
: m) is described as κατὰ ἀόριστον (sc. πρὸς ἀριθμόν, which must be 
understood from the previous line), ὥσπερ τὸ πολλαπλάσιον πρὸς τὸ ἕν, 
i. 6. ἁπλῶς πρὸς αὐτούς (type ai). The relation between two consecutive 
numbers other than 1 is analogous to the relation of the πολλαπλάσιον 
to 1 in that it is κατ᾽ ἀόριστον; i.e. involves a variable, 7. 

Then as an afterthought the relation of ὑπερέχον to ὑπερεχόμενον is 
described as being vaguer still, ὅλως ἀόριστον κατ᾽ ἀριθμόν. The reason 
given for this, according to the vulgate reading, is (]. 5) 6 yap ἀριθμὸς 
σύμμετρος, κατὰ μὴ σύμμετρον δὲ ἀριθμὸν λέγεται. I.e. all numbers 
(i.e. integers) are commensurate, but that which exceeds is related to 
that which it exceeds ‘according to an incommensurate number’. The 
statement is highly paradoxical, and could be explained only by sup- 
posing that Aristotle admits some wider sense of number in which it is 
not limited to integers; and there i8 no evidence that he did this. 

A> reads κατὰ μὴ σύμμετρον δὲ ἀριθμὸς od λέγεται. Apelt proposed 
κατὰ μὴ συμμέτρων δὲ ἀριθμοὶ οὐ λέγονται, and this is on the right lines ; 
but AP’s reading with the change of a single letter, συμμέτρου for σύμ- 
μετρον, gives us what is wanted. δέ must also be read with AP for γάρ 
in].6. The corruption into σύμμετρον is due to the repeated occurrence 
in the context of κατά with the accusative, and the other corruptions 
followed naturally. 

10212 8. ἢ ἴσον ἢ οὐκ ἴσον expresses Aristotle’s meaning only im- 
perfectly. The remainder may not only be either equal or unequal to 
the lesser amount; it may be either commensurate or incommensurate 
with it, and in the latter case the ratio is not expressible by whole 
numbers at all. 

19. τῶν δὲ kat ἀριθμόν κτλ. Alexander offers two explanations :— 
(1) that numerical relations have ἐνέργειαι in the sense that they can 
become the object of the ἐνέργεια of thought. Cf. ©. 1o51* 29 (of 


330 COMMENTARY 


geometrical propositions) τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὑρί- 
σκεται αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια. (2) That though numbers have 
not activities of their own, physical things act on one another in virtue 
of the numerical relations between them, and thus the relations may be 
said to act. This interpretation, however, is set aside by Aristotle’s 
remark that αἱ κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι (which such activities would be) 
do not belong to numbers. αἱ κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνέργειαι are the activities 
of powers as opposed to the actualizations of potentialities (@. 10467 1, 
10484 25-- 9). What Aristotle means, then, is that numerical relations 
may be said to be actualized, though they cannot be said to have 
activities. All sorts of ratios are latent, for example, in the block of 
marble; the sculptor actualizes certain of them and thus produces 
a statue in which each part bears a definite ratio to every other. Or 
again, elements are capable of being combined in a variety of ratios; 
in the formation of any particular compound certain of these ratios are 
actualized. There may be, as Asclepius says, in Aristotle’s words a hit 
at the Pythagoreans and Platonists who ascribed actual causal activity 
to numbers, and in this case ἐν ἑτέροις will refer to such works as the 
lost treatises ἸΤερὶ ἰδεῶν and Hept τῆς Τυθαγορικῶν δόξης. 

21. The subject of the sentence must be extracted out of the 
partitive genitive τῶν κατὰ δύναμιν. The construction is not common, 
but cf. A. 107067 οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν νοητῶν στοιχεῖόν ἐστι, het. 1416% 21, 
Xen. Azad, iii. 5. 16 (ἔφασαν) ὁπότε πρὸς τὸν σατράπην σπείσαιντο, 
καὶ ἐπιμιγνύναι σφῶν τε πρὸς ἐκείνους καὶ ἐκείνων πρὸς ἑαυτούς. The 
construction is made easier by the subject which follows after οἷον, as in 
A. 1070» 22. 

25. ἔτι ἔνια κατὰ στέρησιν δυνάμεως. I. 6. as there are correlatives 
like ὁρατικόν and δρατόν, there are correlatives like μὴ δρατικόν and 
ἀόρατον, and as in general that which can do something is relative to 
that which it can do, so that which cannot do something is relative 
to that which it cannot do. 

28. τῷ ὅπερ ἐστίν κτλ,, ‘by the fact that that which precisely they 
are is said to be that which it is, of (or in relation to) something else ’"— 
as the double is said to be the double of its half, or the creative 
of its creature—‘ not by the fact that something else is relative to it’. 

Either ὅπερ ἐστίν or αὐτὸ 6 ἐστιν could well be dispensed with, and 
there is no evidence of the latter phrase in Alexander (406. 25, 31). 
Jaeger is very probably right in regarding it as a gloss on ὅπερ ἐστίν. 

29. τὸ δὲ μετρητὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. In I. 105749 Aristotle points 
out as against this conjunction that really ἐπιστήμη is the μετρητόν, 
and τὸ ἐπιστητόν the μέτρον. 1. 6. knowledge conforms to reality, not 
reality to knowledge. 

81. οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ κτλ. ‘ But if we are asked what thought is relative to, 
we must not say “to that of which it is the thought”.’ Aristotle’s 
point is that that which is measured, known, thought, or seen must 
have a nature of its own, besides being the object of measurement, 
knowledge, thought, or sight. This is true enough, but does not 
differentiate this type of relation from the first two as he thinks it does. 


A. 15. 10218 21 — 102154 331 


It is true that if you ask what is the half half of, you can say ‘its 
double’, and if you ask what is the double double of you can say ‘its 
half’ (and so too with τὸ ποιητικόν and τὸ παθητικόν). But that which 
is double or half must have a nature of its own besides being double or 
half, just as that which is known must have a nature of its own besides 
being known. 

There is, however, a difference. Though every particular double 
must have a nature of its own, there is nothing which you can say 
the double in general must be, except double. But you can say of the 
knowable in general that it must be fact, of the visible that it must be 
colour (or a coloured surface). It is doubtful, however, what could in 
general be said of the thinkable except that it must be a proposition, 
and here perhaps we should be involved in the tautology which Aristotle 
deprecates. 

At the bottom of Aristotle’s thought, though not very satisfactorily 
expressed, is the conviction that knowledge and perception are relative 
to reality in a way in which reality is not relative to them (Il. 29, 30). 
This is brought out more clearly elsewhere, where the argument takes 
a less logical and a more metaphysical turn, in Τὶ 1010 30, ©, rop1? 6, 
1, 1053* 32, 1057* 7. 

b 2. ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, the phosphorescent, De An. 419° 2. 

3. Bz. conjectures that on the analogy of ἃ 32, 33, » 1 we should 
read ἔστιν 7 ὄψις ov ἐστὶν ὄψις for the vulgate ἔστιν ὄψις ov ἐστὶν ἢ 
ὄψις. But the right form is got by adopting Ab’s reading ὅτι ἐστὶν οὗ 
ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, ‘sight is of that of which it is’, The first ὄψις is doubtless 
a gloss. 

τὰ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ ἑαυτά κτλ. In I. 1056) 34 the third class of relative 
terms (those mentioned in 10218 29-- 3) are said to be so nol καθ᾽ 
attd. The two statements are, however, reconcilable. ‘These terms 
are not καθ᾽ αὑτὰ τῶν πρός τι in the sense expressed in Caf. 84 31, that 
‘ their being is identical with their being related somehow to something’, 
as ‘double’ is to ‘half’. On the other hand they καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λέγεται 
πρός τι in the sense that it is they and not something of which they are 
mere accidents that are relative; they are not relative in the incidental 
way in which ‘the man’ is so (1021 8). 

4. τὰ δὲ ἂν TA γένη αὐτῶν ἡ τοιαῦτα. In Zop. 124} 18, (αἱ. 119 23 
Aristotle says on the other hand that if a genus is relative, it does not 
follow that the species are, and actually takes grammar and knowledge 
as the instance of this. 


‘ Complete’ (ch. 16). 


1021» τῷ. ‘Complete’ means (1) that of which no part is outside it, 
14. (2) that which is not exceeded in its kind in respect of excellence— 
it may be excellence in something bad, e.g. ‘a complete thief’, Ex- 


332 COMMENTARY 


cellence is a completion; a thing is complete when in respect of its 
proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude. 

23. (3) That which possesses its end, this being good ; since the end 
is an extreme, we even say a thing is ‘completely’ spoiled when it is 
at the extreme of badness; hence too we call death the end, because 
both end and death are last things; but the final cause is also an end. 

80. (i) Things fer se complete are so (a) because they are not ex- 
ceeded in respect of excellence (= senses (2), (3)), 

(4) because they are not exceeded by anything in their class, what- 
ever that may be, and have nothing outside them (= sense (r)). 

102271. (ii) Other things are complete through some relation to the 
foregoing. 


1021) 12. οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἔξω τι λαβεῖν μηδὲ ἕν μόριον. οὗ apparently 
depends both on ἔξω and on μόριον, ‘that of which it is not possible 
to find any—not even one—part outside it’. 

14-23. As Alexander observes, Aristotle now passes from the 
complete in quantity to the perfect in quality, though the quantitative 
expression μέγεθος is once (1. 23) used metaphorically in this connexion 
(cf. 10208 25). 

16-17. From ll. 22, 23 it is evident that τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς goes not 
with μηθὲν ἐλλείπωσιν but with κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, ‘according to the form of 
their peculiar excellence’. 

23-30. This sense of τέλειον is hardly to be distinguished from the 
second, and in the summary (|. 30 —1022* 1) no reference is made to it. 
It seems to be merely a restatement of the second sense from a slightly 
different point of view, viz. that of the connexion of τέλειον with 
τέλος. : 

23. The vulgate reading οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαῖον can only 
mean (and so ΒΖ. takes it) that which has before it, or is tending 
towards, a good end; but such things are not naturally called perfect. 
The whole context (24-28) implies that it is not the having a good 
end before it but the having attained its end (τὸ ἔχειν τὸ τέλος) that 
makes a thing perfect. That the end should be good is a secondary 
matter; even things which have attained a bad end are called (in 
a secondary sense) perfect. I have therefore not hesitated to read ois 
ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος, σπουδαῖον ὄν, ‘things which have attained their end, 
this being good’. Alexander’s interpretation requires ὄν (ὅτι τὸ 
οἰκεῖον τέλος ἀγαθὸν ὃν ἔχει 411. 21, Cf. 412. 3). This reading gives 
ὑπάρχει its proper sense, 

28. ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ seems to be the correct form. Cf. ἐπ᾿ ἐσχάτῳ 
Pl, Charm. 155 c, Prot. 344 A, Rep. 523 Ὁ, E. 

29. τέλος δέ κτλ., ‘ but even if death is entitled to be called an end, 
at any rate the ultimate object of purpose is also an end’, 

30—1022*1. The summary, as we have seen, ignores ll. 23-30 and 
refers first to the second sense, then to the first. 


A. 16, 1021>12—17. 1022%9 333 


‘ Limit? (ch, 17). 


1022* 4. ‘Limit’ means (1) the last point of a thing, i.e. the first 
point beyond which no part of it is and within which every part of it is, 

(2) the form of a magnitude or of a thing having magnitude, 

(3) the end, i.e. the “ermznus ad quem or final cause,—sometimes 
also the /erminus a quo, 

(4) the essence; this is the limit of the knowledge of a thing, and 
therefore of the thing itself. 

10, There are as many meanings of ‘ limit’ as of ‘ beginning’, and 
more, for the beginning is a limit but not every limit is a beginning. 


1022° 5. πρώτου... πρώτου, to distinguish the precise boundary from 
the things which surround the given thing (which are zo/ the first 
beyond which no part of the thing is to be found) and from the outer- 
most parts of the thing (which are πο the first within which all the 
parts are to be found). 

6. εἶδος = σχῆμα, ‘ figure’. 

μεγέθους ἢ ἔχοντος μέθεγοςς. For the absence of the article with 
ἔχοντος οἵ, Z. 10349 24. 

7. ὁτὲ δὲ ἄμφω probably has not, as Alexander and Bonitz think, 
any reference to the maxim τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ 
γενέσει. It simply means that though ‘limit’ more often means the 
terminus ad quem it sometimes means the /erminus a quo. 

8. ἐφ᾽ ὃ καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. καί = ‘i.e.’ 

9. τῆς γνώσεως γὰρ τοῦτο πέρας. This is what gives precise ‘shape’ 
to our knowledge of the thing, and therefore to the thing itself. 


‘ Thal in virtue of which’, ‘In virtue of itself’ (ch. 18). 


1022? 14. καθ᾽ 6 means (1) the form or essence, (2) that in which an 
attribute directly resides, its matter or substratum. 

1g. It has meanings answering to those of ‘cause’; it may be applied 
to (3) the final and (4) the efficient cause. It also refers (5) to 
position. 

24. Things said to be καθ᾽ αὑτό are (1) the essence, 

27. (2) the elements in the ‘ what’, 

29. (3) attributes contained directly in the subject or in one of its 
parts, 

32. (4) that which has no cause outside itself, 

35. (5) that which belongs to one subject alone, and in virtue of ils 
own nature. 


334 COMMENTARY 


1022°14. There is no single English phrase that answers to the 
various meanings of καθ᾽ 6. ‘That in virtue of which’ will render 
pretty well its uses in 1]. 14-22, but in 22-24 it simply means ‘that at, 
or along, which’. 

15. ‘ That in virtue of which a man is good is good-in-itself’, the 
form and essence of goodness. Christ’s καθὸ ἀγαθὸς 6 ἀγαθός is neat 
but unnecessary. The statement is curiously Platonic, and A may well 
belong to the Platonic period of Aristotle’s thought. 

17. Surface is that in which colour directly resides, so that surface is 
that in virtue of which a thing is coloured. The καθ᾽ ὅ in this sense, 
which Aristotle describes as ὕλη (1. 18), is not πρώτη ὕλη, prime matter, 
but the πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον in another sense of πρῶτος, the direct 
material substratum of the given attribute. 

23. τὸ κατὰ θέσιν. Alexander explains that one asks καθ᾽ ὃ éorykev 
᾿Αθήνησιν ὅδε 6 ἀνδριάς, Meaning, ‘In what part of the city is it situated δ᾽ 

25-36. Aristotle mentions five things which may be said to belong 
to a subject καθ᾽ αὑτό: 

(1) Its essence (cf. Z. 1029» 13). 

(2) The elements in its essence, i.e. its genus and its differentiae. 
The elements in the essence of a thing are similarly described in 
An. Post. 73% 34-37 as being καθ᾽ αὑτό to it, but there the elements in 
question are not the genus and differentiae but the simpler entities 
involved in a complex entity (e.g. line in triangle), 

(3) Attributes which reside directly in it (as whiteness resides in sur- 
face) or in a part of it (as life resides in the soul, which is a part of 
man). This answers to the second sense of καθ᾽ 6, as that ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ 
πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι. Surface is that ‘in virtue of which’ whiteness exists ; 
whiteness belongs to surface ‘in virtue of itself’. Aristotle brings out 
the onesidedness of his former identification (1. 18) of the πρῶτον 
ὑποκείμενον With matter; soul, which is the form of man, is the ὑποκεί- 
μενον Of life. 

That which is καθ᾽ atro in this sense is the properties of the subject 
the second type of καθ᾽ atré recognized in the Posterior Analytics 
(737 37-" 3). 

(4) That which is predicable of the subject directly, not through the 
intermediary of a cause. ‘The instance given is a trivial one. There 
are causes of man; his genus, his differentiae are formal causes of 
him. But there is no cause of man’s being man; man is man καθ᾽ 
αὗτό. ᾿ 

(5) Attributes which belong to the subject alone, and by virtue of 
its own nature. This sense will include the last differentia and the 
properties and thus overlaps senses (2) and (3). In general there is 
a good deal of overlapping between these five senses, but that is in the 
manner of A. Cf. 1018413 n. 

35. The manuscripts present here a great variety of readings, 
pointing to early corruption. κεχωρισμένον is, as Bz. observes, 
preferable to ὡρισμένον, since it accounts better for the origin of the 
reading κεχρωσμένον. There is something to be said for the variant 


A. 18, 102214 —19. 1022) 2 335 


recognized by Alexander, διὸ τὸ κεχρωσμένον καθ᾽ αὑτό, sc. τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ, 
‘wherefore being coloured is fer se to surface’ (cf. ll. 30, 31, Zop. 
131” 33, 134% 22). Butthe ellipse of τῇ ἐπιφανείᾳ is difficult and perhaps 
impossible. The reading suggested by Bz., διότι κεχωρισμένον, does 
not meet the difficulties. 

I read, without much conviction, dv αὐτὸ κεχωρισμένον καθ᾽ αὗτό. 
‘Further, those attributes are per se to a subject which belong to 
it alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of itself 
considered apart by itself’, i.e. by virtue of its specific character, not 
of its generic character nor of any concomitant associated with it: 
The reference then is to attributes commensurate with a subject, those 
which are καθόλου in the strict sense defined in An, Post. 73% 25— 


74° 3- 


‘ Disposition’ (ch. 19). 


1022) 1. ‘Disposition’ means an arrangement of that which has 
parts, in respect of place, faculty, or kind; as the word shows, there 
must be some position. 


διάθεσις occurs in Cas. 8 27 as one of the kinds of quality. It is 
distinguished from ἕξις by its impermanence (8? 35). 

1022) 2. κατὰ δύναμιν. This must mean ἃ non-spatial arrangement 
of parts according to their respective functions, e.g. the hierarchy of 
the parts of the soul, in which reason is superior to the sensitive 
faculty and this to the nutritive. Cf. the distinction between πρότερον 
κατὰ τόπον and πρότερον κατὰ δύναμιν (1018) 12, 22). 

κατ᾽ εἶδος can hardly refer as Alexander thinks to the arrangement 
of the parts of, e.g., a statue, which is really κατὰ τόπον. ΒΖ. thinks 
with more probability that the reference is to the arrangement of the 
parts of a definition, and compares An. Post. 97° 23 τριῶν δεῖ στοχάζε- 
σθαι, τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰ κατηγορούμενα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα τάξαι τί πρῶτον 
ἢ δεύτερον, &c. Cf. Ζ. 10388 30-34. But this is rather τάξις τῶν ἐν 
τῷ εἴδει than τάξις κατ᾽ εἶδος ; it is more likely that Aristotle means the 
co-ordination and subordination of the species in a genus. 

θέσιν. It is, of course, only metaphorically that there is position in 
the latter two cases. 


‘ Having’ or ‘habit’ (ch. 20), 


1022) 4. ἕξις means (1) the activity of that which wears and of that 
which is worn; this kind of ἕξις cannot itself be had, if we are to avoid 
an infinite regress ; 

το. (2) a disposition in virtue of which a thing is well or ill disposed, 
per se or with reference to another ; 


336 COMMENTARY 


13. (3) a part of such a disposition ; hence the excellence of part of 
a thing is a ἕξις of the thing. 


1022” 4. ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου. For this sense of ἕξις 
cf. I. 10655 13, De Resp. 474% 26, De An. Inc. 711% 6, Pl. Rep. 433 E 12, 
Crat. 4148 9, Zheaet. 197B1, Soph. 2474 5, Laws 625c 8. Prof, 
Gillespie has pointed out that Zheaet. 197 Β, Laws 625c make it 
probable that ἕξις in this sense means originally the ἐνέργεια of wearing 
clothes, armour, &c. (I. 7), as opposed to the mere possession of them, 
ἕξις in this sense links up with the category of ἔχειν, of which the 
instances are ὑποδέδεται, ὥὕπλισται (Car. 2° 3). 

8. ταύτην... οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἔχειν τὴν ἕξιν, while a thing may be said 
to have a ἕξις in the sense to which Aristotle proceeds in 1. ro. 

10. ἕξις λέγεται διάθεσις κτλ. In Caz. 80 25—g* 13 Aristotle distin- 
guishes the two by saying that ἕξις implies relative permanence, so that 
while every ἕξις is a διάθεσις not every διάθεσις is a ἕξις. This sense of 
ἕξις is derived from the intransitive, as the former from the transitive, 
use of ἔχειν. 


‘ Affection’ (ch, 21). 


1022) 15. πάθος means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing may 
alter, 
(2) the alterations themselves, 
(3) injurious alterations, especially painful injuries, 
(4) extremes of misfortune and pain. 


102215. ποιότης καθ᾽ ἣν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἐνδέχεται, cf. 1020? 8-12. 
Bz. points out that ἀλλοίωσις is in turn defined by reference to ποιότης 
and πάθος (A. 1069» 12, N. 10884 32, Phys. 2263 26). 

The other three uses of πάθος here mentioned also imply ἀλλοίωσις, 
but Aristotle sometimes uses πάθος in the wider sense of ‘ attribute’ or 
‘property’, e.g. A. 98529, 986817, B. 997%7, IT. 1004>6, 17; 
(Nee OO Aa. 

19. For this use of ἤδη cf. Bz. Zudex 3148 10-17. 


‘ Privation’ (ch. 22). 


1022» 22. ‘ Privation’ is used (1) if a thing has not some attribute 
that is naturally possessed, even though not by it; 

24. (2) if either it or its genus would naturally have the attribute ; 

27. (3) if it has not the attribute, though and when it would naturally 
have it; other similar qualifications may be added ; 


A. 20. 10222 4--- 22, 1022) 30 337 


81. (4) of the violent removal of anything. 

32. There are as many kinds of privation as there are senses of 
a privative ; it may imply in general not having a thing, or Πανίηρ τὶ 
bad, or having it small, or not easily or not well, 

1023? 4. or not at all; in which case there is a mean between the 
positive and the privative term, e, g. between good and bad. 


1022) 221023? 7. For a briefer account of varieties of meaning 
of στέρησις cf. ©. 10468 31. 

22. ἕνα μὲν τρόπον κτλ. This sense of privation, in which all that is 
required is that the attribute of which a thing is said to be deprived 
should be such as can naturally be possessed by something, is wider 
than Aristotle’s ordinary use of στέρησις. It distinguishes privation 
from negation in general only by barring absurd and self-contradictory 
predicates. Zeller, Ph. d. Gr. II. 24. 216 n. 7, maintains that privation in 
this sense is synonymous with negation. Aristotle provides against this, 
however, by the words τῶν πεφυκότων ἐχεσόαι: If we take an attribute 
which cannot be possessed by anything, 6. g. (according to Aristotle’s 
doctrine) ‘ actually infinite’, ‘A is not actually infinite’ is a negative 
judgement, but A cannot be said to suffer privation of anything. 

This sense recurs in I. 1055? 4 (τὸ ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἔχειν), but is not 
usually included in the senses of ‘ privation’ by Aristotle, and does not 
share what is the essence of privation—that it is συνειλημμένη τῷ δεκ- 
τικῷ (I. 1055) 8), applicable only to a particular kind of subject, that 
kind which might have the opposite ἕξις. 

26-27. τὸ μὲν... τὸ δέίς The mole may be said to be not merely 
not-seeing, but deprived of sight, or blind, because its genus, animal, 
naturally has sight; a man may be so described because a man 
naturally has sight. 

27-31. Zeller (I. c.) remarks that privation in these two senses comes 
under the definition of contrariety. The fact rather is that contrariety 
comes under the definition of privation. A subject which might have 
the attribute A but in any degree fails to have it can be said to be 
deprived of it; but it has the contrary attribute only if it is completely 
deprived of A, Contrariety is στέρησις πρώτη (Θ. 1046 14) or τελεία 
(1. 1055° 35). 

80. The manuscript reading here cannot stand, as ἐν ᾧ ἂν 7 is 
meaningless. A tolerable sense is got by reading, as Bonitz suggests, 
ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἣ καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ καὶ πρὸς ὃ καὶ ds ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ πεφυκός. But ἢ 
καί, and the repetition of ἄν, are not entirely natural, and no parallelism 
is maintained with the Previous sentence. The sentence should end 
with ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ (cf. μὴ ἔχῃ at the end of the clause in Il. 25, 28). 
Jaeger’s transposition of πεφυκός meets all the requirements. The 
copyist’s eye ran on from ᾧ ἂν ἢ to ὥς, ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ and led him to add 
πεφυκός before its time. 

‘A man is also called blind if he has not sight in that medium in 
which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with 


9578 °1 U, 


338 COMMENTARY 


reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances 
in which, he would naturally have it’. He is not called blind if he does 
not see in the dark, or if he does not see with his ears, or if he does not 
see sound, or if he does not see what is behind him or too far away. 


‘ Have’ or ‘hold’, ‘ In’ (ch. 23). 


10238. ἔχειν means (1) to treat according to one’s own nature or 
impulse, 

II. (2) to have as a receptive material has the form that is impressed 
on it, 

13. (3) to contain (so the whole has the parts), 

17. (4) to prevent a thing from moving according to its own impulse, 
e. g. to hold together. 

23. ‘To be in a thing’ has corresponding senses. 


The senses of ἔχειν are classified as follows in Ca/. 15: 

(1) ὡς ἕξιν, (2) ὡς ποσόν, (3) ὡς τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, (4) ὡς ἐν μορίῳ, 
(5) ὡς μέρος, (6) ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ, (7) ὡς κτῆμα, (8) γυναῖκα ἔχειν καὶ ἣ γύνη 
avopa. 

Ὡς includes (3) and (7) in the Cafegorzes, (2) here answers to 
(1) and (2) in the Ca/egorzes, and (3) here to (5) and (6) in the 
Categories. 

1023" 20. τὸν “Athavta, cf. Hes. Zheog, 517. , 

21. τῶν φυσιολόγων τινές. Alexander refers to the doctrine that the 
world is held in place by δίνη, i.e. to the doctrine of Empedocles 
(De Caelo 2843 20-26, where Simplicius refers also to Anaxagoras and 
Democritus). 

23-25. The senses of ἐν are discussed in Phys. iv. 3. 

24. It seems better to adopt ὁμοτρόπως (the reading of all the best 
manuscripts), for which cf. Zop. 183) 6, P]. Phaedo 83D 8. Theinferior 
manuscripts have altered it to the form which is much commoner in 
Aristotle, ὁμοιοτρόπως. 


4 


‘From’ or ‘out of’ (ch. 24). 


1023° 26. A thing is said (1) to come from or out of its generic or 
specific matter ; 

29. (2) to come from its efficient cause ; 

81. (3) to come from the complex of matter and form to which it 
belongs, as the parts come from the whole. 

85. (4) The form is said to be made out of its elements; so man 
is made out of biped, syllable out of letter; this is a different relation 
from that of a thing to its perceptible matter. 


A, 23. 10239 20— 25. 1023» 20 339 


» 8. (5) A thing comes ‘from’ that from a part of which it proceeds 
in one of the above senses; so a child comes ‘ from” its parents ; 

5. (6) a thing comes from that which it succeeds in time. Of things so 
related (a) some change into one another, as. day and night ; (6) in other 
‘cases one merely succeeds the other, as one festival succeeds another. 


1023 26-11. For other (partial) classifications of the senses of ἐκ 
cf. a. 9943 22-" 3, Ἡ. 10449 23-25, Ν. 10924 23-35. A classification 
more like the present is found in G. A. 724° 20:80: 

(1) ὅτι τόδε μετὰ τόδε, = (6) here, 

(2) ὡς ἐξ ὕλης, = (1) here, 

(3) ὡς τὸ ἐναντίον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου, = (6 a) here, 
(4) ἐκ τίνος ἣ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, = (2) here. 

28. ἅπαντα τὰ τηκτὰ ἐξ ὕδατος, cf. ΤΟΙ ρῷ ION. 

80-31. ἐκ Tivos... μάχης; οἵ, 1οΙ 38 9. 

84. τέλος... τέλος. These words are intended to justify ἐκ τοῦ 
συνθέτου ἐκ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς (Il. 31-32). In every such case 
the whole is a union of form and matter, for ἃ ὅλον or τέλειον is that 
which has attained its τέλος, and matter has attained its τέλος only when 
it has attained and (so to say) been united with the form towards which 
it was moving. 

36. καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τοῦ στοιχείου. Aristotle is not thinking of the 
letter as an element in particular syllables (this would be quite different 
from the relation of biped to man and would really illustrate the first 
sense of ἔκ τινος), but as something that has to be mentioned in defining 
the syllable (Ζ. 1034 25) as biped must be mentioned in defining man. 

b 2, τῆς τοῦ εἴδους ὕλης does not mean the genus (though that is 
called the ὕλῃ of the species in 1024? 8 and elsewhere), since biped is 
not the genus of man, nor letter of syllable ; but rather the elements in 
the definition of the form. It thus comprises both genus and differentia, 
and also the components, where these have to be mentioned in the 
definition of the whole, as is the case in the definition of ‘ syllable’. 


Pare. (ch. 25). 

1023) 12. ‘ Part’ means (1) (@) that into which a quantity is divided, 
(2) those of the ‘ parts’ in sense (4) which measure the whole (2 is in 
this sense not a part of 3); 

17. (2) that into which the form is divided, apart from the quantity 
(hence the species are parts of the genus) ; 

1g. (3) that into which the whole is divided, whole meaning either the 
form or the concrete whole (e.g. both the bronze and the characteristic 
angle are parts of the bronze cube) ; _ 

22, (4) the elements in the definition (hence genus is part of species). 


Senses (1 δ) (3), (4) reappear in Ζ. 1034? 32—1035%4 
1023) 20. τὸ ὅλον, ἢ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. For the description 
Z 2 


340 COMMENTARY 


of the form asa ὅλον cf. 1013 22. τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος = the concrete unity 
of matter and form, such as ‘the bronze cube’. This has two parts, 
the bronze, and the angle which defines its form. Aristotle does not 
illustrate here the division of the form into its parts; he comes to that 
in 11. 22-25, where it is carelessly treated as implying a different sense 
of μέρος from that in question here. 


‘ Whole’, « Total’, ‘ All’ (ch. 26). 


1023) 26. ‘A whole’ means(1) that from which none of the parts of 
which it is by nature the whole are lacking ; 

27. (2) that which so contains its contents that they are a unity, 
(a) in the sense that each is one with each, or (4) in the sense that all 
together make up the unity. 

29. (a) The phrases ‘true of a whole class’ and ‘as a whole’ imply 
a whole which contains many parts by being predicated of each, and 
by each being one with the rest (e. g. man, horse, god, are one by being 
all of them living beings). 

32. (2) The continuous and limited is a whole when a unity is formed 
out of several constituents, (i) especially if they exist only potentially, 
but (ii) failing this even if they exist actually. Of wholes in sense (δ) 
natural wholes are more truly whole than artificial ones (cf. what we 
said of unity). 

1024°1. (3) Of quantities that have a beginning, middle, and end, one 
to which the position of the parts does not make a difference is a total, 
one to which it does is a whole. One to which it both may and may 
not is both, i.e. one in which the nature remains after the transposition 
but the shape does not (e. g. wax or a garment). 

6. Water, liquids, number are totals, not wholes, except in an 
extended sense. ‘Things which together we call a total, we speak of 
singly as ‘all’ (‘this total number’, ‘all these units ’). 


1023 26. The first definition is equivalent to the first definition of 
τέλειον in ch. τό. 

28-36. The various senses of ‘one’ given in ch. 6 are here in effect 
reduced to two. There is unity of kind, covering the senses mentioned 
in r016%17—-) 6, and unity of quantity (continuity), answering to 
1015) 36—1016° 17. 

28. ὡς ἕκαστον ἕν, ‘in the sense that each is severally one single 
thing’, as man, horse, god are each of them one thing, viz. animal 
(1. 32). The unity of the universal is here opposed tothe unity of the 
continuous (ὡς ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἕν). 


Δ, 26, 10235 26— 27, 1024° 11 341 


29. τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, ‘ that of which we speak when we 
say “as a whole”, implying that there is in some sense a whole.’ 

36, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐλέγομεν, cf. 1016? 4, 

Ι0243τ-6, Aristotle gives here an account of a whole which may be 
a continuous whole like that described in 1023 32-36, or may be 
a discrete whole like a musical scale (10244 21), but is made a whole 
by the fact that transposition of its parts makes a difference to it. 
A sheet of water is a whole in the previous sense but not in this. 

4. Since the nature of these things is unaffected by rearrangement 
of the parts, they are called alls or aggregates; since their form is 
affected, they are called wholes. In English we should naturally speak 
of ‘all the wax’ but of ‘the whole garment’, just as we speak of 
‘a garment’ but not of ‘a wax’, 

8-9. πάντα δὲ λέγεται... ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ πάντα. The anacolouthon is 
natural enough in view of the intervening clause (for a somewhat similar 
case cf. ®. 1048 9-12). The sentence illustrates Aristotle’s favourite 
‘binary structure’, for which cf. A. 983>16n., Riddell, Apology of 
Plato, p, 205, ὃ 224. 


‘ Mutilated’ (ch. 27). 


10244 11. That which is capable of ‘mutilation’ must be not only 
(1) a quantity, i.e. divisible, but (2) a whole. For not only is the 
number 2 not mutilated by the loss of a unit (since what is left after 
mutilation must be greater than what is removed), but no number can 
be mutilated, since after mutilation the essence must remain. The 
‘mutiland’ must have not only unlike parts, as numbers have, but 
parts whose position makes a difference to it, 

20. (3) It must be continuous ; a musical scale is a whole in the 
above sense, but is discrete and therefore cannot be mutilated, 

22. (4) Even wholes are not ‘mutilated’ by the loss of parts 
(a) requisite to their essence, (4) other than extremities, or (4) capable 
of growing again after being completely removed. 


1024" 11-28. τῶν ποσῶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ μεριστόν τε Bet αὐτὸ εἶναι 
“καὶ ὅλον κτλ, Every ποσόν is μεριστόν (το2ο8 7), so that the stress must 
fall entirely on ὅλον. ‘It must be a whole as well as divisible.’ Aris- 
totle goes on to say ‘for two is not mutilated by the loss of one of its 
units .. . nor can any number be mutilated’. Now two is not ‘ muti- 
lated’ by the loss of a unit, for the same reason for which things that 
are wholes are not ‘ mutilated’ by the loss of ceréazn parts, viz. because 
what is removed by mutilation must be less important than what remains 
(cf. Il. 13, 14 with ll. 23, 24). Therefore the fact that two is not 
‘mutilated’ by the loss of a unit does not give a reason for saying that 


342 COMMENTARY 


the ‘mutiland’ must be a whole; the stress again falls on the second 
member. ‘What is to be mutilated must beawhole. For not only is 
two not mutilated by the loss of a unit, but no number can be mutilated,’ 
What distinguishes numbers from wholes is that, since they. have no 
plan or structure independent of the number of units in them (for the 
‘quality’ ascribed to them in 1020>3~-8 depends entirely on their 
having just so many units), every unit in them is κύριον τῆς οὐσίας, and 
none can be removed without altering the identity of the number. If 
one be removed, you get not the old number mutilated, but a new 
number. : 

Nor (Il. 16-18) is it enough to say that what is to be capable οἵ 
being mutilated must have unlike parts. Every number but 2 has 
unlike, at least in the sense of having unequal, parts. What is to be 
mutilated must (Il. 18-20) be a whole in the sense defined in 1. 2, that 
the position of its parts makes a difference to it. Five has unlike 
parts, two and three, but it does not matter whether it is considered as 
2+3 or as 34+2. A number has not the organic structure which 
makes a whole on the one hand incapable of surviving certain 
rearrangements of its parts, and on the other hand capable of surviving 
the Joss of certain of its parts. 

Further (I. 20), what is to be mutilated must also be continuous, i.e. 
a whole in the sense defined in 1023 32-34. 

Finally (1. 22), even wholes are not mutilated by the loss of any part 
taken at random. The part that is removed must itself satisfy certain 
conditions. 

21. The vulgate reading ἀνομοιομερῶν is clearly out of place here, 
and has come in from ]. 16. Ab preserves the true reading ἀνομοίων. 

The notes of the scale are unlike, and they have position in the 
octave, but they are not continuous, and therefore the scale cannot be 
‘mutilated ’. 

23. οὔτε τὰ κύρια τῆς οὐσίας, since (I. 15) τὴν οὐσίαν δεῖ μένειν. 


‘ Kind’, ‘ Other tn kind’ (ch. 28). 


10242 29. ‘ Kind’ is applied to (1) beings of the same type, of which 
there is continuous generation ; 

81. (2) beings with a common ancestor; they are more often named 
after the male ancestor than after the female, who only supplies the 
‘matter ; . 

36. (3) that which underlies the differentiae ; 

b 4. (4) the first element in the definition. 

6. Thus kind implies 

(1) continuous generation of the same type, or 
(2) a first mover of the same type as his descendants, or 
(3) a matter or substratum underlying differentiae. 


A. 27. 10247 21 — 28. 1024) 12 343 


g. ‘ Other in kind’ is applied to things whose proximate substrata are 
different and cannot be analysed one into another or both into the same 
thing ; e.g. form and matter, or things falling in different categories. 


1024* 35. τῆς ὕλης. For the conception of the female as providing 
the matter, the male the form of the offspring, cf. A. 988%5, H. 1044 
34, GA. 7328 8, 736° 18, 737% 29, 738) 20, 740? 24. 

b 4. ἔτι ὡς κτλ his sense is really the same as the third, differently 
described. In the summary in ll. 6-9 the two are merged together. 

τὸ πρῶτον. ἐνυπάρχον κτλ. According to Greek idiom this must.mean 
not ‘ the first constituent which is stated in the τί éore’ but ‘the first 
constituent, which is stated in the τί ἐστι᾽. 

ὃ λέγεται ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, ‘which is stated in saying what the thing is’. 
Sometimes both’ genus and differentia are included in the τί ἐστι (An. 
Post. 94% 24, 91” 29, Lop. 153217), but elsewhere, as here, the τί ἐστι 
is identified with the genus, and the differentia is described as answering 
to the question ποῖόν τι (Zop. 102% 32-35, 1225 16, 1284 28, 142623— 
29, 1445 1|, 21). 

8. ὁμοειδές, ‘the first mover being of the same kind as the members 
of the kind’, The point seems to be that if a family were descended 
from something non-human it would be named not after this but after 
its first human ancestor. 

ὡς ὕλη. For the description of the genus as the matter of its species 
cf. Z. 10384 6, I. 10589 23. 

10. τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, the proximate substratum. Phlegm is 
not ‘other in kind’ than τὸ λιπαρόν, because it can be analysed into it ; 
nor is it other in kind than gall, because they can be analysed into the 
same materials (H. 1044 18-23). But stone and bronze are other in 
kind because one is made of earth and the other of water, and earth 
and water cannot be analysed one into the other nor both into any single 
αἰσθητόν (Al. ye 

12. καὶ ὅσα καθ᾽ ἕτερον σχῆμα κατηγορίας κτὰ. Alexander thinks 
this is a stricter sense of ‘other in genus’, since form and matter, 
which are other in genus in the first sense, are both in the category of 
substance and therefore not other in genus in this sense. It is hardly 
true, perhaps, that ὕλη considered apart from εἶδος is placed by Aristotle 
in the category of substance. But better instances could be given to 
show that things in the same category may be incapable of being 
analysed into one another or into the same thing. Number and 
spatial extension cannot be so analysed, nor can whiteness and heat ; 
and the list could be indefinitely extended. In I. 1054» 28-30, how- 
ever, ὧν μή ἐστι κοινὴ ἡ ὕλη μηδὲ γένεσις εἰς ἄλληλα are apparently identi- 
fied with ὅσων ἄλλο σχῆμα τῆς κατηγορίας, οἴ. n. ad loc, 

But ‘in different categories’ is not put forward as a separate. sense 
of ‘other in kind’, but as falling under the already mentioned sense, 
viz. ‘incapable of resolution one into another or both into the same 
thing’ (cf. 1. 15 with 1. rr). 


344 COMMENTARY 


18. σχῆμα κατηγορίας τοῦ ὄντος. This is the only passage in which 
Aristotle uses this phrase. It is a compound of the more usual ροῦν: 
τῆς κατηγορίας and κατηγορία. τοῦ ὄντος. 

14. ὡς διήρηται πρότερον, LO17 24. 


‘ False’ (ch. 29). 


1024517, ‘False’ is applied to (1) a false ‘ting. This is (2) one 
which (i) is not put together, or (ii) cannot be put together, e.g. (i) 
that you are sitting, (ii) that the diagonal of the square is commen- 
surate with the side; or 

21, (4) a thing which exists, but is such as to appear (i) not such as 
it is, or (ii) to be something that does not really exist. A scene- 
-painting is a false thing in sense (i); a dream is so in sense (ii). 

26. (2) A false account qua false is an account of what is not; 
hence any account is untrue of anything save that of which it is true, 
e. g. the account of the circle is untrue of the triangle, 

29. In one sense there ig only one account of a thing, viz. its 
definition ; in another there are many, since in a way a thing is the 
same as itself-with-an-attribute (the false account is an account, in the 
first sense, of nothing). 

32. Therefore Antisthenes was childish in thinking that nothing 
should be described except by its proper ‘account’, which made con- 
tradiction, and practically falsity also, impossible. It is possible to 
describe a thing not only by its own ‘account’ but by the account of 
something else. This may no doubt be done falsely, but it may be 
done truly ; we call ὃ double, using that which is the ‘ account’ of 2. 

1025*2. (3) A false man is one who tends to choose such accounts 
for their own sake and to impress them on others, as we call things 
false if they make false impressions. 

6, Hence the argument in the A7ppzas to show that the same man 
is false and true is delusive. It assumes (@) that he who can speak 
falsely (i.e. who knows) 7s false, and (4) that it is better to be willingly 
than unwillingly bad. This rests on a false induction, implying a con: 
‘fusion between willingly being, and willingly pretending to be, 


1024>17. ὡς πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος is opposed to λόγος ψευδής (I. 26). 
This contradicts Aristotle’s real view, which is that truth and falsity 
are essentially characteristics of thought (E. 1027) 25, I. torr? 26). 
Evidently there is no such thing as a ‘false object or fact. The first 


A. 28. 10245 13 — 29, 1024 26 345 


kind which he recognizes (Il, 18—21)—the objects of false opinions, 
i.e. what is falsely thought, in distinction from the false thinking—are 
more properly called non-existent than false. The other class (21 I-24), 
to judge from the description of them, are real objects about which 
people happen or may happen to entertain false opinions ; but one of 
the zustances Aristotle gives, viz., the dream, is nothing if not a state 
of mind, 

Throughout this book, however, Aristotle aims at classifying the 
current usages of words rather than at stating a thoroughgoing meta- 
physic. Some conflict between what he says here and elsewhere is 
only to be expected. In particular, he seems to be adapting here the 
terminology of Antisthenes (cf. 1, 32), with its opposition of πρᾶγμα to 
ὄνομα and λόγος. 

πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος. τὸ ψεῦδος is so often opposed to τὸ ἀληθές that 
ψεῦδος comes to be used as an adjective, cf. Pl. Ογαΐ, 385 c 16, 
Polit. 281413. The form ψευδές seems not to occur in Plato or 
Aristotle; ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος occurs constantly in Aristotle where we 
should have expected ψευδές if he had ever used such a form. Lobeck, 
Paral. τότ, pronounces against this use of ψεῦδος, but does not seem 
to have known all the instances. 

22. ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μὴ ἔστιν κτλ. ‘ Scene-paintings seem to be 
another sort of thing than what they are; dreams seem to be some- 
thing which in fact does not exist. This seems to be Aristotle’s 
meaning ; it answers to the distinction between illusion and hallucina- 
tion. A picture in two dimensions seems to be an object in three, but 
at any rate it is a physical reality ; the dream, which seems a physical 
reality, is not one at all, 

23. σκιαγραφία is a rough sketch in light and shade, which produces 
its effect best at a distance. Cf. RhezZ, 141428, Pl. Theael. 208 Ἑ, 
Phaedo 69 8, Parm. τόδ ο, Rep. 365 c, 602 d, ἄς. 

26. The meaning of λόγος here, as is not unusual with that word in 
Aristotle, is somewhat ambiguous. ‘Two ambiguities may be detected. 
(τ) Aristotle begins by saying that a false λόγος, account, or statement, 
is an account of that which is not. ‘Take, e.g., the definition of the 
triangle as ‘a figure bounded by a line all the points on which are equi- 
distant from a point called the centre’, A triangle thus characterized 
is a μὴ ov, and this false account is an account τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. The same 
may be said of any false account. But now it occurs to Aristotle that 
the account which is not_true of the triangle may be true of something 
else ; it is not wholly false, and in so far as it is true it is τοῦ ὄντος. 
He therefore qualifies the statement that it is τοῦ μὴ ὄντος by adding 
ἡ ψευδής, ‘in so far as it is false’. And he continues ‘hence every 
account is an untrue account of anything other than that of which it is 
the true account; e.g. the account of the circle is not true of the 
triangle’. 

Now if for brevity we formulate a false definition in the form ‘that 
A is BC’, A is as essential an element in this as its being BC. Now 
‘that A is BC’ cannot be true of something else; it is only BC, or 


3.46 COMMENTARY 


rather ‘that it is BC’, that can be true of something else. It is 
evident, then, that Aristotle passes from that notion of a λόγος which 
may be formulated as ‘that A is BC’ to that notion of it which may 
be formulated as ‘that it is BC’, leaving the subject indefinite. It is 
only the first that can be said to be false ; it is only the second that 
can be described as being true of one thing and false of another. - It 
is evident, however, that no particular statement can be formulated in 
the latter way; this is no real act of thought at all but an extract of 
what may be common to several. 

(2) So far λόγος has meant the essential account or definition of 
a thing. It is only in this sense that the λόγος of a circle must be un- 
true ofa triangle ; there are many statements of another kind that are 
true of both. But Aristotle now points out that while in this sense there 
is only one λόγος of a thing, viz., the account of its ‘what’, in another 
(that in which it means ‘statement’ in general) there are many. 
Socrates is not merely Socrates but is ‘musical Socrates’, and the 
statement “Socrates is musical’, though it is not the definition of 
Socrates, is a true account of Socrates, and there may be many such. 

Of this ambiguity Aristotle is aware; of the other, apparently, he is 
not. 

247. Christ’s conjecture 7 ψευδῆ, ‘a false λόγος is a λόγος of things that 
are not, inasmuch as they are false ’—cf.]. 21 οὕτω yap οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα 
—is ingenious but unnecessary. 

ZI. ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἁπλῶς λόγος. This apparently 
means that a false account is not an account in the strict sense, i.e. 
a definition (ἁπλῶς = κυρίως Alexander), of anything. There is, as we 
have seen, in this sense only one λόγος of a thing, and that of. course 
is the-true λόγος of it. 5 

32-34. This passage must be considered in connexion with 
H. 1043 23-32 and with Pl. Zheae/, 201 p—202c, Soph. 251 B;C. 
Campbell ( Z/eae?., p. xxxix) thinks that the reference in the Zheaefefus 
is not to Antisthenes but to some Pythagorean. But if in 1043) 28-32 
Aristotle is restating (as he seems to be) in his own language the 
Antisthenean theory, the passage in the Zheaefefus, which similarly 
describes simple entities as indefinable, and complex entities as 
definable, probably also refers to the Antistheneans. Campbell thinks 
that the passage in the Sophzs/es refers to Antisthenes. Prof. Taylor 
(V..S. 85) seems to cast doubt on this. 1 agree with him that it is 
absurd to find in ‘the accidental prosodical correspondence between 
ὀψιμαθής and ᾿Αντισθένης ᾿ (τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι Soph. 251 B) an 
allusion to Antisthenes. And the εἰδῶν φίλοι of Soph. 248A are 
certainly not the Antistheneans. But the persons referred to in 
251 B,c are distinguished from the εἰδῶν φίλοι (Ὁ. 251 D 1,-2), and 
a comparison of 251 B, c with the Aristotelian passages makes it highly 
probable that Antisthenes is referred to, The scornful tone (εὐήθως 
1024? 32, of οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι 1043 24, τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι 
Soph. 2518, ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως 251 6) confirms this 
(Τ. 1005 3 ἀπαιδευσία τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, 1006" 6 ἀπαιδευσία may also 


A. 29. 1024> 27-34 347 


refer to Antisthenes),  Luthyd. 283 π---284 ο, 285 E—286pD, Crad. 
429 Ὁ, 432}, Ε, 433 Ὁ seem also to refer to Antisthenes. 

On the whole question cf. Procl. 2 Crat. ch. 37, Zeller ii. 1.4 292-- 
296, Maier ii. 2. 11-16, Natorp in Pauly-Wissowa 5. v. Antisthenes, 
Gillespie in Archiv f Geschichte d. Phil. xxvi. 479-500, xxvii. 17-38. 
Prof. Gillespie illustrates the logic of Antisthenes admirably by refer- 
ence to Hobbes’s similar nominalistic view. The following points are 
common to the two theories (xxvii. 23): 

(1) The proposition is the application of names to things. 

(2) The definition is a proposition in which a formula consisting of 
several names is substituted for a single name (λόγος μακρός). 

(3) As in the proposition of the type S is P subject and predicate 
are both names of the same thing, the proposition is really assimilated 
to the definition. 

(4) The intensive meaning of the name is treated objectively, as 
the οὐσία of the real object: this οὐσία can itself be signified by a 
formula consisting of several words. For the function of the name 
is to distinguish one thing from another. 

(5) Thought is ‘computation’, involving the resolution of com- 
plexes into single elements. 

(6) These simple elements are αἰσθητά. 

(7) A word-formula, and hence a proposition, may be true or false 
(though Antisthenes rejects the zame ψεῦδος) or unmeaning. 

A simple entity (πρᾶγμα) should have only its own name (ὄνομα) 
_ predicated of it (Soph. 251 a) ; of a complex entity one may predicate 
either its own name or its own Adyos, which is merely a many-worded 
name (or expansion of the simple name) in which the parts of the 
subject are specified ( Zheae/. 201 ff.). 

32. διὸ ᾿Αντισθένης ᾧετο εὐήθως. The stress is on εὐήθως. Because 
in a sense there are many λόγοι of the same thing (I. 29), it was simple- 
minded of Antisthenes to insist that a thing could have only its proper 
λόγος or definition asserted of it. 

88. ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν. This doctrine is mentioned 
in Isocr. Helena, 10.1, is discussed without mention of Antisthenes in 
Luthyd, 285 b—286 B, and is ascribed to. Antisthenes in 70. 104? 21. 
‘A and B are supposed to be talking about the same thing...A 
and B in their discussion make various assertions about the thing, 
which they no doubt call by the same name; but they do not neces- 
sarily attach the same or the right formula to the name. Still in 
no case can they be said to contradict each other; if. both have 
in mind the right formula, they agree; if one has the right oe 
and the other a wrong one, they are speaking of different things 
if both have wrong formulae in mind, neither is speaking of τ te 
at all’ (Prof. Gillespie in A. G.P. xxvii. 21). 

34. σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. This doctrine is ihentione’ in 
Isoc. loc. cit., in Luthyd, 283 e—284c, 286c,p, and in Crat.-429 ἢ. 
Antisthenes’ argument seems to have been: Any one who says any- 
thing τὸ dv λέγει, speaks of that which is, But τὸ ὃν λέγειν is (by the 


348 COMMENTARY 


definition of ἀληθής) τἀληθῆ λέγειν. Hence no-one ψευδῆ λέγει. 
‘ The aim of the paradox is not to deny the fact of error, but to reject 
the definition of ψεῦδος as saying that which is not. In other words, 
falsehood is ἀλλοδοξία᾽ (A. G. P. xxvii. 20). 

1025* 7-13. Plato, according to Aristotle, makes two mistakes : 

(1) He assumes that the man who can tell lies is a liar, when he 
should have said ‘the man who chooses to tell lies’, Cf A.W. 
1127> 14 οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν TH προαιρέσει. 

(2) He assumes that the man who is willingly bad is better than the 
man who is unwillingly so. 

The latter assumption is the result of a mistaken induction. Plato 
says that he who is willingly lame is better than the man who is 
unwillingly so, But all he has a right to say is that he who willingly 
pretends to be lame is better than the man who unwillingly zs so; if he 
really were willingly lame he would presumably be worse. And so 
too in character, the man who willingly tells lies is worse than the man 
who does so unwillingly. (In its application to lameness κρείττω has 
of course no moral significance.) 

7-8. τὸν δυνάμενον... φρόνιμος, ch. App. Min. 365-369. 

9. ἔτι τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον βελτίω, cf. ib. 371-376. 

The best attested reading, ἑκόντα τὰ φαῦλα, has probably arisen by 
dittography :—éxovra φαῦλον---ἑκόντα τὰ φαῦλον---ἑκόντα τὰ φαῦλα. 
Jaeger conjectures that πράττοντα has fallen out by haplography after 
ἑκόντα. This may be so, but we cannot be sure that Alexander read 
πράττοντα (437. 8, 11) any more than that Asclepius read λέγοντα 
(357. 4). Both are probably trying to make the best they can of 
τὰ φαῦλα. 


10. τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, οἵ, 79. Adin. 373-375. 


‘ Accident’ (ch. 30). 


1025* 14. ‘Accident’ means (1) what belongs to a thing but not of 
necessity nor for the most part. 

21. Since there are attributes and they belong to subjects, and some 
of them do so only in particular places or at particular times, an 
attribute which belongs to a subject now or here, but not because it is 
this particular subject, is an accident. 

24, It has therefore no determinate cause, but ἃ. chance cause, 
A man ‘happens’ to go to Aegina if he goes not by his own intention 
but by reason of something else, e.g. a storm, 

30. (2) What belongs to a thing ger se though not present in its 
essence; e.g. having its angles equal to two right angles is an 
accident of the triangle. Accidents of this sort may be eternal; those 
of the other sort cannot. 


AO 1025 71 BO 10 255 34 349 


1025* 15. εἰπεῖν, epexegetic of ἀληθές, cf. A. 98g? 7 n. 

It is necessary to insert ὡς before ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ with Asc.c and 
Eucken. ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ seems never to be found in Aristotle or Plato in 
the sense of ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. 

21-24. ἐπεὶ ἔστιν ὑπάρχον τι κτλ. ‘Since there are attributes and 
subjects, and some of the attributes belong to the subjects only in a 
particular place and at a particular time, an attribute which belongs 
to a subject, but not because the subject was just. this subject or the 
time this time, or the place this place, will be an accident.’ Even of 
necessary events some are limited to certain places or times, but are 
due to the nature of a particular subject and to its being in a parti- 
cular place at a particular time (e.g. the rising and setting of the 
heavenly bodies); events which are not due to such a determinate 
cause are accidental. The cause of the husbandman’s finding the 
treasure is not his individual nature, nor his presence in a particular 
place at a particular time, but something indefinite, i.e. something that 
cannot be inferred certainly from the result. Some one must presum- 
ably have put the treasure there, but we cannot say who or when. 
This would seem to be Aristotle’s meaning in saying that the cause is 
indeterminate. There is no lack of causation, but two causal series 
meet (that of which the burying of the treasure was a member, and 
that of which the husbandman’s going to the field was a member), 
and the result—the finding—could not be foreseen from a consideration 
of the latter series only, nor can the cause be discovered from a con- 
sideration of the result. Similarly the cause of the voyager’s coming 
to Aegina is not his nature or his purpose, but something else— 
whether winds or pirates we cannot tell by merely knowing that he has 
got there. 

28. ἢ ἔστι has better support in the manuscripts than καὶ ἔστι and 
gives an equally good sense. 

80. Aristotle now proceeds to what he elsewhere (B. 995? 20, 
25, An. Post. 75° 1, 8319) calls the καθ᾽ αὑτὸ συμβεβηκός, that 
which, since it is not included in the definition of the subject, is a 
Patents but which yet flows from the nature of the subject,—in 
other words, the property. 

34. ἐν ἑτέροις. That τὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα are demonstrable 
(which implies that they are eternal) is stated in An. Post. 75* 39-41, 
7611-15; that the others are not demonstrable is stated in E, 2, 
Byes 18. An. Post. 75°18. Since A is apparently the earliest book of 
the Metaphysics, the reference is no doubt to the Posterior Analytics. 


350 COMMENTARY 


BOOK ἢ 


Since Z init. refers, for the list of the categories, not to E. 2. 10262 
35->1 but to A, Jaeger concludes (Ar7s/. 209-211) that E. 2—and 
with it E. 3 and 4, which arise out of the classification of the meanings 
of dv at the beginning of ἘΠ. 2—are a later addition meant to bridge 
the gulf between the introductory part of the JZe/aphysics, ABTE. 1, 
and the substantive parts of it, Z-O and IM. Thisis not improbable, 
but can hardly be proved. 


Division of theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics, 
theology (ch. 1). 


1025) 3. We are seeking the causes of existing things gua existing. 
Every science is concerned with causes more or less accurately 
grasped. 

7. The sciences (a) study some particular existing thing, not the 
existent as such ; 

10. (4) offer no proof of essence but make it obvious to the senses 
or assume it, and go on to prove the properties of the genus they are 
studying; whence it is clear that they make essence known not by 
demonstration but in some other way ; 

16. (c) they do not discuss whether their subject genus exists—this 
being a matter for the same kind of thought which studies essence. 

18. (1) Physics, like the more.special sciences, studies a particular 
genus, viz. the kind of substance which has its origin of movement and 
rest in itself. It is not a practical nor a productive science, since the 
origin of things made is in the maker, that of things done in the agent. 
Therefore it is theoretical. 

26. It studies mutable objects, and essence for the most part as 
inseparable from matter. It is important to observe how essences exist. 

30. Some, like ‘snub’, already imply matter (the snub is a concave 
nose) ; others, like ‘concave’, imply no perceptible matter. 

34. Since all physical objects are of the type of ‘the snub’ (e. g. 
animals and plants, and their parts), it is clear how physics should 
study essence, and why it studies the kind of soul that implies matter. 

10262 7. (2) Mathematics also is theoretical. Whether its objects 
are immutable and separately existent is not at present clear, but at all 
events some branches of it treat their objects as being so. 


E, 1. 1025 6-7 351 


10. (3) If there is anything eternal, immutable, and existing 
separately, it must be studied by a theoretical science, not physics nor 
mathematics but prior to both. For physics deals with objects exist- 
ing separately but not immutable, and some branches of mathematics 
deal with objects immutable but not existing separately, while the 
primary science deals with objects existing separately and immutable. 

16. All causes must be eternal, and especially these, which act as 
causes on what is visible of the divine. τ 

18. Thus there are three theoretical sciences, mathematics, physics, 
theology (for if the divine is present anywhere, it is in such objects), 
and the highest science must deal with the highest objects. The 
theoretical sciences are the highest of the sciences, and this is the 
highest of the theoretical sciences, 

23. For if the question be asked whether the primary science is 
universal or deals with a particular genus (the distinction is found in 
mathematics ; geometry and astronomy deal with a particular genus, 
universal mathematics with all), 

27. the answer is that if there is no other substance than natural 
substances, physics is the primary science, but if there isan immutable 
substance, the study of it is the primary science, and universal because 
primary. It studies the essence and properties of being as such. 


- 1025? 6. ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας is designed, as Bz. says, to include 
bodies of so-called knowledge which rest on experience rather than on 
reasoning. It is these that study αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχὰς ἁπλουστέρας (1. 7), 
i.e, vaguely conceived causes. 

7. ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας answers to ἢ ἀναγκαιότερον ἢ pada- 
κώτερον 1. 133 for this sense of ἁπλοῦς cf. A. ο878 21. The con- 
ditions of the ἀκρίβεια of a science are stated in A. 982% 25-28, 
M. 10788 9-17, An. Post. i, 27. 

4-18. Aristotle characterizes the special sciences in three ways: 

(1) they deal, each of them, only with one department of being 
ioe 0) ; ᾽ 

(2) they offer no argument to prove the essence of their subject, but 
make it-evident to sense or assume it, and go on to prove the conse- 
quent properties (10-16) ; 

(3) they do not discuss whether their subject exists, but simply 
assume that it does (16~18). 

It is not very clear what light these remarks are meant to throw on 
the nature of metaphysics. The first point is no doubt meant to 
distinguish the sciences from metaphysics. They study particular 
évra; it studies. τὸ ὃν 7 dv (cf. Τ', 10038 21-26). But in the end this 
chapter describes it as studying a particular kind of ὄντα, those which 
are both χωριστά and ἀκίνητα (102616). It is true that Aristotle still 
says it studies τὸ ὃν ἡ ὄν (10268 31); it is universal in the sense that it 


352 COMMENTARY 


is primary (1026 30): i.e. its objects are those which give to all 
others their general character, and in studying them it is studying 
being as such. But Aristotle can hardly be said to have stood firm by 
the intention with which he evidently begins the chapter. 

Again, what is the point of his reference to the other two character- 
istics of special sciences—that they do not offer proof of the essence 
nor of the existence of their subjects? Is it meant that metaphysics 
proves what being is, or that it is? Or that it proves the nature or the 
existence of the objects of the special sciences ? 

On one interpretation of 1025%14-16, Aristotle says not merely 
that the special sciences do not prove the essence of their subjects, but 
that proof of essence is impossible. It is, then, impossible even for 
metaphysics. And if so, proof of existence is equally impossible for it 
(11. 16-18). But probably 11. 14-16 should be interpreted otherwise, 
and if so, the passage throws no light on the method of metaphysics. 
What we may say, however, is that in practice the method of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics is not that of ‘linear inference’ from a definite set of 
ἀρχαί, but that of aporematic discussion which discovers the ἀρχαί 
only as it proceeds. 

11. at μὲν. .. αἱ 8. Alexander illustrates this by medicine, 
which, he says, simply shows us bodies being analysed into the four 
elements, and by arithmetic, which simply assumes that the unit is 
a substance without position. Assumption is the right course for a 
science to adopt with regard to the meaning of αἱ] its terms (An. Post. 
76% 32). 

15. ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς. In the parallel passage K. 10648 8 
this goes with δῆλον, which answers to φανερόν in the present passage. 
‘It is evident from this review of the sciences.’ But if the present 
passage is so translated, (1) the separation of ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπαγωγῆς 
from φανερόν by so many words is very curious, (2) τῆς τοιαύτης (not 
ταύτης τῆς) is odd, (3) it is difficult to describe the general reference 
to the sciences in ll. 4-13 as an ἐπαγωγή. 

Alexander takes the present passage differently. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐκ τῆς 
αἰσθήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς πίστις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις (441. 38). 
1. ε. 7 τοιαύτη ἐπαγωγή is treated as meaning the ‘leading on’ of 
the mind to general truth by the exhibition of ‘particular fact to sense 
(ai μὲν ἘΠῚ ποιήσασαι αὐτὸ δῆλον 1. 11). If Alexander is right, 
the writer of K must be supposed to have misunderstood this passage. 

16-17. οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μὴ ἔστι TO γένος... οὐδὲν λέγουσι, cf. Am. 
Fost 768 51, 28. 

17. διὰ τὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. This does not, as has sometimes been 
thought, contradict the distinction drawn by Aristotle in Am. Post. ii. 
1, 8 between knowledge εἰ ἔστι and τί ἐστι. He says in 89> 34 that 
we ask what a thing is only when we already know that it is; but this 
does not imply that the mode of ‘knowledge may not be of the same 
type in both cases. It is in fact in both cases immediate apprehension, 
not demonstration, and this is what Aristotle means by τῆς αὐτῆς 
διανοίας. 


πε LOZA Τ 122 353 


18-—1026* 7. Aristotle has already (Il. 7-10) distinguished meta- 
physics from the special sciences. But there is a science which makes 
a special claim to be the supreme science (cf. 1026% 27-29, T', 1005 
32), and whose relation to metaphysics it is particularly important 
to make clear, viz. physics. To this Aristotle accordingly devotes 
particular attention. 

20. τὴν τοιαύτην... οὐσίαν κτλ. This is the strictest definition of 
φύσις (A. 1015% 13). 

21. In the light of A. 1014” 19, 10154 15 there is much to be said 
for Schwegler’s conjecture 7 αὐτή for ἐν αὐτῇ. 

22, 23. [have restored the reading of A> ποιητῶν... πρακτῶν in place 
of the vulgate ποιητικῶν . .. πρακτικῶν. E Al, read ποιητικῶν... . πρακτῶν, 
which is unsatisfactory. K in the corresponding passage (1064? 11, 14) 
has ποιητικῆς... πρακτικῆς, but it is evident that ποιητῶν ... πρακτῶν gives 
the better sense here, and that the vulgate reading has arisen by assimila- 
tion to πρακτική. «. ποιητική 1. 21. It is the ἀρχή (or origin) of what 
is made or done, not the ἀρχή of the sciences that study making or 
doing, that Aristotle must be describing as present in the maker or doer, 
and identifying with νοῦς, τέχνη, δύναμίς τις, OF προαίρεσις. His point is 
that, while the physicist studies objects that have the source of their 
movement in themselves, the student of an art or of morals is learning 
what movements he himself ought to originate—the distinction between 
art and conduct themselves being that artistic activity aims at an ἔργον 
beyond itself, while moral activity does not (2, JV. vi. 4). Physics, 
then, is not a practical nor a productive science. 

Aristotle’s classification of sciences in this chapter is as follows ; 


ἐπιστήμη 
| 


| | | 
πρακτική πουησιμαῖ θεωρητική 
| | | 


μαθηματική φυσική θεολογική. 


The main division into three is said by Diog. Laert. ili. 84 to be due 
to Plato, It reappearsin Zop. 145% 15, &. NW. 11308 27. The late Peri- 
patetics and the neo-Platonists tell us that Aristotle recognized only two 
main divisions, θεωρητική and πρακτική (cf. a. 993? 20, H. L. 12148 8-- 
12), and divided the latter into ethics, economics, and politics, But 
their statements have no authority as against his own words. It is on 
the present classification that the traditional arrangement of Aristotle’s 
works is based, the logical works being placed first as propaedeutic 
to the rest, and followed by the theoretical, the practical, and the pro- 
ductive (Poesics). 

22. ἢ νοῦς ἢ τέχνη ἢ δύναμίς τις. Cf. Ζ. 1032427, where διάνοια 
takes the place of νοῦς. In neither passage does Alexander give a satis- 

2678-1 Aa 


354 COMMENTARY 


factory interpretation. The three words suggest diminishing degrees 
of rationality (cf. ll. 6, 13), δύναμις being something like ἐμπειρία or rule 
of thumb procedure (A. 981» 8). τέχνη and δύναμις are distinguished 
(without any explanation) in Z. 10338; they are frequently conjoined 
as being practically synonymous. 

27. καὶ περὶ οὐσίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡς οὐ χωριστὴν 
μόνον. ΒΖ, , following Alexander, takes οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον as = μόνον 
οὐ χωριστήν = ἀλλ᾽ οὐ χωριστήν, and prints ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οὐ χωριστὴν 
μόνον, understanding the clause to mean ‘and it deals with substance 
for the most part as form rather than matter, only not a form that can 
exist apart from matter’. This use of μόνον is very difficult. On the 
other hand, if we read τὴν... οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον without a comma, οὐ 
for μή is a difficulty. I have therefore adopted the reading of ET 
ὡς οὐ χωριστὴν μόνον (ὡς was very likely to drop out, owing to its 
awkwardness after the other ὡς). I translate, ‘and it deals with sub- 
stance-in-the-sense-of-form for the most part only as inseparable from 
matter’. μόνον thus at the end of the sentence is not uncommon 
(Bz. Index 472 44-46). This brings out the difference between 
physics and metaphysics, which is Aristotle’s point, better than the 
other reading and interpretation ; there is no particular point here in 
saying that physics studies form rather than matter, though this is of 
course true (cf. Z. 10374 17). 

29-80. os... μηδέν ἐστι ποιεῖν, ὡς in the sense of ‘since’ is not 
quoted in Bz.’s /ndex, but is of course quite good Greek. Alexander 
takes it so. Possibly, however, ὡς means ‘that’, and the sentence 
means ‘the mode of existence of the essence must not escape our 
notice; we must observe that to inquire without knowing this is 
fruitless ’. 

81. τὸ σιμόν receives fuller treatment in Z. 5. 

34. ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς. Hollowness does involve ὕλῃ νοητή, exten- 
sion (Ζ. 10364 9). 

εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ φυσικὰ ὁμοίως TO σιμῷ λέγονται. All physical things, 
like ‘the snub’, involve a union of form and matter. But there is a 
difference, since ‘snub’ involves a union of a subject, which is itself 
a unity of form and matter, with a proprzum, while the other terms 
here mentioned are substances, or parts of substances, involving simply 
a union of form with matter. 

102642. οὐθενὸς γὰρ ἄνευ κινήσεως ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ del ἔχει ὕλην. 
ὕλη = potentiality of change, so that ‘changeable’ is used as synony- 
mous with ‘material’ or ‘sensible’ (A. 989 31 f., Z. 1036” 28 f.), 

5. kat διότι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας κτλ., viz. because physics studies 
form as inseparable from matter (102527). There seems to be 
nothing in Christ’s view that καὶ διότι... ἐστίν (|. 6) was originally meant 
to go after τούτων |. . 

περὶ ψυχῆς ἐνίας, i.e. all except the reason which comes in from 
without and has no communion with the body (De An. 403% 16-28, 
429% 24, δ. A. 6418 17—b 10, G. A. 736” 27). 

For the unusual singular ἐνίας cf. Probl. 8840 15, Theophr. fr, 8. 1. 


E. 1. 1025) 27 — 1026 14 355 


8. Whether the objects of mathematics are, as the Platonists say, 
separately existing unchanging entities, Aristotle leaves at present un- 
certain ; in MN he answers that they are not. But at all events some— 
the pure—branches of mathematics (ἔνια μαθήματα seems to be subject, 
not object : Chl τῆς “μαθηματικῆς ἔνια, περὶ ἀκίνητα, &c., An. Post. 
4927 τὰ μαθήματα περὶ εἴδη ἐστίν, Phys. 1045 7 τὰ ἀπ πότερον τῶν 
μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτική, De Caelo 302b 29 οἱ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν) study 
their objects gva unchangeable and separate. Some on the other hand, 
(the ‘ physical’ or applied branches, optics, harmonics, astronomy, 
Phys. 194? 7) study objects unchangeable indeed but not separate but 
‘as in matter ’ (1, 15). Aristotle states his position more fully in 
Wil, @, 3. 

g. Schwegler argues with much ingenuity that the correct reading 
must be not ἣ χωριστά but μὴ χωριστά. This alone, he holds, would 
justify Aristotle in his conclusion that if there is a separately existing 
substance it cannot be studied by mathematics. That conclusion, 
however, (n.b. δέ 1. το, γάρ 1. 13) is not drawn from the present sen- 
tence but from the later mentioned fact (I. 14) that τῆς μαθηματικῆς ἔνια 
(just 207 the ἔνια mentioned here—applied, not pure mathematics) are 
περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν ov χωριστὰ δὲ tows. It is true, as Schwegler says, that 
τὰ μαθηματικὰ οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ (De An, 431) 15)is not 
equivalent to 7 χωριστὰ θεωρεῖ. The latter, however, can and must 
mean ‘studies its objects in that respect in which they are χωριστά᾽, 
viz. gua separable in thought. Cf. Phys. 193533 διὸ καὶ χωρίζει 
(ὃ μαθηματικός)" χωριστὰ yap TH νοήσει κινήσεώς ἐστι. Regarded 
as concessive, the sentence is satisfactory enough with the traditional 
reading. 

10. Natorp seeks to get rid of the difficulty about the object of 
metaphysics (cf. 1025 7-18n.) by interpreting εἰ ‘whether’, and by 
translating καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα in]. 16 ‘a/so about separate and 
immutable objects’. He thinks it the business of first philosophy to 
study substantial unchangeable substance (God) among others, and only 
to determine whether and what it is, and cuts out 18f. dare . . . Geodo- 
γική and 21f. cai... εἶναι. He points out that θεολογία and the kindred 
words elsewhere (except i in K) always refer to myth, and objects to 
θεολογική here on that ground. ‘There is no need, however, for such 
violent methods of criticism. 

14. The balance of the sentence clearly requires Schwegler’s emen- 
dation χωριστά. Physics studies things separate but not unchangeable, 
mathematics things unchangeable but not separate, metaphysics things 
both separate and unchangeable. ἀχώριστα μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀκίνητα would 
be a false antithesis, for the things that are not separate from matter 
are necessarily things that have movement. > 

The objects of physics are χωριστά in the sense that they exist 
separately. The reading ἀχώριστα is due to some copyist’s reflection 
that they are not χωριστά in the sense of ‘ separate from matter’, and 
in particular to a recollection of 102528. Butthere it is not physical 
things but their form that is said to be treated as οὐ χωριστήν. 

ΑΔ 


356 COMMENTARY 


15. tows is as usual inserted simply out of caution, cf. A. 9878 26n, 
The fact is not proved till MN. 

16-18 justifies the name θεολογική which Aristotle is about to apply 
to the study of χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. ΑἸ] causes, i. 6. first causes, must 
be eternal, if we are to avoid an infinite regress (a. 2); and above all 
the unmoving first causes which act as causes on ‘ those among divine 
things which are manifest to sense ’, 1. 6. on the heavenly bodies whose 
eternal revolution is itself the cause of all other events. The thought 
is not quite exact, for it is only γϑεί causes that need be eternal, and 
ταῦτα are not some first causes among others, but the only first causes. 
The heavenly bodies are only second causes. It is evident, however, 
that the science which studies eternal causes is properly called θεολογική, 
and this is Aristotle’s point. 

For tots φανεροῖς τῶν θείων cf. Phys, 1964 33 τὸν δ᾽ οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ 
θειότατα τῶν φανερῶν, and also L. Δ᾽, 1141434. 

If we ask what exactly Aristotle means by these first causes, the 
answer is, God, who moves the sphere of the fixed stars, and the other 
immutable, eternal beings who move the spheres that account for the 
motion of the planets (A. 1072*19—1073P 3). 

19. The designation of metaphysics as θεολογική is confined to 
this passage and the corresponding passage in K, 106463. Geodo- 
γεῖν, θεολογία, θεολόγος in Aristotle always refer to the early cosmo- 
logists, But in Pl. Rep. 379 A θεολογία is used of rational theo- 
logy. This way of naming metaphysics is connected with the view 
of it not as studying the general character of being as such, but as 
studying those beings which are χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, in other words 
θεῖα. 

19-21, οὐ γὰρ... ὑπάρχει Seems to be best treated as a parentheti- 
cal clause justifying the use of the name θεολογική for the science of 
that which has independent and immutable existence. 

22. al μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαί kth. This has been shown in A. 982» 
24.366. 

23-32. The argument does not seem to be as obscure as Bonitz and 
Christ suppose it to be. Theology is more to be chosen than the 
other theoretical sciences; for if the question be asked whether it is 
universal or studies one particular kind of being, our answer is that it 
studies the primary kind of being, and that which gives their funda- 
mental character to all other beings. It is thus both primary and 
universal, and doubly supreme among the sciences. 

25. The same alternatives as have been suggested with regard to the 
objects of philosophy are found within mathematics. Geometry, 
astronomy, and (we may add) arithmetic, study special kinds of quan- 
tity, but there is a general mathematics which studies quantity in 
general (cf. Κι 1061 19). Bonitz thinks that this general mathematics 
is arithmetic, But A. 982 28 suggests that arithmetic is a science along- 
side of geometry though more accurate. M. 10778 9-12, Ὁ 17-20, An. 
Post, 74®17-25 make it clear that Aristotle contemplates a science 
wider than either arithmetic or geometry ; and a specimen of it is to 


Ea feel O26" τε Ὁ 357 


be found in Euclid’s treatment, in Bk. v of the Zvements, of propor- 
tion as existing between azy kind of magnitudes, 
30. αὕτη, the science which studies this immutable substance. 


Accidental being the subject of no science (ch. 2). 


1026* 33. ‘ Being ’ means (1) accidental being, (2) being as truth, 
(3) the categories, (4) the potential and the actual. 

b 3. (1) Accidental being is studied by no science. For (a) the maker 
of a house does not make the infinite attributes incidental to it—its 
pleasantness to some people, injuriousness to others, &c. 

10. (2) The geometer does not study the incidental attributes of 
figures, 6. δ. whether ‘the triangle’ is the same as ‘the triangle with angles 
equal to two right angles’. 

12, This is natural enough; the accidental is little more than a name. 
Plato was not far wrong in saying that sophistry deals with not-being. 
For it deals for the most part with the accidental—‘ whether the musical 
‘and the grammatical are the same’, &c.—puzzles which indicate that 
the accidental is near to not-being. 

22. This is shown also by the fact that things which exist in the 
proper sense are generated and destroyed by a process, while accidents 
are not. 

24. Yet we must as far as possible state the nature and cause of the 
accidental ; this may show why there is no science of it. 

27. (a) The cause of it is that while some things are always alike 
and of necessity (in the sense that they cannot be otherwise), others are 
only for the most part; that which is neither always nor for the most 
part is the accidental. 

33. Εἰ g. cold in the dog-days is accidental, but heat is not. That 
a man is pale is accidental, that he is an animal is not. Thata builder 
should cure a man, just because the builder happens to be a doctor, is 
accidental. 

10274 5. Necessary or usual events are the effect of arts that tend to 
produce them; of accidental results there is no definite art, since the 
causes of accidents are themselves accidental. 

8. Thus the existence of accident is due to the fact that most things 
are only for the most part, and therefore to the matter which admits of 
a departure from the usual. 

15. We must start from the question whether there must not be 
something that is neither always nor for the most part. There are 


353 COMMENTARY 


such things. We may defer the question whether there is o/hing that 
is always. 


1g. (4) Evidently there is no knowledge of the accidental, since 
knowledge is of that which is always or for the most part; otherwise 
learning and teaching would be impossible. 

24. We cannot state when the accidental takes place. E. g, ‘ honey- 
water is good for fever except at new moon’. If we can say this, then 
what happens at new moon happens then either always or usually ; but 
the accidental happens neither always nor usually. 

26. Thus we have stated the nature and cause of the accidental, and 
that there is no knowledge of it. 


10262 34. ἦν. The reference is to A. 7. Of the four senses of 
‘being’ mentioned there, τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός is briefly discussed 
in ἘΣ, 2, 3, τὸ ὧς ἀληθές in E. 4; τὸ κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας, OF 
rather substance, the first category, is discussed in ZH, and τὸ κατὰ 
δύναμιν Kal ἐντελέχειαν in Θ. 

by. σημαίνει. The subject is τὸ ὄν. 

6. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν οἰκίαν κτλ. The builder as a matter of fact 
makes a house which has these attributes, but he does not make it gua 
builder. His business is to make a house which is an efficient 
‘ covering for living creatures and goods’ (H. 1043216). Such a house 
may incidentally be agreeable or salubrious for some tenants and not for 
others, but that is not his concern; the house is not this gua house. 
Again, it will be different from everything else in the universe ; but this 
it is not gua house, since the same could be said of anything else. - 

II-12. οὐδ᾽ ei... ἔχον. Alexander thinks the question is whether the 
geometrical triangle which has its angles equal to two right angles is 
the same as the triangle of wood or stone. τρίγωνον alone, however, 
could hardly have this meaning; it naturally means the geometrical 
triangle, and the question must be whether the triangle as such, 
i.e. thought of simply as a rectilinear figure with three sides, is 
the same as the triangle thought of as also having angles equal to two 
right angles. Nor need the fact that this is a property, i.e. a συμβε- 
βηκός of the type that is not in question here, ἃ συμβεβηκὸς καθ᾽ αὑτό 
(A. 1025 30), disturb us. The ASAIO a of the triangle which 
Aristotle says the geometer does not discuss is not ‘having angles 
equal to two right angles’, but ‘being other than, or the same as, the 
triangle having angles,’ &c. ‘This the geometer as such does not con- 
sider, just as the builder does not consider whether the house he 
makes is other than a man, &c. (I. 9) 

These are in fact sophistical puzzles of the type referred to in ll. 15- 
21. If one says the two are different, the sophist asks ‘ how is it, then, 
that every triangle λας its angles equal to two right angles?’ If one 
says they are the same, then for ‘ triangle’ one can substitute ‘ triangle 
having angles equal to two right angles’, for this one can substitute 


E. 2. 1026% 34 — 1026) 18 359 


‘triangle having angles, &c., having angles,’ &c., and so ad infinilum. 
Cf. Soph. EZ. 13. 

18. ὥσπερ yap ὄνομά τι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν. Probably no 
very precise meaning is to be looked for here. Aristotle means that the 
puzzles with which the sophists occupied themselves, puzzles turning 
on accidental predications such as τὸ μουσικόν ἐστι γραμματικόν, are 
purely verbal and require only a clearing up of the meaning of words. 
All that is necessary is to point out (1) that τὸ λευκόν here means not 
white colour but a particular thing which has it, and (2) that ἐστι 
means not ‘is essentially’ but ‘happens to be’. 

14. διὸ Πλάτων kth. Cf. Soph. 254 A. 

16. πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτόν κτλ. The sophistic argument, as 
Alexander says, is as follows: 

Socrates is grammatical (i.e. can read and write, Zop. 142 30-35). 

οὖς Grammatical Socrates is the same as Socrates. 

Socrates is musical. 

οὖν Musical Socrates is the same as Socrates. 

οὖς Musical Socrates is the same as grammatical Socrates. 

οὖς The musical is the same as the grammatical. 

But if so, where the grammatical is the musical will be. 

But Aristarchus is grammatical but not musical. 

.'. The grammatical is not the same as the musical. 

17. καὶ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος. The sophistical puzzle here 
would be: if Coriscus is the same as musical Coriscus, then he is the 
same as musical musical Coriscus, and so ad infinitum. Cf. a similar 
puzzle in Soph. E7. 173 34. 

18. καὶ εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἡ κτλ. The sophists seem to have opposed the 
natural view that what is and has not always been must have come to 
be, by the following reductio ad absurdum : 

If a man being musical has become grammatical, then being 
musical he is grammatical. 

And if so, then being grammatical he is musical. 

But he has not always, being grammatical, been musical. 

If that which is and has not always been must have come to be, 
then being grammatical he has become musical. 1.6. he must have 
been grammatical before he was musical as well as musical before he 
was grammatical. Which is absurd. 

Alexander gives various arguments, none of which quite suits the 
text. The argument is briefly hinted at in Zop~. 104» 25, while 
a different argument for the same thesis is referred to in K. 1064 23. 

Aristotle admits the force of the reasoning, but draws not the con- 
clusion which the sophists draw, that the belief that that which is but 
has not always been must have come to be is false, but that the 
supposed instance of a thing’s being, by application to which they refute 
the belief, viz. that the musical is grammatical, is really an instance of 
not-being, and that all accidents are so too (I. 21). Thus that Plato 
was right in saying that sophistic deals with not-being is proved 
thus: 


360 COMMENTARY 


Sophistic deals with the accidental. 
The accidental is not-being. 

Plato himself said that the sophist was concerned with not-being not in 
the sense of the accidental but in the sense of the false, that which seems 
to be what it is not (Soph. 235 A, 239 c). 

2i. φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ cup BeBands ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος. IT. 6. when 
Α 15 κατὰ συμβεβηκός B, the connexion is so remote that A can hardly 
be said to de B in the full sense of the word ‘be’. 

22, τῶν τοιούτων, ‘such as the following’. For τοιοῦτος referring 
forward cf. A. 987» 4, B. 9088 το, De An. 408? τ, 

23. τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν. Aristotle’s meaning is this: 
If A becomes B, it is as a general rule by one part of it becoming B 
after another (@. 1049” 35, Phys. 237 9,15). But there is no gradual 
change in the musical by which it becomes grammatical. A gradual 
change takes place in the man who is musical, by which he becomes 
grammatical, and when this is over the musical is found to be 
grammatical; but it never was becoming grammatical. This con- 
ception of a thing’s now not being and later being, or vice versa, 
without ever being in course of becoming or ceasing to be, is applied 
not only to accidental events, and to their causes (10274 29), but also 
to ἐνέργειαι such as sensation (De Sensu 446} 4), to geometrical points, 
lines, and planes (B. 10024 32, H. 1044» 21, K. 1060» 19), to moments 
(B. 1002 6), to forms superinduced on matter (H. 1043 15, 1044» 22), 
to contacts (De Caelo 280» 26). Aristotle also says that some thinkers 
applied it to movement (De Caelo 280 6). 

28. οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης, A. 10152 26. 

29. ἀλλ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν KTH, Δ. 10152 33-35. 

80. αὕτη ἀρχή κτὰ. I. ε., since there are things which happen more 
than 7 and less than 2” times out of 2, there must be things that 
happen /ess than 7 times out of 2 71. 

37. kal τὸ ὑγιάζειν δέ κτλ. In the exposition from |. 247 to this 
point, the accidental has been identified with what is neither ἀεί nor 
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, i.e. with what is unusual or at best not usual. 
Aristotle now (35—1027? 8) calls attention to another aspect of the 
accidental than its lack of frequency,—the aspect to which the word 
συμβεβηκός ‘concomitant’ points. A is or does B κατὰ συμβεβηκός 
when it is or does it not gua A but gua C, a concomitant of A. 

1027* 5. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων [ἐνίοτε] δυνάμεις κτλ. Bonitz argues 
against ἐνίοτε on the ground (1) that τὰ ἄλλα, necessary or usual 
events, not sometimes but always have definite causes, and (2) that 
there is no trace of the word in Alexander or Asclepius. He con- 
jectures αἰτίαι τε καὶ δυνάμεις from Alexander, but probably αἰτίας καὶ 
δυνάμεις (Al. 451. 34) is merely Alexander’s expansion of δυνάμεις. 

It seems better to treat ἐνίοτε as the gloss of a cautious copyist. 
And it should be noted that δυνάμεις ποιητικαί does not mean 
‘causes’ in general. It is almost equivalent to τέχνας and means 
something only a degree less organized than an art (cf. 1025) 
22 ἢ). 


E. 2. 1026 21 — 10278 25 361 


It would also be possible to read ἄλλαι and interpret : ‘for of some 
of the effects thus produced by one art there are ofher faculties whose 
proper business it is to produce them (as it is the business of ἰατρική, 
not of οἰκοδομική, to produce health), while of others there is xo 
definite art or faculty’ (as, according to the Platonists, there is no art 
of pleasure—Z. WV. 1152» 18). 

8. kal τὸ αἴτιόν ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. This seems only to mean 
that if B follows accidentally from A, A is only accidentally the 
cause of B. 

8-16. Bz.’s proposal to place ὥστ᾽... dvayxys(I.13) after |. 16 ἀδύνατον 
does not seem necessary nor even an improvement. It would involve 
the expression of the same thought in three consecutive sentences,— 
10 ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν, 12 κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται, 
16 ἔστιν ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. 
ὥστε in |. 8 is natural enough; it introduces not a conclusion from 
what Aristotle has just said, but a summary of what he has been arguing 
for since 1026) 24. 

15. ἀρχήν, sc. of the proof that accident exists. 

19. ὕστερον, A, 6-8. 

21. For the inclusion of the usual as well as the necessary among 
the objects of science cf. An. Pr. 326 18, An. Post. 87 20. 

25. ἢ γὰρ det κτὰ. Bz. thinks that a better sense would be 
obtained here by reading ἡ yap ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, Kal τῇ νουμηνίᾳ. 
Alexander’s commentary (452. 35—453- 1) does not show clearly 
whether he had this or the traditional reading before him. ‘The latter, 
however, gives a good if difficult sense. ‘For even that which happens 
at new moon (viz. honey-water’s not being beneficial) happens then 
either always or for the most part’. 1. 6., the conditions of the 
accidental as such cannot be stated. If you can state the conditions of 
an event, then even if it is an exception to a wider law it has a law of 
its own and is not a mere accident. This clause is very important, for 
it is perhaps the only place in which Aristotle implies the view that 
there is nothing which is objectively accidental. ‘There are events 
which present themselves as accidents, i.e. as unintelligible exceptions, 
but if we knew more about them we should know that they obey laws 
of their own, Elsewhere Aristotle speaks as if there were events which 
are sheer exceptions and below the level of knowledge ; here he admits 
that they are merely beyond our present knowledge. 


Nature and origin of accident (ch. 3). 


1027* 29. Evidently there are causes that are generable and de- 
structible but are never in process of being generated or destroyed. 
Otherwise all events would be necessary, if that which is generated and 
destroyed by a process must have a non-accidental cause. 

82. For if we ask for the conditions of a future event, and the con- 


362 COMMENTARY 


ditions of those conditions, and so on, we-finally come to conditions 
which are or are not in existence now, or (going further) to conditions 
which have or have not occurred in the past. Therefore, according to 
this line of thought, all future events will take place of necessity. 

bro. But in fact, though it is certain that a living man will die, it is 
not yet certain whether it will be by disease or by violence. This 
depends on something taking place. Evidently, then, the causal 
connexion goes back to a certain starting-point but no further. This 
is the cause of the chance event, and has itself no cause. 

14. Whether this is a material, final, or efficient cause, is an important 
subject of inquiry. 


1027%29. γενητὰ kat φθαρτὰ ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι καὶ φθείρεσθαι. Aristotle 
has already (1026 22) pointed out that accidental events are never in 
process of becoming or perishing. He now says that the same is true 
of their causes. The passages referred to in the note on that passage 
(especially, for the verbal form, H. 1043 15) are enough to vindicate 
the correctness of the text against such proposals as that of Apelt. 
Those who wish to emend the text have not sufficiently noted the fact 
that γίγνεσθαι and φθείρεσθαι are in the present tense. You can say of 
such a cause γέγονε, but you can never say of it γίγνεται. As 
Alexander points out, the builder gradually by a process of learning 
(and, we may add, of subsequent building) becomes the cause of a house; 
but the healthiness of the house supervenes instantaneously on this 
process, and he does not gradually come to be the cause of a healthy 
house. All we can say is that a moment ago he was not so and now 
he is so. 

That the αἴτια of which Aristotle is speaking are the causes of 
accidental events is shown not only by the general drift of the chapter 
but by the corresponding passage in K. 106526, ὅτι δὲ τοῦ κατὰ 
συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι Kal ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται οἵἷαίπερ τοῦ καθ᾽ 
αὑτὸ ὄντος, δῆλον. It cannot be maintained, however, that the chapter 
works out with any great clearness the thesis here put forward. In the 
next sentence Aristotle points out that, since that which does come into 
being by a process must have a non-accidental cause, i.e. one which 
necessarily produces it (this he assumes as in Z. 10324 13, 1033* 24, 
@. 1049” 28), it follows that if all causes came into being by a process, 
they would come into being necessarily and so would all their results, 
immediate or remote, so that all events would be necessary. If, then, 
he can show that some events are not necessary, he can show that 
there are causes which do not come into being by a process. 

He next (8 32-- ro) points out that if we start in thought from some 
event about which we are doubtful whether it will happen, and assume 
a necessary connexion at every stage, there must be conditions 
now in existence, and indeed there must have been conditions realized 
in the past (ἢ εἰς τῶν γεγονότων τὶ > 3, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ὑπερπηδήσῃ τις 


E. 3. 10272 29 — 1027 10 363 


κτλ. " 6), from which the event in question either necessarily will 
follow or necessarily will not follow. This necessary connexion, he 
admits, is up to a certain point realized. A man is eating pungent food, 
therefore he will necessarily be thirsty, he will necessarily go out to get 
water, he will necessarily be killed by his enemies. Again, there are 
contraries present in the same living body, the harmony between them 
will necessarily be dissolved, the body will necessarily die. But, 
Aristotle adds (> 10), not a// future events are thus already necessitated. 
It is certain that a man will die, but it is not yet certain whether it will 
be by disease or by violence. That depends on some condition not 
yet in existence, and (he implies) not made necessary by anything that 
is in existence—some condition which will arise, if it does arise, not by 
a process but instantaneously. If the man is eating pungent food, his 
fate is sealed (so we may probably interpret Aristotle), but before he eats 
it there is no condition from which it necessarily follows that he will 
eat it. The eating is an ἀρχή to which we can trace back the causal 
nexus, but beyond it we cannot go. Therefore all events are not 
necessary ; therefore there are αἴτια γενητὰ ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. 

The statement that it is not yet determined whether a man will die by 
disease or by violence seems to be simply an appeal to common sense. 
Aristotle does not make it clear whether these αἴτια γενητὰ ἄνευ τοῦ 
γίγνεσθαι are always acts of voluntary agents. In the corresponding 
passage of K (1065 16) the matter is illustrated by an eclipse, but he 
certainly did not think eclipses were accidental,and it seems that he takes 
it as an instance of the cases in which he admits complete necessary con- 
nexion. In the De /nferpretatione the instances of doubtful future events 
are—-whether a sea-fight will take place (18> 23), whether a ganment 
will be cut up or worn out (198 12),—both clearly dependent on human 
action ; and appeal is made to the fact ὅτι ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐσομένων Kal 
ἀπὸ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρᾶξαί τι (19% 7). But he seems not 
to confine contingency to human action and its results, for he goes on 
to something more general, καὶ ὅτι ὅλως ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ ἀεὶ ἐνεργοῦσι 
τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως. In fact he recognizes an initiative in 
unconscious nature analogous to that which he allows to man; the 
former under certain conditions leads to τὸ αὐτόματον as the latter 
leads to τύχη (Phys. ii. 4-6). 

bg, Aristotle first considers the case of death by violence, and comes 
to death by disease only in ll. 6-10. νόσῳ ἤ seems to be plainly a 
gloss owing its origin to νόσῳ ἢ βίᾳ |. το. 

8. ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Aristotle seems here to draw the conclusion which 
follows from the supposition he is trying to prove wrong, the supposi- 
tion that there are no ungenerated (i.e. accidental) causes. He gives 
an example (τὸ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν ζῶντα) in which he admits that there is 
certainty, but proceeds to add one (εἰ νόσῳ ἢ Bia) in which he claims 
that there is not. The argument is at this point very obscure. 

10. σώματι, which is omitted by A> and apparently by Alexander, 
is doubtless a gloss. It gives the meaning correctly enough. τὰ évav- 
τία are the primary ἐναντιώσεις, the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry. 


364 COMMENTARY 


14. ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἀρχὴν ποίαν kth. Aristotle has already (ἃ 13) said that 
matter is the cause of accident, but this does not mean that matter pro- 
duces the accidental event; bare matter is a potentiality of opposites, 
without inclination to either. The meaning is that matter or the 
potentiality for opposite realizations is what makes accident, i.e, an 
unusual realization, possible. He now says it is a question for con- 
sideration, what actually brings the accidental event about, whether it is 
a material, final, or efficient cause. He omits the formal cause, since 
the accidental is just what cannot be traced to the essence of its 
subject. Both Alexander and Asclepius say Aristotle’s view is that the 
ἀρχαί he has been speaking of are efficient causes. It seems clear that 
the positive cause of the accidental result cannot be bare matter, 
since that is what lends itself to opposite results. Accidental events, 
since they take place in time, must have an efficient cause, and Aris- 
totle is no doubt thinking of this; e.g., a man’s death at the 
hands of his enemies is traced to his ὄρεξις to eat tasty food, and this 
is an efficient cause. But wherever there is ὄρεξις there is behind it 
an ὀρεκτόν acting as final cause, and this also Aristotle doubtless has 
in mind. 


Being as truth τς not primary being (ch. 4). 


102717. (2) Being as truth and not-being as falsity depend on 
a putting together and a taking apart; both together are concerned 
with the partition of a pair of contradictory propositions 

20. (for true judgement affirms when the subject and predicate are 
in fact combined, denies when they are separated, while the false does 
the opposite ; how thinking things together or separately takes place is 
another question—I mean thinking them so that the thoughts are not 
a succession but a unity) ; 

25. for falsity and truth are not in things (e.g. the good is not true, 
the bad false), but in thought, and with regard to simple objects, i.e. 
essences, there is not falsity or truth even in thought. 

28. Being in the sense of truth must be discussed later, but since 
that which is in thought, not in things, is different from what zs in the 
strict sense (the essence, quality, &c., which thought joins with or takes 
away from its subject), being as truth, as well as accidental being (the 
cause of the latter being indefinite, that of the former being some 
affection of thought, and both presupposing being in the strict sense 
and not denoting an objective existent), may be dismissed for the 
present. 

1028* 3. We must study the causes of being itself as such. 


FE, 3. 102714—4. 1027) 33 365 


1027 10. ἐπειδή κτλ. Bz. pointed out rightly, after Alexander, that 
the grammatical apodosis does not come till ]. 28. But 1. 29 ἐπεὶ dé 
κτλ. really continues the line of thought started in |. 19 ἐπειδὴ παρὰ 
σύνθεσιν κτλ., and the /ogical apodosis does not come till 1. 33 [τὸ μὲν 
ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ] τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὃν ἀφετέον. 

It seems better to read παρά with the best manuscripts; the manu- 
scripts of Alexander vary between παρά and περί in two places, but in 
457. 20, 22, 25, 27, 38, 458. 4 give only παρά. παρά = ‘ dependent 
on’, cf. Bz, Index 562% 7~21. 

τὸ δὲ σύνολον κτλ., ‘and the true and the false together are con- 
cerned with the sharing out of contradictories. The true affirms where 
the subject and the predicate are in fact united, denies where they are 
divided ; the false shares out the propositions in the opposite way’. 

23. τὸ ἅμα... νοεῖν, the thinking together implied in κατάφασις, 
τὸ χωρὶς νοεῖν, the thinking apart implied in ἀπόφασις. This gives 
a better sense than taking τὸ ἅμα, τὸ χωρίς as objects of νοεῖν. 

ἄλλος λόγος does not amount to an explicit reference to another 
book. Ζ. 12, to which Alexander refers, is hardly in point. De An. 
ili. 2, 6, 7 deal with the problem in question. 

24. λέγω δέ κτλ. ‘By thinking things together or apart I mean 
thinking them so that one thought does not succeed the other but they 
form a unity.’ 

25—1028° 3. Jaeger (S/ud. pp. 21-28) argues that 1027) 29—102883 
ἀφείσθω cannot be a resumption of the argument in 1027» 25~29, since 
it overlooks the distinction there drawn between the apprehension of 
ἅπλᾶ and the apprehension of the truth of propositions, and since 
apart from this distinction the one section would be a meaningless 
repetition of the other. He therefore considers that ll, 25-29 are 
a later alternative version, just as Θ, 10, which contains the same 
distinction and is referred to in 1. 29, is a later addition to ® He 
thinks that the recognition of the apprehension of ἁπλᾶ as distinct from 
judgement was due to Aristotle’s coming to see that if all knowledge is 
a matter of judgement, of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, we cannot know the 
pure, simple forms which are the objects of metaphysics. 

If Jaeger’s contention be right (and it is probable enough though by 
no means certain), it enables us to date the older version of E® before 
De An. 430° 26, where the distinction is already drawn. 

27. περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ. For Aristotle’s 
doctrine of the apprehension of τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν cf. Θ, 1051> τὴ --- 
105284nn. τὰ τί ἐστιν is explicative of τὰ ἁπλᾶ, but a difficulty is 
caused by Aristotle’s distinction of αἱ μὴ συνθεταὶ οὐσίαι from τὸ τί 
ἐστιν in 1051 25--27 : ν. ἢ. on 1051 17-1052 4. 

28. οὐδ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ. With regard to τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν there is 
no falsity or truth even in thought. The only alternatives are appre- 
hension of them and non-apprehension, 

29. οὕτως, Sc. ὡς ἀληθές. 

ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον, @, 10. 

31-33. Thought is always assigning or else denying to a given 


366 COMMENTARY 


subject a certain essential nature, a certain quality, quantity, &c., and 
thus presupposes things which have ‘being’ of a more primary kind 
than the being which is truth—viz. the categories. 

102821, τὸ λοιπὸν γένος, i.e. τὰ κυρίως (102731), τὸ ἔξω ὃν καὶ 
χωριστόν (Κ. 1065% 24), the categories, which are the various senses of 
being καθ᾽ αὑτό. 

2. Natorp (4. G. 25. i. 192) argues that ἔξω means ‘outside the 
categories’ and that in K. 1065 24 τὸ ἔξω ὃν καὶ χωριστόν, ‘ objective 
being’, is a later misunderstanding of Aristotle’s meaning. This is 
possible, but if ἔξω here were to bear the meaning Natorp assigns to it 
we should expect ἔξω τούτου. For ἔξω = ‘objective’ cf. De An, 
417 20, Pl. Theaet. 198 c 2. 

4-6. φανερὸν... ov. The remark is pointless here, as it has 
already been noted (10268 33) that ‘ being’ has a variety of meanings 
and two of them have been discussed in chs. 2-4. The sentence is 
a free version of the first sentence of Z, and is evidently a later addi- 
tion meant to indicate the connexion of the two books. 


Date Due 


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